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The State and Engineers: An Historical Examination of the Union of the Chambers of
Turkish Engineers and Architects

by

Fazýl Ahmet Öncü　　　Ⓒ

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology

Edmonton, Alberta

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
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled The State and Engineers: An Historical Examination of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects submitted by Fazýl Ahmet Öncü in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ÝKLÝM

Topraðýn da vardýr bir kiþiliði
Her insanýn nasýl bir iklimi varsa.
Bir topraðý anlatmak deðil mi ki,
Bir insaný anlatmaktýr biraz da.

Metin Altýok

ABSTRACT

This thesis is the first attempt to write the organizational history of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (UCTEA) from a sociological perspective. The purpose of this thesis is to understand why in the 1970s the leading organization of the engineers and architects of Turkey, the UCTEA, had become disenchanted with the Turkish state's ability to represent the interests of all groups and classes in society. Within this problematic, the thesis makes an inquiry into the organizational history of the UCTEA between 1954 and 1980 by contextualizing the actions of the members of the UCTEA in terms of social, economic, political and cultural conditions in different time periods. Based on this inquiry, it is argued that the majority of the members of the UCTEA of the 1970s had come to view the Turkish state as an organization usurped by the "dominant forces of society," and participated in a political struggle against the hegemony of dominant classes within the state and society.

The main resource that the UCTEA used in this mobilization was its claim to be the representative of modern technology in Turkey. The thesis argues that the UCTEA had discovered Thorstein Veblen's theory of the conflict between the productive forces of society and the subordination of industrial system to financial ends through the medium of the institution of private ownership. This discovery led the majority of the members of the UCTEA to see the state as the hegemony of the dominant classes because in the struggle between the productive classes and the dominant classes the state and its organizations had sided with the latter.

When the findings of this thesis are considered in terms of a comparative perspective, it can be argued that the progressive professional identity of engineers culturally constructed

in Turkey seems to be the outcome of various factors such as proletarianization, foreign dominance in the technical field, severe legitimation crisis of the state, and political culture. Thus engineers in Turkey and the history of their organization may furnish a unique case which can initiate a new debate on the role of technicians in political processes of capitalist countries.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

beautiful. She believes in magic just like her dad. "That is, what if listened for , that which

we seek."

Bilkent, Ankara
September 30, 1996

To Aype and Yasemin

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Man finds himself and his society through organizations

Charles Perrow

On March 1, 1975, the Board of General Directors of the Chamber of Architects of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Turk Muhendis Mimar Odalari Birligi, TMMOB, afterwards abbreviated as UCTEA) decided to initiate a survey research designed to gain insights into its members' opinions on "the position of engineers and architects in social relations." On May 6, 1975, the Board of General Directors of the UCTEA decided to support the Chamber of Architects in this endeavor. In addition to the Chamber of Architects, the Chambers of Civil Engineers, Chemical Engineers and Mining Engineers participated in the survey conducted in 1976.[1]

Table 1 presents the responses by year of graduation to one of the many questions included in the 1976 "Engineers-Architects" survey. The question is as follows: *"According to you, is the state over and above all groups and independent from them?"* Needless to say, this is a vague question as it does not refer to any particular group or class in relation to the state's autonomy from society. This vagueness may create some problems in interpreting the responses in that different generations may refer to different

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[1] Based on the close-end questionnaires, 38 interviewers conducted 1899 interviews in the country as a whole. The population of engineers and architects was 49,900; and the sample size was 2517. Thus, the response rate was about 76 %. The data collected were presented in the cross-tabulation form appeared in the book titled "Engineers-Architects" published by the Chamber of Architects in 1978. Table 1 is reproduced from the mentioned publication.

groups from which, they may think, the state is not independent. Still, however, the table appears to contain invaluable information regarding the contradictory conceptualizations of the state by the members of the UCTEA belonging to different generations.

Table 1: Graduation Year/ Opinion on the State

Graduation Year	State is independent	To a certain extent independent	State is not independent	No opinion	No answer
1930-1950	30.6	23.5	38.2	2.2	5.5
1951-1960	22.5	24.9	46.2	2.4	4.0
1961-1970	18.1	22.5	55.1	2.3	2.0
1971-1975	18.5	22.1	54.8	2.9	1.7
Overall	22.2	23.5	48.6	2.5	3.3

One can read from the table that the younger generation respondents have a significantly smaller percentage of their members (18 %) who think that the state is *independent* from social groups. In contrast, the oldest generation has about 31 % of its members believing in the state's autonomy from society. When one looks at the response "state is not independent," the younger generation respondents have 55 % of their members who think that the state is not independent from social groups. In brief, according to the numbers presented in Table 1, the younger the respondent is, the higher the likelihood that he thinks the state is not independent from some social groups. The question is *why* this is so. Another question is *what* these social groups are.

As mentioned already, the question regarding the opinion on the state is vague as it does not make any explicit reference to any social group. In other words, we don't know exactly which social group the engineers and architects who had participated in the survey had in their minds when they were answering this particular question. This vagueness can

be removed if and only if one makes an *historical* inquiry into the *organizational activities* of the UCTEA during the time this survey was conducted. However, until today this vagueness has not been removed. Since there has not been one single *comprehensive* work on the *history* of the UCTEA which has been active in the soil of Turkey as one of the leading democratic organizations since 1954.[2] And no one knows what the numbers in Table 1 tell.

One of the main contributions of this thesis is to fill this vacuum in the literature. This thesis is the first comprehensive attempt to write the *organizational history* of the UCTEA from a *sociological* perspective. The purpose of this research is to understand why in the 1970s the leading organization of the engineers and architects of Turkey, the UCTEA, had become disenchanted with the Turkish state's ability to represent the interests of all groups and classes in society. Another major contribution of this thesis is to explain the reason why a majority of the members of the UCTEA had come to view the Turkish state as an organization usurped by the dominant forces of society, and participated in a political struggle against the hegemony of dominant classes in the state and society. In this sense, this thesis aims to explain the *history* behind the numbers presented in Table 1. In other words, this thesis provides an historically situated theory for the numbers in Table 1.

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[2] I should mention here that Tanık's (1991) periodization of the organizational history of the UCTEA in terms of its "effectiveness" and Kunar's (1991) characterization of the engineers and architects of the UCTEA belonging to different generations are two exceptional journal articles on the organizational history of the UCTEA. Without these authors' articles, I wouldn't understand the rich content of the historical material I use in this thesis. It is my intellectual duty and happiness to acknowledge the significant contributions of these authors to my understanding of the UCTEA as a "democratic organization." In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 I attempt to relate my findings with the accounts of these authors.

I should mention that Table 1 challenges sociologists in terms of two major theoretical questions. The first theoretical question is about the nature of the modern capitalist state. It is a well known fact that the sociological literature on the modern state is divided into two traditions (Barkey and Parikh, 1991; Schwartz, 1990; Alford and Friedland, 1985; Berberoglu, 1990). On one side, there is the *state autonomy tradition*, which accords the modern state the power to pursue goals without being dominated/controlled by the demands of social groups and classes (Skocpol, 1985; Islamoglu and Keyder, 1987; Keyder, 1987, 1988). On the other side, there is the state as a "dependent variable in the research" tradition (Barkey and Parikh, 1991:546). This tradition sees the state as an expression of "values, interests, and imperatives that cannot be understood in any meaningful way except as part of the whole society" (Alford and Friedland, 1985:26).

When posed against the division in the sociological literature on the state, the numbers in Table 1 appear to raise a critical question against the state autonomy tradition. Regardless of their generational differences, the majority of the respondents from the UCTEA of the 1970s think that *the modern state cannot be accorded autonomy*. This thesis argues that the unique nature of the state-society relationship in Turkey helps the members of the UCTEA discover the *hegemony* of the dominant classes in the state and participate in the formation of an alliance of progressive forces in opposition to the interests of hegemonic classes. The thesis introduces the engineers and architects of the UCTEA of the 1970s as social actors capable of producing *a sphere of autonomy* (Harris, 1990:200) against the hegemony of dominant classes in the state and society. In this

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sense, by making an inquiry into the organizational history of the UCTEA, this thesis also makes a contribution to a better understanding of the nature of the Turkish state's dependence on the dynamics of civil society in Turkey. By emphasizing the importance of society in understanding the nature of the modern state, this thesis also joins "the increasing trend": the movement away from the state autonomy tradition (Barkey and Parikh, 1991).

The second theoretical question raised by the numbers in Table 1 is about the role of engineers, understood as the technical labor force of a modern society, in the contest of various social classes comprising, what is sometimes called, civil society. Similar to the literature on the state, the sociological theories of *the* engineer can be divided into two approaches (Zussman, 1985; Crawford, 1989). On one side, there is the *professionalization* approach, which considers *the* engineer as one of the professionals seeking to control a market for their technical expertise (Larson, 1972; Bell, 1973; Freidson, 1973). On the other side, there is the *proletarianization* approach, which considers *the* engineer as a member of the (new) working class exploited by the capitalist class (Gorz, 1967; Mallet, 1975; Braverman, 1974; Wright, 1976, 1978). This approach attempts to delineate the conditions under which the engineer can gain its true *proletarian* class consciousness and choose to lead the working class in the fight against the capitalist class.

Recently some theorists inclined toward a more ideographic and historical research tradition have criticized both the professionalization and the proletarianization approaches for being too abstract and lacking empirical content. In the last decade, Zussman (1985), Whalley (1986) and Crawford (1989) have argued that there is no

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engineer but *engineers.* Zussman (1985), Whalley (1986) and Crawford (1989) examine the work, careers and politics of engineers in America, Britain and France, respectively. Based on the research findings of these writers, it is possible to argue that there exist significant differences among the American, the British and the French engineers in terms of socio-economic status, socialization backgrounds, educational qualifications, the position occupied in organizational hierarchies and the utilization of engineering expertise in different sectors. Yet there also appears to be a common element that ties them together in the category of the engineer in the advanced Western countries. That is, a considerable degree of discretion at their jobs is delegated to these engineers that renders them, according to Whalley (1986:194), "trusted workers." By coining the term "trusted workers," Whalley (1986) argues that the engineer is a part of the team, the management, whose function is to organize production processes in terms of the requirements of capitalist market relations. In his words,

> Engineering and managerial positions are routinely part of the same career line. In Britain they offer alternative routes for securing job satisfaction, whereas in France they are both an integral part of the engineer's role. In either case the similarity of interests that engineers share with managers as trusted workers is far more critical in defining their joint class interest than any issue of diverse training or functional specialization (Whalley, 1986:195).

What Whalley argues for the social class identity of the British and the French engineers echoes Nobel's (1977) claims regarding the engineer's position in the contest of various classes. Based on his research on the American engineer, Nobel (1977) argues that as an employee hired by the capitalist corporation, the engineer is the producer of the capitalist technical possibilities. The engineer's production of capitalist technical possibilities gives the capitalist class yet another tool for controlling and holding down the economically disadvantage groups and classes. In this sense, the engineer's participation in a political struggle against the hegemony of the capitalist class in the state and society is a remote

possibility. In brief, the engineer appears to be a happy employee of the capitalist organization and largely an apolitical citizen of his country, or perhaps just a voter.

By returning to Table 1 at this point, we can raise some critical questions against the engineer as an apolitical actor notion. If the engineer were an apolitical actor, why would then a group of engineers and architects want to conduct survey research and learn about the "position of engineers and architects in social relations" in their country ? Why would they want to know what the members of their organization think about the position of the state vis-à-vis social groups in their society? Why would they want to know how many of their members think that the state is not independent from some social groups? In short, why were the engineers and architects of the UCTEA of the 1970s interested in politics? The answer lies in the historical trajectory and the contingently achieved activities of the members of the UCTEA: Because of the unique nature of the state-society relation in Turkey, the engineers and architects of the UCTEA of the 1970s had moved away from being happy employees of capitalist organizations to being political activists who were critical of the hegemony of the "dominant forces of society" in the state and society.

It is hardly new to say that "knowledge is power." It can be argued that by knowing more about the opinions of the members of their organization, the active members of the UCTEA had wanted to empower themselves in their struggle against the hegemonic classes. In this sense, the "Engineers-Architects" survey was itself a form of political action. Surely, this and other similar surveys were not constituting the prime source of their power. This thesis argues that the essential source of power of the engineers and architects of the UCTEA rested in their claim to be the representatives of modern technology in their country. According to a majority of its members, the UCTEA represented an economic power, *technology*, which was, due to its "universality," considered to be "always a transformative and revolutionary force of production." Coming together around the idea of technology they thus defined, the politically active members of the UCTEA of the 1970s aimed to stop the monopolization of the benefits of / control

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over the uses of modern technology by the dominant classes of society, whose sectional class interests were hindering the optimum use of technology "in the attempt to satisfy the needs of all levels of society." If anything, they became the ideal type Veblenian technicians.

Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) was one of the few social theorists who conceived of modern technology as the all-inclusive organizing principle of modern society (Davis, 1980). He argued that social institutions and individual actions reflect technological and economic factors. Technological factors include not only techniques of work but also techniques of thinking and questioning. In the industrial era, Veblen thought, industrial technology reflective of "the logic of machine" leads to a constant search for an improvement in efficiency and productivity, i.e., technological change, and hence an increase in the well-being of the community. Thus, according to Veblen, technological change appears to be the most dynamic element of modern society and its institutions.

It is important to note, however, that "Veblen was not a technological determinist. He did not see technological change as leading ineluctably to particular kinds of social change." (Lauer, 1991:161). Veblen did not assign any teleological power to the industrial technology. For him, modern technology could furnish a vision for a new order in which individuals could enjoy a high standard of living that cannot be hindered by any sectional interest. This new order would be different from the social organization existing in Veblen's times in which industry was subordinated to financial ends through the medium of the institution of ownership (Davis, 1980:86). The new order would have institutions which would not be associated with "business," but with the guidance of "the state of the industrial arts," or technology. That is why Veblen "advocated the idea of the technologically minded -- the engineers and technicians -- becoming the leaders in a new social order." Under the leadership of technicians, the "new order would be a kind of self-governing industrial organization, with an emphasis on efficiency and productivity and a consequent maximizing of the well-being of all." (Lauer, 1991:162).

In sum, Veblen's theory of industrial society rests on the idea that the industrial logic of material production contradicts the logic of financial profit making. He contemplates that technicians may eventually discover the conflict because of their being familiar with the workings of the industry, and attempt to challenge the hegemony of the capitalist class over the organization of the industrial system. It should be mentioned, however, that Veblen is vague about the clarification of social and political conditions under which engineers might choose to oppose the hegemony of the economically dominant class. In this sense, Veblen should be considered more as an enigmatic theorist who provides interesting insights into the relationship between the craft of engineering and their potential images of the world. In other words, the implications of Veblen's idealization of the technician as one of the leading radical actors must be worked out in terms of a theoretical framework which can elucidate the concrete social and political conditions facilitating the radicalization of technicians.

When compared to the research findings on the engineers of the advanced Western countries, it is not difficult to reject Veblen's theory of the engineer. Since, as mentioned earlier, in the advanced Western countries engineers as trusted workers appear to be content with the leadership of the capitalist class over the totality of the material production of society. Thus, it is not difficult to write off Veblen from social theory by seeing him as a dreamer, or utopian. This thesis argues that Veblen was not a dreamer because what he speculated as a possibility became contingently a reality in a social context, Turkey, of which he might never have thought. In the 1970s, the engineers and architects of the UCTEA thought that it was the requirement of their profession to make sure no group could obstruct the material well being of all in the community. These engineers and architects viewed themselves as the organizers of a new self governing industrial system in which vested interests would not be allowed to interfere with the community's welfare.

The theoretical perspective and the unit of analysis

Before moving on to an overview of the chapters, I have to clarify the social theory perspective to which I adhere, and why I use *the* organization, and not *the* individual engineer, as the unit of analysis. It is widely known that in terms of ontological assumptions, social theory is divided into objectivist and subjectivist approaches. The objectivist approach sees the action of individuals as outcomes of structural laws, existing independently from human consciousness. The subjectivist approach sees the motive of individuals' actions as the outcome of their subjectivity and free will. The social theory perspective that guides this study is neither objectivist nor subjectivist. It is informed by Anthony Giddens' (1984) structuration theory which offers a unique synthesis of objectivism and subjectivism, and Antonio Gramsci's (1971) theory of politics which offers a strategic theory of political action.

As it is well-known, the core notion of Giddens's structuration theory is "the duality of structure." By this term, Giddens refers to the fact that there is no structure without action, and there is no action without structure:

> All structural properties of social systems . . . are the *medium* and *outcome* of the *contingently* accomplished activities of situated actors. (Giddens, 1984:191).

Here the term *social system* refers to social relations patterned across time and space. Social systems differ from each other according to their structural properties. Structures specify which type of action is more likely to be taken in a social system. Understood as such, structures are known by actors, as actors are situated within structures.

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As Munch (1993:177) emphasizes, Giddens thinks of the *knowledgeability* of actors as the key determinant of the continuation or transformation of structures. The argument is that the more social interaction involves the knowledgeability of actors, the higher the rate of transformation of structures. With this argument Giddens draws closer to Gramsci's criticism of "mechanical historical materialism" as he, like Gramsci, moves away from the passive to the active side, i.e., the agency of actors or their ability to make history.

Similar to Giddens' structuration theory, Gramscian realist theory of politics and society aims to bring to the fore the *contingently* achieved activities of situated actors. Surely, this theoretical stand appears to be antithetical to what Gramsci refers to as "economistic materialism" or "mechanical materialism." Because:

> Mechanical historical materialism does not allow for the possibility of *error*, but assumes that every political act is determined, immediately, by the structure, and therefore as a real and permanent (in the sense of achieved) modification of the structure. (Gramsci, 1971:408).

In other words, mechanical historical materialists know that "men make their own history." But they seem to forget that humans do not make history just in terms of some structural requirements. "Men make their own history, . . . , under circumstances *directly* encountered, given, and transmitted from the past" (Marx, 1869). According to Gramsci, one of the encountered, given, and transmitted, and hence *known* circumstances that condition individuals' actions, especially their political actions, is the *organization*, be this a party, church, or society as a whole:

> It is not sufficiently borne in mind that many political acts are due to *internal necessities of an organisational character*, that is they are tied to the need to give *coherence* to a party, a group, a society. This is made clear for example in the history of the Catholic Church. If, for every ideological struggle within the Church one wanted to find an immediate primary explanation in the structure one would really be caught napping: all

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sorts of politico-economic romances have been written for this reason. It is evident on the contrary that the majority of these discussions are connected with *sectarian and organisational necessities* (Gramsci, 1971:408).

In short, understanding actions requires examining the internal necessities of an organization within which these actions are taken by historically situated and knowledgeable individuals. At the heart of this examination is the issue of giving *coherence* to an organization and how and why *organizational necessities* occupy the primary role in activating individuals toward change, i.e., making history. Here making history refers to actions starting from given organizational settings and contributing to their transformation. This is the fundamental reason why instead of *the* engineer or *the* technocrat, the organization of engineers, the UCTEA, is chosen as the unit of analysis in this thesis. Having said this however, I should emphasize that I do not overlook the role of the engineer as an individual actor. On the contrary, I attempt to contextualize the action of the engineer in terms of organizational necessities that may *contingently* lead the engineer toward making history by discovering the power and domination relations prevailing in civil society. Thus, the next question is how to contextualize individuals' actions in terms of organizational necessities.

The "fields of interaction" framework: contextualization of action

J.B. Thompson's (1990) conceptualization of "field of interaction" may help one to contextualize the actions of knowledgeable actors in terms of organizational necessities. Following Bourdieu, Thompson defines a field of interaction in the following manner:

> A field of interaction can be conceptualized synchronically as a space of positions and diachronically as a set of trajectories. Particular individuals are situated at certain positions within this social space and they follow, in the course of their lives, certain trajectories. (Thompson, 1990:147-48).

Based on this definition, J.B. Thompson (1990:148) refers to three essential kinds of resources or "capital" specifying these positions and trajectories: economic capital, cultural capital and symbolic capital. Economic capital is comprised of property, wealth and financial assets of various kinds. Cultural capital contains *knowledge*, skills and differing types of educational qualifications. Finally, symbolic capital includes the accumulated praise, prestige, and recognition associated with a person or position or gender or race.

Having defined the field of interaction and particular kinds of capital that specify positions and trajectories located within fields of interaction, J.B. Thompson argues that

> Within any given field of interaction, individuals draw upon these differing kinds of resources in order to pursue their particular aims. They may also seek opportunities to convert resources of one type into resources of another (Thompson, 1990:148).

A particular case which is congruent with the purpose of the question posed in this thesis is the attempt to convert cultural capital to symbolic capital. For example, the cultural capital comprised of *knowledge* of the engineering position can be used to gain prestige and recognition associated with this position, which in turn may lead to further increases in the cultural capital of engineering, and so on. Needless to say, within this process, the engineer gains knowledge about his knowledge, and hence increases his potential for transforming structures.

According to Thompson (1990:148), in pursuing such aims and interests within fields of interaction, individuals also "typically draw upon *rules and conventions . . .* [which] are implicit, unformulated, informal, imprecise." For example, a sensational scolding such as asking the dismissal of a minister from the membership of an association in order to compensate the loss of prestige and recognition that have ensued from the

government action taken by that member-minister may be an unformulated, informal and imprecise rule and convention of a field of interaction. Another example might be making feverish speeches directed at the "concerned individuals" in order to make them "get involved." Thompson conceptualizes such rules and conventions as *"flexible schemata which orientate individuals in the course of their everyday lives, without ever being raised to the level of explicit and well-formulated precepts."* It is indeed this particular characteristic of fields of interaction that differentiates them from *social institutions* or *organizations* per se such as General Motors, the University of Alberta or the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects.

Social institutions or organizations as goal-directed and deliberately structured activity systems can be seen as relatively stable clusters of rules and resources, together with the social relations that are established by them and within them.(Thompson, 1990). In other words, organizations -- unlike fields of interactions -- have rules and conventions which are usually explicit and well-formulated. One of the well-formulated and explicit rules of any organization is to define an identifiable boundary between itself and its external environment. As Daft (1992) puts it,

> An organization can be tightly interconnected with elements in the external environment, but the organization must maintain itself as an entity distinct from the environment. A visible boundary is a necessary characteristic of organizing. . . . When people are organized into an [organization] to accomplish a goal, they become a *social entity* distinct from other [organizations]. (Daft, 1992:8).

The interesting point to note in this quotation is that organizations, however well-formulated their precepts and identifiable boundaries, are still *social entities*, and hence largely influenced by fields of interactions in both their internal and external environments. That is why organizations

can be seen as constellations of rules, resources and relations which are situated within, and at the same time create fields of interaction. When a specific [organization] is set up, it gives shape to pre-existing fields of interaction, and at the same time it creates a new set of positions and possible trajectories. (Thompson, 1990:149).

What fields of interactions may have in common with organizations is that they can also be "structured" social entities or what Thompson calls "social structures." As social structures, they are characterized by "relatively stable asymmetries and differentials in terms of the distribution of, and access to, resources . . ., power, opportunities and life chances" (Thompson, 1990:150). Seeing fields of interaction as social structures that may include organizations within themselves provides an interesting understanding for the question of how fields and organizations are related to each other. For example, the field of engineering in a particular country at a particular point in time can be characterized by a set of organizations such as the government, the ministry of public works, universities and technical schools, private and public engineering companies, associations and unions of technical employees and of other professionals and so on in determinate relations to one another which *structure* this field. Then, each particular organization within this field can be characterized by the structured asymmetries and differentials specific to each organization such as between the minister and top-administrators, between top-administrators and staff engineers, between private sector and public sector engineers, between old and young engineers, between capitalist contractors and engineer contractors, and so on. Since organizations are located within the field, specifying how each organization is structured is also to specify in part how the field is structured.

The importance of the concepts of fields of interaction, organizations and social structures is that "they enable us to grasp the social features of the contexts within which

individuals act and interact." (Thompson, 1990:150). Thus the more we learn about the resources or capital, rules, conventions and schemata as well as structured asymmetries and differentials constitutive of social contexts the more we understand why particular individuals in these contexts take particular actions, including political, and interact in the particular ways they do. For example, it becomes possible to understand why members of an engineering organization who have ideally and officially come together to protect and augment their group interests may still lack *cohesiveness* long after their organization has been founded. Surely, in such a case, it becomes relatively uncomplicated to see why some other members may want to attempt to transform, if I use Bourdieu's terminology, the habitus of the group by redefining the relationship between the three types of capital and the rules and conventions of their flexible schemata. This might involve a critique of the mission, goal and effectiveness of the organization, which is mediated by the mentality of the engineering profession. If we really observe that such a transformatory agency is emerging from some internal organizational necessities, we can understand how this agency may spill over to other organizations through the passages provided by the fields of interaction within and outside the organization in question. We can now understand how a minor issue in a minor organization may have major implications for the macro setting of a particular social formation and vice versa. In brief, the concept of a field of interaction allows us to examine the interactions between the state and society in a more informed and historically sensible manner.

Outline of the thesis

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to explain why engineers, understood as the technical labor force of a modern society, may take sides with subordinate groups and classes against the hegemony of a dominant class in the state. With respect to Gramsci's (1971) conceptualizations of the state, civil society and hegemony, I argue that the modern state is both the hegemony of the ruling class and at the same time its dictatorship. Following this discussion, by drawing upon Harris's (1990) conceptualization of autonomy, I try to contextualize the meaning of autonomy in opposition to hegemony in the state and society. The second part of the chapter deals with the role of engineers in the production of autonomy in opposition to the hegemony of dominant lasses. In answering this question, I make an inquiry into Thorstein Veblen's theory of industrial society and the engineer, or the technician. In concluding the chapter, I clarify the social and political conditions under which engineers may attempt to free themselves from the hegemony of the economically dominant class and transform themselves into autonomous social agents.

In Chapter 3, I make an inquiry into the history of struggles for hegemony in the state in Turkey in the twentieth century up to 1980. The key issue addressed in the chapter is whether the Turkish state has formulated goals for itself independently from the demands and interests of dominant social groups and classes, and whether the engineers and their organization, the UCTEA, have opposed the hegemony in the state and society, and struggled for the political production of a sphere of autonomy as defined in Chapter 2. Based on the historical inquiry focusing on this key question, I conclude the chapter that long years of hegemonic crisis in the state, reflective of the internal divisions of the ruling class had reached a climax in the 1970s, especially after the 12 March 1971 military coup.

The deepening of hegemonic crisis and the UCTEA's participation in the struggle against the power/domination relations in society seemed to be associated. It was in the 1970s that the UCTEA had taken a leading role in the democratic movement against oppression. In concluding the chapter, I argue that this observation on the UCTEA's becoming a politically active organization in the 1970s supports the arguments made in Chapter 2 .

In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 I examine the organizational history of the UCTEA between 1954 and 1980 from the field of interaction framework suggested earlier in this chapter. This framework allows me to contextualize the actions of the members of the UCTEA in terms of a set of economic, cultural and symbolic capital as well as a definite flexible schemata of the field of engineering in different time periods. Drawing upon the theoretical claims made in Chapter 2 and Tanik's (1991) arguments, I divide the organizational history of the UCTEA into three periods, 1954-1965, 1965-1970 and 1971-1980. The first period, 1954-1965, the subject matter of Chapter 4, is characterized by the assertion on the part of the active founders and members of the UCTEA that the "Turkish" engineer has as much knowledge of technology as the "foreign experts" employed by Turkish governments. This is the period in which the UCTEA increased the symbolic capital of engineering and made a claim to be the organization that could play a leading role in the industrialization process. The second period, 1965-1970, examined in Chapter 5, is characterized by the discovery of technology's implication in the overall social organization of the industrialization process, including political, cultural and legal aspects. In this period, by challenging the first generation members of the UCTEA, a young group of engineers and architects aims to redefine the requirements of their profession and the

goals of their organization by taking into account the conflict between technology as a means of producing the material well-being of people at large and the interests of the dominant ⸝rces of society. The third period, 1971-1980, examined in Chapter 6, is the period in which the UCTEA becomes an organization struggling against hegemonic power in the state and society in order to remove socially formed obstacles to the full utilization of technology for the benefit of all in society.

In Chapter 7, I reconsider the theoretical, empirical and political implications of the findings of the thesis by focusing on the class and professional identity formation of engineers and architects in Turkey in the period of 1950-1980. Finally, I suggest some questions for further research.

CHAPTER 2

THE STATE AND ENGINEERS: HEGEMONY VERSUS AUTONOMY

The earthquake in Lice and its villages was fatal. A large number of our humans suddenly lost their lives. Lice which is now a mass of rock and soil became a graveyard to several souls well-above the numbers given in the official statements. Surely, this is a very sad thing. Yet in Diyarbakir and its environs another disaster which is more widespread, more effective and in the long term silently and openly kills larger communities reigns: Unemployment.

We had written on the cover of the Union News "those responsible for the lives lost are the governments which are not siding with the people." We have already been aware of the unemployment issue. Yet after seeing the large human crowds sitting in coffee houses we [want to] reiterate the same judgment: those responsible for souls perishing of unemployment are the exploitative capitalists who are dependent on imperialism and *their* fascist and chauvinist governments.

From the Union Of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects' *Experts'* *Report* **on the 1975 Lice Earthquake**

Introduction

This chapter makes a theoretical inquiry into the question why engineers, understood as the technical labor *force* of a modern society, may take sides with subordinate groups and classes against the hegemony of a dominant class *in the state*. In connection with this question, it also examines the conditions in the state and society under which engineers *can* play leading roles in the formation of collective social projects aiming to change power, domination relations in civil society. Focusing on these questions requires one to take a stand on the state's relation to the whole society. This is hardly

surprising because no theory can be built without taking a stand on the categories abstracted from the practical social life.

Sociologists are divided on the question of the distinction between the state and society (Alford and Friedland, 1985; Berberoglu, 1990; Barkey and Parikh, 1991). In the first part of the chapter, I attempt to clarify the key issue involved in the division of sociologists regarding the nature of the relationship between the state and society. Following this brief discussion, I attempt to outline the essential aspects of my position on the state-society distinction. Here I focus on Gramsci's conceptualizations of the state, civil society, and hegemony. Gramsci's formulations allow me to argue that the modern state is both the hegemony of the ruling class *and at the same time* its dictatorship. To put it differently, the ruling class should establish its ethical-cultural leadership not only in society but also in the activities and organizations of the state, including the state's coercive organizations such as the army and the police. This theoretical positioning makes it possible to answer whether the state can be seen as the realm of autonomy (understood as the political production of ethical universal) -- i.e., an ethical principle which does not represent any sectional interest (Harris, 1990). I argue that the state cannot furnish the basis for the production of autonomy as it is the "apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes" (Gramsci, 1971:258). By drawing upon Harris's (1990) conceptualization of autonomy, I try to contextualize the meaning of autonomy in opposition to the hegemony in the state and society. Harris (1990:200) argues that autonomy can be constructed politically (collectively) by opposing a state which is broadly

seen to no longer represent the ethically universal but a sectional interest, viz., the ethical values of a dominant group or class.

The section on Veblen's work attempts to discuss Veblen's theory of engineers, especially what he takes to be the contradiction between the engineers and the market system. Though Veblen is vague about the clarification of the social and political conditions under which engineers might challenge the hegemony of the ruling classes, he provides interesting insights into the relationship between the craft of engineers and their potential images of the world.

The Mystery About the Modern State

The question whether the state has a distinct capacity over and above society has always been a controversial one. Not surprisingly, taking a strong position in this debate has always been problematic. Skocpol (1985) may provide a basis for discussing the reason why this has been so. Skocpol's (1985) purpose is to "bring the state back" into the examination of the pattern and direction of social change in such a way that in the analysis the state ceases to be an epiphenomenal actor. In other words, the state becomes an actor whose motives are more than mere reflections of certain powerful groups in society. She wants to emphasize that the state is an autonomous agent as much, if not more, as any other social group :

> States conceived as *organizations* claiming control over territories and people *may* formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society. This is what is meant by "state autonomy." (Skocpol, 1985:9).

Thus, for Skocpol (1985), states *may* formulate goals for themselves. Here the "may" also refers to the other possibility that states sometimes may not formulate goals

independently from the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society. In other words, entering the realm of the state/society nexus is to enter the realm of historical contingencies in the first place. Unlike what one may possibly think, the latter is not the realm of *mystery* in which everything appears to be possible. Quite the contrary, this is a realm in which only certain things are possible. In a different manner, the possibility of certain things resides in the historical contingency, and not in any *a priori* theory. This is essentially because:

> Social life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the *comprehension* of this practice. (Marx, 1843, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Feuer, 1959:245).

In this sense, the first task in reaching the *practical* foundation of the question at hand is to understand the *mystery* about the nature of the modern state. Here the *mystery* refers to the question of whether modern states formulate goals for themselves independently from the demands and interests of dominant social groups or not. In the case of Turkey, however, it is relatively unproblematic to begin with a theory of hegemony along the lines of Gramsci. We can set aside the question of whether modern states have autonomy vis-a-vis the dominant classes and groups.

The State: "Hegemony Protected by the Armour of Coercion"

As Kiros (1985) argues, Gramsci is an enigmatic writer whose concepts involve rich ambiguities resulting in an equally rich proliferation of perspectives. Just like Veblen and other enigmatic writers, Gramsci develops concepts that are rich if used in a historically specific way. The reader of *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* usually feels cheated by his author because in the middle of the most exciting plot Gramsci may move

from there to another plot with a different setting. One of the reasons of Gramsci's unpredictable writing behaviour should be searched in the difficulties of the prison conditions. In other words, we should always remember that Gramsci was writing in a prison. Without rejecting the adverse influence of prison life on his writing, it can also be suggested that Gramsci moves seemingly erratically from one setting to another because he wants us to see how everything social is inextricably implicated in all other aspects of social life. Thus, by beginning with the intellectual, for example, he may want to take us to a journey in the school, from the school to the factory, from the factory to the court, from the court to the university, from the university to the church, from the church to the party, from the party to the army, from the army back to the intellectual.

In one of the journeys with Gramsci, Sassoon (1987) takes note of one of the sayings of our guide squeezed in a footnote. Sassoon, reflecting on this footnote, notes:

> Gramsci uses the concept of *hegemony* to describe a *modern state*, and it is indeed an integral part of the very definition of a modern state and arises from the development of *modern society. It was not part of ancient and feudal society.* (Sassoon, 1987:113)

Sassoon's suggestion has utmost significance in understanding the modern state from a Gramscian perspective since, most of the time, hegemony is treated as if it has been always a part of the state *as such*. This might be true, however, it is definitely not a Gramscian understanding; and if we want to understand Gramsci we have to agree with Sassoon. Because as Gramsci says: The modern state differs from earlier forms of the state in that the latter were, "in a certain sense, a mechanical bloc of social groups" (Gramsci, 1971:54). The modern state, however, melts this mechanical bloc in "the active hegemony of the directive and dominant group" (Ibid).

This meaning of hegemony becomes helpful in understanding the officialdom -- or what can be called the state class -- as an integral part of *only* the modern constitutional state. In a feudal society, as Oppenheimer (1914:264) says, "as long as the nobles ruled the state, they exploited it as they would have managed an estate . . ." In other words, the feudal ruling class did not have to take into account the interest of the *individual* because the interests and rights of the individual, as being a member of one of the mechanical groups, was unconditionally fixed by the legal-political contract defining the estate-like state. Yet with the rise of modern society, the estate lost its power to make contracts with "fixed" social groups. Instead of the estate, it is now capitalism, the movable estate, which, needing *individuals* to realize its goals, became the basis of the organization of social life. This change in the leading social contracting agent led to an important change in the organization of the state. In the words of Oppenheimer (1914:264-265):

> When the bourgeoisie obtains mastery, the state is exploited as though it were a factory. And the *class religion covers all defects, as long as they can be endured with its* "don't touch the foundations of society."

Thus both Oppenheimer with his concept of *officialdom* and Gramsci with his concept of *hegemony* draw attention to a new elite, which, as it will be taken up later, Veblen refers to as "business men." The new elite, instead of saying "don't touch my state," say now "don't touch the foundations my society." When it comes to the state, the new elite say: "The state is all ours. Let our statesmen do their business."

It can be argued that the phenomena of officialdom and hegemony are closely related with each other. In the first place, they emerge simultaneously. They are the

products of modern capitalist society. Yet they are not the same for the important reason that they arise from two different needs. Hegemony, following Oppenheimer, can be defined as the expanding "class religion" of the social group which is dominant in the organization of the modern material life. Yet "A social group . . .," says Gramsci (1971:57-58), "becomes dominant when it exercises power." He then immediately adds: "[But] even if it holds [the power] firmly in its grasp, it must continue to *lead* as well." Thus, more than holding the power, hegemony derives from the need to "lead" in order for remaining to be dominant in the economic organization of modern society.

Although hegemony is a process initiated by the existence of a class monopoly over the organization of the economic means of a modern society, it is not limited only to the realm of material production. Rather than being a process leading to a "definitive point of view" maintaining the class monopoly of the dominant group in the economy, hegemony is a claim to "intellectual and moral leadership" over the totality of social existence (Bobbio, 1988; Bocock, 1986) -- i.e., a search for leadership originating within and from the realm of the economy yet stretching towards the organization of the political and cultural institutions. So much so that hegemony is directed more to the officialdom, and hence the state, than the subordinate groups whose social position is defined by the domination relations existing in the economy. In other words, *hegemony must exist in both the state and civil society* if the dominant group is going to dominate the life process of all, i.e., the nation living within the borders of the state.

The need for the organization of hegemony within the state involves the officialdom whose task is to rule the common affairs of the polity without appearing to act

primarily on behalf of any particular group in civil society. In other words, the actions of

officialdom separated formally from the private realm should be carefully taken into

account in gaining the leadership of the nation. On this issue Oppenheimer has an

interesting point to make:

> [The master class] in every state uses the administration of the state in the interest of
> those belonging to it under a twofold aspect. In the first place it reserves to its adherents
> all prominent places and all offices of influence and of profit, in the army, in the
> superior branches of government service, and in places on the bench; and secondly, by
> these very agencies, it directs the entire policy of the state, causes its class-politics to
> bring about commercial laws, colonial policies, protective tariffs, legislation in some
> degree improving the conditions of the labouring class, electoral reform policies etc. . . .
> (Oppenheimer, 1914:26).

Based on Oppenheimer's observations, it can be suggested that the moral leadership of the

dominant group must include the leadership in the state. By emphasizing the need for

hegemony in the state, Gramsci gets near to Oppenheimer's understanding of the master

class's powerful influence on the officialdom, and hence the state. Here Gramsci's

conceptualization of the "political society " and the "civil society" as "superstructural

levels" should be remembered:

> What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural "levels": the one
> that can be called civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called
> "private", and that of "political society" or the "State". The two levels correspond on the
> one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout
> the society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised
> through the state and juridical government. (Gramsci,1971:12).

Some of the important terms in this passage deserve to be elaborated carefully. It is

apparent that to Gramsci, "civil society" and "political society" are separated from each

other yet they still belong to the same realm -- the so-called superstructure -- as two

different levels of it. By the term political society what Gramsci refers to is what

Oppenheimer calls as the officialdom. Thus had not the officialdom gained a separate

existence apart from all economic classes, there would not have been two levels of the so-called superstructure. In other words, in the absence of the formal separation of the private and the public, the hegemonic leadership understood as the ethical-political directing within civil society would be sufficient to ensure the hegemonic leadership in the political society. With the separation, however, the command exercised through the state and juridical government have become external to the dominant group, as much as they are external to the subordinate groups. Now, just like the subordinate groups, the state needs to be directed in terms of the interests of the dominant group, if the dominant group is going to lead.

According to Gramsci, the creation of a certain "conception of the Law" becomes the most important task in the dominant group's gaining the hegemony in the state. Taken by itself the general notion of the law is important because it "is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilising activity undertaken by the State" (Gramsci, 1971:247). Thus, the dominant group should do everything to stop the emergence of a conception of the law that may contradict the foundation of its organization of "collective life and individual relations," namely, the foundation of civil society.

> If every state tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and of citizen (and hence of collective life and of individual relations), and *to eliminate certain customs and attitudes* and to disseminate others, then the Law will be its instrument for this purpose (together with the school system, and other institutions and activities.) [The law] must be developed so that it is suitable for such a purpose . . . (Gramsci, 1971:246).

This passage can also be interpreted in the following manner: By developing a certain conception of the Law, the dominant group aims to create a moral order that maintains its ethical-political leadership not only in civil society but also in the organizations and

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activities of the state. In this sense, the state becomes the key agent in the dissemination of

the *ethical principle* of the dominant group. Thus,

> [The] State must be conceived of as an "educator," in as much as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilization. Because one is acting essentially on economic forces, reorganising and developing the apparatus of economic production, creating a new structure, the conclusion must not be drawn that superstructural factors should be left to themselves, to a haphazard and sporadic germination. The State, in [the] field of [the Law], too, is an instrument of "*rationalisation*", of *acceleration* and of Taylorisation. (Gramsci, 1971:247).

In other words, as Oppenheimer argues, if the dominant group is going to be not only

dominant but also "leading," the modern state must also be organized like a *factory*, i.e., a

production organization with a definite goal, mission and philosophy as well as

hierarchical positions defining a functional division of labour. Once the state gains a

machine-like existence in this manner, it can be accoi ... d some power of independence

from the day to day politics of the dominant group, provided that no state activity can

"touch the foundation" of the dominant group's civil society. Then, the dominant group

can use most of its "energy" in "civil society" in which individuals and groups interact on

the basis of the Law now subdued to the requirements of the dominant group's hegemony.

In this ideal condition, hegemony appears to be *the enslavement of the legally liberated*

individuals within the "class religion" disseminated by the dominant group. Thus, in this

condition, the state truly becomes the state of the dominant group, although the

officialdom appears to be completely separated from the private realm. In short, hegemony

is exercised both in the state and civil society, since "the general activity of law"

establishes

> the correspondence "spontaneously and freely accepted" between the acts and the admissions of each individual, between the conduct of each individual and the ends which society sets itself as *necessary* — a correspondence which is coercive in the sphere of positive law *technically* understood, and is spontaneous and free (more strictly

ethical) in those zones in which "coercion" is not a State affair but is effected by public opinion, moral climate, etc. (Gramsci, 1971:195-196).

