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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

**DAI LI AND THE NATIONALIST
MILITARY SECRET SERVICE, 1927-1946**

by



SOON JOO CHIA

A THESIS

**SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS**

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1990



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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "DAI LI AND THE NATIONALIST MILITARY SECRET SERVICE, 1927-1946" submitted by Seen Joo Chia in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.


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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on Dai Li (1897-1946) and his career as Chief of the Nationalist Military Secret Service from 1932 to 1946. It traces the rise of Dai Li from relative obscurity to become the top spy in Nationalist China, and describes and analyzes the growth and development of the military secret service he led and the important role the organization played in the attempt by the Guomindang government led by Chiang Kai-shek to rule a China that was plagued with internal challenges and external threats.

Dai Li's active involvement in the Nationalist intelligence service began in 1927 when he left the Huangpu Military Academy to work for Hu Qingan, who was in charge of intelligence work for Chiang. In 1932, when Chiang decided to create the Tows Chs (Department of Special Services), he appointed Dai Li as its head. A year after the outbreak of the war with Japan, the Tows Chs was renamed the Junshi Weiyuanhui Diaocha Tongji Ju or Juntong Ju (Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Affairs Commission). Dai Li became the deputy director of the Juntong Ju but with control over all its operations.

Dai Li's organization was essentially an internal security cum intelligence organization. Its mission was to ensure that the Guomindang rule was not threatened by security threats from within and without China. Throughout Dai Li's career, the Guomindang government was threatened internally by rebellious regional militarists, and an armed insurrection by the Communists. It also faced opposition from the people, particularly the urban

intellectuals. Externally, the country was increasingly threatened by Japanese imperialism. As the chief of Chiang's secret service, Dai Li played an active role in checking these threats. In particular, during the war with Japan, Dai Li's organization became one of the most important establishments of the Guomindang government. The Juntong Ju expanded dramatically in size and took on new duties such as fighting a guerrilla war in the occupied areas. Dai Li also assumed the important task of undermining the Nanjing puppet government.

Dai Li's career came to an abrupt end in March 1946 when he was killed in an airplane crash.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Dai Li was the head of Chiang Kai-shek's military secret service from 1932 to 1946. Described as "a short, medium built man with a flat nose, wide set eyes and triangular ebony brows"¹ and as "a handsome, slender man with tiny beautiful hands,"² he had a bad reputation at home and abroad. The organization he headed was believed to be behind the many assassinations, illegal arrests and summary executions of anti-Guomindang elements during the 1930s. To many Chinese, Dai Li's name was closely associated with terror and fear so much so that it was reportedly "used to frighten children into behaving."³

In the West, Dai Li has invariably been described as a "ruthless assassin" and "the Himmler of China".⁴ A sample of these views follows:

... the operations and tactics of [Dai Li's organization] are said to parallel those of the vicious and repulsive Sicherheitsdienst in Germany. Tai personally has been described as a political assassin... an advocate of stringent "thought control"....⁵

[Dai Li was] an assassin.... He needs no permission from anyone to imprison people. He apparently assassinated his own mother [sic].⁶

This [Dai Li's] was probably the most potent and terror-producing name in wartime China. In brief, if Chiang Kai-shek wanted anyone watched, investigated, arrested, or exterminated, Tai Li's organization did it. General Tai had risen as Chiang Kai-shek's chief of security with a positive flair for assassination.

A number of Americans, members of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), a joint-intelligence cum guerrilla training establishment created in 1943 between Dai Li's organization and the U.S. Navy, however, had a different opinion of Dai Li and his intelligence organization. For example, Milton Miles, the deputy director of SACO, who spent about four years working closely with Dai Li, who was also SACO director, disputed the conventional view of Dai Li:

I had certainly seen nothing that bore out any of the extreme intelligence reports that I had read in Washington -- nothing that suggested either the assassin or the head of a Chinese OGPU with which anyone from the United States would be embarrassed to associate.

Instead, Miles had lots of praise for Dai Li:

Nowhere in the world have I ever found anyone with such high standards, especially in his loyalty to his leader, his patriotism to his country, his extreme generosity, his humble attitude towards the learned, his honesty, his self-restraint, and fearlessness in time of personal danger.

Another SACO member, First Lieutenant Edward Forter, who had helped train Dai Li's guerrillas, summed up his observations:

I had heard many unpleasant things about Tai Li from the American Army and the press, but he was a man whom one did not know until one met him, talked with him and observed the work he had done for China's war cause. I had numerous opportunities to speak at length with the General and found him to be a fascinating personality.¹⁶

These conflicting views on Dai Li and the intelligence organization he led reflect the controversial nature of the subject of secret intelligence work in general and in China particularly. This study is not intended to be an indictment of the misdeeds carried out by Dai Li or in praise of his work. Rather, its aim is to examine objectively the role played by Dai Li's organization in dealing with the security problems facing Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

In April 1927, the Guomindang under Chiang Kai-shek established the National Government in Nanjing, marking the beginning of a new political era in China. But the survival of the new Government was threatened. It was continually being challenged by regional militarists and new warlords who jealously guarded their autonomy from encroachments from the Central government and occasionally rebelled against Nanjing. Because of Chiang's increasingly dictatorial rule and his failure to bring about better living conditions for the people, he also faced mounting opposition from the populace, especially the intellectuals and students. His policy of appeasement towards Japan, which had stepped up its aggression of China, was also unpopular with the people, leading to many protests and demonstrations against his government. Faced with these threats from within and without, one of the measures taken by Chiang to deal with the problems was the creation of an internal security and intelligence organization in 1932 known as the *Towu Chiu* (Department of Special Services).

The man who Chiang chose to head this agency was a little-known Huangpu graduate by the name of Dai Li, who had begun serving as Chiang's personal intelligence agent since 1927. Dai Li remained in control of the Tosa Chu, which was reorganized and renamed the Junshi Weiyuanhui Diaocha Tongji Ju or Juntong Ju (Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Affairs Commission) in 1938, until his death in March 1946. Dai Li's career thus covers almost the entire period of Nationalist rule in mainland China. During this period, his organization, which grew into one of the largest and most powerful security establishments in Nationalist China, was actively involved in dealing with the threats facing Chiang and his government. This being the case, it is of utmost importance that we should try to find out more about the man and the activities of his organization if we want to have a better understanding of the history of the Guomindang during this period. However, at present, this subject has not been sufficiently explored.

There has been very little scholarly research done in the West on Dai Li and the activities of his organization. A recent article, "Dai Li and the Liu Geqing Affair: Heroism in the Chinese Secret Service during the War of Resistance,"¹¹ by Yeh Wen-hsin is the best we have on the subject. The main concern of the article, however, is to examine Juntong's internal mechanism of control. It discusses how Dai Li attempted to control his organization by exploiting and manipulating values such as benevolence and righteousness which his men shared, to portray himself as a leader worthy of their loyalty. But it does not pay any attention at all to

the role the organization played in Nationalist China. Of the other scholarly works on the Nationalist government, few have discussed Dai Li's activities. Of those that do, they are mainly interested in that aspect of his role in the suppression of the anti-Guomindang elements. For example, Lloyd Eastman in his The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937, devotes a section of a chapter on the "Blue Shirts Society", a revolutionary organization within the Guomindang aimed at reviving the revolutionary spirit. He discusses the terror and assassinations attributed to Dai Li's organization which was a branch of the society, in an attempt to show that the society glorified violence and was therefore "fascist" in nature.¹²

Thus, while students of modern China outside China have shown some interest in the subject of Dai Li and the Nationalist intelligence service, more research needs to be done on the impact of the activities of the organization on Nationalist China. This study will attempt to do this.

A Note on the Sources

Given the nature of the subject, a few words have to be said about sources. In preparing this study, I have relied largely on the writings of former town agents published in Taiwan and in the People's Republic of China. These writings, in the form of reminiscence accounts, memoirs, and biographical studies, began to appear in the press in Taiwan especially from the late 1960s,

presumably because the subject was no longer a sensitive one by then. They are mainly published in the journals, Zhongwai Zazhi, (Kaleidoscope Monthly) and Jianxing Yuekan (Jianxing Monthly), which is an in-house publication of the Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju (Intelligence Division of the Ministry of National Defence), and is strictly for internal circulation. Only a few issues of this journal are available in North America. Many tewa agents in Taiwan, who for some reasons did not write their own recollections, spoke about their experiences to one of their colleagues, Qiao Jiakai, who has published their recollections in Dai Li jiangjun he ta de tongzhi [General Dai Li and his comrades]. In the People's Republic of China, former tewa agents were encouraged by their captors to denounce their past and their accounts are published in the Wenhui Ziliao Xuanji (Selections from Literary and Historical Materials) at both the provincial and national levels. In one way or another, these publications have revealed crucial information about Dai Li and the activities of the Nationalist intelligence service, which would otherwise have remained hidden. But as can be expected, few of them are without partisan bias; accounts by former tewa agents in Taiwan, with little exception, are generally adulatory in nature, glorifying the achievements of the organization and praising Dai Li's leadership. In contrast, their colleagues who were captured by the Communists condemned Dai Li and the work which they were probably once proud of. Generally, however, both sets of accounts are based on true events and there is no reason to doubt their authenticity. Minor inaccuracies, especially of facts, or even exaggeration of

personal involvement in certain events will inevitably be present. To some extent, it is possible to verify some of the claims made with similar accounts by other tewa agents and with the documentary sources available.

Documentary sources for a study of this nature is scarce for obvious reasons. However, beginning in 1948, the Nationalist intelligence service (then known as Baozi Ju, Bureau of Secret Affairs) published selected speeches, orders and directives given by Dai Li in three volumes entitled Dai xiansheng yixun [The bequeathed teachings of Mr. Dai]. Classified as "secret" (daiwai jimi), they were intended for use by the Baozi Ju to educate its agents with the various sayings of Dai Li and activities of the organization under his leadership. In 1979, some of the speeches and directives were selected for inclusion in the two-volume Dai Yunong xiansheng guanli [The Complete Collection of Mr. Dai Yunong], in which there is also an official biography and an updated version of the chronological biography of Dai Li, published by the Guofang Bu Qinghe Ju. Although the materials in these two publications were predigested, they contain information about the Nationalist Intelligence organization under Dai Li which is indispensable to this study.

FOOTNOTES

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7. John King Fairbank, Chinatown: A Fifty-Year Memoir (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 216.
8. Miles, Different Kind of War, 52.
9. The Collection of Admiral Milton E. Miles, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California, Box 9, folder 357.
10. Quoted in Stratton, SACO, 21.
11. The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 48, no. 3 (August 1989): 545-62.
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CHAPTER II

THE EARLY CAREER OF DAI LI, 1897-1931

Dai Li, the man who later became China's most feared personality in the 1930s and 1940s did not do well in the first thirty years of his life. Only after he entered the Huangpu Military Academy in October 1926 did things dramatically change for the better for him. This chapter traces the early life of Dai Li to 1931 just before he was appointed head of the Tewa Chu (Department of Special Services).

Dai Li, first named Chunfeng, was born on May 28, 1897, in Baoan village, Jiangshan xian, a mountainous district in Southwest Zhejiang, close to the border of Fujian and Jiangxi provinces. For generations the Dai family had been farmers and no one is known to have become scholars or officials.¹ Dai Li's father, Dai Guanying, described in one account as a lazy person who refused to engage in productive work,² died when Dai Li was four. Dai Li and his younger brother, Dai Yunlin, were brought up by their mother, Lan Yuexi. From age seven to thirteen, Dai Li attended village schools where he was taught the Confucian classics. In 1909, when he was fourteen, he left home for the first time to attend Wenxi Upper Primary School in the xian town, about 90 li (about 45 kilometers) from Baoan. Described as a highly intelligent boy by his teachers, Dai Li was the top student in his class for four years at Wenxi. He also showed leadership potential. He was the class monitor and the organizer of a "Youth Club" created to promote

activities such as campaigns against foot-binding and opium smoking.³

After graduating from Wenxi, Dai Li dutifully married a village girl (Mao Xiucong) selected by his mother in 1914 at age seventeen. Dai Li then left for Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang province, to begin his lower secondary education at the Diyi Zhongxue (First Provincial Secondary School), described as one of the best modern schools in Zhejiang. But after only three months, he was expelled for causing injury to the old dormitory master who fell from a flight of stairs after stepping on a wooden dumbbell left there by Dai Li.⁴

After his expulsion from school, Dai Li was too ashamed to return home immediately. He remained in Hangzhou for a while, working in a bean curd shop of a distant relative. He only decided to return to Baoben in 1915, probably upon hearing that his wife had given birth to a son.

