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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Nietzsche as Educator

BY

David Livingstone



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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
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
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
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
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Dr. Leon Craig



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August 27, 1993

Abstract

Nietzsche's essay *Schopenhauer as Educator* is ostensibly about the educational impact Arthur Schopenhauer had on Nietzsche. But the essay goes much beyond this to discuss in detail those aspects of modern times which Nietzsche declares stand in the way of the development of true culture. But it is also evident that an understanding of the philosophic life is essential in order to understand what Nietzsche means by culture. Schopenhauer, as he is presented in this essay, is an image of the truly philosophic man. He stands in contrast to modern men who are devoted to the state, to money making or to modern academic science and scholarship, believing as they do that these are important components of culture. Nietzsche argues that it is these very things which modern man holds in such high regard which in fact stand in the way of the production of the true cultural geniuses and most especially of the philosopher. Thus, anyone who is truly interested in assisting in the preservation of culture worthy of the name will have to combat in their own time those forces, such as the ones just named, which stand in the way of the production of genius. But this means that they will first have to understand more clearly what constitutes genius, and why, as Nietzsche argues in this work, the philosopher properly understood is the true goal of culture. Nietzsche's essay, then, is primarily an articulation and defense of the philosophic life.

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Introduction

Nietzsche's third essay in his "Untimely Meditations" series is curiously entitled, *Schopenhauer as Educator*. The title is curious because one soon realizes after reading and reflecting on the essay that it presents neither extensive biographical information about Schopenhauer nor systematic treatment and discussion of his philosophical doctrines, especially with respect to how his writings might be particularly **educative**. What one finds instead is an essay which is principally concerned with defending philosophy as such against the conditions in modern times which are inimical to it.

Nietzsche's essay opens with an anecdote about a traveller who observed in his voyages that almost all men everywhere are lazy. It is this laziness, Nietzsche says, which perhaps explains why it is that most men lead their lives in conformity with the opinions of their time and place. Nietzsche argues that this lazy, unreflective condition is shameful. The reader may, as a result of Nietzsche's assertion, feel this shame in himself because he too is guilty of having been similarly lazy in the past. He may even feel stung to action by Nietzsche's words, and to want to liberate himself from the opinions of his time and place, even before he fully understands the meaning of this liberation about which Nietzsche writes. Nietzsche tacitly invites the reader to use this essay, then, as a means to his own liberation and to learn about true liberation in much the same way that Nietzsche declares he was liberated through reading Schopenhauer's works.

But the Schopenhauer Nietzsche presents in this work is an idealized Schopenhauer, an image which Nietzsche admits he is painting, and painting imperfectly for the reader. Nietzsche says he is only *imagining* what sort of man Schopenhauer must be to have written such works as he did. The reader may well begin to wonder, then, to what extent this painting of Schopenhauer is based in reality, or to what degree it is simply Nietzsche's aesthetic creation. And when Nietzsche suggests later in the essay

that the repeated production of men such as Schopenhauer is necessary to restore culture in modern times, the reader may well question what evidence there is, aside from this painting of Schopenhauer, that such men in fact exist. This eventually leads one to wonder about Nietzsche, to imagine what sort of man he must be to have written this work which he claims is an account of his own education. Is one to assess this work in the manner which Nietzsche says he assessed Schopenhauer's writings -- that is, on how well the essay speaks to one's longings to be liberated? How well it speaks to one's own "needs, distresses, and desires"?

Education, Nietzsche says, is the path to the liberation he first speaks of in Section One. In Section Two, he begins to analyze various educational maxims which are "being hatched in our own time", maxims which seem to conflict with each other. He makes it clear in the discussion of them that a true teacher must and will find the right educational maxim for the pupil he wishes to teach. But because we suspect that this work is itself an education about education, one wonders to what type of student Nietzsche is addressing the essay and which maxim he himself employs. It may even be the case that more than one type of student can learn something from this essay, and perhaps these differing students are meant to bring away different lessons from the work.

On the one hand, the essay seems to be addressed to first rate, talented individuals, those men who display extremely rare talents as in Nietzsche's example of Benvenuto Cellini. These individuals may come away from the essay inspired by Schopenhauer's (and Nietzsche's) struggle against his age, and be willing as a result to take on the unconditional burdens which complete liberation entails. But what about the comparatively larger audience whom Nietzsche describes as "second and third rate talents"? That is, those who are attracted by Nietzsche's call to liberate themselves from parochial opinions, but who nonetheless realize that they are not destined to be geniuses? What does the essay say to them?

Nietzsche says in Section Five of the essay that his task is to discover a new circle of duties for such second and third rate

talents to apply themselves to. It will be a circle of duties which will help them to become more cultivated than they presently are, but which will also reinvigorate culture as such, which Nietzsche argues is in danger in modern times if it has not already disappeared. He must first convince these lesser talents that those he calls cultural geniuses are valuable to them and to their own maturation into human beings in the full sense; and second that the answer to the question explicitly raised in Section Six -- "how can your life, the individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance?" -- is that one should work towards procuring the conditions which will lead to the production of the highest example of man: the philosopher.

But why should these individuals be convinced that their life can receive the highest significance through serving another individual? Why would these young men not do better to become scientists or scholars¹ (since their intellect and talent would certainly be welcome and useful in these fields), and work to discover truths and theories which would be useful to a great number of people and whereby they could achieve individual distinction? Would their lives not be made more meaningful, not by serving the purposes of the single highest exemplar, but quite the contrary, by serving the greatest number of people? And yet, throughout the essay Nietzsche repeatedly criticizes modern science and scholarship, causing his reader to pause and reflect on the nature of these disciplines. He argues that it is possible that what modern man believes to be the very stuff of higher learning, higher education and culture actually impedes *true* culture, culture properly understood. Clearly Nietzsche wants this essay to undermine our thoughtless respect for what we heretofore regarded as valuable and important to modern culture and society.

Thus Schopenhauer, or the image of him presented in this work, is described as, among other things, courageous, cheerful, honest, steadfast, strong and natural -- attributes which would win favor, it seems, with these young and spirited men, and perhaps turn their attention away, at least temporarily, from the

attractiveness of the sciences. Nietzsche tells the reader that Schopenhauer battled heroically against the indifference, and even the hostility, of his contemporaries for the sake of knowing the truth about existence -- but that Schopenhauer became the man he was, not because of modern education, but in spite of it. Surely all of this is meant to start youthful readers thinking about their own education. They may begin to suspect that their own education, and the direction it is taking them, is not everything they presumed it to be. But in order to examine critically one's own education, one would have to see that there are alternative views about what a good education consists of. In addition, one would have to be willing to regard these alternative views as being potentially better views. Whatever else, one would have to liberate oneself from any pre-judgement about the superiority of one's own education or in the modern opinions about education.

Nietzsche apparently hopes to persuade some in his audience to turn their attention to procuring the conditions necessary for the repeated development of the philosophical genius. He says in Section Five that these talented men should form a new institution which will be dedicated to the preservation of the philosopher and his works. And no doubt this institution is also meant to cultivate and refine the men who constitute it. And yet, Nietzsche also claims that it is only "pseudo-philosophies" which believe that political change could really have any positive effect on man's contentment with existence. What, then, is the character of this institution, and what is its role with respect to culture and the production of the philosopher? Does the formation of this new institution constitute the kind of political change that Nietzsche criticized as essentially ineffectual in helping man to be content with his existence?

Nietzsche begins to deal with some of these practical questions concerning the conditions for the development of the cultural genius in Section Seven of the essay. He concludes there that, among those factors which contributed to Schopenhauer's development into a philosopher was the fact that he had the freedom to devote himself entirely to the truth, that he was not

weighed down by the petty necessities of life and forced to spend the majority of his time and energy merely "making ends meet", as it were. It would seem, then, that if anything modern would be conducive to this cultural project, it would be the modern university. In the university, at least, one would find it possible to do nothing else but "philosophize" while being paid to do so by the state. But Nietzsche wonders "Whether truth is served when one is shown a way of making a living off it."² The state, Nietzsche argues, cannot in fact adequately encompass the task which it sets out to do of promoting true philosophy. As a consequence Nietzsche suggests the state should persecute philosophers instead, for then at least it would find out very quickly who really is devoted to living for the sake of philosophy and who is not. But this seems to be a bizarre prescription in an essay which has so far tried to outline the tasks and conditions which must be procured for the sake of reinvigorating philosophy and of preserving the philosopher against the indifference, and sometimes even the hostility, of his contemporaries. In addition, how can Nietzsche condemn university philosophy (which he says makes philosophy appear ludicrous instead of mighty), when it was most likely due to the fact that he was once a scholar himself that he was introduced to the writings of Schopenhauer (not to mention the ancient Greek philosophers), and to philosophy itself? In fact, how could the reader be expected to agree with Nietzsche's criticisms of professorial philosophy and of the teaching of the history of philosophy, considering that the reader's own introduction to philosophy, not to mention Nietzsche's own writings, was probably facilitated by the modern university?

Needless to say, this essay raises many troubling questions and only seems to become more perplexing (and interesting) the more one begins to reflect on its puzzles and paradoxes. In general, however, this is not a critical examination of Nietzsche's essay but is instead a commentary, or an interpretation of his work. That is, I have attempted the first, and essential part of any examination of a philosophic work, which is to try as best as possible to understand the work as the author himself intended it

to be understood. So, although we cannot promise to solve, or probably even to raise, all of the questions which one could raise about the work, we will at least attempt to shed some light on the essay as a whole, and on why the questions it raises are worth the time spent reflecting on them.

¹ The German word "Wissenschaft" is more broadly defined than the English "science" or "scientist" since it means academic pursuit in general. It includes most all of those we would refer to as academics, those who work in the humanities and social sciences, as well as natural scientists. Because Hollingdale in the translation of Nietzsche's text often uses "science" in this broader sense, it should be read with this same broader meaning in the context of this analysis of Nietzsche's work.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Schopenhauer as Educator*, in Untimely Meditations. Trans. R.J.Hollingdale (Cambridge Press, 1989), p.184. All subsequent references to *Schopenhauer as Educator* are to this edition and page numbers for the citations will appear in the text of the essay.

Section One

In the final paragraph of the first section of this essay, Nietzsche states what is superficially the subject of this discourse entitled *Schopenhauer as Educator*. By reflecting back on one's educators, we are told, one can find oneself. One can come to oneself out of the bewilderment in which one usually wanders as in a dark cloud (130). This first section argues that education should serve the purpose of liberating the youthful soul. But what is the youthful soul being liberated from? What is this dark cloud in which one usually wanders?

Every man is unique, Nietzsche states, but he hides this uniqueness behind a cloak of conventionality. He is fearful of his neighbor who demands that he don this cloak. But he is also someone else's neighbor and is feared by them for the same reasons. The fact that we are all each others neighbors suggests that we only have to look at the demands we place on others to understand this impulse to conformity. But there is another reason why men are sometimes like herd animals. "Men are even lazier than they are timid and fear most of all the inconveniences with which unconditional honesty and nakedness would burden them" (127). Thus, even if men were able to master their fear of isolation, the burdensomeness of their task might stand in their way. Political society requires a considerable measure of shared trust in shared beliefs, and those whose actions or words appear to undermine or challenge these shared beliefs are suspected by their neighbors. But Nietzsche points out that there are some, most especially among the youthful souls, who are frustrated by the seemingly arbitrary conventions which bind them. Such youthful readers may not share that quality of laziness which the traveller (in the anecdote which opens this section), discovered in men everywhere he went. At least some of Nietzsche's readers may, on the contrary, display the energy which is characteristic of youth. And among these active, youthful readers an even smaller number may be what Socrates called "lovers of labor", thus having that quality of soul which serves as the most promising indication

that a young person is suited to the philosophic life. A young reader such as this might be very interested, then, in Nietzsche's own criticisms of his merely "conventional" and lazy contemporaries.

The conventions of political society are meant to lend a degree of uniformity and (hence) predictability to the actions of the citizens who make up the polity, regulating their activity in ways that facilitate peaceful association. Living in a way that consistently expresses one's uniqueness requires constant effort in the face of the stifling expectations and routinized actions of one's neighbors; and since man is as lazy as he is fearful, it could only be the exceptional few who commit themselves to living in ways that go against the grain of public opinions. The youthful soul, on the other hand, is enamored of his individuality, which appears to him to stand in distinction to the boring conventions of society which constrain the members to act like "herd animals". The youthful soul soon learns that the conventions are specific to time and place. It seems to be a product of mere chance, then, that the individual should be asked to commit himself to opinions of the day which will not outlive the day. So, Nietzsche begins his essay by pointing to a perennial source of tension between the individual and political society.

This tension is felt most acutely by the youthful souls, those who are more apt to be forward looking, contemptuous of restraints and skeptical of authorities. The youthful soul hears the call to liberation, an inarticulate urge which contradicts the specific circumstances of time and place and indicates a divergence between the path to man's highest potential and the path to congeniality in political life. "Every youthful soul hears this call day and night and trembles when he hears it; for the idea of its liberation gives it a presentiment of the happiness allotted to it from all eternity-- a happiness to which it can by no means attain so long as it lies fettered by the chains of fear and convention" (127). Just as in Plato's Republic, then, where Socrates speaks of political society as analogous to a cave in which individuals are constrained to watch shadows on the wall,

mistaking these merest appearances for the reality they represent, Nietzsche invites the youthful soul to try to liberate himself from the shackles of public opinion by seeking out a true and proper education.

There is, Nietzsche explains, no more desolate sight in the world than the man who pays no heed to these inner admonitions from his conscience. Such a man in the end becomes nothing but the opinions he has dressed himself in. He is wholly exterior, without kernel, a tattered painted bag of clothes and destined to be as time bound as the opinions he clings to. Not only does he not find himself, which is the means to liberation, he actually appears to destroy the self which could have been his to develop. This implies, then, another reason why Nietzsche's most appropriate audience is made up of youthful souls: these are the individuals who still feel within themselves the kernel of their unique individuality -- their unique potential which must be nurtured and cultivated.

Nietzsche states that it is an inexplicable fact that we live "today" , of all times -- given that we had an infinitude of time in which to come into existence. Yet we yearn for just such an explanation. We have only to consult our own experience to confirm that we each "want to be the true helmsman of our own existence and refuse to allow our existence to resemble a mindless act of chance" (128). Those who feel this sentiment reverberate within themselves know that a great deal of reflection is not required in order to realize that the answers to why we exist when and where we do, and to what end, are not immediately evident. Nietzsche contends that since our conscience will not tolerate living in the belief that there is no purpose at all to our existence, we must consciously assume responsibility for our own existence. But this also suggests that we are not responsible to God for our existence, nor is He responsible for our existence. Nietzsche seems to be suggesting that in reality our existence *is* a product of chance but that we should not let it remain at that. If we take on the dominant views of the day without examining them, simply because they are the dominant views, then we in effect succumb

to this act of chance, and remain a plaything of fortune. It is parochial, Nietzsche argues, to bind oneself to views which are themselves subject to generation and decay. The alternative, then, is to disentangle oneself as much as possible from becoming, because "the enigma man is to resolve he can resolve only in being, in being thus and not otherwise, in the imperishable" (155). Examining the question, "To what end do I exist?" begins this task.

To this point it is clear that Nietzsche has been speaking about the individual's liberation. But he suggests that there is another level of liberation: liberation of the age. There is the danger that later generations will look upon our time with disdain, if they look upon it at all. Looking back they will see an era ruled by pseudo-men, not by living men.¹ Without this liberation this era will be forgotten because it was the least human life. Whatever else can be said about this liberation then, it appears that it is essential in order for what is distinctly human about us to come to fruition.

Our pride is aroused at the thought that we may be forgotten by history -- in part because we tend to believe that whatever is truly of any importance will survive the test of time; as we say, "time will tell". Nietzsche admonishes those who are not pseudo-men to "awaken their time to life and so live on themselves in this awakened life" (128). It sounds, then, as if there is a call to arms for the benefit of all mankind, one which runs parallel to the very private call to the individual to liberate himself. Nietzsche warns that distant posterity may look back on our age with disdain. On the one hand, the distant posterity would certainly be disdainful of our age, it seems, if they came to share Nietzsche's belief that our age knows little about what true liberation is. Evidently Nietzsche is not one of the "pseudo-men" who are dominated by public opinion, and if by writing this book he intends (as we suspect) to assist in the liberation of his readers, he is obviously interested in more than simply his own self-liberation. But on the other hand, if future ages ignore our age altogether it could very well be on the basis of the opinions which grew out of our own age, such as historicism. That is, if future ages

look as disdainfully as we presently do on what past ages may have to teach us about ourselves, then it may, ironically, be prejudices against the past very akin to our own which will be cited by posterity for why our age has nothing to say of any enduring relevance.

But if Nietzsche has hopes for some kind of liberation of the entire age, the results will only be seen in the distant future, if at all. Thus, those who do not feel themselves to be citizens of this time will try to awaken and bring into being their own time, which is necessarily some future time. They will also live on in this future time. For having been the touchstones and taskmasters for this future, they will become timeless and immortal and thereby transcend the question altogether as to why they arrived at this particular moment in the stream of becoming, as they will have disentangled themselves from becoming as such, at least so far as it is possible for mortal men to do. Until this liberation of the future age happens, however, such individuals will be the solitary fighters against their time who will have to liberate themselves first; and in this respect, then, Nietzsche is still speaking here about "individual" liberation.

If we accept that liberation is the goal that the youthful soul should strive toward, by what means is this to be accomplished? Nietzsche poses this question in the fourth paragraph of this section. Nietzsche acknowledges that man is a thing that is dark and veiled and difficult to get hold of. He states that it is a difficult and painful undertaking to tunnel into oneself by the nearest path, and that despite this being the most direct means of investigating what one is, it is also the most dangerous. "A man who does it can so easily hurt himself that no physician can cure him" (129). As he does not elaborate, one is left wondering how Nietzsche knows this, and what more precisely is the injury one risks. He does not say that everyone who tries this direct method will be permanently injured, however.² But why, he asks, should we risk this dangerous path when "everything bears witness to who we are"? He proceeds to list eight items, most but not all of

which are external manifestations of our selves, and which we typically use when we try to assess the nature and character of another person. For instance, what is the quality of their handshake? what books do they read, or write for that matter? who are they friends with? who are their enemies? But Nietzsche also dispenses with this second means of assessing oneself, and introduces a third in saying, "This, however, is the means by which an inquiry into the most important aspects can be initiated. Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft...?" (129) Provided that one can identify what one truly loves, this will be a more direct indication of what one is than viewing the eight externalities alluded to previously. For if society effectively demands a significant degree of conformity, then these external indicators may be a spurious representation of oneself, being no more than the dissimulation practiced by individuals for the sake of remaining an accepted and respected member of society. But if one can dissimulate before others, Nietzsche suggests that one could not dissimulate to oneself about what one has truly loved. If something has inspired or moved one deeply, then these inner feelings are undeniable and may be a promising starting point for assessing what one is. Nietzsche asks the reader to begin with his own inner experience of existence as the indisputable facts set before him which need to be explained. But Nietzsche narrows down the investigation of one's loves to that which attaches to those true educators and formative teachers who reveal to each of us what the basic material of our being is. Nietzsche's preferred audience for this work is narrowly defined. It would seem to be made up especially of those youthful souls who have experienced a love of education and who are, moreover, "lovers of labor". In contradistinction to most men who are lazy, these individuals will take on the burdens and toils which liberation and unconditional honesty entails.

By committing oneself to this path of liberation, one is -- whether one realizes it or not -- committing oneself to culture; for as Nietzsche says true culture is liberation.

[It is the] removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of the plant, an outstreaming of light and warmth, the gentle rustling of nocturnal rain, it is imitation and worship of nature where nature is in her motherly and merciful mood, it is the perfecting of nature when it deflects her cruel and merciless assaults and turns them to good, and when it draws a veil over the expressions of nature's stepmotherly mood and sad lack of understanding (130).

Culture is this process rather than, strictly speaking, a state of being. The cultivation metaphor Nietzsche uses to describe this process indicates that it may be one which, although determined by nature, can and must be directed by man in order to bring the process to complete perfection. Still, the guiding criterion throughout the cultivating process is that which is conducive to the health and maturation of the "plant", and more specifically, the most delicate and beautiful part of the plant, the flower.

In sum, then, we are presented at the outset with two reasons why this liberation is an urgent and important matter. We must liberate ourselves as individuals in order to experience our unique selves, and we must also help in whatever capacity we can to liberate this age so that future ages can also be liberated. So far Nietzsche has not firmly established that man's liberation has value in itself which he must do in order for us to believe that the struggle for liberation is worthwhile. The best "argument" Nietzsche may have with respect to the value of this enterprise is the reader's own feelings of longing which Nietzsche evokes in the description of this liberation.

It will have to be realized, however, that (as we alluded to earlier) a distinction must be made between those who are able to achieve this liberated state on their own, and those who require the assistance of the self-liberated. To the extent that this liberation is valuable, those who can liberate themselves and others are necessarily of the highest value. The first section of the essay anticipates what will eventually emerge in later sections as a prominent theme of the essay; for most readers their highest

activity, that which can give their life meaning and significance, is to work towards the repeated production of the genius.

¹ This will have to be kept in mind when in later sections of the essay Nietzsche speaks of Unfruitful (sterile) men, and the effect they have on culture.

² Cf. (154) where Nietzsche states that the man who wishes to be aware of life, and escape being part of the "majority of men" will "descend into the depths of his existence with a string of curious questions on his lips". There is the possibility, then, that there is a criteria of rank among men based on their strength and health with respect to this liberation. Some will be able to immediately perceive themselves while others will only ever have a mediated perception of themselves.

Section Two

Nietzsche concluded part one of his third "Untimely Meditation" by saying that if one wants to liberate oneself one must attend to the educators one has loved in the past. One must examine these educators and perhaps one will learn something about oneself, about what one is. Nietzsche therefore begins the second section by examining the first impressions Schopenhauer's writings made on him. In order to do this adequately, however, he claims that he must first show the state he was in just prior to reading Schopenhauer for the first time.

He begins by stating an idea which used to come to him frequently and pressingly in his youth. He wanted to be educated by a true philosopher. He wanted to be relieved of the terrible effort and duty of educating himself. Nietzsche describes himself as being in a pre-educated state of potential. He knew he wanted to be educated, and moreover, he wanted to be educated by a philosopher, but he needed to find the right teacher for him.

This search for the ideal educator at first blush appears to contradict what he had warned the youthful soul against doing in the fourth paragraph of the essay. There he said that "No one can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely you must cross the stream of life, no one but you yourself alone. There are, to be sure, countless paths and bridges and demi-gods which would bear you through this stream; but only at the cost of yourself: you would put yourself in pawn and lose yourself."¹ How can we reconcile his search for an educator in whom he could have more faith than in himself with the independence and liberation he exhorted the reader to in the first section of the essay?

Nietzsche has said that liberation does not result from education alone. One must be educated first and then, after the fact, look back in order to determine why precisely those educators were chosen and not others and to analyze what in the educators was attractive. Nietzsche suggests that this will teach one about oneself insofar as this relationship between the teacher

and the pupil is not wholly accidental. He said in Section One that the youthful soul should look back on those things it has loved up to now. "Set up these revered objects before you and perhaps their nature and their sequence will give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self"(129). To the extent that one has loved one's educators they can aid in one's liberation. A compatibility exists between the educator and the student; and this compatibility, if its essence can be discovered, will be a clue to the student's nature and what he longs to become. A student does not view all educators as equivalent, but being able to distinguish and rank educators is not necessarily a result of being educated. The student begins his education with a desire to be educated, and Nietzsche will later in the essay articulate this as the desire or longing to be like that individual one recognizes as superior to oneself. ² We must try, ultimately, to understand the implications of this longing.

We should also remind ourselves that in Section One Nietzsche pointed out a more direct method of finding oneself and of achieving liberation. It is likely that Nietzsche believes that those who are destined to be philosophers take the direct and dangerous route of "tunneling into themselves", whatever exactly this might mean. If it is true that liberation requires unfettering ourselves from the chains of conventions and public opinion, it may be the mark of the genius that he does this on his own while others of us attain a degree of liberty only by being helped out of our bonds by these self-liberated ones. One must bear in mind this distinction when analyzing the effect this work is meant to have on the audience, since the audience may have varying measures of the strength required to unchain themselves.