The discussion up to now draws attention to one of the complex concepts of social theory, that is, *ideology*. More than any other formulation of the concept of ideology, it is Riceour's (1986) definition of it as "the claim to legitimacy" that appears to have close affinities with Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony as "spontaneously and freely accepted ethical values" of a dominant group. According to Ricoeur (1986), "ideology" must traverse the strain between the claim to legitimacy made by the authority, or the dominant agent, and the belief in this legitimacy offered by the citizenry, or the subordinate agents. Ricoeur argues that ideology, whether or not it can successfully distort the true relationship between the dominant and the dominated, cannot be assumed to be conflict free. On his view, within an ideological community "tension occurs because while the citizenry's belief and the authority's claim should *correspond* at the same level, the equivalence of belief with claim is never totally actual but rather always more or less a cultural fabrication" (Ricoeur, 1986:13).

The implication of Ricoeur's clarification of the tension between the agents of an ideological community regarding the use of the state power separated formally from the private realm is interesting to note. It can be suggested that insofar as the tension between the claim and the belief is resolved by a "cultural fabrication," the state can rule over the polity without unnecessary application of physical force. This is because in such a context, the state appears to be located on a neutral ground where the existing domination/power relations between the dominant and the dominated groups cannot lead to a critical questioning of the state in relation to the whole society. Yet if the production of "cultural

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fabrications" is getting more and more difficult as a result of an ever-widening disbelief among the dominated, the state may become more prone to the application of coercion.

In a different manner, by following Ricoeur we can ask: What happens if the tension between the claim to legitimacy and the belief in it by the citizenry remains unsettled? Or in Gramscian terminology, what happens if "the conduct of each individual and the ends that society sets itself as *necessary*" do not correspond? Ricoeur would answer: In such cases, ideology fails to establish "legitimate authority" by consent. Thus the way is now open to establishing "domination" by physical force the result of which cannot be known precisely.

Faced with such a question, Gramsci would first attempt to qualify it: "How are [such cases] created in the first place?" (Gramsci, 1971:211). He then would answer:

> In every country the process is different, although the *content* is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class's hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses (especially of peasants and petty bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together . . . , add up to a revolution. A "crisis of authority" is spoken of: *this is precisely the crisis of hegemony or general crisis of the state.* (Gramsci, 1971:210).

On Gramsci's viewpoint, the crisis consists "precisely" in the condition that "the old is dying and the new cannot be born, in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears" (Gramsci, 1971:276). Symptoms may include changing the "disloyal" officials occupying prominent and strategically significant positions in the state, passing new legislation designed to restrict previously granted legal rights and freedoms (especially those of public servants), and mobilizing the army and the security forces to contain any form of dissent. Needless to say, these symptoms taken together show that the

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state is now a dictatorship. Thus the "crisis of hegemony" or the "general crisis of the state" shows the complete meaning of the state, while at the same time highlighting the importance of the hegemony in the state: ". . . in its integral meaning [the state] = dictatorship + hegemony." (Gramsci, 1971:239).

What this formulation of the state means is that the state is the "ethical educator" with a stick in his hand. In order to be able to use the sometimes much needed stick, the dominant group must first establish hegemony in the state since without it there is no guarantee for the dictatorial utilization of the state power on behalf of the sectional interests of the dominant group. This explains why the state cannot be left to itself since the state qua dictator is still needed as the protector of the dominant group when the latter sometimes has to rule in civil society without hegemony. Yet this also reveals that the modern state cannot exist as an entity, or for that matter, a symbol shared commonly. The form of the modern state and its activities appear to be conditional upon the nature of the dominant group's hegemony in the state and society. In brief, "the State autonomy" that Skocpol (1986) assumes to be existing appears to be the "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion":

> It should be remarked that the general notion of state includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say the state = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.) (Gramsci, 1971:262-63).

What is Autonomy then?: Struggle against hegemony in both the state and society

It is not too difficult to argue that autonomy, understood as being independent from the influence and directing of the dominant classes and groups, does not reside in the state. It can even be argued that the state is the realm in which autonomy is removed as a

possibility of existence. In a different manner, the state acts against the realization of autonomy, simply because it is the agent directing as well as forcing individuals and subordinate classes to participate in its journey as docile passengers directed by the ruling class. One could oppose this statement by saying that the state also acts as the "ethical guide" providing a moral coherence to human groups. Following Gramsci, I would reply that the fact that the state is ethical as much as it is political should not blind us to the state's "initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes." (Gramsci, 1971:258). According to Gramsci, Hegel, one of the most prominent philosophers of the state as the ethical organization of civil society, is blind to the hegemony of the ruling classes that prevents the state from being autonomous:

> Hegel's conception belongs to a period in which the spreading development of the bourgeoisie could seem limitless, so that its ethicity or universality could be asserted: *all mankind will be bourgeois*. But, in reality, only the social group that poses the end of the state and its own end as the target to be achieved can create an ethical state — i.e. one which tends to put an end to the internal divisions of the ruled, etc., and to create a technically and morally unitary social organism. (Gramsci, 1971:258-59).

Thus it should be noted that any ethical principle lacking universality cannot furnish the ground on which autonomy may come into existence. In the Marxist tradition universality is considered to be embedded in working class. The argument is that by overthrowing the bourgeois state, working class not only puts an end to the class state but also an end to its own existence. This in turn may lead to a social organization in which the state cannot be utilized as a means of the representation of the sectional interest of a class. Inspired by the Marxist tradition, Roger Harris (1990) attempts to suggest what real autonomy implies:

> Opposition to a state which no longer represents the ethically universal, but a sectional interest, in the name of 'autonomy' and 'democratic control,' must involve opposing that sectional interest not by another sectional interest, but by the universal interest. (Harris, 1990:200).

Harris's elaboration of the notion of autonomy makes it clear that autonomy does not belong to civil society either, because of the fact that civil society is the realm in which different groups with different interests struggle for power, resources and life chances. Where does autonomy belong to then? Once again we should let Harris tell us what he thinks on this question:

> Autonomy, however, is not like gold, which lies passively waiting to be stumbled upon. Rather, it has to be constructed. A theorisation which aims to locate a notion of autonomy concretely in social life does not tell us where to find it, but must be an account of the method of *political practice* by which collective rational autonomy is produced. (Harris, 1990:200)

According to Harris (1990:206), autonomy can be produced *politically* in the form of a *sphere* based on some specific "causes," -- which, by following Gramsci, I prefer to call "organizational necessities" -- "which by *collectively contending against both state and civil society, advance the actualization of ethical universality in human social life."* Having clarified his understanding of the notion of autonomy as a politically "organisable" sphere, Harris does not appear to be expecting from all to be against the hegemony in both the state and civil society. Yet he does not forget to mention that "not all may do both, but it is important to fight against private medicine in civil society as it is to oppose state nuclear bureaucracies" (Harris, 1990:206).

Harris's theorization that aims to locate the notion of autonomy in social life draws attention to the importance of *organizations* in which the issue of democracy exists as a pressing concern of their various members. On Harris's view, the issue of democracy prevails in all organizational settings even if it cannot be openly addressed in all. The issue

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derives from the need to find a *moral force* guiding the members of an organization in their collective activities. Based on this understanding, Harris contends that:

> The moral force of democracy within an organisation derives not from abstract principle but from the moral rightness of concrete political objectives which are, in their very nature, necessarily collective in character, i.e., components of a substantive ethical universality.

In this sense, more than the mere existence or non-existence of democracy, it is the "moral force of democracy" that is at the heart of the issue. An organization can be mobilized by the "moral force of democracy" to the extent that

> [The] objective to which you are committed is, in your judgement, morally right; it is an objective which can only be achieved collectively; it has as its aim a right which can only be exercised collectively; and the organisation engaged in pursuing that objective, to which you belong, is the only organisation to which anyone hoping to work for that objective could feasibly commit their efforts. Your commitment to the objective of the organisation would therefore keep you in it even if majority decisions within it went against you, for there is nowhere else to go to pursue these objectives. (Harris, 1990:203-4).

Thus, at least in theory, we have an organization in which individuals participate with their *free* will yet they do not want go elsewhere because they know that the only place where they can advance their very own moral rightness is the organization to which they belong. We can call this organization as the *autonomous organization* and the sphere comprised of such organizations as the *sphere of autonomy*. Harris calls this organization as the "progressive force" that does not belong to either the state or civil society. In his utopia, organizations as "progressive forces" can come together to form what he calls the sphere of "the alliance of progressive forces," whose progressive nature lies in the "potential bringing into being ethical universality." (Harris, 1990:206). As we shall see, engineers in Turkey understood their prophetic mission in such terms. But as petty bourgeoisie

professionals, how can engineers come to such a vision of the world? Veblen provides some insights into the habits of mind of the engineering mentality.

It has been argued briefly in the Introduction Chapter that, to Veblen, the engineer is one of the potential *organizers* who can organize the industrial society by taking into account the material well-being of all. In the remainder of this chapter, I take up Veblen's theory of the engineer to question whether under certain historical conditions engineers can realize the potential of discovering the sphere of autonomy and play a leading role in the formation of the *alliance of progressive forces*. In other words, I consider the question whether engineers may choose to oppose the hegemony in the state and society and identify themselves as social actors representing ethical universality.

Veblen's Theory of the Engineer

In order to contextualize Veblen's theory of the engineer in terms of the question posed above, one needs to be familiar with his theory of modern society or industrial society and the influence of industrial technology on modern individuals and institutions. Modern society is unquestionably an industrial society. Industrialization and modernization appear to be one and the same. They both draw upon the same civilizational idea: Humanist Enlightenment. Their origin lies in their common rejection of the tendencies that restrict human sociation. Industrialization is the rejection of the confining influence of nature on the life of humans -- a nature which sometimes may become *destructive*. In a different plane, modernization is the rejection of traditional economic, social, political and cultural institutions. These, as historically evolved durable patterns of social relations, hinder the individual's realization of her self-conceptualizations by rendering her helpless

vis-à-vis the forbidding community. Seen from this perspective, industrialization and modernization are the same idea coming into being on two separate yet closely knitted planes -- the former being the plane of human-nature nexus, the latter being the plane of human-human nexus. At the intersection of these two planes, there emerges a new historical actor whom Thorstein Veblen calls the "common man of civilised countries":

> . . . [In] the final analysis and with due allowance for a margin of tolerance it is the frame of mind of the common man that makes the foundation of society in the modern world; even though the elder statesmen continue to direct its motions from day to day by the light of those principles that were found good some time before yesterday. (Veblen, 1964:16).

Veblen, like Marx, Durkheim and Weber, searches for the historical meaning of modern civilization within an inquiry into the nature of the modern industrial system -- altough more than the classical trio of sociology he is seen to be an economist rather than a social theorist (Davis, 1980). This is an unfortunate outcome of academic specialization. Like the trio, Veblen's interest in the modern industrial system derives from his primary concern with finding an all-inclusive organizing principle of modern society. In Marx, this inquiry leads to the conceptualization of capitalism as an economic organization based on the exploitation of the labour-power of "free" wage labourers. In Weber, it leads to the conceptualization of bureaucracy understood as the emergence of an all-encompassing activity system based on legal-rational authority, or domination, invading all aspects of modern life. In Durkheim, it leads to the conceptualization of organic solidarity understood as a new form of social integration creating a complex interdependent society. And in Veblen, it leads to technology, or "the state of the industrial arts," understood as a

knowledge and belief system creating an endless tension in all aspects of modern society and causing it to change continuously.

For Veblen, technology is more than a particular process of the transformation of nature into objects satisfying historically created human needs. It is primarily a knowledge and belief system. As a knowledge and belief system, he thinks, industrial technology is the *differentia specifica* of "the modern point of view." Thus, technology is also "a point of view" :

> What is spoken of as a point of view is always a composite affair; some sort of a rounded and balanced system of principles and standards, which are taken for granted, at least provisionally, and which serve as a base of reference and legitimation in all questions of deliberate opinion. So when any given usage or any line of conduct or belief is seen and approved from the modern point of view, it comes to the same as saying that these things are seen and accepted in the light of those principles which modern men *habitually* consider to be final and sufficient. (Veblen, 1964:2-3).

Veblen argues that humans learn by "habituation rather than by precept and reflection." This, he thinks, is what he has been taught by History. The significance of this teaching of History, once learned, is to make one see that in any period in history *habituation* guides the "underlying principles of truth and validity on which the effectual scheme of law and custom finally rests." (Veblen, 1964:15). As a unique point of view, the modern habituation differs from earlier forms of learning and thinking because of "the peculiar character of its industry and of its intellectual outlook, particularly the scope and method of modern science and technology." (Veblen, 1964:11).

> The intellectual life of modern Europe and its cultural dependencies differs notably from what has gone before. There is all about it an air of matter-of-fact both in its technology and in its science; which culminates in a "mechanistic conception" of all those things with which scientific inquiry is concerned and in the light of which many of the dread realities of the Middle Ages look like superfluous make-beliefs. (Veblen, 1964:11).

There are at least two important references in this quote that deserve particular attention: *mechanistic conception of all those things* and *superfluous make-beliefs*. By the term mechanistic conception a habit of learning and thinking geared towards finding a final and sufficient truth and validity for knowledge can be understood. In other words, modern technology reflective of its mechanical industry leads to a habituation and eventually institutionalization formed by and guided to the finalization of answers to *questions of deliberate opinion*. The term *superfluous make-beliefs* can be decoded as a reference to the peculiarly modern capacity to discover unheard questions, formulate unknown answers to those questions and more importantly, make the self and others believe in the falsity and invalidity of commonly held beliefs based on the newly discovered answers. In other words, the modern mind has the potential of falsifying make-beliefs and of replacing them with new ones.

Based on this decoding of these two terms, one can enter the Veblenian modern industrial world and its peculiar realm of tension and conflict between its constituting elements of pull and push. In a nutshell this realm of tension and conflict can be put forward in the following manner: The mechanistic conception invading the minds of modern actors is the key source of resistance to change activated by the inherent capacity to create new make-beliefs equally, if not more, characteristic of the mind set of modern individuals. Thus, if there is such a thing as Modern Individual, like the Prometheus of the Greek tragedy, this is an individuality split between believing in what he has been taught mechanically and what he can yet discover with the implication that he can reject completely his hitherto make-beliefs. Because of the latter, the modern individual carries

within himself the traces of Humanist Enlightenment. In this sense, the former, i.e., the belief in what has been taught, remains within him as hang-over from the earlier periods of human history.

Technology/Sabotage Duo as the Organizing Principle of Modern Industrial Society

Karl Marx begins his major work, *Das Kapital*, with the concept of commodity. The first sentence of Capital reads: "The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an 'immense collection of commodities'; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form." (Marx, 1977:125). Thus, for Marx, the commodity is the elementary form of capitalism. As the elementary form,

> ... [The] commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to sum total of labour as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers. (Marx, 1977:164).

This can be read as follows: If capitalism is the organizing principle of modern society, then capitalism is organized on the basis of the commodity production by creating a social relation between the products of producers existing "apart from and outside the producers." According to Marx, an understanding of the capitalist mode of production, and hence the modern society, requires an understanding of this "mysterious character of the commodity-form."

The readers of Thorstein Veblen's *The Engineers and the Price System* (1921) may get puzzled with its beginning sentences:

> "Sabotage" is a derivative of "sabot," which is French for a wooden shoe. It means going slow, with a dragging, clumsy movement, such as that manner of footgear may be expected to bring on. So it has come to describe any manoeuvre of slowing-down, inefficiency, bungling, obstruction. (Veblen, 1921:1).

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Having provided the original meaning of "sabotage," Veblen refers to the peculiar usage of it in American English. According to Veblen, the word "sabotage" gains a "sinister meaning" in American usage. It denotes "violence and disorder" rather than a movement of "slowing-down." This, he thinks, is the outcome of the tactics of those persons and "newspapers who have aimed to discredit the use of sabotage by organized workmen." (Ibid:2). Surely, he argues, this sinister meaning "lessens the usefulness of the word by making it a means of denunciation rather than of understanding" (Ibid:2).

Veblen aims to restore the original meaning of the word "sabotage" by denunciating the sinister meaning emerged in America. Thus, he wants to use it in "understanding" the nature of modern society characterized by the inherent tension rooted in its industrial technology as the peculiar "modern point of view": "It should not be difficult to show that the common welfare in any community which is organized on the price system cannot be maintained without a salutary use of sabotage" (Veblen, 1921:7).

The reference to "the price system" in this sentence involves two significant aspects of the modern industrial system as actually existing in "civilized countries." First, the price system refers to the economic organization of the process of allocation and distribution of products of the industrial system. The price is used to make decisions about cost minimization and profit maximization, and hence help producers specify a definite combination of inputs in producing their outputs. Second, the "price system" refers to the social organization of the industrial system. Specifically, it refers to the organization of the modern industrial system as a "businesslike" entity in which each unit aims to keep a profitable market share, sometimes working against other units with the same objective. It

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is because of this unique social organization of the modern industrial system, rather than its economic organization, that "a salutary use of sabotage" becomes an "unremitting condition of prosperity in any community whose industry is owned and managed by business men" (Veblen, 1921:8).

It should be re-emphasized that it is the ownership and management of the industrial system by "business men" and not the "price system" as such that requires a movement of "slowing down, inefficiency, bungling, obstruction," in brief, "sabotage" for maintaining the prosperity in "civilised countries." In the words of Veblen, "sabotage" is the ""conscientious withdrawal of efficiency" by the business men who control the country's industrial output" (Veblen, 1921:8-9). Veblen uses the term "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency," rather ironically, to explain the tactics of "business men" in the face of "overproduction." For him, "overproduction means production in excess of what the market will carry off at a sufficiently profitable price" (Ibid:8). Thus, in order to restore a profitable price the excess output should be eliminated in one way or another. This, "business men" do, because "they control [the country's industrial output] for their own use, of course, and their own use means always a profitable price" (Ibid:9).

> [Thus] the requirements of profitable business will not tolerate [overproduction]. So the rate and volume of output must be adjusted to the needs of the market, not the working capacity of the available resources, equipment, and man power, nor to the community's need of consumable goods. (Veblen, 1921:9).

At a later stage in his discussion, Veblen makes a prophetic statement -- a statement that sounds a little bit uneasy about the control of the industrial system by "business men."

> Their only salvation is a conscientious withdrawal of efficiency. All this lies in the nature of the case. It is the working of the price system, whose creatures and agents these business men are (Veblen, 1921:14).

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In other words, Veblen sees "business men" as individuals whose intentions and actions are driven by "the profitable price." In another prophetic statement, Veblen writes: "Price is of the essence of the case, whereas livelihood is not" (Veblen, 1921:17).

"The essence of the case" renders "business men" who control the rate and volume of industrial output face a challenging task. On one hand, they are driven towards controlling the rate of output in terms of profitability, on the other, as the leaders, they are required to organize the reproduction of the material wealth of the community in such a way that they ensure the provision of the means of subsistence of individuals, i.e., their livelihood. In this sense, the role of "business men" involves a *dilemma*: Their self-interest revealed by the profitable price condition may preempt their social responsibility stemming from their leadership position in community and industry, or their "being the palladium of the Republic" (Veblen, 1921:17). This can be called *the structural dilemma of "business men."* In the words of Veblen:

> Those wise business men who are charged with administrating the salutary modicum of sabotage . . . [are] faced with a dubious choice between a distasteful curtailment . . . and an unmanageable onset of popular discontent that may be in prospect . . . (Veblen, 1921: 16).

The discussion up to now can be summarized as follows: the capitalism/commodity duo that Marx uses in understanding the nature of modern society and the peculiar tension residing in all aspects of it becomes the technology/sabotage duo in Veblen. Industrial technology as a point of view is common to almost all members of a modern community. It is, in a Durkheimian sense, a basis for the modern *esprit de corps* that unites different social sectors with divergent interests and dispositions by providing them with "a point of view." "Sabotage" in its original French meaning, analogous to Marx's commodity notion,

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is the reflection of the social relation of the agents of industry to the industrial technology as a relation between objects, namely, between profits and "the rate and volume of industrial output." Surely, this is the mystery of the industrial system. Thus, the mystery should be solved. This is what Veblen aims to do in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of *The Engineers and the Price System*.

The Sabotaging Agent of the Industrial System: "Corporation Financier"

Veblen's economic theory can be considered a unique critique of neo-classical economics. At the heart of standard neo-classical economics is the determination of the prices of the three "factors of production": Land, labour and capital. In this sense, neo-classical theory is also a theory of income determination, i.e., incomes accruing to the three factors of production: Rent, wages, and profits. Veblen's criticism of this theory is not about its explanation of the determination of prices, and hence incomes, but rather, its assumption regarding what constitutes a "factor of production." He says: "It has been assumed that whatever yields an income is a productive factor" (Veblen, 1921:27).

A question arises, Veblen argues, if there is a factor of production which does not yield any *stated* income other than rent, wage or profit, yet at the same time, makes a contribution to the production over and above the contributions of land, labour and capital:

> . . . [This] threefold plan of coordinate factors in production is notable for what it omits. It assigns no productive effect to the industrial arts, for example, for the conclusive reason that the state of the industrial arts yields no stated or ratable income to any one class of persons, it affords no legal claim to a share in the community's yearly production of goods. The state of industrial art [i.e., technology] is a joint stock of knowledge derived from past experiences and is held and passed on as an indivisible possession of the community at large. (Veblen, 1921:27-28).

According to Veblen, it was not only technology as such which had been excluded from the original "scheme of factors." The "business man" was also omitted -- an omission which contradicted the original assumption made regarding what constitutes a factor of production, i.e., income yielding. Veblen argues that over time "business man" has come "more and more obtrusively to the front and [come] in for a more and more generous portion of the country's yearly income" (Ibid:28) In other words, "business man" has become a factor yielding not only income but also a "generous income" -- "which was taken to argue that he also contributed increasingly to the yearly production of goods" (Ibid:28). Yet he had been omitted from the threefold plan of factors in production.

> So a fourth factor of production has provisionally been added to the threefold scheme, in the person of the "entrepreneur," whose wages of management are consic..red to measure his creative share in the production of goods, although there still is some question as to the precise part of the entrepreneur in productive industry. (Veblen, 1921:28-29).

Veblen argues that "entrepreneur" is a "technical term" to refer to the individual whose primary concern is the financial returns on production activities. In this sense, "entrepreneur" is the same as the "more familiar term business man." Yet entrepreneur "vaguely" refers to "big business rather than small," which the term "business man" does not necessarily denote.

> The typical entrepreneur is the corporation financier . . . Indeed it is nearly true that in current usage "producer" has come to mean "financial manager" both in the standard economic theory and in everyday speech. (Veblen, 1921:29).

According to Veblen, the substitution of "producer" for a more correct term "corporation financier" results from the "liberal principles of the eighteenth century" which conceive "any legal defensible receipt of income [as] a sure sign of productive work done" (Veblen, 1921:31).

Seen in the light of this assumption, the visibly increasing productive capacity of the industrial system has enabled all men of a liberal and commercial mind not only to credit the businesslike captains of industry with having created this productive capacity, but also to overlook all that the same captains of industry have been doing in the ordinary course of business to hold productive industry in check. (Veblen, 1921:31).

In other words, slowing down the rate and volume of industrial output by the "captains of industry," or the "corporation financiers" has been unrecognized. This failure to recognize the actual relation of the captains to the productive industry was partly the outcome of a visible and continuous growth trend in the industrial output, however this was short of what it could have potentially been. The growing industrial output over time hid the fact that the industrial system had been frequently sabotaged by "the captains."

Yet the industrial system kept growing not only in volume but also in complexity. Within this process, Veblen argues, the captains of industry began to give their "attention more exclusively to the 'financial end'" (Veblen, 1921:34). Thus, financial management gained the upper hand and became the primary and almost the only concern of the captains. Still however, the captains "continued to be entrusted with the community's industrial welfare" (Veblen, 1921:40). In other words, in the person of the corporation financier industrial management came under the total control of financial management. As a result:

. . . [The] discretionary control of industrial production is shifting still farther over to the side of finance and still farther out of touch with the requirement of maximum production.(Veblen, 1921:41).

The rest of Veblen's discussion can be regarded as his farsighted anticipation of the Great Depression that came almost a decade after the publication of *The Engineers and the Price System*. The following observations by Veblen should be taken as reflective of

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the organization of the industrial system in the pre-1930 period, and hence should not be treated as universal claims.

> When corporate organization and the consequent control of output came into being there were two lines of policy open to the management (a) to maintain profitable prices by limiting output, and (b) to maintain profits by lowering the production cost of an increased output . . . On the whole the former proved the more attractive, . . ., it required less acquaintance with the working process of industry. (Veblen, 1921:41)

These historically specific two lines of policy, when seen as the parameters of a general choice problem, may transcend their time relevance and redefine the structural dilemma of "business men." It is clear that the choice (a) involves a financial decision and enters the domain of financial management. It is also clear that the choice (b) involves a production decision and enters the domain of production management. It can be suggested that as the industrial system changes, the content of choices (a) and (b) also changes. Yet the choice problem may remain intact. Moreover, it may be further assumed that the choices of (a) and (b) may remain as conflict ridden as they were in Veblen's depiction. Yet whether they are conflict ridden or not, financial criteria guide the choice decision insofar as financial management dominates industrial management. In a more polite manner, industrial managers may be requested to get adjusted to the changing financial realities of the market by financial managers. This request can be conceptualized as *the technological repression* of industrial management by financial management. Here, the term technology refers to the modern point of view as conceptualized by Veblen as "a sufficient and final answer to questions of deliberate opinion." Repression refers to the holding down of the potential of innovation stemming from the inquisitive aspect of industrial technology as the modern point of view.

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Thus technological repression is the hidden social relationship between the corporation financiers and the productive agents of the industrial system, which acts itself out as the social relationship between profits and the rate and volume of industrial *output*. This can also be called technology fetishism understood as a belief system restricting innovation. It can also be seen as the abuse of technology as a point of view by the sabotaging agents of the industrial system. Since the sabotage is directed at the slowing down of industrial production, namely, the unemployment of the forces of production, the technological repression, once discovered, may lead the pro-choice (b) type social groups to take action against the "corporation financiers." Among these groups, "industrial experts, engineers, chemists, mineralogists, technicians of all kinds" may occupy the front lines due to their being well familiar with "the working process of industry." These groups may want to recapture the technology as such and as the modern point of view perverted by the sabotaging agents of the industrial system. This may define the contentions and intentions of such groups trying to get back what in fact belongs to the community at large and because of which should not furnish any income and hence power to any class of persons.

The Workman Trained at the Cost of the People at Large: The Engineer and his relation to the people

The modern industrial system as a particular form of economic organization is an interdependent system of production of goods and services. Each unit in this system is tied to the rest in a dynamic process of input and output linkages. In the terminology of

organizational theory, each unit is an open system that must interact with other units in its

the environment to survive; it both receives resources and sends resources to the

environment. Thus, as an open system, each unit must control and coordinate its internal

activities subject to the conditions in the environment. Veblen thinks of this unique nature

of the modern industrial system as of utmost significance in specifying the positioning of

the engineer in the production of "the material welfare of the people":

> [The modern industrial system] runs on as an inclusive organization of many and
> diverse interlocking mechanical processes, interdependent and balanced among
> themselves in such a way that the due working of any part of it is conditioned on the due
> working of all the rest. (Veblen, 1921:52-53).

According to Veblen, each production unit can work optimally if the industrial

system as a whole works optimally. In other words, the optimum resource allocation in

individual organizations presupposes the optimum resource allocation within the industrial

system as a whole. Veblen argues that such a condition can be arrived at if "industrial

experts, production engineers . . . work together on a common understanding" (Veblen,

1921:53). More particularly, he says, "on condition that they must not work at cross

purposes."

Although the existence of a common understanding does not necessarily preclude

the existence of cross-purposes, it can be argued that the former may help work out the

negative tendencies stemming from the exigencies of the latter. Thus, the first condition

for an improvement in the organization of the industrial system as a whole is the industrial

experts' coming together around a common understanding -- i.e., a certain shared-view

used as a guide at both micro and macro level production management. It can be

suggested that such a shared-view can emerge if those individuals who are given the tasks

of production planning and management as well as production supervision and execution can communicate with each other without any obstacle, or hindrance. Within this communication process, individuals may generate a set of objectives defined as targets to which each individual organization should strive to make its particular contribution. Since the generation of targets involves the participation of all individual organizations and their representatives, there is no need for any superior body to impose a binding agreement clause in order to secure the fulfillment of the targets. In the terminology of game theory, this is neither a zero-sum game nor a prisoners' dilemma setting. It is simply an organizational model based on the strategy of cooperation among the interdependent units interlocked in an inclusive organization. The key assumption of this model is that it includes only the productive agents of the industry as its participants. It excludes those who are participating in the industry as non-producers. When the latter is introduced to the model, it may turn out to be a zero-sum game or a model characterized by the prisoner's dilemma.

It can easily be said that this model has not existed in the actually existing "civilized countries." Surely, it was also absent in America when Veblen was writing his works. Yet it can be suggested that this was the implicit model in Veblen's mind guiding him in his inquiry into the position and the role of the engineer in the industrial system. Thus, the following quote from Veblen must be read in the light of the organizational model suggested:

> And for the due working of this inclusive going concern it is essential that . . .
> technological specialists who by training, insight, and interest make up the general staff
> of industry must have a free hand in the disposal of its available resources, in materials,
> equipment, and man power . . . Any degree of obstruction, diversion, or withholding of
> any of the available industrial forces, with a view to the special gain of . . . any investor,
> unavoidably brings on a dislocation of the system, which involves a disproportionate

lowering of its working efficiency and therefore a disproportionate loss to the whole, and therefore a net loss to all its parts. (Veblen, 1921:54).

At this point of his discussion, Veblen returns to the concept of sabotage as the major obstacle before "the due working of the modern industrial system." As clarified earlier, modern technology as a point of view goes beyond the organization of production processes. It defines the "peculiarly modern habituation" of looking for a deliberate opinion on issues, however these issues may involve complex and multifaceted aspects. Thus, the *sabotage*, it can be suggested now, is the successful directing of modern individuals by investors, or "the captains of finance," through providing them with deliberate opinions on complex issues. In doing so, "the captains of finance" speak, or call out, to the technology based habituation of individuals. For example, one may hear from a "corporation financier" that "the project, although it is very promising, is unfortunately not financially sound." In other words, there is no alternative other than its cancellation. This is a directing of individuals whose lives may be directly affected by the project. Veblen calls this as "misdirecting," though I prefer to call it, successful directing:

> So it happens that the industrial system is deliberately handicapped with dissension, misdirection, and unemployment of material resources, equipment, and man power, at every turn where the statesmen or the captains of finance can touch its mechanisms, and all the civilised peoples are suffering privation together because their general staff of industrial experts are in this way required to take orders and submit to sabotage at the hands of the statesmen and the vested interests. (Veblen, 1921:54-55).

Thus Veblen sees in the sabotage more than a mismanagement of production processes at both micro and macro levels. He sees in it the "sufferings of all the civilised peoples." Moreover, he sees the suffering peoples as individuals held captive by the statesmen and the vested interests who ask them together with the general staff of industry

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to take orders and submit to sabotage. Here, a brief digression on Veblen's conceptualization of the "vested interest" should be made. Since this discussion may provide a better understanding of the engineer as the social actor who may discover the root cause of sufferings and aim to drive the vested interests out of the industrial system, and hence bringing the inquisitive and critical aspect of the people's modern habituation to the front.

Veblen's concept of "vested interest" is analogous to Marx's concept of "surplus-value." By "surplus value" Marx refers to the process of the valorization of capital:

> The capital C is made up of two components, one the sum of money c laid out on means of production, and the other sum of money v expended on labour-power. . . . When the process of production is finished, we get a commodity whose value = (c+v)+s, where s is the surplus-value. (Marx, 1977:320).

The expression (c+v)+s can also be written as C+s, which Marx calls C', or the valorized capital. In the event the value of C' is realized in the market or circulation, then, there will be a surplus sum of money over and above the initial sum laid out on the means of production and labour power. In this sense, Marx sees capital as money making more money.

According to Marx, surplus-value, although created by the labourers within the production process, is appropriated by the capitalist due to his legal property rights, i.e., the initial sum of money laid out on means of production belongs legally to the capitalist, and hence he is entitled to the proceedings ensuing from the sale of the products. Thus, from a Marxian perspective, capital can also be conceptualized as a source of free income. Here, free income refers to any income obtained without spending labour-power.

It is important to note that for Marx, the source of this free income lies in the production process, i.e., the production of surplus-value by labourers.

Veblen, although he may not disagree with Marx's conceptualization of surplus-value, is interested more in the source of free income residing outside the production sphere. The difference between Marx and Veblen derives from their different conceptualizations of capital. For Veblen, "capital -- at least under the new order of business enterprise -- is capitalised prospective gain" (Veblen, 1964:104). In other words, capital is the power of making claim to a prospective income over the initial cost laid out on any investment, be this a productive or financial investment.

> From this arises one of the singularities of the current situation in business and its control of industry; viz., that the total face value [of the assets] . . . always and greatly exceeds the total market value of [those assets] to which the securities give title of ownership and to which alone in the last resort they do give title. (Veblen, 1964:104-105).

Veblen defines the difference between the total face value and the total market value of the assets as "the margin of free earning capacity." Thus, the higher the margin is, the higher the free income accruing to the investor holding the ownership title is. In this sense, the owners of the productive assets always want to increase the margin in order to increase their free income. One possible way of doing this is to increase "the net product of industry over cost."

> In case the free income which is gained in this way promises to continue, it presently becomes a vested right. It may then be formally capitalised as an immaterial asset having recognized earning capacity equal to this prospective income. That is to say, the outcome is a capitalised claim to get something for nothing; which constitutes a vested interest. (Veblen, 1964:105).

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In other words, a vested right may emerge out from the legal ownership of productive assets. The vested right in its turn may give rise to "immaterial assets" such as securities, shares, etc., which can be bought and sold, and hence generates a vested interest. Within this process, the attention of investors move away from the value of "the material properties" of assets to their financial value. Thus, the vested interest emerges out from a tangible thing and becomes a concern about an intangible thing, i.e., "a prospective gain" out of some paper.

The vested interest understood as "a capitalised claim to get something for nothing" deviates remarkably from the logic of industrial process of income generation, since the latter rests on the idea of producing something to get something else. Unlike the industrial interest as such, the vested interest in its pure form is the occupation of gaining income without producing anything tangible. The process of the generation and gaining of this free income manifests itself explicitly in the "speculative episode." Galbraith writes:

> The more obvious features of the speculative episode are manifestly clear to anyone open to understanding. Some artifact or some development, seemingly new and desirable -- tulips in Holland, gold in Louisiana, real estate in Florida, the superb economic designs of Ronald Reagan -- captures the financial mind or perhaps, more accurately, what so passes. The price of the object of speculation goes up. Securities, land, objet d'art, and other property, when bought today, are worth more tomorrow. This increase and the prospect attract new buyers; the new buyers assure a further increase. Yet more are attracted; yet more buy; the increase continues. The speculation building on itself provides its own momentum. (Galbraith, 1993:2-3).

It should be noted that among the "other property" there may be industrial enterprises in which some of the "general staff of industry" may be working and producing as "business usual." They may keep working in this way until the day when the "eventual and inevitable fall" comes. Because the increase in the worth of the material assets was fictitious, one day

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some individuals may stop believing in the "reality" of the prospective gain out of their immaterial assets, and thus they start selling what they bought. When this comes, says Galbraith (1993:4), "it bears the grim face of disaster. . . . [The] speculative episode always ends not with a whimper but with a bang." Thus the "business usual" comes to a disastrous end where some of the "general staff of industry" are now unemployed; the rate and volume of output are now stagnating, if not falling. According to Veblen, in brief, it is the vested interest that causes this unnecessary stagnation in the industrial system. More than any other economist, Rudolf Hilferding may be in sympathy with Veblen on this issue, since he, similar to Veblen, sees "the sway of finance capital" as the fundamental cause of the failure in the industrial production:

> Finance capital has the appearance of money capital, and its form of development is indeed that of money which yields money (M - M') - the most general and inscrutable form of the movement of capital. . . . Capital now appears as a unitary power which exercises sovereign sway over the life process of society; . . . [Now] property, concentrated and centralized in the hands of a few giant capitalist groups, manifests itself in direct opposition to the mass of those who possess no capital [i.e., "prospective gain" or prospective "free income"]. (Hilferding, 1981:235).

To this, Veblen may add that among the mass of those who possess no capital the engineer, one of these days, may say no to this "go and stop" way of the organization of the industrial production, simply because the engineer is the individual trained at the cost of the people at large to go and go. Specifically, the engineer may ask: "What use is made of the free income which goes to . . . [the] vested interest?" (Veblen, 1964:113). He then may answer:

> The free income which is capitalised in the intangible assets of the vested interests goes to support the well-to-do investors, who are for this reason called the kept classes, and whose keep consists in an indefinitely extensible consumption of superfluities. (Veblen, 1964:113).

"So much seems clear," says Veblen (1920:82), "that the industrial dictatorship of the captain of finance is now held on sufferance of the engineers and is liable at any time to be discontinued at their discretion, as a matter of convenience."

Whether Veblen was Daydreaming or the Engineers Betrayed Veblen:

Webster's New Dictionary of the English Language defines convenience as "1. Suitability. 2. Personal Comfort. 3. Anything that increases comfort or makes work easier." Based on this dictionary definition, it can be suggested that replacing a condition with a new one in order to provide convenience is to make life more comfortable and easier. Thus those who claim that they can provide convenience must, first of all, be able to show that there is some difficulty in the current condition. Then, they have to convince those whose life is at stake that the difficulty can be superceded and replaced by a condition which is more comfortable and easier. Veblen seems to be well aware of the difficulties involved in the replacement of "the industrial dictatorship of the captains of finance" by "the general staff of industry" under the leadership of the engineer. He is particularly aware of these difficulties in the American context:

> By settled habit, the American population are quite unable to see their way to entrust any appreciable responsibility to any other than business men. . . . This sentimental deference of the American people to the sagacity of its business men is massive, profound, and alert. So much so that it will take harsh and protracted experience to remove it, or divert it sufficiently for the purpose of any revolutionary diversion. And more particularly, popular sentiment in this country will not tolerate the assumption of responsibility by technicians, who are in popular apprehension conceived to be a somewhat fantastic brotherhood of over-specialized cranks, not to be trusted out of sight except under the restraining hand of safe and sane business men. (Veblen, 1921:150-151).

What Veblen says is that the productive agents of the industrial system may have hard times convincing the American people that there is some disadvantage in the

leadership of "the corporation financiers." Simply because, the American people do not

trust the technicians unless they are chaperoned by "business men." This can also be put

forward in the following manner: If the American people is going to make a decision about

choosing between the technicians and the financiers as individuals granted the occupation

of "positions of responsibility," they will choose the financiers, or "business men." Surely,

in the first place, such a major choice problem can emerge in the public sphere if and only

if the technicians have such a claim to the occupation of positions of responsibility. In the

absence of a large group of technicians making such a claim, the Veblenian

conceptualization of the tension between business men and the technicians remain to be

just a theoretical speculation rather than a potential for a major social change in the

organization of the modern industrial society.

It should be emphasized that Veblen is also aware of the prevalence of the

"sentimental deference" among the American technicians. Since he does not exclude the

engineer, or the technician, as a citizen-individual from his interpretation of the mind set of

the American people:

> Nor are the technicians themselves in the habit of taking greatly different view of their
> own case. They still feel themselves, in the nature of things, to fall into place as
> *employees of those enterprising business men* who are, in the nature of things, elected to
> get something for nothing. Absentee ownership is secure, just yet. (Veblen, 1921:151).

Thus Veblen knows that the American Engineer is under "the sway of finance capital" as

much, if not more, as "the common man" of America. His emphasis on the American

technicians as "employees of enterprising business men" moves Veblen away from his

abstract theoretical model of the modern industrial society to a consideration of a

historical-concrete case. In other words, Veblen is not daydreaming about the inevitability

of the discontinuity of "the industrial dictatorship of the captain of finance" by the mere reflective moves of the technicians, however this may be convenient. This historical approach by Veblen based on his conceptualization of the technology/sabotage duo as the all-inclusive organizing principle of the modern industrial society differentiates him from other theorizations of the engineer as the social actor with consequential economic and political power in the process of social change in "civilised countries."

Theories of the Engineer

The literature on the engineer is not short of theories arguing about and for the radical social change that might be activated by the engineer. In general, one can find two major approaches in the examination of the engineer's position in the economy, politics and society. The first approach can be called the standard sociological approach characterized by its over-emphasis on the structural-functionalist consensus theory, yet sometimes coloured by a rich Weberian conflict perspective in the hands of prominent theorists such as Bell (1973), Freidson (1973) and Larson (1977). The second approach can be called as the radical sociological approach characterized by its over-emphasis on the Marxian conflict theory that manifests itself in the search for the class identity of the engineer. In the second approach the works of the following theorists can be cited as the most influential ones: Gorz (1967), Aronowitz (1971), Mallet (1975), Poulantzas (1975), Gouldner (1976), Noble (1977), Carchedi (1977), Wright (1976, 1978) and Braverman (1974).[1]

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[1] For a concise yet comprehensive introduction of the theories of the engineer see Whalley (1986). Whalley (1986) divides the different theories of "the engineer" into five broad categories: engineers as technocrats, engineers as professionals, engineers as members of new working class, engineers as corporate staff under capitalist hegemony, and engineers as employees between managers and workers.

In both the standard and the radical sociological approach, technology appears to be either an unproblematic concept or a concept whose analytical significance is not sufficiently clarified -- the more so in the case of the former. In the professionalization literature, for example, technology is conceptualized essentially as specialized technical expertise. As technical expertise, technology is learned and generated by those individuals who make up the technical staff of the industry. In other words, technology appears to be the exclusive concern and business, i.e., occupation, of the technical staff. According to this conceptualization, other individuals may use technology but -- because they lack the full knowledge of the technology used -- they cannot influence the production of technology and its particular form of utilization. In this sense, it is appropriate to argue that in the standard sociological approach, the concept of technology appears to be technology as such. Thus, in the professionalization literature, technology becomes a new basis for the formation of occupation-based social categories broadly called professionals. In the words of Larson (1977:xvi), "professionalisation [is] the process by which producers of special services [seek] to constitute and control a market for their expertise." Moreover, "professionalisation appears also as a collective assertion of special social status and as a collective process of upward mobility."