Dai Li, however, had no intention of remaining at home to lead a peaceful and restricted life. At first he contemplated becoming a teacher and in 1917 he finished second in an entrance examination for a normal school. Despite this success, he decided against joining. Instead, he chose to become a recruit in the army of Fan Guogang, commander of the First Division of the Zhejiang Army.⁵ The chaotic political situation in China then made a career in the army appear more attractive than one in the teaching profession. China had just entered the period of warlordism; there was a breakdown of central authority at Beijing and the country was divided up among several

powerful warlords who fought each other for power and supremacy, causing great suffering to the Chinese people. However, Dai Li apparently did not stay very long in Fan's army for in the same year he decided to leave the army after it was defeated by another warlord army.⁶

After leaving the warlord army, Dai Li spent most of the next ten years, from 1917 to 1926, in Baoan, his home village, except for a brief sojourn in Shanghai from 1920 to 1922. Unfortunately, only the sketchiest facts are known of Dai Li's life in Shanghai. He reportedly worked as a clerk, but for whom and in what trade, there are no details. It was also during his stay in Shanghai that he came into contact with the powerful Shanghai underworld, then dominated by the Honghang (Triads) and the Qinghang (Green Gang). This raises the question as to whether or not he then became a member of the secret society and engaged in illicit activities. According to his official biographers at the Intelligence Division of the Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan, although Dai Li mixed freely with secret society members, he did not formally become a member. Furthermore, he did not pick up bad habits as a result. For example, Dai Li "never smoked opium, never gambled and never danced."⁷ Another biographer of Dai Li, Liangxiang, whose real name is Tang Xin, a former Dai Li agent, disagrees. Liangxiang is of the view that Dai Li was quite heavily involved with the Honghang. He argues that the fact that Dai Li, in his own admission, was a sworn brother of Wang Aqiao, a leader of the Honghang, and had even put up in Wang's residence showed that Dai Li was a secret society member.⁸

Regardless of whether Dai Li became a member of a secret society, he had no qualms about mixing with people who ran gambling dens, brothels, smoked and sold opium. His association with Shanghai gangsters suggests that he shared some common values with them, such as a strong sense of loyalty to one's friends and leaders. His thinking and personality could even have been influenced by secret societies. Furthermore, Dai Li's ability to move at ease with Shanghai gangsters and to gain their trust and respect became an asset later when he was engaged in intelligence work. For example, in late 1927, Dai Li, through the introduction of Yang Hu, the Shanghai Garrison Commander, befriended the most powerful man of the Shanghai underworld, Du Yuesheng, the boss of the Qingbang. Dai Li, Yang and Du even became sworn brothers.⁹ Du Yuesheng, who played an important role in the April 12, 1927 coup by Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists in Shanghai, assisted Dai Li in many ways, including the mobilization of thousands of Shanghai people to join the Biedong Dai (Special Action Corps) created by Dai Li during the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, and in 1943, helped Dai Li overcome a very serious crisis in his career.¹⁰

After spending more than two years in Shanghai, Dai Li returned to his home in Baoan in 1922. We do not know specifically why he decided to leave Shanghai, but during the next four years he tried to establish himself as a local leader. He became a member of a village school affairs committee and he took the initiative in 1924 to organize a small self-defense corps to protect the village from possible looting by warlord armies fighting nearby.¹¹ After the

threat from warlord soldiers to his village had receded, Dai Li did not disband the self-defence corps. But supporting the corps soon became a problem because the villagers, seeing that such a corps was no longer necessary, had refused to help. In order to maintain the corps, Dai Li resorted to forcing the locals to donate food or money, making him very unpopular with the villagers in the process.¹²

By 1926 Dai Li had enough of life in the village and decided that he should once again leave home to strike out on his own in the metropolis. This time, he went south to Guangzhou to join the Huangpu Military Academy.

By the mid-1920s, Chinese nationalism had reached a fever pitch. Many labor strikes and student demonstrations broke out during this time against warlordism and imperialism in the cities. Incidents such as that of May Thirtieth 1925 aroused patriotic feelings among Chinese all over the country. Many flocked to Guangzhou to participate in the revolution led by the Guomindang (Nationalist Party). Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, the Guomindang had earlier in 1922-23 been reorganized and rejuvenated with the help of the Soviet Union. It had also formed a United Front with the Chinese Communist Party, under which Communists could join the Guomindang to take part in Sun's bourgeois democratic revolution.¹³

With Soviet help, in May 1924, the Guomindang also set up the *Lujun jingguan xueiao* (Army Officers Academy), commonly known as the Huangpu Military Academy, with Chiang Kai-shek as its commandant. A high percentage of the trainees came from the

countryside, of which the majority were natives of provinces in the Yangtze valley or in South China.¹⁴ The main objective of the Academy was to train a disciplined party army for the task of uniting the country. The Academy became the base from which Chiang rose to become China's supreme leader. For as the commandant of the academy, Chiang "established ties of friendship and leadership with academy instructors and students that were to bind them to Chiang for the next two decades as they rose to leadership positions in the army."¹⁵

Although we do not have information indicating Dai Li's level of political consciousness, it is safe to assume that he was not oblivious to such dramatic developments taking place in China in the early 1920s. As early as 1914, Dai Li had read about the 1911 Revolution from a novel entitled Shenchen guangfu zhi (Annals of the 1911 Revolution in China.)¹⁶ Moreover, the time Dai Li spent in Shanghai and other cities must have increased his knowledge of political events unfolding in China. Like many Chinese, therefore, a strong sense of patriotism could have been the driving force behind Dai Li's decision to join the Huangpu Military Academy.

However, it was a chance meeting with a former Wuxi classmate, Mao Renfeng, at the town in Jiangshan xian that convinced Dai Li that he should go to Guangzhou. Mao Renfeng, who later became one of Dai Li's close aides in the Tzu Chu, was a trainee of the fourth class at Huangpu. Poor health, however, forced him to quit before graduating. Upon learning that Dai Li wanted to leave home to make a living in the metropolis, Mao encouraged him to join the Guomindang

revolution by enrolling at Huangpu. Mao also revealed that a few of their classmates, such as Zhou Nianxing, had already graduated from the academy.¹⁷ Partly due to peer pressure and partly because he was convinced by Mao that there was a future ahead of him if he joined Huangpu, Dai Li finally took the plunge which changed his entire life.

This decision of Dai Li to enrol as a trainee at the Huangpu Military Academy in 1926 was a decisive turning point of his life. From then on, his fortunes took a great change for the better. Because he showed potential for investigative work he was recruited for intelligence service after he left the academy in 1927. This marked the beginning of his career in the Guomindang secret service. Although he spent only about ten months in the academy, it was significant in shaping his subsequent career.

When Dai Li arrived in Guangzhou by sea in May 1926, he had just missed the recruitment of students for the fifth class at Huangpu. Since its creation in May 1924, the academy recruited students twice a year, in May and October. Dai Li therefore had to wait till September to sit for the Huangpu entrance examination for the sixth class. In his first attempt, he was unsuccessful.¹⁸ Disappointed but not disheartened, he decided to try again. Believing that his life had lacked the element of "water," Dai Li decided to change his name from "Zhonglan," his school name, to "Li," alias "Yunong" ("Yu" means "rain water").¹⁹ This time, he was successful and he was admitted as a trainee of the sixth class.²⁰ Together with him was at least another 3,200 trainees. The duration of the training was two years.²¹

Dai Li's first involvement in secret intelligence work can be traced to his stay in Huangpu. Before the purge of the Communists in the Guomindang on April 12, 1927, ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, the academy under the United Front had many Communists among the students and instructors. Communists served as political officers responsible for political indoctrination of the trainees. Zhou Enlai, for example, was the deputy head of the department of political education at the academy.²² Concerned with the growing presence of Communists in Huangpu, Chiang Kai-shek sent two of his trusted students, Hu Qingan and Chen Chao, to the academy to organize pre-Guomindang trainees. Dai Li apparently was secretly recruited by Hu to collect information on Communists among the trainees.²³ When the order came on April 14, 1927, to purge all Communists in the academy, Dai Li identified about twenty of them in his battalion.²⁴ Following the purge, Dai Li was among the 300 trainees selected for the newly formed cavalry battalion.²⁵

The relationship which Dai Li established with Hu Qingan while the latter was at Huangpu was crucial to Dai Li's future career. About two months after the purge, Hu left Huangpu to do intelligence work for Chiang Kai-shek.²⁶ It should be pointed out that Hu Qingan was not heading a formal intelligence organization of the Guomindang government. Rather, he was given the task by Chiang, who decided to step down temporarily in August 1927 to facilitate reconciliation between separate elements in the Guomindang, to keep Chiang informed of political and military developments while he was out of office. To assist him in the job, Hu had recruited a few

other Huangpu graduates, such as Qiao Jiakai, Cai Jinjun and Dai Li.²⁷ Around the time Chiang announced his temporary retirement, Dai Li decided to leave the cavalry battalion which was then in Suzhou on its way to Nanjing. The reason was that the affairs of the academy then were neglected for a while and the commander of the cavalry battalion had problems getting enough food for members of the battalion.²⁸ After leaving the battalion, Dai Li went to Shanghai in September 1927 to assist Hu Qingan.²⁹ By the time his battalion regrouped and resumed training in Nanjing in early 1928, Dai Li was doing so well as an intelligence operative that he did not find it necessary to continue with his training. Despite this, Dai Li was still granted graduate status by the authorities.³⁰

Although Dai Li had worked for Hu Qingan for only about four months (from September to December 1927), he had sufficiently impressed him with his capability for espionage work and his deep commitment to the Guomindang cause that when Hu was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Germany for training in January 1928, he recommended that Dai Li be his replacement.³¹ This was accepted by Chiang and Dai Li was given the official title as Liaison Staff Officer in Chiang's headquarters with the rank of Captain.

The new appointment gave Dai Li the opportunity to serve Chiang directly, and to prove himself as a capable intelligence operative. When Chiang resumed the Northern Expedition in March 1928, following his reinstatement in January 1928 as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, Dai Li worked tirelessly, shuttling between major cities in North China collecting intelligence for the

advancing Guomindang troops. So determined and committed was Dai Li to his work that not even a badly bruised bottom, the result of many continuous hours on horseback, could stop him from accomplishing his mission.³² Dai Li also showed tremendous courage in performing his work. In December 1929, after the completion of the Northern Expedition, Tang Shengzhi, one of the generals who had earlier pledged allegiance to Chiang, rose up in rebellion against Chiang. At the risk of being arrested and facing possible execution, for Tang reportedly had placed a reward on the head of Chiang's spies, Dai Li confronted Tang's security chief, Zhou Weilong, a Huangpu graduate of the fourth class, and succeeded in persuading Zhou to switch his allegiance to the Central government, using the argument that their loyalty as Huangpu graduates should be with the Central government and Chiang Kai-shek, their *xiaoshang* (head master).³³

Towards the end of 1931, Dai Li's hard work and loyalty to Chiang had paid off. When Chiang decided that he needed a small intelligence unit in his headquarters, he appointed Dai Li to head it. That unit, known as the *Mieha Zu* (secret intelligence section) was the predecessor to the *Toua Chu* in 1932.³⁴ As the head of the *Mieha Zu*, Dai Li, for the first time since he began working as an intelligence operative, was given a proper office, located at No. 53 Ji's Lane in Nanjing, and a small operating budget. Assisting Dai Li were nine other operatives of whom only one (Wang Tianmu) was not a Huangpu graduate. Together, they formed what was called the "Group of Ten" (*Shiren tuan*). In secret-society style, the ten took an oath at No. 53 Ji's Lane, pledging to sacrifice their lives for the country, party and their *xiaoshang*.³⁵

Thus by the end of 1931, Dai Li had become one of Chiang's most trusted lieutenants. His rise was phenomenal; five years earlier, Dai Li was just one of the many trainees at Huangpu. Looking at Dai Li's career up to this point, it is clear that his decision to enter the Huangpu Military Academy was crucial to his future career. The Huangpu Military Academy was Chiang Kai-shek's personal power base. Many of its graduates were appointed by Chiang to important positions in the military. By gaining Huangpu status, Dai Li had satisfied one of the important criteria in joining Chiang's power structure.

However, while becoming a "student" of Chiang was important, it was no guarantee of success. Dai Li could have graduated -- in this case he did not -- from Huangpu just like many thousands before and after him and end up as an ordinary soldier fighting for the Guomindang to unite the country had his talent not been spotted by Hu Qinan. It was his relationship with Hu that gave Dai Li a unique opportunity to serve Chiang, albeit indirectly before 1928, immediately after leaving Huangpu. After 1928, Dai Li had the rare opportunity to work under Chiang. Like Hu, he reported directly to Chiang without going through intermediaries or superiors. In this way, it was much easier for Dai Li to gain Chiang's attention and trust. Without this, it would probably have taken Dai Li a much longer time to gain recognition, if at all, by Chiang Kai-shek because there were many other Huangpu graduates who were more senior and perhaps more capable than Dai Li.

FOOTNOTES

1. Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1985), 1: 10.
 2. Ibid. In the chronological biography of Dai Li, prepared by the Intelligence Division (its predecessor was the Tewa Chu) of the Ministry of National Defence, Taiwan, Dai Li's father has been described as a scholar! See Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, ed., Dai Yunong xiansheng guanli (Taipei: Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, 1979), 2: 619. [hereafter cited as Quanli.]
 3. Ibid., 1: 4; Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 14; Qiao Jiakai, Tianxia jiangsheng shuan - Dai Li da gushi (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1985), 7-8.
 4. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun (n.p., n.d.), 2: 324; Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 16-17.
 5. Ibid., 1: 20; Quanli, 1: 6.
 6. Ibid.; Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 19-20; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 20.
- According to Wen Qiang, Dai Li served in the warlord army for two years. This is inaccurate. Wen Qiang also got the facts wrong when he states that Dai Li joined the warlord army after he had been involved in a village self-defense corps, when it should have been the reverse. See his, "Dai Li qiren," in Dai Li qiren, eds. Shen Zui and Wen Qiang (Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1980), 179-80. For a critique of Wen Qiang's account, see Qiao Jiakai, Hai lishi guochang (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1985), 207-45.
7. Quanli, 1: 6-7. See also Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 20-21.
 8. Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 23-24.
 9. Wen Molin, "Musheng wangshi - Dai Li jiangjun yu Du Yuecheng xiansheng," part 1, Zhongwai Zashi 11, no. 2 (February 1972): 18.
 10. See pages 49-50. For a short biography of Du Yuecheng, see Y.C. Wong, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative Political Biography," Journal of Asian Studies, 26, no. 3 (May 1967): 433-55.
 11. In 1924 Sun Chuanfang, who controlled the Shili clique, invaded Zhejiang from Fujian province. Zhejiang was then controlled by a military governor whose loyalty was to the Anhui clique under Sun Qirui. Sun completed the conquest of Zhejiang in September 1924. See Donald A. Jordan, "Provincialism within the Chinese National Revolution: The Case of Chekiang, 1926-1927," in China in the 1920s: Nationalism and Revolution, eds. F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas H. Stoddard (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), 130-31; R. Keith

Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Political Change: Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 11; and Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li da gushi, 21.