Immediately upon declaring his wish to discover a philosopher-educator in whom he can place his faith, Nietzsche discusses the principles by which the educator would teach. He presents two maxims of education which are "being hatched in our own time". Both of these educational maxims are naturally attractive but they also appear to be incompatible with one another. For the one says that the educator should quickly

recognize the real strength of his pupil and then try to develop that one strength to full maturity. The other principle, on the other hand, suggests that the educator should try and develop all of the inclinations in the student and bring them into harmony. By combining the two educational principles Nietzsche seems to present a third alternative. But by combining these two principles of education he only accommodates what he calls the strong talents, and perfects them by bringing harmony to their natures. His new educational maxim suits men like Benvenuto Cellini, a strong and definite talent, much better than either of the first two educational principles did alone. The more "mediocre natures", however, are not the focus of this innovation in educational principles. For what seemed to be the virtue of the mediocre natures, i.e., harmony, is actually discovered in the properly developed strong natures such as Benvenuto Cellini. "...Where do we discover a harmonious whole at all, a simultaneous sounding of many voices in one nature, if not in men such as Cellini, men in whom everything, knowledge, love, hate, strives toward a central point, a root force, and where a harmonious system is constructed through the compelling domination of this living centre?" (131) While acknowledging that there are mediocre natures, Nietzsche nonetheless tacitly abandons them here. This serves to further refine the audience to whom Nietzsche is directing this essay. He is interested in addressing the youthful, active individuals whose desire to learn has not been cooled by their education thus far, but who also, like Cellini, have this compelling and dominating centre which must be developed in harmony with an assortment of peripheral drives.

Harmony is an essential mark of the educated being and it may be the case that the mediocre natures are not capable of this harmony at all. We see in music, for instance, that a harmonic chord requires a dominant note, the tonic note, which the harmony anchors on and builds around.³ This single dominant note is also the note by which the chord will typically be identified. Lacking an analogous dominant centre, mediocre natures may simply be defined as those without the requisite

basis for harmony. Lacking a dominant centre, they lack the strength necessary to impose an order on their various drives and desires. Attaining this ordered form around a dominant centre of gravity is part of the goal of the education Nietzsche is here talking about. He suggests that the philosopher's "educational task would, it seemed to me, be to mould the whole man into a living solar and planetary system and to understand its higher laws of motion" (131). The first maxim is inadequate for such pupils as Cellini because it develops the one talent to the exclusion of all the other peripheral forces. No harmony, in the true sense, could result from this. The second maxim is also inadequate since it supposes that harmony can be achieved in spite of and even in the absence of a strong central force. Such an educational maxim will not address the necessity of making the central talent of the student the anchor of their harmony.⁴

Harmony is essential to education and the model of this harmony, Nietzsche indicates, is found in nature. Man can pattern himself after the order which he finds naturally occurring in the movement of the planets. That which in man is most able to pattern itself after this eternal order, so it seems, is the soul. The well ordered soul is a condition of good health and is the goal of education. But this then is not a new education maxim being "hatched" in our own time since Socrates articulates this educational maxim in the Republic. If Schopenhauer is the modern model of the educating-philosopher, he may in fact be a representation of a very old educational ideal.

It is interesting to observe that what Nietzsche calls the "natural individual" in this section resembles the product of the refined educational maxim presented above. Such a person is described as a harmony built around a strong centre. Nietzsche claims that it is a joy to discover such a whole complete, self-moving, unconstrained, and unhampered, natural being, in opposition to the unnatural tragelaphine men of today. Schopenhauer, he says, is just such a natural being who has an unaffected naturalness which is possessed by men who are within

themselves masters of their own house, and a very rich house at that. As a result, Nietzsche assures us, we ourselves can feel human and natural for once in the company of such men who do not live the uncanny masquerade which most men are accustomed to live. Nietzsche even states that Section Two has been a description of the *physiological* impressions produced on him by the magical outpouring of the inner strength of one natural creature on to another. But what is natural, then, is not only the harmony of the parts of the soul with respect to one another, but also the feeling of happiness one has in the presence of such individuals, even in the presence of their work.

We have so far argued that Nietzsche sees it as necessary that one should submit themselves to their educator, but that this is only a necessary first step to one's eventual liberation. This faith in one's educator is based on a recognition of the educator's clear superiority over the student. With regard to Schopenhauer, his superiority was evidenced to Nietzsche by the certainty, simplicity, courage, and strength with which Schopenhauer faced real and difficult questions. Nietzsche suggests that we can liken this faith in the philosopher as educator to the trust that a son places in his father. Nietzsche not only invests Schopenhauer with his faith, but in explaining Schopenhauer's honesty and disdain for deception he states that "Schopenhauer... speaks with himself: or, if one feels obliged to imagine an auditor, one should think of a son being instructed by his father. It is an honest, calm, goodnatured discourse before an auditor who listens to it with love" (134). Nietzsche had also earlier stated that he was this intended auditor. "I trusted him at once," Nietzsche writes, "and my trust is the same now as it was nine years ago. Though this is a foolish and immodest way of putting it, I understand him as though it was for me he had written" (133). Nietzsche ends this section with the claim that Schopenhauer "promised to make his heirs only those who would and could be more than merely his readers: namely his sons and pupils" (136). It is clear from Section One of the essay that the philosopher-educator in Nietzsche's mind would in no way resemble the "pseudo-men dominated by public

opinion". He would be distinguished from these others not least by being able to inspire fear. The genius is the very opposite of the "repulsive and desolate creature", the "man ~~who~~ has evaded his genius" because, "In the end such a man [as this] becomes impossible to get hold of, since he is wholly exterior, without kernel, a tattered, painted bag of clothes, a decked-out ghost that cannot inspire even fear and certainly not pity" (128).

In order to understand Nietzsche's point better, we should look further at how this issue of paternal love is played out in the example of Benvenuto Cellini's education. Cellini is offered by Nietzsche as the example of a strong and definitely talented student whose nature inclined him to work as an artist through the medium of gold. Nietzsche criticizes Cellini's father for trying to bend this strong talent away from the direction it was drawn. "Is one to agree," Nietzsche asks rhetorically, "that Benvenuto Cellini's father was right continually to force him to play the 'dear little horn' -- 'that accursed piping', as his son called it? In the case of such strong and definite talents," Nietzsche concludes, "one would not agree" (130-31). Nietzsche here adduces a father son relationship which does not work out to be an ideal educational partnership. Yet the paternal relationship may still be the model educational relationship for at least two reasons. First, as Nietzsche points out, the educator will regard the pupil as another self, or as potentially one, much as a father will identify his own self-interest with his son's, and no loving father would intentionally want to deceive his son about the most important matters of life. Schopenhauer will not deceive his pupils because he speaks with them just as he would if he were speaking to himself. Second, the mixture of fear and love in this relationship would contribute to a more patient and thorough education. As a son, one obeys, sometimes out of fear, what one's father says about the dangers in life, about things to avoid, and what not to do. Fear is necessary in order that the son actually obeys reasonable rules of conduct before he can be expected to see their reasonableness for himself. By contrast, the modern educational approach increasingly seeks, first and foremost, to develop a

critical attitude in the student and then encourages the student to direct this hypercritical skepticism at everything that should happen to fall across his path. Small wonder that the teachers themselves, and even one's parents, soon become the testing ground for this power. A young person whose notion of education is founded on this modern model would likely regard Nietzsche's claims about the teacher-student relationship as very strange, at least at first. But if his soul still yearns for something more substantial than his own education thus far has provided, his interest may be stirred by Nietzsche's own search for something higher.

Nietzsche clearly associates himself with Cellini as being a strong and definite talent. Such pupils should and will search for that educator in whom they can have, for a while at least, more faith than they have in themselves. As in the case of Nietzsche, such pupils will make themselves the sons and heirs of the philosopher-educator. Here we have an example of the "perfecting of nature" which Nietzsche spoke of in the fourth paragraph of Section One. For such pupils, their biological father may be, in terms of education at least, their stepfather, and their true kin may be defined more on the basis of similarities of souls than on bloodlines of bodies. Those with strong and definite talents may have to leave their biological parents in order that they can be truly educated by ones who are more suited to do so. In suggesting this, Nietzsche may incidentally be pointing out the perennial difficulty faced by the philosopher in the political community, and a problem which brought Socrates before the Athenian court on charges of corrupting the youth. The "substitution" of the biological father for the educational father is not one which will likely be tolerated very well, especially when it is for the sake of making the son a philosopher, which may be regarded as something useless if not downright perverse. Nietzsche, however, reserves his more explicit discussion of this problem for Section Eight.

We should note that Nietzsche's discussion of the educational maxims leads directly into the discussion of the natures of the

students, of which Nietzsche clearly identifies with the strong-natured type. As a physician can only tailor his practice to his patient's requirements, so the educator must tailor his teaching to the type of student he is to educate. In the eighth paragraph Nietzsche himself tacitly likens the moral educator to the physician:

Never have moral educators been more needed, and never has it seemed less likely they would be found; in times when physicians are required the most, in times of great plagues, they are also most in peril. For where are the physicians for modern mankind who themselves stand so firmly and soundly on their feet that they are able to support others and lead them by the hand?⁵

As should well be clear by now, Nietzsche is not advocating a universal approach to education, and is certainly not suggesting that everyone could or should be educated by Schopenhauer. Nietzsche argues that the search for the appropriate educator can and will be done by the student himself. The student must first see his deficiency in order to know that he is in need of education. This is not as easy as knowing that one needs the services of a doctor, and it is made more difficult if one has already been "educated" by contemporary institutions and public opinion. This is precisely the problem that most men face today with regard to their education. Presently men are suffering from a restless disorder which condemns the modern soul to joyless unfruitfulness. Nietzsche says in this section that "Nothing, however, displays the arrogant self-satisfaction of our contemporaries more clearly or shamefully than their half niggardly, half thoughtless undemandingness in regard to teachers and educators" (131). He will later reiterate this sentiment when in Section Four he writes:

Everything, contemporary art and science included, serves the coming barbarism. The cultured man has degenerated to the greatest enemy of culture, for he wants lyingly to deny the existence of the universal sickness and thus obstruct the physicians. They become incensed, these poor

wretches, whenever one speaks of their weaknesses and resists their pernicious lying spirit. They would dearly like to make us believe that of all the centuries theirs has borne the prize away, and they shake with artificial merriment (148-49).

The physician should not have to beg to practice on those who are in need of healing.⁶ Instead, those who require a doctor must have a sufficient grasp of their own ill health in order to understand their need.

Nietzsche must have been dissatisfied with his education prior to reading Schopenhauer since the "pre-condition" he is outlining here says as much. He judged the present educational system to be wanting, and he makes this judgement (at least at the time he writes) in light of the standard of the Greeks and the Romans who he claims had a better grasp of what it means to educate a human to be a human.⁷ He thereby indicates to the reader that a perspective on education which is worth considering as superior to our own can be found in the ancients' view of education. The best place one might begin such an examination would be with the Republic, since this is where the educational maxims Nietzsche approves of seem to be first examined.

If to know what education is requires that one know how to make a human a human, this in turn requires that one know what a human being is, and the heights to which he can ascend. That modern man does not understand the tasks of educating a human to be a human is evidenced by the typical young scholar's unthinking and premature devotion to science today. Such men become "crookbacked", "unnatural" and "monstrous" as a result of being educated by science, "that is to say by an inhuman abstraction" (132). Nietzsche goes on to say that

Even the much admired way in which our German men of learning set about their scientific pursuits reveals above all that they are thinking more of science than they are of mankind, that they have been trained to sacrifice themselves to it like a legion of the lost, so as in turn to draw new generations on to the same sacrifice (131-32).

Science, Nietzsche claims, is pursued in the spirit of *laissez faire*. This approach is dangerous since it assumes that a "silent hand" operates behind the individual actions of the various scientist to bring about the common good, without anyone actually having to concern themselves with the question, "what *is* the good for man?"

Given that the education that Nietzsche endorses in this essay is directed towards what makes a human a human, then he must show how or why the premature devotion to science (including all modern scholarship) stands in the way of this goal. That science is part of the problem, if not the problem, blocking the road to man's moral education is emphasized by Nietzsche when he says that the men of learning become crookbacked through their devotion to science. Nietzsche later says that scholars have limbs which are stiff and awkward. The final paragraph sees Nietzsche calling the men of today the tragelaphine (horned beast) men. Clearly, Nietzsche's point is that the devotion to science has somehow made contemporary men "monstrous" rather than "manly". Thus when Nietzsche says that men such as David Strauss do not see the monsters they purport to see and combat, and further that such men lyingly deny the universal sickness and obstruct the physician, the monsters they do not see might well be themselves. Nevertheless, Nietzsche must explain how the very stuff of modern higher education, science and scholarship, stand in the way of higher education properly understood. He will deal with this question more explicitly later in the essay, beginning with Section Six.

Related to this issue, Nietzsche says that a weighty and perilous witness to the absence of higher education in modernity is that there are no moral exemplars. Nietzsche claims that the fact that there is no reflection on questions of morality is due in part to the spiritlessness of the modern age. This spiritlessness, in turn, is in part a consequence of declining Christianity in our own time. Triumphant Christianity replaced the ancient moral systems with something higher and more exalted, an ideal that excited apathy and disgust against the naturalism of these early systems, a naturalism which was incompatible with Christianity but

essential to the viability of the ancient systems. The lofty goals of Christianity were too high to achieve, however, with the result that hypocrisy became endemic. Christianity is now declining, Nietzsche tells us, yet there can be no simple return to what was good and high in antique virtue. Presumably a condition of one moral system superseding another is a successful critique of the old morality. The result being that the knowledge of the old morality's inadequacies (as exposed by the ascendant morality) will be impossible conveniently to forget in order that the old morality can be resurrected. Yet a coherent moral system seems to be imperative for a person's being able to act. Modern man's problem is that he is caught in the undertow of the changing tides of moral systems.

It is in this oscillation between Christianity and antiquity, between an imitated or hypocritical Christian morality and an equally despondent and timid revival of antiquity, that modern man lives, and does not live very happily; the fear of what is natural he has inherited and the renewed attraction of this naturalness, the desire for a firm footing somewhere, the impotence of his knowledge that reels back and forth between the good and the better, all this engenders a restlessness, a disorder in the modern soul which condemns it to a joyless unfruitfulness (133).

Nietzsche suggests that this brief history of the succession of moral systems helps clarify the problems man presently faces. But while there is a logic to this succession, Nietzsche's analysis makes dubious any theory which suggests that man necessarily progresses through history. The temporal succession of moral systems does not guarantee progress. This may indicate that a return to ancient moral systems would be beneficial though this return might be difficult, or even impossible. If this return is regarded as "impossible", it may be because people are aware that it is a return to "ancient" morals and thus think of it as "regressive". But if these ancient ideals could be presented in a modern form, then perhaps they would be more acceptable to all those people who adhere to the modern view that man necessarily progresses over time.

If Christianity is declining, as Nietzsche claims that it is, what has brought this about? He has implied already that an awareness that the goals of Christianity are too lofty actually to attain contributes to this.⁸ But where does modern man get this knowledge of Christianity's weaknesses from? If Christianity succeeded antique virtue by replacing its ideals with higher ones, it seems that modern science and scholarship have been undermining the basis of Christianity, or perhaps of faith in general. In Section Four of the essay, Nietzsche, in giving a summary of the "philosopher's" critique of modern culture, more explicitly correlates the ascendance of science with the decline of religious belief. He says, "The waters of religion are ebbing away and leaving behind swamps or stagnant pools; the nations are again drawing away from one another in the most hostile fashion and long to tear one another to pieces. *The sciences, pursued without any restraint and in the spirit of the blindest laissez faire, are shattering and dissolving all firmly held belief.*"⁹ But science, with its critical posture, does not attempt to replace the outgoing moral system with a comparable substitute in the way that Christianity tried to replace the ancient moral systems. Instead there is now no firm footing for men to push off from in order to act. Science itself cannot be the defining principle upon which man rests his foot in order to push off and act. Science itself requires a "higher maxim" in order that it can be directed and kept within bounds. Properly understood, it is not an end in itself but is rather a tool which should be regulated by a true conception of man's ends.

Nietzsche's preliminary observations about the condition he was in just prior to reading Schopenhauer for the first time serve as the initial critique of the modern approach to education, an education which he says in a later section sets out to reproduce the medieval scholar. He hints at the danger of this misdirected education when he points out that modern men have become undemanding with regard to their education when compared to the ancients. But because men today have been educated by the modern view of education it becomes that much more difficult for

them to believe that it is worthwhile considering this ancient alternative. Misconceived education can easily be self-perpetuating. Nietzsche's articulation of his own dissatisfaction is meant to raise suspicions in the reader's mind about his own education to date, and to alert him to the possibility that there is some worth in examining the alternative view of education represented in this work by the achievements of Schopenhauer, ones which ultimately echo the ancient teachings about education.

Nietzsche does not say how he came across Schopenhauer's writings for the first time, even though we have argued that his search must have been motivated by dissatisfaction in his own education to that point (resulting, perhaps, from his extensive acquaintance with Greek and Roman literature). This leaves open the possibility that fortune plays a significant -- perhaps enormous -- role in bringing together students of certain natures with their appropriate educators. On the other hand, Nietzsche spends some time discussing Schopenhauer's writing style. Nietzsche emphasizes that it was only in the form of a book that he discovered Schopenhauer, and that he had to imagine the man who stood behind these words. Nietzsche had earlier stated that one could run through all of Germany and be unable to fulfill a basic desire to learn how to be a good writer or orator. He hints, then, that he came to Schopenhauer, whom he speaks about as a master of style, because of this more basic desire to master the use of language. This suggests that true educators will pay the most careful attention to the presentation of their material, and not neglect matters of style and rhetorical effectiveness if they are at all concerned with drawing the right students up the stepladder¹⁰ of desires and loves that marks out their educational path. Nietzsche is aware, of course, of the reflexive character of his remarks. He is, after all, drawing the reader's attention to the role which style and rhetoric play in works of education, and he does so, moreover, in a book which sets out to educate the reader about nothing less than what true education is. The careful reader will have to reflect everything Nietzsche says about Schopenhauer's style, and its effect on Nietzsche's education, back on Nietzsche's

essay itself. Given that there is very little in this essay about Schopenhauer's actual teachings and their role in Nietzsche's education, one begins to suspect that Nietzsche is largely using Schopenhauer's name to speak about his own views concerning education, and that this essay puts those views into practice with Nietzsche as the teacher and the reader as the potential student.

Nietzsche then distinguishes between writers such as David Strauss and Arthur Schopenhauer -- in part on the basis of their style, but certainly not at the expense of the content of their writings. Schopenhauer's writings impressed Nietzsche by their cheerfulness which results from being a victor: "For at bottom there is cheerfulness only where there is victory" (135). Writers such as David Strauss are vexing to Nietzsche because they want to deceive readers into believing that a victory has been fought and won, when in fact they do not even see the monsters they purport to see and combat. This demands either that Nietzsche is able to see these monsters himself in order to make this evaluation, or that he can see that the monsters David Strauss purports to combat do not, in fact, exist at all. The happiness that Nietzsche experienced upon reading Schopenhauer for the first time convinced him that he should continue to read Schopenhauer; this is not to say that Nietzsche judged Schopenhauer to be correct in everything he wrote. In fact, Nietzsche points out that he discovered in Schopenhauer a little error here and there. The important thing for Nietzsche was that Schopenhauer spoke to Nietzsche's needs, distresses and desires, i.e., those inner feelings which are presupposed in the student and to which education and the educator must address themselves because these are the desires which raise the student's eyes upward to look for something higher than what they presently are. Nietzsche began by looking for a philosopher to be his educator and he was satisfied that Schopenhauer was the man for the task. That Nietzsche made this evaluation when he did suggests that it is possible for at least a certain kind of person to recognize a philosopher without being one himself.¹¹

The question remains for the reader to decide what brought him to *Schopenhauer as Educator* and how the style of Nietzsche's writing somehow suggested to the reader that here he was in the proximity of one of those victors who has conquered the hardest tasks by thinking. That is, the reader is tacitly invited to confirm for himself what Nietzsche claimed to experienced when he read Schopenhauer, and to do so by a similar experience evoked by reading Nietzsche's account. Despite Nietzsche's initial argument in Section One that we are all individuals, each a "strangely variegated assortment" which no imaginable chance will for a second time gather together, we nonetheless have a commonality with Nietzsche in so far as we are able to feel in reading Nietzsche what he claims to have felt when reading Schopenhauer. We certainly want to read on, then, to discover what else Nietzsche might know, since to this point he has demonstrated that he already knows quite a lot about our own needs, distresses and desires.

¹ Apparently such demi-gods as Nietzsche talks about in this quoted passage do exist since Nietzsche says later in the essay that there will always be demi-gods who can endure to live under terrible conditions, "and if you want to hear their lonely song listen to the music of Beethoven" (140).

The image of crossing the stream of life oneself is further complicated when in the 36th paragraph (the fifth section) this image changes significantly. Nietzsche says there that "it is already much that we should raise our head above the water at all, even if only a little, and observe what stream it is in which we are so deeply immersed" (159). It appears by Section Five that we are deeply immersed in the stream of life rather than standing on the banks looking for a bridge to cross it and it is much that we should even be able to lift our heads above the water in order to see what stream we are in (or that we are in a stream at all). In addition, emerging out of the stream is not to be accomplished by our own power. It is the philosophers, artists and saints who lift us out of the stream (159).

² E.g. "This is the root of all true culture: and if I understand by this the longing of man to be *reborn* as saint and genius, I know that one does not have to be a Buddhist to understand this myth" (142) and, "Anyone who believes in culture is thereby saying: 'I see above me something higher and more human than I am; let everyone help me to attain it, as I will help everyone who knows and suffers as I do' " (162).

³ A chord requires at least three pitches whereas musical harmony, strictly speaking, requires only two pitches. Harmonic chords are more analogous to the present discussion, since presumably there are more than two parts being harmonized by this education i.e. not just the body and the soul, but in addition the parts of the soul each with the other.

⁴ Just as in The Republic of Plato where the great souled men are the object of most attention with respect to the problems of education, Nietzsche also aims his work at those who are most likely to be capable of doing the greatest deeds, be they evil, when they are

corrupted, or good when they are well reared. Cf. The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

⁵ *Schopenhauer as Educator*, (133). Whereas in the Platonic dialogue Theages the educator is more aptly likened to a trainer, Nietzsche uses the physician metaphor. Where a trainer may begin with a generally healthy specimen and simply tone those muscle groups required by his athletic specialty, Nietzsche suggests that we first require a physician to nurse our spirit back to a point of health before we can even consider training to compete with the Olympians.

⁶ Cf. book six of the Republic, (489b), where Socrates has been speaking with Adeimantus about the reasons why those who truly practice philosophy are regarded by many to be at best useless, and more likely vicious.

And further, that you are telling the truth in saying that the most decent of those in philosophy are useless to the many. However, bid them blame the uselessness on those who don't use them and not on decent men. For it is not natural that a pilot beg the sailors to be ruled by him nor that the wise go to the doors of the rich. The man who invented that subtlety lied. The truth naturally is that it is necessary for a man who is sick, whether rich or poor, to go to the doors of doctors, and every man who needs to be ruled to the doors of the man who is able to rule, not ~~for~~ the ruler who is truly of any use to beg the ruled to be ruled.

Taken from The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

⁷ The German reads "...einen Menschen zum Menschen..." which Hollingdale translates as "...how to make a man a man...." "Menschen", however, is more accurately translated by the English word "human". It does not carry the ambiguity of the English word "man", which can mean either "manly", or, relating to man as such.

⁸ Alternatively, it may be that science (specifically Darwinism) has lowered man too far below these ideals.

⁹ *Schopenhauer as Educator*, p.148 (Emphasis added).

¹⁰ Cf. Section One where the loves Nietzsche speaks about as indicative of one's nature are analogous to the rungs of a stepladder, the lower desires eventually bringing one to the higher ones. This also brings to mind Plato's Symposium and the ladder of eros.

¹¹ However, it still may mean that one must be a philosopher in order to recognize the potential philosophers in one's audience and speak to them in a way which cultivates and directs their nature.

Section Three

Nietzsche claimed in Section Two that there is no genuine reflection these days on questions of morality whereas it has always been the case that every more highly civilized society has engaged such questions. Two explanations as to why there is no reflection today immediately come to mind. Men may feel they have the answers to the important questions of morality; or, they may believe that their questions are unanswerable. Nietzsche argues that we need a visible, contemporary moral exemplar, but one who is liberated from this age and from the view that, for whatever reason, man no longer needs to reflect on questions of morality. That we need an untimely exemplar may mean simply that we need someone who speaks in the images and language of the day, but who nonetheless points up the contradictions and other inadequacies of the current age.

Nietzsche begins Section Three of the essay with the assertion that the only philosopher from whom he can profit is one who teaches through being an example. This example, he says

must be supplied by his outward life and not merely in his books - in the way, that is, in which the philosophers of Greece taught, through their bearing, what they wore and ate, and their morals, rather than by what they said, let alone by what they wrote (137).