It should be conceded that this approach is highly useful in understanding the occupation-based group formations, particularly among the technical workers. As Parkin

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The first two categories fall into the standard sociological approach. The last three categories are part of the radical sociological approach. In addition to Whalley (1986), Zussman (1985) and Crawford (1989) can be referred to for an excellent introduction to the literature on the engineer and the specific issues deriving from the social, economic and political positions of the engineer. It should also be mentioned that, in Turkish, the research conducted by the Chamber of Architects in 1976 and published in 1978 under the title "Engineers- Architects" includes a comprehensive summary and the abridged translations of the works of the theorists mentioned above. Thus it can be referred to by the Turkish reader.

(1979) succinctly explains in his social closure theory, in modern industrial societies socio-economic classes are formed by exclusionary practices aimed to secure a legal monopoly over access to jobs and the socio-economic advantages associated with those jobs, for example, in the case of engineering. Likewise, Collins (1992) explains how specialized knowledge gained within and through the educational system leads to a new basis of social stratification. Seen from the light of these theories, knowledge of technology as such may itself become a vested interest in the Veblenian sense. In other words, by drawing upon the technology fetishism in the community at large, some groups, say professionals, may make a claim to a "prospective gain" out of their intangible knowledge of technology as such. In this projection of the technical staff, the engineer becomes yet another social actor struggling for his sectional interest at the expense of all other segments of society. Thus, in this approach, there appears to be no room for the examination of the Veblenian tension residing in industrial technology as a "modern point of view," i.e., the tension between the "mechanistic conception of all things" and the capacity to replace all "make-beliefs," including the "scientific and technological" ones. In other words, the door is completely closed to the engineer who may conceptualize his sectional interest as part of the universal interest of the community at large, and hence may become self-critical and self-reflective by rejecting the notion of technology as knowledge and technique empowering a sectional interest. Yet this is a possibility in a very rationalistic sense since the universal interest may include the sectional interest of the engineer. Even sometimes, the realization of the former may become the precondition of the realization of the latter.

In the radical sociological approach, engineers are given a much wider breathing space in transcending their hedonistic drives which may prevent them from coming to terms with the peculiar tension in industrial technology as a modern point of view. Here the loose conceptualization of professionals is replaced with a more inclusive conceptualization of social class. In the work of Mallet (1975), for example, almost all technical staff are seen as the members of a "new working class" who differ, slightly yet with a significant implication, from the manual workers because of the specific position they occupy in the production process. The "new working class" is responsible for the application of science and technology to production processes which are executed by the manual workers. In spite of this difference, however, the "new" and the "old" working class share the common experience of being under the yoke of capitalists. According to Mallet, the "new working class" will draw closer to the manual working class by discovering the class conflict between the capitalists and the workers. Moreover, the new working class with its technical superiority may itself become the class agent activating all working people against what Gorz (1967) calls the "barbaric command for financial profit."

Gorz (1967), another "new working class" theorist, is one of the rare writers focusing on the Veblenian conflict between the "financial profit" and the interests of engineers. Yet Gorz (1967) does not conceive this conflict as the outcome of *technological repression*, i.e., the social relationship between the technology abusers (i.e., "corporation financiers") and the technology users and innovators (i.e., the technical staff), which manifests itself as the social relationship between "profits" and "output." In Gorz's

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(1967:104) work, the technical staff discover the conflict because they are like any other worker wage earners, and hence fall into a conflict with profit earners.

Noble (1977) is another leading theorist who can raise some interesting issues for addressing the Veblenian conflict. Unlike Gorz for whom technology as a modern point of view appears to be an unproblematic concept, Noble (1977) attempts to clarify the very meaning of technology in capitalism. From this clarification he reaches a quite different conceptualization of the engineer as the social actor occupying a strategic position in the capitalist production process. Noble's (1977) theory rests on the assumption that the capitalist class strictly controls and dominates every aspect of modern industrial society, including the industrial technology and the engineer. In his view, modern technology becomes yet another tool of the capitalist class for controlling and holding down the economically disadvantaged groups and classes. In this theory, the engineer who is employed by the capitalist is the producer of the *capitalist technical possibilities*.

It is not too difficult to criticize this class reductionist reading of the meaning of modern technology with reference to the foregoing discussion. In brief, although he explains how and why the capitalists can define (abuse) the technical possibilities, Nobel (1977) forgets to take into account modern technology's being a "peculiar point of view." As a result, he completely misses the agency side of the engineer by overemphasizing the structural traits of the "engineer's work." More correctly, he overlooks the fact that he is making an inquiry into a historical-concrete agency, i.e., the American engineer, about whom Veblen has some critical questions. Thus, by overlooking this fact, he overgeneralizes about the engineer as such. In other words, what Noble (1977) observes

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in America may not be the case elsewhere. What this class reductionism leads to is the elimination of the engineer as an autonomous social actor from the politics of modern industrial society. Thus we are once more left with the two fundamental contending classes of capitalism, viz., the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Not surprisingly, in the works of Aronowitz (1971), Braverman (1974) and Wright (1976, 1978, 1985) the conceptualization of technology takes another twist in order to answer whether the application of technology in industry may lead to the proletarianization of technical employees. As in the case of Noble's (1977) work, the underlying assumption here is that the engineer lacks an autonomous agency unless he is proletarianized. Braverman's (1974) argument regarding the deskilling of the engineer, for example, attempts to provide a sure sign of the proletarianization and the intensification of class conflict in the nineteenth century European sense.[2] This argument remains a theoretical speculation in the absence of any remarkable class struggle in America.

In Wrights' earlier works, the issue of proletarianization is treated more cautiously than by Bravermen in reference to the "contradictory class locations." Wright argues that the engineer may occupy more than one fundamental class location, viz., "capitalist,"

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[2] It should be noted that Derber's (1982) attempt to clarify the meaning of proletarianization with reference to its economic and ideological aspects appears to be directed at this misconception of the lack of radical agency among the engineers. In brief, Derber (1982) argues that economic proletarianization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the engineer's becoming a radical social actor. He rather conceives the engineer as an agent split between the requirements of his work controlled by the capitalist class and his professional responsibilities requiring him to be in the service of the public. He then argues that in the event the rendering of the job specific services contradicts what is expected of the engineer as a professional in the service of the general public, the engineer may experience ideological proletarianization. Thus, Derber (1982) opens up a new avenue for the examination of the utilization of technology as such. For example, it becomes possible to ask how and why the engineer agrees to work in a bomb manufacturing factory. This is a puzzling question because the engineer is educated and trained to serve the people, and not to kill them.

"petite bourgeoisie" and "worker." For example, an engineer can be located in the "working class" if he has no control over the resource allocation within his organization. Yet at the same time he can be located in the "capitalist class" if he has control over the labour process of others. What Wright then argues is that this contradiction in the contemporary capitalist class structure constrains the possibilities for the engineer to participate in the formation of the working class. Thus, the engineer appears to be facing a difficult choice problem, i.e., going along with either the "capitalist class" or the "working class."

Yet it remains to be answered why having control over the labour process of others does necessarily assign one to a capitalist class position in the first place. Perhaps, sometimes, such positions may become battlefields for a war against the capitalist class which appears to be an absentee ownership class. In short, the engineer should not necessarily turn his back on his controlling power over the labour process to become an anti-capitalist. If there is an abuse of this power by the engineer, this can be a matter of dispute between the engineer and the worker. When this happens, it may become clear to the participants of the dispute that the so-called capitalist class location occupied by the engineer is indeed a contradictory position -- i.e., a contradiction between Veblen's "business men" and Wright's "capitalist-engineer." In other words, the engineer can discover the sway of finance capital over his so-called superior position in the industrial labour process, and may choose to locate himself on the side of the working class in the contest of classes. In such a case, the question whether the engineer is a capitalist agent or not cannot be answered by an abstract, universal theory. The key question becomes

whether the engineer can lead the economically powerless groups and classes against the vested interests, or the *kept classes*.

It should be mentioned that the above scenario is a possible historical contingency, and not a historical determination. If this contingency springs out from a historical-concrete context, one of the possible outcomes may look like what Veblen envisions in the closing pages of *The Engineers and the Price System*:

> In short, so far as regards the technical requirements of the case, the situation is ready for a self-selected, but inclusive, Soviet of technicians to take over the economic affairs of the country and to allow and disallow what they may agree on; provided always that they live within the requirements of the state of the industrial arts whose keepers they are, and provided that their pretensions continue to have the support of the industrial rank and file; which comes near saying that their Soviet must *consistently and effectually take care of the material welfare of the underlying population*. (Veblen, 1921:166).

The Engineer in Veblen's Utopia and Gramsci's New Intellectual: The engineer as an autonomous social agent

Based on the foregoing reading of Veblen's theory of the engineer, implicit ideology for Veblen can be explicated by reference to an utopia, i.e., a social organization that does not exist. In this social organization, the role assigned to the technicians appears to be the organization of the reproduction of material life in terms of the requirements of maximum output. To fulfill the requirements of maximum output, the technicians use technology in the form of both what I suggest to call *technique as production* and *technique as criticism*. Technology in the form of technique as production is an approach to the organization of the industrial system in terms of the optimal use of society's productive forces. It is the technical capacity *as such* that ensures the condition of maximum output. Technology in the form of technique as criticism means that the

participants of industry have the power to remove *collectively* all social constraints sabotaging the optimum use of society's productive forces. In other words, in the event that any sectional interest hinders the material welfare, then, technique as criticism will help discover the causes of the failure in the reproduction of economic means.

This criticism is essentially directed at the once-and-for-all-type of all "rounded and balanced systems of principles and standards" used in the economic organization of life process of society. Such a criticism appears to be a possibility because in this utopia no agent has any consequential power to sabotage the process of the reproduction of the material welfare because of its sectional interest. The "economic affairs" of this absent land are regulated by reference to a set of provisional principles and standards formulated on the basis of the "common understanding" of the participants of the industry. These principles are not dictated to the rest of the community but suggested as opinions open for the criticism of the people at large. The only criterion used in the formulation of these contestable principles is "the requirements of the state of the industrial arts." Thus, in this absent land, science is everybody's "business." In other words, science is truly socialized. The "Soviet of technicians" do science in order to open up a platform of rational social and historical criticism involving the people whose life is affected by the discoveries and the application of science in the production and reproduction of the material life. It is because of this unique task assigned to the technicians that the engineer (or "whatever name may best suit") of this absent land does not belong to any social category whose actions are motivated by its sectional interest. The engineer is a member of the class which can transcend the class politics whose nature is specified by the underlying system of

stratification in civil society. In other words, the ideal engineer of this absent land is a classless individual, at least in her vision of humanity. Just like a mother who is always concerned about the well-being of her children, this absent engineer is always concerned about the material welfare of all in the community. In other words, she can be conceived of as the incarnation and expression of the *ethical universal* that Harris (1990:) considers as the precondition for producing politically the *sphere of autonomy*.

Veblen's potential engineer bears resemblance to what Gramsci refers to as the new intellectual. Gramsci defines this intellectual in the following way:

> The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in practical life, as constructor, organiser, 'permanent persuader' and not just a simple orator (but superior at the same time to the abstract mathematical spirit); *from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history* . . . (Gramsci, 1971:10).

Needless to say, a capacity to proceed from "technique-as-work" to the humanistic conception of history is also the ability to formulate a universal conception of life, which in turn may direct one in terms of his moral presuppositions without being directed by anyone. In brief, the engineer as the new intellectual has the potential to become a counter-hegemonic agent who can oppose the hegemonic power in both the state and civil society.

It is really surprising to find that one American, i.e., Thorstein Veblen, and one Italian, i.e., Antonio Gramsci, beginning with a significantly different problematic reach a remarkably similar conclusion regarding the role of the engineer and technology in modern capitalist society. In brief, they both assign the engineer and modern technology an ability to put an end to the internal divisions within civil society by using the technique as

criticism, or "science," and attempting to organize the people at large around a humanistic conception of history. Thus the pressing question is how the engineer tends to proceed from technique as work, or production, to technique as criticism and eventually to becoming an autonomous organizer.

It can be argued that the more frequent and the deeper the crises of hegemony, or *general crisis of the state*, the greater is the likelihood that engineers will attempt to free themselves from the hegemony of capitalists and become autonomous social actors. This is because in such a context, lacking the consent of the citizenry the economically dominant class needs to mobilize the coercive forces of the state in order to secure the conditions of its class rule. As mentioned before, during the times of general crisis of the state, the dominant class uses its whole *energy* in the state: It changes all suspicious officials, passes repressive laws restricting the use of constitutional rights, utilizes its armed forces to stop social opposition etc. etc. By doing so, it subordinates its historical role of organizing consent to the necessity of suppressing its opponents. To make the matters worse, by using, or attempting to use, the state as its overt class instrument, the ruling class amplifies the divisions within civil society. As a result, civil society gets politicized in terms of sectional class interests, leading the subordinate groups and classes to discover the power/domination relations hidden in their everyday interactions.

If we return to Veblen's problematic in the context of a social organism deeply divided in terms of sectional class interests, we can suggest that by discovering the power/domination relations engineers can break with the *habit* of *feeling* themselves as *employees* of *business men*. In other words, engineers aim to free themselves from the

hegemony of business men, and hence perceive taking orders from them and submitting to their sabotaging of a community's welfare to be unacceptable. In this sense, the movement from technique as production to technique as criticism, and eventually to the humanistic conception of history should be conceived of as the collective understanding that reveals itself in the movement from hegemony to assertion of potential autonomy.

The most significant *moment* of this movement is the transition from technique as production to technique as criticism, for at this stage engineers may come into conflict with the hegemony of business men over their work and become critical of taking orders from them. This in turn leads engineers to focus on the capitalistic *social organization* of industrial system and of the material welfare of modern society. In other words, their attention moves away from the relationship between profits and the rate of industrial output to the *hidden* social relationship between capitalists and the productive agents of the industrial system, i.e., the *technological repression*. As a result, they discover that the unemployment of the forces of production is the outcome of capitalists' control over the use of technology as such and as a modern point of view. Now the stage is ready for engineers to make a claim to technology as a universal force of production which belongs to the community at large and thus should not furnish any power to any class of persons. And the stage is the organization of engineers, which not only contextualizes their actions but also provides them with historical-concrete *organizational necessities*, leading to unique formulations of political objectives.

Summary

In this chapter, I made a theoretical inquiry into the question *if* when there is a decisive crisis, how engineers may choose to oppose the hegemony of a dominant class in the state and society. By drawing upon Gramsci (1971), I proposed to conceptualize the modern state as *the enslavement of the legally liberated individuals within the "class religion" of the dominant class*. Yet I also argued that the hegemony of the dominant class appears to be a claim to the legitimacy to lead, which cannot be assumed to be conflict free. In other words, the hegemony of the dominant class can be challenged anytime by the dominated groups and classes since the claim to legitimacy and the belief in it is always a cultural fabrication. That is why, I argued, the dominant class must also establish its ethical-political leadership in the activities and organizations of the state, if it aims to lead. All this implies that the modern state also relies on coercion. Thus, I arrived at the integral meaning of the modern state suggested by Gramsci: "The state = dictatorship + hegemony." In other words, the state is the "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci, 1971:262-263).

Based on the clarification of the modern state's integral meaning, I rejected the notion of the autonomous state. I suggested that the state is the realm in which autonomy is removed as a possibility of existence since it is the realm in which individuals and classes are forced into "the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling class." In this sense, I rejected the notion that the state represents the ethically universal, i.e., an ethical principle that does not represent and/or protect the sectional interest of a class or group. By drawing upon Harris (1990), I defined the realm of autonomy as the political production of a sphere in opposition to the hegemony in both the state and society. I emphasized, as

Harris (1990) does, the importance of *organizations* in the production of the sphere of autonomy by arguing that the question of democracy, i.e., a search for the universal ethical principle, exists in all organizational settings.

In the remainder of the chapter, I made an inquiry into Veblen's theory of industrial society and the engineer in order to demonstrate that engineers if discover their potential autonomy and seek to play a leading role in the formation of "the alliance of progressive forces" against the hegemony of the dominant class, they will develop a worldview mediated by their professional ideology. Veblen's emphasis on the unique nature of modern technology as the most dynamic element of the modern industrial society led me to redefine the Veblenian conflict between the capitalist class and engineers, i.e., between the sabotaging and productivist agents of the industrial system. I suggested the use of the term *technological repression* to refer to the hidden social relationship between the capitalist class and the productive agents of the industrial system, which acts itself out as the social relationship between profits and the rate and volume of industrial output. I argued that engineers, understood as the technical labor force, may discover the technological repression since they are mostly motivated to their actions in terms of the optimality condition, or what I called *technique as production*, which is violated by the existence of financial domination over production planning and execution. In the last part of the chapter, I argued that in the context of a society deeply divided in terms of sectional class interests as a result of a long period of hegemonic crisis, engineers can, as illustrated by the case of Turkey, break with the habit of feeling themselves to be employees of capitalists and become critical of taking orders from them and submitting to their

sabotaging of the welfare of the people at large. In other words, engineers can move from technique as the production aspect of modern technology to technique as the criticism aspect of it. By doing so, they also move from hegemony to relative autonomy, or from seeing themselves in the service of a sectional interest to that of the universal interest.

In the next chapter, informed by the preceding theoretical discussion I make an historical inquiry into the hegemonic struggles within the state in twentieth century Turkey. Specifically, I attempt to answer whether the Turkish state has ever formulated goals for itself without being dominated/controlled by dominant groups and classes, and whether the engineers of Turkey and their organization, the UCTEA, have ever moved against the hegemony of such groups and for autonomy.

CHAPTER 3

STRUGGLES FOR HEGEMONY IN THE STATE AND THE PRODUCTION OF THE SPHERE OF AUTONOMY: THE CASE OF TURKEY 1908-1980

> The production relations and socio-political and socio-cultural structure tied to them, which have been dictated to the country by the hegemonic classes, had been successful in preventing many a well-educated individuals from [discovering] these problems. The revolutionary struggle of the people of Turkey which goes back to the 1920s had been repressed by oppression and blood. Long years of . . . repression which was hidden from public opinion had been experienced.
>
> This dark period that requires a much more complex analysis had come to an end with the 1961 Constitution . . .

<div align="right">

Celal Soygan, forest engineer, 1975

</div>

Introduction

Mosca (1939), in his major work *The Ruling Class*, refers to the decline of the Ottoman imperial state in order to explain the leadership qualities of the "governing class in Turkey." By considering events prior to 1895, Mosca argues:

> However grievously the governing class in Turkey may have sinned on the side of corruption, inefficiency and negligence . . . nevertheless, at certain definite moments, when the Crescent seemed to be in danger, the Turkish people displayed a fierce energy that gave pause to Europe's strongest military states. . . . The reason was that . . . The Turkish peasants . . . believed sincerely and deeply in Islam, in the Prophet, in the sultan as the Prophet's vicar, and the beliefs for which they were asked to make the utmost sacrifices were the beliefs that ordinarily filled their lives and made up their moral and intellectual world (Mosca, 1939:107-108).

The first point that needs to be questioned in this passage is the term "Turkish," qualifying the peasants of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious imperial state: Did the Ottoman governing class govern only the Turkish peasants? Or was it claiming to govern both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects? The answer is: As the Ottoman state was not a nation-state, the

Ottoman governing class was claiming to govern non-Turkish peasants as well. This was the case at least until 1923 when the *solid* Ottoman state had *melted into air*. The same year, a new nation-state founded in the remaining lands of the melted Ottoman state made its entrance into the modern inter-state political system. This was the Republic of Turkey whose founders claimed to put an end to the *archaic* Ottoman empire. What was changed effectively and initially was the old governing class which was replaced by a new one which assumed the leadership of the *Turkish* nation, instead of claiming to be the Prophet's vicar. Thus, for the first time, in the ex-Ottoman lands a governing class began to rule only the *Turkish peasants*. Surely this was a very difficult task since, as Mosca clearly points out, the peasants inherited from the Ottoman governing class -- whether or not they were Turkish -- "believed sincerely and deeply in Islam, in the Prophet, in the sultan as the Prophet's vicar." In other words, the *peasants'* moral and intellectual world was not very receptive to a disenchanted kind of leadership like that of the new *Turkish* governing class.

The history of the modern Turkish nation-state can, in one sense, be conceived of as a socio-cultural project aimed to create a modern citizen-subject with a moral and intellectual outlook receptive of a legal-rational leadership organized on the basis of a nationalist ideology designed to secure the conditions of capitalist industrialization. Seeing the modern history of Turkey from this angle is to see it as a process of ongoing revolutions and counterrevolutions. Within this process, not only a modern citizen-subject, or Veblen's "common man" of modern society, comes into existence but also a modern constitutional socio-political formation emerges out from the social struggles in which the

created citizen-subject participates, and hence brings about transformations in the state and civil society. Thus the modern history of Turkey involves one of the unique revolutions of our times -- a revolution which can revolutionize itself. In other words, the twentieth century history of Turkey is truly a modern history because it pours all its citizens "into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish" (Berman, 1983:15). This chapter attempts to highlight some of the most important moments of this process of social "ambiguity and anguish."

Having said this, however, I should clarify the nature of this chapter within the overall problematic of this study. As explained in the Introduction chapter, the essential purpose of this thesis is to examine the state/society relation in Modern Turkey by making an historical inquiry into the field of engineering and the organization of engineers and architects, the UCTEA. Before moving onto this examination in the following chapters, however, the reader should be provided with a brief historical overview of the socio-political conditions of each period in which the field of engineering presents certain social features influencing the form and content of interactions among its actors as well as between them and the rest of the society. Specifically, the historical background presented here aims to answer the key question whether the Turkish state has formulated goals for itself independently from the demands and interests of dominant social groups and classes and whether the engineers, among others, have struggled against the hegemony in the state and society, and for the political production of a sphere of autonomy as defined in Chapter 2.

Answering these questions requires the specification of the position of the state class, or the *officialdom*, vis-à-vis the dominant and subordinate groups and classes. This can be done by examining the officialdom's approach to the resolution of contradictions stemming from the conflict of interests prevailing in civil society, be this economic, social or political. This examination in turn makes it necessary to analyze the historical foundations of hegemonic projects in both the state and society. As argued in Chapter 2, the need for the organization of hegemony in the state derives from the existence of the officialdom separated from civil society, rendering the command exercised through the state and government external to the dominant classes. As mentioned before, one way of establishing hegemony in the state is the dominant classes' attempt to place their adherents in influential offices in the state administration, in the army, in the parliament and government. By doing so, they can direct the entire policy of the state, including the creation of a *conception of law* that can secure the foundation of their leadership in civil society. Thus, the interesting historical questions become: Has any dominant class ever been able to establish hegemony in the Turkish state? If yes, then, has this class been successful in protecting its control over the administration of the state in the face of challenges from both other dominant classes and subordinate classes and groups? If yes, has this class been successful in establishing hegemony in civil society by resolving the tension between its claim to legitimacy and the belief in it offered by the subordinate groups and classes? In other words, has this class ever experienced the "crisis of hegemony" or the "general crisis of the state"? If yes, has the Turkish state revealed the integral meaning of the modern state clearly, i.e., "the state = dictatorship + hegemony" ?

If yes, has any group or class ever attempted to produce politically a sphere of autonomy based on specific causes such as the *moral force of democracy*? If yes, have the community and the organizations of engineers played leading roles in the creation of the *alliance of progressive forces* against domination and oppression in the state and economy? Before answering these questions, we need to make a brief journey into the history of struggles for hegemony in the state in the twentieth century Turkey.

The period under investigation in this chapter is mainly the history of the twentieth century up to 1980 in which the last military intervention had occurred, putting a temporary halt to the political dynamics of civil society. With the return to the civil regime in 1983, political dynamism characteristic of the pre-1980 period revived in a different form within the new politico-legal context that had been established in the interregnum of 1980-1983. In neither this thesis nor this chapter do I attempt to make an inquiry into the developments after 1983. This is because I argue that there exist several issues in the pre-1983 period still waiting for explanations, and without clarifying them, a sensible analysis of the unique developments after 1983 cannot be made. In this sense, the material presented in this thesis as well as this chapter can be seen as a modest input furnished by a sociologist to those researchers who aim to examine the socio-political dynamics of the post-1983 era with some sensible sociological information about the pre-1983 era.

A Failed Social Revolution: The 1908 Young Turk Revolution

Although they have been disputed, the following observations are generally accepted as valid by several social theorists studying the Ottoman social formation: By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman centralized feudal (timer) system had been

largely replaced by a decentralized feudal agricultural organization leading to the emergence of large-scale private property in land. Along with this process of feudal decentralization that had culminated in a fully developed feudal landowning class (Berberoglu, 1982:5) by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the western provinces of the Ottoman Empire were completely integrated into the division of labour of the capitalist world economy (Kasaba, 1987). This integration led to the development of a comprador capitalist class tied to European imperialism (Berberoglu, 1982:6; Kasaba, 1987:841). An important part of the nineteenth century witnessed intense power struggles between the ruling religious class of the Ottoman Empire, the *ulema*, and the nascent comprador bourgeoisie and their political representatives in the state bureaucracy and the military (Savran, 1992:27). The latter was aiming to transform the state into a secular form that would supersede the former's (economic) class power implicated in its political power whose legitimacy was resting on the Islamic law, *shari'a*. Indeed the ulema was responsible for the regulation of both the strictly religious services and the legal, economic and educational activities of the state. Various elements comprising this class were legitimizing their socio-economic privileges based on the official Islamic ideology of the Ottoman state. The official ideology rested on the notion that the Ottoman monarchy had symbolized the unity of the Sultanate and the Caliphate. The latter, whose origins went back to the period after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, represented the unity of the Muslim people all over the world (Toprak, 1987:223). Ottoman sultans had been assuming the title of Caliph from the sixteenth century onwards. Thus, the sultan and the

ulema were trying to hold onto state power and to defend the Islamic form of the state in order to secure their socio-economic privileges.

During the nineteenth century, when belated attempts toward reconstituting the absolutist monarchy along western lines were initiated, several reforms toward secular statism had influenced but failed to resolve the power struggle between the supporters of the ancien regime and those of the evolving capitalist social formation. By the end of the nineteenth century, in the most developed provinces of the empire some minor civil and military bureaucrats began to form secret societies in opposition to the monarchy. The most effective of these was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), or as Europeans called them, the Young Turks. The Young Turks skillfully reached a synthesis of divergent demands and interests in a political program launched for terminating the sultan's absolutist domination and the unchallenged position of the ulema in the affairs of the state. The social base of the Young Turk movement included the commercial bourgeoisie, large landowning class, civil servants, military-students and some sections of the urban working masses. The political aim of the Young Turks was to form a secular nation-state provided with legal-rational institutions that all citizens irrespective of their ethnic and religious identities would be willing to belong to.

In 1908 the Young Turks eventually began organizing armed groups in order to depose the sultan and undermine the political power of the ulema by re-proclaiming the constitution which had been suspended in 1876 immediately after its declaration. The caliph-sultan, ". . . alarmed for his own safety, felt compelled to reinstate the constitution" before the Young Turks. This event, on July 23, 1908, was an unexpected development

"causing great disappointment to the revolutionaries, for by this act the sultan . . . managed to save his position" (Robinson, 1963:9). Thus, the "disappointed" Young Turks were compelling the caliph-sultan to take an oath to remain loyal to the constitution without clearly overthrowing the monarchy. Still, "the 1908 revolution represented a benchmark in Ottoman history, for now power was rested in a political elite," i.e., the government formed by the CUP, whose mandate was legally separated from socio-economic status based on Islamic religious precepts (Szyliowicz, 1975:26).

One immediate consequence of this significant change was the emergence of the political party as a major institutional factor radically transforming political processes. Above all, "politicization was enhanced by growing tensions among different groupings" centered around political parties with programs based on modernist ideologies such as nationalism and socialism (Szyliowicz, 1975:27). The enhanced politicization in turn prepared the ground for the new regime to move toward the adoption of revolutionary changes at the expense of the privileges of the ulema. This involved women's rights, legal and administrative reforms, economic policies designed to install a national industrial base, and most importantly, secularization in the educational system (Lewis, 1968; Ahmad, 1969).

Nevertheless, several factors inhibited a complete revolutionary break with the old pre-capitalist theocratic regime. One of the most important was the multi-ethnic character of the empire that hindered the formation of a powerful nationalist ideology occupied a central place. In the absence of an apparent ethnic core that might have defined an "imaginary nationhood," the Young Turks attempted to legitimize the new regime

through an amalgamation of "Ottomanism," "Pan-Islamism," and "Pan-Turkism," (Ahmad, 1969; Kasaba, 1980). In effect, the Young Turk revolutionary program did not only lead to the estrangement of the religious class, which was still commanding the veneration of the vast majority of people. It was also "destined to alienate all those whose privileged positions were based on the traditional order. Muslim Turks, Arabs, and Albanians protested as vigorously as the Christian Greeks, Slavs, and Armenians against the rationalization of life" (Ahmad, 1969:156). Under these conditions, the Young Turks, even after in political control, "had not dared speak out among the common soldiers against the sultan himself because of the religious significance of his office" (Robinson, 1963:10). As a result, Islamic law, shari'a, still dominated, and the millet system whose permanence was based on the sultanate continued -- that [i.e., millet] "system whereby various religious and [ethnic groups] had access to their own [ethnic] and religious courts of justice" (Robinson, 1963:11). In short, the Young Turks were unable to de-Islamize the state and social life, and thus failed to transform the Ottoman state into a secular nation-state form provided with universal abstract laws.

The Independence War of 1919-1922 and the Ensuing Social Revolution from Above

Changing conditions after World War One made it possible to create the Turkish nation state that led to a radical break with the precapitalist Ottoman past. Even before the end of World War One, the Young Turk government began a political agitation for "national rights" and laid the basis for the future armed struggle for founding a nation state (Zurcher, 1991:11). Untimely however, in March 1919 the Young Turks fully lost power

to the British and the pro-Entente monarchist Freedom and Understanding Party. With the Young Turks' loss of power, the pressure of the Entente on the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, increased. Later, with the Sevres Treaty in 1920, European imperialist powers ultimately partitioned Ottoman territories among themselves (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1987:271). As a reaction to this dramatic development, groups of resistance began emerging all over the country among the propertied groups whose economic interests were most imperiled by foreign occupation (Ibid:271). Within this process, several patriotic societies, associations for the defense of national rights, were founded largely by Turkish and Kurdish local notables, merchants and landowners, who later organized the National Liberation movement. The local "Unionist," i.e., the Young Turk, military and civil bureaucrats of the collapsed Ottoman state swiftly assumed the leadership in these societies due to their organizational skills and official positions. (Sunar, 1974; Oran, 1993; Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1987; Zurcher, 1991).

The nationalist leadership tried to arouse and mobilize "local Muslim" people through meetings and mass demonstrations, and prove its legitimacy by the convening of regional congresses (Zurcher, 1991:13). In the congresses, the nationalists proclaimed as their goal the defense of the "Islamic lands" and the "Islamic population" against the invading infidels in order to get the support from the ulema (Mortimer, 1982). In the end, the nationalist leadership secured the ulema's backing and waged the "National Liberation War" between 1919 and 1922 that, to some accounts, took on the character of a *jihad*, a holy war.

In its real nature, however, the war involved at least three distinct, albeit intertwined, hegemonic struggles with important implications for the ensuing nation-state formation. First, the war was an anti-colonial national liberation war in defense of the motherland against imperialist and imperialist supported occupations. Secondly, it entailed an intense class struggle between the dominant propertied classes along ethnic and religious lines. Namely, Muslim propertied classes were aiming to fight off Christian Greek and Christian Armenian propertied classes supported by the imperialists. Finally, the war years witnessed a power struggle between the "imperial" Ottoman government located in Istanbul and the Grant National Assembly founded by the "national forces" located in Ankara (Savran, 1992; Shaw and Shaw, 1977:352-354).

The liberation war ended with the victory of the Ankara national forces. The victory terminating the imperialist occupation was essentially the victory of the Ankara national government over the Istanbul Imperial government. During the war years, the Istanbul government refused the legitimacy of the Ankara government on the grounds that the Sultanate as the legitimate authority had resided in Istanbul. As a reaction, just two months after the victory, on November 1, 1922, the leader of the Ankara government, Gazi Mustafa Kemal, proclaimed the abolition of the Sultanate, which left the Sultan only with a symbolic title, namely, the Caliph. In the following months, the Ankara government encountered strong opposition from the ulema that rightly felt to be misled by the nationalist leadership. But Kemal "cut off the discussion by explaining that the . . . nation had already 'effectively taken sovereignty and sultanate into its own hands. This was an 'already accomplished fact' . . ." (Mortimer, 1982:134). In this sense, the war

involved a political revolution mostly unrecognized by the masses for whom the war meant nothing but a *jihad* against the invading infidels.

In a recent work, Savran (1992) argues that the creation of the Turkish nation-state in 1923 was the outcome of a revolutionary struggle, leading to the overthrowing of the six-century old Ottoman state. According to Savran, one of the peculiar aspects of this revolutionary transformation was the absence of any significant collective violence directed against the old regime. This was because the revolutionary leadership deliberately prevented the "masses" from participating in the revolutionary process both during and after the liberation war. The principal factor, rendering a political "revolution without the masses" possible, was the civil-military bureaucratic leadership's ability to organize "a revolutionary movement based on officials and organs of the old regime" such as the army and the provincial administrative units (Trimberger, 1987:17; Zurcher, 1991). The revolution began with the foundation of the National Assembly in Ankara as an alternative center of authority, claiming legitimacy on the basis of long-established institutions and practices (Trimberger, 1978:92). In this sense, rather than requiring the masses' backing, the revolutionary leadership felt it necessary to keep them under control, as well as away from any other competing leadership that might have worked against the interests of the Muslim propertied class alliance.

In the midst of a double-headed state authority (i.e., one in Istanbul and the other in Ankara) and foreign occupation, the task of the revolutionary leadership was certainly difficult. During the liberation war several groups and armies that had drawn their members from the rural masses rose to seek power for themselves in open conflict with

the Ankara "national forces." These armies became so commanding that "on April 20, 1920, the Grand National Assembly passed [the Treason Act] that prohibited 'crimes against the nation' and set up Independence Courts to try and execute on the spot" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:352). Five months later, the Assembly amended the Law on Associations that gave the government "the authority to prohibit organizations opposing public law and state policy" (Harris, 1967:80).

According to Harris (1967), the principal motive of the Ankara government in passing these repressive laws was to halt the rising "communist" movement "during the early phases of the struggle for independence." At this time when a "socialist revolution" was underway in the neighbouring Russia, "the communists seemed to be on the threshold of achieving power . . . [and] . . . to establish a special relationship with key partisan units . . . of the . . . revolutionary movement" mobilized against the Ottoman regime which was not resisting the foreign occupation. (Harris, 1967: 7). One influential group known as the Green Army, for example, managed to formulate a discursive unity between socialism and Islam, and began to recruit followers from the masses. In July 1920, the Green Army, now "seemed dangerous," was disbanded by the government in accordance with "public law and state policy." Yet the "communist threat" did not easily melt into air. The left-wing opposition formed the people's faction (Halk Zumresi) in the Assembly, which was strong enough to influence the legislative process (Zurcher, 1991).

Between July 1920 and May 1921, the Ankara government continued to employ the Independence Courts to intimidate the remaining "communists" and the masses associated with them. By the end of May 1921, the "communist activity" in Turkey which

had "sympathizers among the uneducated masses" and "religious leaders" came to a halt (Harris, 1967:93). Besides aiming at the "communists," the government used the Independence Courts to halt the growing number of deserters from the "national army." By some accounts, the number of deserters executed by the Courts substantially surpassed the number of soldiers killed in combat by the enemy (Oran, 1992:81). In brief, when looked at retrospectively, it was not a predetermined outcome which leadership, the civil-military bureaucratic leadership of the propertied class alliance or the left-wing coalition mobilizing the rural masses, would dominate the national liberation movement and make a legitimate claim to the new state. The former gained the upper hand largely by suppressing the autonomy of the masses on the basis of repressive laws and coercive governmental actions involving the army. In this sense, the new Turkish nation-state was born with the birth marks of institutionalized repression. For, as Shaw and Shaw (1977:352) put forward, the Independence Courts "became a major instrument of the Ankara government to suppress opposition long after independence itself was achieved."

The political revolution, although largely unnoticed by the masses, brought about comprehensive transformations in the *conception of law* in terms of the organization of political, legal and educational institutions leading to the de-Islamization of the state activities -- and to some extent that of social life. Among these, the emergence of the nation state, the Republic of Turkey, in October 1923, was the most significant one. The newly founded nation state became the principal agent replacing pre-capitalist legal, educational and cultural forms of social relations with those of modern market relations. The decades from 1920s to 1940 constituted a "social revolution from above," following

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the footsteps of the Young Turks (Savran, 1992:51-54; Trimberger, 1978; Lowy, 1981).

Among the most significant revolutionary changes, were those directly related to political processes. In 1924 the Caliphate was abolished. With the abolition of the Caliphate, Islam, which had been officially utilized by the pre-capitalist imperial state, lost its last legitimate political base. In the same year, the abolition of the office of *seyh ul-Islam* was another move in the process of de-Islamicizing politics, that is, "ending the ability of the religious class, i.e., the ulema, to limit and control the state" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:384). Again in 1924, the abolitions of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations and that of the shari'a courts based on Islamic law were indicative of the revolutionary leadership's unyielding struggle for breaking with the theocratic state structure. These changes were followed by the abolition of the medreses and the mekteps, which were the religious educational institutions inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and the prohibition of tarikats (religious brotherhoods) and the ban on all their activities (Toprak, 1987). By doing this, the entire system of religious schools and groupings was eliminated; and most members of the ulema were "pensioned off" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:384). Then, under the direction of the Ministry of Education, a unified system of secular education was established.

Among the newly introduced institutional-legal changes, the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, giving equal civil rights to men and women, was "one of the most revolutionary acts in terms of the de-Islamization of social life" (Toprak, 1987:224). Following this major change, the new regime granted political rights to women, first in municipal elections in 1930, later in national elections in 1934. Moreover, "women were admitted to the public schools, the civil service, and the professions on an increasingly

equal basis with men" (Shaw and Shaw, 1976:385). The adoption of the Civil Code and the granting of political rights to women, however, did not constitute a mere facade in the confrontation with the ulema. These actions were finalizing the prolonged transition process from pre-capitalist property relations to capitalist private property relations in the realm of law (Savran, 1992:51). Not surprisingly, the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 was accompanied by the adoption of the Italian Penal Code and the German Commercial Code.

The Mono-party State and its Regulation of Politics

The social revolution succeeding the unrecognized political revolution has been suggested as one of the unique instances of the category of "unfinished bourgeois revolution" (Lowy, 1981). According to this account, the social revolution failed to confront all facets of the democracy issue, that is, establishing a secular democratic republic based on political and civil freedoms, especially for the labour movement. Second, it failed to resolve the agrarian question and the ensuing city-country relation, namely, moving toward a "definitive abolition of all pre-capitalist modes of exploitation of the rural labour force, the expropriation of the great landowners and the distribution of their domains to the peasants" (Lowy, 1981:161; Savran, 1992:54-55).

Although there was no prohibition of a multitude of parties in the Constitution, the Republican People's Party (RPP) would soon become the single party legally permitted to function in both the Assembly and the country (Kocak, 1992). The RPP evolved out of the "Association for the Defence of the National Rights" (ADNR) that had waged the Liberation War. On August 9, 1923, in the Assembly the ADNR reconstituted itself

officially as the People's Party, and after the establishment of the republic, it became the Republican People's Party (Zurcher, 1991:30).

The leadership within the party and de facto within the Assembly belonged to the bureaucratic elite whose power rested on the coalition of the commercial bourgeoisie and the large landowning class (Sunar, 1974; Oran, 1993). In fact, the foundation of the republic aimed to establish the political domination of the latter, which had emerged as economically dominant classes by the end of the nineteenth century (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1987:272). Thus, the political structure formed by the republican regime was an accommodation among the commercial bourgeoisie, the large landowning class, and the civil and military bureaucrats. "Since none of them could rule alone, a coalition followed" (Sunar, 1974:65).

Although the new state had rested on the coalition of these dominant classes and groups, the evolving nationalist ideology -- later to be called the "Ataturkist," or the "Kemalist," nationalism after the founder of the new regime, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk-- repudiated the existence of socio-economic classes and their contradictory nature. In the new official ideology, society was conceived of as a unitary nation, which was depicted as free of social, economic, ethnic and cultural cleavages (Oran, 1993:207). In the early phases of the dissemination of the new official ideology, the state was defined as the key agent protecting the unity of the nation, which did not require more than one political party in the National Assembly.

Yet actual developments after the declaration of the republic had indicated diametrically opposite tendencies. "With elections in the offing, the political pot in Istanbul

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rapidly came to a boil. Most of the Istanbul press, divining that their city stood little chance of regaining its political primacy without the Sultanate, adopted attitudes of varying hostility to [the Ankara] regime. Many hoped for a return to constitutional monarchy" (Harris, 1967:122). At this time, "a number of leading military figures of the revolution" who had close ties with the Istanbul bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie began to attack the Ankara regime's secularist and modernist policies. Between October 26 and November 9, 1924, these "last Ottoman generals" resigned from their military posts and from the RPP (Zurcher, 1991). But the generals decided not to resign as deputies and to be active in the Assembly as a group that would work toward forming a new political party. Suspicious of such a development, Mustafa Kemal initiated a campaign for defaming the generals and the political opposition in Istanbul. As early as September 20, 1924, he addressed this issue in a speech made before a very reluctant audience at the local branch of the People's Party in Samsun, a Black Sea town symbolizing the conception of the National Liberation War:

> Friends, the body that now bears responsibility for governing the country is the party of the republic, which I think comprises the whole nation. . . The fundamental principle of this party is to work for . . .the nation and I think this is the clear-cut road. That is a sign for the achievement of the nation's . . . renovation in the mental and social revolution. . . Today we stand at the head of a clear cut-road. The distance covered is too small to influence our plans. All positions must first acquire the necessary clarity and precision. Until that has happened, the thought of more than one party is common partisanship, and ladies and gentlemen, from a point of view of order and safety of country and nation the conditions to open the way for the establishment of more than one party have not been met yet (Zurcher, 1991:43).