12. See Zhang Liangming, "Dai xiansheng de shengping," Jianxing Yuankan, no. 141 (1969): 93-95.

13. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 3rd edition (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 520; G. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 8-13.

14. Richard B. Landis, "Training and Indoctrination at the Whampoa Academy," in China in the 1920s: Nationalism and Revolution, eds. F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas H. Ertold (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), 76.

15. James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912-1949 (New York: Free Press, 1975), 212.

16. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun (n.p., 1948), 1: 212.

17. Zhang Liangming, "Dai xiansheng de shengping," 128-30. See also Qumaji, 1: 8; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 26-28.

18. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 30; Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li da gushi, 24.

19. Wang Yicai, "Dai xiansheng ersan shi zhuyi," Jianxing Yuankan, no. 176 (1972): 59; Luo Zhiyi, "Xinotan Dai Li ersan shi," Zhongwai Zashi 41, no. 1 (January 1967): 29. Many of the aliases which Dai Li adopted in the course of his career either had the Chinese character "shui" (water), one which means "water" or one with the radical "water."

20. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 30; Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li da gushi, 24. According to Zhao Longwen, who was also a senior tutor, Dai Li was successful only in his fourth attempt. Zhao Longwen, "Dai Yunong xiansheng," Zhongwai Zashi 1, no. 3 (May 1967): 12.

21. Richard E. Gillespie, "Whampoa and the Hanking Decade (1924-1936)," Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1971, p. 38. F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), 11.

22. *Ibid.*, 12.

23. Qumaji, 2: 631-32.

24. *Ibid.*, 1: 11-12; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 33.

25. Qiao Jiacai, "Dai xiansheng zai huangpu," Jianxing Yuankan, no. 142 (May 1969): 124-25.

26. Qiao Jiacai, "Dingshen youguan Dai xiansheng de shiliao," Jianxing Yuankan, no. 176 (1972): 104.

27. Ibid.; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 36-37.

28. Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li da gushi, 31. According to another account, Dai Li was forced to quit because he had been accused by his colleagues of corruption. Although his name was cleared, he felt he could no longer stay in the battalion and decided to leave. See Yang Mingtang, Cong yaming yingxiang dao yaming yingxiang: Dai Yunong xiansheng de fadou licheng (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1976), 20-21.

29. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 35; Quanji, 1: 12. Shen Zui states wrongly that Dai Li had assisted Hu Zongnan in intelligence work instead of Hu Qingan. See Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," in Dai Li giren, 5.

Hu Zongnan was one of Chiang Kai-shek's trusted army commanders. He was the commander of the second regiment of the first division of the First Army when the Northern Expedition began in July 1926, and was not known to have been involved in doing intelligence work. See Howard L. Boerman ed., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 2: 175-77.

30. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 34.

31. Ibid., 1: 37.

32. Ibid., 1: 40; Quanji, 1: 13.

33. Ibid., 1: 15-16; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 15-17; Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li da gushi, 34-37.

34. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 53-54.

35. Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li jiangjun he ta da tongzhi (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1981), 1: 223.

CHAPTER III

THE CREATION OF THE TOWU CHU

The year 1932 marked another milestone in Dai Li's career; in April that year he became the head of the Towu Chu (Department of Special Services), a security and intelligence organization which was much bigger than the Michu Zu (secret investigation section). In September, he was appointed director of the Second Department of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. Unlike the Michu Zu, which being a part of Chiang Kai-shek's military headquarters, was a government establishment, the Towu Chu belonged to a secret revolutionary society which was popularly known as the Blue Shirt Society, branded by some scholars as a "fascist" organization.¹ Since the Towu Chu was organizationally part of the Blue Shirt Society -- the Chinese called it the Sanmin zhuyi Lixing She (Earnest Action Society of the Three Principles of the People) -- a discussion on the creation of the Towu Chu must begin with the founding of the Lixing She.

Founding of the Lixing She

Founded on February 29, 1932, as a secret organization operating within the Guomindang,² the Lixing She was the outcome of a movement founded in July, 1931 by a group of Hunanpu graduates studying in Tokyo.³ They came together in response to the Wanbaoshan Incident of July 3, 1931, in which the Japanese intervened in a land dispute between Chinese and Korean farmers in

Wanbaoshan, Jilin (Kirin) province, forcing the former to abandon their farmland. Concluding that the incident was a prelude to full-scale Japanese aggression in China, two of the students, Xiao Zanyu and Teng Jie, returned to China immediately to organize other patriotic Huangpu graduates for the purpose of "saving the country."⁴

Developments in China following the return of Xiao and Teng added urgency to their cause. Following the Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931, Japanese troops invaded and occupied Manchuria. Meanwhile, the Yangtze river overflowed its banks, flooding at least four provinces in the central region of Yangtze and making millions homeless.

Exploiting the situation, the Communists who had entrenched their positions in the countryside of Hunan and Jiangxi increased their strength. On November 7, 1931, the Communists established a provisional government in Jiangxi, posing a serious challenge to the Guomindang Government at Nanjing.⁵ Factional strife within the Guomindang, meanwhile, had intensified with veteran politicians such as Wang Jingwei challenging Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. Faced with a split in the government, Chiang resigned as president of the Nanjing government on December 15, 1931.⁶ Support of the Guomindang from the students and intellectuals was also dissipating quickly because of the failure of the government to openly resist Japanese aggression. Since the Manchurian Incident, widespread demonstrations by students shouting slogans such as "Down with the Guomindang" and "Long Live the Chinese Communist Party" broke out

frequently.⁷ The prestige of the Guomindang, the party which just a few years before rode on a wave of popular nationalism to capture power and unify China, was at its nadir. China, in short, was on the brink of total political collapse.

Upon returning to China, Teng Jie, who had assumed a leading role in the movement, quickly drafted a plan proposing the creation of a secret society with the mission to mobilize the people to save the nation. Membership of the society would be restricted to Huangpu graduates.⁸ Teng discussed his plan with other Huangpu graduates and by the third meeting in October 1931, a temporary office was established in Nanjing. In December, Chiang Kai-shek, then in retirement in his hometown, was informed by the organizers of the creation of the movement.⁹ When he returned to power in early 1932, Chiang met with the organizers and offered to lead them.¹⁰ In February 1932, the Lixing She was officially founded in an inauguration ceremony where members led by Chiang took an oath in front of a portrait of Sun Yat-sen pledging to "earnestly strive to implement the Three Principles of the People, to revive the revolutionary spirit, to rejuvenate the people, to sacrifice all personal interests, obey all orders, maintain secrecy of the organization, so as to complete the revolution and to rebuild the nation...."¹¹ Chiang explained that the objective of the society was "to stop foreign aggression, rejuvenate the people, implement the Three Principles of the People and to complete the revolution." But its immediate task was "to quell internal rebellion first, then resist external aggression."¹² Chiang Kai-shek became the director

of the society and was addressed by the members as the Leader (lingnia). At its peak, the society had around 300 members, Dai Li being one of them.¹³

Dai Li and the Lixing She

Dai Li was invited by one of the founding members of the Lixing She, He Zhonghan, to join the society during its preparation stage. This was before Chiang Kai-shek was informed of the creation of the society. Knowing that Dai Li was working for Chiang, the organizers perhaps planned to ask Dai Li to inform Chiang later.¹⁴ It is not known whether Dai Li had reported to Chiang confidentially even before the organizers had formally done so. This could not be ruled out because Dai Li was known to be personally loyal to Chiang. Moreover, it was against the Guomindang regulations to form factions within the party.¹⁵ Eventually, however, Dai Li was not asked to report to Chiang by the organizers. Instead, Teng Jie asked Deng Wuyi, Chiang's aide-de-camp to do so.

As a member of the Lixing She, Dai Li attended all meetings Chiang had with the organizers before the official founding of the society. He was also given the additional task of seeing to security matters at these meetings held at Zhongshanling Garden at Nanjing.¹⁶ When the society was formally created, Dai Li was "elected" as one of the eleven reserve members of the Executive Committee.¹⁷ Later, he was appointed head of the Touu Chu of the Lixing She, after the resignation of Chiang's first appointee to the post.

The Creation of the Touw Chu

It is not known exactly when Chiang Kai-shek began to pay more attention to the need for a formal intelligence organization. However, he certainly thought that such an organization was needed when he decided to create the Michu Zu, a small intelligence unit headed by Dai Li in his military headquarters in December 1931. Before this Chiang had a number of intelligence operatives, each working independently for him. With the founding of the Lixing She, Chiang decided that it should have an intelligence department. To prepare members of the Lixing She for this, Chiang organized a one-month intelligence knowledge training camp for more than twenty people. He engaged one of his German advisers to lecture at the class.¹⁸ Dai Li was among those who attended the training camp.

At the graduation ceremony held at the end of the training camp, Chiang spoke of the need to establish a Touw department in the Lixing She. According to Gan Guozun, who was present at the ceremony, Chiang explained that the aim of the Touw Chu was to eliminate all counterrevolutionaries so that internal unity could be achieved before the nation resisted Japanese aggression. The ultimate objective of the Touw Chu was to help the Guomindang complete its second phase of the revolution and to implement the Three Principles of the People.¹⁹

The person Chiang selected to head the Touw Chu was not Dai Li but Gui Yongqing, who was the class monitor of the month-long training camp. However, after one week in office, Gui resigned as he

had other more pressing military duties to perform.²⁰ Upon Gui's resignation, the Linxing She recommended to Chiang six potential candidates to fill the position. We do not know the exact list, but presumably it included Dai Li and Qiu Kaiji, Gui's deputy in the Tewa Chu, and who was widely expected to succeed Gui.²¹

Dai Li, however, was Chiang's choice. As Dai Li himself revealed, in late February 1932, he received orders from Chiang to head the Tewa Chu, at a meeting with Chiang held at the Zhongshanling Garden. Dai Li at first was reluctant to accept the appointment. He believed that there were many people in the society who were more senior and better qualified than he for the post.²² Dai knew that his standing among the group of Huangpu graduates was rather low. He was a graduate of the sixth class, and for that matter, he had not even officially completed his training. Others in the society, such as Teng Jie, Qiu Kaiji and Zheng Jiemia, were all from the first five classes of Huangpu. Many of them too had attended or were graduates of universities in Japan, Russia or Germany.²³ The only advantage Dai had over the others was that he had already built up his credentials in intelligence work. Chiang obviously must have taken this into consideration.²⁴ He therefore assured Dai Li: "You are still the most suitable candidate. So long as you have the determination, you do not have to worry," (meaning, Dai Li could count on his support). Accepting the appointment, Dai Li pledged his loyalty to Chiang and was determined to sacrifice his life if necessary to complete his new mission. Dai Li revealed that when he accepted the order, his feeling was: "With

one hand I received the order [to head the Tzu Chu], with the other hand, I held on to my head --- if I did a good job, I might become a target of my enemies, but if I didn't, I was ready to accept punishment from the Leader [Chiang Kai-shek].²⁵

Chiang's choice of Dai Li heading the Tzu Chu was not well accepted by the other Lixing She members. Teng Jie, secretary of the society, initially was hesitant to confirm Dai Li's appointment, indicating some unhappiness over and resistance to Chiang's decision. Although Chiang, as director as well as "the Leader", had the final say over all appointments within the society, Teng Jie confirmed Dai Li as head of the Tzu Chu only after being repeatedly pressed by Chiang.²⁶ Dai Li's appointment was immediately challenged. The following day after he was named by Chiang to head the Tzu Chu, one comrade, who Dai Li did not name, claimed that he had been appointed by Chiang to look after the financial and personal matters of the Tzu Chu. According to Dai Li, he immediately tendered his resignation to Chiang, but it was not accepted. One year after that incident, Dai's position was still being challenged in the society.²⁷ Each year, at the Lixing She annual meeting, a resolution calling for Dai's removal was passed; but each time Chiang came to Dai's rescue, vetoing the resolution.²⁸

The relationship between Dai Li and Qiu Kaiji, in particular, had not been good. Qiu, who was Gui's deputy, was bitter that he was not appointed to replace Gui. In the Tzu Chu headed by Dai Li, Qiu was put in charge of operations. That Qiu could not get along

with Dai Li was well known in the Tewa Chu. Coincidentally, at a meeting with Dai Li in May 1932, Qiu was hit by a bullet fired by one of Dai Li's guards. Fearing that the incident might be misinterpreted, Dai Li promptly reported to Chiang that the guard had accidentally pulled the trigger while cleaning his rifle. Fortunately, Qiu was not seriously injured. After recovering from his wound, he was transferred to Hankou, to avoid future friction with Dai Li.²⁹

Dai Li was seen as an upstart. His appointment as head of the Tewa Chu was a controversial one threatening the unity of the society. However, by coming to Dai Li's defence every time he was being challenged, Chiang had in a way made Dai Li feel beholden to him. Dai Li's future, therefore, remained in Chiang's hands. This apparently was Chiang's way of ensuring that the head of his secret service would not become a threat to him.

Another source of friction between Dai Li and members of the Lixing She was the semi-independent status of the Tewa Chu. Although the Tewa Chu was a department of the Lixing She, the society had no control over how Dai Li ran it. Dai Li did not receive orders from the Executive Committee of the Lixing She but only from Chiang and he was ultimately responsible to Chiang.³⁰ He staffed his department with people he knew and trusted, and could not tolerate those who disagreed with him. Dai Li's conflict with Qiu Kaiji was partly because of Qiu's tendency to accept orders from the Lixing She, thereby undermining Dai's authority.³¹ Once Tong Jie confronted Dai Li about the matter but Dai Li simply refused to

discuss the status of his department, showing his uncompromising attitude on the independence of the Tewa Chu.