Nietzsche indicates by this that the ancient Greek philosophers are the example par excellence of what a philosophic example can be, and so it would be to them that one might

unconventional tastes and concerns, combined with his evident intelligence, are sufficient to raise the curiosity of spirited and talented young men such as Glaucon and Adeimantus. They are curious enough, at least, to be willing to forego their plans for a night of drinking and feasting in the city in order to stay and hear Socrates' views concerning justice. In doing so, they find out more about the philosophic life, and why it might be an attractive alternative to the political ambitions they harbor.

Schopenhauer's example as Nietzsche depicts it in this essay is also one which may be curious to young men, but ones who would otherwise be destined to "sacrifice themselves like legions of the lost" to scientific scholarship. Nietzsche points out that "Schopenhauer had little patience with the scholarly castes, separated himself from them, strove to be independent of state and society-- this is his example, the model he provides-- to begin with the most superficial things" (137). Schopenhauer's example raises the possibility that the manliness which he represents is not harmonious with, much less derived from, the scholar's life. Whatever it is that the young reader finds attractive in Schopenhauer it cannot be due to the fact that he was a famous scholar, a lionized exemplar of some academic elite. Quite the contrary.

Schopenhauer's example, like that of the early Greek philosophers, also emphasizes that life as it is actually lived and experienced ought to be the starting point for philosophic investigations. Nietzsche apparently endorses a kind of priority of practice over abstract theory, suggesting that philosophy ought to take its lead and standards from our basic experience of living. This perhaps explains why he began the essay in Section One by appealing to the basic experience of the suffering his intended audience feels when they face the questions surrounding the value of their existence. The significance of Socrates' example, among other things, is that he displays a unity of thought and action -- that is, he learns from active engagement with the world which in turn structures and guides active engagement. His learning guides his life; it is not merely an abstract theory about

life, to which the thinker then pays no heed in his "everyday" actions.

Nietzsche points out that in Germany the philosophic life is misunderstood so long as anyone believes that the spirit can be liberated without the body being also liberated.

How completely this visible philosophical life is lacking in Germany! where the body is only just beginning to liberate itself long after the spirit seems to have been liberated; and yet it is only an illusion that a spirit can be free and independent if this achieved sovereignty - which is at bottom creative sovereignty over oneself - is not demonstrated anew from morn till night through every glance and every gesture (137).

Strange as it may seem, this visible philosophic life may be the first indication whether someone truly is or is not dedicated to the philosophic life. It requires moderation and self-discipline with respect to those things which the body desires and which turn the attention away from contemplation of important questions. Both of the educational maxims discussed in Section Two of the essay demand an ordering of one's life, and the primary order that one must achieve is order over oneself. The testing ground of our strength to effect this order is in the division between the soul and the body. The moderation in bodily appetites is one sign of inner strength. By contrast, the shamelessness of the cultural philistines discussed in Section Six indicates their lack of a strong ordering centre; they have a taste for everything, which is to say, they lack even the most basic power of discrimination. "Now they are suitably prepared for satisfying every taste; and everyone shall have something, whether his inclination be for the fresh-smelling or foul-smelling, for the sublimated or for peasant coarseness, for the Greek or the Chinese, for tragedies or for dramatized lewdness " (166).

Nietzsche points to the case of Kant to show the lack of creative sovereignty in Germany. Kant lived a life in conformity with the conventions of his scholarly castes and so his example has produced above all else professorial philosophy. Kant lived the life, Nietzsche tells us, of the academic who devotes himself to the

passionless and objective investigation of nature. Yet Kant's metaphysics undermine that endeavor. The metaphysical assumption that undergirds science is that by using the senses and reason, man can form representations of things which actually correspond in detail to the things themselves as they exist independently of man. The true essence of nature will reveal itself to man through his scientific work. But Kant denies the validity of this correspondence between man's representations and the things they represent. The "thing in itself" can never be known in the way that science demands. What is ludicrous about imitating Kant and becoming professorial academics of this kind is that, if taken seriously, it must eventually lead to skepticism regarding the whole purpose of academia. Perhaps the only thing more ludicrous in Nietzsche's estimation is that armies of scholars are still producing their work as if nothing at all were suspect about their project. Nietzsche writes, "it seems to me, indeed, that Kant has had a living and life-transforming influence on only a very few men". For if he really did have an impact it would show itself in the form of a "gnawing and disintegrating skepticism and relativism" (140). Skepticism and relativism is rampant in modernity, but because those who profess it are shallow and not serious, it does not affect them in any profound way. Philosophy, correctly conceived, is a "life transforming" project, and not simply a dispassionate, scientific examination of the world. Investigators such as Kant (unlike Socrates and Schopenhauer) outline the necessary conditions of active engagement in the world in terms of a system of ethics and aesthetic judgements which are in turn based solely on formal conditions derived from abstract, *a priori* principles of philosophy, rather than from the ongoing experience of life. This is perhaps why Nietzsche's critique of Kant is made in light of the damaging effect of Kant's metaphysics on the drive to truth, which is said to be natural and evident in men such as Kleist who "assess the meaning of philosophy in the most 'sacred part' of their being " (141). Schopenhauer's example, which Nietzsche would have replace Kant's, is in the first instance a negative example. His example will help philosophers in Germany

unlearn how to "be" pure knowledge. Philosophy, if it is not to be regarded simply as the activity of calculating machines, must involve the whole of human existence, which includes an understanding of the full gamut of passions one naturally feels. The scholar, on the other hand, pursues "value free" science yielding the "objective" truth of matters. This pursuit of supposedly pure knowledge persists in the face of Kant's own critique of reason's ability to overcome subjectivity with respect to the independently existing world. So, no one lives the Kantian philosophy or metaphysic, nor (one suspects) do they actually guide their life by the categorical imperative which is derived from the critique of pure reason. Kant wants to begin with a metaphysical system and derive a moral system from it, rather than deriving knowledge of ethics from his experience of living. In doing so, Kant remains a scholar. But a "scholar can never become a philosopher; for even Kant was unable to do so,... He who thinks that in saying this I am doing Kant an injustice does not know what a philosopher is, namely not merely a great thinker but also a real human being; and when did a scholar ever become a real human being?" (181). Kant lets concepts and opinions step between himself and things, and is not an immediately perceived thing even by himself. The philosopher, on the other hand, is motivated by deep feeling and a sense of awe and wonder which is centered around the mysteriousness of his own existence, about which he will always have immediate and undeniable evidence for reflecting upon.

Here we might consider the pedagogic value of Schopenhauer's example, bearing in mind that Nietzsche's intended audience throughout the work seems to be the youthful student. It is with this audience that an example such as Schopenhauer's would have its greatest effect. The youthful soul wishes to find his place in the world, and above all else to live a life which is meaningful. The young man feels within himself potential for which he must find its timely and appropriate expression. He looks to education as a means to discover that avenue by which he can bring his potential into actualization, and

thereby feel that he has matured and been perfected. He desires to become something worthy of his own admiration and the admiration of others. Thus he wants to distinguish himself. This suggests that the more a youth is spirited, and motivated not least by his desire for recognition, the greater will be the attractiveness of Nietzsche's image of Schopenhauer as presented in this essay. Ironically -- given his concern with his own uniqueness -- imitation may be for such a youth the most natural means of beginning one's acquaintance with what one wishes to be. Nietzsche claims that it is natural that the example which Kant set has been imitated to produce professorial philosophy. In contrast to this model, Nietzsche offers the example of Schopenhauer in an attempt to lure away those who would likely be led toward staid, secure, state-supported professorial scholarship. In Nietzsche's essay, Schopenhauer has been variously described as a fighter, as independent, as mostly indifferent to public opinion, as honest, steadfast and cheerful in a hard and profound sense. These qualities set him apart from Kant, but also from almost everyone else. He exists in isolation from his contemporaries, and thereby distinguishes himself. Nietzsche expects this model to lure the discontented young men who have grown up under the present liberal education system, and who, despite this education, feel somehow that they have been short changed.

The men of science who educate these youths carry on the tradition of thinkers like Kant insofar as they try to turn every question into a dialectical game of the head and not at all of the heart.¹ The most astute heads of our age are caught up in the indiscriminate search for anything that is knowable, and so they regard the picture of life as simply a heap of dots which must be understood severally. They have no taste for the philosopher's quest to see the picture of life as a whole. The philosopher, unlike the modern scholar and scientist who is inevitably a specialist, concentrates on the entire form of the picture rather than the assembly of its constituent parts. Without attention to this larger picture, the individual sciences blindly proceed in discovering knowable things, all of which point beyond themselves in

countless threads, and which only render our life more confused and labyrinthine.

After proposing that Schopenhauer should be the example young men model themselves on, Nietzsche discusses those dangers which nearly prevented Schopenhauer from becoming this example at all. These dangers, regarded generally, threatened Schopenhauer's humanity, or that part which is most human. That they threatened to reduce him to "pure knowledge" suggests that, in Nietzsche's estimation, our faculty for knowing is not in itself sufficient for distinguishing someone as fully human if simply "knowing" does not abate the suffering man feels at the valuelessness of his existence.

The first danger Nietzsche speaks of is the danger of solitude. That this danger is included in the list of constitutional dangers means that this conflict of the philosopher and the society is not due to idiosyncrasies of either Schopenhauer or modern society, but will occur wherever philosophy and political life cross paths. The philosopher is said to voluntarily isolate himself. Wherever there have been tyrannies, the philosopher has sought to conceal himself. But Nietzsche suggests that public opinion, powerful societies, governments, and religions are themselves tyrannies. These were also identified in Section One as the obstacles on the path of the youthful soul's liberation. The danger here is that of more or less automatically conforming to the opinions of the place and age one is born into. The political community requires that individuals have a considerable measure of shared beliefs about what is right and what is wrong. The state is organized in order to preserve itself and the individuals who make up the state. The state essentially appeals to the egoistic drives of the individuals who comprise it by promising the means to health and pleasures with a minimum of internal discord, as well as protection from foreign aggressors. Ideally, from the perspective of the state, the citizens should recognize the state as their benefactor and thereby maintain their loyalty to it. Anyone who challenges the stability of the regime by undermining the beliefs which hold it together can easily be taken for one who

wishes to do harm to the state and its citizens. If in addition to this the state is seen, as Hegel would have it, as the culmination of history and its inevitable rational unfolding, the individuals in the state will see themselves as the fortunate members of the age which has come at the end of this rational enterprise, and who can now enjoy the fruits of their ancestor's work. They themselves, however, will have nothing in particular to concern themselves with since, in the first place, history has unfolded itself and has reached its end which is manifested in the freedom enjoyed by the citizens of the state; and secondly, because even if Hegel was mistaken in saying that *this* age was the end of history, no individual actor, according to Hegel, ever fully comprehends his role in bringing about the rational end of history, and yet he successfully plays his role without having to realize it. "Providence", in this manner, subdues the individual's quest for self-knowledge, since this knowledge now seems superfluous.

Against this mass of complacent individuals, Nietzsche juxtaposes the philosopher. The history of the state may well indeed be the history of the masses' blind desire to exist, but this striving is not necessarily the highest striving possible for each and every type of man. The philosopher wishes to oppose himself to the egoism of the masses by becoming aware of himself and the complexities of life and the universe; these metaphysical questions are the very ones which Nietzsche asserted in Section One are naturally so attractive to the youthful soul. Most individuals, on the other hand, are so caught up in their own everyday existence and the practical necessities of providing for their survival that they rarely take any interest in the mysteries of that existence. Public opinion, then, is a distillation of those conceptions which have proven through time to be the most useful to maintain order, comfort, and at least a minimal level of peaceful social interaction in the state. As the condition for the existence of this peaceful life, these shared views take on the air of being undeniable truths.² Thus anyone who does question the truth of these opinions threatens the foundation of the civil society itself. The philosopher's drive to truth, although it may

recognize the utility and necessity of this mutual self-deception, strives to move beyond merely useful opinions in order to arrive at a truly satisfactory conclusion about the whole of existence and its metaphysical foundation. Such radical questioning of the foundations, not only of the state, but of life in general, can lead the philosopher into conflict with the society he finds himself in. Faced with that prospect, he looks inward in order to serve as his own "brief abstract" and first experiment into the complexities and mysteries of the world. He voluntarily turns his back on the deceptions of civil society and the tyranny and conformity of public opinion. In Platonic terms, he escapes from the cave in an effort to understand the nature and source of the shadows which his fellows regard as truth.

We have as yet in this discussion to identify what, more precisely and concretely, is dangerous to the philosopher, what it is that may prevent him from becoming an example at all. Nietzsche states explicitly that the greatest danger facing these men who are uncommon and who do not identify with the common opinions is that, despite having fled inward for their freedom and solitude, they still have to live outwardly. The philosopher is not so self-sufficient that he can live without the civil society he is in. In fact, one may go so far as to argue that in truth what justifies civil society at all is that it can at least provide for the philosopher -- that he alone leads an intrinsically valuable life. Of course, one could hardly expect this to be the view of non-philosophers.³ But what should the opinions of the masses matter to the philosopher? And, in fact, they do not matter much when taken in isolation. Yet Nietzsche told the reader in Section Two that Schopenhauer struggled to be heard, but when he finally was heard his loud triumphing was too loud. Nietzsche attributes this fault to the human side of Schopenhauer, and the side which can bring us closer to him. He was not an icy uncommunicating atom but rather wished to share his insight. He was confident that his plough was digging a deep furrow into the ground of modern mankind, with results which deserved to be seen as a great addition to man's understanding of himself.⁴ He is, to this extent,

aware of the vehicle of culture and its importance for the furtherance of humanity, and he is evidently not only concerned with his own liberation and development, but in addition, with the cultivation of a higher humanity in his fellows. But he is also aware of the impact which the men around him will have on the message he hopes to convey. Though he might like to speak past them completely to the distant posterity who may better appreciate his task, he realizes that this unmediated communication with the receptive individuals of the future will be impossible. For even these individuals, the intended audience of the future, no matter how great their potential for culture, will have a thousand difficulties of their own to overcome simply in order to arrive at the condition of awareness (like Nietzsche's own condition which he sketched in Section Two), such that the appearance of the genius will stimulate them at the appropriate moment. If this event which brings the student who longs for this education together with the philosophic educator is not to be left entirely to fortune, then it must rely on the institutions in place to serve this function, in the hope that at least some people will continue to hold up as great those individuals who truly are great.

The philosopher, disgusted by the hypocrisy of his contemporaries, cannot stand to have posterity view him as simply a man in conformity with his time. For were that the case, then he would hardly be any more worth knowing than his fellows for whom he has no respect, and for whom he wished to intellectually escape. The knowledge the philosopher gains through his quest to replace opinions about what is good for man with knowledge of that good is not dependent on the accolades of his contemporaries, but the transmission of his thinking and the impression of his greatness must be made as an indelible stamp on the minds of these lesser men so its force can be an inspiration to generations millennium hence.⁵ Schopenhauer's philosophy nearly perished, Nietzsche points out, because of the indifference of his contemporaries. Schopenhauer did not enjoy immediate satisfaction of his desire to be read, and this caused him nearly to destroy his work in a show of disgust for his contemporaries.

Nietzsche acknowledges that this was a human fault in Schopenhauer since it shows a crack in the stoic indifference to human concerns. Schopenhauer seems to be infected with the desire for fame, respect, recognition and honor. This same desire was used by Nietzsche in Section One in order to anger the reader at his time, which if nothing changed would be forgotten by history. But there Nietzsche also claimed that this age as it stands does not deserve to be remembered. Here, however, the philosopher's claim is a just one because he does deserve honor, only most men are incapable of recognizing this. The philosopher realizes with dismay that the preservation of his work contends against formidable opponents; fortune, and the inherent limitations of his fellow men.

The second danger Schopenhauer faced, Nietzsche says, affects anyone who starts out from the Kantian philosophy and who assesses it in the "sacred part of their being". They will despair of the truth. Schopenhauer is great because he overcomes this skepticism and gives a picture of the world which is meant to be an interpretation of the whole world. But by Nietzsche using the word "picture", does he mean to indicate that this is more an aesthetic creation than a rational construction? In which case, one would want to know what connection this picture has with reality. And how, then, are we to evaluate philosophers, or even distinguish them from non-philosophers, if we acknowledge at the outset (as we must) that pictures tend to emphasize certain things while leaving others out. By what criteria does the artist make his selection of what is to be included and what is left out from his picture? According to its resulting beauty? We might ask these questions with direct reference to the "image" of Schopenhauer which Nietzsche admits he is painting, and painting imperfectly at that. How do we judge these pictures and the men who make them? Is philosophy meant to be evaluated on aesthetic grounds and not on the basis of truth, or is truth beautiful and thus the necessary ingredient of any beautiful work? ⁶

Whatever else, in Nietzsche's view, the picture Schopenhauer presents -- about which we are told virtually

nothing-- is better than the approach of the scientists because the latter's approach leaves the world divided. The superior perspective sees the world as a unity. Thus the "picture" which the philosopher sets up demands coherence, it would seem, as one criteria by which one could judge it. But it also seems that it must make things clear which were previously obscure to the audience, perhaps most especially the coherence of things. It must have some relationship to that presupposed desire in the audience to see more clearly what they can only partially see. Those pictures, then, which are self-contradictory, or those which do not make sense of our perceptions and feelings of the world and of ourselves, are lost on us. We must reflect on ourselves and our own experiences in order to be able to verify the teachings of any given philosopher. Thus their pictures and philosophical systems are not flights of fancy and free creations, but instead take their guidance from experience and the perceptions of existence. This demands that we trust in the reality of what we experience, that an acceptable account, or "picture", must somehow square with that experience. This presumes that the essential questions which man faces because he is self-conscious persist as long as man persists. Nietzsche invites us to consider what the great men throughout history have said concerning these questions -- beginning, perhaps, (and as we have suggested here), with the early Greeks as the best model of this rational self-consciousness.

The philosopher, through his quest, touches on the essential problems facing mankind in every age. These questions ultimately lead one to metaphysical questions which are by Nietzsche's account destined always to remain to some extent mysteries to human beings limited as we are. Because these questions will always remain questions, men will look for guidance in dealing with them. The philosopher does not, as the scientist is sometimes thought to do, lay these questions to rest once and for all. Instead, philosophy is an awareness of the perennial problems and an inclination toward their few plausible solutions.⁷ Just as musicians never tire of reusing the same themes as the basis of their music, and yet their music is always in some ways different, so the

philosopher brings his perspective to bear on the recurring question of the worth of existence. It is this question, after all, which Nietzsche identifies as the root of the philosopher's drive to truth. The philosopher picks out a theme and renders it in a myriad of tonal colors. Or, as Nietzsche says in Section Seven of the essay, Schopenhauer simply employed what was around him, including the Kantian philosophy, as rhetorical devices through which to communicate his picture of life as a whole. "For him there was only one task and a hundred-thousand means of encompassing it: one meaning and countless hieroglyphics with which to express it" (182).

The third danger Nietzsche talks about is more obscure. He refers to what he calls the "root of all true culture"; man longs to be reborn in the likeness of the saint or the genius, according to which of these he finds most lacking in himself. Where there is talent devoid of this longing, we find people who hinder the development of true culture. Schopenhauer himself longed for sainthood, but Nietzsche does not clarify why this was so or what about sainthood would be dangerous to Schopenhauer. Is it simply that Schopenhauer would not have communicated his vision had he tried to become like a saint? Nietzsche restates the problem in the realm of the talented individuals, not in the realm of genius. Here he does outline that the danger is that such men become culturally sterile. For one risks becoming an icy, uncommunicating atom. Without communication, however, the genius would no longer assist in the liberation of some future age. "In a cultural sense he becomes useless and feeble" (144). The danger appears to be that he dissociates himself so much from the rest of mankind that he ceases to have any impact at all, and is therefore not a cultural force of any kind. He will no longer be a source of inspiration to those who need to surround themselves with pictures of good and brave fighters so as not despair of the solitude their fellow men present to them.

This is perhaps why Nietzsche, after acknowledging that the wearying struggle of genius against their contemporaries often brings about a premature death of the genius, nevertheless

encourages the genius to engage in this battle against his contemporaries. This touches on the fourth danger Nietzsche outlines in this part. A danger which is distinct from the others because it is not a constitutional danger, but, rather, one that arises from the modern age.

According to Nietzsche, it is the philosopher's task to be a lawgiver with respect to the measure, stamp, and weight of things. The Greeks, he says, had exuberant life all around them, and their art and artists still dominate wherever serious people consider these matters. In evaluating existence the philosophers of Greece had worthy companions to look upon in order to make their judgement. The philosopher today, on the other hand, requires history in order to know that the age he lives in is not the best of all possible worlds, and that his contemporaries do not show him the highest examples of human life. Much has to be overcome in the modern age in order that the philosopher can achieve this view and thereby become a just judge of existence. Here Nietzsche seemingly invokes a principle of justice which would fit very well in the realm of science. For it would seem that Nietzsche is suggesting that the philosopher must be an objective and "disinterested" observer of human history. Yet this is not entirely the case. He claims that anyone whose judgement is not distorted by an inflated belief in the greatness of modernity will conclude that the age of the Greeks presented the highest example of humanity. But this is an evaluation made, not on the basis of scientific objectivity, but on aesthetic grounds, because it is a decision based on the beauty and grandeur of the Greek culture which evokes in us an undeniable attraction to them.

The three constitutional dangers Nietzsche has listed are said to affect "us all". It is not clear what he means by this "us all". From the passage we quoted earlier it would seem that Nietzsche is speaking about those individuals who are talented, who long for culture, and yet who will never be geniuses themselves. The truth of the matter may be that these dangers more easily affect these lesser individuals (the true geniuses having sufficient strength and confidence in themselves to

persevere through the dangers on their own). These secondary individuals, while more plentiful than geniuses, are far from being the majority of the population of a given society. But because they are talented and intelligent, and they like to do the "dialectical double step", they are the most likely to be attracted to the sciences. It is crucial, then, that Nietzsche win their hearts to the cause of the struggle for culture with Schopenhauer as their "general".

It seems relatively clear, then, that Nietzsche is pointing towards the necessity of a sympathetic audience for the works of the geniuses handed down to our age. Even if this group is relatively small it will help in preserving these great works and will be the means by which the highest and brightest sparks of humanity are kept visible. In order to arouse them to this challenge, Nietzsche must reawaken their longing for culture. He must cultivate in them the naive outlook natural to youth, which treats every personal event as a metaphysical mystery. He will also have overcome the contemporary prejudices which detract from the investigation of these questions. In addition he will have to pull down the scientific model which holds out promises of "success" to these talented youths provided they learn to see nature in the scientific manner, that is, piece by piece, and with the question of utility always set before them.

¹ They follow in the footsteps of Parmenides who was, Nietzsche writes in an earlier work, the first philosopher to make a mind/body distinction. Parmenides denies the value of the senses in knowing and provides the first critique of man's apparatus of knowledge which, according to Nietzsche, has proven to have disastrous consequences. "By tearing asunder the senses and the ability to think in abstractions, i.e. reason, just as if they were two thoroughly separate capacities, he demolished the intellect itself, and incited people to that wholly erroneous separation of "mind and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies like a curse on philosophy." From Nietzsche, "Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the Greeks", transl. M.A. Mugge, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, V(II), Ed. O. Levy, (Russell & Russell Inc., 1964) p.124.

² F. Nietzsche, *On Truth and Lies In a Nonmoral Sense*, in Philosophy and Truth: selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's, Edited and Translated by D. Breazeale, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979) p.81.

³ One is led to think in this connection of Socrates' proposed punishment in the Apology of Socrates (36b-37a) which Nietzsche alludes to in Section Eight, "I could well envisage a degree of pride and self-esteem which would lead a man to say his fellow-men: look after me, for I have something better to do, namely look after you." (p.184)

⁴ Cf., F. Nietzsche, *On Truth and Lies...* . To the rarest of men there occurs a sudden flash of illumination which, to them, crystallizes their endeavors and their whole nature. They have finally, so they believe, understood in its completeness what it is that they were looking for for so long. Although Nietzsche speaks in the language of these philosophers and says they have found the truth, he does not really abandon his epistemological views. For he says that they draw up the light from within themselves as though to "create" a universe. The philosopher's "pathos of truth" drives him to wake himself up, not to continue in the slumber in which most people spend their time in existence. "Oh the fatal curiosity of the philosopher, who longs, just once, to peer out and down through a crack into the chamber of consciousness." "Yet even while he believes himself to be shaking the sleeper, the philosopher is himself sinking into a still deeper magical slumber. Perhaps he then dreams of the 'ideas' or of immortality. Art is more powerful than knowledge, because it desires life, whereas knowledge attains as its final goal only-annihilation". Still, at these moments when the philosopher feels that he has penetrated the veils of illusion, he is pierced by a certainty which fills him with happiness, the certainty that that which exalted him and carried him into the furthest regions-and thus the height of this unique feeling-should not be allowed to remain withheld from all posterity. He despises the thought that this instant of supreme universal perfection should vanish without posterity and heirs.