Under these prohibiting "conditions," the Istanbul-based opposition formed the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) on November 9, 1924. On November 26, some deputies resigned from the People's Party and joined the opposition PRP (Zurcher,

1991:233) Surely, the PRP was not "founded solely out of personal differences. . . [It] had a real political programme and an ideological stance, but it was not, . . ., a reactionary or religious one" (Zurcher, 1991:114). Like the People's Party, it declared its full support for "republicanism" and "free enterprise system" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:380). Unlike the Ankara regime, however, it opposed the abolition of the caliphate and the rapid secularization plans. On the face of it, as Zurcher claims (1991:114), "its platform looked more in tune with the mood of the country . . . than the radical policies of the [Ankara government], which were often imposed on an unwilling population." Very soon, however, due to its "looking more in tune with the mood of the country," the PRP swiftly released a growing number of groups from all sides of the political spectrum which were critical of the project of the formation of a Turkish nation-state (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:381). As a result, not only the Ankara government but also the PRP felt threatened by popular discontent and opposition to the secular nationalist state.

Early in 1925 "a serious revolt" began in southeastern Anatolia led by the feudal Kurdish leaders who had organized the Kurdish masses during the Liberation War (Shaw and Shaw, 1976:380; Oran, 1993). "Propaganda leaflets and letters found on the rebels made clear both the [movement's] Kurdish-nationalist aspect (with demands for a Kurdish national government) and [its] Islamic character (with demands for the restoration of the holy law and the Caliphate)" (Zurcher, 1991:81). The latter provided the Turkish Islamist groups located mainly in Istanbul with an opportunity to express their own opposition to government's religious and secularist policies. Although the PRP had been trying to distance itself from these oppositional groupings, it was clear that the Islamists were

prompted by the PRP's opposition to the government. Therefore it was not difficult for the Ankara government to make the connection. Its immediate reaction was to reinstate the Independence Courts of the Liberation War, and to declare martial law in the southeastern provinces. The PRP was quick to join the government; the "government had been supported unanimously" in its handling of the Kurdish revolt that essentially took on the character of an Islamic movement (Zurcher, 1991:83).

The leading figures of the revolt were soon captured and executed by the Courts. This experience in 1925 validated, rather violently, Mustafa Kemal's 1924 prediction that the conditions for more than one party had not been met yet. The new state was still too weak to allow even a moderate opposition as this could easily trigger either a counter-revolutionary or a separatist movement. The opposition PRP finally came to terms with what Mustafa Kemal had meant by "standing at the head of a clear-cut road." In this "road" there was no room for the so-called "democratic freedoms." On June 3, 1925, the government ordered that the PRP be dissolved; and the PRP without showing too much resistance complied with the order. Thus, the mono-party state regime officially commenced just two years after the declaration of the republic.

During these years, another problem area that the new regime also tried to take under control through repressive measures was the political mobilization of the working class. Even before the foundation of the Republic, the May Day celebration had been banned -- which was still legal by then -- on the grounds that it was divisive (Gundogmus, 1992). The leaders of the labor movement, who were encouraging "workers, peasants and people of modest means" to participate in the May Day parade, were "apprehended by the

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police . . . for handing out circulars allegedly inciting the workers to revolt." (Harris, 1967:123). Two years later, in 1925, based on the Law for the Maintenance of Order promulgated immediately after the Kurdish revolt, the right to form trade unions and professional associations and right to strike were completely repressed (Isikli, 1987). In 1928, the government closed down the Association for the Promotion of Workers (Amele Taali Cemiyeti) in Istanbul. In 1933, new provisions were included in the Penal Code, further restricting the *professional* and *working class* based economic and political organizations. In 1935, with the promulgation of the Law on Strikes (Tatil-i Esgal Kanunu), the rights to form trade unions and to strike were practically outlawed. In 1936, the infamous articles 141 and 142 were inserted into the already broad penal code "to outlaw organizations advocating class struggle in any form." (Harris, 1967:138).

The imposition of revolutionary transformations through anti-democratic ways corresponded to the widening of the gap between the cities and the countryside in terms of the penetration of new socio-cultural values. Although the revolutionary transformations were "almost immediately internalized by the civil servants, the military and urban intellectual elite, the same was generally not true for people of peasant and small town origins." (Toprak, 1987: 225). As a result essentially of the unchallenged politico-ethical leadership of the large landowner class over the peasantry, the new nationalist ideology "failed to become a meaningful alternative to Islam as either a political discourse or a prescription for a new way of life" in the countryside (Toprak, 1987: 225). In this outcome, the bypassed land reform that could have provided a rapid capitalist transformation in agriculture played a significant role (Savran, 1992).

The State and its Relation to the Emerging Capitalist Class

By the end of the 1920s it was clear that industrialization, "an indispensable element of . . . the [chosen] national capitalist development," was proceeding slowly (Boratav, 1992:293). Between 1923 and 1929 the rate of growth in industry had been always lower than those in the other sectors of the economy. Thus it came to the fore that a 1927 law to boost private industry had essentially failed to replace the defeated and "deported" non-Muslim industrialists with their "Turkish" counterparts. "In fact, there were several business failures partly due to lack of adequate capital, partly due to managerial incompetence." (Ozay, 1981:9). Thus, the weak capitalist class had to be supported more than it used to be.

The 1929 Great Depression very timely prepared the ground for the implementation of a new socio-economic policy designed to support the emerging industrial capitalist, or rather entrepreneurial, class. The Depression drastically reduced the revenues of the merchant capitalists and the large commercial landowning class specializing on export-import trade in virtually open economy conditions. It was at this time that the class balance of the ruling coalition, if not its composition, was disturbed. Under the crisis-ridden environment, the bureaucratic elite gained the upper hand and assumed a leading role in the 1930s (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1987:274).

The new economic policy package -- which was introduced as "Etatism" -- was one of the first models of state capitalism that has subsequently been applied in many advanced countries with the emergence of welfare state (Savran, 1992). Like Western welfare states, "the system of Etatism applied in Turkey [was] not a system copied and

translated from the ideas that socialist theoreticians have been putting forward since the 19th century." (Mustafa Kemal, speaking in 1935. Quoted in Lewis, 1968:287). The "Etatism" applied in Turkey took as its basis the private initiative. For "the spokesmen of Etatism . . . had no intention of collectivizing the economy . . . They would not touch agriculture at all . . . . Their purpose was to initiate and develop projects in fields where private capital was incapable, inactive, or dilatory." (Lewis, 1968:286). Not surprisingly, "the Etatism period provided Turkish businessmen with considerable . . . capital, despite the idea of a classless society envisaged by the official ideology . . . " (Ilkin, 1993:188). The origins of the "industrialists" invented in this period were varying from the civil-military bureaucrats to small scale traders. Strikingly enough, there was almost no industrialist from a background of small-scale production (Ilkin, 1993:197). As result of their strong dependence on the state, these "industrialists" comfortably adopted the secularist policies. They envisioned that they could become "westernized" via "opening new schools and giving scholarships" (Ilkin, 1993:185).

The Commencement of the Multi-Party Regime with "Legal Bans"

Turkey, with 80 percent of the population living in villages, was still a "peasant" society by the end of the World War Two. A British woman traveller, Lilo Linke's (1937:179) narration of her encounter with a *sunni* Turkish peasant family in 1935, which should have been in the same position in the mid-1940s, seems more informative than most theoretical accounts on this issue:

> The old man was amazed at the fact that a woman was allowed and dared to travel in a foreign country all by herself. He had heard that things were different nowadays, but hitherto the only change in his life had been brought about by unintelligible laws, imposed on him from above.

Although Linke does not sound amazed at all, it should have been amazingly difficult to appreciate the old man's amazement because a woman was not only allowed but also dared to be elected to a political office in the old man's country all by herself in 1930. In other words, the old man had either not heard this "new thing" yet or understood the significant difference between "a woman's traveling all by herself" and a woman's election to a political office. As Linke's narrative reveals, the latter was the probable reason of the old man's amazement. Because there was no significant change in the old man's life except for some "unintelligible laws, imposed on him from above."

As mentioned earlier, the essential, if not the only, reason of the socio-cultural polarization of the population in terms of the city-country divide was the unchallenged ethical leadership of large landowners and small town merchants, i.e., local notables or esraf, over the peasantry. This class as both the hegemonic leader of the peasantry and a partner in the hegemonic bloc in the state was using a "popular Islamic" discourse in securing its dominant position in society, if not in the state. In the eyes of rural and small town people, various elements comprising this class were trying hard to save traditional values from the onslaught of the evil government. The rural sunni people regarded them as true believers whom "Allah could not blame for submitting to force." (Linke, 1937:180). "One day inshallah (as God will)," they would sweep away "the wicked government" which was traversing on a sinful road whose end "was not yet clearly visible," and "still somewhat obscure" (Ibid:316-17).

During the years of World War Two, socio-economic conditions changed in such a way that "sweeping away the wicked government" finally became a possibility. Due to

high inflation rates during these years, the esraf accumulated massive amounts of money capital, and thus strengthened its economic and political power (Boratav, 1992). As a result, the balance of forces within the ruling coalition shifted in favour of the commercial and agrarian class interests. In 1946 the governing RPP split between the supporters of a land reform proposal and the representatives of landowners. On January 7, 1946, four renowned members of the RPP who were representing the interests of the large landowning class and the commercial bourgeoisie resigned from the party, and founded the Democrat Party (Eroglu, 1987:104). Thus, the multi-party regime had commenced officially. Remarkable as this may sound, however, the DP was the only opposition granted legitimacy.

The DP's party program did not significantly differ from the ruling RPP. As an off-shoot of the latter, the DP claimed to remain loyal to the fundamental principles of the secular state while demanding greater respect for religion and less government intervention in religious affairs (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1988:13). "Article 14 of the program stated that the party rejected the erroneous interpretation of secularism that lead to a hostile attitude against religion, and advocated a clearer separation between religion and public affairs so that the government would not interfere in religious activities" (Geyikdagi, 1984:67).

Very soon, the DP successfully articulated a new hegemonic discourse by combining the economic and political interests of the urban working masses with the popular religious demands of the rural masses and many Islamic elements in constant opposition to the mono-party rule of the RPP. With this new discourse, the DP linked

Islam to group or class interests. Henceforth, mainstream political parties would have to take into consideration the decisive role of the religious vote. This process -- that can be referred to as the emergence of right-wing mainstream conservative politics -- would result in the reemergence of political Islamic and irredentist nationalist groups that would actively engage in the affairs of the state and try to make it serve their organizational purposes.

The first signs of the emergence of mainstream conservative politics came forward in 1949 and early 1950. The ruling RPP moved toward the direction of greater religious tolerance in order to slow down the DP's rising popularity as a result of its courting the general vote. Optional religious lessons were introduced into the primary school, a faculty of theology established at the Ankara University, and official courses for prayer leaders, imams, and preachers initiated (Geyikdagi, 1984). Significantly, these educational moves were made under the Ministry of Education -- the fortress of secular revolutions -- and fully in line with the republican regime's policy of regulation of religion from above. However, these changes were sufficient to activate various political Islamic groups that had moved to the underground. Among these Islamic groups, the followers of the Ticani sect were the most active:". . . just prior to the 1950 election the government had been forced to arrest and try . . . the sheik of the Ticani sect . . . [who] . . . at the time . . . had some 300 000 followers." (Robinson, 1963:202). The suppression of Islamists by the government added further popularity to the DP's election promises while undermining any political capital the RPP might have gained from moving toward the direction of "greater religious liberalism."

Not surprisingly, the DP won the 1950 national elections with an overwhelming majority of the popular vote. While reading the government program in the Assembly, the newly elected prime minister, Adnan Menderes, declared that the government would protect only those revolutions which were adopted by the nation (Kircak, 1993:28). The government's first act to this end was to abolish the penalty for giving the prayer in Arabic which had been introduced under Ataturk. This move quickly gave rise to a public dispute over the issue of making concessions to Islamic groups for political gains. Responding to his critics, Menderes argued:

> Ataturk had to fight the spirit of fanaticism to materialize the revolution; the obligation of using the Turkish language for the call to prayer was a necessity of this kind. But . . . today, it is no more necessary to take these measures. . . (Geyikdagi, 1984:77).

In other words, Menderes had been claiming that the revolution was successful in fighting the counter-revolutionary Islamic opposition. Surely, this was a far cry from the truth, and Menderes himself was well aware of this fact. At this time, several Islamist periodicals were coming out with typical headlines such as "How a generation was destroyed" or "Why is this nation weeping?" In one of the leading Islamist journals, a deputy was writing the following lines: "It is not true that the nation is thankful to Kemal Ataturk for his revolution . . . The nation must seek its salvation in the Kuran." (Geyikdagi, 1984:78). Thus the nation should have been re-introduced to the message in the holy book.

Behind the facade of this politico-ideological transformation, however, a radical change in the organization of macroeconomic processes was in progress. On the economic front, one of the first acts of the DP government was to open up the Turkish economy to foreign competition and capital. In the early 1950s the government began to accept

substantial loans and credits from international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and used these funds mostly in the public works projects, adding to the infrastructure required for the expanding international trade (Trimberger, 1978:121). At the same time, however, by setting aside the proposed Land Reform Act, the DP government overturned the bureaucratic elite's fragile effort to capitalize agriculture for a rapid economic development. Indeed during the 1950s when the DP was in power, no "planned" attempt was made to channel economic resources to productive investments (Boratav, 1992). "In short, the DP mobilized all the resources afforded by its incumbency to benefit Western imperialism, foreign capital, the commercial bourgeoisie, and large landowners." (Eroglu, 1987:111).

Yet the DP did not match its "liberal" economic policies with political liberalization, a promise that led it to the electoral victory in 1950. Once in power, the DP relied on the repressive state power that it had borrowed from the mono-party regime. In January 1951, it started a violent assault on the left-wing organizations, parties and intellectuals, which continued throughout the 1950s. The DP seemed to forget its pre-election promises on the right to strike, and became an ardent supporter of the anti-strike legislation. "Unions and union leaders who continued pressing for this right were subjected to repression and persecution." (Isikli, 1987:315). "Forget about those empty talks," said the prime minister while speaking in the Assembly, "can there be strikes in Turkey, . . . Let's develop a bit . . . We can think about this issue later." (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976:97). Unions were not alone; the state repression also extended to the official opposition - the RPP -, universities, the press, unaffiliated youth organizations and the courts.

Within this process, the more the DP relied on repressive state measures, the more it moved away from the urban segments of the society. Interestingly, however, when Menderes made further concessions to large landowners and Islamic and irredentist elements in the party, some members (deputies) representing the industrial and urban commercial interests left the DP in 1955. These members blamed Menderes for being intolerant and repressive in governing the country (Tuncay, 1992:183). They supported the idea of economic planning combined with a democratic regime and constitutionally secured legislative process that could cease the monopolization of political power by landowners and small town merchants based on their strong grip on the majority of voters (Shaw and Shaw, 1976:412; Schick and Tonak, 1980; Savran, 1992). Menderes made it clear that he would associate with the representatives of landowners and local notables, when he made one of his historical statements in the DP party caucus on November 29, 1955:

> My friends have accused me of being a dictator. Is there any possibility for me to be a dictator before you? You are so powerful that if you want now, you can even change the constitution, even bring the Caliphate back (Kircak, 1993:53).

Shortly after these and the ensuing startling statements by the prime minister of the secular Republic of Turkey, a broad urban-based coalition began to be formed against the DP regime backed by the rural majority. The RPP, the official opposition, was the only organization that could resist the ever increasing dictatorial rule of the DP. Thus, it swiftly became the centre of resistance to repressive government policies, and sought to lead various groups comprising the broad urban-based opposition. Eventually, in 1959, the RPP launched what was called the "Grand Offensive" toward a democratic reconstitution of Turkish society and politics (Eroglu, 1987). The universities became active centres of

political activity and opposition to which the government "replied with suspensions, restrictions, and imprisonments" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:411)

In short, by the end of 1959 the DP was not leading anymore. It was only dictating the class interests of the commercial bourgeoisie and the large landowners on the urban strata of the population. Surely, mevlids, i.e., religious ceremonies politically utilized by the government, could not be of great help to pacify the urbanites who had long internalized the democratic essence of the secularist revolutionary transformations introduced by the republican regime in the 1920s and the 1930s. Therefore, in the beginning of 1960, in reaction to the prolonged DP dictatorship, the Kemalist "unfinished bourgeoisie revolution" appeared to be ready to make a big leap forward, or rather a "Grand Offensive," toward "democratic freedoms." However, this time it was not only from above but also from below.

A Period of Expression of Differences Subsumed in the Legal Identity: 1960-1980

On April 28, 1960, students at Istanbul University took to the streets for what they called "the struggle for freedom awaiting outside the universities." During May 1960, university students joined by lawyers, journalists, military students and ordinary citizens in major cities shouted for "freedom" and "down with all dictators." Troops and the police answered with mass arrests. In the bloody clashes between the police and students at least eleven demonstrators were killed. These events, the Globe and Mail reported on May 19, 1960, "the first of their kind for more than 50 years or so, have deeply shocked the

country." According to the Globe, Turkey was in a legal and practical confusion and "in this confused situation one thing [stood] out: the most powerful actual authority . . . [was] the army." On May 27, 1960, the "most powerful actual authority" took over the administration totally, and thus ending the "confused legal and practical situation." The next day the long commentary in the New York Times argued that the coup was indeed "Turks' reaction" to the DP's "ten year-rule, increasingly dictatorial in recent months."

In its effect, the 27 May coup was an attempt to save the state that had been alienated from its citizenry. The coup provided the industrial bourgeoisie with what it needed the most, namely, "a constitutionally secured legislative process." It also opened the way for granting fundamental democratic rights and freedoms to the citizenry. As Korkmaz (1992:24) mentions, "this condition was not a deviation from the logic of the coup; [the coup] did not disturb the class hierarchy in the society, in one night, it shortened, and resolved the process that was called 'progress,' which would have been unraveled by struggle, tears and blood."

A new constitution that provided extended political, civil, economic and social freedoms and rights was ratified by popular vote on July 9, 1961. As opposed to the previous constitutions, in the 1961 constitution liberalization of freedoms was the norm; "restriction" was the exception (Ergul, 1981:39). The constitution aimed to provide and to guarantee as much freedom and rights as possible: freedom of thought, freedom of faith, freedom of communication, freedom of demonstration, right to strike, right to form political parties and so on. In the words of Eroglu (1987:130), the constitution "created a democratic legal framework the likes of which had never before been seen in Turkey, and

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which was rare even in the contemporary world at large, aiming at restraining the state and leading to the flourishing of civil society." This was a social milieu in which legally identical individuals had effective standing as citizens, "partly because [they had] the effective opportunity . . . to participate in the common life of the society . . ." (Connolly, 1991:192). The realization of the latter would result in the expression of differences that had been subsumed in the legal identity guaranteed in the constitution.

In the years between 1961 and 1965 the new democratic legal framework did lead to the expression of differences. In a short period of time, new social actors with different demands and aspirations joined the "common life of the society." Most importantly, universities, associations of professionals and mass media institutions, that is, the realm of traditional intellectuals, began to separate themselves from governments and their agenda. They became sights of new political and social projects based primarily on progressive ideals as well as spheres of opposition to violations of public interests by those usurping the state (Aydinoglu, 1992; Korkmaz, 1992). Equally important, as a result of rapid industrialization and constitutionally guaranteed rights, the working class made a remarkable entrance into mainstream politics with independent representatives such as the Turkish Labour Party founded in 1961 and the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions (CRWU) founded in 1967. In this period the working class transformed itself from a "young and inexperienced" grouping into "a very militant and highly organized sector" (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984:16). The 1960s also witnessed the advent of the industrial-financial bourgeoisie as the dominant element in the coalition of the propertied classes. The period of 1960-80 was the period of expansion of the "Turkish bourgeoisie"

(Ahmad, 1980; Ilkin, 1993). During the 1960s, "the growth rate of industry reached 9 percent. The internal contradictions within the bourgeoisie became more and more acute, as this class developed, particularly between small and monopoly capital" (Schick and Tonak, 1980:16). Yet no element of the industrial-financial bourgeoisie raised any serious opposition to multinationals that established branch plants and distribution networks in Turkey through franchises, licences and know-how agreements. "There [was] fear of foreign domination, but not much talk in terms of national capital" (Ahmad, 1980:20). Until 1980 Turkish governments, mostly controlled by industrial-financial interests, implemented a policy of import substitution industrialization with easy credits, protectionism and state intervention in infrastructure development (Altan, 1984:14; Savran, 1992; Boratav, 1992; Laciner, 1975).

Finally, the new regime established after the 27 May 1960 coup brought about significant transformations in the relationship between the army and the state. Before the 1960s, the army was almost totally dependent on the government that had attempted to use it as a simple instrument of coercion (Oz, 1992). "But after 27 May 1960 the army became an autonomous institution, recognized as the guardian of the new regime it had set up" (Ahmad, 1977:194). The role of the army thus conceived was ratified in the new legislation, providing a legal basis for the army's direct involvement in political crises (Ozdemir, 1992; Ergul, 1981). In addition to this constitutional change in terms of the political functions of the army, in this period, the military was transformed into a branch of financial capital (Schick and Tonak, 1980:17). In 1961 the Army Mutual Assistance Association (AMA) was founded, which required that all regular officers in the armed

forces invest 10 percent of their salaries. With its shares in the Turkish Automotive industry, an insurance company, food and cement factories, the AMA accumulated $300 million in assets by 1972 (Ibid.). Thus, "in the sixties the army was more concerned to defend the regime than a particular party. . . . The High Command was naturally antagonistic to a socialist party . . . just as it was sympathetic to parties . . . promot[ing] the existing order of private enterprise" (Ahmad, 1977:194).

Surely, the immediate economic interest was not the only factor that rendered the army an "autonomous" institution "concerned to defend the regime." The ties established between the American and the Turkish Armed forces - the so-called Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) - in the early 1950s had been enhanced in the 1960s by the establishment within the Turkish General Staff of a Department of Special Warfare, headquartered in the JUSMMAT complex in Ankara and getting special US funds (Karasapan, 1989). Karasapan (1989:7) provides the following illuminating quote from a text used to train recruits to the Special Warfare Department in the late 1960s that gives an idea about how deeply the army had become "concerned to defend the regime" :

> Our security isn't threatened just by external attacks. In addition there are other threats which are much more dangerous . . . these camouflaged attacks . . . are at times civil wars, at times uprisings, but also democratic and reformist movements. It is our *intention* to prevent the rise of these movements.

Their "intention" was going to turn into action on March 12, 1971, when a coup unseated the elected governing Justice Party.

The Justice Party was one of the rightist parties founded after the 27 May coup, which strived to build its electorate on the heritage of the defunct DP. By establishing a

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strict control over the DP organization nationwide, the JP largely succeeded in reclaiming the former popularity of the DP (Eroglu, 1987:122). Suleyman Demirel, an engineer and representative of the American Morrison company, unexpectedly became the leader of the JP. Demirel, who aimed at leading the party to power through the religious vote, was handicapped by his secular background. There were even rumours among the conservative members that he was a freemason. Yet Demirel was able to offset the rumours by stating: "I am not a mason; I was born into a family that does not sit down to breakfast before reading the Holy Qur'an." (Ahmad, 1977:235). However true this might be, Demirel's JP affiliated with the industrial-financial bourgeoisie and worked for a new consensus between the various elements of the propertied groups (Schick and Tonak, 1980; Savran, 1992).

The JP came to power in 1965 with a clear majority of the votes cast and a socio-economic program which represented the industrial interests tied to multinationals while also restricting and abolishing democratic rights, freedoms and social reforms provided by the constitution. Soon after this program was put into effect, newly emerged democratic organizations of professionals, universities, working class organizations, and the part of the press associated with the democratic-reformist spirit of the new constitution strongly resisted the JP government (Kircak, 1993). Against this opposition, the government resorted to *unconstitutional* measures. "It increased the police and commando units; it tolerated the formation of armed extremist right wing groups; intellectuals were arrested, restrictions were slapped on the press" (Cousins, 1973:4). Between 1965 and 1970 several people were killed as the state security forces clashed with the people. While the

opposition was being suppressed by force and government sponsored right wing terrorist groups, including Islamist and irredentist, the government's exploitation of Islam for legitimizing its unconstitutional measures was gaining further momentum. In the pro-government Islamic periodicals Demirel was being described as the "Muslim prime minister" who was determinedly fighting the "godless communists" (Kircak, 1993:190-191).

Yet in the beginning of the 1970s strikes and student riots with demands for the full realization of the socio-economic reforms put aside by the government reached an unprecedented scale. As a result, the democratic legal framework of the 1961 constitution became a major threat to the hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie in the state (Savran, 1992). In the midst of this economic and increasingly political crisis, in the early 1970, the governing JP was divided from within. First, a group of deputies who were representing the landowners and smaller elements of commercial and industrial bourgeoisie resigned from the JP. Later, these deputies formed the Democratic Party which immediately gained the support of large landowners who felt threatened by the rising power of big industrial-financial groups (Geyikdagi, 1984:117). Given the political strength of the landowners due to their control over the general vote, the "crack in the JP alliance" constituted a serious threat to political representatives of the industrial-finance capital (Schick and Tonak, 1980:16).

The next year, the JP was further divided by the establishment of the National Order Party, on January 26, 1971, whose leader, Necmettin Erbakan, had been a prominent member of the JP and was the ex-president of the Union of Chambers of

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Commerce and Industry (Geyikdagi, 1984:120). Equating capitalism with immorality, dishonesty and corruption, the NOP opposed the JP government as the party of the monopoly capitalists. During its first congress, the founders of the NOP made speeches supporting Islam in opposition to hidden agendas of "communists," "freemasons" and "sionists," introduced as anti-Islamic forces controlling the state and the economy. These speeches were constantly punctuated by cries of "Allah-u ekber" (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1988). "Because of the legal prohibition against the use of the word of Islam, however, the party program used more indirect words like "morals and virtue," ahlak ve fazilet (both Arabic terms with strong Islamic connotations), to make its purpose clear" (Geyikdagi, 1984:120). Thus, as Margulies and Yildizoglu (1988) argue, the NOP emerged as the first party in many decades to openly advocate an Islamic political ideology.

The social base of the party consisted of small merchants, small landowners and artisans who had experienced a loss of status and wealth in consequence of the rising political and economic power of monopolies. The party gained a strong backing from these social groups within a short period of time, and proved to become a much more serious threat to the JP than the new Democratic Party. In other words, the rapid growth of the NOP was the expression of economic discontent by small producers and low income groups from rural areas mediated by religious feelings (Toprak, 1987:229). In this sense, the emergence of the NOP seriously deprived the JP of a strong social base in fighting the militant working class and reformist-democratic organizations, and thus rendering the civil government ineffective and powerless.

Under these conditions, on March 12, 1971, the armed forces of Turkey issued the following memorandum:

> Parliament and the Government with their persistent policy, views and activities have pushed the country into anarchy, fratricide and social and economic unrest, made the public lose hope in reaching the level of contemporary civilization . . . It is imperative that a strong and respected government be formed under democratic principles to stop anarchy . . . If this is not promptly undertaken the Turkish Armed Forces will use its legal rights and seize power directly to accomplish its duty of protecting and supervising the Turkish Republic (Cousins, 1973:4).

On the declaration of the memorandum, the JP government instantly resigned, and a new government was formed according to the directives of the army. The new government declared that social consciousness had surpassed the level of economic development in the country (Kircak, 1993). Thus, strong measures had to be taken to stop the continuing "anarchy and socio-economic uneasiness." These measures included massive arrests, detention and torture of university professors, student activists, members of professional associations, union leaders, workers and Kurdish activists (Cousins 1973). Several amendments to forty different articles of the 1961 constitution were drafted to restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms. These amendments "ensured that were martial law to be lifted, . . . , a military regime would be able to retain its control and continue its repressive activities behind a facade of constitutionality" (Cousins, 1973:8).

Along with the suppression of democratic organizations, the military backed government aimed to silence the opposition from the landowners and small elements of propertied groups by shutting down the Islamist NOP in May 1971 - on the pretext that the NOP had violated the secular principles of the state. Yet it could not prevent the reemergence of the NOP with a new name, the National Salvation Party, in October 1972. Just like the NOP, the NSP aimed at that segment of the right wing voters which

was disenchanted by its economic losses to the finance capital. In this sense, the NSP represented the continued opposition of landowners and small producers to big industrial-financial groups, thus depriving the government of this social base. Equally important, the military backed government had little, if any, success in its attempt to slow down industrial conflicts, primarily strikes and ensuing working day losses (Margulies, 1984:17; Isikli, 1987). In short, it soon became clear that the 12 March coup had failed to resolve the hegemonic crisis in the state rooted in the propertied classes division from within. In this context, the army allowed a general election in 1973, and gave over the power to the civilians again.

With the return to the civilian regime, the militancy of the working class and the reformist demands of several democratic movements and organizations reignited -- but this time, with a much expanded support base, including some socialist groups and parties (Savran, 1992; Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984, Korkmaz, 1992; Gundogmus, 1992). Under these conditions, the RPP, with its new "social-democratic" leader, Bulent Ecevit, who had guardedly opposed the repressive military regime, would form a coalition government with the Islamist National Salvation Party (Ahmad, 1981).

The RPP-led coalition government that lasted only nine months aimed at winning over the working class and establishing social peace required for maintaining the high level of economic growth that took place during the military regime (Ahmad, 1981; Savran, 1992). Yet the social democratic policies of the government would not get a majority approval in the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen founded in 1971 immediately after the 12 March coup. Only the most progressive and advanced group -

the Istanbul group- was backing the idea of social democracy under the RPP-led government. Just before the formation of the coalition, the president of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry was making the following startling statement to the press:

> . . . Turkey does not need fascism at this st   . of development and industrialization. If it hates communism it can get by with soc   democracy during this stage . . .(Ahmad, 1981:15).

Nevertheless Turkey would fail to get by with social democracy, for in 1974, a record number of workers were on strike while unionization was proceeding swiftly (Margulies, 1984:18). Thus Turkey had arrived at that stage where it seemed it did "need fascism."

In September 1974 the RPP leader, Bulent Ecevit, resigned from the government with assurance that an early election would bring his party the majority needed to rule without the restraints of coalition (Ahmad, 1981:16). As a reaction, the right-wing parties, including the Islamist NSP, united in opposition to an early election and another RPP-led government. Then, in March 1975, the first "Nationalist Front" government was formed by the right wing parties under the JP leadership. In the new coalition government, beside the NSP, there was an irredentist party, the Nationalist Movement Party, whose militants, the "Grey Wolves" or "Commandos," were in contact with the state security forces and the Special Warfare Units (Agaogullari, 1987:203; Karasapan, 1989:7). With the Nationalist Front government, the extreme-right-wing terrorist movement grew large and street violence instigated by "Commandos" spread to work places, universities and small cities that were resisting the Nationalist Front government. For example, the right-wing terror was responsible for up to 1200 deaths in 1978 alone (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984:18).

In this turbulent situation, on the basis of an election the Second Nationalist Front government had been formed in 1977. Like the first one, the second one was trying to suppress democratic organizations such as the Confederation of the Revolutionary Workers' Union and the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (UCTEA) that were increasingly centring around the working class as the key revolutionary agent. Other than this well-defined objective, however, the government remained divided, reflecting the struggle between the small and monopoly finance capital for hegemony within the state.

Concurrent with the rise of the right-wing terrorist movement supported by the "Nationalist" government, a broad "anti-fascist" front began to be formed by a variety of democratic forces such as professional associations of engineers, doctors, economists, technicians, lawyers, professors and teachers. The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (CRWU) behind which the urban working class had lined up rapidly joined the anti-fascist struggle. The CRWU, together with the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (UCTEA), soon became the leading organizations among the democratic forces that were "struggling for the basic demands for *democratization* of the masses" (MERIP REPORTS, February, 1984:24). During these years, *democracy rallies* organized by the anti-fascist front nationwide attracted tens of thousands. In brief, the right-wing terrorist movement helped define a collective threat by reference to which *progressive forces* could put aside their ideological differences and work toward formulating alternative social projects to the displeasure of the dominant classes. In this context, neither the right-wing terrorist movement nor the Nationalist

Front government had any capacity to organize the masses from below and obstruct the progressive social opposition demanding more power to the working people and the oppressed. Not surprisingly, both the irredentist Nationalist Movement Party and the Islamist National Salvation Party remained marginal in terms of the size of their electorates and the followers with working class backgrounds (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1988; Toprak, 1987).

The 1980 Coup and "I am the State" I can Punish

On September 12, 1980 the army once again took over the state power in order to "rescue the country from the paralysis of its civilian governments." Once again the army declared itself as the only national institution that could cease the "fratricide, anarchy and socio-economic unrest." Yet this time, the real motive of the coup was transparent enough, namely, the "fulfillment of the requirement of the strong state." In other words, the coup aimed to suppress democratic organizations and provide what Savran (1992) calls, "a bourgeois united front" against the working people and the *alliance of progressive forces* led by the CRWU and the UCTEA. The formation of such a united front was very difficult, if not impossible, within the civil parliamentary regime due to political divisions within the dominant classes indicative of the hegemonic crisis in the state.

One of the first actions of the junta was to suspend the 1961 constitution. Then, it began a well-planned *legal* attack that aimed to brush aside the CRWU, the UCTEA, socialist parties and professional associations of lawyers, teachers and so on which had invariably participated in the anti-fascist struggle. The attack included the suspension of

the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining, as well as the curtailment of the freedom of the press, university autonomy and the right to form organizations. Finally, a new constitution that would make "restriction" of freedoms the norm was drafted in 1982.

In terms of detention, imprisonment, torture and execution, the 12 September regime surpassed the 12 March regime, albeit following the same methods (Kivanc, et. al., 1992). Almost all possible sources of social opposition were severely suppressed to create a silent society. Under the well-publicized "the 12 September peace and security milieu" discourse, not only the fundamental freedoms and rights but also the most essential aspects of the "progressive-democratic" personality that had been the outcome of social struggles throughout the Republic's history were assaulted by the state and its repressive and ideological institutions. As Nebiler (1992:136) precisely puts it,

> The junta was inclined toward personality adulteration. It hit at the most healthy points of democratic elements on the path of healthy development, their moral values, conceptions of integrity, productions and creative capacities. What was attempted to be destroyed was a social structure with personality. . . What was castrated by torture was the creative, productive society.

Conclusion: Putting the Historical Background in Perspective

In the introduction of this chapter we have asked whether the Turkish state has formulated goals for itself independently from the demands and interests of dominant social groups and classes. The account of the history of the Turkish state presented above provides us with ample evidence that dominant groups and classes have always influenced the form and activities of the state. From its establishment until the 1980 military coup, the economically powerful classes have attempted to establish hegemony in the state more than perhaps in civil society. In their attempt to establish hegemony in the state four organizations involved in the activities of the state have always appeared to be significant.

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These were the parliament, the bureaucracy, the army and the political party. The reason why these organizations have become so significant for the dominant classes's hegemonic projects rested in the nature of the formation of the nation state in Turkey.

The Muslim propertied classes under the leadership of the modernist and pro-capitalist or pro-business bureaucratic-military elite united in a single political party, the RPP, and established the state by monopolizing the legislature, i.e. the parliament. Non-Muslim propertied classes, ethnic groups other than Turks, landless peasants and propertyless urban poor were excluded from the National Assembly, and hence from the processes of the state formation mostly through repressive state measures. Among others, these groupings and classes were not allowed to form their independent political and economic organizations, and hence were excluded from the social revolution. In this sense, during the initial phases of the state formation, by totally controlling the parliament, the political party, the army and the state administration, the economically dominant classes, except perhaps the large landowning class and the local notables, could rule in civil society without hegemony. Interestingly it was the latter two which had had to give their consent to the hegemony of the modernizing bureaucratic-military elite in the state in order to secure their dominant position in the economy. In other words, the landowning class and the local notables were also a far cry from establishing an all-inclusive ethical-political leadership in civil society. In this context, using its hegemony in the state, the pro-capitalist state elite not only transformed "the conception of the Law" by a social revolution from above but also created an industrial capitalist class -- largely from within its own ranks -- through various state activities such as macroeconomic policies,

establishment of state economic enterprises, credit extensions, etc. With such state activities, the state tended to create and maintain a modern citizen-subject freed from the customs, habits and attitudes imprinted in the institutions of the pre-capitalist Ottoman state. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code and the German Commercial Code and the establishment of a unified system of secular education under the Ministry of Education were the cornerstones of the process of using the state as an instrument of "rationalization" in the organization of collective life and individual relations.

In the wake of World War Two the changing class balances in the coalition of the dominant classes led to the exclusion of the bureaucratic-military elite from the hegemonic bloc in the state. Initially, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie together with the landowning class and the local notables gained the upper hand in influencing the activities of the state as a result of their increased economic power. The split in the ruling RPP and the emergence of the DP as the only opposition party coincided with this significant change in the hegemonic bloc. With the DP's coming to power and its monopolization of the legislative process, the parliament, the army and the bureaucracy momentarily lost their relative significance in the attempts of establishing hegemony in the state. Whoever became powerful and influential in the internal politics of the DP could influence the activities of the state. As the party's support base resided in the rural areas, i.e., the majority, the representatives of the large landowners and local notables were able to establish a strict control over the important positions in the party, primarily in the party leadership. In this sense, the rapidly flourishing industrial bourgeoisie was far from influencing the decision processes within the party, and hence in the legislation. The split

in the DP in the mid-1950s was the outcome of the search of the industrial bourgeoisie for a renewal in the ideology of the party bent toward establishing its hegemony in the government, in the parliament and hence in the state. When this attempt failed, the industrial bourgeoisie left the hegemonic bloc in the state. As a result, the state tended to become dependent almost completely on the directives of the landowning class and the local notables. The position of the army as one of the state organizations was of utmost significance in determining the final outcome of the struggle for hegemony in the state. The army sided with the rising industrial bourgeoisie and toppled down the DP government via a military coup in the beginning of the 1960s. The wave of the democratic revolution from below initiated by the students came into resonance with the industrial bourgeoisie's demand for the democratization of the legislative process. This in turn legitimized the army's intervention and takeover on behalf of the industrial bourgeoisie.

The 1960s witnessed a period of expression of differences, indicating the absence of an uncontestable hegemony in civil society. The new constitution with its provision of extended rights and freedoms released the long repressed social forces such as intellectuals, professionals and the working class, leading them to participate in the common affairs of society with their own organizations and parties. In the beginning of the 1970s, these groups were struggling for the realization of reforms and the effective use of rights and freedoms provided by the constitution. Translating these demands into democratic-reformist projects and getting organized within civil societal organizations such as professional associations of engineers, architects, teachers as well as trade unions they began to threaten the already weak hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie in civil

society. The latter, by drawing upon the party organization of the governing JP, had been trying to unite the dominant classes under its leadership, and hence aiming to establish its hegemony in the parliament and the bureaucracy. The industrial bourgeoisie failed, however, to lead the dominant classes under the JP leadership. New parties such as the new Democratic Party and the National Order Party emerged from the power struggles within the JP, preventing the industrial bourgeoisie from establishing its hegemony in the legislation and the state administration. In the midst of a rising democratic-reformist movement stretching from civil societal organizations into the organizations of the state, the dominant classes' division from within led to *the general crisis of the state*, and revealed the integral meaning of it: "the State is the hegemony protected by the armour of coercion." It is in terms of this background that the interpretation of the12 March 1971 military intervention should be posed.

As a branch of monopoly capital, the army was the only state organization within which the economically dominant industrial bourgeoisie had established hegemony. The government formed according to the directives of the army aimed to resolve the crisis of authority mainly through repressive measures, that is, detention and torture of professors, civil servants, workers, student activists and the amendments of articles to the constitution restricting the constitutional rights and freedoms. Other than this objective, the military government put a temporary halt to the hegemonic struggles of the dominant groups in the state. The military banned and closed down the parties representing the interests of small capital and the landowning classes. In brief, all these state activities revealed that the state was a dictatorship: The dictatorship of the industrial bourgeoisie which was unable to

enslave the legally liberated individuals, groups and classes within its class religion. In this context, the application of mere physical force made it ever more difficult to produce cultural fabrications designed to legitimize the industrial bourgeoisie's claim to power. Thus, when the military had left the parliament to the civilians again, the crisis of the state deepened. In the absence of the legitimate authority that would lead to the correspondence *spontaneously and freely accepted* between the interests of citizenry and the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, the paramilitary right-wing extremists became a means of forcing the citizenry into the rule of the dominant class. This militaristic approach to political power failed, for the subordinates were as knowledgeable as the dominants and had the agency of making a difference in the course of events.

The events that led to the 12 September 1980 military intervention involved the opposition to the dominant classes which no longer could establish an all-inclusive ethical leadership. During this period, the formation of the alliance of progressive forces struggling against the *fascistic* rule of the dominant classes produced politically a sphere of autonomy based on the moral force of democracy. With the emergence and the extension of this sphere, the subordinates not only discovered the power/domination relations in civil society but also produced moral values that tended to create a new collective life and social relations. That was the *lively democratic experience which was quite unique in the world* (Kara, 1984). That was the *productive society with personality* which was castrated by torture in the jails of the 12 September, 1980 coup.

In terms of the main question of this thesis, that is, the role of engineers and their organizations in the production of autonomy in opposition to the hegemony in the state

and society, what conclusions can we derive from the historical account presented in this chapter? The first thing to note is that there appears to be an association between the hegemonic crisis and the engineers' active participation in the political struggle against the dominant classes' repression. We have seen that the hegemonic crisis reached a climax at the beginning of the 1970s, which led to the 12 March military intervention on behalf of the industrial bourgeoisie. We have also seen that the military oppression led only to the deepening of the authority crisis. This was mainly because the military regime failed to prevent the politicization of civil society in terms sectional class interests. During these years, the state qua dictator was in the front and on the side of the dominant industrial bourgeoisie. Interestingly, it was during this time the Union of the Chambers of Engineers and Architects (UCTEA) began assuming a leading role in the alliance of progressive forces against the repression by the dominant classes. The UCTEA joined the *anti-fascist front* together with the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions.

