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LENIN'S EPISTEMOLOGY AND BRITISH EMPIRICISM

by



DENNIS ALAN BARTELS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Lenin's Epistemology and British Empiricism" submitted by Dennis Alan Bartels in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

M. G. Kelley.....  
Supervisor

Arthur Coakley.....

Arthur M. Marderos.....

Georges F. Juchacz.....

Date...3<sup>rd</sup> Feb. 1970.....

## ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I shall attempt the following:

- a) to present some of the epistemological and ontological views that were held by the British Empiricists, b) to present some of the most important and influential arguments that Lenin levied against Berkeley's 'idealism', c) to show that Lenin's epistemological views are similar to those held by the British Empiricists, insofar as both rely upon the concept of 'sensation', and, d) to show that Lenin's arguments against Berkeley's 'idealism' can be turned against Lenin's own epistemological views, particularly those involving the concepts of 'sensation' and 'reflection'.

Lenin fell into these difficulties because, like the empiricists, he treated the concept of 'sensation' as the basis of his epistemological theory. It will be shown that similar reliance upon the concept of 'sensation' can be found in the work of Engels, but not in the work of Marx. I believe that Lenin, wishing to defend Marx's philosophical views, and believing that Engels' epistemological views were identical to those of Marx, retained Engels' reliance upon the concept of

'sensation' (and, hence, inherited all the difficulties involved in this concept), without realizing that such reliance is absent in the work of Marx.

The thesis ends with a short postscript concerning the implications of Lenin's epistemological views for Marxian social science.

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## INTRODUCTION

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part contains a brief exposition of certain epistemological and ontological views that were held by the British Empiricists. Some may object that my treatment of their views is so uncomprehensive and selective as to be unfair; this may be true. However, I am presenting their views, not with an eye to detailed criticism and examination, but in order to stress those parts which Lenin found most important, and most wrongheaded.

In the second part, I shall advance some of Lenin's arguments against Berkeley's 'idealism'; and in the third part, it will be seen that Lenin's epistemological views are similar to those of the empiricists insofar as both rely upon the concept of 'sensation'. I shall then claim that Lenin's arguments against Berkeley's idealism can be turned against Lenin's own epistemological views.

Lenin fell into this difficulty because, like the empiricists, he attributed a great deal of importance to the concept of 'sensation' in his epistemological theory. It will be shown that similar reliance upon the

concept of 'sensation' can be found in the work of Engels, but not in the work of Marx. I think that Lenin, wishing to defend Marx's philosophical views, and believing that Engels' epistemological views were identical to those of Marx, adopted Engels' epistemological views regarding 'sensation' (and, hence, fell into all the difficulties generated by them), without realizing that these views are absent in the work of Marx.

I shall add a short postscript concerning the implications of Lenin's epistemological views for Marxian social science.

PART I

LENIN AND BRITISH EMPIRICISM

The Difference Between 'Mental Things' and 'Physical Things'

There seems to be a difference between 'Mind' (which, in this context, means 'mental things' such as thoughts, perceptions, emotions, feelings, etc.) and 'Body' (which, in this context, means 'physical things' such as tables, chairs, and human bodies).<sup>\*</sup> Perhaps more important, there actually is a difference between the ways in which we speak about and behave toward mental things and the ways in which we speak about and behave toward physical things.

For example, if someone asks me about the size, shape, and location of the face of the tachometer (a physical thing) on the instrument panel of an Aston-Martin DB-5, I might be able to answer very precisely: "The face of the tachometer is circular, with a diameter of 5 cm.; it is located 8 cm. to the right of the speedometer, and 11 cm. immediately below the uppermost extremity of the dashboard."

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<sup>\*</sup>From now on, I shall designate these two categories as 'mental things' and 'physical things'.

But what if someone asks me about the size, shape, and location of a particular thought (a mental thing)? I might, with some reservations, reply that the thought is in my head. But could I say that the thought is rectangular, and 8 cm. to right of my pituitary gland? This would sound odd indeed. It is because of this oddity that people are often led to say that there is a difference between mental things and physical things; or, as some would have it, between 'Mind' and 'Body'.

We shall soon have much more to say of physical things.

#### Two Epistemological Propositions

Let us assume that a person, B, wishes to know whether or not a certain physical thing (say, a black swan) exists. Another person, A, tells B that he has seen such a swan, but B is sceptical. Hence, A tells B where he can go to see the swan for himself. B duly goes, sees the swan, and thus comes to know, with certainty, that the swan exists.

I think that most people would agree that before B (or A, for that matter) could be said to know that the black swan exists, that some sort of 'proof' was necessary; and that B's going to see the swan, just as A presumably did, constitutes such proof for a case such

as this one.

Now, of course, there are innumerable situations which are similar to this one; and because of this, some people have been led to think that some kind of seeing, touching, tasting, smelling, or hearing is essential for knowing anything at all about physical things. They might therefore assert the following epistemological proposition (Proposition I): all knowledge of physical things has its source in 'sense experience' (i.e. data or 'proof' gathered by seeing, hearing, touching, etc.).


Now when we see physical things, we see that they are colored, square, large, small, etc.; when we touch them, they feel hard, smooth, squishy, etc.; when we taste them, they taste sweet, sour, piquant, etc.; when we smell them, they smell sweet, pungent, etc. In short, (Epistemological Proposition II), our senses give us knowledge about the properties of physical things.

#### Physiology and 'Seeing'

Consider a person (P) who sees a physical thing, say, a chair. Thanks to our scientific colleagues, we know that part of the process of 'seeing' the chair involves the reflection of light of various wavelengths from the surfaces of the chair. This light 'impinges' upon certain types of cells in the retinas of P's eyes which, in turn, somehow 'generate' 'electro-chemical'

impulses which travel along P's optic nerve to his brain.