⁵ "The fundamental idea of culture is that the great moments form a chain of mountains which unites mankind across the centuries". Nevertheless the message of these individuals, the "boldest knights among these addicts of fame", must travel through the medium of their contemporaries first, and it is carried down through the valleys. "This road leads through human brains- through the brains of miserable, short lived creatures who, ever at the mercy of their restricted needs, emerge again and again to the same trials and with difficulty avert their own destruction for a little time" Nietzsche, *On the Pathos of Truth, in Philosophy and Truth: selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's*, Edited and Translated by D.Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press,1979) p.62.

⁶ Nietzsche wrote in his notebooks at this time that "The beauty and grandeur of an interpretation of the world (alias philosophy) is what is now decisive for its value, i.e., it is judged as art." He says further, "considered scientifically, a philosophical system is an illusion, an untruth which deceives the drive to knowledge and satisfies it only temporarily. In such satisfaction, the value of philosophy does not lie in the sphere of knowledge, but in that of *life*. The *will to existence employs philosophy* for the purposes of a higher form of existence". "Higher life" is then the criterion by which to judge philosophical systems as well as their authors, and we have already shown how Nietzsche judged Kant's philosophical doctrines on the type of life it generated in its wake. The dangerous thing about Kant's philosophy is that it foreclosed the pursuit of truth by concluding that it is impossible to have. Thus relativism is always a danger to the philosopher, as great a danger as is dogmatism. We must then ask, how does one judge types of life? One almost wants to say that Nietzsche is looking for a natural standard in his appeal to life, yet he has said numerous times in the essay on Schopenhauer that the goal of culture is to transfigure, and improve nature. *The Philosopher: Reflection On the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge, in Philosophy and Truth: selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's*, Edited and Translated by D.Breazeale, (New Jersey: Humanities Press,1979) p.19, (48), and (49).

⁷ Cf. Leo Strauss, " Philosophy as such is nothing but genuine awareness of the problems, i.e., of the fundamental and comprehensive problems. It is impossible to think about these problems without becoming inclined toward a solution, toward one or the other of the very few typical solutions. Yet as long as there is no wisdom but only the quest for wisdom, the evidence of their solutions is necessarily smaller than the evidence of the problems. Therefore the philosopher ceases to be a philosopher at the moment at which the 'subjective

certainty' of a solution becomes stronger than his awareness of the problematic character of that solution. At that moment the sectarian is born." On Tyranny. Including the Strauss-Kojeve Correspondence, Gourevitch, Roth ed. (Toronto: Free Press 1991) p.196.

Section Four

Of the dangers analyzed in Section Three the fourth -- the importunity of the age -- was said to be the one danger which Schopenhauer was most exemplary in overcoming. Whereas the other dangers were said to be "constitutional" dangers (i.e., inherent in the philosophical life, as such), this fourth danger is one which, in its severity at least, is peculiar to these times. It is the danger that this age considers itself to be the height of civilization so far. Nietzsche had earlier said that it is the philosopher's task to arrive at a just verdict on the highest fate that can befall individual men or entire nations. So there is the danger, even for the philosopher, that the age one lives in will involuntarily be appraised too high. This danger entails more than the perennial problem of the philosopher's solitary existence in the face of tyrannizing public opinion.¹ It is necessary, then, for modern men to be acquainted with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche explains, because he overcame this fourth danger in himself and as a result he can serve as a mirror for modern times in which one can see more clearly the problems and limitations of this age. Schopenhauer is exemplary because he liberated himself from these times, and he is educative because through him we can liberate ourselves from the idolatry of our time. Of course, we do have to remember we are reading Nietzsche and not Schopenhauer. The credit for any liberation we experience must, in fact, redound to Nietzsche.²

There is a sense of urgency to Nietzsche's task of liberating his readers from these times since he claims that it may not always be possible really to know this age in the way that Schopenhauer can teach us to know it. There is the risk that this age may become another dark age. It is not so much that there will be no writing about our time, but rather, it will be writing which is born of smoke and vapors, either having no content worth reading, or having as its purpose a screening effect, obscuring the dangers that threaten true culture. Nietzsche

evidently fears that the literature produced now is either of such poor quality that it will turn people away from books altogether, or that the doctrines presented in modern literature are self-defeating. Nietzsche is hesitant, however, to say that knowing this age is without qualification an advantage. He says that *if* it is an advantage to know this age, one should know it thoroughly and not superficially. Thus the books born out of smoke and vapor which veil the troubles of this time behind a cloud of optimism are of little assistance in this task.

At the end of the third section, Nietzsche said Schopenhauer defeated in himself the age he lived in and its attempt to frustrate his potential to be a genius. He could overcome the modern age in himself only by reflecting on it with all seriousness, and by not allowing the age to lure him into the mundane existence characterized by his contemporaries. Recall in Section One of the essay, Nietzsche stressed the importance of liberating the youthful soul from the chains of public opinion. But in order for this to be accomplished, it would seem necessary for this age to be known. Given these reasons for wanting to know this age, why was Nietzsche somewhat cautious at the beginning of this section in stating that knowing this age is an advantage?

To liberate oneself from one's age is, even for the philosopher, "a difficult and hardly achievable task" (145). At the end of Section Three Schopenhauer was said to have struggled to expel from him everything that was time bound and which this age had soldered on to his own untimeliness. Nietzsche contends that this struggle was not a mechanical operation, or a result of blind obedience to an inner compulsion. The genius, Nietzsche says, "knows just as well as any little man how to take life easily and how soft the bed is on which he could lie down if his attitude towards himself and his fellow men were that of the majority " (154). There is nothing predestined about the success of this struggle, or that those with a philosophic nature will take up this pursuit. Denying that the great man is compelled to liberate himself from this age means that this liberation is a voluntary task, it does not mean, however, that everyone is capable of this

liberation. Clearly some men are capable of ignoring altogether the "inner admonition" to search for this liberation. What is important to Nietzsche's essay is that the young men who make up his preferred audience will have at some point in their lives wondered about the meaning of their existence, and Nietzsche must capitalize on this longing for an answer to the puzzles of human existence in order to establish in the hearts of these young men the greatness and importance of the genius.

As we discovered in the earlier sections of the essay, not everyone will be capable of the liberation Nietzsche spoke of in Section One, even though "every youthful soul hears this call to liberation". Of course -- only exceptionally few individuals become geniuses: however, nothing short of becoming a genius appears to constitute the complete liberation Nietzsche spoke of in Section One. Coming to this realization may be painful, especially for the ambitious youths Nietzsche is addressing this work to. For if one "begins to examine how closely they are entwined with becoming, and how closely they are entwined with being" and they know furthermore that everything that does not participate in being "deserves to be destroyed", and lastly, that only the genius escapes the eternal puppet play of becoming, then this knowledge may not be palatable. It is possible that the youth who are affected by this will become malicious and envious "if they are capable of malice and envy at all". Such individuals, if they are not directed towards assisting culture, could become the greatest impediment to culture.³ Nietzsche will go on to say explicitly in Section Six that the existence of those who are not geniuses themselves can be made significant and meaningful by serving the genius and his requirements. Nietzsche stops short of stating this fact in this section for he must first clear the ground of the obstacles of seeing this truth. These obstacles include the idolatry of the state and the incomplete images of modern man as conceived by Rousseau and Goethe.

Of those views which are opposed to the resolve to live for the good of the rarest and most valuable exemplars, the first discussed by Nietzsche is the belief that the state is the final goal

of man's activity. He writes "whoever is seeking to answer the question of what the philosopher as educator can mean in our time has to contest this view, which is very widespread and is propagated especially in our universities" (147). Nietzsche initiated the attack against the tyranny of the state in Section One, when he pitted the public opinions demanded by state-life against the individual development of the youthful soul. In this section, Nietzsche denies that the state alone could have any positive impact on man's contentment with existence.

Every philosophy which believes that the problem of existence is touched on, not to say solved, by a political event is a joke-- and pseudo-philosophy. Many states have been founded since the world began; that is an old story. How should a political innovation suffice to turn men once and for all into contented inhabitants of the earth? (147-8)

Nietzsche is not arguing that the state is wholly unimportant to the question of the meaning of man's existence. However, the very fact that there have been many forms of political union throughout history, and yet the problem of the value of man's existence remains, suggests that the solution is not to be found solely in how the state is organized or reformed. But there are other reasons why Nietzsche deprecates the state.

If the question of the value of man's existence is the primary question which Nietzsche says must be addressed by the genius in every age, the state seems to take as given the value of existence of its comprising members since its activity is directed toward their preservation and prosperity. If this state activity is to have value, however, the end towards which it works must also have value.⁴ On this point, however, the state contradicts itself. On the one hand its activity, viewed from the perspective of its constituents, affirms the value of existence, while on the other hand, the state hides its true origin, which often lies in annihilating struggle with other peoples, proclaims that existence as such is worthless.⁵ Existence has, in terms of the state, only conditional value -- the prime condition being that one is born a constituent of the state in question, which is in essence a

fortuitous event. The state regarded as an end in itself gives, in practice, an ambiguous answer to the question of the value of existence as such. This ambiguous answer points out what Nietzsche may be arguing here. Man's existence is based on competitive, annihilating struggle. The possibility of complete contentment is excluded, at least if "contentment with existence" is taken to mean peace and the universal recognition of the equality of all men, as is so often presumed by distinctly modern men.

Nietzsche's pessimistic view of the state has echoes in Schopenhauer's writings. Nietzsche writes in Section Six that Schopenhauer regarded the state's only legitimate function to be to provide protection for its constituents. The reason that the state is a necessity, then, is chiefly due to man's tendency towards injustice and injury of his fellows.⁶ It is due to man's weaknesses that the state exists, and so long as these weaknesses and desires persist there will be need of the state. Honoring the state tacitly honors man's ability to preserve his existence for a short while against his own selfishness and brutishness. "From this point of view", Schopenhauer writes, "it is easy to see the ignorance and triviality of those philoposters who, in pompous phrases, represent the state as the supreme goal and greatest achievement of mankind and thereby achieve an apotheosis of philistinism."⁷ Those men who do believe that their highest duty is to the state find meaning for their existence, then, only by serving an institution which exists for the sake of preserving their existence. But this existence has not, as a result, been determined to have any intrinsic value or meaning. It is not until one begins to inquire into the nature of existence that the question of this value is truly approached. But then, this is the philosophic quest, and not a political "event". If the modern state is nonetheless viewed as important to serve, this is because it has degenerated into a vehicle of modern hedonism.⁸ Nietzsche acknowledges this when he notes that men are preoccupied with themselves, that they arrange their lives so that they can be distracted from the question of the meaning of their existence, and that in their desire

to deceive themselves "they feel the need for new tinkling word bells to hang upon life and so bestow upon it an air of noisy festivity" (158).

Despite the fact that throughout this work Nietzsche addresses his admonitions to the individual -- and seemingly therefore, to all individuals -- he does not expect that more than a handful of men will ever truly participate in the kind of culture he has defined. The problem with the modern state, then, is not that men are confined to political organizations and thus cannot find their individuality or freedom. To Nietzsche this is a matter of little consequence. What is dangerous about modern political life is that everyone wants to be recognized as each other's equal, but only for the purpose of pursuing a comfortable existence.⁹ What is not tolerated in this context is precisely what Nietzsche is arguing for here -- that most individuals should serve the purposes of a single higher individual. Nietzsche does not condemn the state because it does not help all, or even most, men realize themselves, but because it blocks the production of the creative genius.¹⁰

The increasing velocity of life, the haste and hurry now universal and the cessation of all contemplativeness and simplicity are, to Nietzsche, the symptoms and weaknesses of the modern state. In part this has come about because of the separation of church and state. Nietzsche blames the reformation for purchasing the existence of Christianity at the expense of its involvement in political affairs. The faults of Christianity notwithstanding, it was able to bind together the mutually hostile forces which comprise the state. It could do this, furthermore, with at least the semblance of serving a higher metaphysical purpose.¹¹ Whereas, now the state is simply the vehicle of secular whim and fancy. It is largely for the sake of wealth creation that the state exists, expands, or defends its interests. It is run by the "crudest and most evil forces", the money makers and military despots who now need not feel constrained even to hide their self-serving activity behind a mask of piety or virtue. A contemptible money economy propels individuals to an exclusive preoccupation with themselves never before encountered in man,

"they build and plant for their own day alone" (149). Men are, more than ever, ruled by the moment and by their changeable wants. The state is held responsible for the welfare of the citizens and it is expected that it should be able to provide for the relief of the citizen's estate. This view of the state is promoted by demagogues who promise that every fancy can be catered to for the sake of maintaining public favor.

This has deleterious consequences for the type of culture which Nietzsche envisages. As mentioned, to the extent that the genius is recognizably superior to his fellows, the modern age works against his possible occurrence because he threatens that equality as much as he threatens the basis of that claim to equality, i.e., that men are all equally driven by the love of wealth. Insofar as the existence of the genius rests on the labors of others, then, his existence is incompatible with the constituents of the modern liberal democratic society. Nietzsche has described the value of most individuals in terms of their being a means to the production of the genius. The purpose of the state, however, in the opinion of the ruling majority, is to provide protection from the strong and the rare so that they can pursue their pleasures without fear of losing their property and gains. In addition, men are encouraged by popular opinion to regard an easy and carefree life as a happy life.

Nietzsche points to the unpalatable end this process is working towards. He writes

For a century we have been preparing for absolutely fundamental convulsions; and if there have recently been attempts to oppose this deepest of modern inclinations, to collapse or to explode, with the constitutive power of the so-called nation state, the latter too will for a long time serve only to augment the universal insecurity and atmosphere of menace (149).

The "deepest of modern inclinations" is a vague and difficult pronouncement to understand, but it is perhaps possible to find evidence of what he means in the present "re-Balkanization" of eastern Europe which is following fast on the heels of the dual thrust of free-enterprise and the right to self-determination. The

revolutions which spread across Eastern Europe in the late 1980's and early 1990's show the effect of the not always happily cojoined forces of capitalism and nationalism. On the heels of a half-century of constraint under the authoritative hand of communist regimes, the peoples of these countries exploded with the demand for market economies which would allow them to pursue their individual lifestyle filled with material comforts. This atomistic revolutionary call did not, however, override a parallel desire to re-establish old national groupings based on ethnic affinities. Nietzsche stated that Christianity had been able to unite the competing forces within the state, and it may have been these forces which he meant. That is, the competing desires of the individual to simultaneously disassociate himself from society (in order to lead an atomistic life), and his desire to remain a part of a larger group bound by stronger ties than their mutually recognized covetousness. The modern state, without a higher purpose, is not capable of satisfying both of these demands because it must either view all the citizens as the separate but equal atoms of society (thereby denying them the significance of belonging to a group which has a history and will exist beyond the time of their own life) or it must treat them as a racial, religious, or ideological unit and exclude individual freedoms which interfere or threaten this.

So, Nietzsche prophesies an inevitable, atomistic revolution. but he also contends that great universal emergencies usually have the effect of improving men and making their hearts warmer. It may be the case, then, that Nietzsche is himself pushing for a kind of "revolution", a breakdown of the distinctly modern state and society. Nietzsche has certainly been waging a battle against everything modern which stands in the way of the production of the cultural genius. This fourth section, as we noted earlier, begins from the point of discovering the form of the cultural genius in Schopenhauer, revealed at the end of Section Three. Now Nietzsche hopes to show how the Schopenhauerean image can educate the reader against his own age. In fact, according to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer's task is to teach us

to distinguish between those things that really promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so: how neither riches nor honors nor erudition can lift the individual out of the profound depression he feels at the valuelessness of his existence, and how the striving after these valued things acquires meaning only through an exalted and transfiguring overall goal(142)

Through reading Schopenhauer (or is it Nietzsche?), the reader is being taught what should be considered as valuable, and that all that presently is so highly valued should be regarded as actually having very little worth. Nietzsche is, then, engaged in the revolutionary process of undermining the conventions which bind together modern society in the hopes that a few individuals will disown these opinions and support the development of the cultural genius. In a sense, then, he is founding a new political order within the already established order, insofar as a political order rests on shared beliefs in shared values. And he hopes to effect this by educating young, talented individuals to support and defend the philosophical genius.

When in Section Five of the essay Nietzsche asks if it is possible to pursue the ideal of the Schopenhauerean man by means of a practical activity, he answers "yes". He continues, "one thing is above all certain: these new duties are not the duties of a solitary; on the contrary, they set one in the midst of a mighty community held together not by external forms and regulations, but by a fundamental idea" (160) -- the idea of culture. But this new community must somehow be immune to the criticisms of the "pseudo-philosophies" which believe that the problem of existence can be solved by a political event. Three observations may suffice here to deflect this criticism. First, this new political order is organized around the genius, but more specifically, around a conception of the philosophic life. It will be comprised of those individuals who can understand and appreciate the philosophic life. This community shares the degree of self-knowledge which the philosophers attain and communicate, and has the advantage, then, of sharing something which, (unlike material goods), can be fully shared without loss to any member. The "distribution" of this

good, insofar as it depends on the nature of each individual, his suitability for the philosophic life and his love of labor, is distributed justly -- that is, proportional to his ability and effort. Second, the community is one which is comprised of members who freely choose to associate. They have not been compelled to join, and thus there is no necessity of the coercive power of the state. Third, the *raison d'être* of this community is to preserve the "image of humanity", and to address the permanent questions which are a condition of human existence. Its purpose not being a transitory thing, it is not subject to generation and decay as are corporeal states and institutions. Instead, it is an institution which can exist in "logos" so long as there are men who are willing to take seriously the questions which arise as a condition of their existence. But this community is not self-sufficient and will therefore always exist within some more conventional polity. But what are, then, the potential images which will bind this community together?

The three images that are relevant are those of Rousseau, Goethe and Schopenhauer. All three of these thinkers, (unlike, for instance, Kant and Hegel), begin their investigation of man by thinking about suffering rather than by thinking about thinking.¹² Rousseau, Nietzsche claims, is capable of producing the greatest popular effect. Rousseau is attractive to most dissatisfied men because he offers for their discontent and anger an easily identifiable target. These inflaming passions arise when the crowd glimpses their lowly position and resent it, when they feel that they are oppressed and half-crushed by arrogant upper classes and merciless wealth, ruined by priests and bad education and rendered contemptible to themselves by ludicrous customs (151).

The Rousseauian man turns to nature to find what appears to be simple, unadulterated, pure and therefore worthy of emulation. But looking back on nature with an indiscriminating eye is a mistake, if not an impossibility, in Nietzsche's view. True culture is the "transfiguration of nature" and not simply the imitation of it. In Section One Nietzsche stated that nature *per se* must be overcome; it is to be imitated when it is in its motherly

mood, but it must be resisted and shaped when it is in its stepmotherly mood. This demands that man have a criterion by which to evaluate nature, and this criterion is provided by the exemplary existence of the genius, both by the illumination he gives to the permanent questions and by the model of the life he lives. However, although men should not be content with their present existence, since it falls short of this measure, they cannot forget themselves as they presently are either. The Rousseauian man demands that man give up ludicrous conventions in order to find his original self. But man cannot simply forget what he has learned so far. In fact man requires the past, as Nietzsche states in Section Three, in order to see what in man needs to be overcome but also to see (as manifested in history), "the highest fate that can befall individual men or entire nations" (144). The Rousseauian man, although attempting to find himself, in fact loses himself by looking to the distant past rather than to what it is possible for man to be, given his present condition.

The Rousseauian man, Nietzsche says, does have an important virtue despite his faults, however. When he cries "Only nature is good, only the natural is human", he signifies both that he despises himself and that he longs to go beyond himself. This despising is the crucial first step towards cultivating the longing for true culture. The misfortune of the Rousseauian man is that, despite this dissatisfaction with himself, his focus remains too much on external causes of his dissatisfaction rather than facing the truth Schopenhauer offers -- that man's discontent is a permanent condition of his existence.

Goethe's image is the antithesis of the Rousseauian man. The Goethean man turns away from the Rousseauian man because the former loves contemplation and despises all violence and sudden transition-- but according to Nietzsche, that means all action. His insatiable appetite for knowledge means both that he excludes the crowd (who will never understand such a lust for knowledge) and that his continual quest for knowledge will prevent him from acting with conviction. His curiosity and gnawing skepticism will ensure that he does not step up to lead the crowd with slogans

and revolutionary rhetoric. Nietzsche says that the Goethean man is

the contemplative man in the grand style, who can avoid languishing away on earth only by bringing together for his nourishment everything great and memorable that has ever existed or still exists and thus lives, even though his life may be a living from one desire to the next; he is not the man of action: on the contrary, if he does ever become a member of any part of the existing order established by the men of action one can be sure no good will come of it,...and, above all, that no order will be overthrown.¹³

The Rousseauian man is too apt and able to overthrow order where Goethe, the conciliatory power, cannot bring himself to destroy those forms of order which perhaps deserve to be ruined. It would seem, then, that Nietzsche must be looking for a blend of these two images, and the fact that he rejects Goethe because he is not destructive enough of the established order enforces our argument that Nietzsche is looking for a special kind of "revolutionary" leader-- an active Goethe who has "a little more muscle power and natural wildness".

How does Nietzsche's Schopenhauerean man measure up to this tall order? First, his image is meant to give to the Goethean man the muscle power he lacks. Nietzsche would prefer to err on the side of Goethe in this "Frankensteinian" project. He would rather start out with already rarified genius and lend it strength and active motivation, than attempt to refine and educate the Rousseauian man.¹⁴ We can see the practicality of this if only because the Rousseauian man is said to have rejected education along with the other "ludicrous customs" of society, and thereby prejudices himself against the desire to be cultivated, a desire which is crucial to Nietzsche's project. Schopenhauer's image is meant to inspire us to anger, but unlike Rousseau, this destructive anger is not restricted to the external causes of man's distresses. In contrast to the Goethean man, who is a preservative and conciliatory power, the Schopenhauerean man is meant to get us

angry at everything that stands in the way of the development of men such as Schopenhauer.

We were told at the end of Section Three, however, that one such obstacle is the importunity of the age. In effect, this means that *we* stand in the way of the Schopenhauerean man when we remain bound to this age. Our anger must first be directed towards that in ourselves which is time bound. We are encouraged by the heroism of Schopenhauer to search for everything false and to try by this search to purify and make true our existence. Nietzsche assures the reader that this is a much more productive approach to the task than searching for "truth and happiness" as the ancient thinkers did -- for in regard to this search "what has to be sought shall never be found, says nature's evil principle" (155).

This apparent declaration of skepticism by Nietzsche is disturbing if only because we are left wondering what we are meant to learn from the Schopenhauerean image. Is it that the philosophic quest is futile? For if the despair of the truth (the third danger presented in Section Three), is insurmountable, then the philosophic quest becomes little more than playing with the essential questions. And in fact, reflecting back on other things Nietzsche has said in the essay heightens our own "despair of the truth". Despite acknowledging the danger of relativism which might result after studying Kant, Nietzsche does not explicitly state that Kant was wrong (he does say in Section Seven, however, that Kant never became a philosopher). We are told by Nietzsche that Schopenhauer overcame the danger of despairing of the truth by being able to see the picture of the world as a whole. Nietzsche does not explicitly deal with the problems this image of Schopenhauer as a "world painter" may have. How does one evaluate such pictures? Is it unimportant whether Schopenhauer sets up a picture that corresponds with reality? Is just any fantasy of the world acceptable? Surely not, but if this connection with reality is important, does knowledge of that reality not have to be a precondition, and not a result, of evaluating Schopenhauer's picture of the world? Again, as we have noted in

other parts of the essay, Nietzsche claims to be painting his own picture, the picture of Schopenhauer, and so we have to return to the issue of why this picture of Schopenhauer is attractive to some of Nietzsche's readers. It seems that there must be something about this picture which is not divorced from the reader's own experiences and longings in order for it to have the effect it presumably does. Nietzsche seems to have some knowledge, some truth, as a result of his reflection about these problems.