In September, 1932, Dai Li was appointed as head of the Second Department of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS) of the Military Affairs Commission. However, as far as the Tewa Chu was concerned, it continued to function independently of the BIS. The director of BIS, Chen Guofu (leader of the C.C. Clique), for example, had no control over Dai Li and Tewa Chu operations. The appointment of Dai Li as head of the Second Department was one of expediency; it legitimized the existence of the Tewa Chu by giving it a front organization in which to operate, and it also solved the problem of government funds being used for Tewa Chu operations. Thus, while the Tewa Chu was officially known as the Second Department of the BIS after September 1932, in practice, it continued to be run and managed by Dai Li independent of the BIS and the Lixing She.³²

It was probably Chiang Kai-shek's intention that the Tewa Chu should remain independent of the Lixing She and the BIS as far as its operations were concerned. This would enable him to exercise personal control over such an important instrument of power. Why was the Tewa Chu made a department of the Lixing She in the first place if it was intended to be run independently? One plausible explanation is that as the Lixing She was a secret society and not a government organization, by creating the Tewa Chu under the nominal control of the society would preempt any likelihood of this powerful organization from falling into the hands of Chiang's rivals.

In the early 1930s, Chiang's position in the Guomindang and the government was by no means secure; between 1927 and 1931, he had been twice forced to resign his position in the party and government. Therefore, being a shrewd politician as he was, by placing Tows Chu directly under his personal charge and at the same time out of the government structure, Chiang had made it rather difficult for anyone to gain control of the Tows Chu.

Another reason could be that Chiang wanted to underscore the revolutionary character of the Tows Chu. Unlike the Michu Su, the Tows Chu was not just another intelligence organization; it was a revolutionary organization entrusted with a sacred mission to eliminate all counterrevolutionaries. Because it was a revolutionary organization, those who joined were patriotic citizens who would be more committed to the Guomindang cause and the organization would not degenerate into an inefficient organization plagued with corruption and bureaucratic practices, like many departments of the Nanjing government. In short, Chiang hoped that by making Tows Chu part of a revolutionary organization, it would acquire for itself a revolutionary spirit which the Guomindang lacked after the establishment of the Government at Nanjing in 1928, and which the Lixing She was trying to revive.

In conclusion, the Tows Chu and its parent organization, the Lixing She, were created when the Guomindang revolution was teetering on the brink of total collapse. They had a common goal: "to protect the party and save the nation". The Lixing She, which formed a few other overt organizations, such as the Revolutionary

Soldiers Association, the Revolutionary Youth Association, and the Chinese Renaissance Society, so as to mobilize the people, organized at least four mass campaigns in the 1930s: the New Life Movement, the Internal Pacification and Stop External Aggression Movement, the National Military Education Movement, and the National Economy Reconstruction Movement.³³ Although Dai Li's position in the society was not very high nor his relationship with some members of the society good, his control over the Tzuu Chn of the society was secure due to the support from Chiang Kai-shek. Being a member of the Lixing She also had a very significant impact on the way in which Dai Li viewed the role of his department and the way he managed it. This and the development of the Tzuu Chn will be examined in the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China 1927-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). For a critique of Eastman's work see Maria Hsia Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism (Berkeley: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of California Press, 1985).
2. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1985), 1: 98.
3. Gan Guozun, "Minshu fuxing yundong ji," Zhongwai Zazhi 16, no. 1 (July 1974): 40.
4. Ibid.; Deng Yuanzhong, "Sanmin zhuyi lixing she chugao" Part IV, Zhuanji Wenxue 40, no. 6 (June 1982): 105.
5. Deng Yuanzhong, "lixing she chugao," Part IV, 103-104.
6. Ibid., 104-105.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 106.
9. Gan Guozun, "Minshu fuxing", 41.
10. Ibid.; Deng Yuanzhong, "lixing she chugao," Part IV, 108.
11. Gan Guozun, "Guanyu Shuowei fuxing she de zhenqing shi kuang," in Gan Guozun et. al., Lanyi she, fuxing she, lixing she (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1984), 117.
12. Chen Dunzhong, "Fuxing she, Qingbai she, Lanyi she" in Gan Guozun et. al., Lanyi she, fuxing she, lixing she, 65; Deng Yuanzhong, "lixing she chugao" Part IV, 108.
13. Deng Yuanzhong, "lixing she chugao" Part I, Zhuanji Wenxue 39, no. 4 (October 1981): 68.
14. Qiao Jicai, Huaren ji (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1981), 4: 489.
15. Gan Guozun, "Minshu fuxing," 41.
16. Ibid., 43.

17. Gan Guoxun, "Fuxing she de zhenqing shikuang," 117-118. It should be pointed out that although office bearers of the Lixing She committees were elected by its members, Chiang Kai-shek made the final decision on all appointments, taking into consideration, among other things, the number of votes a candidate won, experience, Huangpu class status. See also Deng Yuansheng, "lixing she chugao," Part IV, 109.

18. Deng Yuansheng, "Lixing She neimu zhuanzhen," Part I. Zhongwai Zashi 33, no. 5 (May 1983): 15-16.

19. See Gan Guoxun, "Lixing she yu Juntong Ju," Zhongwai Zashi, 31, no. 1 (January 1982): 69-70.

According to Chiang Kai-shek, the first phase of the revolution, from the beginning of the Northern Expedition (1927-28) to 1931, had ended in failure. The founding of the Lixing She marked the beginning of the second phase of the revolution. Teng Yuan-chung, "The Significance of the National Regeneration Movement in Republican China's History," Symposium on the History of the Republic of China, volume 3, Northern Expedition and Period of Political Turbulence (Taipei: Symposium of the History of the Republic of China, 1981), 199.

20. Deng Yuansheng, "Lixing she neimu," Part I, 16.

21. Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 49.

22. Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju ed., Dai Yunzong xiansheng guanli (Taipei: Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, 1979), 1: 316 [hereafter cited as Guanli].

23. See Deng Yuansheng, "lixing she chugao," Part III, Zhuanli Hannan 40, no. 1 (January, 1982): 81-87.

24. Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 49.

25. Guanli, 1: 316-17.

26. Deng Yuansheng, "Lixing she neimu," Part I, 15.

27. Guanli, 1: 417-18.

28. Mao Zhongxin, "Wei Dai Li xiansheng baibang bianwu," Zhongwai Zashi, 30, no. 4 (October 1981): 17.

29. Deng Yuansheng, "Lixing she neimu," Part II, Zhongwai Zashi, 33, no. 6 (June 1983): 23.

30. Mao Zhongxin, "Wei Dai Li xiansheng baibang bianwu," 17; Xiao Zulin, "Fuxing she shulue," Huashi Xiliao Hannan, no. 11, pp. 27-28.

31. Deng Yuanzhong, "lixing she neimu," Part II, 23.
32. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 30; Deng Yuanzhong, "Lixing she neimu," Part I, 16.
33. See Gan Guoxun, "Guanyu Shuwei fuxing she de zhengqing shikuang," 142-148.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONALIST MILITARY SECRET SERVICE: FROM TOWU CHU TO JUNTONG JU, 1932-1946

Dai Li served as Chiang Kai-shek's military secret service chief from April 1, 1932 to March 17, 1946, when he was killed in an airplane crash. During this period, the Towu Chu (Department of Special Services), which was reorganized in August, 1938 as the Junshi Weiyuanhui Diaocha Tongji Ju or Juntong Ju (Military Affairs Commission, Bureau of Investigation and Statistics), developed into one of the most powerful organizations in Nationalist China. By the end of the war of resistance against Japan in August 1945, Dai Li commanded more than 100,000 men and women, compared to less than 200 in 1932. This dramatic expansion was the outcome of the continuing unstable political situation in China, the growing dictatorial rule of Chiang Kai-shek and particularly the increasing Japanese encroachments on China which culminated into full-scale war in July 1937. These developments will be examined in detail when we discuss the activities of Dai Li's organization in the following chapters; in this chapter, the main concern will be the internal organizational developments of the Towu Chu and Juntong Ju.

The Development of Towu Chu, 1932-1937

While Dai Li had been continuously challenged as head of the Towu Chu by his comrades in the Lixing She (Earnest Action Society), within the Towu Chu itself, he was the undisputed leader. Called the laopan (bees)¹ by his men, Dai Li exercised

complete control over all affairs in the organization. Those who disagreed with him or posed a potential challenge to his authority were quickly neutralized. For example, as discussed earlier, Qiu Kaiji, who was the head of operations and who sometimes took orders from the Lixing She, was sent by Dai Li to Hankou as the station chief there. Dai Li also did not keep his deputy, Zheng Jiemín, who was one of the senior ranking officials in the department appointed by Chiang Kai-shek to assist Dai Li, in his headquarters in Nanjing. Instead, Zheng was permanently stationed at Beijing to coordinate the department's operations in northern China.²

From the outset, Dai Li also took personal control over the recruitment of operatives in his nascent organization. Most of the senior operatives were recruited by Dai Li personally or on the recommendation of existing Tewa operatives with Dai Li's approval. As the Tewa Ghu belonged to an organization which restricted membership virtually exclusively to Huangpu graduates, Dai Li also tried to limit his senior ranking operatives to Huangpu graduates in the initial years. In fact, the majority of them were Dai Li's former classmates at Huangpu; they formed the core group of the Tewa Ghu and later, of the Juntang Ju.³

Not only did Dai Li try to limit his inner circle to people whom he already knew and therefore trust, he even personally interviewed all rank and file operatives before engaging them.⁴ But following the outbreak of the war of resistance in 1937, Dai Li had to abandon doing this because his department had to resort to mass recruitment to meet the urgent needs of the war. Nevertheless, to ensure that

the new operatives were familiar with who their leader was and to gain their loyalty, Dai Li made it his policy to give what was called "spiritual talk" (jingshen jianghua) at training camps held for these recruits, and to speak at all graduation ceremonies held at the end of such training camps.⁵

Before 1937 when the Tows Chu was expanding slowly, Dai Li relied mainly on his own circle of friends as a potential source of new operatives and comrades in the Lixing She to recommend their friends and relatives to join the department. The various military and police academies under Guomindang control were also places where Dai Li turned to for recruits, especially after the Tows Chu began to expand rapidly following the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan.⁶ To prepare the newly recruited operatives to perform their work properly, Dai Li organized numerous training camps for the operatives. He attached great importance to such training camps for he believed that they had "a direct bearing on the success or failure of our work."⁷ Besides teaching them the mechanics and techniques of tows work which included, among other things, communication with codes, disguise, surveillance, escape, break-in, driving, shooting, use of explosives; Dai Li also placed great emphasis on inculcating a strong revolutionary spirit among the trainees.⁸

However, not all Tows Chu operatives were recruited by Dai Li or were graduates of this training camp. In 1935, more than a thousand men from an intelligence section in Chiang Kai-shek's military headquarters at Nanchang were incorporated in the Tows Chu, following the merger of the intelligence section with the Tows

Chu.⁹ The intelligence unit in Nanchang was created in 1933 by Chiang as part of his campaign to exterminate the Communists in Southern and Central China. It was headed by Chiang's military aide-de-camp, Deng Wenyi. In July 1934, with the Guomindang Fifth Extermination Campaign progressing smoothly against the Communists, Deng was suddenly removed as head of the intelligence unit reportedly due to his failure to prevent a big fire at Nanchang airport, believed to be the work of the Communists.¹⁰ Chiang then appointed Dai Li to double as head of the intelligence unit. Following the successful completion of the Fifth Extermination Campaign, which resulted in the Communists fleeing their strongholds and embarking on the epic Long March, Chiang ordered the merger of the intelligence unit in Nanchang with Dai Li's Tzu Chu.

Unlike the intelligence unit in Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters at Nanchang which operated predominantly in the Communist-infested Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, the Tzu Chu was a national organization. Thus immediately after its creation, Dai Li sent his men to the various cities in the country to set up field organizations. This task was facilitated by the fact that the Lixing She had branches throughout the country, and initially Dai Li's operatives used Lixing She premises as operation bases.¹¹ Generally, there were three main types of field tzu chu organizations: "region office", "station" and "special unit". Region offices were usually established in large and strategically important cities such as Nanjing, Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjing, Hankou, Guangzhou; stations were found in small cities such as

Nangzhou, Zhengzhou, Suzhou, and Zhangsha; special units, on the other hand, were created in towns or certain places such as those where Guomindang troops were stationed.¹² For security reasons, field operatives were not allowed to establish horizontal relationships; each agency operated independently of each other so as not to jeopardize the lives of other operatives and their work should one of the field organizations be infiltrated by the enemy.¹³ Dai Li travelled frequently to various parts of China to inspect these field organizations and to direct operations.¹⁴

Besides expanding his organization nation-wide, Dai Li at the same time worked to penetrate open organizations so as to use them as a cover for covert operations. One such organization was the military. Although the conduct of military intelligence was not the responsibility of the Toua Chai -- it belonged to the Second Bureau of the General Staff -- Dai Li was indirectly involved when his deputy, Zheng Jiebin, was concurrently the director of the Second Bureau. Furthermore, many of the military intelligence operatives were also Dai Li's men in the sense that they were trained by Dai Li's instructors.¹⁵ Another organization of the military over which Dai Li exercised some form of influence was the powerful Gendarmerie corps. The head of the political training department of the Gendarmerie headquarters was a Dai Li man.¹⁶

Dai Li also worked covertly and relentlessly to bring under his ambit China's police forces. Dai Li was aware that for his secret service to be an effective instrument in maintaining the internal security of China and eliminating opponents of the Guomindang, he had

to control the police force.¹⁷ In fact, before the creation of the Towa Chu, Dai Li had proposed to Chiang Kai-shek formation of a political police force "to perform intelligence, security and safety work".¹⁸ Perhaps in response to that, Chiang appointed Dai Li the special Commissioner to the Hangzhou Zhejiang Police Academy in October 1932. Under Dai Li's command, the academy became the base at which a new political police force was trained; Dai Li also used the academy as a cover to organize towa training classes.¹⁹