Thus, we can ask now the following questions: Did the members of the UCTEA discover the power/domination relations in civil society and break with the habit of feeling themselves as employees of capitalists? If they did, what were the organizational processes involved in the affairs of the UCTEA leading to this discovery? In other words, how did this discovery influence the organizational change experienced by the UCTEA? Finally, what were the resources, i.e., the *cultural, symbolic and economic capital,* and the *flexible schemata* of the field of engineering utilized and mobilized in the UCTEA's becoming an autonomous societal organization? Answering these questions requires one

to make an historical inquiry into the UCTEA's social features in different periods of its

organizational presence. In the rest of this thesis, I attempt to answer these questions.

CHAPTER 4

THE DISCOVERY OF TECHNIQUE AS PRODUCTION:

EMERGENCE OF THE UNION OF THE CHAMBERS OF TURKISH ENGINEERS AND ARCHITECTS (UCTEA) AS A CIVIL SOCIETAL ORGANIZATION 1954-1965

. . . Through all the contentions of intentions and motives a miracle has occurred. There is something new under the sun; being has emerged from nonbeing; a spring has bubbled out of a rock.

R. D. Laing

Introduction

We have seen in the previous chapter that in the 1970s the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects was one of the leading organizations in the *anti-fascist front* formed against the repressive regime of the *Nationalist Front* Governments. In terms of the theoretical discussion presented in Chapter 2, this period in the organizational history of the UCTEA can be considered as the completion of the movement from subordination to hegemony to autonomy. I have argued in Chapter 2 that the movement of engineers and their organizations from hegemony to autonomy appears to be the outcome of the discovery of power/domination relations in society. One of the factors that makes this discovery possible is the transition from technique as production to technique as criticism.

Briefly restated, technique as production refers to the *planning* of organization of production processes with respect to optimality or efficiency considerations. In other words, it refers to the *deliberate* answer given to the question: What is the optimum use

of resources to produce things? Technique as criticism is the follow-up and involves a questioning of the assumptions of technique as production by focusing on the execution possibilities of plans. More specifically, technique as criticism refers to the reflection on technique as production from a sociological point of view. In this sense, it aims to find out those social constraints that are not taken into account in the specification of technical efficiency (i.e., technique as production) yet preventing plans from being executable.

This chapter argues that the foundation of the UCTEA in 1954 is the outcome of the persistent struggle of a group of engineers and architects for gaining recognition and prestige in terms of their *knowledge of technique as production*. The chapter attempts to illuminate the historical factors behind the formation of this struggle and the eventual foundation of the UCTEA. In the first part of the chapter, the field of engineering and the organizations of engineers and architects before the foundation of the UCTEA are briefly depicted in order to provide an historical background. Next, drawing upon the historical material presented in Sukru Er's (1993) work on the history of the Turkish engineers and architects, the nature of the struggle for the foundation of the UCTEA is highlighted in terms of competing definitions of the meaning of engineering and of the social and legal status of the *Turkish* engineer. Further insights into the unique nature of the struggle for the foundation of the UCTEA is provided by the textual analysis of Binici's (1956) article. Before moving onto the conclusion of the chapter, the implicit and unformulated precepts, i.e., the flexible schemata, that had guided the managers of the UCTEA in the 1954-1965 period are examined by reviewing two articles by Sukru Er, -- a founding member of the UCTEA. In the conclusion, the social features of the field of engineering and the UCTEA

presented in the chapter are reevaluated by reference to the *field of interaction* framework suggested in the Introductory Chapter.

The Field of Engineering and the Organizations of Engineers and Architectures Before the Foundation of UCTEA

In 1949 the Union of Turkish Higher Engineers (Turk Yuksek Muhendisler Birligi) and the Union of Turkish Higher Architects (Turk Yuksek Mimarlar Birligi) organized a protest march in Ankara. A large group of engineers and architects walked from Kizilay to Ulus Square and gathered in the conference hall of the Turkish Hearth. They were opposing the Istanbul University's decision to employ only American engineers in the construction of one of the buildings of its Faculty of Medicine. In the crammed-full conference hall, several individuals, including a people's deputy from Samsun, Dr. Fahri Kurtulus, made feverish speeches and condemned the University's policy. This first influential collective action by the organizations of Turkish engineers and architects led the Istanbul University to modify its policy and hire Turkish engineers and architects for the completion of the construction project. More than a mere opposition to the hiring policy of an organization involved in the construction of "important buildings," however, this event constituted a pivotal step in the emergence of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects and its identity as the representative of the technical labour force in Turkey in opposition to "foreign experts."

In Turkish, *muhendis* is the word used to refer to the professional known as Engineer in English. In the late eighteenth century, muhendis had been fabricated from the

Arabic word *hendese* to refer to someone who knows and uses geometry in his occupation (Kunar, 1991). The first muhendis schools, Bahr-i Humayun (1773) and Muhendishane-i Berr-i Humayun (1795), were founded as military schools to generate a new group of officers who were supposed to know and apply modern war techniques developed in the west. Instructions in these schools were delivered by "foreign experts," mostly from France, who were hired by the Ottoman state (Kucuk, 1984). In this sense, military requirements of the declining Ottoman empire had been the fundamental factor in the emergence of the engineering profession in Turkey. Yet in the absence of industrialization and the continual decimation of the Ottoman state and the army, until the 1920s engineers had been far from establishing themselves as a sizable professional group with any consequential social and political power.

When the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, there were only about 100 engineers in the country as a whole. The Union of Turkish Higher Engineers (UTHE), the first professional organization of engineers, was founded on April 26, 1926 by 85 of those 100 or so engineers (Er, 1993). These engineers were all graduates of the Muhendis Mekteb-i Alisi (later to be Istanbul Teknik Universitesi), which was the only engineering school open in Turkey. The official foundation goal of the UTHE was to put all of the different branches of engineering profession together under the coordination of one single organization. Most of the founding members, and especially those who had initiated the foundation process, were top-administrators in the public sector. The others were working mostly as government employees or contractors (Insaat muteahhidi) in the railway and building construction projects undertaken by the state.

One of the initial impacts of the foundation of the UTHE was to activate architects toward establishing a similar organization in order to bring together the small community of architects located mainly in Istanbul. In 1927, the graduates of the department of Architecture at the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy followed suit and founded the Union of Turkish Higher Architects (UTHA). Like the UTHE, the UTHA had served its members for almost thirty years through publications, seminars and conferences and preparing codes and regulations. Among the most acknowledged achievements of these two pioneering organizations was the formulation of the code designed to regulate the foundation of professional chambers of engineers and architects, which had been submitted to the National Assembly in 1931.

With this move, primarily led by the UTHE, engineers for first the time aimed at providing their engineering titles and the professional authority of their chambers with a legal basis. In the words of Er (1993:61), however, "in the Assembly the Minister of Public Works . . . and some of the deputies who had seen the organization of engineers as dangerous rejected those articles related to the [foundation of] chambers by intensely criticising them." The rest of the code proposed was promulgated by the Assembly in 1938 and constituted the backbone of the current code (3458 sayili Kanun) that regulates the professional titles and authorities of engineers and architects functioning in Turkey.

In 1942 the foundation of chambers of engineers and architects that had been forced to be put aside in 1938 regained a new currency among the managers of the UTHE and the UTHA. From 1942 to the foundation of the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects in 1954, this issue occupied the agenda of almost every congress

organized by both organizations. On December 6, 1942, in the annual Congress of the UTHE, a commission was founded to review the rejected code regulating the legal status of chambers. In the same year, simultaneously yet independently from the UTHE's initiation, the UTHA began to work on a new legal framework for founding chambers and proposed it to the Ministry of Public Works for further reviews.

In this process, both professional organizations and their respective commissions had used the regulations, programs and codes of European and American professional (engineering) associations as models to be adopted. In 1951 the commission formed by the UTHE completed its work and submitted the renewed code to the Assembly. While the Assembly was discussing the proposal for the code of chambers, the UTHA submitted its own code. According to Er (1993), this was an indication of an open competition and lack of coordination between these two professional organizations creating confusion and resulting in some unnecessary discussions in the Assembly.

In 1953, while the proposals were still under the review of the Assembly, an unexpected event created a rift between the government and the UTHE. At this time, the Ministry of Public Works was having difficulties in finding the needed technical personnel to be employed in large public projects. Because of the legally established salary scales, it could not offer a desirable wage to those engineers who might have wanted to work with the Ministry. When a foreign engineer applied to an advertised position, however, the Ministry could make a contract agreement with this engineer and pay an attractive wage. At the end of 1953, the Ministry brought 20 such engineers from Germany to fill the required positions. Some of the members of the UTHE swiftly reacted to the Ministry's

move by asking the dismissal of the Minister of Public Works, Kemal Zeytinoglu, -- an

engineer and member of the UTHE -- from the Union. The motion submitted to the

Discipline Committee argued that the hiring of foreign experts was a blow to the

"sovereignty of Turkish Engineering" :

> In our country, there is no such issue as the shortage of engineers and architects. So much so that most of the engineers and architects with the Ministry are occupied with works that should be done by apprentices and technical employees . . .

> This is a sovereignty issue as much as an issue of self-respect and honour. The signing of this tragic blow to Turkish engineering by a minister who is a member of our Union is a sad thing. This move openly violates section (d) of the article of the regulation of our Union that defines the goal [of the UTHE]. In this situation we cannot keep Kemal Zeytinoglu as a member of our Union. We request to have the required be done to hand over Kemal Zeytinoglu to the Discipline Committee.

To discuss the issue and the motion, the UTHE held a congress on December 6,

1953, which came to a halt only the next day at 2:30 am. While Kemal Zeytinoglu did

not show up, ministers, undersecretaries, chief executive officers and other high-ranking

government employees who were the members of the UTHE participated in the meeting.

Except for a small group of young members, the speakers tried to defend Zeytinoglu by

making reconciliatory remarks. In total there were 300 engineers in the conference hall;

and at this time the UTHE's membership was about 1300.

Some of the reconciliatory speeches, as provided by Er (1993:53-59), were as follows:

> Halim Dogrusoz (Academician): It was the duty of the Board of Directors to reflect the reaction and reconcile frictions with the government that occurred as a consequence of importing foreign engineers. It has been acted on very slowly. The Board of Directors has always to make inquiries into the community that it represents. In most cases, swift action can prevent mistakes. That is all I want to say.

> Remzi Birand (People's Deputy, Konya): If one of the engineers graduated from the same class gets a 60 TL daily wage from a company employing engineers and the other gets a 25 TL monthly principal salary, the Ministry of Public Works and those concerned must be responsible for explaining this injustice. An injustice has happened, as one friend did not give the salary of his own engineers to the 20 engineers that he brought in order to satisfy the needs of the country. If engineers with the same qualifications got different salaries, this would cause a negative effect. But consider

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yourselves, if you worked here for 800 Liras, you would ask 1500 Liras in the event you are invited to a foreign country. This is the result of the principle of supply and demand.

Tevfik Ileri (Minister of National Education): This profession has been treated roughly for a long time. Its dignity and honour has not been harmed by the importation of 15 foreign engineers. [In the past] someone who was responsible for the protection of the dignity and honour of this profession attacked the dignity and honour of this profession in the Assembly. . . . Now I shall take up the issue of foreign engineers. We should reach a position where we do not need to import foreign engineers to this country. Everybody is conforming to this view. As a result of an increase in the volume of projects in the country, the demand for engineers has also increased. Friends said that highly qualified engineers did not work in engineering projects. In our times, those who were assigned to the Trabzon-Erzurum highway -- which was the only work -- were our luckiest friends. Today in 64 provinces there are three engineers as Public Works Managers. Currently, the Highways [Department] could not find one engineer for three-four bridge construction projects. Young friends are working as professionals to such an extent that makes us [older generation] envy them. In Turkey, the number of engineers is not sufficient to satisfy the need.

[Istanbul] Technical University and Technical School are taking measures. The current government's policy that increases the material and spiritual value of the engineer could not obtain the [needed] engineers. The fulfillment of the need for engineers by phasing it out over periods requires a long time. In order to spend the money available in its budget a ministry has brought in 20-30 engineers. This is a government expenditure. . . . Is there any crime . . . ? I have sadly heard that a minister from within us has been wanted to be handed over and exported to the Discipline Committee for an unclear issue. I request from young friends to revoke this motion.

Some of the "young friends" made the following comments (Er, 1993: 56-57):

Vedat Dalokay: The new Board of Directors should be sensitive about the importation of foreign engineers. Real experts can always be brought in under the following conditions.
1. It can be a new subject. A specialist can be brought.
2. A great star can be invited. He is the pioneer in this century.
3. Well-known persons who have invaluable works can be brought to introduce them and have them give lectures.
We did not raise our voice against the Italian experts who had come for the Anit-Kabir [project] and those who brought American aid materials.

Necdet Eraslan (Academician): I, your humble servant, have struggled against [foreign] experts since I began working. Besides just because of this I stayed in prison for 15 days when I was a Reserve-Officer because I had expelled some foreign experts from a room with a bayonet. Here the national feeling plays the essential role. We can predict what a foreign expert thinks about us when he comes to our country. Because the thought of a [foreign] expert about our capacity is different. . . . Let me give you an example: an expert has been brought for such a ridiculous job, who told us that he had taught our captain the course of travel while he was coming by a ship. . . . The visiting person thinks that there is no way Turks know what his specialization is, let alone finding the direction in the sea.

Tevfik Ileri's request was sufficient for revoking the motion; Zeytinoglu did not face the

Discipline Committee for the unclear issue. Yet young engineers such as Dalokay and

Eraslan were able to lead the congress to take certain measures against "the importation of

foreign experts, which might yield fruitful results." Indeed, some of the decisions taken by

the congress involved making assertive claims on behalf of the "Turkish engineers," and

informing about the approaching new period for the engineering community. The

following decisions of the congress are worthwhile to note (Er, 1993:58):

> . Based on the current legal procedures, the concerned authorities should give the works
> of projects, analysis and control to private engineering offices.

> . Appropriately applying the governmental decision of the education of a group of
> assistant technical personnel, the concerned authorities should employ engineers and
> highly qualified engineers fittingly and efficiently.

> . The Ministry of Public Works should form a Permanent Technical Advisory
> Committee that must meet at specific times of the year and take decisions in advisory
> nature. The Committee must include members from the concerned Ministries, State
> Economic Organizations, institutions of technical education and Unions of [engineers].
> In order to initiate this process, a commission must immediately be formed by the
> Ministry of Public Works and the organizations of [the UTHE].

> . With the modification of the law regulating the salaries of government employees
> (Barem Kanunu) in accordance with the need of technical personnel, inconsistencies
> stemming from the differential salary scales of engineers working in the state offices
> must be prevented.

> . Based on the principles propagated by our Union, the Code of Chambers (Odalar
> Kanunu) must immediately be promulgated.

The document listing these decisions and others not-stated here ended with a conciliatory

yet self-confident remark:

> Our congress expresses that it feels respect for real [foreign] experts, yet at the same
> time does not approve the random importation of technical personnel.

Sukru Er, as a young engineer, participated in the Congress and sided with his

peers. In the 1990s, well-above the age of 60, however, he thinks, "in the Congress the

young group acted disrespectfully." While making this claim to clarify his conscience in

old age, perhaps, he makes an observation that provides an important piece of information regarding the disrespectful young engineers' motives: "Those who prepared the motion said: We were just kidding. Our aim was not to dismiss Zeytinoglu but *create an atmosphere of excitement and make everyone concerned get involved with the Union*" (Er, 1993:60) Whether they were really kidding or not is an issue that today we cannot know precisely. Yet whether they succeeded in making everyone concerned get involved with the union is not difficult to judge. For almost two months after the Congress, the two proposals for the Code of Chambers prepared separately by the UTHE and the UTHA were put together and resubmitted to the National Assembly. On January 27, 1954, the Assembly promulgated the Code without any delay. This, in fact, was the legal foundation of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (UCTEA).

"Coming Together via the Law": The Foundation of the UCTEA

Gaining legal identity does not necessarily lead to an immediate change in the formation of a group, simply because the group that struggles for gaining legal identity has an already formed group identity. Even after gaining legal identity, the latter still keeps guiding particular dispositions, actions and projects of the group, however these are foreseen by the new legal framework. The immediate effect of legal identity on the formation of the group is rather to make members more group-centered around their history leading up to the gaining of legal identity. It is possible to observe such an initial impact of the foundation of the UCTEA on its members reflected by the issues addressed in the Birlik Bulteni (Union Bulletin), the journal of the UCTEA, in the second half of the 1950s.

The article titled "Bir Hasbihal" (which can be translated as "A Friendly Chat") and published in the Birlik Bulteni on September 1, 1956 is a particular example in this genre. The author, Muzaffer Binici, had worked in the Board of Directors of the UTHE and was the General Secretary of the UCTEA at the time the article came out. As its title implies, the article is written in a form that allows the reader to have a "friendly chat" with its author. *By locating myself into the text,* I make a journey back in time and make an interview with Binici (in the text) about his recollection of the history of his group up to the foundation of the UCTEA, his life, work and organizational experiences as an engineer, his interpretation of the meaning of the UCTEA and his suggestions for it to be a more effective organization.[1]

> Question: While the idea of founding a Union by legal means was being propagandized, there were professional unions of engineers and architects, which are still functioning today. I just want to know why the Union of Chambers needed to be founded while there were already active unions.
>
> Binici: *My recollection of the reasons as to why the existence of these organizations - established in accordance with the Code of Associations (Cemiyetler Kanunu) and had a past, however short this might be, tradition and contact with its members - was seen as insufficient and the Union of Chambers was needed to be founded is as follows:*
>
> *There had been several unaddressed professional problems; the activities in the developing sectors of agriculture, industry and construction had created several new issues. Once when the word engineer was uttered, what was visualized was an occupation of someone who is knowledgable about construction, architecture, mechanics and electrics. Moreover, it was supposed that the person with the title of engineer could do everything in the domain of these fields. In the event a person with the title of engineer did not assume providing services belonging to these specific areas, that was evaluated as the insufficiency of that person. Thus, one of the major reasons of the foundation was to get specialized and give a meaning to the boundaries of specialization areas in accordance with the needs, requirements and understandings of the country.*
>
> Question: In the absence of a clear idea about what one's specialization is, it should have been very difficult, if not impossible, to use that person efficiently. How efficient

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[1] Please note that the sentences written in italics are directly from Binici's essay "Bir Hasbihal." The reason why I present Binici's views in the form of an interview is to clarify the "subtexts" between the lines for contemporary and foreign readers. I suppose, the questions that I insert into Binici's text may help one contextualize the historically specific meaning of it, while also clarifying the subtle issues involved.

was the utilization of engineers, or rather technical personnel (teknik elemans), in the days before the establishment of chambers of specific engineering fields?

Binici: Let me try to answer your question by modifying it a little bit. We can ask: What kind of an atmosphere were most of engineers experiencing in their work life? When I answer this question, it will be easier for you to decide on the efficiency issue.

In several public offices that had not wanted to hear the voice and suggestions of the technique (teknik), the inconsiderate management of responsible and authorized individuals had been causing a spiritual pain in our colleagues. Some of the co-workers who were occupying technical positions had not been hesitating to apply their personal assessments even if these were opposing the principles of their professions. . . . In contracting projects the colleagues who had devoted their capital and professional life to service were gradually getting pacified by the pressure of the unrestricted competition. Only a petition with a 16-kurus stamp was needed to obtain the Certification of License (Ehliyet Tesviki); and the capitalist contractor who had ruined the money, program and work of an institution could have easily found the opportunity of dragging another public office to the same course of events. There was not one single professional community that could have defended the rights of our colleagues from the day they begin their careers to their posts in the civil service and eventually getting indifferent in their private life.

Question: If I am not wrong, you are telling me that anyone who wanted to be a contractor in a lucrative public works project could have obtained the engineering certification and operate as an engineering company and all that go with it. And engineers and their unions established based on the Code of Associations would not say anything against this practice. Was that the case?

Binici: Exactly. For instance, the UTHE was like an alumni association (Er,1993). In other words, it did not have any legal power for establishing standards and checking out whether private companies were following those established standards. Surely this was not only detrimental for the country but also for our profession.

Question: While working on the history of your professional organizations, I have noticed that as a community you are very sensitive about the importation of foreign engineers, or rather, "experts." Why do you think that this issue has always occupied the attention of Turkish engineers?

Binici: *In our country, which we are reconstructing now again after the great wars that had ruined and neglected her, with the disappointment of being just an onlooker we had been struggling against foreign elements' haphazard production of our national and local works. A foreign name like an etiquette increasing the worth of projects had not been made fit into files . . . While in hotel corners modest and valuable well-educated Turkish artists were trying to complete the small projects that they had obtained from here or there, foreign corporations in their offices that they got through big interests had the opportunity to work comfortably.*

Question: Sorry to interrupt but this sounds like, you had been facing the conditions of a typical colonized state. In other words, your reaction was something like an anti-colonial struggle against the colonizer, wasn't it? Yet the strange thing was that the state was an independent and sovereign state.

Binici: If you want to put it like that, go ahead. Yet what you said is a too-radical stance that, I don't think, we had taken. On the other hand, in the Zeytinoglu Affair, for example, we had written a motion and stated: "This is a sovereignty issue as much as an issue of self-respect and honour." You may want to look at the content of that motion.

Question: I am familiar with the Zeytinoglu Affair. In fact your depiction of the Turkish engineers vis-à-vis the "foreign expert" immediately reminded me of the congress that the UTHE held to discuss the issue three years ago. I heard that you were on the Board of Directors of the UTHE by then.

Binici: Yes. It is nice to hear that the young generation gets interested in our struggles and discovers them in the old documents that grew pale.

Question: In January 1954, that is just two years ago, the law (6253 sayili Kanun) that regulates the duties, responsibilities and rights of the chambers and makes it obligatory for all engineers and architects to be members of the Union was put in practice. Needless to say, you have obtained the professional organization that you had long desired. Do you think that all of your objectives and solutions of the problem areas you have mentioned can be realizable now?

Binici: *It is appropriate to mention that it is a mistaken view to see the foundation as obtaining everything and the beginning of the Union managers to their effective services as the realization of all objectives. As much as there are lots of things to be done by all community members without any exception, it is a necessity for the state institutions to show interest in the Union whose responsibilities are of a public character.*

Question: Now I want to hear from you about your life, work and organizational experiences as an engineer. This is important to me since I want to have a better understanding of the unique qualities of engineers of your generation who took active role in the formation of your professional organizations. I would greatly appreciate if you could give me specific examples so that I can learn about your dispositions and action plans.

Binici: I am not sure whether I can be representative of the diverse membership base of our community. Yet if it is going to help you I will be pleased to tell you my story.

I got acquainted with my professional circle and the work world in the occupational field at the Samsun-Sivas railway construction in 1927. I was a student at the Istanbul Technical University by then. In the railway construction foremens were foreigners; likewise some positions in the Control Department were occupied by foreign engineers. When it came to the Turkish engineers, various difficulties were being put in front of them. They were also being treated suspiciously as if they were incompetent.

When I went to Karakose for another construction project, I had already had an opinion regarding the nature of our profession and how it was perceived in the country. Yet I never forget the governor with whom I met there. He told me that those young engineers who want to leave their posts in the civil service should be expelled from the country.

The next year I was working in the Irmak-Filyos railway construction. At that time the Kalecik section was under construction. A Swedish group had got the control of this section. Only the general inspection was superficially being done by the Turkish

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engineers. It was interesting that the particular location at which I was working was taken by a German contractor-engineer who was known as an ignorant and incompetent individual. The completed works seemed slipshod to me. There was a general lack of motivation on the part of the workers. As if the mallets of the workers from Surmene were going down and coming up without any sign of willingness. I could not have thought why the organization was in the hands of foreigners. For as a rule the Turkish colleagues were being seen as inadequate, and I was working as a staff employee who knew only the topography and getting some good money.

I graduated from the university in 1931; and was assigned to my civil service post in Ankara. Thus we began frequenting the Ministry of Public Works. I was pretty sure that we were underutilized. I had seen how much demand for engineers really existed outside. Besides I was disappointed spiritually by foreign engineers' occupation of desks at the Ministry of Public Works and the fact that this foreign class was making three times more monthly salary than us. In fact, based on the law regulating the salaries of state employees (Barem Kanunu) we could have gotten a 5-Lira promotion every three years. While this was the case we had heard one day that these individuals got promoted. When we wanted to learn the reason for that, we were told that they were living away from their native lands and must be materially rewarded. Thanks to our valuable older brothers and their energetic actions, this foreign class was briefly removed from the Bridge Construction Desk. Yet all of this was enough for me to get disenchanted with the civil service post. So I resigned from my position at the Ministry. Then I became the engineer of the contractor company at the Trabzon-Erzurum highway project.

Question: Did the governor of Karakose want to expel you from the country?

Binici: Who knows, maybe. Anyway. *Between 1945 and 1949 I was working in the construction of the new Grand National Assembly Building. In the sixth and the ninth sections of the construction it was difficult to feel stability and coordination in the organization of work. It is now almost impossible to not remember the unsystematic reinforced concrete (betonarme) calculations done by a foreign expert and his conservative defense of himself.*

It was in this period, in 1946, we, contractors, gathered in the hall of UTHE and discussed the advantages of founding a Union empowered by the law. Yet we were not convinced about the feasibility of the proposal made up of valuable opinions of our 15 or 20 colleagues. In 1947 the Construction Congress was held. Every colleague expressed his anguish regarding the issue. Some decisions were taken. Then, in 1951, the Irrigation Congress was held. After the Congress some of the decisions were partially put in practice. Yet suggestions regarding the fundamental principles did not come true. The decision to establish a Technical Advisory Committee was not carried out. And in 1954 the UCTEA was founded.

Question: So it has been two years now that the UCTEA has been serving its community and the country. How do you evaluate the performance of this young organization of yours? What are the fundamental challenges waiting for your community and its organization? Do you have anything to say regarding how the effectiveness of the Union can be increased?

Binici: I will try to be very brief in my response. You have to find out the reasons behind my claims.

In congresses and general board meetings all of us wanted too many things. But we are not precisely sure that the realization of our demands depended on our common activities and the without exception kind of interest and attention that we would have in the Union.

One can observe that we believed in the magical capacity of the managers of the Union. Yet without professional cooperation nothing had been done in the way we wished. If we wanted to introduce our community as a presence in public services, we had to draw near to each other; by bringing up our disadvantages and advantages we have to compensate each other with relentless criticism and sincere appreciation. In a great development leap forward the duties and responsibilities of our members as individuals have been enormously increased yet at the same time our community has become fully responsible.

We have come together via the law. We have established ten specialized chambers. But even among ourselves we are a far cry from coming to terms with the requirements of professional friendship. In order to render the Union and the Union concept a spiritual Union we have not put together our individualistic efforts. We remained individualistic.

Question: I would like to thank to you for the invaluable information you have provided me with. I will try to find out what you mean by "We remained individualistic" and what that implies for the effectiveness of your organization.

The Engineer as a "Happy" Entrepreneur : The legacy of the UCTEA of the 1950s and the early 1960s

Before moving onto the next chapter to examine the transformations occurred in both the UCTEA and the engineering field during the period of 1965-1974, it is worthwhile to know more about the *flexible schemata* that implicitly oriented the managers and members of the UCTEA in the years between 1955 and 1965. The significance of this discussion is that it provides one with a basis for a comparative analysis of the two periods considered. In other words, it makes it possible to distinguish what had remained the same from what had really changed after 1965. Sukru Er's various writings appear to stand up for the task at hand as they are very informative regarding the *implicit* and *unformulated* precepts that had guided the active members of the UCTEA in the period of 1955-1965. First, however, a brief digression on Er's biography needs to be taken in order to put the content of some of his writings in a more sensible context.

Sukru Er graduated from the Istanbul Technical University's Department of Mechanical Engineering in 1948 as an aeronautics engineer. During his university years, as the representative of the student body of the Engineering Faculty, Er participated in the foundation of the Istanbul Technical University Student Association that later became one of the most influential youth organizations in Turkey. His involvement in "organizing" (orgutculuk) activities continued after his graduation. When the Code of Chambers was promulgated, he was a member of both the UTHE and its commission responsible for the foundation of the UCTEA and the preparation of its regulation. After the foundation of the UCTEA Er kept his focus on the organizing activities of the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers (CME). He served for the CME as its chairperson and general secretary until the late 1960s. In the 1957-1958 term, he was also the general secretary of the UCTEA. As a result of transformations in the UCTEA's initial organizational goals and effectiveness criteria in the late 1960s, however, Er became disenchanted with the affairs of his professional organizations to which he had contributed as a founding member.

During the 1970s, when he had abstained from participating in the activities of the UCTEA and the CME, he devoted his time more to his professional work. Yet during this time he was not completely inactive politically and organizationally. It was in this period that Er got involved in the activities of the Union of Metal Industrialists (UMI), one of the most powerful and controversial business associations in Turkey. In a brief time after joining the UMI, Er became the president of this socially and politically influential organization and acted as its president for eight years. Again in this period, he was a member and one time chairperson of the Ankara Hearth of Intellectuals, a conservative

cultural organization that acted as an advisory committee for governments after the 1980 military coup.

In his professional life as a civil servant, Er was a "worker," "apprentice," "foreman," "chief of the workshop" and "chief engineer." After the completion of his compulsory civil service, Er continued his career as an "entrepreneur." He was the founding partner of a private engineering and marketing company whose primary focus was construction projects. Er worked as a "manager" in various construction projects undertaken by his company. During the 1960s and the 1970s, he participated in the strategic planning of the mechanical industry in Turkey through working in the commissions of the State Planning Organization and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry.

Throughout his professional life, Er has also striven to make contributions to the education and dissemination of the engineering knowledge. He taught a "knowledge of materials" course in the Higher Technical Teachers School. For four years, he worked in the Ankara Academy of Engineering and Architecture as an "instructor" and taught a "construction machines" course. He also worked on several engineering journals and magazines such as I.T.U Motor Mecmuasi (Istanbul Technical University Engine Magazine), Turk Yuksek Muhendisler Birligi Dergisi (Journal of the UTHE) and Makina Muhendisleri Odasi Makina dergisi (journal of the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers Engine). He was the editor of the Journal of the UTHE in 1952. In these journals and magazines as well as others he published more than 100 articles, essays and commentaries addressing "technical, economic and social issues." He abridged these publications in 24

books. Sukru Er has been an incredibly industrious person for whom living and working are one and the same. In this regard he was just fulfilling the bee-like image projected by the Istanbul Technical University's "Engineering March" (Er, 1993:19):

The land dry mountains untouched
Wanely flowing turbulent springs watched

> Our example is bees, let's move onward
> Motherland waits for us, don't you see it
> Our way our land shall be cheerful
> we make it sure
> We are engineers in this way, let's move onward

Villages, towns ruined
In the horizon dusty roads lost

> Our example is bees, let's move onward
> Motherland waits for us, don't you see it
> Our way our land shall be cheerful
> we make it sure
> We are engineers in this way, let's move onward

Er (1993), in his essay titled "Muhendisin Uygar Hayatta Rolu" (The Role of Engineer in the Civilized Life), attempts to clarify the role of engineer in the economy and in "civilized life." He argues that in order to determine the position of the engineer one needs to have a clear definition of civilization (uygarlik), which, he thinks, is a very complex concept. That is because "factors such as richness, wealth, independence, technical superiority do not suffice to define civilization" each by itself alone (Er, 1993:22). To support his argument Er says that "oil producing countries with their highest per capita incomes in the world such as Kuwait are not among the civilized nations" (Ibid:22). It is not only that "the citizens of these countries do not pay taxes but

also they get pocket money from their sheiks." Thus, they are seen as "backward countries."

Having first established that wealth is not a sufficient condition for civilization, Er moves onto a brief discussion as to whether mere technical superiority can create a "civilized life" in a country. Here he refers to the "historians who are studying ancient civilizations through interpreting the remnants of technical products discovered by excavations" (Ibid:22). Both such historians and "philosophers and sociologists who would like to define civilization" agree "generally" on the insufficiency of mere technical superiority as the precondition of civilization. They rather see "fineness, mutual respect and tolerance in the relationship among citizens as important components of the definition of civilization" (Ibid:22) "Thus, in civilization, numerous factors such as wealth, independence, culture, technical superiority, respect and tolerance play a role [in a determinate relation to each other]. In all these factors the engineer [appears] to have an important role and responsibility" (Ibid:22).

After clarifying the complexity of the definition of civilization and establishing a direct link between the civilizational "factors" and the engineer, Er takes up the engineer's position in society in terms of its "different aspects." What is of interest for the issue addressed in this section is Er's various definitions of the engineer. The first definition emphasizes the research aspect of the engineering position. Er argues that the engineer can first of all be defined as a researcher. The reason for this appears to be related to the specific ways through which discoveries are made in the present. While "in the past discoveries were dependent on ingenuity and intuition of persons," says Er, "today

discoveries are made by teams of ordinary people involved in systematic researches and the coordination among them" (Ibid:22). Interestingly, "in all this . . . the engineer takes part [and performs] as a brain" (Ibid:22).

In his second definition of the engineer Er stresses the significant role of complex organizations in the formation of modern societies. He argues that with the emergence of large-scale complex organizations "groups of people" have begun to be located in production processes, which has created previously unknown problems which are no longer possible to "work out intuitively." According to Er, the resolution of such problems has even created a special field of engineering: "the management of manpower and the improvement of means of production." He further thinks that whatever the specific position an engineer occupies in an organization, he has a managerial and organizational role to play. Thus the engineer can also be defined as a "manager."

As a manager, the engineer "always spends his effort to obtain the maximum efficiency. It is always his duty to find remedies to waste, be this labor or material. Observing instances objectively, reaching explicit and fine results through serious research and analysis [define] the objective and the principle of the engineer's occupation" (Ibid:23). In this sense, in addition to being a researcher, the engineer acts like a "leader" whatever his particular assignment might be. More importantly, independently from his hierarchical position in the organization, "*the engineer is either the employer or the representative of the employer*" (Ibid:23).

In his third definition of the engineer Er attempts to draw attention to the social responsibilities of engineering. According to Er, in order to perform his duties, the

engineer has to develop a self-disciplining habit in the first place. It is only through self-disciplining that the engineer can use human labor efficiently and fittingly -- a requirement that derives from the fact that engineering is essentially a discipline developed for "increasing the value of human labor." One of the contributions of engineering to the efficient use of human labor is the introduction of machines in production processes. Through mechanization, he argues, not only the value of "human labor" increases but also working hours decrease. Moreover, machines make it possible to prevent human labor from doing "filthy jobs." Yet mechanization by itself may not be sufficient for making humans use the time gained for "improving their health and increasing their cultural endowments" (Ibid:24). To make the matters worse, mechanization usually leads to human misery and unhappiness.

This unwanted by-product of mechanization imposes an onerous social responsibility on engineers, that is, the education of humans with respect to what can be called as life skills. By educating their workers, Er maintains, engineers can provide humans with "knowledge and an ability to judge and appreciate values clearly" (Ibid:24). Indeed, "human happiness depends on" the latter, since "real happiness and wealth relies on wisdom" (Ibid:24). Thus, the engineer must also be an "educator" who has to "educate himself in the first place."

Based on these three definitions, i.e., engineer as researcher, manager and educator, Er finally attempts to develop an all-inclusive definition of the engineer: "engineer as a happy human." This normative definition is based on his axiomatic belief that "the engineer is the happiest individual among humans" (Ibid:25). Similar to the

concept of praxis, Er contemplates that human self-realization derives from and depends on the ability to create preconceived products. In other words, self-realization rests in the action of producing things which one sees as one's own creation. What is of interest to Er here is that self-realization is one of "the leading factors" contributing to one's happiness. Thus, *"the engineer is the happiest individual,"* says Er, "since . . . the opportunity to create things is more or less granted to almost all engineers" (Ibid:25).

Although Er sees the engineer as the happiest individual, he at the same time thinks of him as an "unlucky person." The reason for this is that "the engineer cannot create things by himself alone. He has to work with teams. This team includes engineers with various specializations and workers." Yet "putting together members of the team around the same creation process with the same objective" is a difficult task to achieve. This is why the engineer driven by his occupation-granted self-realization potential constantly searches for a better organization of the process of creating (producing) things -- thus, the engineer as researcher, manager and educator. By doing this, the engineer contributes to the solution of "dissonance and social crisis" ensuing from "the astounding development of economy and technology." Er's (1993:25) essay concludes with the following prophetic claim: *"That is why I say: The fate of the country is the fate of engineers. These two cannot be separated"*

Written at a younger age, Er's (1972) essay titled "Endustri Casuslugu ve Endustride Sabotaj" (Industrial Spying and Sabotage in Industry) may help one decode the ideological underpinnings of his prophetic claim. It also provides a better understanding about the social and political precepts that were largely conceived as universal truths by

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the organized engineers of the 1955-1965 period. This essay written in the midst of social

and economic crisis associated with a rapid industrialization process aims to highlight the

significance of industry in economic development. It further attempts to establish a

correlation between national strength and industrial development:

> It is impossible for a country to be militarily weak if that country is economically
> powerful. Because of this fact, international war begins first in the realm of economy.
> Perhaps, wars between armies occur as consequences of economic wars (Er, 1972:107).

Seeing the realm of economy as a battlefield, Er moves onto an examination of the factors

facilitating a successful industrialization process. More than anywhere in his writings, Er

clearly states here his social class identity that he most probably shared with his colleagues

in the Board of Directors of the UCTEA in between 1955 and 1965:

> In industry the role of the entrepreneur is most important. The entrepreneur whether he
> is from the capitalist [class] or from the *technical* [class] is the person who has a strong
> initiation spirit and resolution. [It is the entrepreneur] who puts [different] elements
> such as knowledge, labor and capital together and directs them to a target by providing
> harmony among them (Er, 1972:130).

Thus the higher the initiation spirit and the stronger the entrepreneurial resolution in a

country, the faster that country gets industrialized successfully. In its turn the faster the

industrialization, the more developed that country's economy will be, and hence leading to

a stronger nation.

Having clarified the significance of the entrepreneur in industry, Er returns to the

issue of economic wars, i.e., industrial spying or sabotaging a nation's industry. According

to Er, attacking the entrepreneurs of a country is a common strategy utilized in economic

wars. One form of attacking the entrepreneurial spirit in a country is to show easy profit

making ways to the entrepreneur. For example, making profit through commerce can be

introduced as easier than that through industrial manufacturing. Thus one can observe that the entrepreneur usually "gets offers from foreign organizations to be their sales representative" in his country (Ibid:131). In this way, the entrepreneur is discouraged from risk-taking and manufacturing. The result is usually a deviation from successful industrialization. Yet the success of this form of attack appears to depend primarily on already existing commercially oriented individuals. In the event there exists a large group of dynamic individuals who enjoys taking risks at all costs, this attack fails to sabotage a nation's industry. In such cases it is possible to "create some obstacles via international organizations"(Ibid:131).

Using the power bestowed in international organizations, it is possible to "chop off" a nation's industry through suggesting and codifying such standards as "job security, trade union rights and so on which are well above the country's possibilities in terms of labor force and other indicators." According to Er, Turkish industry, for example, is under such an attack. In other words, through the unchallenged power of international organizations such as OECD and ILO, which are usually controlled by advanced nations, Turkish industrialization is being "chopped off." Yet Er seems to believe that this attack is destined to fail because "at all costs Turkey is today getting industrialized and her industry will [eventually] develop."

The rest of Er's (1972) essay is an attempt to establish a critical dialogue (i.e., a warning from an "older brother" to) with the young engineers who began to be influential in the UCTEA from 1965 onwards, and thus providing an opportunity for moving onto the next chapter. Addressing those young engineers as "heedless enlighteners," Er claims

that Turkish intellectuals who are participating in the congresses held under the auspices of influential international organizations "buy into those seductive ideas propagated without taking into consideration the weaknesses of our economy" (Ibid:131). This heedlessness in turn leads them to struggle for "such regulations and codes which are even luxurious for the advanced nations whose industries are fully developed." The example that Er chooses to clarify his point refers to a politically very sensitive issue in the 1970s, that is, the issue of workplace safety and the related regulation imposing the standards for the minimum health conditions at the workplace. With some irony in his voice, Er argues: "The current safety regulation that defines the structural characteristics of factory buildings" is so unrealistic that if the leading Turkish industrial organizations "abide by this regulation conscientiously, it is necessary to close down all of them." That means that Turkey should fully give up from industrialization and declare national moratorium. The rest of Er's argument is charged more heavily with his ideological position:

> All of the inconvenience is imposed on employers. According to the requirements of the current regulation, in the event the employer provides the family of the employee with an accommodation, the comfort expected from that accommodation is not only not to be less than that asked for the one allotted to a high-ranking civil servant but also it makes the employer be responsible for the cleanliness of the linens in this accommodation. When we ask the concerned individuals how they have come up with such rules, they usually tell us that they get them from the textbook of an American professor. Under such conditions, the entrepreneur will either give up taking the time to produce or ask protection as a consequence of the increase in labor costs that prevents him/her from competing in international markets (Er, 1972:132).

Er (1972), instead of a conclusion, argues that when the Turkish Labor Law and the Code regulating collective bargaining and leaves on Sundays, national and religious holidays, the days of sickness and of extraordinary occasions are taken into account, it can be seen that Turks as a nation work only 200 days annually. Then, the bee-like Er immediately adds: "A nation that works this little cannot develop." Thus, he expects the

young engineers who struggle for the rights of the "working class" to be reasonable. We shall make an inquiry into the mind set of those young engineers in the next chapter to find out whether they could hear Er and his peers' request. We also shall try to understand the structural factors behind the reason why the young engineers did not want to hear Er and his peers and why they were called "heedless enlighteners" by the latter.