In addition to these questions, Nietzsche leaves the reader with the impression at the end of Section Three that the genius, the "highest fruit of life", can justify life as such. But when he then explicitly asks whether this is so, he says only that Schopenhauer "gives the answer of Empedocles". Earlier in the same section Nietzsche said that Empedocles' verdict on the meaning of existence holds great weight because it is not contradicted by any other great thinker of the same great era. Without a comprehensive analysis of Empedocles, we are left merely hoping that the answer he gives does redeem existence, but we do not know that.

However, this epistemological skepticism and doubt about the genius' verdict on existence is mitigated at least by Nietzsche's proposal that, unlike the ancients, we should seek *untruth* and voluntarily ally ourselves with unhappiness. Nietzsche states that "All that exists that can be denied deserves to be denied; and being truthful means: to believe in an existence that can in no way be denied and which is itself true and without falsehood" (153). Nietzsche indicates by this that we can at least recognize what is false in things, which in itself seems to demand the condition that the world is unified. In fact, this "new" approach may not be that different, after all, from the ancients, at least not that different from Socrates' dialectical method of investigation. With the belief that the law of non-contradiction actually obtains in the world (which if doubted leads one into incoherent absurdities) the search for self-contradictory opinions exhibited in the speech and actions of men may be a method of purging oneself of false opinions and practices. It is interesting to note that in the Apology

of Socrates, Socrates says he began his investigation of the God of Delphi's' pronouncement that he (Socrates) was the wisest man by trying to prove it false, and he accepts it as probable only when he is satisfied that everyone else whom he has interviewed (all those having the reputation of being wise) are actually more unknowingly ignorant than he. In addition, despite his own claim of ignorance, it does seem that Socrates came to know a few things in his life-time.

If this alignment with everything false for the sake of coming to that which cannot be denied (and is imperishable and true?) is similar to the Socratic dialectical method, it is interesting that in the Republic, (as in this essay of Nietzsche's), this way of proceeding toward that which cannot be denied is introduced where the mysterious height to which the philosopher aspires is also tantalizingly hinted at. In the Republic, Socrates advises Glaucon to consider the sun as analogous to the Good, supposedly because it is impossible for Socrates to speak directly about the Good to those who evidently lack the necessary prior experience and education. But Glaucon could come to see the Good himself, he is told, if he abides by the proper education and learns dialectic at the appropriate time. Nietzsche ends this section of the essay with the equally compelling and questionable state which follows from his "dialectical" method, a state which is inexpressible and of which conventional notions of happiness and truth are only idolatrous counterfeits. All the same, Glaucon is convinced that Socrates knows a few things, and that his opinions about the Good are more likely to be worth considering than are other people's opinions. Similarly, Nietzsche speaks knowingly about this "inexpressible experience" (which precludes the possibility that it was merely "expressed" to him by Schopenhauer) and we cannot help but want to know more about this experience. Not only that, but Nietzsche's preceding analysis of the character of modern civil society shows that he has thought about matters more deeply and more clearly than most other people, which indicates that he may have many other "un-popular", but equally interesting opinions worth considering.

Is the philosopher's "inexpressible" experience Nietzsche alludes to the same as what Socrates describes to Glaucon when he speaks about the experience of knowing the Good, or is it different? Does the possibility of having that experience depend on there being eternal truths which correspond with eternal being? It is not necessary that Nietzsche answers all of these questions (if they are completely answerable, in the final analysis), since it is enough at this point for him to get his readers interested in finding out more about this inexpressible experience, which demands that they first examine their opinions to discover what is contradictory and false in them.

¹ In fact this may explain why Nietzsche said in Section Two that despite our inheritance of our forefathers moral capital we need a moral exemplar. Because Schopenhauer is a modern thinker, he cannot be accused, as our forefathers are, of having no knowledge of this age and thereby of having nothing of relevance to say about our times.

² And so would any charges of seducing or corrupting his youthful readers, we might add.

³ It is the strong natured men that Nietzsche seems especially concerned about, as we pointed out in Section Two of the essay, because they can be drawn to philosophy, but also, unfortunately, due to their evident talents, they can more easily be drawn toward either scholarship, or politics where their "talents can gleam by their own lights". Cf. Plato's Republic, 491e where Socrates says " 'Won't we say for souls too, Adeimantus, I said' that, similarly, those with the best natures become exceptionally bad when they get bad instruction? Or do you suppose an ordinary nature is the source of great injustices and unmixed villainy? Don't you suppose, rather, that it is a lusty one corrupted by its rearing, while a weak nature will never be the cause of great things either good or bad?' " Transl. by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

⁴ Or, as Nietzsche writes in an earlier essay, "in order that labour might have a claim on titles of honor, it would be necessary above all, that Existence itself, to which labour after all is only a painful means, should have more dignity and value than it appears to have had, up to the present, to serious philosophies and religions", "Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the Greeks", trnsl. M.A. Mugge, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol(II), O. Levy ed. (Russell & Russell Inc., 1964) p.11.

⁵ Nietzsche writes that "One would indeed feel inclined to think that a man who looks into the origin of the state will henceforth seek his salvation at an awful distance from it; and where can one not see the monuments of its origin - devastated lands, destroyed cities, brutalized men, devouring hatred of nations!", *Ibid.*, p.11.

⁶ Arthur Schopenhauer, "On Laws and Politics", Aphorism #3, p.149, in Essays and Aphorisms. Translated and Edited by R.J. Hollingdale (Markham: Penguin Books, 1970).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.149.

⁸ Schopenhauer, in addition, writes:

People have always been very disconcerted with governments, laws and public institutions; for the most part, however, this has been only because they have been ready to blame them for the wretchedness which pertains to human existence as

such. But this misrepresentation has never been put forward in more deceitful and impudent fashion than it is by the the demagogues of the present day. As enemies of Christianity, they are optimists: and according to them the world is "an end in itself", and thus in its natural constitution an altogether splendid structure, a regular abode of bliss. The colossal evil of the world which cries out against this idea they attribute entirely to governments: if these would only do ~~their duty~~ there would be Heaven on earth, i.e. we could all, without work or effort, ~~cram ourselves~~, swill, propagate and drop dead- for this is a paraphrase of their "end in itself" and the goal of the unending progress of mankind which in pompous phrases they never weary of proclaiming. *Ibid.*, p.154.

⁹ Cf. L.H. Craig, The War Lovers, Chapter Seven, p. 38, note twelve. In referring to Sokrates' taxonomy of actual, "human" regimes (cf. 497c) he writes, " Democracy refuses on principle to rank desires or pleasures in order that freedom, understood as the liberty to do whatever ones desires, might so far as possible be justified; and that everyone, reduced to the common denominator of pleasure seeker, can the more plausibly be regarded as equal."

¹⁰ Or, as Nietzsche states more boldly in the unpublished essay on the Greek state, "every human being, with his total activity, only has dignity insofar as he is a tool of *the* genius, consciously or unconsciously; from this we may immediately deduce the ethical conclusion that "man in himself", the absolute man possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties; " Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the Greeks", trnsl. M.A. Mugge, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol(II), Ed. O. Levy (Russell & Russell Inc., 1964) p.11.

¹¹ Nietzsche wrote in his notebooks at this time that religions are powerful because they establish standards of value and criteria by which man can regulate and guide his behavior. Furthermore, these standards of value are regarded to be fixed forever and are not changeable by men according to their fancy or designs. Nietzsche contends that man must in some way interpret and ~~thereby~~ evaluate what he lives through and experiences. Science cannot do this since it knows nothing of the passions of man. "Science probes the process of nature, but it can never command men". "Religious interpretations", on the other hand, "have this to be said for them; that they measure life according to *human* ideals." Religion established that picture whereby individuals could read value into their own existence as instruments of a higher metaphysical purpose. It served the purpose furthermore of guiding man's thoughts towards a goal higher than his present self. It was for most individuals what "wisdom" is to the genius, i.e., that which helps to limit the insatiable knowledge drive which barbarizes men. The most important feature of this wisdom is that it keeps man from being ruled by the moment. "The aim of wisdom is to enable man to face all the blows of fate with equal firmness, and to arm him for all times." From "The Struggle Between Science and Wisdom", in Philosophy and Truth : selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's, trnsl and ed. by D.Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press 1979) p.140 (#199).

¹² C. Zuckert, Nature, History and the Self, in Nietzsche Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch fur die Nietzsche Forschung, Vol 5, 1976, p71.

None of these images, it should be noted, are in the image of God, thereby enforcing Nietzsche claim that man is responsible for transfiguring and perfecting his own nature. It further underscores the point that Nietzsche is looking for a standard of value which relies less on myth, and which, thereby, is less susceptible to the critique of natural science. The image cannot rely then on supernatural qualities, and it must be a practical and workable example, unlike the Christian virtues which, although noble, were set too high to be achieved.

¹³ Schopenhauer as Educator, p.152. Also cf. The Republic, 519 (b-c).

¹⁴ The "Rousseauian man" Nietzsche criticizes here appears to be the popular conception of Rousseau's doctrine concerning political life, and how it might be changed with a view to making man more content and more natural than he presently finds himself to be. But Rousseau himself preferred to live a solitary life and believed that the contemplative life was irreconcilable with harmonious political life. The popular effect of his teachings, on the other hand, is that men who are not born philosophers are justified in pinning their hopes on revolution and political utopia. They look to external, political causes of their suffering. A revolutionary atmosphere is perhaps the least likely to establish the conditions necessary for the leisure which the philosopher requires to carry out his task, and in addition, it turns the attention away of those men who would otherwise be encouraged to look within themselves for the basis and solution of why they suffer from existence, seek political reform instead.

Goethe, on the other hand, fails to be an example which can be popularly followed since, as a philosophical poet, he has gifts which most of us do not have. It may be that in Nietzsche's mind, Goethe is a higher example per se than Schopenhauer, but he lacks the appeal to the public which is necessary if philosophy is to remain before the youthful reader as a reminder of a higher life than what is presented to him by contemporary standards. Again, however, Nietzsche's criticism of Goethe, as with Rousseau above, conflates the men who wrote these works, with the popular understanding of these works, or, as in Goethe case, with the principal character of the work (i.e., Faust), as if there was no distinction to be made between the two.

Section Five

Nietzsche's essay is divided into eight parts and so the fifth section marks the beginning of the second half of the work. It is perhaps appropriate, then, that Nietzsche announces a new approach to his task, a new beginning. He suggests that the hardest task still remains before him, as if to say that the prior sections were only the preliminary work for what lies ahead. The hardest task is to say how a new circle of practical duties can be derived from the ideal image of the Schopenhauerean man which was presented to the reader in the fourth section. This ideal image, we argued in the analysis of Section Four, is essential to the formation of a community of followers devoted to the idea of culture. In this section Nietzsche takes up this theme again stating that a new circle of duties must be found which will bind men together in a mighty community united by this fundamental idea of culture (160). The hardest task, according to Nietzsche, is to show that this ideal can in fact be related to the activities of men in the modern world. He seems, then, to be anticipating the critique of practically minded men that the Schopenhauerean image could only ever be a beautiful illusion, a castle built on sand, but which could have no real consequences for man's contentment with existence. We might make the point concretely by suggesting that Nietzsche has yet to persuade the Adeimantus's¹ in the audience.

Nietzsche hopes to persuade a small minority of modern men to combat in their time those forces which work against true culture. And so, when Nietzsche gives his formula here in the centre of the work, the formula that will link the ideal Schopenhauerean man with the practical activities of modern men, the formula encourages such men to promote the production of the philosopher, artist and saint both "within us and without us", and thereby work at the perfecting of nature. But one thing above all is certain, he says, these new duties which are derived from the Schopenhauerean ideal are not the duties of a solitary.

Instead, "They set one in the midst of a mighty community held together, not by external forms and regulations, but by a fundamental idea" (160). That idea is, of course, the Schopenhauerean man.

Section Four ended with a glimpse of this heroic Schopenhauerean man searching for a "miracle of disappointment" of which, Nietzsche promises, truth and happiness are only "idolatrous counterfeits". Nietzsche begins Section Five by returning to more practical questions, thereby descending from the lofty heights of this inexpressible vision back to the level of experience from which he left his reader. However, it is not nearly enough, Nietzsche says, for him to paint, and to paint imperfectly, this wonderful "Platonic ideal". (He does not clarify this ambiguity: does he mean what we moderns have come to call a "Platonic Ideal"-- a notion more Kantian than Platonic, or an idea of the philosopher similar to the one provided in the writings of Plato, i.e., the model of the philosophic life exemplified by Socrates?). Nietzsche reminds us that he is painting a picture for the reader, and that, after all, he is only "imagining the living man" whose testament he had to read. In saying this he also reminds us that Schopenhauer also set up a picture, a picture of the world as a whole by which he overcame the dangers of the despair of the truth. Nietzsche's painting of Schopenhauer is, then, a painting of a painter who is, himself, an image of man. Noticing that, we might well wonder about the degree to which the picture Nietzsche is painting of the Schopenhauerean man pertains to "real life". Is it, perhaps, simply "wish driven fancy" and a free creation of Nietzsche's, or does it in fact make a difference whether what Nietzsche paints is a real possibility or not?²

If Nietzsche is questioning the relationship of the picture to reality, this does not mean that he is concerned with how accurately the painting portrays Schopenhauer, the concrete historical figure. Nietzsche is concerned, however, with whether or not this picture squares with the reader's own experience of himself and the world, and more importantly, whether practical duties can be derived from this ideal image. Utility appears to be

the criterion by which Nietzsche hopes to evaluate his painting of Schopenhauer. The adoption of this practical standard accords with a return from the heights of the contemplative man to the lower strata of readers who ultimately may still be concerned with the question of the philosopher's political utility.

Nietzsche expresses concern that practical men will regard the ideal of the Schopenhauerean man as too lofty to attain. The dignity of this ideal may leave them prey to an even deeper dissatisfaction with themselves than they experienced prior to being acquainted with this ideal. Nietzsche outlined a similar experience faced by man when Christianity overcame the moral systems of antiquity. In the absence of a definite and fulfillable moral system (either ancient or Christian), modern man oscillates between these incompatible alternatives, and as a result he remains disordered and unfruitful. Furthermore, the decline of Christianity in our own time was said to have resulted in a spiritless age. Nietzsche does not want a similar reaction to result in his readers as a consequence of glimpsing the Schopenhauerean ideal without understanding how to proceed toward such a seemingly extravagant goal through a practical activity. On the other hand, Nietzsche is not interested in lowering his reader's sights to a less lofty goal merely in order to guarantee fulfillment. However, before Nietzsche can formulate this new circle of duties which are to be derived from this ideal, he says he must offer some preliminary observations.

Nietzsche begins with the observation that more profoundly feeling people have at all times felt sympathy for the animals which appear to suffer senselessly from life.

That is why there has arisen in more than one part of the earth the supposition that the bodies of animals contain the guilt laden souls of men, so that this suffering which at first sight arouses indignation on account of its senselessness acquires meaning and significance as punishment and atonement before the seat of eternal justice. ³

In this passage Nietzsche describes the perception these profoundly feeling people have of the natural world which

surrounds them. They have a reaction to this world which itself appears to be "natural", since profoundly feeling people from various races, regions and epoches have, from the basis of their feeling of indignation, given a similar interpretation to the facts presented before them. For the "profoundly feeling" person (not profoundly "thinking" person, we might note), the feeling of indignation forces, or at least eventuates in, an explanation of the suffering of animals which will give it sense. In so doing nature is anthropomorphized in order that it can be comprehended. This must be the case if one is to say that they have sympathy ("like-feeling") with the animals. It is only from our experience of life that we begin to contemplate the life of the animals. We could only know the quality and character of our own feelings and superimpose these on the animals. (We might note that the same thing must be true when we contemplate the genius; we must have *something* in common with the genius in order to glimpse what Nietzsche means when he speaks about the philosopher's "inexpressible experience"). In Nietzsche's account, the perception that animals suffer from existence is initially made sense of when this suffering is regarded as the punishment for man's guilt.⁴ Moreover, this punishment, it is supposed, is meted out by a higher cosmic order, by a regulatory force in nature. The cosmos in this interpretation is ordered for the sake of, or at least takes into account, what is in man's best interest, in this case, justice. Nietzsche wants, however, to elevate man's importance by placing him even more at the centre of the cosmos than this original interpretation allows. For he continues,

to hang on to life madly and blindly, with no higher aim than to hang on to it; not to know that or why one is being so heavily punished but, with the stupidity of a fearful desire, to thirst after precisely this punishment as though after happiness- that is what it means to be an animal; and *if all nature presses towards man*, it thereby intimates that man is necessary for the redemption of nature from the curse of the life of the animal, and that in him existence at last holds up before itself a mirror in which life

appears no longer senseless but in its metaphysical significance.

(157, emphasis added)

Notice Nietzsche has changed the original meaning and significance of the suffering of the animals in this account. The suffering of the animals is now conceived of as *nature's* sin for which man is the possible redeemer, rather than being the punishment for man's guilt. Through his conscious willing, man can, apparently, redeem nature's senseless cruelty.

Nietzsche asks, however, "where does the animal cease, where does man begin?" He concludes that for the greater part of our lives the vast majority of us fail to emerge out of our animality, and that "As long as anyone desires life as he desires happiness he has not yet raised his eyes above the horizon of the animal, for he only desires more consciously what the animal seeks through blind impulse" (157). Man is both sinner and redeemer. He sins against nature insofar as he fails to emerge out of his animality and achieve an understanding of himself. To the extent that man continually pursues his endless bodily desires, lusting after them as though their fulfillment could produce happiness, he remains like an animal. The greater part of man's political history is reduced by Nietzsche to the product of this unconscious instinct. "The tremendous coming and going of men on the great wilderness of the earth, their founding of cities and states, their wars, their restless assembling and scattering again, their confused mingling, mutual imitation, mutual outwitting and downtreading, their wailing in distress, their howls of joy in victory -- all this is a continuation of animality" (158). If we are correct in our interpretation of Nietzsche's criticisms of the modern liberal state -- that it, along with most things modern, serves to legitimize this easy and thoughtless manner of living -- then it unwittingly denies that it is possible to make sense of our suffering. The pursuit of pleasure and easy living have long been regarded by profoundly feeling people as low aims, but now they are regarded as the *raison d'etre* of the modern liberal state. But the irony of existence is that those who most desire its fleeting pleasures are also most dismayed by the fact of their mortality,

and spend their days trying to hide that fact from themselves. On the other hand, those people who, according to Nietzsche, have a "healthy" disdain for mere life stand a greater chance of being immortalized as the geniuses who contribute to the liberation, not only of themselves, but of the men of future ages as well.⁵

Nietzsche has given us a picture of animal life that is incomprehensible without presupposing man's desire that existence have meaning and significance, for we must remember that man's feeling of indignation at the senselessness of the animal's suffering is at the basis of this interpretation of nature. We might note, then, that this is an interpretation which does not count as "scientific", but one which is nonetheless helpful in disclosing man's feelings of discontent with his present condition. As mentioned, the image relies on an anthropomorphic view of nature, and by this Nietzsche suggests man's inability to be a merely "disinterested" observer of nature as modern science demands he be. Disinterested knowledge, at least concerning the question of the significance of man's existence, is impossible since man's quest for knowledge of this kind is fundamentally driven by his longing for an answer to why he suffers from existence. If the scientific method demands an "objective" view of nature, it will, when applied to the questions of most importance to man, remove man's suffering from the interpretation of nature. Such scientific knowledge might well be "disinterested", but it only succeeds in making life more "confused and labyrinthine" since it no longer recognizes those questions of most importance to man when it no longer recognizes why, or even that, man suffers in the absence of knowledge about these questions.⁶ This is not to say, however, that Nietzsche ignores the distortions which occur when men cloud their pursuit of the truth with erroneous passions and desires. On the contrary, he raises this point most explicitly in Section Six when he more thoroughly analyzes the men of science.

In sum, we are invited at the beginning of this section to view animal life subjectively (and thus unscientifically), as if we were humans experiencing an animal's life. We are expected to see some of the differences between men and animals, to

imaginatively take away what is distinctly human from man and consider for a moment how depraved life would be. The animals we are told are in a position of not knowing that they suffer, much less why. Man on the other hand has this awareness. But if, as Nietzsche says, animals are not even aware that they are suffering, does that not imply that (strictly speaking) they are not fully suffering?⁷ In which case, man is the only one who suffers in this sense, i.e., from the inner demand that such conscious suffering "make sense". The crime man is guilty of, the "sin" against nature, is that he ignores this inner demand. Although he believes that by hiding his ignorance concerning the question, "to what end do I live?", he escapes the pain of longing for its answer, he in fact only slips into a meaningless and endless chase after transitory pleasures; he remains wrapped up in endless becoming and continues to be the plaything of time. In addition, like the animals, he thirsts for this "punishment", deceiving himself into thinking that it is happiness.

This self-deception is inadequate, however, and Nietzsche says the evidence that men are dimly aware of the shameful of their life as they usually live it shows itself in their haste and hurry and in the universal "need for new tinkling word-bells to hang upon life and so bestow upon it an air of noisy festivity" (158). The most elaborate arrangements are made to make ourselves so busy that we do not have the leisure to reflect on what the meaning of our existence is, for if we did stop to reflect on this question we would soon realize that we do not adequately know what this goal should be.

If we do come to realize our animal-like condition, it is due to the strength of the philosophical men who raise themselves up out of this condition. If they have the strength to accomplish this task on their own, most of us, by contrast, feel that we are too weak to endure the contemplation required by the task. It may be that we share too much in that quality which the traveller of the First Section discovered in men everywhere he went -- laziness. The philosophers act as a reminder to us of our self-seeking drives, and that despite our attempt to hide it from ourselves, we

are dimly aware that these are not manifestations of what is highest in us. This reminder may not be pleasant to our ears, and so the philosopher may be regarded, as Socrates says he is regarded by Athens, as a pest, a gnat, or a gadfly which refuses to let us doze our life away thoughtlessly.

Nietzsche tells us that this self-knowledge is what nature is striving to attain. Man's rational powers, which are a product of nature, justify nature's striving to produce man when, through him, nature "may at last behold as a clear and finished picture that which it could see only obscurely in the agitation of its evolution-- for the end, that is to say, of self-knowledge" (160). Given that man's suffering is a result of his lack of knowledge about the meaning and significance of his existence, it is the philosopher, who dedicates his life to knowing the whole and man's place in it, that man and nature must work towards producing. If most individuals oscillate between self-deception and self-awareness, between animal-like life and the life more befitting a fully rational being, the philosophers are among those who are no longer animal. If they shed their appetitive nature, that which they held in common with the animals, then they could well be said to have destroyed their own willfulness and to have completely overturned and converted their being, "which it is the real meaning of life to lead up to" (152). Having said this, however, one must recall that real philosophers (unlike mere paintings of them), have bodies, and so have bodily needs which will require that they live in political society, subject to those demands and dangers of unsympathetic public opinion which Nietzsche has so far outlined. But it would seem to be the height of injustice if the highest individuals should be prevented from completing their task because they were weighed down by the necessary demands of their material existence, or by the misconceptions of citizens who regard them as, at best, useless, or more likely as vicious. What if, then, these philosophical men had friends and allies who were able to persuade others, once they themselves had been convinced of the philosopher's importance, believing that the philosopher is on the right path toward the

knowledge which man as such needs, beginning with the knowledge of what are the important questions? Such a group would consist of individuals who have some appreciation of the superiority of the life of the mind and sympathy with the struggling genius. This would be a group of men who (as Nietzsche says in Section Six), "feel it as their *own* distress when they see the genius involved in toilsome struggle, or in danger of destroying himself, or when the shortsighted greed of the state, the superficiality of the money-makers, the arid self-satisfaction of the scholars treat his work with indifference..." (176).

But having been convinced of the philosopher's task, and his connection with their own guilt and suffering, and having come to the belief that the philosophic life is the highest life, would not most of the individuals of this admittedly small group want to participate in the "great enlightenment as to the character of existence", and be philosophers themselves? Perhaps so, but as we stated in the analysis of Section Four they soon confront their own limitations. "'To see what is above you but not to be able to reach it! To know the way that leads to the immeasurable open prospect of the philosopher, and almost to set foot on it, but after a few steps to stagger back!' " (159) Nietzsche says that there is enough torment here to make a man who is mis-talented in such a way malicious and envious, if he is capable of malice and envy at all. Perhaps such a man is no longer capable of malice or envy if he has already been too corrupted by this spiritless age and is spiritless himself. It would seem that the anger which Schopenhauer is meant to awaken in the reader, the shame he is meant to feel at his animal-like condition, the despising of himself as he normally is (which despising Nietzsche claims is the fundamental, transhistorical basis of all culture) are directed at arousing his spirit to its appropriate task of aiding his reason in its battle against his appetites. The circle of duties which is appropriate for these second and third rate talents who identify with the heroism of the philosophical genius is to combat that which stands in the way of the repeated production of the philosopher both "within us and without us". Whereas most

individuals "hasten to give [their] heart to the state, to money-making, to sociability or science so as no longer to possess it [them]selves" (158). In Section Six Nietzsche outlines the problems with each of these four distractions, as if to leave no doubt for these spirited men where they might begin combating in their time what is inimical to the repeated production of the philosophical genius.