The foregoing suggests the following diagram:



X stands for light of various wavelengths, and r stands for the process of X 'impinging' upon P's retinas.

Philosophy and 'Seeing'

It seems that certain philosophers have seen fit to combine the principles underlying Diagram I with Epistemological Propositions I and II. The result of this combination can be graphically illustrated as follows:



$O_1$  and  $O_2$  represent physical things. The dotted-lines (1 and 1') are analogous to the dotted-line (X)



which represented the light-waves in Diagram I. However,  $l$  and  $l'$  do not represent light-waves, but rather the means by which physical things affect our senses, no matter what these means might specifically be. If we regard the large rectangle  $R$ , as being analogous to a room with windows ( $w$  and  $w'$ ), these windows would correspond, according to this point of view, to our sensory apparatus: eyes, ears, tongue, etc. These 'windows' are 'affected' by  $l$  and  $l'$ ; and after  $l$  and  $l'$  pass through  $w$  and  $w'$  they somehow 'weld' themselves into our 'sensations' ( $s$  and  $s'$ ) of 'red-ness', 'round-ness', 'sweet-ness', etc. which correspond to the properties of the physical things that we are 'sensing'. The small squares ( $a$  and  $b$ ) inside the large rectangle ( $R$ ) reflect combinations of 'sensations' and thus form 'images' or 'reflections' of the properties of the physical things that we 'see', 'taste', 'touch', etc.

Now if we regard  $R$  as a picture gallery with windows, and  $a$  and  $b$  as pictures on the gallery's walls which somehow 'reflect' 'images' of the landscape which is visible through the gallery's windows, then the combination of the principles underlying Diagram I and Propositions I and II is almost complete. However, it should be noted that there is 'someone' in the gallery who is 'looking' at the pictures there. Some

philosophers have claimed that this 'someone' (M) represents what we might call 'mind' or 'soul'; it is M who 'observes' the changing 'images' upon a and b; further, it is M who might presume to give certain of these 'images' (i.e. those which recur) names.

### 'Sensations' in Modern Philosophy

The importance of Diagram II lies in the fact that it provided what several well-known and influential 17th and 18th century philosophers believed to be an accurate picture of the way our sense organs operate when we come to 'know' about physical things. I have tried to show a possible way in which the states of affairs which physiologists have discovered--i.e. the state of affairs represented by Diagram I--when combined with epistemological propositions I and II, might conceivably lead people to assert the principles embodied in Diagram II. Anthony Flew attests to the possibility that some such development took place in the thought of several important 17th and 18th century philosophers. Here, he writes of the possible origin of the notion that 'sensations' somehow 'inform us' of the properties of the physical things that we see, hear, touch, smell, etc.

It is perhaps significant that Descartes was a practising physiologist and that Locke had a medical training; and it certainly is that both Berkeley's idealism and Hume's agnosticism developed from a criticism of Locke and Descartes.<sup>1</sup>

Locke and 'Sensations'

I have tried to show how a combination of certain intuitively-attractive epistemological propositions, with certain physiological considerations, might produce a 'Model of perception' such as Diagram II. Flew, I take it, has suggested that just such a combination occurred in the thought of Descartes and Locke. I think that Flew's contention, at least with regard to Locke's philosophy, is supported by the following passages from Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which, save for the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" qualities<sup>2</sup>, show that Locke believed that Diagram II, or something similar to it in principle, accurately represents the way in which our sense organs operate when we come to know about physical things.

2. All ideas come from sensation or reflection.--  
 Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

3. The object of sensation one source of ideas.--  
 First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several

distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation.<sup>3</sup>

. . . . .

#### OF SIMPLE IDEAS

1. Uncompounded appearances.--The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are simple, and some complex.

Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas--as a man sees at once motion and color, the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax--yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses; the coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily, or as the taste of sugar and smell of a rose: and there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.<sup>4</sup>

. . . . .

There are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colors, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their several degrees or shades and mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green,

and the rest, come in only by the eyes; all kinds of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the ears; the several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain--the mind's presence-room (as I may so call it)--are, any of them, so disordered as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by, no other way to bring themselves into view, and be received by the understanding.

The most considerable of those belonging to the touch are heat, and cold, and solidity; all the rest--consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle--are obvious enough.<sup>5</sup>

Locke's "presence-room" of the mind corresponds to the picture-gallery in Diagram II. And, of course, the "mind" corresponds to M. l and l' stand for whatever is furnished to the senses by physical things such that "perceptions are produced". As Locke puts it, ". . . they (i.e. the senses) from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions."<sup>6</sup> Locke's "ideas" correspond to s and s', while w and w' correspond to the senses. From Locke's analysis of the properties of a grain of wheat,<sup>7</sup> we see that he regarded a combination of the "ideas", which represent these properties, as providing a picture of the actual object--i.e. the grain of wheat. This 'picture' corresponds to the sort of picture (a or b) that hangs on the wall of the picture gallery in Diagram II.

### Berkeley's Idealism

As Flew points out, Berkeley's philosophy developed from a criticism of Locke. Berkeley, the 18th century Irish-English Protestant bishop, was one of the philosophers who believed that something similar to Diagram II accurately represents the way in which our sense organs operate when we come to 'know' about physical things. However, he drew consequences from this 'epistemological picture' which led him to differ radically from Locke. He asserted, in terms of Diagram II, that a and b are not only indistinguishable from  $O_1$  and  $O_2$ , but identical with them.

To represent Berkeley's contention in terms of Diagram II,  $O_1$  and  $O_2$  (or any other physical things) would simply drop out. Any assertion that physical things exist would simply mean that someone or something was "perceiving them", or had "perceived them". Such an assertion would never mean that these objects existed 'independently' of our 'perceptions' or "ideas" of them.\* Furthermore, these "ideas" could never be said to depend upon physical things such as light waves, sound waves, etc.