Conclusion: The Field of Engineering and the UCTEA in the Period of 1955-1965

As was mentioned in Chapter 3, in the Democrat Party decade (i.e., the 1950s) the Turkish economy had opened up to international trade and finance in such a way that agricultural and resource sectors gained a new importance in the process of economic growth and industrialization. This export-led growth based on agriculture and resource sectors required improving the economic infrastructure, namely, the construction of new highways, bridges, seaports, irrigation systems, new production outlets and so on. In the words of Kunar (1991:31), an engineer who is still an active member of the UCTEA,

> "in and around 1955, as part of the development and construction of public facilities, roads and utilities, an initiation of an all-out mobilization for the reconstruction of Turkey had been announced. In the construction sites, engineers were going to be needed. In this period, the most ambitious individuals chose to be an engineer."

In other words, at a time when the number of engineers was limited and the technological capacity was low this sudden increase in the demand for engineers signaled a potential increase in the economic capital of the engineering position.

In the 1950s and the 1960s, this potential or trajectory specified the actions and interactions of the "ambitious engineers." In its turn the motive of increasing the economic capital of engineering was inextricably qualified by a matrix of trajectories delineated by considerations of the cultural and symbolic capitals of the engineering position. The latter

were as consequential and significant as the former in giving the engineering field its new social features.

As the preceding discussion makes clear, the government and ministries, particularly the Ministry of Public Works, had occupied the top layers of the structured hierarchy of the pre-existing engineering field. The government had almost absolute control over the specification of the objectives or targets that other organizations belonging to the field should attain. Located in the capitalist world economy as the government of a periphery state, however, it had only a limited control over the selection of these objectives as well as means (i.e., technology and skilled labor) that these organizations should use in attaining the specified targets. Thus the government was not only insisting upon a particular socio-economic development policy imposed largely (but not only) by the center states of the capitalist world economy but also a particular form of technology and skilled labor. Constrained by the low technological level and the shortage of skilled labor, the immediate alternative available to the government was to import them from the industrialized countries. As Tevfik İleri, the Minister of National Education of the first DP government, said, "there wasn't any crime" in the importation of some engineers by spending the funds at the disposal of a ministry since "the fulfillment for the need of engineers by phasing it out over periods required a long time."

There wasn't any crime, however, there was an injustice or an imperfect justice, namely, salary differentials between foreign and Turkish engineers in favor of the former. In the words of Binici, the fact that "this foreign class was making three times more monthly salary than" Turkish engineers was causing a spiritual more than a material pain

among the latter. Here the abstraction that was historically and socially discovered was the connection between making less money (i.e., a material or economic capital consideration) and being perceived as incompetent or lacking praise, prestige, and recognition associated with the title "Turkish" engineer (i.e., a symbolic capital consideration). In the Zeytinoglu affair, for example, it was not the economic greed per se that led the members of the UTHE to demand an improvement in the law regulating the salaries of government employees (Barem Kanunu) in favor of the Turkish engineers. Interestingly enough, those engineers who resigned from their posts in the public sector and became contractors were leading the UTHE to demand this improvement in the Barem Kanunu in which they had no direct interest. In this sense, what they particularly wanted to change by this move was the conventional perception that "as a rule the Turkish colleagues were inadequate," and thus could be paid less and given a superficial task in the organization and vice versa.

Thus, by drawing attention to the injustice due to the differential salary scales, the contractor-led engineering movement aimed at making the Turkish engineer question the issue as to "why the organization was in the hands of foreigners." In turn, contesting such rules and conventions (i.e., flexible schemata) of the engineering field made it possible to force the government to promulgate the Code of Chambers (Odalar Kanunu) thereby restructured the field. The new structure was based on the codification of the *"sovereignty of Turkish engineering,"* thus superseding *legally* the stable asymmetries and differentials between foreign and Turkish engineers in terms of the distribution of, and access to, resources, power, opportunities and life chances. In this context, Er's grandiose

definition of the engineer reflective of the mind set of the founders of the UCTEA should be considered as a claim to the cultural and symbolic capital that had been denied to the "Turkish engineers." In this sense, it can be argued that the new structure of the field of engineering after the foundation of the UCTEA provided the "Turkish engineers" with social recognition and prestige while highlighting their technical knowledge, i.e., their cultural capital.

Within this new structure the government and ministries still kept occupying the top layers of the engineering field. After all, it was the government that had promulgated the Code and allowed the foundation of the UCTEA. In the view of Cizmeci (1975), an active member of the UCTEA during the 1970s, the UCTEA was an organization granted legitimacy in order to utilize the limited number of engineers and architects in accordance with the requirements of the government's economic policy. During this time one of the requirements was to establish certain standards that must be followed in the importation of technology and skilled labor from the industrialized countries. Thus from the government's point of view, the UCTEA was the organization that could establish those standards and monitor as to whether public and private organizations were complying with them (Cizmeci, 1975). This particular relationship between the government and the UCTEA in turn rendered the managerial positions of the latter socially, politically and economically influential.

Being a member of the Board of Directors of the UCTEA or that of one of the chambers organized under its umbrella provided one with a powerful position among the groups that were "governing and planning the society" (Tanik, 1991). As Tanik (1991:27)

-- who has been an active member and a high-ranking manager of the UCTEA since the

1970s -- succinctly puts it,

> [In the years between 1955 and 1965] the leaders of the community, the founders and managers of the organization [i.e., the UCTEA], were powerful among the governing elite and in the parliament. The elitist power of both the managers and the members provided the organization with an effectiveness ability [flowing] from the top to the bottom [of the society]. The president of [the state] and other high-ranking government members were participating in the congresses of the UCTEA, frequently getting opinions which were reflecting in the policies at all levels. . . . It was this position of the UCTEA that had formed the source of its effectiveness in the sense of both providing the services required from it and the survival of its organizational presence.

Thus it was not a mere historical accident that in the years between 1955 and 1965,

> Big capitalists, contractors, businessmen, chief executive officers of private companies, top-ranking bureaucrats and technocrats [kept occupying] the positions in the board of directors of the Union and the chambers" (Kunar, 1991:32).

In other words, the new structure of the engineering field formed after the promulgation

of the Code of Chambers *empowered* those who were already powerful. Most probably,

this was the underlying reason why ordinary members of the UCTEA "believed in the

magical capacity of the managers of the Union." Because the managers had the "magical"

power stemming from their being members of the governing elite. Yet, as Binici had

observed, this blind faith in the managers prevented the Union and the Union concept from

gaining a spiritual meaning, and hence leading to "remaining individualistic." Sure enough,

the increased economic potential of engineering due to "the increased volume of works"

and the liberal-economic ideology of the government was itself magnifying the tendency

towards "remaining individualistic." Since there were numerous projects but only a limited

number of potential contractors, this was an economic milieu which later contractors or

engineer and architect entrepreneurs would remember longingly (Ilkin, 1993).

All of this, however, should not lead one to forget that in the period of 1955-1965 in which the UCTEA had an "elitist-effectiveness," (Tanik, 1991) the engineering position in Turkey gained significant grounds in terms of cultural and symbolic capitals. In less than a decade, the meaning of the title of engineer was transformed from "someone who knows and uses geometry in his occupation" to a professional with technical expertise (i.e., knowledge of technique as production) as well as social, economic and political power and responsibility. Finally, "the voice and suggestions of the *technique*" were going to be "heard." In other words, there was a calling for the "technique" in the engineering field and the "country" in which "ambitious individuals" were interacting.

CHAPTER 5

THE DISCOVERY OF TECHNIQUE AS CRITICISM:

THE UNION OF THE CHAMBERS OF TURKISH ENGINEERS AND
ARCHITECTS IN THE 1965-1970 INTERREGNUM

This program can be developed within a definite systematic by reference to other
professions and disciplines that participate in the activity of . . . planning and gradually
within the process of *criticism* involving the most widest masses of people. . . When
this development is achieved, this will be democracy itself in its most general meaning.

Metin Gokturk, architect, 1969

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have argued that by making a claim to being
professionals with knowledge of *technique as production*, the founders of the UCTEA
resisted being seen as inferior to "foreign experts." Their objective was to get organized
within the UCTEA and assert their special social status in a collective manner. Using
Larson's (1972) terminology, this was the process of *professionalization* seeking to
control the use of technical expertise. As argued in some detail in Chapter 4, although they
failed to develop a strong sense of corporate collective identity, they were mostly
successful in gaining cultural, symbolic and economic capital. In brief, they secured for
themselves a solid position among the economically and politically dominant groups and
classes. Most interestingly, they considered the engineer as the *entrepreneur* or the
representative of the entrepreneur. They thought that "the fate of the country was the fate
of the engineer," viz., the entrepreneur. Thus, they remained *ambitious individuals*, using
their knowledge of technique as production for their own personal interest. However, they

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were forgetting or glossing over one issue: The fact that the industrialization process was being sabotaged by the sectional interests of economically powerful groups and classes.

In the second half of the 1960s, by using what I have earlier referred to as *technique as criticism*, a group of young engineers and architects began challenging the leadership of the entrepreneurial engineers and architects in the UCTEA. This chapter attempts to clarify the issues involved in their discovery of *technique as criticism* by considering the transformations in the field of engineering and architecture with respect to the changing membership characteristics of the UCTEA. Like in the previous chapter, particular attention will be given to the competing definitions and conceptualizations of the positions of engineering and architecture formulated in the 1965-1970 period -- a period that involves a pause in the continuity of the institutionalized characteristics of the UCTEA, and hence can also be called the 1965-1970 interregnum. In this sense, in this chapter, an exploration into the process of the restructuring of the field of engineering and architecture and the UCTEA will be made. In the first part of the chapter, using the case study method, an in-depth analysis of the 1969 Architecture Seminar which led to significant changes in the UCTEA's goals and missions is made in order to contextualize the historical nature of the discovery of technique as criticism by engineers and architects of Turkey.[1] In the conclusion, the changing social features of the field of engineering and

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[1] The papers and the commentaries presented in this seminar were published in a book form later by the UCTEA, the Chamber of Architecture. Bulent Tanik, a member of the UCTEA with long years of managerial experience, provided me with a copy of this publication and drew my attention to the strong influence of this seminar on the restructuring of the UCTEA in the 1970s. I would like to acknowledge once again his significant contribution to my understanding of the period under consideration. Needless to say, all problems and limitations regarding the interpretation of the nature of the seminar and its influence on the UCTEA are mine. I should also emphasize that the papers and the commentaries which I quote from and cite in this chapter are not paginated. So in this chapter the quotes appearing without any reference are all from the Chamber of Architects' publication of the 1969 Architecture Seminar.

the UCTEA presented in the chapter are reevaluated. Like in the previous chapter, here the focus will be on the relationship between the economic capital and cultural and symbolic capitals of engineering in Turkey, which is specified by economic and political developments in this period.

The Discovery of "Democracy in its Most Essential Meaning": The 1969 Architecture Seminar of the Chamber of Architects.

An overview of the seminar

On behalf of the UCTEA Chamber of Architects, between December 15 and 18, 1969, a seminar was held in Ankara under the title of "the Chamber of Architects in the Service of Society." In his opening speech, speaking very concisely, Maruf Onal, the chairperson of the Chamber of Architects, tried to put the aim of the seminar in perspective:

> Honourable guests, experts and colleagues
> . . .
>
> The Chamber of Architects that institutes the activities of the profession in accordance with the requirement of serving the public interest [and] whose public organization nature is codified by the Constitution . . . has found it appropriate and useful to organize a seminar addressing the socio-economic problems of our country.
>
> It is a well-known fact that different forms of living, inhabitance, production and consumption and inter-class relationships are closely related to [processes of] conducting, teaching and learning a profession.
>
> Like in all countries aiming to terminate the backwardness imposed, Turkey is in a process of socio-economical, political and cultural change [reflected by] the institutions of the base and superstructure. Professional services and activities cannot be seen as falling outside this process of change.
>
> It has been long observed that those countries that have stayed behind the new forms of economic life, acquisition and use of goods ensued from rapid development of modern culture and technology are having multi-faceted problems among which education comes first. Our country faces the same condition.

In the remainder of his brief speech, Onal listed the multi-faceted problems of Turkey which he wanted the seminar participants to address in their presentations and discussions. His list included the following observations about the nature of socio-economic conditions in Turkey in the beginning of the 1970s:

"In our country, there exists

. A lack of employment policy which is planned on the basis of division of specialization and directed to a certain objective,

. Inadequate utilization of the technical labour force (teknik eleman gucu),

. Disparities between our country's reality and conditions and the formation of occupational education and learning,

. The condition that the diplomas that indicate occupational skills [of individuals] are also signed out by private educational institutions which are more inclined to business [than education],

. The uneven allocation of occupational services within the borders of the nation (yurt sathinda), preventing the low income groups, farmers and workers from getting these services,

. The fact that a large number of well-educated and elite specialists are working abroad.

Having listed the major socio-economic problems inextricably implicated in the structuring of the field of technical services, i.e., engineering and architecture, Onal wants to be enlightened by the seminar participants in regard to very demanding questions that he asks:

In our society, which is in the position of a transition from a primitive and static mode of production dependent on agriculture and the rural areas to a civilized, nationally integrated (ulusallasmis), dynamic society based on urbanization and industrialization, how should the architectural services, education and learning be organized? In the division of public specialization, how can the technical labour force be utilized adequately? How can the services be allocated evenly within the borders of the nation? .
. .

He then concludes,

On behalf of the Chamber of Architects, I would like to greet all of you and thank each of you for taking the time as members of the commission preparing this seminar, as

honourable experts contributing to it through sending papers and as persons sitting in sessions as participants.

In addition to the 21 "experts" (city planners, architects, sociologists, political scientists, economists, a poet and a novelist) who presented very interesting papers, in total there were 451 registered participants who contributed to the discussions by asking questions, making comments and suggestions. Interestingly, 234 of these 451 individuals (i.e., 52%) were university students who in two or three years time were going to join the society and economy as one of the professionals. Most of these were students in one of the leading universities in Turkey, the Middle East Technical University, that during the late 1960s and the whole of the 1970s experienced an unprecedented kind of student activism.[2]

In the first day of the seminar "experts" attempted to highlight the problem areas encountered in the process of social and economic development in Turkey. In the following days, "architects" as members of the UCTEA tried to answer the question of how the "problems of architecture relate to the socio-economic issues discussed earlier." Of these two sets of discussions it is the latter that is more relevant and interesting in terms of the issues addressed in this chapter, and hence will be examined. Yet before this, it is worthwhile to briefly look at the content of another opening speech -- Gurol Gurkan's speech titled "Mimarlikta Devrim'e Dogru" ("Towards a Revolution in Architecture").

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[2] Korkmaz's (1992) *68 Guncesi* (The Diary of 68) and Alpay's (1992) *Ogrenci Olaylari* (Student Movements) are two excellent sources for getting familiar with the social climate and phenomenological features of this student activism at the Middle East Technical University and elsewhere during these years. It should be noted that this activism represents a specifically Turkish appropriation of themes from the late 1960's European New Left.

The first point to note here is that there is a clear difference between the tone of speeches by Onal and Gurkan. While Onal is introducing several new issues unaddressed by the UCTEA's previous generation leaders such as "transition from a static to a dynamic mode of production" and the implications of this for his professional responsibilities, he, like the previous generation, still appears to trust in the technical knowledge's socially autonomous role in the social and economic development, and thus emphasizes the lack of employment and education policies which, he thinks, hinders the generation of the needed technical experts (teknik elemanlar) with the required skills.

Yet Gurkan drastically deviates from the discourse of technical knowledge by arguing with reference to architecture as a particular case:

> In its evolution, architecture has continuously served for the monied and dominant classes. It has remained the profession of those individuals who have been educated in terms of principles that have never been directed to the needs of society.

Gurkan goes on to argue that architecture's being in the service of the economically powerful has rendered it an art that is a result of the desire of the rich to leave an artistic edifice in the world that would remain as something like a remembrance statue. According to Gurkan, this historically influenced artistic orientation of architecture began to dissipate with the industrial revolution that put an end to the dominance of aristocrats and gave way to the reign of bourgeoisie and capital. This time through serving capital, architects redefined their profession in such a way that they now became individuals whose job was to materialize the structures, artistic or otherwise, demanded by "money and machines." Interestingly, this metamorphosis of the social nexus of architecture created a tendency among architects to see their profession as a specialized knowledge of skills in the service of the general public, (i.e., "not in the service of a particular class"). This was mostly an

unanticipated outcome of socio-economic changes experienced after the industrial

revolution that increased the number and significance of "productive classes of society."

The rest of Gurkan's discussion is an attempt to establish a critical link between the

metamorphosis of architecture and a need for a change in the focus of the education of

architecture:

> Today all of the contradictions and tensions related to [the field] of architecture derive
> from this metamorphosis and resistance to digesting and understanding this
> metamorphosis. Most of us and most of the educational institutions stuck to the stage
> prior to the last stage stubbornly continue telling the old story that architecture is an art.
> Thus the facts belonging to a different world are escaping from observations.

In other words, in contrast (yet not in contradiction to) with Onal, Gurkan problematizes

the content of architectural education. He underlines his concerns about the representation

of his profession in the educational process. This can be seen as an attempt to provide a

positive correction to a perspective emphasizing only the quantitative aspect of education,

i.e., how many architects and engineers there should be and how evenly distributed they

should be, etc. The significance of this corrective becomes visible when one considers the

implications of a change in the focus of architectural education from an artistic to a public

service orientation. As Gurkan puts it in his concluding remarks, such a change in the

focus can make the young architect be aware of the fact that "architecture is no more a

relationship between individuals on a personal basis. It is working for individuals whom

the architect does not know personally." When the latter achieved, Gurkan contemplates,

a "revolution" will take place in architecture. Thus,

> Revolution in architecture will be a movement towards society. From now on, instead of
> saying "the Chamber of Architects in the service of society," it should be said that
> architecture is in the service of society. I hope this seminar can create the tension
> required to achieve this transformation. To all of you with my deepest respect and love.

The architect a peasant child and a donkey

Gurkan was going to wait until the third day of the seminar to see his hope come true. One of the discussants, architect Cengiz Bektas, if not creating the tension required to achieve the transformation asked by Gurkan, did create a tension to address it. Bektas wanted to draw attention to the Turkish architecture as the "mirror of our culture and social order." Bektas begins his remarks with an historical reminder:

> Our location is Anatolia:
> A mixture of Asian, Sumerian, Jewish and Arabic ethnic groups, Hittitians, Lydians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantians, Seljukians and Ottomans lived in this land . . . [Artistic products] of various ages reached a synthesis in Sinan's [architectural marvels] which left fine examples of architecture to the cultural history, which locate humans at the centre and are respectful to human size without unnecessarily exaggerating sizes that are outside of human measures.[3]

Beginning his comments with words that sound very pleasant, Bektas moves swiftly to the dark side of the cultural history inherited. "Later on," however, he says, "a bastardized period influenced by European Baroque, Rococo and New Classism ages emerged." This was the beginning of the end of authentic architectural tradition. Now "structures without personality" started to invade the centers of inhabitance. The foundation of the Turkish Republic, Bektas argues, had created briefly a milieu in the 1930s in which a movement towards traditional forms had began. Yet this movement came to a rapid end in and around 1950s. Bektas then makes an interesting observation:

> After 1950, as a result of a reaction to the previous period, a movement back to internationalism set in. Yet, this was a production period based on plagiarism from foreign architectural journals.

Sounding bewildered, Bektas immediately adds,

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[3] Mimar Sinan, or the "architect of architects," was a sixteenth century Ottoman architect whose greatest achievement was the Blue Mosque in Istanbul built across the equally, if not more marvelous Byzantine church, Saint Sofia. According to some, after Sinan built the Blue Mosque, Ottomans had began to see Istanbul as their own.

> Yet architectural form is the reflection of the forms of living, feeling and viewing which belong to a society with its unique social, economic, technical, aesthetic and psychological characteristics. Architectural form cannot be carried from one place to another, . . . Two different societies, . . ., insofar as they are not in a position to establish a real parallel between themselves, cannot import forms in architecture from one to the other. When tried, the form will never go to the roots, will be a transitory fashion, and will never go beyond the desire to imitate someone.

"In short," says Bektas, "today the condition of the field in which the Turkish architect finds himself is blurry."

The next issue that Bektas takes up is the elaboration of the socio-historical foundations of the "blurry" cultural history inherited. Citing from Dogan Avcioglu's *Turkiye'nin Duzeni* (*Turkey's Order*), Bektas asks: "Is this social order an order that, as the JP government argues, we inherited from our ancestors?" He then keeps reading from the same text:

> "No. This order is a colonial order with its roots outside, which, except for Japan, has been created by Western Imperialism in all non-European societies with varying degrees of differences. It is an order based on plundering."

What might have made this quote engaging for the audience in the first place might be the fact that for most of the young generation Turkish intellectuals by then, this widely read work of Avcioglu was beyond any doubt (Barchard, 1976:28). Yet the rest of the quote was particularly engaging because it was articulating the socio-historical foundations of modern Turkey with the conditions concerning the field of architecture. Perhaps this was the real success of Bektas: By citing from *Turkey's Order*, Bektas was locating the essence of Avcioglu's widely accepted claims outside of his text and in the architecture seminar in 1969. The rest of Avcioglu's text carried to the seminar reads as follows:

> "The common panorama in all colonized societies is as follows: In the forefront there exists one or two seaport towns with illuminated and shiny European quarters where

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export and import activities are located. In the background there lies the whole country resting on the misery of the peasantry and a pre-capitalist order with primitive conditions, feudal lords and usurers . . .

In Istanbul and Izmir, "European Quarters" (Avrupa Mahalleleri) have been established. In these quarters in which as many a foreigner as local comprador elements live, the means obtained through the exportation of foodcrops and raw materials produced by the hard work of peasant masses under primitive exploitation conditions have been consumed in the form of luxurious import goods from Europe. . . . In the "European Quarters," a European life style with European consumption goods [have emerged]. . .

Bektas leaves Avcioglu's text from here to move onto "looking at a couple of numbers." He reminds the audience that "in Turkey per capita annual income is 1489 TL, that means that, it is 124 TL monthly." In terms of current prices, Bektas argues, "a peasant child" who moves out from his village to a nearby town to go to school there needs minimum 220 TL monthly income. The rest of this "numeric" argumentation is full of astounding images that can arrest the attention of any kind of intellectual audience, and needs to be directly quoted:

> According to the findings of research conducted by American, Turkish, Pakistani and Iranian experts, in the countries of CENTO [Turkey, Pakistan and Iran], the expenditure for feeding a donkey is 4 TL daily, that is to say, 120 TL monthly. The monthly expenditure for feeding a horse is 363 TL in Konya, 336 TL in Eskisehir and 297 TL in Bursa. In Turkey there exists one doctor for every 4 thousand individuals. Of the 42 thousand villages, in 14 thousand of them there does not exist any school. Half of the teachers in Turkey work in the 3 thousand schools in small towns and cities, the rest work in the 28 thousand village primary schools. For a long period of time the number of Regional Agricultural Schools and Agricultural Technical Schools has not gone above 13. Yet in the last couple of years the number of Prayer and Preacher Schools (Imam Hatip Okullari) has increased to 58. And in the 1969 Turkey, Dear National Education Minister invites university professors to his iftar table [the breaking of Ramadan fast at sunset].

Sounding a little bit saddened by the information he has himself provided, Bektas next tries to make a very poetic transition to his last point, that is, the question of "what architects have to do now":

> As you see, it is this [socio-economic] condition in which, in order to serve this very condition, the Turkish architect, following curriculums copied from American and European architectural schools, has been educated for building yacht clubs, and instructed by professors who, as architects, have [long] been driven out from their fields.

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Thus, he immediately adds that his observations "make it clear [enough] to see both the commonalties and contradictions between the crisis of the Turkish architect and that of the Turkish society." "Under this condition," Bektas argues, "there are today important duties imposed on the Turkish architect." Moreover, he says, "these duties which forces [the Turkish architect] to transcend his personal troubles call for him/her to be more conscious and work harder [than ever]":

> There are lots of things to do for taking stronger steps forward and making a better use of time. . . In addition to the requirement of coming together around a certain view, these are the optimum selection of [social] objectives and mobilization of possibilities towards the solution of problems in terms of activities planned at an aggregate level.

In other words, let "donkeys" eat as much as they want to eat, yet at the same time don't forget to work for the "peasant children" to whom "the architect" has a promise to fulfill, i.e., living up to being in the service of public.

"A theme developed in between sessions": "Democracy"

Although Bektas had implied the existence of a need for "coming together around a certain view," he did not attempt to explain how the architects would achieve that. Likewise, he did not attempt to define what that "certain view" around which the architects would unite would be. Perhaps, he consciously chose not to do so in order to lead the participants to take up these questions. Most probably, however, he did not want to lose the focus of his speech, that is, "the cultural and socio-economic conditions in which the architect finds himself." In the last day of the seminar, Metin Gokturk, a participant from the Chamber of Architects, provided explicit answers to the issues raised but left unanswered by Bektas:

Here in the architecture seminar we gathered as architects, city planners, economists and sociologists to have a heart-to-heart talk[4] with each other on issues related to our occupations. There is nothing new beyond this. Now I want to introduce to you a proclamation which is related to the issues discussed here. This is a theme developed in between sessions. The name of those who participated in this work are: Yavuz Onen, Hasan Cakir, Gurkan Gezim, Haluk Pamir and Metin Gokturk.

Gokturk, as a representative of this five-person architect group, begins his speech with the observation that the seminar once more shows the futility of separating "the problems of architecture" from "the problems of the country." The reason for this, he says, is the fact that approaches addressing most general social problems usually come to a halt at one level of abstraction or the other, and then, "with a definite rupture" move onto a discussion of "the problems of architecture." According to the group of five, this disassociation between the two levels of discussion leads to a very simplistic depiction of the alternatives available to the community of architects:

> If it is put forward vulgarly, the architect is forced to choose between the interests of the society and those of his own and his profession. Those who make their choices in favour of the society are given the badge of the guards of the motherland (vatan fedaisi) and heroic leftists. Those who make their choices in favour of their personal interests and of those imposed on them by the requirements of their profession are labeled as opportunist, lazy and neglectful. We suppose that these contradictions can be prevented if the action fields of architecture are reconsidered from a more sensible approach. This requires to explain how under certain circumstances the architect enters into the realm of revolutionary practice.

The representative of the group of five then attempts to provide a list of "assumptions" which makes it possible to define the field of architecture as a "field of

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[4] The Turkish word for "having a heart-to-heart talk with" is *dertlesmek*. It refers to communication between individuals based on and about their emotions such as fears, worries, desires, as well as grievances, complaints and so on. Dertlesmek can be compared to *tartismak*, a word that may be used as a substitute for dertlesmek and means "to have a discussion, to argue or debate." When an individual is in the *tartisma* mode of communication, he is expected to make logical and intelligible statements supported by observations, references and in some occasions by reference to established disciplines such as sociology, economics and so on. When, on the other hand, he is in the *dertlesme* mode of communication, the individual is not hindered by an expectation of logical consistency and objective validity. Here he first of all addresses to the "hearts" of his listeners and not directly to their reason. Thus, following Max Weber, it can be argued that the dertlesme mode of communication is based on "substantive rationality," whereas the tartisma mode of communication requires to observe the requirements of "formal rationality."

revolutionary practice." Here Gokturk exactly argues that "architecture" is a revolutionary practice:

> Because of:
> 1. The objective conditions in which our country is located,
> 2. The nature of the historical formation of the class [basis of architects],
> 3. The condition that architects belong to the strata of technocrats
> 4. The condition that the long term interests of architects are in parallel with the strategic targets of revolution,
> 5. The condition that architects possess an economic power, *technology*, which is, due to its *universality*, always a transformative and revolutionary force of production.

"In order to clarify these assumptions," Gokturk focuses on "the problems encountered at the planning and execution levels." What should be emphasized here, he says, is the "objectives and action fields" of architects and their relation to the processes of planning and executing. He argues that the plan should first of all be designed to satisfy the needs of each and every stratum of the society. Yet, he says, "various difficulties are put in front of us in the attempt to satisfy the needs of planning at all levels of society." On behalf of the group of five, Gokturk argues that these difficulties are strongly correlated with "the interests of imperialists and those of the dominant forces of society." These groups, Gokturk says, are trying "to drag the planning activities to a conservative direction and prevent them from reaching society's various strata." It is this latter point on which Gokturk's rest of speech expands:

> They do this in the following manner:
>
> 1. In the process of the education of the planner there exists the influence of the dominant forces as a mode of ideological repression. Planning *techniques* which are alien to the conditions of the country and specified by imperialist objectives are being transmitted and required to be taught. *That means that we are under technological repression within the education process.*
>
> 2. We are under political repression within the planning process. In the direction of the imperialist objectives the dominant forces want to utilize the planner, the architect, the technician by strictly controlling them.

3. At the level of execution, by means of the market of construction materials, economic and rational execution possibilities which are appropriate to the conditions of the country are constrained.

4. On top of this, it is a necessity to take into account the feudal forces who prevent the reaching of planning and execution activities to different social strata. *Criticism* at the most general level and the concept of democracy which are preconditions of the planning activity are the ideological enemies of feudalism. In city councils in which small town local notables with their semi-feudal characteristics are dominant the reorganization of units of residence are *sabotaged* at both planning and execution levels.

Based on these observations, Gokturk suggests an interesting perspective regarding the "problems encountered at both planning and execution levels." Thus, says Gokturk, the biggest obstacle "in front of us" is in fact "the coalition of the dominant imperialist and feudal forces." This is, he says, the "reality" that circumscribes the field of architecture. What is interesting about this interim conclusion statement is the way through which Gokturk attempts to qualify it:

> When we were clarifying the [nature] of this reality we did not begin from a political approach. That is to say, we did not begin the discussion with how we can solve the problems of the country. [But instead] we begin from our own problems, that is, by moving from how we can perform our profession we arrived at the conclusion above.

In the remainder of his speech Gokturk attempts to provide a profile of the "community of architects" by referring to the "interests of architects." He first states that "hidden unemployment" is widespread among the 3000 architects in Turkey. The obvious evidences of this hidden unemployment, Gurkan suggests, are those who are working under "under-effective efficiency" conditions as a result of government's over-hiring policy, those members who are working outside the field of architecture, and those who are employed in private bureaus (burolar) with low-efficiency and low-wages. The interesting thing, Gokturk argues, is the fact that "on the other side, there is a huge demand for technocrats ensuing from the process of urbanization." He immediately adds:

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"And we are here, still waiting as hidden unemployed." According to the group of five, "understanding this reality, moving towards this demand and fighting against the obstacles in front of the" technocrats are indeed in parallel with the interests of architects, which involve not only social responsibilities imposed by the conditions of the country but also personal objectives as well as professional requirements. In other words, whether the architect is a "guard of the motherland" or an "opportunist," he must come to terms with the "reality" of his field if he wants to pursue his professional interests.

Finally, on behalf of his group, Gokturk explains to his audience what is expected of architects. The first thing to do, he argues, is to collect the data from its "real source," that is, the empirically given social structure. As the next step, he suggests to evaluate the data collected, and eventually begin to introduce gradually the findings of analyses to "the criticisms of social strata ." At this point he refers to Imar Planlari (City Plans controlling development and construction within an area) as an example. He begins with a humorous yet sad observation:

> [In this country] an Imar Plani for a small town can be prepared while at the same time that town remains unaware of this plan that directly affects itself. The criticism of this is made by a couple of individuals who are completely isolated from [the larger social context]. Then the criticism comes to a halt without ever being applied. Yet [in this country,] there exists democratic organizations among which there exists universities. Why is not this criticized within universities? Why is not this criticized within political parties and why is not this ever expanding platform of criticism handed gradually down to the individual living in that town? It is here that the disengagement of architecture lies. This is the outcome of the sediment that has accumulated within the [field of] architecture and the intensification of its language.

Gokturk believes that all architects can "conceive" the nature of this disengagement process of architecture and work towards "changing it." In order to change this, he says, architects should act "towards a definite target." This target, for example, "can be aiming to build a greater number of residences with the same amount of

construction investment." This, he argues, will also "make a positive contribution to the solution of the hidden unemployment problem" of architects via "increasing the number of construction projects." Moreover, he thinks, this target will also make it possible for the architects to establish a wider dialogue with the society as a result of an increase in the number of people served, and hence leading to a better understanding of the field of architecture by the society. Gokturk goes on to explain how aiming at this particular target may also lead to the gaining of a superiority vis-à-vis the "construction and finance capitalism" by architects as representatives of the "technical force of production." Finally, he refers to the spreading of construction activities all over the country as a result of the chosen target and its underlying anti-feudal political nature.

The proclamation of the group of five, as read by Gokturk, ends with the following statement:

> This program can be developed within a definite systematic approach by reference to other professions and disciplines that participate in the activity of environmental planning and gradually within the process of criticism involving the widest masses of people. . . When this development achieved, this will be *democracy* itself in its most general meaning. Thanks.

Conclusion: The Field of Engineering and the UCTEA in the 1960s

As it has been mentioned in Chapter 3, the 1960s in Turkey began with a revolution from the top following a month-long street demonstrations largely but not only organized by students. The impact of revolution on society was indirect and, because of this very reason, vague. In the first place, the revolution provided the society with a democratic framework one aspect of which was the provision of legal channels facilitating the participation of diverse social groups and civil societal organizations in the common affairs of the Turkish society. In this sense, in the 1960s, in terms of law making capacity,

political power, i.e., government, was not as unhindered as it used to be before the 1960s. Equally true, in terms of influencing macro political decisions, the leading civil societal organizations such as the UCTEA were not as hindered as they used to be before the 1960s. Even more true, most of them such as the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions and Teachers Union -- which had swiftly become powerful organizations -- could only be founded in this new politically liberal era.

Thus, in a socio-political milieu such as this, one could have expected to observe an increase in the UCTEA's economic, social, and political significance. That was the case indeed. In the early 1960s the UCTEA's significance as the leading civil societal organization was enormously augmented -- and rightly so. Rightly because, in the eyes of "general public," the UCTEA had established itself in the 1950s as an important force in the process of socio-economic development and industrialization. Now in the 1960s in which the Turkish economy and society were going to be "planned," there was going to be even more respect and demand for engineers and architects who were the members of the UCTEA as the Code of Chambers required.

In this decade, with the onset of planning activities under the auspices of the State Planning Organization (SPO), several politically important positions at different levels of the public administration became available to engineers and architects. If one wants to make a comparison between the early 1950s and the early 1960s in terms of the social positioning of engineers and architects, the following can be suggested regarding this inquiry: In the early 1960s, those "ambitious engineers" who had worked in the construction sites in the 1950s found themselves in the meeting rooms of public

organizations in order to prepare "strategic sectoral plans." As emphasized in the previous chapter, most of these engineers and architects had worked as entrepreneurs such as founders and managers of small scale factories, contracting companies and so on. Yet some others had worked as high-ranking employees of large scale private and public organizations. As a result, they were able to gain significant amounts of "economic capital," be this cash or financial and physical assets.

As again mentioned in Chapter 4, making money without socially responsible inhibitions, or simply economic greed, was not the prime factor underlying the contentions and intentions of most of these engineers and architects who became economically better-off by the 1960s. If anything, they wanted to be seen as "the engineer" as they understood it, that is, someone who has "scientific expertise" as well as responsibilities as "organizers," "leaders," and individuals with knowledge of social and life skills. It was the successful dissemination of such a new conceptualization of the title of engineer that was their *piece de resistance* -- an outstanding achievement that provided those who called and were going to call themselves engineers with an enormous amount of cultural and symbolic capital.

It should be emphasized here that cultural and symbolic capitals of a professional field, however they may be generated and augmented by particular individuals, cannot be monopolized by these individuals at the expense of others who also belong to the same field. This is because once they are generated they become the property of each and every member of the professional field in question. Mostly because of this collective ownership nexus, professional associations, organizations, chambers and so on establish certain

"codes of ethic" to monitor whether their members abide by the requirements of the cultural and symbolic capitals of their fields. The monitoring of the actions and conducts of the members of a professional field in turn, if not augment, conserves the value of the stock of cultural and symbolic capitals accumulated.

This unique nature of cultural and symbolic capitals significantly differentiates them from the economic capital of a profession understood as the trajectory of material possibilities associated with a professional title, and in this sense can also be seen as a collective property. Unlike in the case of cultural and symbolic capitals, however, professional associations cannot completely control fluctuations in the value of the economic capital of their professions. This is because in a market economy the value of the economic capital of a profession is largely determined by "market forces" over which professional associations have only a limited influence. Thus, while the value of cultural and symbolic capitals remain relatively stable over time, economic capital may fluctuate with fluctuations in the economy. For example, under ceteris paribus, a sudden increase in the supply of individuals with a certain professional title decreases the value of the economic capital of that profession, reflected by declining salary schedules in the first place. In such a condition, if that profession has the requirement of a sophisticated educational background as part of its cultural capital, there may emerge "well-educated but broke" professionals around.

Understanding this particular relationship between the economic capital and cultural and symbolic capitals of a profession has utmost significance in examining the transformations in the engineering and architecture field in Turkey starting from the late

1960s. At this point the following observation by Tanik (1991:27) can provide invaluable

insights into the transformations experienced:

> After 1965, the rapid increase in [the number of engineers and architects] that had
> ensued from [the opening of] private universities was left unchecked later by public
> education policies. Yet in these years, the economic crisis experienced with its
> associated employment problems had the influence of doubling the [adverse] effects of
> this quantitative increase on engineers. Economic crisis, awry industrialization, and
> technology policies had created the outcome of the trivialization of the profession, which
> was reproduced by the trivialization within education. As a result, the elitism accorded
> to engineering and architecture rapidly [began] to get worn-out, [and] the profession
> rapidly became widespread in the direction of becoming a mass profession. Thus both
> the community and the organization lost their elitist characteristics.

What should be carefully taken into consideration while interpreting this particular

paragraph of Tanik's (1991) is its density. The information that Tanik (1991) brilliantly

squeezes into this paragraph covers his observations regarding the transformations which

occurred in a period longer than a decade, i.e., 1965-1980. Thus, to the extent that it is

possible, one has to sort out chronologically the sequence of events leading to the decline

of the established characteristics of engineering and architecture and the organization (the

UCTEA) by which these are represented in Turkey. The specification of this sequence in

turn becomes consequential in delineating the social, cultural and political factors causing

the change in the effectiveness criterion of the UCTEA. Thus before taking up the latter,

one has to know more about the initial phases of the eventual drastic change that appears

to separate the two periods as the day and the night are separated.

Based on Kunar's (1991) observations, the sudden decline in the economic capital

of engineering and architecture by the end of the 1960s ar ... ...rious influences on the

members of the UCTEA can be thought of as the leading factors characterizing the initial

phases of the process of change within the field and the organization:

> By the end of the 1960s, transformations in the modes of production, deepening of the
> dependent industrialization, the graduation of a large number of unskilled and

inadequate [individuals] from private universities caused a decline in the salaries and an increase in unemployment among many skilled engineers. As a result, young engineers who were questioning the "order," discussing the capitalist system [and] inclined to struggle through trade unions began to be active in the chambers and undermine the previously elitist cadre. (Kunar, 1991:32).

Seeing it from this perspective, "the 1969 Architecture Seminar" can be put in a more meaningful context and gains a new significance in understanding the transformations that occurred: More than just an occasion for exchanging intellectual ideas, "the 1969 Architecture Seminar" can be conceived as a battle field of ideas involving symbolic killings, or rather murderings, which in turn characterize the period just prior to the 1970s. Specifically, "the young and the broke" in their attempt to eliminate "the old and the rich" symbolically murder the latter. Thus, for instance, one can read in Gurkan's speech:

"Most of us [meaning: the old generation] . . . stuck to the stage prior to the last stage stubbornly continue telling the old story that architecture is an art. Thus, the facts belonging to a different world [meaning: the social conditions that the young generation face] are escaping from observations [meaning: the attention and interests of the old generation]."

Gurkan's words, when compared to Bektas's unmerciful assaults, appear to be no more than an act of euthanasia. Bektas aims unambiguously at the professional credibility of the 1950 generation as a whole. He says:

[In the 1950s], . . . , a movement back to internationalism set in. Yet this was a production period based on plagiarism from foreign architectural journals.

Sounding like a judge who defends the capital punishment verdict, he provides evidences that, he thinks, leave no room for suspicion about the guilt of the old:

As you see, it is this . . . condition in which, . . ., the Turkish architect, . . ., has been educated for building yacht clubs . . . by professors [i.e., the defendant or the previous generation] who, as architects, have [long] been driven out from their fields.

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Bektas's words can also be read as: "In fact, we are not killing them. Because they are already dead."

It should be noted here that Bektas's mode of criticism tells more than his criticism itself. His criticism does not involve an attempt to overcome the difficulties of a given condition. But rather, it involves the denouncement of the condition in its totality. This particular nature of his criticism -- insofar as it is seen as the reflection of the mind set of the young generation -- reveals that the young generation has no lack of confidence as professional engineers and architects. In other words, even if they may think that the value of the economic capital of their profession has depreciated, they do not perceive any significant deterioration in the cultural and symbolic capitals of their profession. It is indeed through the power of the latter that they accuse the old generation of professional misconduct such as plagiarism, and hence, turning the latter's weapons back to itself. In this sense, although the young generation can empirically be described as non-elite in terms of economic considerations, they culturally and symbolically still see themselves as belonging to an elite group. If this is the case, however, Tanik (1991) and Kunar's (1991) observations need to be qualified: Starting from the late 1960s, what happened in the engineering and architecture field and the UCTEA was not the elimination of the elite but rather the replacement of an elite by another elite with different characteristics.

The proclamation of the group of five presented by Gokturk can thus be read as the manifesto of this new elite replacing the old one. The fundamental purpose of this manifesto is to *redefine* the professional requirements of engineering and architecture in accordance with the "interests of the society" which are inextricably implicated in the

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"action fields of technocrats." What this implies is twofold: First, a technocrat is a professional to the extent that he strives for fulfilling the requirements of his occupation. Second, those requirements, although they can be abstractly specified by reference to a particular discipline, should not be defined independently from the conditions of the society in which the technocrat conducts his occupation. Yet the realization of such a transformation in the professional nature of technocrats requires the *criticism* of *"ideological* and *technological repression* in education" and "political repression in planning" and organizations of the state and government such as city councils. This can be interpreted as follows: "If most of us are underutilized or unemployed, it is not because of our wrongdoing but because of the sabotage and different forms of repression that we have to endure." Thus, it is not surprising that the manifesto rests on the idea of democracy -- the idea suggested as the common view by virtue of which the young generation engineers and architects are called for a unification. Thus, they declare that the unification around the view of democracy does not only contribute to the solutions of the "problems of the country" but also makes it possible to countervail the tendency to move away from the professional requirements of engineering and architecture.