¹ Cf. Allan Bloom's interpretive essay in, The Republic of Plato, Translated by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968) pp397ff. where Bloom speaks of Adeimantus as the representative of an ideal community, a community which is gentle and persuadable, but for whom the utility of the philosopher is a serious question, especially as it pertains to the health of the city.

² It does seem to make some difference to Nietzsche considering his audience here appears to be men who are very much like Adeimantus. Cf. note one above. Also c.f., L.H. Craig, The War Lovers, ch.7, p.9.

³ *Schopenhauer as Educator*, p.157. It is interesting that Empedocles (of all people) is among those who supposed that the bodies of animals contained the guilt laden souls of men. Because of this, he wrote, men were condemned to plunge themselves into guilt through their omnivorous diet and through the blood sacrifices which were meant to appease the gods. "The father lifts up his own dear son in changed form, and with a prayer slays him in great folly." Empedocles in, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, J. Robinson ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968) p.154. The Empedocles apparently looked back to a golden age when Aphrodite, the goddess of love, prevailed and there was no strife between man and man or man and beast. The soul, by purifying itself, could rise by degrees to a higher form of existence which approximated man's existence in this golden age. Given the peculiar references to Empedocles in *Schopenhauer as Educator*, one wonders what this might say about the meaning of existence and the genius' ability to justify such a life steeped in sin.

This may be more interesting in light of Nietzsche's later writings where he speaks about diets, but also in light of his notebooks written at the time he was writing the *Untimely Meditations*. He writes, for example, "I believe that the vegetarians, with their prescription to eat less and more simply, are of more use than all the new moral systems taken together- a little exaggeration here is of no importance. There is no doubt that the future educators of mankind will also prescribe a stricter diet." (44) Also, "In this respect the few philosophical vegetarians have accomplished more for man than all the more recent philosophies. And so long as philosophers fail to muster the courage to seek a totally transformed regimen and exhibit it by their own example, then they are of no consequence." Nietzsche, *Philosophy in Hard Times*, in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's, Edited and Translated by D. Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979) #45. One would might also want to consider in connection with this the first city in speech presented in the Republic- "the city of pigs"- as Glaucon subsequently names it. The subsequent version does contain meateaters.

⁴ That we might not immediately question the supposition of guilt, when it is given no explanation, suggests something about our awareness of our shameful condition as we usually are, which Nietzsche capitalizes on later in this section.

⁵ In the unpublished essay entitled "On the Pathos of Truth" Nietzsche summarizes a distinction between great men and common men: "...again and again a few persons awaken who feel themselves blessed in regard to that which is great, as if human life were a glorious thing and as if the most beautiful fruit of this bitter plant is the knowledge that someone once walked proudly and stoically through this existence while another walked through it in deep thoughtfulness and a third with compassion. But they all bequeathed *one* lesson: that the person who lives life most beautifully is the person who does not esteem it. Whereas the common man takes this span of being with such gloomy seriousness, those on their journey to immortality knew how to treat it with Olympian laughter, or at least with lofty disdain." Friedrich Nietzsche, in, Philosophy and Truth: selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's, Edited and Translated by D.Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press,1979) p.62.

⁶ In connection with this image of the labyrinth, one might recall that the most famous labyrinth was constructed by the "scientist" and technological wizard Daedalus whose moral virtues were, at best, questionable. Some of the best young men of Athens had to be sacrificed periodically to the minotaur lodged in this labyrinth. It is the more interesting, then, that the men of science are "monstrous, horned-beast men"; that talented young men "sacrifice" themselves to science; and that science makes our life "labyrinthine".

⁷ Is that not the appeal for some people when they look upon the care-free life of their cat? Nietzsche's essay on History (the second Untimely Meditation) depended on this thesis - that animals live continuously in the present, they have no historical sense, no horizon and therefore do not live and suffer in the memory of their own deeds, or the deeds of their predecessors.

Section Six

Nietzsche begins Section Six by observing that "Sometimes it is harder to accede to a thing than it is to see its truth" (161). This tension, Nietzsche tells us, is what most people may feel when they reflect on the proposition "Mankind must work continually at the production of individual great men -- that and nothing else is its task" (161) We argued in the analyses of Sections Four and Five that our reluctance to embrace this formula and act on it may derive from our dismay at the realization that we ourselves are not the individuals who can "redeem" existence, and that our own existence, which we heretofore tacitly regarded as valuable in itself, is really only valuable as a means to the production of someone who stands high above us. Nietzsche implies that the proposition presented in Section Five, that we should work for the production of the genius, is true and that it is necessary to overcome our initial reluctance to accede to it.

In order to help us accede to this point, Nietzsche (perhaps ironically), suggests that we should apply to society and its goals something which can be learned from the natural sciences.

...one would like to apply to society and its goals something that can be learned from observation of any species of the animal or plant world: that its only concern is the individual higher exemplar, the more uncommon, more powerful, more complex, more fruitful.... (162)

Nietzsche appears to be asking nothing more than that we be honest. If we believe evolution is true (and its conclusion that we are simply more complex animals), then we should accede to this truth and apply it to ourselves. The salient feature of this application will be our appreciation for the value of the highest exemplar. Man would seem to be in an especially fortunate position to do this since he is not only aware of nature's laws but, Nietzsche says, he is also potentially aware of nature's goal and

ought to create the favorable conditions which will produce the species' highest individual exemplars.

But is the application of the principle of evolution just a rhetorical device? Nietzsche writes in the second "Untimely Meditation"

If... the doctrines of sovereign becoming, of the fluidity of all concepts, types and species, of the lack of any cardinal distinction between man and animal - doctrines which I consider true but deadly- are thrust upon the people for another generation with the rage for instruction which has now become normal, no one should be surprised if the people perishes of petty egoism, ossification and greed, falls apart and ceases to be a people; in its place systems of individualist egoism, brotherhoods for the rapacious exploitation of the non-brothers, and similar creations of utilitarian vulgarity may perhaps appear in the arena of the future.¹

Why, then, in a work which is arguably devoted to moving beyond this Darwinian doctrine, does Nietzsche employ the principle of evolution in order to help his reader accede to this cultural project? Perhaps we should back up and ask, how is Nietzsche in fact applying the "true but deadly" doctrine of evolution, and what light does it shed on the production of the cultural genius?

We should begin by observing inconsistencies between the way Nietzsche has briefly described natural selection and the way it is understood to work in nature by modern scientists. The latter's understanding of evolution differs in the first instance if only because they suggest that looking to lower forms of life is sufficient when we are searching for clues about how our lives can be better understood. But though it may be true that there is a certain biologically based continuity between man and animals, what Nietzsche finds dangerous about this is the belief that we should glean normative principles for man's conduct from the observation of lower animals. But to try and explain what is higher in terms of what is lower could only result in an inadequate account of the higher. An acorn studied in isolation, for instance, would bear little evidence about the nature of a mature

oak. Despite the fact that "usually we fail to emerge out of our animality," and that "we ourselves are the animals whose suffering seems to be senseless", Nietzsche is trying in this essay to turn our attention and efforts toward producing the genius, "those who are no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints" (159). It is significant, then, that when he introduces evolution and discusses its applicability to man, it is at that point when a species is "about to go over into a higher species". If in some way the genius is to be regarded as different from the rest of us, so different in fact as to warrant being regarded as a different species, then it is impossible to think that such an individual could be explained or fully understood with regard to the motivations of average people, let alone understood in terms of the motivations and drives of a lower species. Of course, this entails that the genius cannot be completely understood *by* average men either.

Secondly, Nietzsche misrepresents nature when he states that in ~~any other~~ species their only concern is for the individual higher ~~exemplar, it~~ only because no other species is aware of itself as a species. Nietzsche reminded the reader in Section Five that the life of the animal is consumed with desire and its immediate satisfaction. It is only when we understand these selfish pursuits that we understand the motor that drives evolution.² The endless competition among individual animals and plants for scarce resources which are necessary for their survival and procreation is the basis of evolution, not a conception of the "highest exemplar" which all the members of the species are consciously labouring to produce. Nature accomplishes its ends without the animals ever being aware of anything other than their own desire to survive and procreate. But humans, unlike animals, are capable of seeing Nature as a whole, and thus what the actual consequences are of all such individual striving.

Nietzsche exhorts man to do the opposite of what nature would suggest he do if he were simply another animal. Man must, instead of pursuing his own selfish goals, see himself as a "failed piece of nature" and be willing to sacrifice himself for another.

This may at first raise the question as to whether evolution is applicable to man at all, then, since its fundamental premise, self-interest, can be overcome by particular men, and because the product of this cultural endeavor, the heroic man (as Nietzsche calls him) is the antithesis of the self-serving individual (cf. 153-54, 178). Yet the end result of evolution, the production of the highest exemplar, still constitutes an important similarity between man and the other species. If Nietzsche can persuade the reader to accede to this cultural project, it must presuppose man's longing to see himself develop, even though this longing extends beyond his own personal development. Nietzsche may be awakening this longing in the reader, but he is not creating the longing. This longing may be the conscious manifestation in man of what works unconsciously in the rest of nature as the drive of evolution. However, at this point in the argument, we could only say that man is "potentia", not that there is a specific end point or goal for his longing which is dictated by nature.

We should note that the theory of evolution, as understood by modern science, does not suggest that there is a higher goal towards which all of nature's energy and effort is directed. Modern interpreters of the theory speak only of a species as either fit or unfit for survival in their ever-changing environment. Fitness, therefore, is always and forever a relative measure.³ Nietzsche, however, may in fact believe that evolution does have a discernible general direction which manifests itself in the fact that it has continuously produced more and more complex beings, culminating with man who is conscious of both his own complexity and his incompleteness. This does not necessarily mean that Nietzsche agrees that evolution is a temporal working out of a *final* end. On the contrary, he states that "evolution aims at the highest exemplar not in the mass of exemplars and their well being, *let alone in those exemplars who come last in point of time*" (161). That the exemplar is not the highest exemplar simply because he comes last in time means that he is not simply the product of a continuous, uninterrupted progression through time. Nietzsche says that great historical figures such as Schopenhauer

and Wagner may represent the last tendrils of qualities formerly regarded as German, not that their existence guarantees that energies such as their's still exist in the German spirit and mind. Nietzsche worries that the best individuals have already come and gone, and that their spirit is spent (168-69).

Nietzsche is anxious to counter the consequences of Hegel's understanding of history, that it has been a steady disclosing of Reason, culminating in the conscious recognition of this by Hegel himself. Nietzsche denies that there is such an *unconscious* rational purpose working through man. If the narrow, self-seeking life of the modern middle class constitutes the end of history, history, it might be argued, is absurd rather than rational.⁴ In addition, if history is governed by logical necessity, this would deny that man could consciously affect its course, change history, or create anything new which was not already contained in the idea of history's end.⁵ Nietzsche argues, instead, that history is a product of conscious human intention and action. Man's freedom is necessary if his history is to continue and admit of infinite variations. Yet Nietzsche himself talks of man's goals and that we must be conscious of these goals since they are to inform our activity. Does this not also imply the end of history?

Nietzsche has stated that the goal man must aim his activity at is the *repeated* production of the genius. Nietzsche suggests that the young person should best regard himself as a failed work of nature: "nature has done badly, he should say to himself; but I will honor its great intentions so that one day it will do better" (162). It is important to note that he does not say, "so that one day it will finally complete its work". Nietzsche walks a fine line here since, on the one hand, he denies the logical necessity of history and cultural development, while on the other hand he grants that nature is not simply chaotic -- it has a purpose yet it does not "know" how clearly to bring it about.⁶ Man cannot think of himself as "epigoni" without destroying his will to create, yet he must be conscious of a high and noble goal which gives his life of suffering meaning. Man's goal must be a beautiful image which seduces him to life, to struggle, and to self-perfection. It must be

an idea which sometimes seems breathtakingly close to realization, but always remains this. Nietzsche describes culture as longing. To satisfy it, or to make it seem futile would be to extinguish culture altogether.⁷ If the goal, or the highest life, is the philosophic life, then this means that comprehensive wisdom or complete knowledge of the whole is, strictly speaking, impossible to finally attain. However, one cannot conclude from this that the philosophic quest is fruitless.

But continuing for a moment to differentiate between Nietzsche's project and the standard modern view of evolution, we see that modern biological science measures the fitness of a species against the backdrop of their given environment. The most fit members of a given species are those whose morphology and behavior are such that they are the most able to live in their environment and procreate. Nietzsche has said that the genius, on the other hand, is the one who is untimely, who struggles against his time and place; and the greater an exemplar he is, the more dangerous to himself is this struggle and isolation. The struggle against this age may be ruinous, such that "[the genius] ceases to be fruitful, to propagate himself, in this or that domain; in a cultural sense he becomes feeble and useless" (144). Unlike in other species, therefore, the highest human exemplar is often least "fit" to propagate his kind.⁸ Nietzsche points out that the cultural genius does not fit in with his environment and instead works to change the environment, in order to suit himself. As Nietzsche said in Section One, the genius must awaken his time, which is the future time, to life. This suggests that the view he has of himself as a human being will be the criterion by which he reshapes nature.

But if the genius attempts to awaken the future time to life based on his self-knowledge, there is another way in which man tries to restructure his environment which is not necessarily based on such knowledge. Man finds himself in the peculiar position of being able powerfully to affect his environment in a way that animals cannot. Man works ceaselessly to create around him the material conditions for an easier life. The Enlightenment

looked upon science and technology with favour as that which could relieve man's estate. In addition, thinkers such as Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, wished to apply the scientific method also to the study of politics in order to bring about a stable political order imbued with tolerance towards scientific enquiry, and in which religion and superstition would no longer impede scientific inquiry or the dissemination of truths discovered through this inquiry. Although this is not the conventional interpretation of what these thinkers were trying to accomplish, we can nonetheless see that such an environment would appear to be ideal for philosophers to exist in. It would accommodate their physical requirements while allowing them to pursue their vocation with little or no danger to themselves. This construal of the scientific project, however, is still founded on a particular view of man's nature, that the highest life is the philosophic life, and that providing for such a life is what society should be structured around -- an evaluation which transcends both science and technology since it stands above both as their directing and ordering principle. A profound problem with this conception, however, is that by applying technology and elevating in stature the work of the scientist, the genius in the philosophical sense has somehow become a more remote possibility than he was before. The independent pursuit of truth has become exactly that: independent of the goal it was (perhaps) meant to serve, which was the production of elevated men, not merely secure, comfortable, pompous men. Because of this, science and technology have become ends in themselves and are not directed by a higher conception of what the goal is towards which man should be striving. In fact, technology remains in the service of man's lower desires, or that which he holds in common with the other animals, yet its evident power elevates it to a high stature in the minds of most men. Science is now very attractive to young men seeking honor and prosperity, and Nietzsche will later in this section speak of the effects science has on these young men who serve it -- effects which may have serious negative consequences for culture.

Man, through his powerful technology, now evades the discriminating factor in nature which for other species selects according to fitness, i.e., a criterion which demands that life be seen as a standard of value. But technology is non-discriminatory; it promises to preserve all, or alternatively it threatens to destroy all (e.g., through nuclear war), regardless of merit or fitness. It is not linked fundamentally to an unconscious natural principle of selection in subjection to which man is necessarily improved (as are animals). But neither is technology governed, it seems, by well considered, though constantly re-examined, views of man's true goals and true dignity. Man's proficiency at securing what is required for survival, and the application of science to cure or compensate for his biological frailties, means that man is insulated from natural selection, and without regard for the impact this will have on the fate of the species. And in his employment of scientific technology, (Nietzsche would argue), man is behaving like the animals which put all their energy into preserving their existence -- that which must inevitably perish. The irony is that this technical skill is regarded by many as precisely that which elevates us above the animals.⁹

The competition for what is required to sustain mere existence regulates natural selection in other species, but it is diminished for man by technology. If one wants to say that man, living in a world of scarcity, still competes against his fellow men for the things he desires and needs, then it is at least arguable whether one needs to be the fittest or healthiest (taking this notion in its broader connotation, meaning more than bodily health), as opposed to the most technically well equipped. There is certainly nothing in nature to guarantee that the most virtuous men or peoples will be the best equipped technically to compete and survive (presuming one does not simply equate virtue with pursuit of technical power). Within man there is a disjunction between "health", and successfully being able to compete -- something that is not evident in animals. One must ask what the effects are for man of escaping the unforgiving discriminations of nature which have nonetheless worked, (although so far

haphazardly, according to Nietzsche) to produce the highest natural species, man(whose true height is only revealed in its highest exemplars). Nietzsche is arguing that modern scientific society could lead to man's decline, and that man only truly benefits when he must place himself before a stern discriminating judge and justify his existence.¹⁰ Man must now take conscious responsibility for his development by setting for himself the goals which will become the benchmark for measuring his progress or decline.

But there may, in fact, be a curious problem emerging in the background of all this. If it is the case that Nietzsche wants above all else to have man take this cultural project on as a conscious effort, then this demands that man understand in concrete terms the goal he is striving for. If the highest exemplar is, by nature, the goal of our striving, man must be able to recognize such an exemplification, and also be able to determine the conditions under which repeated production of these exemplars are possible. Nietzsche claims that mankind is in a fortunate position because "it can arrive at a conscious awareness of its goal," so that "mankind ought to seek out and create the favorable conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into existence" (168). But does this amount to a technological solution to the problem of genius? And yet, on the other hand, Nietzsche pointed out that evolution in plants and animals advances by virtue of "apparently chance and accidental occurrences",¹¹ and moreover that, "It often seems as though an artist and especially a philosopher only chances to exist in his age, as a hermit or a wanderer who has lost his way and been left behind" (178). Evolution, as we understand it, and unlike other scientific theories, is not amenable to prediction. Also, given that in order to prepare the conditions for the production of the genius, one would have to know the end goal, i.e., genius itself, how is this knowledge to be had by those who are meant to work for his production if the higher cannot be adequately understood in terms of the lower, or even by the lower? Furthermore, if the genius necessarily struggles against his age, will these conditions which are meant to

anticipate and prepare for him not become what the genius struggles *against*.¹² Lastly, although we cannot depreciate institutionalized philosophy without also showing ingratitude for that which introduced us to philosophy, it still seems that part of the greatness of philosophers resides in the fact, as Nietzsche points out with respect to Schopenhauer, that they overcame their age by themselves, without assistance, and that this self-liberation attests to their strength. Would we have as much respect for the philosophers who result from pre-established conditions, and who are, in effect, cultivated like delicate and exotic flowers? Nietzsche's use of the cultivation metaphor throughout this work seems, on the one hand, to support the view that this "cultivation" is our task, and yet Nietzsche's picture of the heroic Schopenhauer contradicts this point at times.

Without trying to solve these problems here we must reiterate that man is distinct from the rest of nature because he works to change his environment based on the criterion of himself. This is motivated by the urge to self-perfection and development. It is helpful to think back to the first section of this essay when Nietzsche invoked the oracular pronouncement of the God at Delphi, "know thyself". What Nietzsche especially wants to establish is that our cultural task must be a conscious effort, which means that man must continue to reflect on those questions concerning what he should be, and to bear in mind the problematic character of any solutions which are offered to these questions. This necessitates self-knowledge and self-awareness of our dissatisfaction and incompleteness, not to the point of despair, however, which would kill action. This is why Nietzsche describes our consecration to culture as a hierarchy which begins with self-dissatisfaction but culminates in the rarer aspect of action. Only the rarest talents, it seems, can combine the depth and insight into life (which normally would bring on despair), with action. Nietzsche argues that this knowledge should liberate one to create beyond what they currently are. This is, of course, why Nietzsche now evaluates four principal features of modern life with respect to the content of the goals they propose for man and culture, for,

as Nietzsche argued in Section Five, it is not sufficient simply to raise the image of man without indicating how one can work towards it. His conclusion is that these four "greeds" have no knowledge of the goals and real needs of man and as such they cannot be the basis of a new culture.

Nietzsche emphasizes that the four obstacles to culture that he discusses in this section are "greeds". It is curious that Nietzsche names these four obstacles greeds if only because they represent the extraordinary modern expenditure of money and energy on so-called culture. These greeds are manifestations of self-serving egoistic drives which betray man's affinity with the rest of the animate world and his inability, or refusal, to rise above his present self. Nietzsche discusses the greeds in the context of discrediting the belief that man does not have to be conscious of his goals in order to achieve them; that "men may reflect and argue about their ultimate goal as much as they like, in the obscure impulse in the depths of them they are still aware of the rightful path" (164). Instead, Nietzsche argues, the only obscure impulses which are likely to predominate if left to themselves are those which man shares with every species of plant and animal, i.e., the drives directed towards mere existence. It is difficult to imagine that these self-serving drives could by themselves lead to anything higher, and certainly not to metaphysical reflection on existence which, in Section Five, Nietzsche concluded is necessary in order to justify existence at all.

The greed of the money makers and the greed of the state are certainly the easiest to comprehend in this way. The money makers assist culture only to the extent to which it can help them make more money. They limit education to that which will allow a person to begin making a lot of money quickly. The love of money, however, amounts only to the love of those things which can be bought. And, this resembles the animals attachment to transitory pleasures which Nietzsche sketched out in Section Five. "In short: ' man has a claim to earthly happiness," says the money maker,

"and for that reason he needs education, but only for that reason"
 "(165)

The state also views culture as a means to its own end. It has the resources to direct the education of its citizens but the state "affirms its own existence above all else" (175) and it expels and treats as enemies that which would set itself above the state and desire to be its judge. Gifted natures, furthermore, who are educated under the supervision of the state may come to see the state as the end of their striving after education. Nietzsche's view is that this is misguided since the state is only a means to the production of the genius. Any end the state has which goes beyond merely preserving the individuals who comprise it must be given to it from an architectonic perspective which transcends the state. At bottom, the state represents the egoism of the masses and their blind desire simply to exist. But whether they realize or not, their existence is justified only by the occurrence in their midst of the genius. ¹³

The third greed is more difficult to understand under the general criticism above. It is the greed of those who are conscious of possessing an ugly or boring content and wish to conceal the fact with so called beautiful form (166). Nietzsche says, first off, that this greed seeks to satisfy every taste at the same time that it is meant to conceal emptiness. It reveals itself as tastelessness. To be "cultivated" in this sense mean "to hide from oneself how wretched and base one is, how rapacious in going for what one wants, how insatiable in heaping it up, how shameless and selfish in enjoying it" (168) It is interesting to note that such people are aware of having a boring content and that, in addition to this, their actions suggest that they are ashamed of themselves. It is a very shallow self-deception, then, which people use to cloud their thoughts more and more with useless thoughts and tasks so as to have less leisure to reflect on what they are, or what they are not, as the case may be. "As though a potion that prevents them from catching their breath were working within them, they storm ahead with indecent anxiety as the harassed slaves of the moment, opinion and fashion: so that the lack of dignity and

decorum is indeed all too painfully evident and a deceitful elegance is required to mask the sickness of this undignified haste" (168).

Still, we have not answered how this greed relates to self-preservation and that blind desire simply to exist. Science is the means by which man is quickly destroying the images and beliefs which stood between himself and a world which now appears to be indifferent to his existence and well being. Nietzsche perceived the danger this belief about the chaotic universe he lives in, and subsequently the inherent meaninglessness of his life, might pose for man since it would rob him of his will to live and create. His deceptions and illusions are meant to mask over this vision which science, with its prejudice that the objective truth is worth any cost, keeps presenting before modern man. In a sense, then, this greed for indiscriminate entertainment and distractions develops out of the healthier aspect of self-deception which has worked throughout most of his history to preserve man's belief in his self-worth. But now the greed for entertainment is simply meant to mask over the sickness, as it were. It does not try to impose a hard discipline on the soul and elevate man above his present condition in order that he could be justified in thinking that he has self-worth. Instead, the "cultured man" seems content to acquiesce in life's meaninglessness so long as life can at least be made as comfortable as possible while he adds spurious adornment to his meaningless existence. He has a glimmering of the problem that faces him but he is too lazy to try and order his inner chaos. It is much easier, for instance, simply to accept all forms of art than it is to try and determine for oneself an aesthetic criterion.