### Lenin and Berkeley

In his book, Materialism and Empirio-criticism,

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\*"Ideas" is Berkeley's term; hence, the term which has been used to describe his philosophy, "idealism".

V.I. Lenin characterized idealism by citing the following quotations from Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, and making the accompanying comments. The quotations show how the principles represented by Diagram II pervaded Berkeley's thinking and unmistakably convey Berkeley's conviction that "ideas" and physical things are somehow identical.

The work of Bishop George Berkeley, published in 1710 under the title Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge begins with the following argument: "It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination. . . . By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance. . . . Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds. . . . And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things. . . ."

. . . . .

Berkeley goes on to say that besides these "ideas or objects of knowledge" there exists something that perceives them--"mind, spirit, soul or myself". It is self-evident, the philosopher concludes, that "ideas" cannot exist outside of the mind that perceives them. In order to convince ourselves of this it is enough to consider the meaning of the word "exist". "The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed;



meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it. . . ."9

. . . . .

To exist means to be perceived ("Their esse is percipi,"--a dictum of Berkeley's frequently quoted in textbooks on the history of philosophy). "It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding". This opinion is a "manifest contradiction", says Berkeley. "For, what are the aforementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?"10

. . . . .

The expression "collection of ideas" Berkeley now replaces by what to him is an equivalent expression, combination of sensations, and accuses the materialists of a "repugnant" tendency to go still further, of seeking some source of this complex--that is, of this combination of sensations.11

. . . . .

Further, as regards the question of reality, it ought also to be remarked that Berkeley, refusing as he does to recognize the existence of things outside the mind, tries to find a criterion for distinguishing between the real and the fictitious. In S. 36 he says that those "ideas" which the minds of men evoke at pleasure "are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect to others they perceive by sense; which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves about the effects of a Mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former; by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. . . ." Elsewhere (S. 84) Berkeley tries to connect the notion of reality with the simultaneous perception of the same sensations by many people. For instance, how shall we resolve the question as to the reality



of the transformation of water into wine, of which, let us say, we are being told. "If at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality." And Fraser explains: "Simultaneous perception of the 'same' . . . sense-ideas, by different persons, as distinguished from purely individual consciousness of feelings and fancies, is here taken as a test of the . . . reality of the former."

From this it is evident that Berkeley's subjective idealism is not to be interpreted as though it ignores the distinction between individual and collective perception.<sup>12</sup>

It seems clear from the foregoing passages that the 'pictures' denoted by a and b in Diagram II are what Berkeley would call "combinations of ideas". And what, in Diagram II, stood for the process whereby human sensory organs are affected by l and l', Berkeley would call the process of "ideas being imprinted upon the senses". For Berkeley, though, l and l' could never represent anything 'physical'--i.e. something, such as light-waves, which we would say could exist 'independently' of "ideas".

#### The Humean Picture of Perception

As Flew points out, Hume's philosophy developed from a criticism of Locke and Descartes. David Hume, the 18th century Scottish philosopher, also believed that something similar to Diagram II accurately represents the way in which our sense organs operate when we come to know about physical things. However, he drew

consequences from this 'epistemological picture' which led him to differ radically from both Locke and Berkeley. He asserted, in terms of Diagram II, that a and b may represent physical things which exist, as it were, 'independently' of 'sensations' (or, to use Hume's terminology, "impressions"), but that there is no way in which we could conclusively prove or demonstrate that this is the case. Since Hume doubted whether or not the 'independent' existence of physical things could be demonstrated, he has been called a sceptic.

To represent Hume's contention in terms of Diagram II, we could simply replace  $O_1$  and  $O_2$ , as well as  $l$  and  $l'$  (if we regard  $l$  and  $l'$  as physical things) by question marks. Hume would also dispense with the mind or soul (M), but this part of his philosophy need not concern us.

#### Lenin and Hume

In Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Lenin characterized Hume's position (Lenin refers to it as "agnosticism") by citing the following quotations from Hume's works. These quotations show how the principles represented by Diagram II pervaded Hume's thinking and unmistakably convey Hume's conviction that the 'independent' existence of physical things cannot be demonstrated.

Here are Hume's arguments. In his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in the chapter (XII) on sceptical philosophy, he says: "It seems evident,

that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creations are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions. . . . But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it. But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration. It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, 'this house', and 'that tree' are nothing but perceptions in the mind. . . . By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible), and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? . . . How shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. To have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit . . . if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being, or any of his attributes."

He says the same thing in his Treatise of Human Nature (Part IV, Sect. II, "On Scepticism Towards Sensations"): "Our perceptions are our only objects." (P. 281 of the French translation by Renouvier and

Pilion, 1878.) By scepticism Hume means refusal to explain sensations as the effects of objects, spirit, etc., refusal to reduce perceptions to the external world, on the one hand, and to a deity or to an unknown spirit, on the other.<sup>13</sup>

### Materialism: the Antagonist of Idealism

Lenin, like Marx and Engels, regarded idealist philosophy as the nemesis of socialism; and in Materialism and Empirio-criticism he directed his polemics against what he considered to be a resurgence of idealistic views--viz. the philosophy of science of Ernst Mach, and his Russian followers, Bogdanov, Bazarov, Chernov, etc.<sup>14</sup>

Lenin saw Mach as a proponent of Berkeley's brand of idealism. But, more importantly, he saw Mach and company laboring under the delusion that the Machian epistemological view was something new; something that Mach himself had originated. Lenin attempted to dispel this alleged delusion by drawing parallels between Mach's position and that of a paradigm idealist, Bishop Berkeley. Mach, Lenin claimed, was simply touting a refurbished version of the views that Berkeley had professed in 1710. And these views, Lenin believed, had been conclusively refuted by Marx and Engels.