Thanks to the concise information provided by Tanik (1991), we know today that these "revolutionaries" failed, that is to say, they were largely unable to put a halt to the depreciation of the cultural and symbolic capitals of their profession. However, we should not forget that they discovered and struggled for "democracy" -- a discovery and struggle that involved issues going beyond their *sectional interests* and focusing on the material well being of all in the community. In other words, they discovered the *technique as*

criticism as they were calling for the removal of all social constraints sabotaging the optimum use of society's productive forces. This historical discovery that they had shared with those who also participated in the struggle for democracy remains to be their lasting contribution to the political production of the *sphere of autonomy* in Turkey. In the next chapter, the nature of their contribution to the production of the sphere of autonomy will be explored.

CHAPTER 6

THE POLITICAL PRODUCTION OF AUTONOMY:

THE UNION OF THE CHAMBERS OF TURKISH ENGINEERS AND ARCHITECTS IN THE PERIOD OF 1974-1980

Technical workers have provided their struggle against the hegemonic classes' repression with a political content by locating their professional problems within the totality of social problems . . . . The *political* content of the struggle has taken on a class character and the struggle of all technical workers has become a part of the struggle of all working masses.

Teoman Ozturk, Chairperson of the UCTEA, 1975

Introduction

In Chapter 2, I argued that the most significant moment of the engineer's movement from hegemony to autonomy is the transition from technique as production to technique as criticism. As a result of the transition, engineers come into conflict with the hegemony of business men over their work and become critical of taking orders from them. In the previous chapter, we have seen that during the late 1960s, by redefining the requirements of their profession, the young generation members of the UCTEA became critical of the power of "dominant forces of society" over the "action fields of technocrats." They considered "the interests of the dominant forces of society" as the principal interference "in the attempt to satisfy the needs of all levels of society." In opposition to the "dominant forces'" interference, they thought they had to move towards society as there was "a huge demand for technocrats ensuing from the process of"

industrialization. In brief, in the beginning of the 1970s, the UCTEA was not in the service of "entrepreneurs" anymore; it was in the "service of society."

This radical break with the hegemony of the dominant forces gained further momentum after the 12 March 1971 military intervention. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the army failed to remove the social and political conditions producing the hegemony crisis in the state. If anything, the military intervention amplified the politicization of civil society in terms of sectional class interests. The legacy of the coup was the repressive amendments to the Constitution restricting the previously granted rights and freedoms. "For that reason, the constitutional fight, carried on over . . . years and dominating the life of the state" once again came to the fore (Oppenheimer, 1914:265). This was the fight within which the UCTEA transformed itself into an autonomous social organization, and for almost a decade participated in the political production of the sphere of autonomy in opposition to the hegemony in the state and society. This chapter attempts to shed light on the nature of the organizational change experienced by the UCTEA after 1974. The focus of the chapter is on the political aspects of the organizational processes which empowered the members of the UCTEA in their struggle against hegemony and for autonomy.

The "Union News" and the New "Voice"

In 1974, civil society in Turkey was introduced to a new "voice" which could be heard until the September 12th, 1980. This was the new voice of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, which was going to be recorded in the

pages of the Union News (Birlik Haberleri), the bi-weekly periodical of the UCTEA, the

first issue of which came out on August 8, 1974 with the following claims:

> The UCTEA has become the symbol of the voice of the patriotic working people opposing the hegemonic (egemen) classes' multi-faceted exploitation and anti-democratic practices concretized in the problems of most of the engineers and architects.
>
> This voice under the direction of the engineers and architects, whose interests are in contradiction with those of the hegemonic classes, has been getting powerful and widespread for the last two years.
>
> To the best of its possibilities, the management of the UCTEA will turn up and spread this voice. The Union will be a significant factor in fulfilling this task. The Union, while it is filling a vacuum that has existed for a long time, is facing the challenge of reflecting daily events and making heard the work done in the past.

In its fifth issue (January 17, 1975), the Union News published an interview with

Arif Delikanli, the associate chairperson of the UCTEA, on issues related to the

specification of the "functions of the UCTEA." The first question that Delikanli answers

involves a discussion about the clarification of the political significance of the UCTEA in

the democratic process. Delikanli begins his words with an abstract observation:

> Given the fact that society is composed of individuals, it should be clear that every individual has a place in one of the interest groups within the society. These groups deem it necessary to get organized in order to obtain and protect their economic, social and political freedoms through forming an effective solidarity. As a result, they provide individuals with an opportunity to resist to being seen as ineffective by the [already] organized groups and to the latter's attempt to atomize and contemptuously treat them.

Having clarified the socially influenced need for getting organized in a society composed

of several interest groups, Delikanli argues:

> An organization that emerges out of such a need is reflected by the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects and the 17 specialized chambers tied to it. Today the organization which represents an effective sector of the technical labour force (teknik elemanlar) has [a membership of] approximately 50000 engineers and architects.

The second issue that Delikanli addresses is about the effectiveness of the UCTEA in terms of the capacity to resolve economic, social and professional problems of "the engineers and architects working in Turkey." The first point that he notes is the relationship between the problems of the "mass of engineers and architects" and the rest of the society's "productive classes and strata":

> Surely, . . ., the problems of the mass (kitle) of engineers and architects cannot be abstracted from the problems of the society's productive classes and strata. It is clear that the problems of a mass whose manifest character is to produce and influence the production are implicated in the problems of all of the working people.

When asked by the interviewer to qualify his claim, Delikanli suggests to look at "the major problems of engineers and architects and the things that should be done regarding these problem areas." Here Delikanli provides his readers with a list of observations and suggestions which summon them to participate in a political action process. In this sense, this list should be seen as a significant source of information in examining the UCTEA's unique approach to the struggle for democracy, and hence the political production of the sphere of autonomy. Moreover, to the extent that one observes a match between the stated aims of the political action plan and the actual actions taken by the UCTEA during the period under consideration, the information gained from this list can be used in examining the unique nature of the process of democratic struggle in Turkey. Having stated this, we can now turn to the political action plan suggested by the associate chairperson of the UCTEA in the beginning of 1975:

> 1. Ceaseless [attention should be paid] to observing behaviours and attitudes that render our economy externally dependent, and hence opening the door to the political dependence. These behaviours and attitudes should be revealed to public opinion.

2. [Everything should be done] for obtaining the unionization, the strike and collective bargaining rights which are the effective means of solving economic and democratic problems of all working people.

3. Public opinion should be ceaselessly warned against imperialism and its exploitation resulting from its undertakings with ever increasing power bestowed in organizations such as European Economic Community and the World Bank.

4. Research and analyses should be made with an aim to specify the appropriate ways of utilizing our national resources in terms of the interests of our people.

5. There should be resistance against the importation of foreign technical service and the brain drain, which are yet other extensions of the imperialist exploitation.

6. By emphasizing the imbalances in the areas of income distribution, health, education and urbanization, which are the outcomes of the capitalist relations of production, masses should be alerted regarding these areas.

7. A struggle for removing the anti-democratic modifications made in the Constitution after the 12 March should initiated.

8. It should act in solidarity with the democratic organizations which are also struggling for the elimination of the anti-democratic articles of the codes regulating the activities in universities, associations, political parties, trade unions and meetings and demonstrations.

9. Solidarity should be established with organizations that will contest the uncivilized laws that have been promulgated in order to constrain freedom of thought and conscience and propagate the hegemony (egemenlik) of the capitalist class over the other social classes and strata.

10. Measures should be taken to close the door to imperialist exploitation through preventing the importation of foreign technical services and facilitating the use of knowledge, experience and skills of technical labour force of Turkey in terms of the interests of its people.

[All of this] is the collective longing of the technical labour force (teknik elemanlar) and our people.

"And", asks the interviewer, "shall the accomplishment of these objectives be arrived at collectively, too?" Delikanli's answer to this question is a statement that will repeatedly appear in the pages of the Union News and all other publications of the UCTEA during the rest of the 1970s:

Yes, if a summary of what we have listed above and forgotten to mention is necessary, it is the longing of the mass of our technical labour force and the leading aspiration of our organizations to make a contribution to the country-wide struggle with an ever

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increasing determination for breaking the chain of underdevelopment and of our being made underdeveloped.

"This Knot Should Be Undone: A period of sharp contradictions"

In the seventh issue of the Union News (February 14, 1975), Teoman Ozturk, the chairperson of the UCTEA, attempts to inform his readers about the nature of the UCTEA's membership and its tasks ahead. A Comparison of Ozturk's essay with Delikanli's text reveals that the former is built on a dialogue with the latter. Like Delikanli, Ozturk emphasizes the need for a political action plan that should involve all other groups with similar objectives and longings. Yet Ozturk's voice is more cautious than Delikanli's in the sense that the former also questions the nature of the political or collective action. In other words, he, so to speak, says: Collective action is the answer but what the collective action should be is the question. It seems that Ozturk makes several well-informed claims about the diverse characteristics of the membership of his organization.

Ozturk argues first that "a majority of the membership base has adopted the multi-faceted struggle of the UCTEA against the established order's repression and exploitation." He thinks that this condition makes the "hegemonic (egemen) classes feel insecure" and "in contrast finds resonance among the working masses and people of all strata." In explaining the historical processes responsible for the emergence of such a polarization in the society, he refers to "the concrete facts experienced for years such as capital's economic and political repression, unemployment and inflation, emigration and foreign exploitation in the technical field." He also argues that not only because of the mere existence of these facts but also because of "the struggles against them a high level

of consciousness and accumulation among the technical workers (teknik elemanlar) has emerged.":

> Within this process of consciousness formation, the majority of the mass of technical workers has gradually transcended the conditioning and artificial contradictions created by the hegemonic classes' policies which are divisive and fragmentive. . . . [As a result,] professional chauvinism that fragments the struggles of engineers and architects from within and prevents [potential] relations with other sectors of technical workers has lost its effectiveness over the members. Technical workers have provided their *struggle against the hegemonic classes' repression with a political content by locating their professional problems within the totality of social problems at both national and international levels.* Today the political content of the struggle has taken on a class character and the struggle of all technical workers has become a part of the struggle of all working masses.

According to Ozturk, this historical unification of all working people imposes enormous responsibilities on the managers of all chambers, associations and the Union. Yet he thinks that "the dynamic character of the members and their longing for a stronger solidarity and collective action" are not sufficiently reflected in the management of the chambers and the Union:

> Although the managers are not against a stronger solidarity, they do not put the effort required to achieve this solidarity. At a stage where there is a much more difficult task requiring a collective approach, most of the managers keep their focus on the chambers only, and hence economic resources are exhausted in less effective tasks.

The rest of Ozturk's discussion can be read as a self-critique:

> Each step taken together is in the form of inefficient meetings held under compulsion. Managements misplace their power in inefficient, ineffective meetings falling behind the power required by the level reached by the membership base. [Thus,] they could not furnish [the required] new method of activity, its staff and budget.

Ozturk argues that the misplacement of resources preventing a stronger solidarity can only be avoided if the UCTEA is controlled and supported by the members. "In these days when the congresses of the chambers are being held," he says, "motions should be

passed" to make it possible to use the resources in the most efficient way possible. He in particular suggests two motions:

> 1. The UCTEA should strive to become an organization in which the revolutionary-patriotic groups can come together around certain principles and conduct effective, efficient and productive activities. With this aim, the managers of the chambers should be warned and forced to pass motions in this direction.

> 2. Continuity of "The Union News" should be secured; and it should be made a single, centralized organ.

"Why should we come together?" : A voice from the base

In its ninth issue (March 14, 1975) the Union News published a letter from an electrical engineer, Birol Yilmaz, which seems to be written as a response to Ozturk's suggestions regarding the question of what should be done in the congresses. The significance of this letter is the fact that it gives a first-hand sense of the aspirations of "the majority of the membership base" to which Ozturk refers.

> Our chair of the UCTEA, Dear Teoman Ozturk's declaration titled "This Knot Should Be Undone," published in the Union News on February 14, 1975, was indeed very timely. . . . Our profession which used to be the most favourite profession has been tried to be paralyzed and our colleagues have been tried to be made a subordinate class and in all this a certain accomplishment has been obtained . . . [To mention just a few] transforming engineers to defenseless civil servants, withholding our trade union rights granted by the Constitution, and most importantly, attempting to close down our professional chambers . . . All this and the others that we have experienced, are these negligible things?

> This is *the regime of exploitation*. This time, it tries to ignore that the exploited has become conscious and are becoming more conscious. As the contradiction gets sharpened, it becomes confused and starts forgetting what it has already known. Oligarchy shall be defeated within this contradiction because this is its inevitable fate.

> Oligarchy opposes all kinds of unification. Oligarchy is always the enemy of all united forces. This is why we should come together and make our voice heard. Because our voice is the voice of truth. . .

A Voice from the Chamber of Forest Engineers: "The Struggle of Forest Engineers from yesterday to tomorrow"

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In the same issue in which Yilmaz's letter is published, Celal Soygan, a forest engineer (M.Sc.), attempts to explain why and how "revolutionary-patriotic" engineers have become dominant in the Chamber of Forest Engineers. In this sense, this essay aims to explain to the readers why engineers, as the chairperson of the UCTEA asks from them, should "warn and force" the managers of their chambers who are "falling behind the power reached by the membership base." Besides this implicit message, what makes this particular essay interesting is its historical interpretation of the state-society relationship in the context of Turkey.

Soygan begins his analysis with a clarification of the position of the Turkish society and the Turkish economy in the capitalist world system. He argues that Turkey is "a semi-colonized country -- a problem country with its freedoms incarcerated in jails, plundered natural resources and a long-suffering people with no experience other than exploitation." In addition to seeing Turkey as "a problem country," however, Soygan thinks of it as a country which has a long tradition of "revolutionary struggle." He indeed argues that an understanding of the social dynamics of Turkey requires one to examine the interaction between being "a problem country" and yet at the same time having a long tradition of "revolutionary struggle." It should be emphasized here that his understanding of this interaction goes beyond any simplistic formula that can be derived from an abstract social theory. Thus, the rest of his analysis deserves to be quoted at some length:

> The production relations and the socio-political and socio-cultural structure tied to them, which have been dictated to the country by the hegemonic classes, had been successful in preventing many a well-educated individuals from [discovering] these problems. The revolutionary struggle of the people of Turkey which goes back to the 1920s had been repressed by oppression (zulum) and blood. Long years of fascist repression which was hidden from public opinion had been experienced.

This dark period that requires a much more complex analysis had come to an end with the 1961 Constitution with its semi-democratic features. And in the 1970s we begin to experience the courageous democracy struggle of people of Turkey including workers, peasants and intellectuals. *From now on the intellectual of Turkey has come to understand the necessity of seeing his problems within the totality of problems.* As a result, he has begun to explain his problems and responsibilities with a contemporary interpretation. Today, it is this dialectical leap that lies at the origin of the positive crisis which has been shaking this country for the last ten years.

The chain of demands that stretches from income distribution to democratic rights has forced the reactionary classes to take repressive measures. With the 12 March and its aftermath the fascism that has been prowling around for a long time has become concretized in the bloody hands of brutal and sick individuals.

Today while the working class is defending itself with democratic demands and all the possibilities available, there is emerging an intensive peasant movement in the rural areas. Imperialist monopolies and the domestic big bourgeoisie try to find ways to put a halt to all this and finds the solution in the easiest and most natural thing for themselves: Fascism. Mass lay-offs, paramilitary (komando) assaults and oppression in the rural areas — the latter has been carefully hidden from public opinion.

In the intellectual sector, the rights which were usurped by the 12 March fascist intervention have been put back into the agenda. Civil servants, technocrats, and teachers whose labour is hired by the state are fighting for founding their unions and obtaining their right to strike. This fight . . . sometimes has reached the level of anti-fascist and democratic action form.

Today the forest engineers who, due to the nature of their job, have a revolutionary potential yet had long been kept as a submissive mass have discovered the game and for the first time in their professional history have come forward with contemporary demands and in line with its membership base have become dominar in the management of the chamber. In the days to come, this subject shall be vigorously scrutinized and the questions of who we are, what we desire and what our revolutionary personality is shall be patiently explained to those individuals who have good intentions. Yet it should be known from right now that our struggle is not against the gray-haired but the black-brained. This struggle is the struggle between the forest engineers who do not separate themselves and their problems from the problems of their people and have dignified personalities and their opposites. *We, on the one hand, are struggling for our self-rights, yet, on the other hand, taking our place in the revolutionary-democratic practice by locating our problems within the general issue of democracy in this country.*

The Chamber of Forest Engineers was not the only chamber in which "dignified persons" were becoming dominant in the management. In fact, the Chamber of Forest Engineers was just following the footsteps of the Chambers of Geological Engineers, Mechanical Engineers, Electrical Engineers, Civil Engineers, Architects, Agricultural Engineers and so on. In the eighth issue of the Union News (February 28, 1975), for

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example, one could read the statements of other chambers regarding "the problems of the country and the profession," which were, if not the same, very similar to those of the Chamber of Forest Engineers.

The Voice of the Chamber of Geological Engineers: Why of "fascism and anti-democratic repression"

The statement of the Chamber of Geological Engineers was addressing the issue of "fascist and anti-democratic movements" spreading all over the country. The statement argued that there existed an association between the rise of "democratic struggle" and the "spreading of fascist movements all over the country":

> In order to protect their *exploitative regime*, the collaborators of imperialists who are frightened by our people's day by day growing consciousness and movements toward a unification within a progressive project aim to deter the revolutionaries and our people by instigating fascist and anti-democratic movements all over the country.

In the rest of the statement the "TRT Issue" (The Turkish Radio Television) was addressed in relation to the observed political attacks on the public institutions in which *democratic* groups had begun to be powerful. The statement made the following claim:

> In recent days, the collaborators of imperialists and reactionary forces . . . began to assail the TRT by reference to the personalities of individuals. [For sometime] the TRT which has been showing the realities to our people, focusing on the problems of the country and siding with the people in its programs has been causing anxiety among these individuals by making it known the dirty tricks of the domestic collaborators of imperialists.

The Voice of the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers: Who should make "the word and the decision" ?

The "TRT Issue" was an issue related to the spreading of "the word" in the "air" of Turkey. Surely, the issue of the nature and the content of "the word" spread was implicated in the distribution of power resources, be they material or symbolic, and thus

becoming a politically sensitive issue. At the heart of the problem was the question of who would decide on the making of "the word" that was going to fly in the air and perhaps later walk in the streets. The statement of the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers provided an answer for this question:

> . . . A large majority of us live via selling their labour-power. Thus, we, Mechanical Engineers, maintain that the solutions to the problems — *whether these problems just belong to us or the country as a whole* — lie in the ability of the working people and of all of those who are on the side of labour to have the word and to make the decisions in the politics of the country. The precondition of this is *the realization of an advanced democracy* in our country. . . .

The rest of the statement attempted to clarify the position of the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers regarding the creation of an advanced democracy in Turkey. This part of the statement involved a list pointing out the significant steps required to be taken to realize the stated objective. This list was strikingly similar to Delikanli's call for political action. Yet, it also included some suggestions which were not clearly mentioned in Delikanli's call. The following suggestions are worthwhile to note and helpful for getting more informed about the particular political and legal issues of the period:

> . . .
>
> (4) We believe in the necessity of an organized opposition to the anti-democratic practices and all kinds of repression and terror and with this aim, [we demand]
> a) the abolition of the Martial Law,
> b) the closing down of the State Security Courts,
> c) the prohibition of lock-outs,
> d) the abolishment of restrictions imposed on the use of the right to strike and the legalization of the right to sympathy strike and the general strike,
> e) the prohibition of the "rightist-paramilitary" organizations responsible for fascistic assaults and murders,
> . . .
> (6) Agreements such as NATO, CENTO, Common Market and bilateral agreements which include military, economic and political enslavement clauses must be removed. Our country must be cleaned of foreign bases and must be disarmed in terms of military and assault weapons. An independent foreign policy must be pursued.
>
> (7) We, Mechanical Engineers, admit and declare that we shall actively participate in the struggle of our people for democracy, independence and social progress.

It must be emphasized here that the frequent reference to "fascism," "fascistic assaults and murders," and "rightist-paramilitary" organizations was not there in the statements only because of an outcome of some deep theoretical analysis of the political conditions of Turkey in the second half of the 1970s. More than a theoretical insight, this was an insight gained from the *life-world*[1].

"As It 's Known" or the Life-world

In the eleventh issue of the Union News (April 11, 1975), in order to fulfill the "challenge of reflecting daily events," a news article was published. The title of the article was "Repression of Students: The Example of METU (Middle East Technical University)." The article begins with the following claim:

> In recent days, during which the formation of the Nationalist-Front Government has been in progress, the ongoing repression of the patriotic and progressive forces has further intensified. Especially in the sector of youth, this repression has taken the forms of Commando assaults and arrests.

The article continues,

> *As is known*, on March 25, 1975 one female and two male students at the Ankara Law Faculty, one assistant and three students at the Faculty of Agriculture were wounded by Commandos. On March 28, four individuals were wounded in the Commando assaults that took place in the Faculty of Political Science, the Faculty of Linguistics and Geography and the School of Commerce and Tourism. Of these four individuals, Veli Yildirim died in the hospital. The same day, 12 students were wounded and 30 of them were arrested at the State Academy of Architecture and Engineering. On April 1, 1975 eight students were wounded again by the knives of Commandos.

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[1] The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology (Abercrombie, et. al., 1988) defines the life-world as follows:

> . . . The everyday world as it is experienced by ordinary men and women. For phenomenological sociology, the life-world is the "paramount reality" and the main object of sociological inquiry. Its chief characteristic is that it is unproblematic and is taken for granted, and is therefore to be contrasted with the world of scientists and sociologists in which natural objects and social interactions are not taken for granted.

The rest of the article reported that the students of Istanbul Technical University and the Middle East Technical University had boycotted their classes for one day in order to protest Veli Yildirim's killing, the formation of the Nationalist-Front Government and the intensified repression.

In this period, on April 26, 1975 representatives from the UCTEA and its 17 chambers participated in a meeting held in Ankara to evaluate "the government's two-month performance, the developments in the economy and anti-democratic practices." In the statement conveyed to the press, "the brutal assaults on university youths" was condemned and evaluated as a doubtful development in terms of the stability of "the democratic environment" in Turkey. The statement argued that there were "two concrete targets of the recent anti-democratic practices":

> 1. Forcefully imposing the burden of the plundering and looting economy on the working people, distracting people's attention from exploitation and making them concerned about things other than exploitation.
> 2. Silencing the growing economic and democratic opposition.

In the long statement another dimension of "the anti-democratic practices" was addressed, which was the "*elimination of the personnel opposing both domestic and foreign exploitation in the institutions of the state.*" The significance of this particular reference to "the anti-democratic practices" was, if not the creation, at least the diffusion of a new word adding to the counter-discourse of the "democratic forces":

> Long lists of incriminating information have been popular for some time as the basis for the political severance (*kiyim*) of patriotic civil servants [from their positions.] This repression without exception is applied in all ministries and at all levels of the civil service. Thus, the personnel who defends the interests of the country are being eliminated.

The dictionary meanings of the new word, *kiyim*, translated here as political severance, are as follows:

Kiyim: 1. cutting up finely, chopping up, mincing. 2. wronging, mistreatment. 3. cut, way of cutting. 4. massacre.

When translated as political severance, *kiyim* can be compared and contrasted with downsizing, which in general refers to the reduction in the size of an organization's personnel and is usually initiated subject to budgetary constraints. Although *kiyim* can be conceived as a specific form of downsizing, it differs significantly from the downsizing thus defined, which is now a "global" trend in the re-structuration of the public organizations and services. Whereas downsizing is usually associated with an attractive "severance package," (i.e., severance pay), *kiyim*, is simply firing. More problematically, *kiyim* refers to the opening of an incriminating file on someone while at the same time firing that person because of that person's political inclinations. That should be the underlying reason why, instead of severance, the word *kiyim* was used by the representatives of the UCTEA, because someone who is *kiyim*ed is also "chopped up," "minced," "mistreated," in brief, "discriminated against." Because *kiyim* signifies all this in addition to severance, in the rest of the chapter it will not be translated whenever a reference to *kiyim* is being made.

"Repression *Kiyim* and Assaults Cannot Obstruct Our Struggle"

In Turkish there is a saying that goes like, "what has happened has happened and there is no turning back." By the end of 1975 the political condition of civil society in Turkey can be summarized by reference to this saying. Groups such as the UCTEA had

joined a platform of collective struggle for democracy and in response to this, yet some

other groups such as "Commandos" and the police had begun to assault and arrest them.

All this had "happened." Was there any possibility of turning back to the pre-1975 or more

correctly the pre-1970s? The answer was, as will be made clear below, no.

In its twenty-second issue (September 12, 1975), the Union News published a

statement on behalf of the UCTEA regarding the "patriotic duties of the technical workers

of Turkey." The statement entitled "Repression, *Kiyim*, and Assaults Cannot Obstruct Our

Struggle" argued that all actions taken by the Nationalist-Front Government against the

patriots would fail and

> Until the days to come when the fate of Turkey shall be drawn in Turkey, whatever is
> done is done, yet nobody must be suspicious about the technical workers' . . . fulfilling
> of their patriotic duties.

In the rest of the statement a list of public organizations in which an ongoing *kiyim* of the

members of the UCTEA had been in progress was provided. Some of these organizations

were "all ministries, Iskenderun Demir-Celik (a complex producing iron-steel products),

Karadeniz Bakir (a complex producing copper products), Kirikkale MKE (a complex

producing mechanical and chemical products) [and] the Middle East Technical

University." The statement ended with an assertive "voice":

> The UCTEA with its membership of more than 50000 and its chambers see it as its duty
> to declare that because of its positioning against the longings of our own members and
> our people we will not have confidence in this government even if it gets a confidence
> vote in the parliament.

In the same issue of the Union News, a short essay titled "Fascism of the 12 March

and its Aftermath" attempted to explain the reason for the lack of confidence in the

government. The author, Yavuz Onen, was one of the members of the group of five that in

the "1969 Architecture Seminar" had suggested the idea of "democracy" as the view

around which engineers and architects should come together. In his short essay, Onen

claimed that "thousands of individuals who had experienced the tortures of the Fascist 12

March had seen the *brutal inhuman face* of imperialism and *capitalism*, which

transgresses morality, justice and the law." Onen argued that the "people of Turkey" and

"world public opinion" had been informed about all of this as a result of the determined

anti-fascist struggle that emerged in response to the 12 March regime. The anti-fascist

stance in its turn, he argued, gained powerful grounds at all levels of society in "the

direction of long-term goals."

Having summarized the political nature of the recent past, Onen wanted to warn

his readers about the "short-term targets":

> At a time when resistance to and solidarity against fascism have gained significance, the
> short-term targets that revolutionary cadres (kadrolar) shall put forward also gain
> significance. While these cadres are showing these targets, they may make mistakes if
> they follow a submissive policy by exaggerating current political developments or try
> adventurist endeavours by getting distressed.

It should be emphasized that the managements of the UCTEA and the chambers

appeared to be neither submissive nor adventurist. In their struggles against *kiyim* and

repression, they were drawing rather from the resources accumulated in the field of

engineering and architecture as a result of a long tradition of struggle against injustice. For

instance, the issue of "foreign experts" that led the generation of the late 1940s to move

towards founding the UCTEA had become relevant again in the second half of the 1970s

and provided a legitimate reason for acting against the *kiyim* policy. In the twenty-second

issue of the Union News, the Chamber of Civil Engineers reintroduced the issue of "foreign experts" to the members of the UCTEA. The statement of the Chamber of Civil Engineers emphasized the contradictions between the economy-wide lack of skilled technical personnel and the implications of the *kiyim* policy for the use of the already limited technical workers:

> The Nationalist-Front government that meets the demands of the hegemonic circles without any delay on the one hand talks randomly about the insufficiency of technical personnel, on the other hand, continues the *kiyim* of talented technical workers. This idea that counts on the foreign experts who are hundred times more expensive than our self-power cannot be a nationalistic idea.[2]

It is important to note here that the discovery of the contradiction between the excess demand for technical workers and the political *extermination* of them leads to the discovery of the contradiction between the government's nationalist ideology and its policies which are anything but nationalistic. It was through this discovery that the Chamber of Civil Engineers counterpoised its "patriotism" against the "nationalism" of the government:

> In the very near future we altogether shall see the growing of *patriots* like an avalanche and of public opinion's condemnation of this idea [i.e., government's nationalism] that prevents our own human-power from serving the society while attempting to silence [us].

In the first organized collective action against *kiyim*, the technical workers refused to be silenced and walked *silently* in the streets of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir in late September 1975. The organization of this march was planned in the meeting held in the first week of September 1975. In this meeting the managers of the UCTEA and the

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[2] In the thirty-fifth issue of the Union News, the names and the monthly salaries of "the so-called foreign experts" were published. In the list provided, the range of monthly salaries of foreign experts was between 151035 TL and 43980 TL. The average monthly salary of a "non-foreign expert" was about 5000 TL.

Chambers decided to "struggle effectively against repression and *kiyims*." The "action program" planned involved the formation of a social support system that would help the members of the UCTEA who were *kiyim*ed. Specifically, the social support system aimed to provide the following services:

. The formation of an effective and central information network.
. The initiation of an extensive campaign to expose *kiyims* and repression to public opinion.
. The establishment of a central law office at the UCTEA to provide the members *kiyim*ed with legal services.
. The establishment of a job search office at the UCTEA to find new jobs to those members who lost their jobs as a result of *kiyim*.
. The initiation of a fund-raising campaign and the establishment of a fund to financially help the members who were *kiyim*ed.

"Walking Against Darkness": The march of March 1976

In Turkey, like elsewhere, the year of 1976 began with some new year's resolutions. Every individual, every group had wished several things to happen in 1975 and most of those wishes, like elsewhere, had not come true. Thus, like elsewhere, individuals and groups in Turkey had wished 1976 to be a better year than 1975. Some of these individuals and groups had wished the assaults, arrests, repression and *kiyims* to come to an end. Representatives of such individuals and groups met in Ankara between January 21 and January 28, 1976 to discuss "the Nationalist-Front Government's Civil Servant *Kiyims* and All The Things That Go With It." Nine leading civil societal organizations participated in this meeting. These were the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, Ankara Higher Education Association, The Union of All Economists, The Association of the Union of Teachers of Turkey, The Association of Civil Servants, The Association of All University Professors, The Association of Turkish Medical Doctors and The Association of All Technical Workers.

The purpose of this meeting held in a conference hall was to evaluate the political and economic conditions experienced in 1975 and make suggestions, or rather resolutions, for 1976. In the statement published in the thirty-third issue of the <u>Union News</u>, information obtained by the information networks regarding repression and *kiyim*s was conveyed to "public opinion." Having first stated that "repression and *kiyim*s aim at limiting and hindering the democratic struggle of the working people," the statement continued:

> In the last period, 6 teachers were killed; 5 thousand teachers were forced to leave their schools, the ex-chairperson of the Association of Civil Servants [ACS] and the general secretary of the ACS at the PTT were assigned to locations where they could not perform their duties; several members of the ACS were laid-off, the chairperson the Association of All Technical Workers Seydisehir Branch and the chairperson of the UCTEA, Teoman Ozturk, were removed from their offices at Seydisehir Aluminium and Ankara City Planning Office, respectively. Again, 1500 agricultural engineers (M.Sc.) and more than 2000 forest engineers were *kiyim*ed. Again in this period, 17 engineers and 429 workers at Karadeniz Bakir were laid-off when they went to strike in reaction to the employer's violation of their rights approved by the court. Finally, when the majority of workers in Seydisehir wanted to get organized within the revolutionary workers union, paramilitary fascist bandits assaulted them with weapons. The chief engineer, Hikmet Bilge, who was working in Seydisehir Aluminium complex, was arrested. The only crime of all these friends was to defend the idea that technical workers should also get organized within the revolutionary workers union.

Needless to say, 1975 was a far cry from being a prosperous year for most of the working people of Turkey including its "patriotic technical workers." The conclusion of the statement of resolutions for 1976 emphasized that the new year would be worse than the last year if "patriots" did not raise their voices louder than ever. The reason for this was explained by reference to the following political analysis:

> Capital lost the chance of coming to power through elections as a result of the democratic struggle of the working class and all other labouring classes and strata. The Prime Minister [Suleyman Demirel] said: "Turkey cannot be governed by this Constitution." He said: I am denouncing the Council of the State and the Constitutional Court on behalf of the Turkish people. A prime minister's frontal attack on the Constitutional Court is extremely informative about the particular path that he would take. [Not surprisingly his] vice-premier declares his party's street militants as the helpers of the state security forces and explicitly promotes their getting militarized.

The conclusion of the statement ended with a strong message that anticipated the political developments yet to be experienced in the new year:

> Struggle against fascism, that is, struggle against the bloody dictatorship of capital, is on the agenda now. The force that shall defeat fascism is, first of all, the working class and the organized and persistent union of all working people.

Approximately two months after this statement, on March 13, 1976 more than 50000 individuals belonging to the nine organizations mentioned above participated in a march that ended in Tandogan Square in Ankara. This was the march against "fascist repression and *kiyims*." The chairperson of the UCTEA, Teoman Ozturk, was one of the members of the organizing committee. In the announcement made to the public, which was reprinted in the thirty-fourth issue of the <u>Union News</u> (March 5, 1976), it was declared:

> . Fascist bloodbath should be stopped
> . 141-142 and all other anti-democratic codes and articles should be abolished
> . the State Security Courts should be closed down
> . Unemployment and inflation should be controlled
> . *Kiyims* should be stopped
> . Democratic education must be provided
> . Join the struggle for trade union rights with strike and collective bargaining

In the thirty-fifth issue of the <u>Union News</u> (March 19, 1976), the march of March 1976 was given a large coverage. A picture of the large crowd gathered in Tandogan Square was printed on the cover page. One could read the following lines or the message superimposed on the picture:

> WORKERS, TEACHERS ARE WALKING, CIVIL SERVANTS, ENGINEERS, STUDENTS, TECHNICAL WORKERS, HEALTH WORKERS, UNIVERSITY ASSISTANTS ARE WALKING. HONEST AND COURAGEOUS HUMANS ARE WALKING. THEY ARE WALKING AGAINST THE DARKNESS OF FASCISM'S ROBBERY, REPRESSION AND OPPRESSIVE REGIME. TENS OF THOUSANDS ARE WALKING . . .

Some of the speeches made in Tandogan were as follows:

Hamdi Ogus (The Chairperson of the Chamber of Ankara Medical Doctors):

We can reach the humanly living environment with all democratic rights and freedoms that we have been defending for sometime and has been tried to be taken away from us only through the struggle for independence and democracy. A collective struggle is a must against our major enemy, imperialism, and fascism which is not the fate.

A Student (representative of the Association of Ankara Higher Education):

We conceive the anti-fascist struggle as part of the political struggle of the working class. Efforts have been made to frame fights taking place at universities as left-right fights. In reality, these are the assaults of fascists who do not have the support of the masses.

Bilal Oguz (The General Secretary of the Union of All Economists):

There is only one correct revolutionary policy against fascism. That is, putting the democratic resistance of popular masses in front of fascism like a castle. . . .

Cemal Cakir (The Chairperson of the Association of the Union of Teachers of Turkey):

The most effective way of saying enough is enough to this shameless condition is to raise the mass struggle of all individuals who are democrats, progressivists and revolutionaries and make them face the enemies of democracy and people like a tight fist.

Teoman Ozturk (The Chairperson of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects):

I am talking to you on behalf of the patriotic engineers and architects struggling against imperialists and their servants who seized and carried off our human-power, above and underground resources, oil and mines. . . . Today we are here to exhibit the power of people against fascism. Fascism is oppression, repression and *kiyim*. One day fascism shall be defeated by our persistent and *organized struggle*. This struggle is a difficult one. In this struggle there is no room for getting demoralized, depressed and fragmented. . . . As workers, peasants, students, teachers, technical workers we altogether shall fight shoulder by shoulder. Long live those who open their chests against imperialism and fascism, long live tomorrow's independent Turkey.

Intensification of Assaults and Killings and the Question of the Legality of the State Security Courts: "No to the SSCs"

As Ozturk emphasized, the "struggle" was a "difficult one" involving arrests, detentions, assaults and killings. Just two days after the march of March 1976 assaults

gained a new momentum, which made the "struggle" even more difficult. On March 15, 1976, the Izmir Branch of the Chamber of Civil Engineers and Izmir Branch of the Association of All Technical Workers were searched by the police authorized by the State Security Courts. Various documents of these organizations regarding their activity plans were seized. Six days later, on March 21, 1976, unknown persons raided the residence of Yilmaz Sarioglu, a member of the Board of General Directors of the Chamber of Civil Engineers. In the raid Sarioglu's son who was three years old was seriously injured and hospitalized. In the following week, Mehmet Omer, a Turkish Cypriot and an engineering student, was killed in Istanbul by unknown persons.

In its thirty-sixth issue, the Union News published the statements of the Chamber of Civil Engineers and the Union of the Chambers of Cyprus Turkish Engineers and Architects (UCCTEA) addressing the issue of the intensification of assaults. The statement of the Chamber of Civil Engineers argued that police searches aimed at the elimination of the democratically elected members of the Board of Directors:

> In the General Congress of our Chamber all progressivists and patriots have gained a remarkable success against the group supported fully by the Nationalist-Front Government and won the key positions in the management again. When the hegemonic circles recognized that they could not get the management through democratic methods, they applied repression methods against our Chamber [as the last resort]. Our Chamber which is a Constitutional organization was searched by the prosecutor of the SSC (State Security Court) without providing any reason. [In the search] several files and documents regarding our Chamber were seized . . .

The statement also reported the raid of Sarioglu's residence and argued that the perpetrators of this incidence were members of the "fascist mobs which [were] active in Ankara." The statement ended with the same persistent voice:

> As patriotic technical workers, we once again repeat that we shall not be discouraged by these repressive acts and shall side with all working people in the ongoing struggle in the direction of our country's interests.

The UCCTEA's statement with its unique Cypriot accent condemned the killing of

the Cypriot student, Mehmet Omer:

> As a result of fascist attacks we Cypriots lost a new victim. As a new name, Mehmet
> Omer augmented the sorrow of all students, workers and patriotic revolutionaries who
> were the victims of Fascism.
>
> We ask these unconscious murderers:
> . Is it a crime to defend the development of our nation by breaking the chains of
> underdevelopment?
> . Is it a crime to defend the saving of our natural resources from foreign exploitation?
> . Is it a crime to defend being free of dependence on foreign nations?
> . Is it a crime to deny our labour force's being in the service of foreign nations?
> . Is it a crime to criticize the externally dependent economic system?
> . Is it a crime to oppose the dragging of our nation towards an open market exploitation?

In the thirty-seventh issue of the Union News (April 16, 1976), news about new

incidents of attacks and killings were published. In one of these incidents, Ridvan Bazman,

a member of the Board of General Directors of the Chamber of Metallurgical Engineers,

was attacked by unknown persons who forcefully seized Bazman's identification

documents. In another incident three university students were reported as killed by

unknown persons. In the report published, the following information was conveyed to the

readers:

> *The government of the hegemonic classes* once again murdered three patriotic youth.
> Ten-thousands participated in the funeral service organized. Those who do not struggle
> against fascism,. . ., shall not only be responsible before the history but also fall prey to
> the fascist terror.

In the forty-first issue of the Union News (June 11, 1976), a summary of the

assault incidents happened in "recent days" was provided in a news article titled "The

Chairperson of the UCTEA Chamber of Mining Engineers Was Attacked by a Group of

Fascists." In the article the following incidents were reported:

> 1. Cemal Cetin, a mechanical engineer working at the General Directory of CAYKUR,
> was detained based on the incriminating information that he was writing slogans on the

streets. He was taken to the Trabzon Police Department where he was tortured. The Mayor of Rize wanted to prevent his medical treatment. Yet, as a result of the persistence of progressivists, he was hospitalized and got a medical report from the hospital stating that he cannot work for a week.

2. Berat Uzel, a civil engineer, was attacked by a group of fascists and was wounded all over his body.

3. The local headquarters of the UCTEA was raided by a group of fascists. In the raid, the UCTEA Urfa representative was wounded.

In the forty-second issue of the Union News (June 25, 1976), it was reported that the chairperson and the general secretary of the Istanbul Chamber of Mechanical Engineers were "illegally" detained and kept in custody for a day. During the time they were in the "cell," they were assaulted both verbally and physically. In the statement published, it was declared:

> . . . We, progressive, patriot, democrat, revolutionary technical workers protest this illegal repression and declare once again that such repression cannot obstruct the struggle of our people and its inalienable component, technical workers, for independence and democracy.

In the forty-fourth issue of the Union News (August 1, 1976), it was reported that Sevket Acikeli, a member of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Civil Engineers, was brutally assaulted. The assault took place in his residence which was "raided by a group of fascists who wanted to suffocate him." In the raid, Acikeli's son, Bulent Acikeli was stabbed by a skewer and seriously wounded. In the same issue, it was also reported that the State Security Courts closed down "thirteen democratic organizations" in Izmir. The report stated that

> . . . With a new decision the State Security Courts whose foundation has been declared by judicial authorities to be in contradiction with the Constitution, the most fundamental principles of law and democracy prohibited . . . thirteen democratic mass organizations from their activities. This decision is a new blow to our labouring people's and all patriots' freedom of founding organizations, which is a fundamental right.

In the same issue of the Union News an editorial article titled "The SSCs Violate the Principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitutional Law, the Constitution and the Criminal Code" argued that courts could not be given the task of the provision of "security" in a democratic country. In the long commentary the following argument was made:

> In civilized societies and in our judicial system, it is clear that the task of the provision of "Security" does not belong to the judiciary organ. It belongs to the executive organ. Given this condition, the assignment of the task of the provision of security to judiciary organs by forming courts under the name of "the State Security Courts" is another indicator for the fact that these courts were founded for political purposes.