The transition from the third greed to the fourth, the greed of the sciences and the characteristic qualities of their servants, the men of learning, is interrupted by a discussion of the Franco-Prussian war, concluded just two years prior to the publication of Nietzsche's essay. The digression is difficult to explain if only because one might have thought it would fall more naturally into the discussion of the greed of the state. Nonetheless the

digression, although it speaks of the war, continues to analyze the third greed while simultaneously alerting us to a specific danger with respect to the fourth greed. Nietzsche discovers that the Germans, although claiming that the military victory over France implied cultural superiority, are imitating the French, not, however, in anything profound. "Handicrafts especially are invited to compete with the more cultivated neighbor, the fitting out of the German house is to be made similar to that of the French..." (167).¹⁴

Nietzsche points out in this digression that war brings together elements which were previously separate. Thus the Germans, having seen the more cultivated side of the world, come home looking at their own culture differently. But their imitation of the French could only happen if they were, as Nietzsche describes them in this Section, culturally empty to begin with. There is the possibility in war that one will be attracted to, or take on the characteristics of, one's enemy and lose the sense of what one initially set out fighting to preserve. Interestingly enough Nietzsche has already pointed out that the person who is to commit themselves to culture will have to "combat" everything which stands in the way of the production of the cultural genius. This includes, above all, science with its prejudice that the truth should be had at any cost and that there is a duty to mankind to disseminate all knowledge. There is the risk, however, that science will overtake one, especially if one is an empty husk to begin with, for "only he who has a clear view of the picture of life and existence as a whole can employ the individual sciences without harm to himself, for without such a regulatory total picture they are threads that nowhere come to an end and only render our life more confused and labyrinthine" (141).

The greed of the sciences is the only greed which Nietzsche expressly points out can impart its own character to the men who serve it. Science seems to have a consuming power of its own which the other greeds do not. Once set in motion it appears that science eludes political control. Nietzsche decides to attack science in a scientific way and in turning the scientific method against

science Nietzsche proclaims a victory against it. He discovers that the men of learning, though they profess to be driven by a desire for "cold inconsequential truth", are in fact driven by petty desires; for instance, the desires to please authority, the desire to make money at a lucrative position, the desire to seek honor from their fellows, the desire to have a discovery named after them. But what does it say about Nietzsche that he has decided to "scientifically" investigate the men of science? In doing battle with the men of science has he involuntarily taken on the characteristics of his enemy?

Nietzsche's employment of the scientific method reflects well on him precisely because he concludes that it is not the desire for inconsequential knowledge that is at the basis of scientific activity. In contrast to these servants of science, Nietzsche is completely aware that the pursuit of such inconsequential knowledge is not what drives him on in his investigation. One suspects, however, that he is not motivated by the other petty desires of the scholars either. Perhaps, then, he is motivated by justice, that mysteriously appended and rarely occurring thirteenth motive, since he says that a spark from the fire of justice fallen into the scholar's soul would be enough to expel him from the frosty mood in which scholars usually accomplish their daily work. Nietzsche, after all, was once a scholar. It is this motive which must put the passion back into the search for the truth where this passion had supposedly been previously expiated for the sake of objectivity.

The scientific man loses this human element of his drive to know. He loses sight of knowing the knower by involuntarily taking the motives for wanting to know out of the realm of investigation. But if men continue to seek objective knowledge in this way they will gradually lose all knowledge of what is distinctively human. The scientific man does not question whether he wants to know for the sake of inconsequential truth, or for the sake of knowing the good life, perhaps because he automatically assumes that the former leads to the latter. He is not aware of any disjunction between the two, and yet Nietzsche reminded us that

we sometimes have difficulty acceding to what is true. Could this difficulty be a sign of a healthy self-protection "instinct" which preserves men from truths which are "true but deadly"? Only the bravest and the strongest would then be able to endure approaching such truths without danger, but the men of science are characterized by a poverty of feeling and aridity which makes them "capable of vivisection". "He has no inkling of the suffering which knowledge often brings with it, and therefore has no fear of venturing into regions where the hearts of others fail them", "He is also considered daring, but he is no more daring than the mule who is immune from vertigo" (171).

Nietzsche tells us that science has not love and knows nothing of self-dissatisfaction, and that within the sciences suffering is really something improper and incomprehensible (169). Yet this suffering in the absence of complete self-knowledge is what drives these men on to investigate the puzzles of existence. Nietzsche paints for the reader the image of the Schopenhauerean man who is full of blazing and consuming fire and is far removed from the cold contemptible neutrality of the so called scientific man. If science conceives of itself as the genuine path to knowledge about the most important things it must deal with what is most important for man. But if science tries to do this "objectively" then it hides the fact that man's desire to know is based on the suffering he experiences in the absence of knowledge about the meaning of his existence. Thus the scientist, when he sees suffering as "incomprehensible", must also fail to comprehend man as a knowing being. In a cultural sense the man of science is sterile, unfruitful and harbors a natural hatred for the fruitful Schopenhauerean man.

Although the man of science ostensibly pursues knowledge for its own sake, Nietzsche argues that he is instead driven by "a host of little, very human impulses". All the same, because society values the scholar so highly, the talented youth can be seduced by the public acclamation which becoming a scholar promises. Such talented young men can easily become estranged from their original longing to discover who they are by the spirit of the times

(*Zeitgeist*) which aims at their weaknesses and vanities. But these desires which the *Zeitgeist* preys on are self-defeating in a sense since they combine in such a way that the men of learning desire above all else to see the world in a manner that in no way involves, or seriously curtails, human desires. Nietzsche asked how it could be possible for young men not to start back at the sight of ossified academics, but instead wish to become like them. His answer is that to young men, science, promises them honors, it combats their boredom, they can feel the joy of the huntsman on the path of the sly fox in the realm of thought... in short, they are seduced by science. Their desires are aroused by science, and it promises fulfillment, but only at the cost of extinguishing, as best it can, their desires, at least that original desire to know themselves which Nietzsche drew the reader's attention to in Section One. Therefore science maintains legions of "eunuches" and ironically it is these individuals who we in the modern age look to as our highest "human" examples. And yet Nietzsche tells us that, "Wholly fortunate ages did not need the scholar and did not know him, wholly morbid and listless ages have valued him as the highest and most venerable of men and accorded him the highest rank" (174).

These young men should take a different path instead, one less travelled. They should help to form a cultural institution which will preserve the works of the genius and prevent them from being washed away by the tremendous crowd. The philosophic genius is the rational and spiritual leader of this community since the members are united by a common feeling of sympathy and a "profound kinship and involvement with the genius" (176). Nietzsche's project becomes inherently political despite his contempt for the state and for the necessary constraints put on individuals for the sake of political life. His task, Nietzsche openly acknowledges, requires that the second and third rate talents be persuaded (which presupposes that they are persuadable) to see that their lives possess significance and meaning only in subjection to the destiny of the philosophical genius. Similarly, in the Republic Socrates must convince talented

men like Adeimantus, men who may not be suited by nature to be philosophers, but who are talented and destined for political life, to respect the philosophic life. But if Adeimantus (and those like him) is destined for politics, his new respect for the philosophic life is not meant to keep him from going into politics. On the contrary, he is to become the mediating agent between the polity and the philosopher who thus rules indirectly through the auspices of these moderate gentlemen. If Nietzsche's modern problem involves men directed towards scholarship this means (perhaps), that those who are persuaded by Nietzsche should also continue in this direction and mediate between philosophy and science. But if Nietzsche's project is to convince these spirited individuals his task is different, then, from Socrates', because Socrates' audience is drawn from the political men, and politics and spiritedness -- a passion for life, a concern for questions such as "what is justice?"-- are certainly not mutually exclusive. For Nietzsche's audience, they are at least incompatible given that the "thirteenth motive" is so remote for these men who no longer feel the suffering which the youthful soul of Section One feels. The severity of the corruption in the soul of the youth who remain unpersuaded by Nietzsche seems to be potentially greater than would be the case in Socrates' project.

Whatever else we might conclude from this, we should contrast the rosy promises of liberation in Section One with the subjection of the youth to the destiny of the philosopher here in this section. The best that the non-philosopher can do is to exchange willingly the chains of fear and convention which the society he is born into places on him (127) for a chain of fulfillable duties which is derived from the image of the Schopenhauerean man (157). Even the philosopher's freedom is compromised since from his productive uniqueness is suspended a chain of toil and burdens (143). There may be some satisfaction that at least these chains are recognized as such, and that, in keeping with Plato's allegory of the cave (from which this image of chains is surely drawn), the cave has at least been seen to be a cave. That is, we

can take heart that we have been liberated from public opinion at least this much even if we have not escaped the cave altogether.

By beginning this section with an invitation to reflect on the modern understanding of evolution Nietzsche invites the reader to reflect on the many ways in which man differs from the rest of nature, and the relevance these differences have when one considers what culture is. If man wants to discover what he should strive to be, then he must look to himself and see what his nature is. The philosopher is described by Nietzsche as a natural being who stands in contrast to the men of science, and the cultured men who are unnatural, misshapen, and sterile in a cultural sense. Because our modern institutions aim at the development of these latter types of individuals, the natural condition is one which man must struggle against modern misconceptions of education in order to attain. It is impossible for anyone growing up in this age to avoid being influenced to some degree by modern institutions and opinions concerning culture. It is not impossible, however, to think that some men can come to see the problematic character of these opinions and strive, as Nietzsche has shown Schopenhauer to have striven, to get past their "stepmotherly" age and to see the modern cave as a cave. If what is lacking in the modern "cultured" man is a strong centre around which the chaos of information, styles and types which the modern age puts before him can be organized and shaped, and the scientific man lacks the philosopher's awareness that man suffers from his ignorance about why and to what end he exists, then it is, in part, a depth and strength of feeling which distinguishes the philosopher from these others. Out of the philosopher's deep feeling there perhaps arises a criterion for determining what is truly of importance for man to know, and which can then regulate and guide the other wise *laissez faire* approach to the sciences. Science and the culture of the modern age are destructive because they are divorced, and are divorcing man from his natural instincts and passions for life. His erotic nature is being denied for the sake of truth, but his *eros* for the truth about his essential

nature and dignity is destroyed in the process, making him unfruitful in a cultural sense.

¹ Nietzsche, *On the uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, Untimely Meditations, R.J. Hollingdale, trnsl. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) pp112-113.

²The only aim which is elevated above strict self- preservation and procreation in the animal world is the protection of offspring, and this is true only in more complex animals, and in these only with respect to immediate offspring in their formative years regardless of their actual contribution to the gene pool and fitness of the species. It cannot, therefore, be said to be anything akin to planning for the species in a long range sense.

³We can think of, in this regard, the popular work by S.J. Gould in which he states, "Darwinianism is not a theory of progress, increasing complexity, or evolved harmony for the good of the species or ecosystem." The Mismeasure of Man, p326.

⁴ C. Zuckert, *Nature, History and the Self*, in Nietzsche Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche Forschung, Vol 5, 1976, p.67.

⁵ This last point may not be so much an argument against Hegel's theory but a reason why, in the interest of a healthier or stronger life, it should be "forgotten" as Nietzsche advises in the history essay. (Cf. H. Neumann, in Nietzsche Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche Forschung, Band 5,p.15.)

⁶ Cf. "Nature seems to be bent on squandering; but it is squandering, not through wanton luxuriousness, but through inexperience; it can be assumed that if nature were human it would never cease to be annoyed at itself and its ineptitude."(177)

⁷ Perhaps this is why he must aim his essay at the young person who is precisely in that state when "every personal event shines with a double gleam, both as the exemplification of a triviality and, at the same time, of an eternally surprising problem, deserving of explanation." Taken from Nietzsche, "The Future of Our Educational Institutions", trnsl. J. Kennedy, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, V(III), Ed. O. Levy (Russell & Russell Inc., 1964) p.128. If our passions diminish with time, it may be because we see that they cannot often be satiated, which frustrates us, and renders us unfruitful in a cultural sense. Nietzsche says that "to the truly cultured man is vouchsafed the inestimable benefit of being able to remain faithful, without break, to the contemplative instincts of his childhood, and so to attain to a calmness, unity, consistency, and harmony which can never even be thought of by a man who is compelled to fight in the struggle for existence." *Ibid.*, p.96.

⁸ This may be more a problem of not having a suitable mate, rather than a reflection on the genius' strength. Cf. the analysis of Section Seven below with respect to the genius' reproduction.

⁹ Nietzsche stated quite clearly in Section Five that for the most part we do not emerge out of our animality, especially to the extent to which we pursue life as though after happiness.

¹⁰ Was this in fact not the role of God previously? Wasn't He the the discriminating judge before whom one was ultimately accountable for their way of conduct? If so, what has changed this? Nietzsche would likely argue that at least two attacks are responsible. The Christian God became a God of pity and forgiveness, and thereby lost the power to judge and punish the flock. Secondly, science has largely replaced God and an anthropomorphic universe with a view of nature which is non-teleological and indifferent to man's moral conduct.

¹¹This "apparently" may be important.

¹² What this may indicate, in the end, is simply that, despite Nietzsche's insistence that there is an important role for the "second and third rate talents" to play in this cultural project, their real effect will be minimal. At best one can only hope not to be an impediment to culture. Nietzsche said that culture is "the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of the plant"(p. 130). To the extent that we are not geniuses ourselves it may be, from the geniuses perspective, that we are the weeds.

¹³ Cf. "That my life has no aim is evident from the accidental nature of its origin; that I can posit an aim for myself is another matter. But a state has no aim; we alone give it this aim or that." in Portable Nietzsche Trnsl. by W Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press,1965) p.40.

¹⁴ Nietzsche explained in his second "Untimely Meditation" that the Greeks were able to avoid being overwhelmed by what was past and foreign. Instead of being a mere aggregate of the cultures of the East, the Greeks organized the chaos and took possession of themselves by thinking back to their real needs. Several things may be suggested, then, by this digression on war. The Greeks thought of themselves as the centre of human civilization and that succumbing to the Persians would surrender civilization to barbarism. The value they placed on their culture gave them the reason to be militarily strong. Their military strength was not the *reason* they were civilized. Nonetheless war required certain virtues be cultivated, especially courage and moderation. These virtues served not only to protect the Greek culture, but also to further it since it fostered the kind of moral discipline which is crucial for developing a culture, but which Nietzsche says the Germans lack. In modern warfare, technology can, and largely has, taken the place of virtue. Victory on the battle field may have little to say, in fact, about the superior strength of soul of the victors.

Section Seven

Nietzsche invites us at the beginning of Section Seven to once again assess our cultural task from a different perspective, from the political perspective, one might say. We turn our heads away from the "noble assent" bestowed from the ethereal heights of genius evoked in Section Six, in order to reflect on practicalities and hard realities. Nietzsche concluded Section Six with the discussion of the institution comprising mainly second and third rate talents dedicated to the production of the genius, and now goes on to state the minimum conditions which must be procured for the benefit of evolving philosophers at present. But in Section Five Nietzsche warned that deriving such practical duties from the image of the Schopenhauerean man is the hardest task. Here, too, it may be difficult in the end to be satisfied that that which influences the philosopher's development, especially fortune, can be overcome to any great extent, or that the practical duties of the new cultural institution will significantly improve the uneasy relationship between true philosophy and civil society.

Nietzsche begins Section Seven with a lament concerning nature's irrational ordering, such that only a few men are "struck with the force with which the philosopher and artist launch their shot" (178). This acknowledges the fact that the problem does not lie with the initiators of this communication, but with the recipients of it. Nietzsche says that a great impediment to the development of philosophers, "that which in the end wants to vitiate any rebirth of the philosopher with every means in its power, is, to speak bluntly, the perversity of contemporary human nature" (178). The audience for these great philosophical artworks constitutes the "unreason in nature", and explains why the philosopher is not universally "useful".

It is especially modern concepts, Nietzsche says, which act as leaden weights on the philosopher. These concepts have two effects on philosophy. First, the philosopher must rid himself of the prejudices which his age teaches him, as Schopenhauer is said

to have done. This seems to be the best use of Schopenhauer now for "evolving philosophers". For they can use his work as a mirror for their own times, which Schopenhauer shows to be disfigured and distorted (146). Second, these concepts affect the philosopher's audience, for these concepts constitute some of the opinions which normally serve as the shared beliefs required for a stable and cohesive political society. However much these opinions appear to most men actually to make sense of the external world and of their relations with other men, these opinions virtually always rest on unproved assumptions. By criticizing these established orders and opinions in his search for the unchanging structure in nature standing behind these opinions, the philosopher makes himself hated by his contemporaries who, like most men, seek only to prolong their own existence -- which depends, so they believe, on the orders and opinions under attack.¹ The philosopher suffers unproductively in trying to overcome these opinions, and his work suffers because it has to force its way up violently against the indifference or hatred of his contemporaries.

Nietzsche makes it sound, however, as though the philosopher should be judged as effective merely on the basis of the number of people he directly affected, and whether or not these people loved his work to the same degree and in the same way in which the philosopher does. This despite the fact that Nietzsche began the Sixth Section by acknowledging that to most people it will seem absurd that culture demands that they should live for the sake of the single highest exemplar. They believe instead that the ultimate goal lies in the happiness of all or of the greatest number (162). But is it less absurd, Nietzsche responded rhetorically, to let mere number decide, when it is intrinsic significance and value that are at issue? Why should we regard a great mass of insignificant lives as having value? And yet Nietzsche attacks nature in the same vein, it seems, as these "utilitarians" attack the goal of culture in Section Six. Philosophers fail to become universally useful, he charges, and they strike home at only a few when they should strike home at everybody.

Schopenhauer's greatness is not reflected by the effect he has had. In fact, despite his name being perhaps more widely known than is Hegel's, he "has still produced no effect at all" (179).

Nietzsche describes nature's mood as melancholic as a result of this inefficiency. It wants to be of universal utility and yet it does not know how to go about achieving its goals efficiently. "That nature has wanted to make existence explicable and significant to man is, given nature's own desire for redemption, certain..." (177). This redemption appears to depend upon whether or not nature is understood by man. "For as nature needs the philosopher, so does it need the artist, for the achievement of a metaphysical goal, that of its own self-enlightenment, so that it may at last behold as a clear and finished picture that which it could see only obscurely in the agitation of its evolution- for the end, that is to say, of self-knowledge" (160) Since we were told in Section Three that the philosopher's task is to judge and evaluate existence, and that the genius alone can be life's advocate and redeemer, only those who are philosophic are able to redeem nature.

But as we argued in Section Five, it appears as though it is really our own specific nature which begs (or should beg) for this self-knowledge we presently lack. It is we who suffer from life and who are melancholy, as Nietzsche says nature is. It is our nature which suffers from life when it appears to be senseless, and this suggests that this desire for order and sense which man finds in himself is natural. The animals' existence, by contrast, is a senseless cycle of life and death which is repeated endlessly. However, for the most part we fail to emerge out of our animality, especially when we pursue the pleasures of our body as if they were ends in themselves, and ignore our inner admonition. Nietzsche's essay exhorts the reader to break out of this cycle in which he is trapped, and which is due, in large part, to the demands his body places on him. The key to this liberation, Nietzsche states, is to give one's life meaning and significance which transcends mere existence and rescues it from the eternal "puppet-play" of becoming. For the genius, this will mean that he

breaks the curse of death in as much as he awakens his time to life, which is the future time, and lives on in this future. The task of the non-philosophers is to prepare the way for the philosophical genius, and to combat everything that has prevented them from being Schopenhauerean men themselves.

But if the genius attains a measure of perfection because he sheds, so far as possible, his attachment to the ephemeral needs of the body for the sake of understanding the eternal order in nature, his escape from death, his "immortality", is precarious. After all, it must be carried forward in the minds of smaller mortal men who *are* more often concerned with caring for their bodily appetites than they are about patterning their souls after the eternal harmony found in nature.

So nature is criticized by Nietzsche for striving after its goal in such an inefficient manner. Nietzsche laments nature's irrational ordering of affairs, such that the genius -- the highest fruit of existence, who believes that he has peered into the depths of existence -- should be unable to communicate this vision to an audience with the force which it merits. And further, that this inability to communicate his vision should play a role in wearing down the philosopher himself, at the same time that it prevents future philosophers from developing.

We might ask, however, why the philosopher is required to communicate at all, and why it now seems that, despite having fled to the "inward cave" to escape the tyranny of public opinion, he cannot remain a solitary (cf.139). Strictly speaking, it cannot be for the benefit of the large majority of non-philosophers that he must now go back to that much larger cave of political life and try as much as possible to liberate others. This would mean, in effect, that the philosopher's existence would have value only as a vehicle through which we can come to feel human and briefly awaken to see that we live like an animal for the greater part of our life. This would contradict what Nietzsche has already stated: that it is we non-philosophers who should see ourselves as a failed piece of nature and who must work for the sake of the philosophical genius, one who is of intrinsic value in being truly

and fully human. The philosophical genius is the goal of culture and is the end of nature's striving. The value of the philosopher is not measurable by calculations of utility, nor is his purpose to secure the happiness of the greatest number. Thus, strictly speaking, the philosopher's communication is necessary, if it can be said to be necessary at all, only in order to achieve his fullest effect, which is to say, in order that he educate philosophers. When Nietzsche criticizes nature because the philosopher does not effectively communicate to a large number of men, this must be understood in the context of this full effect of the philosopher, i.e., his reproduction. This is not to say that the rest of us cannot be benefited by raising ourselves up so far as possible from our present condition, and it may even be the case that the philosopher will, out of compassion, assist his fellow human beings in their struggle to understand the meaning of their existence. Nevertheless we are to understand that the highest life is the philosophic life, and it would remain the highest existence even if the philosopher remained a hermit and was never recognized to be a philosopher by anyone else. His existence does not require verification by others in order for it to really be the highest existence. But is not all it could be if it is not procreative, if it is not itself productive of intrinsically valuable existence.

Thus, isolation poses a problem for the philosopher's repeated production insofar as his reproduction depends to a certain degree on an audience who is sympathetic to the philosopher's quest. Several points need emphasizing, however. First, the philosopher, to the extent that he is truly a philosopher, will be uninterested in recognition. This desire for recognition is more characteristic of the scholar described in Section Six, and Nietzsche showed how this desire to be recognized blurs the scholar's vision in his search for the truth, because he begins to look instead for that which will win him praise from authorities. Schopenhauer's own desire to be read was similarly criticized by Nietzsche as an "all-too-human" fault, a flaw in his philosophical detachment from the opinions of others. The philosopher, in the strict sense, has no need to communicate to a large audience, not

even for the sake of a deficiency of subjective certainty, since he serves himself as a brief abstract of the world and learns most of what he needs to know out of his own self-reflection.² So the philosopher, as such, does not personally need to make himself known to, or loved by, a large number of people.

Second, Nietzsche has pointed out that the philosopher will avoid the tyranny of public opinion by escaping to the inward cave and by being a solitary. Ours is an era, moreover, which Nietzsche says is "ruled not by living men, but by pseudo-men dominated by public opinion" (128). The genius, Nietzsche says in this section, is hampered by the "bogus concepts" and generalizing opinions which prevail in our time, and which act as leaden weights on his development. So the philosopher in these times will more than ever be inclined to be a solitary and a hermit. This is no less a danger in a liberal democracy, it seems, where the very tolerance of opinions can lead to an easy-going belief that all points of view are of equal worth, along with the concomitant belief that anyone who argues against this popular belief in the equality of opinions is anti-democratic and must be sympathetic to despotism. There is reason to believe that, in times such as these, a philosopher might especially wish to keep quiet and mind his own business.³

Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that the philosopher is interested in sharing his experience of the philosophic life, and what knowledge he has found through his quest, with at least those few of like nature to himself. Being convinced that the philosophic life is inherently valuable, his promotion or cultivation of it in others adds value to his own. The next best thing to living this life oneself is to share it with one's true friends. The philosopher is drawn to communicate with the young men who may be suited by nature to be philosophers themselves, and as such he need only concern himself with communicating with this select group of talented men. But as we pointed out in previous sections, these young men are the very ones most likely to be led astray by public acclamation and by the flattery of those authorities who are in a position to award them honor and money.

So, the philosopher, if he is to persuade any of these young men to forego such "goals" in favor of philosophy, must himself be willing to face the animosity and even persecution which his unpopular ideas generate. He must contend with public opinion in order to demonstrate for these young men by his deeds the difference between real and apparent philosophers, and to show what a source of the heroic wells within philosophy. For it is this heroism that will attract young men of sufficient spirit and courage. The dignity of the philosopher who risks this will be enhanced in the eyes of this select audience once they appreciate such dignity only increases "in the measure that servitude to public opinion and the danger to freedom increases" (193). One would be led to believe, then, given what Nietzsche has said about the degree to which this is an age dominated by public opinion, that the present conditions are potentially ripe for the emergence of a courageous philosopher who is willing to attempt many things.