Because of the alleged similarity between Mach's views and Berkeley's views, Lenin feared that the popularization of Mach's idealism would have the same effect that Berkeley intended for his own views--viz. to remove

the cornerstone from the "doctrine of Matter" which had lent support to "every wretched sect of atheists". Lenin, as a practical politician, regarded such an effect as detrimental to the interests of the international working-class movement on the grounds that many Christian sects had traditionally provided ideological ammunition for the bourgeoisie in its exploitation of the workers.

But most importantly, idealism could call into question the alleged causal connection between constantly changing and developing 'objective conditions' (i.e. physical things, such as the 'forces of production') and social conditions, which serves as the cornerstone of Marxist social theory.

## PART II

### LENIN'S ATTACK ON IDEALISM

#### Berkeley's 'Criterion'

Lenin's primary objection to Berkeley's idealism is that it provides no adequate criterion for distinguishing between illusion and reality.

. . . Berkeley, refusing as he does to recognise the existence of things outside the mind, tries to find a criterion for distinguishing between the real and the fictitious.<sup>15</sup>

Since Berkeley cannot identify 'reality' with physical things that exist 'outside the mind', and remain consistent with his epistemological and ontological views, he must find some other way to identify 'reality' if he wishes to retain any distinction between illusion and reality at all; and his "search for a criterion" reveals his intention to retain such a distinction.

As Lenin points out, Berkeley "finds" this criterion in the alleged facts that 1) some 'ideas' are more 'steady' or 'strong' than others, and cannot be evoked at pleasure; 2) these 'stronger' ideas bespeak the effects of a Mind "more powerful and wise than human spirits" (i.e. these ideas are always perceived in the mind of God); and 3) when many persons perceive that same idea (as opposed to the ideas perceived by one person),

these are supposed to possess "more reality" than others.<sup>16</sup>

The 'Inconsistency' of the Criterion

According to Lenin, this criterion leads to inconsistency with Berkeley's epistemological views, and has solipsistic consequences as well. Now why is this the case? The following example will show us.

Suppose that two persons, Joe, a good Berkeleyian, and Harry, who has no philosophical pretensions, both wish to know whether or not a black swan exists. They have heard that there is a black swan swimming in a nearby lake, so they decide to go and see for themselves whether or not the swan exists. They duly go, and they both see the swan. However, Joe finds the sight of a black swan swimming in the lake so extraordinary that he does not believe his eyes. After all, he thought that it was literally impossible for a black swan to exist. So, Joe, being a good Berkeleyian, decides to use Berkeley's criterion in order to determine whether or not his 'ideas' of the swan are 'real'. He closes his eyes, and tells himself that when he opens them again, the 'ideas' of the swan will be gone. But, when he opens his eyes, the 'ideas' of the swan are still there. Consequently, he knows that his 'ideas' of the swan are more 'steady' or 'strong' than others (i.e. stronger than others that would disappear after he 'told them to go away'), and cannot be

evoked at pleasure. Berkeley's criterion is, in part, satisfied.

Next, Joe decides to find out whether or not "many persons perceive the same ideas" (i.e. 'ideas' of the swan), and starts by asking Harry whether or not he (i.e. Harry) also enjoys 'swan-like ideas'. Harry replies that he does not know anything about 'ideas', but he definitely sees the black swan. Joe, of course, knows that Harry is not talking about seeing the swan, but about perceiving certain kinds of 'ideas'; still, Joe is suspicious. He knows that Harry often enjoys deceiving people. He therefore decides that he must find out whether or not Harry's 'ideas' of the swan are similar to his own without taking Harry's word for it. But how can Joe do this? Joe might administer a local anesthetic to Harry in such a way that Harry would not feel pain while he looks at the swan. Then, Joe might open up Harry's head in order to see whether or not 'swan-like ideas' are there. In this way, he might take a first step toward finding out whether or not many persons perceive the same 'ideas' (i.e. 'ideas' of the swan). Needless to say, Joe would not find any 'ideas' in Harry's head. He might find nerve cells, glands, 'grey matter', etc., but no 'ideas'.

Now consider Joe's hypothetical, surgical attempt to find Harry's 'ideas'. First of all, this attempt



failed to demonstrate that Harry's 'ideas' were the same as his own; and it is difficult to see how he could have possibly done so. Second, Joe failed to do anything which would demonstrate that Harry enjoyed any 'ideas' at all; and it is difficult to see how he could possibly do so. Joe has no grounds for claiming that Harry enjoys the same 'ideas' as he (i.e. Joe) does, and Joe has no grounds for claiming that Harry is a sentient entity at all. Given this latter state of affairs one could claim that Harry might be some sort of automaton that does not perceive 'ideas' at all; and it is difficult to see, given Berkeley's criterion and epistemological views, how Joe could show such a claim to be false--viz. show that Harry is, in fact, another human being who enjoys 'ideas' that are similar to those that other humans allegedly enjoy.

I think these are the sorts of considerations that led Lenin to claim that Berkeley's criterion is inconsistent with his epistemological views. It is inconsistent, because in stating that those 'ideas' which are 'more real' than others are perceived by many persons, it presupposes that it can be determined whether or not many persons perceive the same ideas, and it presupposes that it can be determined whether or not others perceive 'ideas' at all; and given Berkeley's epistemological views, it is difficult to see how either of these things

could be determined, as the previous example hopefully has shown.

These sorts of considerations led Lenin to speak of two kinds of difficulties that idealists often fall into.