According to the commentary, the Constitutional Court could investigate the foundation of the SSCs in terms of "fundamental principles" and "cancel them out." To this end, the commentary called the "experienced judges" to their judicial duties:

> The removal of these courts [SSCs] from among our judicial organs is going to be a significant service and step in terms of the establishment of the Legal State (Hukuk Devleti) given the fact that these courts render the martial law permanent.

Next to the commentary on the same page was the statement of eleven leading civil societal organizations that informed about their decision to participate in a collective struggle for the removal of the SSCs. The last paragraph of the statement reads as follows:

> Because of the above-mentioned reasons, we, the democratic mass organizations that called this press conference, declare that we shall keep continuing our ongoing struggle against the SSCs until their removal and support the actions taken and the DISK (the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions) that asks solidarity.

In the following weeks the managers of the UCTEA and the chambers held meetings to organize the participation of the UCTEA in the march of "No to the SSCs," which took place on September 27, 1976 in Tandogan, Ankara. During those days, new

forms of "Commando assaults" began to make their entrance into the "politics of the street." This time, instead of knives, skewers, clubs and strings, machine guns and dynamite were killing and wounding the "victims." In its forty-sixth issue (September 15, 1976) the Union News reported the following "daily events":

> Yesterday a handful of fascists who call themselves Commandos attacked the students of the Faculty of Science in Izmir with machine guns and dynamite and the students of the Ankara State Academy of Engineering and Architecture in Ankara with guns. They wounded twenty-two students five of whom were in critical condition.

> [Two days ago similar incidents took place] in Elazig . . . The events that began in Elazig, Izmir and Ankara seem to continue. Because the Nationalist-Front government has been having difficulties in finding a leeway in internal and external economic and political realms.

In the last paragraph, the news article reassured the readers that

> Like everywhere in the world and in every period in the history, in Turkey too, fascist repression and assaults shall eventually be defeated by the struggle of all labouring masses with their effective union and solidarity.

In the forty-seventh issue of the Union News (October 1, 1976) the march against the SSCs was given a large coverage. The title of the issue was "No to the SSCs." More than fifteen organizations participated and supported the march that was ended by speeches in Tandogan. Teoman Ozturk's speech was full of expressions of anguish and devastation. Beneath this anger, however, one could uncover the voice of an actor forced to act in an epic drama -- a drama about which neither the actors nor the audience appeared to be content:

> We, as students fired at, teachers, civil servants and technical workers *kiyimed* and assaulted, are here to fulfill our duty in the struggle against the code submitted to [the parliament] in order to hinder the just struggle of all working people and the working class and make it possible more exploitation and repression, and we cry out with our powerful voice "No to the SSCs."

> We call out to *a handful of minority* who oppresses, represses and exploits. We do not call out to a few fascist aggressors but to their bosses, imperialists. We call out to the Nationalist-Front that wants to drag the country to the darkness. . . You are the oppressors, repressors and exploiters . . . You are *the ones who have eyes on the bread*

and life of students, civil servants, peasants and workers. You are *the ones who imprison millions in unemployment and starvation . . .*

Historical days are being lived in Turkey . . . We have lived the rising up of our revolutionary workers against exploitation and oppression and the first political general strike. . . Today there is an ever widening social opposition to exploitation and oppression . . .

The proposal of the SSC code is one of the means that imperialism and fascism want to utilize. In the event it cannot be promulgated, it should be known that the ongoing struggle has a significant share in this [outcome]. Yet without exaggerating [this achievement] it should be moved towards giving a push to new struggles.

In the forty-eight issue of the Union News (October 15, 1976) the closing down of the State Security Courts was announced to the readers. The announcement was a brief note which appeared to be published just for leaving a historical document behind. The paragraph-long announcement reads as follows:

The proposal of the State Security Courts code opposed by all progressive, patriot, revolutionary individuals and organizations could not be promulgated until October 11, 1976 — the last date that was suggested by the Constitutional Court. [Thus,] the SSCs disappeared. The SSCs had been founded after the 12 March and until the day they were closed down, had sentenced hundreds of individuals.

Exposing the State's Secrets or Taking the Case to a Civil Court

One of the last cases that the Ankara SSC was assessing before its "disappearance" was the case filed against Teoman Ozturk, the chairperson of the UCTEA, on the pretext that he had "exposed the state's secrets." The court was asking Ozturk's imprisonment for between 16 and 63 years. According to the prosecutor of the Ankara SSC, Ozturk, as the editor of the Union News, was responsible for the leaking secret information about a contract agreement between a public organization and a private firm. In the forty-seventh issue of the Union News (October 1, 1976), in a brief note, the following information was conveyed regarding the Ozturk's case:

In the forty-third issue of the "Union News" dated July 9, 1976, based on the documents it has been announced that the funds allotted to the modernization of the steel factory of the MKE were used for different purposes and without any technical reason [a

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renovation project was initiated] and given to the Alarko company without letting a contract by competitive bidding.

The Ankara State Security Court has brought a suit against Ozturk by seeing him as responsible as he is the editor of the "Union News."

After the "disappearance" of the SSCs, the case was taken to a civil court of which the UCTEA and other civil societal organizations had viewed as an independent judiciary organ and had confidence in its impartiality. It did not take too long for the civil court to reach a verdict in the case. In the fifty-fifth issue of the Union News (February 1, 1977), the verdict was made public: "Teoman Ozturk, the chairperson of the UCTEA, about whom a 63.5 years of prison term was asked based on the claim that he exposed the state's secrets was acquitted." The vindicated chairperson made the following comments upon hearing the court's verdict:

> We do not find it odd the labeling of the announcement of corruption as the exposition of the state's secrets in a period in which the SSCs, the repressive element of the 12 March fascist regime, were functioning . . . It is also a fact that the cases taken away from these courts which were removed as a result of . . . [our] struggle to the civil courts and the verdicts reached by the latter are causing great disappointment among those who want to cover up corruption.

The Discovery of Corruption or "Two Disasters that Bring Death to the People; Earthquakes and Hegemonic Classes; One Natural - the Other Not"

"When faced with the violence of an earthquake," says Rand Mc Nally's World Atlas (1988:16A), "even our sophisticated technological society is often helpless." Earthquakes are mostly considered as natural phenomena as they are caused by natural forces or "stresses" that "may build up over many years until the breaking strength of some part of the rock is exceeded" (McNally, 1988:17A). When the latter happens, "a

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sudden break occurs and the two sides of the fault line move, generating shock-waves which travel outward in all directions from the focus at the point of rupture." The point on the surface directly above the focus is called the "epicentre" which may be inhabited by humans. In the event the epicentre is a town or city, it is not only the land but also the whole social structure with its constituting elements which moves. In such cases from the ruins of the demolished buildings things such as corruptions or "fault lines" of the social structure long hidden from the sight of the "public opinion" can come out. At this point the whole focus turns away from the "focus of the rupture" to the rupture in the social structure. Thus earthquakes can also be considered as social phenomena -- an aspect of earthquakes which is sometimes forgotten.

Lice, a small town in the province of Diyarbakir in the Southeastern Region of Turkey, was an epicentre of a violent earthquake in September, 1975. Besides Lice, Hani and Hazro were also hit hard by the earthquake. In the report prepared by the UCTEA Chamber of Architects Istanbul Branch, which was published in the thirtieth issue of the Union News, the following information was provided about the history and socio-economic conditions of these towns:

> Lice, Hani and Hazro, the towns which were hit hardest by the earthquake, have a long history. Some say that Hani has 2000 years of history while Lice's history goes back to 600 years ago. The Hatuniye Medrese in Hani and the Ulu Mosque in Hazro were from the Seljukian period. [Like the towns themselves] the disasters in the region have a long history. [In the common memory of the people of Hani one can still find the traces of an ancient earthquake.] Villagers told us that long ago, after an earthquake, people who came through the Keban Strait asked "Where is the city."[3] This was the event that gave Hani its name. In Gurbulak (locals call it as Gulbidak), a village under the juristiction of Hani, villagers talk about those who died because of starvation before the republic was established and those who ate dried lentils, chick peas and donkey meat to stay alive. This village was established two hundred years ago. Currently, there is not a muhtar [the person who is the legal head of the village]. The residential units in the region were located on steep slopes with rocky summits and facing plains as required by the old land-production-city relation and at the same time reflective of an instinct for defense

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[3] Hani means where in English.

against attacks and bandits. The Lord Houses (Bey Evleri) whose current owners live in Diyarbakir are like small castles built for defense.

The recent history of Lice involves better evidence regarding how the people of Lice have been rendered helpless against disasters. Over a long period of time, the rocks right on the summit of the hill on which the town was established had become tools of killing. The people who had detected the danger had been able to transform them to a political issue. . . .

The law numbered 6610 published in the Official Gazette dated 27.5.1955 and passed regarding the "neighbourhoods under the threat of rocks in the town of Lice" had assigned the duty of changing the location of Lice to governments and the members of the "executive board" of the period. 150 such residential units delivered in 1961 were six to eight hundred meters away from the existing residential area. Yet the recent earthquake did not cause any damage in these units. [The old residential location which was declared in 1973 as an area outside the zone of disasters is now in ruins.] . . . That is Lice's recent past . . .

The UCTEA's first report on the Lice Earthquake appeared in the twenty-second issue of the Union News (September 12, 1975). The title of the report was "Earthquake in Diyarbakir: Thousands of Our Citizens Died. Millions of Liras Damage." In this issue it was also announced that the Chamber of Civil Engineers and the Chamber of Architects were sending experts to the region in order to investigate. In the twenty-sixth issue of the Union News (November 7, 1975), the first impressions of the experts sent to Lice and its environs were published under the strange title "In Lice Two Bottles of Whiskey Given to Each Household as American Aid." The report stated that the Earthquake Committee of the UCTEA had distributed 360 bags of flour each 35 kilograms directly to the victims. These were bought by the money accumulated in the UCTEA Earthquake Fund. Based on the interviews done with the villagers, the experts concluded that aid materials such as food, clothing, blankets and tents from public organizations and foreign nations, if delivered to the people, were only a small portion of what had actually been shipped. The experts also explained the reason why a large portion of the aid materials had disappeared in thin air:

> In the region there is a widespread rumour that has been running around regarding the
> Justice Party's utilization of the aid materials sent to villages and Lice as a means of
> obtaining more votes. Especially, in the areas of residential unit construction and
> distribution heavy pressures have been imposed on the villagers -- news such as if they
> did not vote for the Justice Party, the units wouldn't be built, yet if they so voted, extra
> money would be given to each family for temporary housing . . .

In the rest of the report the experts wrote that really amazed them was the
discovery of an interesting item of foreign aid: Whiskey. This humorous part of the report
reads as follows:

> The American aid that could reach up to Lice is also very interesting because two bottles
> of whiskey were distributed to each household. In the Lice marketplace this is an issue
> widely talked about. When an old woman had drunk a glass of whiskey by seeing it as a
> "remedy," the amulet of an hodga (Muslim preacher) saved her from the bewildering
> influence of [alcohol]. In some households American whiskey had been used as a
> substitute for vinegar and mixed with the soup.

In the last part of the report under the sub-title of "A disaster more widespread and
killing than an Earthquake," the experts reported their discovery of another form of
"disaster" prevailing in the earthquake region:

> The earthquake in Lice and its villages was fatal. A large number of people suddenly
> lost their lives. Lice, which is now a mass of rock and soil, became a graveyard to
> several souls well-above the numbers given in the official statements. Surely, this is a
> very sad thing. Yet in Diyarbakir and its environs another disaster which is more
> widespread, more effective and in the long term silently and openly kills larger
> communities reigns: Unemployment.

> In the aftermath of the earthquake, sending those who survived the earthquake to
> Germany, a foreign land, as workers and giving priority to them [in this regard] have
> been announced by official authorities as if this is a favour, a form of assistance . . . .

> We had written on the cover of the Union News "those responsible for the lives lost are
> the governments which are not siding with the people." We have already been aware of
> the unemployment issue. Yet after seeing the large human crowds sitting in coffee
> houses we [want to] reiterate the same judgment: those responsible for souls perishing of
> unemployment are the exploitative capitalists who are dependent on imperialism and
> their fascist and chauvinist governments.

Before moving onto the last section of this chapter to evaluate the UCTEA's
struggle for democracy in the 1970s in terms of its organizational effectiveness and

relation to the processes of political struggles in civil society, the panorama of the disaster region told by the victims and recorded by the engineers and architects of the UCTEA will be highlighted. *The significance of the material presented here is that it shows us the marriage of the "patriotic" engineers and architects with their "people." Thus, it provides us with an opportunity for judging whether the words of the patriotic engineers and architects were also their deeds*:

. . .

In the plains of Diyarbakir agriculture and husbandry are developed. In Hani there is a developed winery production. The producers sell their products in Diyarbakir. They had promised to establish a grape juice factory in Hani, later they gave up. People of Lice are poorer. Because of this they have become smugglers. In Hani, Lice and Hazro one cannot find a decent road system, in most of the villages there is neither road nor primary school. Yet bank branches and electric networks are widespread. The savings accumulated in the region go to the banks and are diverted to consumer goods. The people who are benefiting from bank credits is another issue.

An Interview

An interview recorded in the village. Gurbulak. The interviewed does not know Turkish. We communicate with the help of an interpreter. (8. 10. 1975).

[Question:] Is the state giving you credits from the bank?
[Answer:] Up to now nobody in our village got any credit. If there was any, it was not given.
[Question:] Well, if the state were giving you money with interest, would you like to get it?
[Answer:] There are some who take it, there are some who do not.[4]
[Question:] Why does not he take it?[5]
[Answer:] Interest is a sin.
[Question:] If you deposited your money into a bank, would you get interest?
[Answer:] There is not any, I make two to three thousand in a year.
[Question:] How many people are you taking care of?
[Answer:] Eleven people.
[Question:] Are you, eleven persons, living on this money?
[Answer:] Yes, that is it. With that money only bread can be bought. If we make two to three thousand, with that we will buy bread, we will buy wheat. If we are not out of bread, we can live with anything.

. . .

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[4] Perhaps as a requirement of politeness, the question in Turkish is in the plural form. However, the interviewer most probably wants to know about the opinion of the interviewed. Yet the interviewed interprets it as a general question and answers it in the plural form.
[5] Perhaps in order to make the interviewed personally involved with the question, the interviewer this time asks the question in the singular form.

Another Interview

[Question:] Is there any literate person in your village?

[Answer:] No, there isn't. Last year they built a primary school. Children don't know Turkish.

[Question:] Do you know Turkish?

. . .

[Answer:] No. Since the day I have known who I am, I have been in the mountains. We neither have a school nor a thing. How can we know Turkish.

[Question:] Have you ever gone to Diyarbakir?

[Answer:] Yes I have gone. A couple of our relatives landed in jail. I went to visit them.

. . .

Aid Politics and Legal Expropriation

(Recorded interviews. Hani. 8. 10.1975)

[Question:] Now, what do you know about who we might be? You have come and wanted to show us your house. Why?

[Answer:] I don't know. Maybe you came to help.

[Question:] Didn't they give you things other than a tent?

[Answer:] [The government] has given one blanket and one tent. I went. I got bread. It has given one bread for two people.

[Question:] Well, the elections are approaching. What are the parties doing for you?

[Answer:] They are pouring it into politics. It has appointed 17 muhtars to their places. Abdullatif Enasiroglu. So that you are voting for them.

[Question:] Who is Abdullatif Enasiroglu?

[Answer:] He is a people's deputy. A Justice Party people's deputy. He says, if you vote for us. We will make them built barracks for you.

He did not help us. We are 45 people. They gave three tents to us. We are eight families in one place. Nobody helped us.

Another person: After all this they got our neighbourhood from us. Without paying, the land, the appraisal document, I have declared. If I had been illiterate, if I had been crazy, If I had been whatever. The value of the asset is 300 thousand Liras, I have declared 50 thousand liras. I am not the only one there are many others.

Others: If we declare it higher we cannot pay the taxes.

Another: Right. . . .

I have five acres of land. They should either gives us the land or if they don't provide us with a place they should execute us by shooting. They should stuff us in a house and burn it down. I mean we adapted the first earthquake, we are getting ready for the second one. If it hits too, houses demolished, the tent gone. Some got it some did not. Especially hunger, misery is not an issue, if it also takes our land away from us, it is better for the government to kill us.

Other Information

Said Beser, 70 years old, said his land was providing a means of living for 86 people but has been totally expropriated. Zulfikar Oruc and his brothers with 62 people, their 30 acres of land have been expropriated as well. Sefik Hazar, 60, with 25 people, was arrested while trying to stop the tax assessment of his 12 acres of land.

Interviews

(An interview with a group getting aid materials. Lice. 9.10.1975)

[Question:] What is the name of the village? How many households?
[Answer:] Asagi Ecemis, Yukari Ecemis, 200 households.
. . .
[Question:] Up to now how many tents did you get?
[Answer:] 15 tents. Now it has given us four. Two for Asagi Ecemis, two for Yukari Ecemis. . . .

(Hani)

. . .

[Answer:] I mean, as if all this punishment is not enough, this time seven trucks full of soldiers came. With the major. We were in the jail. Locals fled we have been left alone. When I was in the jail.
[Question:] Why did they come?
[Answer:] They came. They have told there was a rebellion in Hani.
[Question:] For what reason?
[Answer:] Because of this reason. Landowners. An earthquake happened. Don't burn us once again. It had happened to us. . . . with our children we will die. Yet they did not make a thing. They took us to the court. Why did they take us? Moreover they called me, come answer our questions.

(Gulbudak Village)

. . .

[Answer:] Long years ago, in the time of starvation, while I was walking in front of my village I had seen a woman eating the arm of her child. She had grabbed her child's arm, trying to eat it. As normal, she was eating. I went to her, what are you doing? Why are you eating your child's arm? What I can do I am dying of hunger. I called my mother. Oh my mom, run, come here, I said. Take a slice of bread and bring it here, I said. My mom took a slice of bread and gave it to her. After all you should not give the whole bread. Be slow. We gave some portion of the bread to her, some portion to her child. Yet in a short time they both died.

I had eaten donkey meat. Also chick peas, lentil, I had eaten. To stay alive. Things happened in the time of starvation.

In the winter of 1976 in Lice, Hani and Hazro people experienced how helpless humans could be in an unfriendly natural environment. When the temperature fell below minus 30 Celsius, most of them could not find a house to take shelter in. They could not find enough bread to give to their children. Worst of all, they lost all their hope for the summer because the "earthquake" had taken their land away from them. In those days they had too-few good things in their lives. One of those too-few good things was the patriotic engineers and architects who were there with them to share the cold, hunger and the hope

left. In fact, they were the hope. The engineers said: *"It is the most natural human right to get nature under control."* They said: *"Two disasters that bring death to the people: Earthquakes and hegemonic classes. One is natural, the other not."*

Conclusion: The Field of Engineering and the UCTEA in the 1970s

As mentioned in Chapter 5, the UCTEA had entered the 1970s with the mission of democracy essentially understood as the criticism of repression at all levels of society. For the first time in the organizational history of the UCTEA, a group of engineers and architects who had been increasingly influential in the internal activities of the UCTEA conceived opposition to repression as the way towards democracy. In the vision of these individuals, democracy appeared to be a condition of existence within which socially binding decisions are made within a process of criticism involving the widest segments of the society. In this sense they were not opposing the state per se. But rather they were opposing those interests which were hindering the realization of the process of social criticism required for the resolution of conflict of interests in the society, be they economic, cultural, or political, and hence leading to a unitary social organism. It was their insight to conceptualize the obstacle to change as the interests of the hegemonic groups and classes.

It was also their achievement to redefine the requirements of their professions in accordance with the "interests of society" which were inextricably implicated in the "action fields of technocrats." They conceived the latter as the field of "revolutionary practice" by claiming that their activities rest on "the power of technology which is, due to its *universality*, always a transformative and revolutionary force of production." Thus, in

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opposition to the hegemonic interests, they thought they were primarily representing the ethical universal which located them over and above the society and different groups and classes in it. The latter enabled them to discover the power/domination relations prevailing in the society. In their conceptualization, the society had two major groups or classes: the "hegemonic class" and the "people." They conceived the people as both the object and the subject of the social criticism. As an object, the people referred to the humanity who is in need of technological services which provides the material welfare and also humanizes the unfriendly and sometimes destructive nature. Thus, the fulfillment of the people's needs in terms the provision of technological services is the object of social criticism. As a subject, the people referred to the humanity exploited and oppressed by the hegemonic class and hence the class opposite of the latter -- a class that carried within itself the actors of social criticism required for democracy and the realization of the ethical universal against the sectional interests of the hegemonic class. Thus, the people was the class to be "sided with" in the struggle against the hegemonic class. As Teoman Ozturk said:

> Technical workers have provided their struggle against the hegemonic classes' repression with a political content by locating their professional problems within the totality of social problems at both national and international levels. . . . The political content of the struggle has taken on a class character and the struggle of all technical workers has become a part of the struggle of all working masses [mostly referred to as the "people."]

Yet not only in their abstract theory of society but also in their discourse the state did not constitute a significant point of reference. It was as if the politically active members of the UCTEA perceived the state as nonexistent or an absence in presence. Perhaps, this was the outcome of the repression experienced by them and the "people," which were skilfully left untouched by the state -- revealing the state's integral meaning,

i.e., the hegemony and the dictatorship of the ruling classes. They observed that with all its existence the state was responsible for repression that did not require too much attention to be discovered. The engineers and architects of the UCTEA asked: Where was the state when thousands were put in jail and tortured in the 12 March? Where was the state when students were being fired at and killed? Where was the state when thousands of public workers were *kıyım*ed, exiled or forced to move from one place to another? Where was the state when the constitutional rights and freedoms such as the right to strike were removed? Where was the state when "foreign experts" were making a "hundred times more" monthly salary than the engineers and architects of Turkey? Where was the state when the natural resources of Turkey were being sold out to foreign interests? Where was the state when Lice, Hazro, Hani were left to their "centuries long loneliness"? Where was the state when the aid material sent to the earthquake victims were disappearing in thin air? In all this, the state was absent. Yet the state was present in the affairs of the "hegemonic circles." Thus, the politically active members of the UCTEA wittingly or unwittingly but safely and correctly dropped the concept of the state from their theories of society and political discourse. In substitution for the state they used the term "hegemonic classes." In this sense, they were trying to save the state usurped by the hegemonic classes. In this struggle, the formation and mobilization of democratic opposition became the goal of their organization. It is against this background that the effectiveness of the UCTEA in the 1970s should be measured.

As the events documented in this chapter suggest, in the 1970s the UCTEA was an extremely dynamic organization asking great efforts on the part of its members. Above all,

it was asking its members be directly involved in the management of their chambers, whether they were the elected members of the board of directors or not. The direct involvement in the management of the chambers in its turn required the members to ask their managers to be accountable for their decisions and activities. As we learned from the documents presented in the Union News, the majority of members of almost all chambers did fulfil the requirements of their organization thus defined. They actively participated in the elections of their boards of directors and wanted them to have clearly formulated action plans geared towards the realization of the stated goals. As a result, the members also contributed to the dynamism of their organization which was already dynamic. In this process, the internal activities of the UCTEA augmented like a snow ball and diversified in consequence of the various inputs that its dynamic members brought in. In the words of Kunar (1991:32), the nature of the membership of the UCTEA in the 1970s had the following features:

> The individuals that constituted the resources of the chambers of those days had, right or wrong, a set of concrete and decisive social projects. And, as the outcome of the [social] climate of their times (and at the same time the cause) they had a mind template which was [appreciative of] ascetic, honest and self-sacrificing "revolutionary ethical" values and was based on the principle of voluntarism striving towards the construction of individuals' self-confidence and their participation in the process of their own transformation [going beyond] personal interests to a condition where the social was given priority, and hence they were conscious of their creation of a common, productive and rich socio-historical memory. In one sense, that was, I think, the spiritual disposition peculiar to that period that kept the chambers dynamic and provided a breathing space for them.

As inputs of the UCTEA, the members participated in several congresses, seminars, meetings and demonstrations. In doing so, they fulfilled the requirements of the political action plan suggested by Arif Delikanli, the associate chairperson of the UCTEA, at the beginning of 1975. Thus, it is now possible to answer affirmatively the question

asked in the very beginning of this chapter, that is, whether there exists a match between the stated aims of the action program declared and the actual actions taken by the members in the rest of the 1970s. The material presented in this chapter reveals that

. The members struggled for removing the anti-democratic modifications made in the Constitution after the 12 March such as the foundation of the State Security Courts and the restrictions imposed on the use of fundamental rights and freedoms.

. In this particular struggle, they participated in the formation of a wide alliance of democratic organizations and individuals. As a result, they transcended, if there was any, the limiting perspectives of their own organizations and discovered the similarities and differences between them and others in like-conditions. Among these "others," there were workers, students, teachers and public employees other than engineers and architects.

. They resisted the importation of foreign technical "expertise" by publicly denouncing the injustices involved in the differential salary schedules used in the remuneration of foreign and domestic technical staff.

. They constantly drew attention to the imbalances in the areas of income distribution, health, education and urbanization. They informed the "public" and particularly those who were worse-off that the imbalances were not the fate but outcomes of social arrangements which could be transformed.

. They ceaselessly criticised the "nationalist" governments and their policies contradicting their "nationalism." They emphasized that the *kıyım* of citizen engineers and architects and the replacement of them by non-citizen engineers and architects could not be nationalistic. Thus they rendered the nationalist discourse of governments powerless in the eyes of "public" and depicted it as the veil of groups and classes dependent on the imperialist capitalist world system.

. In addition to these, in the Union News, they published articles, essays and research papers addressing the problems encountered in the planning processes of industrialization and macro-level resource management. Issues (which are not mentioned in this chapter in order to not to lose the focus) such as "productivity," "optimum resource allocation," "production planning," "investment planning," "inter-industry linkages," and so on were addressed in several research papers published in the Union News. Thus, by addressing these issues, they aimed to specify the appropriate ways of utilizing national resources in terms of the interests of the "people" of Turkey. Also, by emphasizing the dependent nature of industrialization in Turkey, they aimed to shed light on the political dependency of Turkish governments on the power houses of the "global" capitalist regime such NATO, EEC, the World Bank, IMF and etc.

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It was this matching of the aims and the actions that had generated a large group of engineers and architects remembered today as the patriotic, progressive, revolutionary and democratic technical workers of Turkey.

As Kunar (1991) has observed, these individuals involved in the affairs of the UCTEA in the 1970s participated in a process in which they first constructed their self-confidence and then transformed their now empowered selves in such a way that the "social" became their self-conception. Yet the "social" that guided their selves did not exist in the concrete context in which they were acting. The "social" was in the process of becoming as a result of ongoing institutional transformations in the field of engineering and architecture and elsewhere. The significant moments of this process were reflected by the new aims and interests emerging in several fields leading to the emergence of a new set of social rules and conventions, i.e., a new flexible schemata. The unique features of these new schemata were the self-reflectivity in terms of positioning in the spectrum of social issues, the spontaneity in terms of initiating the action plans formulated based on the decisions collectively made and the capability of seeing the whole in the parts.

It was these new features that restructured the field of engineering and architecture and the distribution of power resources within and between the organizations belonging to it. Within the UCTEA and any of the chambers under its umbrella, those who were guided by the "social" in the process of becoming, eliminated the self-centred individuals lacking the features of self-reflectivity, spontaneity and the holistic perspective yet still occupying the managerial positions. The process of the elimination of such individuals from leadership positions, who were reflective of the features of the previous generations did

not violate the laws and regulations of the UCTEA and the chambers. Within and through a democratic participation process involving elections, congresses and meetings, the new individuals with their new features "came to the managements." In other words, the managers and the active members of the UCTEA were motivated to their organizational struggles by what we have called earlier the *moral force of democracy*.

Mostly, as a result of the conceptualization of the technology as an all-inclusive aspect of the "social," stretching from material production to the political and the cultural realms, the UCTEA was able to establish links with organizations that were not directly involved in the field of engineering and architecture. These newly discovered organizations such as associations of teachers, medical doctors, economists, lawyers, manual workers and so on increased the number of services expected from the UCTEA. As the saying of those times goes, "the problems of all working people become a part the problems of engineers and architects" and vice versa. This particular nature of the increased demand for the services provided by the UCTEA moved the organization away from the economically and politically powerful groups such the owners of the productive assets and the elites of the mainstream political parties and public organizations to the ranks of the economically and politically powerless groups. Yet within this process, the UCTEA discovered a new source of power. This was the power of the *alliance of progressive forces, which formed the sphere of autonomy*. Drawing from this new power source the leaders of the UCTEA were able to "exhibit the power of people against fascism," or "cry out with [their] powerful voice "NO to the SSCs"."

According to Kunar (1991), during those years the UCTEA experienced a painful process of breaking up with governments and the state. This was also the process that rendered the UCTEA as an *autonomous* societal organization freed from the hegemony in both the state and civil society. The UCTEA freed itself from the hegemony in the state as it saw the state as a presence only in the affairs of the "hegemonic circles." The UCTEA also freed itself from the hegemony in civil society because it felt it belonged to a society without hegemony. Within this society, no class could control and dominate the livelihood of the people at large. To put it differently, the UCTEA freed itself from the hegemony of *business men*. Most of its members did not view themselves as the employees of business men. They were ready to share their knowledge of *technique as production* with the people, and learn from their knowledge of *technique as criticism*. This was the "New Life" in the labour room. This was also the "New Life" aborted in the morning of September 12, 1980 by the coercive apparatus of the Turkish state.

In that inauspicious morning most of the engineers and architects together with other patriots, revolutionaries and democrats who had similar spiritual dispositions were perhaps experiencing the mixed feelings of the fictitious character of *Yeni Hayat* (New Life, Orhan Pamuk's 1994 novel) in the final moments of his life. The novel, New Life begins with the following sentence: "One day I read a book and my whole life changed." He then decided to devote his whole life to the dissemination of the message in the book. The story told in the rest of the novel is about our fictitious character's endless desire and struggle to make the people be aware of the message in the book and hence changing them so that they could start a "New Life." Yet from the beginning to the end, Pamuk does not

let his character tell us explicitly what the message is. When we reach the end and read the last sentence, we are still ambiguous about the content of the book and the message in it. Thus, we are forced to discover the message all by ourselves. Because we don't have the book, we cannot read it to discover the message. We cannot find the character of the novel to ask what the message is for he does not exist. We cannot expect Pamuk to tell us the message because he did not want to tell it in the first place. Perhaps he did so because he wanted to show us that the message was not in the book. If this had been the case, where would it have been then? I suggest that the message was in the "New Life" which had been in the process of becoming. And because of this, perhaps, our character did not want to die on that inauspicious night when the bus he was in was hit by a truck while the other passengers were sleeping. Thus we can now let our character speak first for himself in the last moments of his life and then ask him whether we can use his vision for understanding the feelings of our engineers and architects in that chilly morning of September 12, 1980:

> . . .
> No, not altogether. Those lucky individuals who would live that fantastic moment were going to come from among the passengers of the back seats who stayed alive after the incredible pandemonium caused by the explosion of the accident. Yet I, sitting in the very front seat and with my dazzled eyes in amazement and fear looking at the lights of the approaching truck and the fantastic light spurting out from the book, was going to pass away into another world.
> I conceived this as the end of my life. Yet, I wanted to go back to my house, begin a new life, did not want to die, never and never.

CHAPTER 7

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION:

> In spite of all this,
> we will survive
> stubbornly against the enemy.
> For we are the tomorrow . . .
>
> We will die.
> Yet our children will keep our heritage alive
> in their hearts
> Their hearts will never know the fear
> The fear that had oppressed us
>
> **Yilmaz Guney**

In this thesis I attempted to examine the social, political and organizational processes that led the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects to pose itself against the hegemony of the dominant classes within the state and society in the 1970s. I carried out this inquiry at both theoretical and empirical levels. At the theoretical level I tried to construct a class position and professional identity for engineers, or technicians. Here I mainly drew upon Veblen's theory of engineers, especially what he takes to be the contradiction between the engineers and the market system. Though Veblen is vague about the social and political conditions under which engineers might oppose the hegemony of the ruling class, he locates engineers in a class position whose material interest may contradict the existence of the institution of private ownership. This in turn leads him to establish a conflict of ideal interest between engineers and capitalists, which is mediated by their disparate material interests. By working out the implications of Veblen's argument from a Gramscian perspective, I argued that in the context of a society deeply divided in terms of sectional class interests as a result of a long period of

hegemonic crisis, engineers can take on a professional identity and class position along the lines of the prophetic mission envisioned by Veblen.

Second, at the empirical level, I tried to examine the social praxis in which engineers in Turkey constructed their class position in different periods and how they reproduced their constructed class position over time by redefining their professional identity in terms of the objective conditions of their country. At this level of the analysis, I emphasized the parallels between the objective crisis of the Turkish state and the crisis of professional identity experienced by the members of the UCTEA.

Equipped with this background, in this chapter, I try to compare the class position and professional identity of engineers constructed at the theoretical level with the one constructed at the empirical level by the members of the UCTEA. This discussion draws upon Eder's (1993) reading of Bourdiue's concept of *class habitus*, which is incorporated into the conceptualization of field of interaction by J. B. Thompson (1990). As was emphasized in the introductory chapter, taking the field of interaction framework as the starting point of an inquiry into the class, or social, position of engineers requires taking into account economic, cultural and symbolic capital of the engineering position. In addition to the three types of capital one needs to develop a notion of the flexible schemata of the actors belonging to the engineering position, which orient these actors in their everyday interactions. According to Eder (1993), an inquiry such as this can shed light on the actors' "opinions on what is good, beautiful and just" (Eder, 1993:64). These opinions in turn can be seen as indicators for the class habitus culturally constructed by the actors.

In Chapter 4, by examining the structural location of the three types of capital, i.e., the relation among economic, cultural and symbolic capital of engineering in the 1950s, I suggested that the foundation of the UCTEA in 1954 was the outcome of the persistent struggle of a group of engineers and architects gaining recognition and prestige in terms of their knowledge of technique as production. These engineers resisted being seen as inferior to "foreign experts." Thus, in the relation among the three types of capital, the symbolic capital of "Turkish" engineering was dominant and in the front. In order to increase the volume of their symbolic capital, the early generation of the active members of the UCTEA drew attention to the injustice due to the differential salary scales applied to Turkish and foreign engineers in favor of the latter. In their opinion, this injustice was the outcome of the common perception that the Turkish engineers as technical experts were inadequate. Thus, they also aimed to highlight the cultural capital of their profession by calling for a unification in terms of the "voice and suggestions of the technique." As they were already better-off economically, however, they did not have any consequential economic motive for overcoming their individualistic approach to their profession and organization.

In Chapter 5, I examined the transformation in the opinions of some of the members of the UCTEA in the late 1960s by focusing on the generation specific features of the perception about the structural location of the three types of capital. I drew attention to the fact that as a result of a set of economic and political factors in the late 1960s the younger generation members of the UCTEA experienced a decline in the volume of economic capital of their profession -- which was not the case for the older

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generations. Other than this specific difference between the generations, however, both generations belonged to the same field of interaction and the organization, thereby would share in the volume of the collectively owned symbolic and cultural capital of their profession. In this period, the younger generation members managed to establish a connection between their worsened economic condition and the exploitation and oppression experienced by the subordinate classes and strata. Within this process, they considered "the interests of the dominant forces of society" as the principal interference "in the attempt to satisfy the needs of all levels of society." As a result, their opinion on "what is just" changed in such a way that they denied being in the service of the dominant forces of society and saw themselves as professionals in the service of society. As was discussed in Chapter 6, when this specific transformation experienced by the majority of the younger members of the UCTEA was coupled with the hegemonic crisis of the Turkish state after the 12 March 1971 military intervention, the UCTEA had already completed its movement from subordination to hegemony to autonomy. Since the UCTEA represented the collective identity of engineers and architects in Turkey, the organizational change along the lines thus defined resulted in the cultural reconstruction of the class position of engineers in Turkey. A majority of engineers came to see themselves as members of the "working people" whose material and ideal interests were in contradiction with those of the hegemonic classes. Thus, I argue that there is a match between the class position that I theoretically constructed and the one which was culturally constructed by engineers in the context of Turkey. In this sense, the most important contribution of this thesis is the demonstration that in the late 1960s a new generation of engineers and

architects relocated themselves in the class structure of their social formation by redefining their professional identity in such a way that they were able to oppose the hegemony of the dominant classes in terms of the requirements of their profession.

I began this thesis with a table taken from the "Engineers-Architects" survey conducted by the UCTEA in 1976. In concluding, I return to the same table in order to support the argument regarding the match between the theoretically constructed class position of engineers and the one culturally constructed by the engineers in the context of Turkey. Briefly restated, this table provides a robust finding regarding the contradictory conceptualizations of the state by the members of the UCTEA belonging to different generations: The younger the member of the UCTEA is, the higher the likelihood that he thinks the state is not independent from some social groups. I argue that this thesis explains why this is so and what these social groups are.

1) *Why do the majority of younger members of the UCTEA of the 1970s think that the state is not independent from social groups?* Based on the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6, I argue that because, first, the younger the member of the UCTEA is, the higher the likelihood that he is an autonomous technician, i.e., a technician who has freed himself in identity terms from the ideological hegemony of dominant forces of society over his work and profession. Second, the younger the member of the UCTEA is, the higher the likelihood that he is dynamically involved in the activities of his organization, which in turn is a leading organization in the alliance of progressive forces against the hegemony of dominant forces of society in the state. And for all of this to happen, one needs to conceptualize the state as the hegemony of the dominant class or classes. In other words,

one needs to view the state as the hegemony of a ruling class and at the same time its dictatorship. The answer to the following question makes it clear that the majority of younger generation members of the UCTEA of the 1970s view the state as both hegemony and dictatorship, and only a small minority (18%) see it as autonomous.

2) *What are the social groups that the members of the UCTEA of the 1970s think that the state is not independent from?* Based on the discussion in Chapter 6, I list the following labels: First, "imperialists and their servants who seized and carried off *our* human-power, above and underground resources, oil and mines." Second, "*the government* of the hegemonic classes." Third, "a handful people, a minority, who oppresses, represses and exploits." Fourth, "the ones who have eyes on the bread and life of students, civil servants, peasants and workers. . . . the ones who imprison millions in *unemployment and starvation . . .*"

I have argued in Chapter 1 that according to the research findings on the engineers of the advanced Western countries, engineers' participation in a political struggle against the hegemony of the capitalist class in the state and society is a remote possibility. I have demonstrated with ample evidence that engineers in Turkey falsify this passivity as a universal premise since they not only participated in a struggle against the hegemonic classes' repression but also defined the requirements of their profession by locating them within the totality of social problems. Among those problems, they had seen the *unemployment* and the underutilization of the productive forces of society, primarily the human-power or the *people*, as the major one. This was hardly surprising because they were the technicians who had considered themselves as individuals educated and trained at

the cost of people at large. And engineering, to them, appeared to be a discipline developed for "increasing the value of human labor." Thus they were oriented to their activities from the efficiency perspective reflective of *technique as production* aspect of modern technology. In Chapter 4, I have underlined the fact that the founders of the UCTEA had discovered this particular aspect of modern technology and successfully disseminated it within and through their organizational activities. Their organization, the UCTEA, aimed to give "a meaning to the boundaries of specialization areas in accordance with the *needs, requirements and understandings* of the country."

Based on the boundaries of specialization areas drawn by the founders of the UCTEA, in the late 1960s the younger members of the UCTEA had been able to question the "needs, requirements and understandings" of their country from a focused specialist's point of view. As a result of this questioning, they argued that their profession required a "revolutionary practice mainly because of the "objective conditions" in which their "country" was located. The objective conditions revealed themselves in the contradiction between the "huge demand for technicians" and the technicians being unemployed or underemployed. This contradiction in turn made the young members of the UCTEA of the 1970s focus on the conflict between the needs of society and the interests of "imperialists" and those of the "dominant forces of society." Within this process, the members of the UCTEA discovered that the material welfare of the people was *sabotaged* at both "planning and execution levels" by the hegemonic classes. In other words, the majority of them became the ideal type Veblenian technicians. They discovered the subordination of the material production of social life to the financial ends through the medium of the

institution of private ownership. Within this process, they wanted to redefine the goal, mission and activities of the UCTEA in such a way to render it "the symbol of the voice of the patriotic working people opposing the hegemonic classes." In the 1970s, the management of the UCTEA had to lead this dynamic group of young engineers. Yet, as we have seen in Chapter 6, "the dynamic character of the members and their longing for a stronger solidarity and collective action" did not immediately reflect in the management of the UCTEA. It took a long and difficult struggle within the UCTEA to render it the organization "in which the revolutionary patriotic groups could come together."

As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, this thesis is the first attempt to examine the organizational history of the UCTEA from a sociological perspective. In this sense, the author of this thesis is aware of the limitations of his research and his arguments. Without further research on the subject, several questions raised in this thesis, explicitly or implicitly, will remain unanswered. In this thesis the difference between the engineers in the advanced Western countries and those in Turkey is explained by reference to the question whether the dominant class is successful in establishing hegemony within the state and society. The argument is that as a result of the hegemonic crisis within the state, civil society gets politicized in terms of sectional class interests leading engineers to focus on power/domination relations, and hence on the capitalistic nature of the organization of material life. Further research may question the validity of this argument by making an inquiry into the class position and professional identity of engineers in countries such as Greece, Portugal, Brazil and Chile, where the hegemonic crisis within the state also resulted in oppressive military regimes.

Another question that needs to be tackled is why the politically active members of the UCTEA in the 1970s used a quasi-Marxist discourse. Answering this question requires making a more sophisticated inquiry into the intellectual and political climate of the 1960s and the 1970s in Turkey and its relation to the experienced social and economic crisis. A research such as this may shed further light on the UCTEA's dialogue with other groups and organizations such as political parties, professional and working class organizations. As part of this research, the internal opposition to the radicalization of the UCTEA along class lines can be further examined in order to situate the material basis of the conflict of interest between the old and young generation engineers. Finally, one may also want to examine the organizational change experienced by the UCTEA after 1980 to see whether the progressive organizational culture constructed in the 1970s is still dominant in the philosophy, mission and goals of the UCTEA. This question is important because the UCTEA is important for "the general democracy issue" of Turkey.

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