Those who are born with the qualities of soul which make them suitable for philosophy are certainly very rare, however. It would make sense, then, for the philosopher to write his works so that they could be read generations hence, and thereby speak to the greatest number of potential philosophers. In order for this to happen, these works would have to survive the test of time, which requires that they impart something of value to the minority of men who, though not philosophers themselves, have genuine appreciation of philosophy, and will do what they can to keep alive that appreciation in the hopes that some day a born philosopher might happen upon these works.

Nietzsche outlines, in this section, four conditions which would, in addition to this, assist these born philosophers in their development. On the whole, Nietzsche says, these are the same conditions as Schopenhauer grew up under. The philosopher needs rugged manliness, freedom from narrow patriotism, something that deflects him away from the lure of science and scholarship, and the financial support necessary to escape the "petty necessities of life", thereby allowing him to devote his life to the truth. Of these four conditions, at least three are credited, in the

case of Schopenhauer, to his father's efforts. Even the apparent exception, that he was not brought up to be a scholar, was due to the fact that he worked for a while in a great mercantile house, that is, in his father's business.

These conditions seem to rely on the fortunate coincidence of a "born philosopher" and a father who is willing and able to supply the four conditions with the assistance of which the potential philosopher "can at least avoid being crushed by the perversity of our times" (180). It is perhaps with the intention of educating the non-philosophical fathers to be forbearing with respect to philosophy that Nietzsche says the philosopher must strike home at a much wider audience if the conditions for the repeated production of the philosopher are to improve.

The new cultural institution Nietzsche spoke of at the conclusion of Section Six will assist in this task by being a counter force to public opinion. The task of this institution will be to keep alive the debate among the alternative visions of human excellence developed in the great books, and to preserve the pictures of good and brave fighters which a person must surround himself with if he is not to become depressed and melancholic when he struggles to be untimely. This institution does not have to be as formally organized as the modern university or academy; in fact, as Nietzsche will argue in Section Eight, it is best if it does not resemble these institutions at all. Instead it should be a cultivated class, a natural aristocracy in a sense, in mutual awareness and communication, and understands itself to be an alternative to the presently dissolving "educated class" which grows "daily more restless, thoughtless and loveless", and is presently constituted by the cultural philistines Nietzsche described in Section Six (148).

Perhaps, Nietzsche will say in Section Eight, some father or other may have learned something from what has been discussed, and will apply it to the education of his own son. Socrates, Nietzsche reminds us, fell to the wrath of the fathers who, in every age, have put up the most determined resistance to their sons being "corrupted" by philosophy: "...Plato for that reason

considered it necessary to institute a whole new state if the existence of the philosopher was not to be imperilled by the unreason of the fathers" (183). But it would seem that Plato constructed the city Nietzsche refers to, only "in speech" precisely in order to show the improbability that such a regime could come into existence "in fact" -- due to the inherent, ineradicable tensions between philosophy and civil society. When Nietzsche says, then, that Plato really does seem to have accomplished something by making philosophy more respectable, this sentiment appears to contradict Nietzsche's lament in this section, i.e., that philosophers have had very little effect. Perhaps, then, Plato's actual effect has been too successful: the price of respectability has been the degeneration of philosophy in the minds of post-Enlightenment men. As a result the state now believes that it is among its tasks to assist nature in producing what it considers to be new Platos. But here the state is mistaken and reveals by its activity of promoting safe, acceptable, scholarly philosophy that, in fact, it does not understand Plato at all -- genuine Platos would be anathema to both the political and the intellectual elite of the modern state. For genuine philosophers are the natural superiors of these elite, suited to rule them as kings. But this means that the success of Plato's project, which according to Nietzsche, was aimed at assuaging the fathers, must be a distortion too. Perhaps the fathers remain unpersuaded, or perhaps they are not persuadable at all, at least not adequately enough, or in numbers great enough, to make much difference to the actual production of true philosophers. If fathers now appear to tolerate their sons becoming philosophers probably this is only because they are confusing the modern scholar (who is respected and rewarded) with the true philosopher. But even so, Nietzsche does not abandon the hope that the new institution will have some effect, however small, in overcoming a complete reliance on the fortuitous coincidence of a born philosopher having a father who is gentle toward philosophy (or even one who unwittingly secures those conditions under which Schopenhauer developed, as was most likely the case with Schopenhauer's father).

In the end, however, it may be necessary (as we pointed out in Section Two) for those who are "born philosophers" to liberate themselves from their biological fathers in order to make themselves the disciples and sons of their true educators; and Nietzsche's new institution may assist this process to the extent that it continues to take philosophy seriously. This means that philosophy will once again open itself up to the charge of corrupting the best and brightest sons, and it may well run the risk of feeling the wrath of the fathers again. The tension between philosophy and politics has not been resolved by the practical activities Nietzsche outlines in this section. Perhaps this tension is unresolvable in its entirety, which is not to say that efforts cannot be made to ensure the vitality of the best parts of the contending sides of this conflict. Nietzsche declares, however, that despite these efforts to procure the conditions under which the philosophical genius can develop, that the artist, and especially the philosopher, only *chances* to appear in his age, that Schopenhauer only belonged to this age by *accident*, that Schopenhauer had the indescribable good *fortune* to have seen the genius close up in the person of Goethe and that the philosopher *as a rule* appears in his age by *chance* (all emphases added). Section Eight sets out, then, to show how the state, above all, is mistaken in believing that the philosopher resembles the scholar, and why, furthermore, this confusion is dangerous to true philosophy and to the state itself.

¹ C. Zuckert, *Nature, History and the Self*, in Nietzsche Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche Forschung, Vol 5, 1976, p.76.

² Cf., Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence (Toronto: Free Press, 1991) pp.200-202.

³ The Republic of Plato, Translated by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books,1968) 496b.

Section Eight

The conditions required for the development of the philosopher are not necessarily the same as the conditions required for developing a good citizen. This is no less the case now after the Enlightenment than it was before, though people may now be under the impression that religious dogma and erroneous political opinions have given way to the free and objective pursuit of the truth-- that the pursuit of the truth which the philosophers are involved in has now been made respectable and harmonious with political life. This pursuit of the truth is, to most people, exemplified by the activities of scholars, and among these, most especially by the natural scientists. It is not at all certain, however, that untrammelled science is conducive to healthy political life. And whereas Nietzsche says that freedom is a condition of the philosopher's development this freedom properly conceived is largely absent in the university, contrary to popular opinion. Nietzsche argues explicitly in Section Eight that what endangers philosophy the most is that it is no longer considered to be dangerous to civil society, and that this in turn endangers the state. In fact, far from being dangerous, philosophy too often now appears to be ludicrous, especially to the young men introduced to it in the universities. True philosophy will have to distance itself from the state-sanctioned university and thus from the state, which it will more easily do when its true friends attest that the love of truth is something fearsome and mighty.

The essential conditions for the production of the genius are reducible, Nietzsche says, to the word "freedom". It was in this perilous element that the Greek philosophers were able to grow up. It is, however, an element which an evolving philosopher today must struggle to attain in a way in which these earlier philosophers did not (cf. 145). Whereas, for instance, one might suppose that the university satisfies the fourth condition discussed in Section Seven (freeing one, through the wages it pays, from the "petty necessities of life), Nietzsche argues to the

contrary. He doubts that making philosophy an "office of profit" means that academic philosophers really devote their lives to the truth, rather than to pursuing posts and honors. And if one looks at the state's objective, which it believes is to assist nature in creating new Platos, one would realize that there is more evidence suggesting that the state does not truly want new Platos because it fears natures such as his, and it "will favor only philosophers it does not fear" (184). It favors "philosophers" who, contrary to Plato, are not willing to apply the scalpel of truth to all things, including the state, for they realize that the state is their benefactor and permits them to live from their philosophy. Unfortunately, Nietzsche says, experience teaches us that "nothing stands so much in the way of the production and propagation of the great philosopher by nature as does the bad philosopher who works for the state" (184).

Nietzsche claims that the concessions which philosophy makes to the state go very far at present. First, these so-called philosophers lend to the state the appearance of being able to determine who is a good philosopher and who is not, as well as how many good philosophers are needed to fill the institutions. This presupposes that there are an abundance of good philosophers to choose from, not to mention that it supposes that true philosophers would gladly take up the occupation. The state, however, affirms its own existence above all else and will, as mentioned, only select those candidates who are the most useful to the state. But the true philosopher does not moderate his desire for the truth on account of money or the state's interests.

In addition, especially in a liberal democracy, the universities feel that they must justify their existence by constantly proving their usefulness and relevance to the fashionable concerns of the day. As Nietzsche says, the universities enjoy little regard because they are so cowardly, "since the small ones fear the big ones and the big ones fear public opinion" (192).

Second, the structure and stated purpose of the university, as the state understands it, is to educate people to be good citizens

and it believes that "the dissemination of education among its citizens can only be to its advantage in its competition with other states" (165). And so, why not teach philosophy to the citizens, especially the "fair green shoots of Hegelianism" which teaches that man has no higher duty than to serve the state? The state compels those it has chosen as philosophers, those who will not apply the scalpel of truth to the state itself, to teach whomever wishes to be taught, and to do so at fixed hours, regardless of whether the teacher has anything worthwhile to say, and regardless of whether the students are suitable by nature, or are even prepared to learn what the educator might be able to teach. Even worse is what so often results from the teacher who really has nothing worthwhile of his own to teach, but who is compelled by his contract with the university to teach anyway. For such a one it will be easy enough to fall back on the vast expanse of historical data concerning philosophers and their doctrines for the resources needed to fill his allotted lecture time. He will then be a walking encyclopedia who is not supposed to be a thinker at all, but instead a most learned presenter of what others have thought, and "so he will always have something to say which his pupils do not already know" (186). But these "teachers" delude themselves if they believe that they are educating their students in a meaningful way, or that at least some of their students are not aware of this masquerading behind a crust of scholarship which is meant to hide the teacher's superficiality or lack of deep feeling for the subject matter. Some students may even become quite perplexed as to how material which is studied so morbidly could ever have been thought to have constituted the very height of human achievement, or how these books could have anything to say about their own experience of life -- which, in contrast to their education, they occasionally glimpse as something mysterious, wonderful and deserving of explanation.

This is the third perilous concession which philosophy makes to the state -- to undertake first and foremost to appear as knowledge of the history of philosophy. It has never been the concern of the true philosopher to concern himself with "the

history of ideas", or what other people have believed. Plato, for instance, had such unconcern for the merely historical truth that he allotted it no role whatsoever in education of either a citizen or a philosopher. He considered the philosophical question of the best political order, in light of which one could evaluate the political order one actually lived under, to be infinitely more important than the historical question of what this or that individual thought of the best political order.¹

Having said this, however, we recognize that Nietzsche, in the course of this work alone, has made reference to numerous men from the past with whose ideas he is familiar (Kant, Hegel, Montaigne, Plato, Socrates, Empedocles, Plutarch, to mention only a few) -- indeed much more familiar than is his reader. Nietzsche insisted in Section Four that one would have to know this age in order for one to liberate themselves from it. This knowledge of the modern age would reveal the peculiarly historical character of the opinions which the genius, above all, must overcome in himself if he is to liberate himself from everything which is merely time bound in the age. Nietzsche reminds us that our present political situation is the result of a self-conscious application of earlier political thought. Plato has, "historically speaking", been most unfortunate, Nietzsche says, because his teaching about philosophy's relationship to politics has been distorted (as we discussed in Section Seven). Since this is an age which has self-consciously tried to put theory into practice, to relieve man's estate through the dissemination of knowledge throughout civil society, the conception this age has of itself is due in part to the legacy of the Enlightenment.

But the Enlightenment was largely a reaction against ancient thought. Modern man's consciousness of himself is permeated by concepts and theories which can only be understood as a conscious transformation of pre-modern ideas; they are not, that is, the result of direct reflection on men's experience in modern times, and comprehensible simply in light of that experience. Therefore, there still is an important role for the history of philosophy in our times; we need it to *understand fully* the ideas of our own time

(given their historical character). Nonetheless, Nietzsche says that he prefers reading Diogenes Laertius to either Brandis or Zeller, since the latter two in their work on the history of Greek thought do not breathe the spirit of the philosophy of antiquity as Diogenes does. The history of philosophy can be useful when it is conducted properly, when it breathes the living spirit of the philosophers. But the history of philosophy is still not philosophy itself, but is only a precondition for modern men to return to more immediate reflections on the conditions and facts of their existence, as did the first philosophers, who did not have a history of political philosophy before them. Nietzsche writes

He who lets concepts, opinions, past events, books, step between himself and things - he, that is to say, who is in the broadest sense born for history - will never have an immediate perception of things and will never be an immediately perceived thing himself; but both these conditions belong together in the philosopher, because most of the instruction he receives he has to acquire out of himself and because he serves himself as a brief abstract of the whole world (181).

Furthermore, if the cultural institution which Nietzsche hopes will be formed by the second and third rate talents is to have a task, it seems that, at best, it is the task of preserving the model of the philosophic life (the quest to understand the important questions) which the great thinkers of the past exemplify. These pictures of the exemplary men will hopefully inspire "born philosophers" to rise above the petty opinions of their particular time and place and to take up the quest which this reflection demands of them.

Nietzsche wonders if overburdening inexperienced youth by teaching them the history of philosophy is not meant to make it even less likely that anyone would want to devote themselves to philosophy. If that is the case, then he says there is one thing to be feared: one day young men will perceive something in the great philosophical works which will provide a glimmer of the difference between true philosophy and the pretense of it. Nietzsche acknowledges that the history of philosophy as it is taught in the universities may at least have that outcome, which

means that it could be, after all, the path by which a born philosopher comes into contact with that ideal which will educate him and draw him aloft. In fact, Nietzsche may be speaking about his own experience as one who, having been a scholar himself, eventually renounced his university position even though his scholarly post was no doubt instrumental in acquainting him with true philosophy, and particularly to the philosophy of the ancient Greeks. In addition, Nietzsche is speaking, of course, to the reader who *is* allowing a book to step between himself and things, and who is not an immediately perceived thing, but is (rather) perceiving himself through Nietzsche's mediation. We may have to moderate our criticisms of the state, of the university, and of academic freedom if only to admit our gratitude for having been introduced to the great books of man's history and for having learned to experience them as such. Nevertheless, this gratitude presupposes that we have come to regard these works as more than simply the stuff of history, but instead as works which still undertake to inspire us to life, to action and to improve ourselves. Thus, Nietzsche says that "the only critique of a philosophy that is possible and that proves something, namely trying to see whether one can live in accordance with it, has never been taught at universities..." (187). It is in light of this standard of interpretation and education, then, that Nietzsche claims that true philosophy is endangered by scholarly philosophers, and why anyone who is grateful for having achieved a glimpse of true philosophy would then want to continue to criticize modern "culture" to the extent that it endangers philosophy.

These academic philosophers are harmful to philosophy because they make philosophy itself appear ludicrous. Philosophy, especially in the wake of Kant's teaching, has been reduced to being "the frontier guard" of the natural sciences. It has given up the pretensions of pursuing a comprehensive view of man and his place in the world, and has instead become (at best), a ratifier and clarifier of the scientific method of inquiry and analysis. Nietzsche said in Section Two, however, that science is harmful to men of learning when it is not "kept within bounds by a higher maxim of

education but on the contrary allowed to run wilder and wilder on the principle 'the more the better' " (132). In addition, in Section Three he stated that, "only he who has a clear view of the picture of life and existence as a whole can employ the individual sciences without harm to himself, for without such a regulatory total picture they are threads that nowhere come to an end and only render our life more confused and labyrinthine" (141). And in Section Six Nietzsche exposed the limitations of the scientific account of the continuity of species as it relates to man's desire to find meaning for his existence. The evolutionary account on its own can only try to explain man in terms of his origin, as modern scientific accounts are wont to do, since it is taken as axiomatic that phenomenon are understandable in terms of their origins, but not in terms of their ends for they have no naturally given ends or completion. But this is necessarily an incomplete account of man, an attempt to explain the higher in terms of the lower, the political in terms of the sub-political. It is an incomplete account because man desires to understand himself in terms of something higher, a goal for his aspiration, giving his life meaning and significance. That is, it is a natural fact that man has longings which modern science can not in principle either satisfy or explain. This means that science does not deal with the "facts" of political life, namely that people's opinions about what is good influence how they interact, and those ideas are inexplicable apart from some idea of what is truly good. Science does not explain man's immediate perception of himself as a rational political animal who is aware of his own incompleteness. Nietzsche has argued that man suffers on account of the knowledge of this incompleteness, and that this suffering urges him on to the quest of finding that goal which will give his life meaning and significance. He searches for what will make him complete; he searches for the whole which he feels he is a part of. In the absence of this knowledge of the whole, the quest for such knowledge must be the highest life for man. However, as Nietzsche said in Section Six, science cannot comprehend this basis

of man's desire to know himself since it removes the question of man's suffering from the realm of permitted sagacity.

By closing down the possibility of there being any sense to seeing the world as a whole, by believing, in fact "that one can achieve a more perfect interpretation if one minutely investigates the paint with which this picture is produced and the material on which it is painted" (141), one would necessarily make philosophy ludicrous because philosophy worthy of the name -- "love of wisdom" -- *is* the quest to understand the whole. Modern scholarship does not address the question explicitly raised in Section Six -- how can the individual life receive the highest value?-- on the contrary, it believes this question to be unsolvable in purely rational terms while simultaneously undermining the traditional answers to that question, such as those rooted in religious faith. Without having a rationally defensible opinion about what constitutes the good life, and what life is most desirable for men to live, there would be no rational defense possible for any particular regime which is dedicated to preserving or promoting a particular way of life. This would mean, however, that neither would there be a rational defense possible for the regime in which unimpeded scientific inquiry is tolerated. Yet it is without a doubt that most people, including scientists themselves, believe that scientific inquiry is a very good thing, either in itself, or for the benefits it produces. They must also admit, however, that their opinions about what constitutes the good life are not the result of their scientific investigations, but they are not apt to be deeply troubled by this inconsistency

However, scholarship which is not directed by a higher maxim of education, that is to say by an understanding of what it means to make a human a human (necessitating thereby an understanding of what it is to be human), is also dangerous for political life. If science and academic scholarship are not kept in bounds by a higher maxim of education, they can lead to the erosion of the necessary consensus of opinions about the right and the good which bind and keep political society unified, despite these beliefs being themselves unproven, or even in the final

analysis untrue. Nietzsche is arguing here that philosophy is in fact dangerous to the state for just these reasons, for as we stated, true philosophy radically questions the very foundations of political society. But it is not necessarily the case that a true political philosopher will voice his criticisms such that everyone in society is aware of them too. Nevertheless, Nietzsche says that it would be better for the state and for philosophy if the state were to persecute philosophy rather than to promote it. The state cannot distinguish between good and bad philosophers, and there is no guarantee that the bad philosophers will not, either knowingly or unknowingly, undermine the integrity of civil society through their activity precisely because they themselves are unaware of the dangerousness of philosophy and cannot, as a result, teach it responsibly to "rash and restless" youths. And in fact, the state would not have any trouble getting rid of bad philosophers since it only has to stop paying them and they will no longer be interested in "philosophizing". Besides, what the state wants, Nietzsche tells us, is not philosophers who undermine it (knowingly or not), but the production of useful and devoted citizens. Nietzsche shows "in deed" why, from the state's perspective, the philosopher should be persecuted by the state: because the philosopher tries to take the best and most useful young men away from the state and make them into true philosophers, those whom the state fears. Nietzsche has identified his preferred readers as the talented and spirited young men of society, perhaps the most talented. He has actively encouraged them to abandon money making, the state, science and culture in its present form. They are even encouraged by Nietzsche's example to abandon their biological parents and instead adopt as their father "anti-establishment" philosophers such as Schopenhauer, or even Nietzsche himself. The second and third rate talents are encouraged to combat everything in their time which stands in the way of the philosopher's production.

Nietzsche is right. The state should be angry since Nietzsche wants to take from it the most useful and talented young men and "corrupt" them against the state. Ironically, Nietzsche can prove

his usefulness to the state if he can antagonize the state enough that it will either persecute philosophy or at least not be interested in promoting it. Nietzsche writes, "If... a man should arise who really gave the impression of intending to apply the scalpel of truth to all things including the body of the state, then the state would, since it affirms its own existence above all else, be justified in expelling such a man and treating him as an enemy" (185). Nietzsche (and now not so much "Schopenhauer") appears to be just such a man. Because Nietzsche has cast doubt on the state's ability to distinguish between good and bad philosophers, it would be wise to rid itself of all academics who call themselves philosophers.² If this were to happen, then Nietzsche would be useful to philosophy too because the state would be following his advice and would be rid of bad philosophers, i.e., those philosophers who believe that philosophy is only a "frontier guard" for the sciences and who, therefore, make even true philosophy seem ludicrous by lending credence to the belief that there is no rational way to approach the questions concerning what is good for man. These are the philosophers who are the most dangerous, both to the state and to philosophy, because they are immoderate with respect to what they teach, and to whom they teach it, even when they teach what is politically dangerous.

¹ Cf. N Tarcov and T. Pangle, *Epilogue: Leo Strauss and the History of Political Philosophy*, in History of Political Philosophy, 3rd edition, L Strauss and J. Cropsey ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1987) p.911.

² In Nietzsche's unpublished notes we find a summary of the problem he is dealing with in this section.

There is a trick of holding oneself aloof from things solely by means of the words and names which one has conferred upon them: a foreign word frequently makes something which we are very well and intimately acquainted with foreign to us. When I say 'wisdom' and 'love of wisdom', I certainly feel something more familiar and powerful than when I say 'philosophy'. But as we said, the trick is sometimes precisely not to let things draw too near; for there often lies so much that is shameful in the familiar words. For who would not not be ashamed to call himself a 'wise man' or even merely 'one who is becoming wise'! But a 'philosopher'? This easily passes anyone's lips- nearly as easily as everyone uses the title 'doctor' [as in Ph.D.], without ever thinking of the arrogant confession which this title contains: the confession that one is a 'teacher',... Is what

we call philosophy today actually the love of wisdom? Does wisdom have any true friends at all today? Let us fearlessly replace the word 'philosophy' with 'love of wisdom': then it will become clear whether they are the same thing.

From "Philosophy in Hard Times", #47, found in Philosophy and Truth: selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's, Edited and Translated by D.Breazeeale, (New Jersey: Humanities Press,1979) p.108.

Epilogue

Nietzsche began this essay by stating that the young person should heed their inner admonition to search for themselves. Moreover, they should heighten the intensity of this inner admonition by acknowledging that it derives from an awareness of man's incompleteness. In order to become complete, man must discover what would perfect him, what he should be. This requires careful reflection on man's nature, what his limitations are and what heights it is possible for him to achieve. The highest existence is, however, revealed to be the existence dedicated to the discovery of what it means to be a human being. This is the philosophic quest, and through it the philosopher attains the highest development of man's rational powers. The search for answers is not fruitless, then, even if it is not in the final analysis a quest which results in answering any important questions with finality for humans being limited such as we are.

But because all men are not indifferent about issues concerning the good life, and about the good political system which promotes the good life, they will always be willing to resort to force to establish what they believe will result in their good, or the good of future generations. Philosophy will always be important, then, because it is the source of the most reasoned alternatives concerning what constitutes the best way of life and how to bring it about. But also because philosophers highlight the questionable character of any "final solution" to these questions. Philosophy is useful because it helps to moderate the fanatical attachment to utopias and, alternatively, because it provides the basis for a more reasoned and civilized means of considering the basic alternatives to the question of what is good for man.

Because the philosophic life is the highest existence for man, Nietzsche says, "of what concern to us is the existence of the state, the promotion of the universities, when what matters above all is the existence of philosophy on earth! or-- to leave absolutely no doubt as to what I think-- if it is so unspeakably more vital that a philosopher should appear on earth than that a state or a

university should continue to exist" (193). Philosophy is more important than a particular state or university, and yet we also know that Nietzsche is not indifferent to what kind of regime exists, precisely because he has spent so much energy discussing the conditions required to revitalize philosophy again in this age. We have argued that, despite their politically revolutionary tone, the bulk of the effective changes suggested in the essay will occur in the hearts and minds of Nietzsche's readers, and not in the constitution of governments, especially to the extent that Nietzsche's readers turn toward cultivating in themselves and in others a genuine appreciation of philosophy. Nonetheless, these new friends of philosophy will not be politically idle if they recognize in their own time the dangers to philosophy, and therewith to the dignity of man, which Nietzsche has so powerfully articulated in *Schopenhauer as Educator*.

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