#### The Idealist 'Source of Knowledge'

1. Idealists often attempt to describe certain types of 'ideas' (e.g. 'ideas' of colors) as being dependent upon 'physical things' (e.g. "light sources")<sup>17</sup> which, presumably, are 'more real' than the 'things' perceived by, say, a person who is hallucinating. Given this information, idealists might wish to claim 'ideas' which depend upon the same physical things are 'the same' to everyone who perceives them. Thus, there is a way to determine whether or not "many persons have the same ideas", and thus to successfully employ Berkeley's criterion.

However, given Berkeley's epistemological views, one is forced to admit that any knowledge of physical things (e.g. light sources) must come from 'ideas', since, for Berkeley, all knowledge comes from 'ideas'.<sup>18</sup> And before one can conclude that these 'ideas' (i.e. 'ideas' of light sources) are 'more real' than any others, one must apply Berkeley's criterion. Yet whether or not it is possible to do this is precisely what is in question.

In terms of Diagram II, it is as if the "presence-room" of Joe's mind contains a movie screen upon which various images are continuously projected. Yet the walls of the room are opaque in such a way that it is logically impossible for Joe's 'consciousness' to somehow 'see through them', or to somehow 'get outside of them' in order to find out whether or not the images which appear on the screen are images of real, physical things.

The sophism of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation ['ideas'] as being not the connection between consciousness and the external world, but a fence, a well<sup>19</sup> separating consciousness from the external world.

Thus, Lenin viewed any move to render 'ideas' dependent upon physical things (thus opening the door to those idealists who would claim that the alleged fact that various persons enjoy the same 'ideas' is established by the dependence of these ideas upon the same physical things) as ". . . idealism vainly seeking to hide the nakedness of its solipsism under the cloak of a more objective terminology"<sup>20</sup> (i.e. terminology which employs the concept of 'physical things' which do not somehow depend upon 'ideas'; the concept which Berkeley wishes to attack).

#### 'Ideas' and 'Solipsism'

2. Lenin also argued that idealism leads to solipsism. He thus claimed that idealists often write of 'our ideas'

or of various persons enjoying 'the same ideas' without having established that other people enjoy 'ideas' at all.

For if the "assumption" of the existence of the external world is "idle" . . . then primarily the "assumption" of the existence of other people is idle and superfluous. . . . Holding this point of view one cannot speak of "our" sensations [i.e. 'ideas'].<sup>21</sup>

Again, in terms of Diagram II, it is as if Harry's "presence-room of the mind" has opaque walls such that it is logically impossible for Joe to penetrate them in order to find out what Harry's 'ideas' are like. Even if Joe's 'consciousness' could escape from its 'presence-room', it could never enter the 'presence-room' of Harry's 'consciousness'.

While Lenin thought that Berkeley's criterion involved an inconsistency with his (i.e. Berkeley's) epistemological views, he did not think that Berkeley's idealism necessarily involved inconsistency. He claimed that it is possible to be a 'consistent' idealist,<sup>22</sup> although this almost certainly involves giving up the search for a criterion with which to distinguish between illusion and reality, and accepting the possibility that one can never be certain that others perceive 'ideas'. This latter view, Lenin believed, constituted solipsism. And he felt that idealists, in general, were not aware that their position posed these alternatives; and that if they were aware that they were faced with these

alternatives, they would have found both unacceptable.

Presumably, Lenin's own epistemological views avoid these difficulties. In the following paragraphs, I shall argue that this is not the case.

### Lenin and 'sensations'

The following passages from Materialism and Empirio-criticism clarify Lenin's view of the epistemological role of 'sensations'.

. . . if . . . colour is a sensation only depending upon the retina (as natural science compels you to admit), then light rays, falling on the retina, produce the sensation of colour.

. . . matter acting upon our sense-organs produces sensation.<sup>23</sup>

Lenin further asserts that "All knowledge comes from experience, from sensation, from perception."<sup>24</sup>

These 'sensations' inform us of the properties of objectively existing physical things: e.g. ". . . my sensations of high, short, yellow, hard, etc."<sup>25</sup> Now how are we to square these assertions with Lenin's view that images of physical things are 'reflected in consciousness'?

Frederick Engels . . . constantly and without exception speaks in his works of things and their mental images (Gedanken-Abbilder), and it is obvious that these mental images arise exclusively from sensations.<sup>26</sup>

Anybody who reads Anti-Duhring and Ludwig Feuerbach with the slightest care will find scores of instances when Engels speaks of things and their reflections in the human brain, in our consciousness, thought, etc.<sup>27</sup>


. . . for every materialist, sensations is . . .  
the direct connection between consciousness and  
the external world.<sup>28</sup>

We are forced to the conclusion that these 'sensations'  
must somehow 'weld' themselves into 'reflections'.

Physical things (e.g. "light waves") affect our sensory  
organs and produce these 'sensations' which, in turn,  
must somehow give rise to 'reflections' of physical  
things.

We can express Lenin's epistemological views in  
terms of Diagram II by thinking of  $l$  and  $l'$  as Lenin's  
"light waves" (which produce visual 'sensations');  $s$  and  
 $s'$  correspond to Lenin's 'sensations', while  $a$  and  $b$   
correspond to Lenin's 'reflections'. 'Consciousness',  
which, for Lenin, is allegedly not separated from the  
'external world' by the walls of  $R$ , corresponds to  $M$ . I  
do not know how to illustrate this latter state of affairs  
in terms of Diagram III.

Diagram III



Engel's View of 'Practice'

Now how does Lenin support this view? He follows Engels' dictum that the success of our action ". . . proves the conformity of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived".<sup>29</sup> Such action, or 'practice', ". . . distinguishes illusion from reality for every one of us".<sup>30\*</sup> If we relate this notion of 'practice' to our previous discussion of Lenin's views on 'sensation' and 'reflection', we see that Leninist practice becomes saddled with the task of weeding out those 'reflections' which do not accurately depict physical things, or 'reality'. For it is only by attributing this role to practice that we can understand the relevance of our action to 'reflection' at all. In other words, we must assume that some of our 'reflections' are inaccurate. And given this assumption, it seems that the only reason which we could furnish in order to explain the inaccuracy of a 'reflection' is that something went wrong with the 'welding process' which bound its constituent 'sensations' together. In terms of Diagram II, the images that appear on a and b would not accurately depict  $O_1$  and  $O_2$  because s and s' are not properly 'reflecting' the properties of  $O_1$  and  $O_2$ .