In 1936, to consolidate further his control of the country's police, Dai Li obtained Chiang Kai-shek's blessing to merge the Zhejiang Police Academy and the Senior Police Officer's Training School of the Ministry of Interior to form the Zhongyang Jingshan Xueyuan (Central Police Academy), with Chiang as commandant and Dai Li the chairman of the academy affairs committee.²⁰ This merger was part of Dai Li's plan to build a new police force for China. Besides the Central Police Academy, Dai Li also organized "Special Police Training Classes" in many locations in China; Qianyang in Hunan, Xifeng in Guizhou, Chengqing in Sichuan, Lanzhou in Gansu and Jianou in Fujian. More than 13,000 policemen were graduates of these classes.²¹ In addition to the training of policemen, Dai Li at the same time sent his senior operatives to work under cover in provincial police organizations and public safety bureaux. As the Police Department in the Ministry of Interior controlled the appointment of key positions in the provincial police establishments, Dai Li first brought that department under his control.²² However, because not all provincial police forces were under Nanjing control,

before 1935, Dai Li could only manage to appoint his operatives to lead the police departments of Hangzhou, Shanghai, Hankou and Nanjing.²³ More provincial police, however, were brought under Dai Li's control towards the end of 1938. These included the police of Lanzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou and Xinjiang.²⁴ In addition, the third section (intelligence) of every province's Bureau of Public Safety (Tsun Chu) was headed by a Tsun operative from the local tsun station.²⁵

After the outbreak of the war with Japan, Dai Li was successful in retaining the loyalty of some of the policemen he trained in occupied China. These policemen became an important source of intelligence on the activities of the Japanese. In 1943, Dai Li told Milton Miles that:

My very best secret agents in occupied China are the policemen I trained before the war at the Police Academy in Nanchow.... When the Japanese captured Nanking, who was controlling the traffic and clearing the streets for their tanks and trucks? The police. The Japanese needed them. They had no men trained to keep order in China, so they took the existing police. The Japanese pay them for the work they know how to do. But they are still my men.²⁶

The Juntong Ju Period, 1938-1946: War and Expansion

By 1937, the Tsun Chu had developed from a small intelligence organization with less than 200 men when it was first created to one with about 3,600 men.²⁷ Dai Li had also established a vast network of field organizations throughout China and had brought more and more of China's police forces under his ambit. However, it was during the war of resistance against Japan, which broke out following the July

7, 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, that Dai Li reached the pinnacle of his career. The war brought massive expansion in the size and mission of Dai Li's organization and increased his prestige and power.

Like all Guomindang establishments, the Towa Chu shifted its headquarters from Nanjing to Chongqing, the wartime capital of China, soon after the outbreak of the war with Japan. Located at Luejia wan, in the outskirts of Chongqing, it soon became the target of Japanese air raids. Sometime in June 1941, these bombing raids were so intense that Dai Li had to temporarily evacuate to a safer site nearby. But with the outbreak of the Pacific War, such raids were less frequent and Dai Li again made Luejia wan his headquarters.²⁸

In August 1938, the Towa Chu, which was officially known as the Second Department of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS) of the Military Affairs Commission, was reorganized and renamed the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics or Junshi Weiyuanhui Diaocha Tongji Ju (Juntong Ju).²⁹ The First Department of the BIS was renamed Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (Zhongyang Diaocha Tongji Ju or Zhongtong Ju) and transferred to the Guominang Central Executive Committee. The respective spheres of operations of these two secret services were not clearly spelled out, but as Dai Li's bureau came under the jurisdiction of the Military Affairs Commission, it was generally concerned with military matters and national security, and Zhongtong Ju was responsible for security in the civilian administration and in the party. In

practice, they often overlapped; for instance, both the Juntong Ju and Zhongtong Ju were involved in anti-communists activities.³⁰

Although Dai Li was the head of the Tewa Chu, he was surprisingly not named the director of the Juntong Ju. Instead, Chiang Kai-shek appointed him the deputy director but with complete control over all affairs of the organization, just as before. The post of director was reserved for directors of Chiang's Personnel Attendance office. Why did Chiang Kai-shek decide against naming Dai Li the director of Juntong Ju which Dai Li unquestionably deserved? According to the official history of the Juntong Ju, Dai Li was not named the director because his military rank, that of major-general (shaojiang), was one rank below the rank for the post of director, which was lieutenant-general (zhongjiang).³¹ Shen Zui, who served as Dai Li's general affairs head, however, believed that Chiang Kai-shek was afraid that appointing Dai Li as director might result in jealousy and unhappiness among some of his generals who were far more senior than Dai Li, and therefore presumably deserved the post more than Dai Li.³² However, as Dai Li was still in control of his organization as before, whether or not he was named the director became rather unimportant.

The Juntong Ju had expanded considerably in size during the War of Resistance against Japan. Before the outbreak of war in July 1937, Dai Li commanded about 3,600 men. A year later the number of men under him had increased to 6,000. By 1941, Juntong Ju had about 20,000 men, an increase of 230 percent in three years.³³

When the war ended in 1945, it was estimated that the Juntong Ju had between 40,000 and 50,000 operatives. If the number of guerrilla troops were included, the total number of men Dai Li had was about 100,000.³⁴ However, of these only about 1,000 men were based in the Juntong Ju headquarters in Chengqing, the others were stationed in the various field organizations and open organizations such as the police and military and other institutions which had been penetrated by the Juntong Ju.³⁵

Besides leading a much bigger secret service than before the war, Dai Li in September 1937 was also given new areas of responsibility. At the height of the Battle of Shanghai, Dai Li was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to organize a guerrilla force in Shanghai to assist the Guomindang army in resisting the Japanese. In response, Dai Li formed the *Sushu Xingdong Weiyuanhui* (Sushu Action Commission), whose members included many well-known Shanghai leaders, such as the head of the secret society, *Qingfeng* (Green gang), *Du Yuesheng*. With the help of these people, Dai Li was able to mobilize up to 10,000 patriotic Chinese youths, workers and secret society members at very short notice to form the *Biedong dai* (Special Action Corps).³⁶ In May 1938, Dai Li renamed his *Biedong dai* the *Zhongyi Jinquo Jun* (Loyal Patriotic National Salvation Army).³⁷ After the fall of the coastal provinces to the Japanese, the *Zhongyi Jun* continued to fight a guerrilla war with Japanese troops in Occupied China. It was also given the task to check Communist expansion in these Japanese-held areas, especially in the Nanjing-Shanghai area.

Besides the Zhongyi Jun, Dai Li was also ordered by Chiang Kai-shek in March 1940 to organize another guerrilla force known as the Bianyi lunsheng dai (Plainclothes Urban Commando Corps). The task of this force was to collect intelligence and to sabotage Japanese military installations and communication lines in major cities in the occupied areas. In December 1941, the lunsheng dai was reorganized and renamed the Biedong Jun (Special Action Army).³⁸

Since the Juntong Ju was given the duty to lead all organized guerrilla forces in Occupied China, Dai Li had been seeking outside assistance to train and equip his guerrillas. He first turned to Britain which was willing to cooperate with him as the British desired his help in collecting intelligence on the Japanese. But the cooperation did not materialize after the British lost Hong Kong and their other colonies in Southeast Asia.³⁹ Dai Li then turned his attention to the Americans, who had entered the Second World War following the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan in December 1941. He received a very favorable response.

In early 1942, the U.S. Navy despatched Vice-Admiral Milton E. Miles to China on an urgent mission to establish weather and intelligence units and to prepare the China coast for U.S. Navy landings in the near future in a general offensive against Japan.⁴⁰ To achieve these objectives, the U.S. Navy needed the cooperation of the Chinese, and only Dai Li's organization was in a position to help. Dai Li promptly extracted a price for this by requesting the U.S. Navy to provide training and equipment for his

guerrillas.⁴¹ Miles readily agreed to this request because he needed Dai Li's guerrillas to protect U.S. installations and personnel in China.⁴² What resulted was the creation of SACO (Sino-American Cooperative Organization) in April 1943.⁴³ According to the SACO agreement,

SACO is organized for the purpose of attacking our common enemy by common effort, employing American equipment and technical training, and utilizing the Chinese War zones as bases. The objects of the common attack would be the Japanese Navy, the Japanese Merchant Marine, and the Japanese Air Forces in various territories of the Far East; the mines, factories, warehouses, depots, and other military establishments in areas under Japanese occupation.⁴⁴

Dai Li was appointed director of SACO, with Miles as deputy director. Over 2,500 Americans from the Navy, Marines and the Army were involved in SACO activities.⁴⁵ Altogether, SACO established twelve guerrilla warfare training camps in Free China and Occupied China, and trained 49,180 men.⁴⁶ Dai Li revealed that his Biedong Jun, the largest operation unit in the Juntong Ju, was equipped almost entirely by the U.S. under the SACO cooperation.⁴⁷

Another new mission which Dai Li assumed during the war with Japan was checking subversive economic activities. By 1939 the Guomindang government, driven from its economic base in the rich coastal provinces to the mountainous primitive provinces of West China, had begun to suffer the consequences of economic isolation, aggravated further by the Japanese blockade. As a result, essential goods were short; hoarding; blackmarketing and smuggling became rampant. It should be pointed out that although China and Japan were at war, Chungking, out of economic necessity, allowed merchants in

Free China to trade with Occupied China. It even imposed import and export duties on this trade.⁴⁸ However, tax evasion was a common problem, resulting in the loss of much-needed revenue to the government. To deal with this matter, and to check hoarding and fight corruption by Guomindang officials in the economic sphere, Chongqing established in November 1940 the Jisi Ju (Smuggling Prevention Bureau) in the Ministry of Finance with Dai Li as its director.⁴⁹ Dai Li reportedly proposed to Chiang Kai-shek earlier in April 1940 the creation of such a bureau.⁵⁰

Towards the end of 1943, Dai Li resigned the directorship of the Jisi Ju. He was succeeded by Xuan Tioua, a graduate from the first class of students at Huangpu. The reason for his resignation is not entirely clear. According to Dai Li, he decided to give up the post because he was holding too many posts.⁵¹ However, there were rumours that Dai Li was forced to give up the post as a result of a power struggle among the Huangpu graduates for this lucrative job.⁵² Dai Li could also have been removed from the post by Chiang because Dai Li had misappropriated a huge sum of money (Ch \$300 million) belonging to the bureau. He reportedly diverted the money to the newly created SACO without proper authorization.⁵³ Because Dai Li was unable to return the money he took, there were rumours that he had committed suicide.⁵⁴ The U.S. Embassy, on the other hand, reported in September 1943 that Dai Li had been relieved of his post, although it did not cite this problem as a reason for his removal.⁵⁵ Dai Li, however, emerged from the crisis unscathed mainly because his good friend and sworn brother, Du Yuesheng, came

to his rescue. Du reportedly spoke to "a certain powerful person" on Dai Li's behalf. He also managed to come up with the money to help Dai Li.⁵⁶

The Jisi Ju affair does not seem to have affected Dai Li's control over another economic organization, the Huoyun Guanli Chu (Commodity Transport Control Bureau). Dai Li was appointed the director of the Huoyun Chu in April 1943. The function of this organization was to secure adequate civilian as well as war supplies for China from the occupied areas.⁵⁷ Besides controlling the import of goods by merchants from the occupied areas, the Huoyun Chu also engaged in trading by setting up private companies operated by Juntong agents.⁵⁸

Thus, during the War of Resistance against Japan, the Juntong Ju under Dai Li was no longer just involved in intelligence and counterintelligence activities. It was also engaged in fighting a guerrilla war in the occupied areas, checking subversive economic activities and in helping to secure important supplies for Free China. With these additional roles, Dai Li's organization expanded dramatically in size. His agents were active virtually everywhere in China, in Free China as well as in the occupied areas. The Juntong Ju, indeed, had become a vital part of Chengqing war efforts.

Maintaining the Revolutionary Spirit and Discipline in the Juntong Ju and Juntong Ju

The way in which Dai Li ran his organization bore a strong imprint of the influences he was exposed to at the Huangpu Military

Academy and the Lixing She. Both the academy and the society were revolutionary organizations of the Guomindang created for the purpose of achieving the national revolution. They emphasized strict discipline among their members and punished severely those who breached the rules. Similarly, Dai Li had considered his outfit a revolutionary organization - in fact "the most advanced revolutionary organization"⁵⁹ in China. Throughout his career, he had placed great emphasis on keeping the revolutionary spirit alive in his organization, to ensure that it "would never become a bureaucratized and yamenized organization", like many of the Guomindang Government departments.⁶⁰ During the war of resistance, he gave "spiritual talks" (jingshen jianghua) on every Monday morning at his headquarters;⁶¹ he also attached great importance to "spiritual training" (jingshen xunlian) and indoctrination at the training camps he organized for new operatives.⁶² Of all his men, he demanded that they "served with unwavering determination, loyalty, courage and be prepared to sacrifice their lives."⁶³ Dai Li also demanded that his operatives must give up seeking personal glory and fame and must not have the intention to become "official" (suoguan).⁶⁴ They had joined the organization "to participate in the revolution to save the country, and not to enjoy a good life".⁶⁵ As if to set an example, in early 1946 Dai Li rejected an offer by Chiang Kai-shek to nominate him as a member of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee "because those who struggle for power and glory are not suitable to be revolutionaries."⁶⁶

Instead of seeking personal fame and glory, Dai Li urged his operatives to strive to become "anonymous heroes" (wuming yingxiang). Claiming rhetorically that as tea workers, they all played a crucial role in the Guomindang revolution, Dai Li said:

The history of the party [Guomindang] may not mention our names because we are the anonymous heroes. But in actual fact, without us the history could not have been written.... History is written on white paper with black ink. Our place in history is not the black ink but the white paper, without which the history could not have been written....⁶⁷

In addition to personal exhortation, Dai Li imposed a very strict code of discipline on his men. He said:

I do not want to see anyone breaking the discipline of the organization. Because discipline is like the life of the organization, anyone who breaks it is trying to destroy the organization. We must therefore, punish those who break the discipline.⁶⁸

The punishment for those who broke the organization rules can be rather harsh although the offense may appear trivial. For example, operatives who were found to be sloppy in their work and failed to carry out their tasks properly risked being put in detention. Those who were corrupt or used their position to engage in illegal activities such as smuggling to enrich themselves could be shot if found guilty by Dai Li. In 1941, Dai Li sent one of his bodyguards to face the firing squad for using his position to swindle money. Neither was his driver for ten years spared when he was caught smuggling.⁶⁹ Dai Li also did not hesitate to punish high-ranking officials who were caught breaking his rules. In 1945, following the end of the war, Dai Li ordered the arrest of Wei Daming, the head of

Communications Department, and a general in the Chinese army for illegally occupying a house which belonged to a German couple in Shanghai.⁷⁰ Dai Li also banned the playing of mah-jongg among his men because he considered it a waste of precious time. Those caught doing so by his internal discipline inspectors could face the maximum punishment of death. Though this appeared draconian, no one was said to have been sentenced to death for being caught playing mah-jongg.⁷¹

Dai Li was also concerned about his men abusing their powers, a common problem in most secret police. Addressing this problem, Dai Li had warned those who "vent their anger on the people, conduct searches improperly, detain people unnecessarily, swindle and abuse their position and ride roughshod over others" that they faced punishment according to the "rigid rules" of the organization should they be found guilty.⁷² Such behavior, according to Dai Li, had already given the organization "a bad reputation" among the common people, and as the head of the organization, he would not condone it.⁷³ To monitor the conduct of his operatives, Dai Li created an elaborate internal inspection system in 1936 to act as "his ears and eyes".⁷⁴

The total number of operatives who were sentenced to death by Dai Li is not known. However, Dai Li himself revealed that in 1940 alone, 26 persons were shot for breaching the rules; 10 in 1941.⁷⁵ Many more operatives received lesser punishment such as short-term detention. Every year on the anniversary of the founding of the Jungong Ju, some of the detainees were released under an amnesty

announced by Dai Li.⁷⁶ They were allowed to resume their duties, given another chance to *daisui ligong* - to redeem themselves by good performances.

While Dai Li may have been tough on those of his men who broke the organization rules, at the same time, he rewarded those who were loyal to him, who worked hard and sacrificed for the organization. As Dai Li himself admitted: "Discipline does not refer only to punishment, but rewards too; it is not all negative but has its positive aspects as well."⁷⁷ Those who showed good performance, Dai Li rewarded generously with cash.⁷⁸ One operative, for instance, was given Ch\$10,000 by Dai Li for being hardworking.⁷⁹ Besides monetary rewards, Dai Li made it his policy to look after the families of operatives who were killed in line of duty. These numbered 1704 men.⁸⁰ This policy included the families of operatives who received the death penalty from Dai Li for breaking the organization rules because Dai Li treated his organization as a big family:

Our comrades' sons are also our sons, our comrades' daughters are ~~also~~ our daughters; especially the children of comrades who died - whether killed in action, died while serving the organization or sentenced to death according to the organization code - we have to show our special care and love for them....⁸¹

To look after these children, Dai Li set up the Lixun orphanage and a primary school in his headquarters at Chongqing.⁸² He also provided generous financial help to families of operatives who were killed.⁸³

Dai Li may have appeared high-handed, ruthless and authoritarian in the way which he enforced the organization rules. However, he defended his action by claiming that all these were necessary "to maintain order in the organization, to keep it a healthy one, and to protect those who had contributed to the success of the organization...."⁸⁴ Drastic actions taken against those who misbehaved also served as a warning to the others not to misbehave. After the war of resistance had ended in August 1945, however, discipline within Juntong Ju apparently became quite bad. The main reason for this appears to be that when the war was over, those who fought in it thought that they duly deserved the rewards victory brought. Furthermore, the avenues for corruption were numerous. As a result, many Juntong operatives, like many Guomindang soldiers, engaged in corrupt practices during the process of taking over all properties belonging to the Japanese and their collaborators. Viewing this with concern, Dai Li revealed that:

Some of our comrades have succumbed to the evil practices in our society; they have degenerated, become undisciplined and sloppy in their work. Because of this our organization will soon become yamenized and bureaucratized like any other ordinary organization.⁸⁵

Dai Li in fact had anticipated this problem just after the war had ended. From August 21 to 25, 1945, he issued numerous directives to his men warning them against removing any property of puppet officials and traitors illegally, taking revenge against their enemies, and extorting money from the people. He ordered all his men to follow his instructions strictly and not to take any action without his approval.⁸⁶ Those who failed "to observe the strict

discipline of the organization ... will be censored and disciplined."⁸⁷ In response to complaints of abuses by his men, Dai Li formed a Temporary Working Committee to investigate and punish those who broke the organization rules during the take-over process.⁸⁸ And to show that he was serious, Dai Li did not hesitate to arrest one of his senior officers (Wei Daming) for corruption; another junior agent who accepted a suit and a pair of shoes as bribes from a collaborator was ordered to be shot.⁸⁹ Despite this, corruption and abuses of power by Juntong operatives appeared to be rampant, particularly in big cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou.⁹⁰

By the end of 1945, it was apparent that Dai Li had failed in enforcing discipline in his organization. His rhetoric, exhortation and not even his threat to punish severely those who broke the rules could stop his men from trying to enrich themselves during the take-over process. A few days before he died, Dai Li told his operatives at a gathering in Beijing that he was "worried about the future of the organization" because of the deteriorating discipline in the organization.⁹¹

FOOTNOTES

1. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun, (n.p., n.d.), 2: 48. In a directive dated July 25, 1938, Dai Li ordered his men to stop addressing him as "laopan"; they should instead call him "Mr Hung", one of the many alias Dai Li used.
2. Qiao Jiacai, Tianma lingzhong zhuan - Dai Li de gushi (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1985), 53. Zheng Jiemín was born in 1897 in Guangdong province. He spent two years teaching in Singapore. After quitting his teaching job, he operated a small coffee shop which failed. He then returned to China to join the Huangpu Military Academy as a student of the second class in 1925. See Deng Yuansheng, "Sanmin zhuyi lixing she chugao," part III, Zhuanji Wenxue 40, no. 1 (January 1982): 83.

Besides Zheng, Chiang Kai-shek also appointed another person to assist Dai Li. He was Xu Renji, who was in charge of the accounts department in the Tosa Chu and Juntong Ju. See Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhida de Dai Li," in Dai Li si ran, eds., Shen Zui and Wen Qiang, (Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1980), 7; Deng Baoguang "Juntong lingdao zhongxin ju beibu ge shiqi de xushi ji huodong qinghuang," Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji (Beijing), no. 86 (April, 1983): 176.
3. Mao Zhongxin, "Wei Dai xiansheng baibang biamu," Zhongwai Zashi 30, no. 2 (August, 1981): 63; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1985), 1: 50.
4. Mao Zhongxin, "Dai Li jiangjun bieshuan," part I, Zhongwai Zashi 30, no. 5 (November 1981): 133; Ye Xiashai, "Nanwang de xiaoshi," Jianxing Yuekan, no. 176 (1972): 418.
5. Mao Zhongxin, "Dai Yunong xiansheng ersan shi," Qinghai Zhishi 7, no. 9 (March 1966): 5.
6. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhida de Dai Li," 87-88.
7. Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 58.
8. Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li liangjun he ta de tongzhi (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1981), 2: 193-96; Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhida de Dai Li," 85.
9. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 50; Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, ed., Dai Yunong xiansheng suanji (Taipei: Guofang bu qingbao ju, 1979), 1: 23; Deng Baoguang, "Juntong lingdao zhongxin," 175. The manpower of the Tosa Chu increased from 670 to 1722 men after the merger.
10. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhida de Dai Li," 7; Deng Baoguang, "Juntong lingdao zhongxin," 175.
11. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 51; Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tou xushi de shouxiang," Guangdong Wenshi Ziliao, no. 29 (1980): 192.

12. Chen Gongshu, Lanyì shè nàimù (Shanghai: Guomin Xinwen Tushu Yinshua Gongsi, 1943), 6-9; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 54; Quanji, 1: 22, 25; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 42-44; Cheng Yiming, "Juntong towu sushì," 194-95.
13. Cheng Yiming "Juntong towu sushì," 194; Liu Feichu, Fushang luoying ji (Taipei: Zhongzhong Shuju, 1968), 54; Quanji, 1: 441, 447. Because there existed horizontal ties between the Shanxi station and a Taiyuan unit, both organizations were destroyed by the Japanese in 1939 after the Japanese had infiltrated the Taiyuan unit. All 27 operatives except 2 were arrested and killed by the Japanese. See Qiao Jiakai, Hai lishi xuezheng (Taipei: Zhongwai Zashi Chubun She, 1985), 71.
14. During such visits, which sometimes took him into Occupied China, Dai Li had become the target of Japanese bombing runs. For instance, in June 1942, while accompanying Milton Miles of the U.S. Navy to inspect his field organizations in Busheng in Fujian, Dai Li and his party were attacked by Japanese planes. See Milton E. Miles, A Different Kind of War: the little-known story of the combined guerrilla forces created in China by the U.S. Navy and the Chinese during World War II (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967), 48-55. Again in the Lunar New Year of 1943, when Dai Li was at Zhengzhou in Hunan, Japanese planes suddenly began bombing the tours. See Yu Junqun, "Gongshu Dai xiansheng shengping," Jianxing Yuekan, no. 164 (1971): 160.
15. Cheng Yiming, "Juntong towu sushì," 195; Shen Zui, "Wo suo shidao de Dai Li," 103-04; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 271-73.
16. *Ibid.*, 69.
17. *Ibid.*, 47; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 498.
18. Quanji, 53.
19. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 498; Quanji, 1: 53-54.
20. Quanji, 2: 674-75; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 120-22.
- That the Central Police Academy was in effect under Dai Li's control was not known by many outsiders. The U.S. Ambassador to China, for example, reported in 1944 that he believed the Academy had no connection with Dai Li's organization. See Telegram of the Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State, dec. 893-20211/8-1244, August 12, 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), 140 [hereafter cited as FRUS].
21. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 502.

22. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," 90; Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tewu sushi," 195.
23. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 498.
24. Ibid., 2: 501; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 69-70.
25. Ibid., 69; Chen Gongshu, Lanyi sha, 15.
26. Miles, Different Kind of War, 192; see also Charles Dobbins, "China's Mystery Man," Colliers, February 1, 1946, p. 66.
27. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 153.
28. Dai Li, Yixun, 3: 289; Deng Baoguang, "Juntong lingdao zhongxin," 189.
29. Dai Li, Yixun, 3: 20.
30. He Wenlong, Zhongguo tanyu naimu (Hong Kong: Fengyu Shuwu Yinxing, 1947), 33.
31. Quanji, 1: 84-85; see also Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 154-55. Dai Li was promoted to the rank of Zhongjiang posthumously in 1946 by Chiang Kai-shek.
32. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," 28-29.
33. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 286.
34. Ibid., 2: 418, Quanji, 1: 257.
35. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," 30.
36. Quanji, 1: 68-69; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 131-36; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 198-99.
37. Quanji, 1: 73; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 205-06. See also Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, ed., Zhongwai hama suo zhi (Taipei: Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, 1970), 7-8. (hereafter referred to as Zhongwai hama).
38. Ibid., 8, Quanji, 1: 125-28.
39. Ibid., 1: 128; Zhongwai hama, 8-9.
40. Miles, Different Kind of War, 18. The weather in the western Pacific originated from Asia. Unlike Japan, which had an elaborate network of reporting stations from Manchuria through Occupied China to collect weather intelligence, the U.S. fleet operating in the western Pacific did not have such facilities and therefore, was at a disadvantage.

41. Ibid., 51; Zhongwai banun, 12.
42. Miles, Different Kind of War, 51.
43. For scholarly treatment of SACO in the context of U.S. involvement in China, see Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusades in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), chapter 11; and William F. Heed, America's China Sojourn: America's Foreign Policy and its Effects on Sino-American Relations, 1942-1948 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983).
44. Quoted in Miles, "U.S. Naval Group, China," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 72 (July 1946): 922. The full text of the SACO agreement can be found in Zhongwai banun, 19-30 (in Chinese), and in Kermit Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949; reprinted New York: Walker & Co., 1976), 424-28.
45. Miles, "U.S. Naval Group, China," 923.
46. Qianli, 1: 166-67. Miles mentions that the U.S. Navy equipped and supplied 80,000 guerrillas. Miles, "U.S. Naval Group, China," 923.
47. Dai Li Xiang, 2: 291.
48. Lloyd E. Eastman, "Facets of an Ambivalent Relationship: Smuggling, Puppets and Atrocities during the War, 1937-1945," in The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions, ed., Akira Iriye (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 276-77.
49. Ibid., 277; Qianli, 1: 142-44.
50. Ibid., 1: 139-40; Liangxiang Dai Li shuan, 1: 290; Yang Mingtang, Gang yunxing yunxing dou yunxing yunxing: Dai Li xiang xiangsheng de fandan licheng (Taipei: Zhongheng Shuju, 1976), 57-58.
51. Liangxiang Dai Li shuan, 1: 294, 2: 516.
52. Wen Qiang, "Eiben wuxiang hou Dai Li lai ping qinghuang suoji," Bailin Huochi Ziliao Huabian, no. 16 (1983): 128.
53. Liangxiang Dai Li shuan, 1: 236; Mao Zhongxin, "Wei Dai Li xiangsheng baibeng bianru," Zhongwai Zashi 30, no. 3 (September 1981): 97.
54. Ibid.
55. The Charge in China (Atchison) to the Secretary of State, doc. 893.108/76: telegram dated September 10, 1943, FRUS, 1943, 112-13.

56. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 236-37; Mao Zhongxin, "Wei Dai Li bianmu," 97.
57. Qianli, 1: 148-49; Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li da gushi, 399-401.
58. The Consul at Guilin (Ringwalt) to the Secretary of State, doc. 740.00112 FW 18-1044 dated August 8, 1944, FRUS, 1944, 138-39; Roy Stratton, SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy (New York: C.S. Palmer, 1950), 19.
59. Shen Zui, Wo da tian shangya (Hong Kong: Jinling Chubanshe, 1987), 6.
60. Qianli, 1: 439.
61. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," 86-87.
62. *Ibid.*, 85; Qiao Jiacai, Tongzhi, 2: 195-96; Dai Li, Yizun, 2: 58.
63. Dai Li, Zhongzhi Zhentan (n.p., Political Bureau of the Military Commission, 1938), 137.
64. Qianli, 1: 439.
65. *Ibid.*, 1: 337.
66. *Ibid.*, 1: 417.
67. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yizun (n.p., 1948), 1: 212-15.
68. *Ibid.*, 2: 324-25.
69. Qianli, 1: 319, 479.
70. Fortunately for Wei, Dai Li was killed in an airplane crash shortly afterwards before he could deal with the matter. Wei was released without being tried by Dai Li's successor, Zhong Jiamin. See Mao Zhongxin, "Wei Dai Li bianmu," 77.
71. Qiao Jiacai, Dai li chi guosheng (Taipei: Zhongwai sishi, 1985), 58; Mao Zhongxin, "Wei Dai li bianmu," 64.
72. Qianli, 1: 453-54.
73. *Ibid.*, 1: 364; Dai Li, Yizun, 1: 22.
74. *Ibid.*, 3: 251; Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li da gushi, 71.
75. Qianli, 1: 479; Mao Zhongxin, "Dai Li jiangjun bieshuan," part I, 133.

76. Quenli, 1: 480.
77. Ibid., 1: 477.
78. Ibid., 1: 479.
79. Dai Li, Yizun, 3: 50.
80. Quenli, 1: 279.
81. Ibid., 1: 313.
82. Miles, Different Kind of War, 202. Chaplin (Lieutenant) William S. LaSer, an American who served in the SACO headquarters in Chengqing, described what he saw in a Christmas party for the orphans:
- General Tai was a real tough man and he ran a real tough outfit, but you'd never know it when you saw him there with these kids [orphans]. He was just like he had a bunch of his own children and grand children climbing all over him....
- Quoted in Stratton, The Army-Navy Game (Falmouth, Mass.: Volta, 1977), 193.
83. Quenli, 1: 313.
84. Ibid., 1: 322.
85. Ibid., 1: 416.
86. Dai Li, Yizun, 2: 299, 302-03, 306-09, 310.
87. Quenli, 1: 448.
88. Dai Li, Yizun, 2: 299.
89. Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 2: 495.
90. Dai Li, Yizun, 2: 299; Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), 440-41.
91. Quenli, 1: 416.

CHAPTER V

ROLE IN "INTERNAL PACIFICATION"

The *Towu Chiu*, as we have discussed in Chapter 3, was created within the *Lixing She*, founded by a group of nationalistic Kuangpu graduates, in response to growing internal and external difficulties faced by the Guomindang. Chiang Kai-shek had hoped to use the *Lixing She* to strengthen the party and government in order to revive the faltering Guomindang revolution. His strategy was to use the *Lixing She* and the mass organizations it controlled, such as the Revolutionary Soldiers' Association, the Revolutionary Youth Association and the Chinese Renaissance Society, to mobilize and rally the people behind the Guomindang. At the same time, he sought to use Dai Li's *Towu Chiu* to eliminate domestic opposition by means of intelligence operations, which included the occasional employment of terror or assassinations. Chiang's ultimate objective was to achieve internal unity first before facing the increasing Japanese encroachments. In this chapter, I shall examine the role Dai Li played in eliminating domestic opposition to Chiang Kai-shek and his Guomindang government.

In the 1930s, Chiang Kai-shek faced growing opposition from students and intellectuals who protested strongly against his increasingly dictatorial and repressive rule. He continued to face challenges from regional militarists who were wary of Chiang's efforts to end their autonomy: in November 1933 Chiang faced a military revolt in Fujian and in June 1936, Guangdong and Guangxi

rebelled when Chiang attempted to bring them in line. Then in December 1936, Chiang himself was taken prisoner in Xi'an by troops who refused to obey his orders to launch attacks on the Communists. The Communists had posed a serious threat to Chiang's government since the early 1930s, and Chiang was determined to exterminate them before he turned his guns against the Japanese militarists. These are some of the more serious internal challenges Chiang faced.

Tsun Chu and Political Oppression

During the 1930s the Nanjing government became increasingly repressive. Chiang Kai-shek, who had by the mid-1930s emerged as the unchallenged leader with dictatorial powers, was determined to hang on to power in face of mounting popular discontent. Many people were disillusioned with the Guomindang revolution which had failed to improve their livelihood. Meanwhile, Chiang's policy of appeasement towards Japan enraged many patriotic Chinese. Pressures were put on the government by these people who organized anti-government and anti-Japanese demonstrations. Chiang, however, was committed to his policy of achieving "internal pacification first before resisting external aggression"; he was, therefore, intolerant of opposition and was determined to eliminate it. The Guomindang government increasingly resorted to mass arrest, violent suppression of demonstrations and strikes, kidnapping, and even assassinations to silence the opposition.¹

Students, who were generally more vocal and nationalistic in China, bore the brunt of this repressive policy, although leftist writers and newsmen also suffered. According to one account, in Beiping alone, 471 students were arrested, 22 were killed, 95 were wounded and another 113 were expelled following clashes with the authorities during the period of April to September, 1932. Another 100 students and their professors were imprisoned for political crimes from June 1932 to January 1933, also in Beiping. Then between November 1934 and March 1935, 230 intellectuals and students were said to have been arrested in the Beiping-Tianjin area.² Another account by the Communists put the number of students killed and arrested by the Guomindang government during the same period even higher.³

What part did the Tzu Chu play in the suppression of student movements against Nanjing? Dai Li biographers and accounts by former Tzu Chu agents who went to Taiwan in 1949 make no mention of the role of the Tzu Chu in this area. This is not unexpected as to do so would confirm Dai Li's role in the violent suppression and killing of unarmed patriotic students. However, there is enough evidence to show that Dai Li's Tzu Chu was involved in the suppression of the student movements. For instance, most of the student demonstrations against the authorities were suppressed by the police or the gendarme corps. As we have mentioned earlier, Dai Li had brought the police forces in provinces which were under Nanjing's influence under his control as soon as he became the chief of the Tzu Chu. Dai Li appointed his own operatives to lead these police forces and in

addition, trained some policemen in carrying out town work. Dai Li also exercised some influence over the gendarme corps as the head of the political training department of the corps was a Dai Li man. His field agents worked closely with the corps, providing them with intelligence on anti-government groups for further action.⁴

The Town Ghu was also involved in monitoring closely student organizations as many of these bodies were Communist-infiltrated. For example, in December 1935 when the December Ninth Movement (a series of student demonstrations against the Guomindang for its policy of appeasement towards Japan) spread from Beijing to schools and colleges in 16 other cities,⁵ Dai Li ordered his operatives to pay particular attention to student movements. He specifically instructed his operatives to report on the background of student organizations and the main activists.⁶ Shen Zui, one of Dai Li's senior operatives -- he was the head of Juntong Ju General Affairs Department -- who was arrested after the Communist victory in 1949, revealed that in the 1930s, one of his main tasks as the head of a town field unit in Shanghai was to monitor student activities.⁷ He further revealed that the Town Ghu enrolled many of its agents as students in the various schools and colleges to spy on the student population. These "professional students" were usually called up for indoctrination at Town Ghu training classes during the vacation.⁸

There were also numerous political assassinations during the 1930s. Many of these were attributed to the "Blue Shirts" and to Dai Li's special services department. In particular, Dai Li was allegedly behind the assassination of two of Chiang's civilian

enemies, Yang Quan, the Secretary of the League for the Protection of Civil Rights, and Shi Liangcai, the owner of Shanghai's leading newspaper, Shenbao. The League for the Protection of Civil Rights was formed on January 17, 1933, in Shanghai by Madame Song Qingling (widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen), Cai Yuanpei (President of Academia Sinica) and a few other intellectuals who were concerned about the increasing terror and the disregard of civil rights shown by the Guomindang government. The activities of the League, however, antagonized the government. Yang Quan sharply attacked the government for the disappearance of the leftist writer, Ding Ling, in spring of 1933.⁹ In May, 1933, a protest note, attacking the creation of the "Blue Shirt Society" by Chiang, was lodged by the League with the German Consuls in Shanghai because of the fascist nature of the Blue Shirt Society.¹⁰ Anonymous letters, presumably from the Blue Shirts, were sent to Yang and Madame Song, chairman of the League, warning them to cease their "counterrevolutionary" activities.¹¹ On June 18, 1933, Yang Quan, who was also the secretary-general of Academia Sinica, was assassinated in front of Academic Sinica by four gunmen.¹²

Shi Liangcai, on the other hand, was gunned down on a road between Hangzhou and Shanghai on November 14, 1934. Chiang Kai-shek reportedly ordered the assassination of Shi because the latter was helping in financing Communist underground activities in Shanghai.¹³ Shi was also said to be the financial backer of a Communist front member and educationist, Tao Xingzhi.¹⁴

Both the above assassinations were reportedly carried out by Dai Li's agents, and Dai Li was directly involved in the planning of Yang's murder.¹⁵ However, direct evidence of the involvement of Dai Li's agents was lacking. In the case of Yang Quan, the French police actually arrested one of the assassins.¹⁶ He had confessed to the police before his death; but the French police refused to reveal any details of the case "because this would involve the highest personalities in the Chinese Government."¹⁷

Allegations of Dai Li's involvement in the two cases were made by Chen Shaosiao in a book entitled, Hainang Lu (Records of the black network), published in Hong Kong in 1966. Shen Zui also makes the same charge; but unfortunately, Shen's account was based entirely on Chen's evidence.¹⁸ Former agents of the Tzuu Chu who went to Taiwan after the defeat of the Guomindang in 1949, have expectably avoided mentioning the matter. Liangxiang, Qiao Jiacai and, not to mention, Dai Li's official biographers at the Intelligence Division of the Ministry of National Defense, for instance, also chose not to discuss these cases. But in 1981, Wei Daming, who was Dai Li's head of Communications, became the first person in Taiwan to have openly stated that Dai Li was involved in the deaths of Yang and Shi.¹⁹ Wei himself was not involved in operations work; but according to him, he heard about the Tzuu Chu's involvement in the two cases from other agents. Denouncing such activities as detrimental to the reputation of the Tzuu Chu and the Government, Wei, however, claimed that the Tzuu Chu was not involved in similar political assassinations of Chiang's civilian opponents after these two incidents except those who were branded as hanjian (traitors).²⁰

Although the real killers of Yang and Shi may never be known, the suspicions that the Tzu Chu was involved remained strong. As Chiang's secret police chief, part of Dai Li's task was to suppress dissent and opposition to the Government. In Dai Li's own words, the Tzu Chu was:

to monitor and suppress counter-revolutionaries so as to consolidate the power of the party. Only by consolidating the power of the party can we realize the Three Principles of the People.... Those who oppose the Three Principles of the People are counter-revolutionaries; we will use all means to exterminate such evil forces.²¹

In other words, those who opposed the Guomindang, its ideology and its leader, i.e., Chiang Kai-shek, were considered counter-revolutionaries and had to be liquidated by the Tzu Chu. Only those "who were firm believers of the [Guomindang] revolution need not have any fear about the Tzu agents."²²

How should the counter-revolutionaries be eliminated? According to Dai Li, "in our present work, we have no other ways but to adopt negative methods to destroy all obstacles to our revolution."²³ These "negative methods" presumably included the occasional employment of terror, secret arrest and assassinations. In an instruction book entitled, Zhongshi shentan (political spies), written by Dai Li for use in his numerous training classes, he classified "secret arrests" and "assassinations" as a part of sabotage operations by intelligence agents. He commented that they were rather simple to execute, posing very little technical problems.²⁴

**Challenges in the Provinces: The Fujian
and the Guangdong-Guangxi Rebellions**

The Fujian rebellion (November 1933 - January 1934) and the Guangdong-Guangxi rebellion (June - September 1936) were two of the more serious challenges posed by regional militarists against Nanjing. Both rebellions, however, ended rather quickly and with little fighting between the Central government troops and the rebel forces. One reason for this was Dai Li's success in undermining the rebel's military forces by engineering the defection of key commanders and their troops from the rebels' ranks.

The rebellion by the Nineteenth Route Army, which had gained national attention for heroically resisting the Japanese following the Shanghai incident of January 28, 1932, was the outcome of a combination of Communist propaganda and instigation of southern politicians, Chen Mingshu and Li Jishan.²⁵ With the cessation of hostility in Shanghai, the Nineteenth Route Army was transferred to Fujian to fight the Communists insurrection there. In May 1933, Chen, who held a personal grudge against Chiang for bypassing him in 1929 for the post of supreme military authority in Guangdong which he thought he deserved, succeeded in persuading the commanders of the Nineteenth Route Army, Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tinghai to rebel against the central authorities in November 1933. Among other things, the newly created People's Revolutionary Government called for war with Japan, and collaboration with the Communists and the Soviet Union. The rebels even entered into a secret agreement with the beleaguered Red Army in Jiangxi province. This was discovered by Dai Li's operatives in the province.²⁶ Under the agreement, the

Communists who were being encircled by Chiang's extermination forces could replenish vital war supplies through Fujian.²⁷

Following the outbreak of the insurrection, Dai Li went to Fujian to direct personally operations in gathering intelligence on the rebels as well as to attempt to persuade key commanders of the Nineteenth Route Army to defect to the Central government.²⁸ Assisted by Qiu Kaiji, Zhou Zhaoqiong and others, Dai Li established contact with the commanders of four key divisions of the Nineteenth Route Army: Mao Weishou, commander of the 61st division; Shen Guanghan, commander of the 60th division; Zhang Zhen, commander of the 49th division; Qu Shoulian, commander of the 67th division; and succeeded in getting them to switch their allegiance to the Central government.²⁹ With the defection of these key army divisions the insurrection quickly collapsed without major battles being fought.