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\*It is intended to perform the task which Berkeley's criterion allegedly fails to perform.

### PART III

#### LENIN'S CRITICISMS OF IDEALISM APPLIED TO HIS OWN EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEWS

In the following two sections I shall argue that the difficulties which Lenin claims are inherent in idealist epistemology [viz. 1) that it regards 'sensation' as a "wall, separating consciousness from the external world"; and 2) that it cannot establish that other people enjoy sensory experience at all] are also inherent in his own epistemological views. In the following section I shall show that, given Lenin's epistemological views, 'sensation' may be regarded as a "wall" which "separates consciousness from the external world".

#### Lenin's 'Source of Knowledge'

Suppose that Charley, a Leninist, has accompanied Joe and Harry on their expedition to determine whether or not the black swan exists. Charley has certain apparently 'swan-like sensations' and wishes "to prove that they conform to the objective nature of the thing perceived"-- i.e. the swan. How might he do this? Charley, being a good Leninist, knows that he must successfully perform



some sort of action--i.e. do something. After all, Engels wrote that the success of our action ". . . proves the conformity of our sensations to the objective nature of the thing perceived". Now what might he do? He might try to catch the swan in order to make sure that it is actually solid and not just a product of his imagination. Charley will be successful in this endeavor if, when he attempts to capture the swan, his hands do not simply pass through thin air when he closes them around the spot where his eyes tell him that the swan is located. If he is successful, he can conclude that his 'sensations' conform to the objective nature of the thing perceived, and that he is not hallucinating.

Suppose that Charley is successful in his endeavor to catch the swan, and draws the appropriate Leninist conclusion. Is this conclusion--viz. that his 'sensations' of the swan conform to the objective nature of the swan--warranted? After all, Charley's knowledge that he can touch the swan arises from tactile 'sensations'. But could not these tactile 'sensations' be the products of Charley's imagination, just as he suspected that his visual 'sensations' might be the products of his imagination? In fact, couldn't all his 'sensations' somehow be illusory? It is difficult to see, given Lenin's epistemological views, how such a Cartesian consideration could

be shown to be false. To do so would mean that Charley could somehow determine, without 'sensory information', (viz.--'sensations') exactly what the objective nature of the swan is like. Yet Lenin has claimed that all knowledge depends upon 'sensations'. Thus, it seems to follow that Charley can never know whether or not his 'sensations' furnish him with accurate information about the swan.

Again, in terms of Diagram II, it is as if the "presence-room" of Charley's mind contains a movie screen upon which various images are continuously projected. Yet it is logically impossible for Charley's 'consciousness' to somehow see through them, or to somehow get outside of them in order to find out whether or not the images which appear on the screen are images of real, physical things.<sup>31</sup> 'Sensation' acts as a wall, separating consciousness from the external world. However, this is precisely the sort of criticism that Lenin raised against idealism.

We must therefore conclude that Lenin's epistemological views are susceptible to at least one of the sorts of criticisms that he raises against Berkeley's idealism.

#### 'Sensations' and 'Solipsism'

In this section I shall show that, given Lenin's

epistemological views, it cannot be established that other people enjoy sensory experience at all (i.e. that Lenin's second major objection to idealism applies to his own epistemological views).

Now suppose that Charley is aware of the difficulties discussed in the previous section, and decides to resolve them by simply asking his friend Harry to catch the swan, and then to tell him (i.e. Charley) whether or not he was successful. Charley can thus apply Engels' test of 'practice' to the problem of the swan's existence without relying upon his own questionable 'sensations' (as he did in the previous example). Harry asks Charley where the swan is swimming, wades to that spot, grabs the swan, holds it above his head, wades back to shore, and says to Charley, "Well, I sure got that ol' swan, hmmm?" Charley is confused. He would like to believe Harry, but he suspects that Harry went to the spot in the lake that he (i.e. Charley) pointed to, closed his hands on thin air and then raised them above his head as if he were holding the swan. Still, Charley is very curious. He would like to find out whether or not Harry had the requisite tactile 'sensations' (i.e. of the swan), but he does not want to take Harry's word for it. How can he check Harry's 'sensations'? He might perform some sort of surgical experiment of the same type that Joe performed on Harry, but he knows that he will merely find

'grey matter', nerve cells, etc.; no 'sensations'. In fact, Charley begins, at this point, to wonder whether or not there is any way that he can know, with certainty, that Harry is a sentient entity at all. Given this latter state of affairs, one could claim that Harry might be some sort of automaton that does not enjoy 'sensations' at all; and it is difficult to see, given Lenin's epistemological views, how Charley could show such a claim to be false--viz. show that Harry is, in fact, another human being who enjoys 'sensations' that are similar to those that other humans allegedly enjoy. In terms of Diagram II, it is as if Harry's "presence-room of the mind" has opaque walls such that it is logically impossible for Charley to penetrate them in order to find out what Harry's 'sensations' are like. Even if Charley's 'mind' or 'consciousness' could escape from its own "presence-room", it could never enter the "presence-room" of Harry's 'consciousness'. In other words, Charley could never know, with certainty, whether or not Harry met with success in his attempt to capture the swan. It seems to follow from this case that Charley can only know whether or not his own activities are 'successful'; he can never really know about the 'success' of anyone else, since he can never be sure that they enjoy the requisite sorts of 'sensations' for 'success'; in fact, he can never know whether or not others enjoy

'sensations' at all.

Yet this is precisely the sort of conclusion that Lenin found to follow from 'idealism'; and he regarded it as one of idealism's greatest weaknesses because it is solipsistic--i.e. it demonstrates that idealists have no grounds for asserting that others perceive 'ideas'. But the same sort of conclusion seems to follow from his own position. While Lenin scornfully criticizes Mach's 'idealism' by writing:

For the solipsist "success" is everything needed by me in practice . . .<sup>32</sup>

it seems that we can show that the same sort of conclusion follows for 'the Leninist'.

Again, Lenin's epistemological views are susceptible to the same sorts of criticisms that he levies against 'idealism'.

### The Source of Lenin's Difficulties

Now why is it that Lenin, who raised such perspicuous objections to idealist epistemology, framed epistemological views that are susceptible to these same sorts of objections?

I think that we can answer this question after we observe that Lenin's difficulties arise from the fact that he, like the empiricists, claimed that all knowledge comes from mysterious entities called 'sensations'. I think that any philosopher who makes such a claim will face the

sort of difficulties that Lenin finds with Berkeley's 'idealism', and that we, in turn, can apply to Lenin's own epistemological views.

As has been pointed out, Lenin saw himself as repeating the views and arguments of Marx. Yet in Marx's scanty philosophical works, we find no reference to 'sensations', in Lenin's sense, or to the possibility that all knowledge comes from 'sensation'. But in Engels' works, we find several references to 'sensation', in the empiricist sense.

Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense perceptions, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense perceptions of it.<sup>33</sup>

And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions [my underlining] in a way not warranted by them--what we call defective reasoning.<sup>34</sup>

Lenin interprets such remarks as follows:

Frederick Engels . . . constantly and without exception speaks in his works of things and their mental images (Gedanken-Abbilder), and it is obvious that these mental images arise exclusively from sensations.<sup>35</sup>

#### Marx and 'Sensations'

It seems that Lenin adopted Engels' epistemological views and terminology with regard to 'sensations' without noticing that Marx never aired such views, or

used such terminology. This is not to say that Marx was explicitly aware of and concerned with problems regarding the empiricist concept of 'sensation'. His philosophical works are scanty and polemical, usually to the exclusion of systematic and explicit presentation of his own philosophical views.

However, some Marxist philosophers have interpreted some of Marx's remarks as providing grounds for simply dismissing philosophical talk of 'sensations' altogether. David Guest quotes The German Ideology as follows:

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but are real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.<sup>36</sup>

Then Guest writes,

"Real premises from which abstraction can only be made in imagination," here we have the essential materialist critique of idealism, the refusal to make an unreal abstraction from what is actually "given us", and to substitute the shadowy "ideas" and "sense-data" of the philosopher.<sup>37</sup>

I think that Lenin could have avoided many of the problems inherent in his epistemological views had he begun from a similar interpretation of Marx, and not from the philosophical works of Engels.

POSTSCRIPT

IMPLICATIONS OF LENIN'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL  
VIEWS FOR MARXIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE

These concluding paragraphs will show how the issues dealt with in the body of this thesis are related to important issues regarding the methodology of Marxian social science. Specifically, I shall show that Lenin's views regarding 'sensations' lead to consequences which run counter to some of the fundamental methodological principles of Marxian social science--the same principles which, presumably, Lenin was at pains to defend.

In his article, "Marxism and Empiricism",<sup>38</sup> Charles Taylor expounds one of Marx's fundamental methodological principles as follows:

. . . forms of activity are or include ways of looking at the world, that, to be more specific, different ways of economic life, of making and finding the means to life, incorporate different conceptual structures, different ways of classifying the environment and human life.<sup>39</sup>

. . . . .

[these] . . . differences of conception are irreducible one to another.<sup>40</sup>

. . . . .

Thus, the man of technological capitalist civilization has a different set of concepts than that of his ancestor or contemporary in feudal agricultural civilization. . . . the modern man's notion of the



individual as the unit in society, his very notion of matter, these and many others would not correspond to their analogues in the speech of pre-modern men. These differences arise, according to Marxists, because of changes in the human condition over history. But, in Marxist terms, the human condition is defined at the most basic level by the forces of production (man's relation to nature) and the relations of production (man's relation to man); in other words, it is defined in terms of the type of economic activity which the conditions prevailing at the time make privileged. . . . in each [economic] situation [specific to a particular period in history], that set of concepts will be developed which most adequately expresses the human condition, that is, the privileged forms of activity of the time. And since the latter changes through history, the former changes also.

. . . The modern notion of the individual as prior in some sense to the society was bound to arise in our epoch because seeing oneself as an individual of this kind is a necessary part of the form of life of the entrepreneur in a regime of free enterprise. For the entrepreneur the rest of society is a set of individuals with whom he has to deal in such a way as to realize a profit, with whom he can enter in contractual relations or not depending on the advantage to be secured. Feudal societies on the other hand, where a man was held to a certain walk of life by status, and unfree to enter into new relations by contract, could never spawn such a notion.<sup>41</sup> It would have been manifestly untrue to experience.

Taylor's interpretation of Marxian methodology is supported by the following passages from Marx's works:

. . . a certain mode of production or industrial stage is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, that this mode of co-operation is itself a productive force. Further, that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of society, hence that the "history of humanity" must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange.<sup>42</sup>

. . . . .

Thus, it is quite obvious from the start that there exists a materialistic connection of men with one another, which is determined by their needs and their mode of production and which is as old as men themselves. This connection is ever taking on new forms and thus presents a "history" independently of the existence of any political or religious non-sense which would hold men together on its own.<sup>43</sup>

. . . . .

It is self-evident, moreover, that "specters", "bonds", "the higher being", "concept", "scruple" are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.<sup>44</sup>

. . . . .

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.--real, active men, as they are conditioned by a determinate development of their productive forces, and of the intercourse which corresponds to these, up to its most extensive forms.<sup>45</sup>

. . . . .

But man is only individualised [i.e. comes to conceive of 'society' as a collection of 'self-interested individuals'] through the process of history. He originally appears as a generic being, a tribal being, a herd animal--though by no means as a "political animal" in the political sense. Exchange itself is a major agent of this individualisation. . . . Once the situation is such, that man as an isolated person has relation only to himself, the means of establishing himself as an isolated individual have become what gives him his general communal character.<sup>47</sup>

Taylor continues:

According to this [i.e. the empiricist] theory the basis of human knowledge consists of impressions received on the human mind from the outside world. . . . if knowledge consists originally of impressions, then the type or form of impressions is fixed by human physiology or the nature of the

human mind. They were generally thought to take the form of what was called in this century 'sense-data'. In any case, the form was the same for all people at all times.

. . . any differences in outlook (i.e. conceptual differences, not just differences in the degree of knowledge) between men must arise from differences in the way the basic phenomena, alike the source of knowledge for all, were grouped. But since all concepts could be explicated in terms of a range of concepts designating the basic phenomena, all differences could be made completely transparent by giving the rule of translation for any language into the basic one. At once differences of conception become like the differences of shorthand notation; they cannot be classified as more or less true, but only as more or less convenient.<sup>47</sup>

To elaborate upon Taylor's 'shorthand analogy', various kinds of "shorthand notation" can be used to stand for particular dictations. In epistemological terms, the dictations would stand for concatenations of 'sensations' which, according to Lenin, constitute the source of all knowledge, and accurately 'reflect' the properties of physical things. That is, the various 'shorthands' produced by various individuals in various historical periods can ultimately be cashed in terms of 'combinations of sensations'--i.e. the constituents of all possible 'dictations'. I believe that Lenin's identification of 'sensation' as the source of all knowledge commits him to this sort of position. Yet according to the foregoing methodological principle, individuals in various historical periods conceive of various social phenomena in 'shorthands' peculiar to these historical periods; and thus, these 'shorthands' are "irreducible to

one another". In other words, the differing conceptions of social phenomena held by individuals in various historical periods cannot all be 'reduced' to various concatenations of 'sensations'. There is no basic type of 'dictation' viz. 'combinations of sensations'--to which all these 'shorthands' can be said to ultimately stand for.

Thus, Marx would have rejected the claim that there are some sort of 'raw data' (e.g. 'combinations of sensations') which people from all historical periods are somehow presented with; such a claim is inconsistent with the above-cited methodological principle. I think that Lenin was unaware that his reliance upon the concept of 'sensation' rendered his own epistemological views inconsistent with the above-cited Marxian methodological principle.

Naturally, the analogy of various 'shorthands', used by individuals in various historical periods, that are "irreducible to one another", leads to serious problems of interpretation. However, it is not my purpose to deal with such problems here.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Flew, Anthony, "A 'Linguistic' Philosopher Looks at Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", Praxis, 2nd Semester, 1967; p. 107.
2. ". . . bulk, figure, number, situation, and notion or rest of their solid parts; those are in them [i.e. in physical things], whether we perceive them or not; and when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have by these ideas of the thing as it is in itself. . . . These I call primary qualities."  
"Secondly, the power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc."  
". . . and upon their [i.e. the primary qualities'] different modifications it is that the secondary qualities [e.g. taste, color, sound, smell, etc.] depend."  
Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, Edwin A. Burt, ed., Random House, N.Y., 1939; pp. 269-270.
3. Locke, pp. 248-249.
4. Locke, p. 253.
5. Locke, p. 255.
6. Locke, pp. 248-249.
7. "[When we] . . . take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division . . . can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from anybody. . . . These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number."  
Locke, p. 265.

8. Lenin, V.I., Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967; pp. 11-12.
9. Lenin, p. 12.
10. Lenin, p. 12.
11. Lenin, p. 13.
12. Lenin, p. 19.
13. Lenin, pp. 21-22.
14. Lenin, p. 10.
15. Lenin, p. 19.
16. Lenin, p. 19.
17. Lenin, p. 41.
18. Lenin, p. 11.
19. Lenin, p. 38.
20. Lenin, pp. 42-43.
21. Lenin, pp. 30-31.
22. Lenin, p. 113.
23. Lenin, p. 42.
24. Lenin, p. 114.
25. Lenin, p. 56.
26. Lenin, p. 28.
27. Lenin, pp. 28-29.
28. Lenin, p. 38.
29. Lenin, p. 124.
30. Lenin, p. 125.
31. G. A. Paul uses a similar analogy wherein he compares Lenin's conception of our perceptual apparatus to a submarine's periscope; roughly, he claims that, given Lenin's view, it would be impossible for the sub-

marine's crew to surface their craft, disembark, and see for themselves whether or not the reflections viewed through the periscope are accurate representations of physical things.

Paul, G. A., "Lenin's Theory of Perception," in Philosophy and Analysis, Margaret Macdonald, ed., Blackwell's, Oxford, 1954; p. 282.

32. Lenin, p. 126.
33. Engels, Frederick, On Historical Materialism, International Publishers, N.Y., 1940; p. 11.
34. Engels, pp. 10-11.
35. Lenin, p. 28.
36. Guest, David, A Textbook of Dialectical Materialism, International Publishers, N.Y., 1939; p. 30.
37. Guest, p. 30.
38. Taylor, Charles, "Marxism and Empiricism", in British Analytical Philosophy, Williams and Montefiore, eds., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966; p. 228.
39. Taylor, p. 231.
40. Taylor, p. 234.
41. Taylor, p. 232.
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