Operations in Guangdong by Dai Li's operatives to win over the allegiance of Chen Jitang's men, thereby undermining Chen's military strength, had begun before Chen, Li Zongren and Bai Chengxi, warlords of Guangxi, decided to rebel against Chiang Kai-shek in June 1936.³⁰ A year earlier, Nanjing watched with concern the military buildup in Guangdong and Guangxi, and was further alarmed by Chen's illegal detention of three warships belonging to the Central government.³¹ With a combined military strength of more than 400,000 men, the two provinces posed a formidable challenge to Nanjing.³² As a result, Dai Li was ordered by Chiang to step up intelligence operations in the two provinces. Dai Li sent some of his most capable cadres such as Liang Gongqiao and Zheng Jianmin to

Hong Kong and Guangzhou to monitor the situation.³³ By June 1936, when Guangdong-Guangxi leaders decided to resist Chiang's attempt to bring their provinces under his control, Dai Li had already laid the groundwork to win over the allegiance of some of Chen's forces to the Central government.

In 1936, Chiang Kai-shek decided that it was time to bring the two southern provinces into the fold of the Central government. By then, Chiang had already extended his influence to the borders of the two southern provinces. He had defeated the Communists in Jiangxi in 1934 and while pursuing the fleeing Communists, extended his influence into Quisou, Yunnan and Sichuan. He had also brought Fujian under his control in early 1934. When the southern leaders rejected his offer to negotiate, civil war appeared inevitable. The Guangdong-Guangxi armies in fact struck first by attacking Central government troops in Hunan on the pretext of marching north to resist Japanese aggression.³⁴

A bloody civil war was, however, avoided when some of Chen's forces defected to the Central government. On July 2, 1936, 7 pilots led by Huang Zhigang flew their airplanes to Nanchang, marking the beginning of a series of defections in the airforce which had over a hundred airplanes. Two days later, the chief of staff of Chen's airforce, Chen Zhulin, led his men and another 40 airplanes to Nanchang. The last batch of pilots defected with the remaining airplanes on July 18, 1936. Virtually the entire airforce had betrayed Chen. The man responsible for this successful operation was Zheng Jiemia, who had earlier cultivated Chen Zhenxing of the

Guangdong air force. Through Chen, Zheng was able to persuade many other airforce officers to defect to Nanjing.³⁵

Besides the airforce, Dai Li also succeeded in engineering the defections on July 8, of General Yu Hameo of the Guangdong First Army. To contact Yu, Dai Li, under the order of Chiang, managed to persuade a former Guangdong army general, Lin Hu, who was then in retirement in Hong Kong but had maintained close ties with the Guangdong army, to help. Lin agreed and persuaded Yu and his other generals to switch their allegiance. A meeting between Yu and Chiang Kai-shek took place on July 8 and the next day, Yu sent messages to other officers to follow his action.³⁶ In response, other army division commanders also declared their allegiance to Nanjing.³⁷

On July 15, 1936, sensing that defeat was inevitable with all these defections, Chen Jitang fled to Hong Kong. Having lost a powerful ally, Li Zongren and Bai Chengxi were forced to the negotiation table. In September, an agreement was reached whereby Bai took up appointment as a member of the Military Affairs Commission, while Li kept his official post in Guangxi. But Guangxi lost some of its independence as Chiang appointed his own men to handle important financial matters in the province.

The Fujian and the Guangdong-Guangxi rebellions, unlike other rebellions by warlords against Chiang in the period between 1928 and 1931, did not result in bloody civil war. While there were other factors than the defections of important military figures in the ranks of the rebel forces engineered mostly by Dai Li which account for the collapse of these rebellions, -- for example, the Fujian

rebellion was deemed to fail from the beginning because of poor planning and leadership, -- it cannot be denied that Dai Li's efforts had, to a great extent, determined the non-bleedy end of the rebellions. Had there been no such operations by Dai Li or had his operations failed, it was most likely that the final outcome of the two rebellions, which no doubt would still have ended with the defeat of the rebels, would have to be decided on the battlefields. Thus, while Dai Li cannot be given all the credit for the collapse of the rebellions, as his official biographers and colleagues have claimed, his efforts were crucial in determining the nonviolent end to the two rebellions.

Xi'an Incident, December 12-25, 1936

About two months after the collapse of the Guangdong-Guangxi rebellion, China plunged into another unprecedented crisis: the mutiny in Xi'an and the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek by the engineers led by Zhang Xueliang, commander of the Dongbei (Northeastern) Army and Yang Hucheng, commander of the Xibei (Northwestern) Army. Chiang had gone to Xi'an to exhort his generals to commence military operations against the Communists, who had established themselves in northern Shaanxi at the end of the Long March. Fortunately for China, Chiang was released unharmed by his captors on December 25, 1936, after agreeing verbally to stop all anti-communist campaigns and to lead the country into fighting Japanese aggression.³⁸

When the Xi'an crisis occurred, Dai Li was in Guangzhou. Upon hearing the news, he hurried back to Nanjing that very day to attend

an emergency meeting called by the Lixing She to discuss the crisis. As Dai Li was responsible for the security of Chiang, he was strongly criticized by members for failing to prevent the crisis.³⁹ The society decided to adopt a hard-line stand towards the Xi'an rebels,⁴⁰ and supported the so-called "war faction" headed by Mo Yingqin, Minister of Military Affairs, which advocated the use of force against the rebels to secure the release of Chiang. Another group, the "peace faction," headed by Madame Chiang and her brother, T.V. Soong, wanted to negotiate a settlement to the crisis.⁴¹

As Xi'an was surrounded by troops of the Central government and negotiations between Zhang Xueliang and Nanjing got underway to find a solution to the crisis, Dai Li received a letter from Zhang on December 20 through T.V. Soong, who was one of the representatives from Nanjing trying to secure the release of Chiang. Zhang reportedly wanted to inform members of the Lixing She, many of whom held senior positions in the Central Army, about his position and motives.⁴² He had sent the letter to Dai Li and not directly to the secretary of the society probably because of his personal friendship with Dai Li. This relationship was believed to have been forged in the early 1930s. The building in Nanjing which was used by Dai Li as his headquarters was reportedly a gift from Zhang.⁴³

Upon receiving the letter from Zhang, Dai Li decided to make a trip to Xi'an, not secretly but openly, to help secure the release of Chiang. He intended to use his friendship with Zhang to persuade the latter to release Chiang. But Dai Li knew that he was going to Xi'an

at great personal risk because Xi'an then was controlled by rebel troops and infested with Communists who were no friends of his. Thus before leaving for Xi'an, Dai Li bade a tearful farewell to his aged mother and gave an emotional speech to his men, urging them, among other things, to continue to serve the country and party regardless of what happened to him.⁴⁴ He also told his men that he wanted to emulate Chiang Kai-shek's action in 1922 when Chiang went on board the warship *Yongfeng* to be by the side of Sun Yat-sen, who was facing an armed rebellion by warlord Chen Jiongning.⁴⁵ Dai Li, however, did not inform his comrades in the *Lixing She* about his decision to go to Xi'an.⁴⁶ Perhaps he was afraid that because of the risk involved, his comrades might disapprove of his decision. However, it is more likely that since Dai Li had never sought the approval of the society on matters concerning the *Tsun Ghu*, he therefore saw no reason to get the society's endorsement for this decision.

On December 22, Dai Li arrived in Xi'an with Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Zhang Xueliang immediately had him arrested. Dai Li spent the next three days as a prisoner in the basement of Zhang's residence and he was not given an opportunity to meet Chiang. However, by so doing, Zhang had actually prevented Dai Li from falling into the hands of Dai's enemies. In fact Zhang had been urged by his men "to kill Dai to avoid future complications."⁴⁷

Dai Li probably played no role in helping to secure the release of Chiang because he did not hold the key to the negotiations between the various parties in the crisis. By being held prisoner by Zhang,

he was in fact kept out of the matter altogether. It was Madame Chiang Kai-shek, T.V. Soong, and Zhou Enlai who played key roles in settling the crisis.⁴⁸ However, while busy trying to find a way out of the crisis, Zhang did go to the basement where Dai Li was held to talk with Dai Li at least once, on December 24. According to Yu Junyun, Dai Li's bodyguard, Dai Li urged Zhang to release Chiang as soon as possible as any delay could complicate the matter. Dai Li also gave Zhang his personal guarantee to plead with Chiang for clemency on Zhang's behalf once Chiang was released.⁴⁹ However, as Zhang had already decided even before meeting Dai Li to release Chiang, but could not do so until he had convinced his associate in the mutiny, Yang Hucheng, Dai Li's advice and assurances probably had little impact on the whole event.

Chiang Kai-shek gained freedom on December 25, 1936, after spending two weeks as a prisoner of Zhang. To assume personal responsibility for the incident, Zhang decided to escort Chiang out of Xi'an. Dai Li was also released together with Chiang. Zhang reportedly asked to be put on the same airplane with Dai Li to Nanjing.⁵⁰ Was this an indication that Zhang now wanted Dai Li's protection in return? Interestingly, Zhang Xueliang, who was court-martialed and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment but was pardoned by Chiang on the grounds that he had regretted his mistakes, was handed over by the Military Affairs Commission to Dai Li, who took charge of putting Zhang under house arrest.⁵¹

Although Dai Li did not play any significant role in bringing about the release of Chiang, his decision to go to Xi'an shows that

he was very committed to trying all means of resolving the crisis even though he had very little influence over the whole event. By deciding to go to Xi'an despite the considerable personal risk involved, he displayed exceptional courage and personal loyalty to Chiang. That Chiang was very pleased with Dai Li's action was beyond doubt. After the Xi'an incident, whenever Dai Li was sick, Chiang would either send someone to visit him on his behalf or send a personal letter to express his concern. Once Dai Li was hospitalized for a chronic nose ailment, Madame Chiang paid him a visit and reportedly instructed the hospital authorities not to discharge Dai Li without her permission.⁵²

Dai Li's Role in Suppressing the Communists in Northwest China

One of the most serious threats from within China faced by Chiang was posed by the Communists. Following the split with the Kuomintang in 1927, one group of Communists, who were basically pro-Moscow in outlook, went underground in Shanghai and from there, organized strikes, sabotages and uprisings in the cities, causing temporary problems but posing no serious threat to the Nanjing authorities. Another group, under the leadership of Mao Zedong however, retreated to the countryside in Jiangxi where they started to build a party army and try to win over the support of the largely discontented peasantry. By 1931, the guerrilla troops led by Mao had posed a serious security threat to Nanjing. In response, Chiang launched a total of five so-called extermination campaigns against the Communists, of which the first four (the first campaign began in

December 1931 and the fourth one from January 1933 to April 1933) ended in failure. The fifth campaign, which started in October 1933, however, succeeded in defeating the Communists who were forced to flee their bases and to start on the epic Long March. After marching for over 6,000 miles under very difficult conditions and pursued by Guomindang troops, the Communists finally reached northern Shaanxi where they set up their new bases.

Although the Towa Chn was created in April 1932, it was not involved in any significant way in the fourth (January to April 1933) or the fifth (October 1933 to November 1934) campaigns to exterminate the Communists in Jiangxi province. If the Towa Chn had been involved, particularly in the successful fifth campaign, Dai Li's biographers would have been the first to glorify Dai Li's contributions.⁵³ Another indication that Dai Li's Towa Chn was not involved in the extermination campaigns was the creation of a separate intelligence unit in 1933 by Chiang Kai-shek at his Nanchang military headquarters. Known as the Third Section (Bisan Ko) in the headquarters, it was headed by Chiang's military aide-de-camp, Deng Wenyi. Although Dai Li replaced Deng as head of the Third Section in July 1934, the Fifth Extermination Campaign by then was already nearing its end. It would seem that the appointment was aimed at preparing for the eventual absorption of the Third Section by the Towa Chn which occurred in February 1935.

Dai Li only began to assume a more active role in Nanjing's continued effort at suppressing the Communist guerrillas after the latter had established themselves in northern Shaanxi in October

1935. Continuing in his campaign to exterminate the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek established in October 1935 the Northwest Bandit-Suppressing Military Headquarters at Xi'an with himself as commander and Zhang Xueliang, Commander of the Northeastern army (Dongbei Jun), as his assistant. An intelligence unit, also known as the Third Section, was created within the headquarters to provide intelligence on the Communists. But, unlike the Third Section in the Nanchang military headquarters, it was placed under Dai Li's control. The chief of the Northwest Region office of the Towa Chu in Xi'an also headed the Third Section. The Northwest Region office was created, also in October 1935, to coordinate all Towa Chu operations against the Communists in Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai provinces.⁵⁴

Following the establishment of the Third Section and the Northwest Region Office in October 1935, the Towa Chu network in Shaanxi and the surrounding provinces began to expand dramatically. Before this, the Towa Chu had established only two stations, one in Shaanxi (Xi'an), and the other in Lanzhou. After 1935, however, three more stations were established in Taiyuan, Jinan and Yulin. Each of these stations controlled numerous small Towa Chu operational units, distributed in key areas in the province. In just the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area alone, there were more than twenty of such units.⁵⁵ As in other cities in China, Dai Li brought the police forces in Xi'an, Lanzhou and other important cities in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces under the Towa Chu. For example, Ma Zhichao, who was the station chief of Shaanxi was also

the police chief of Xi'an; Shi Min, the station chief of Lanzhou, was also Lanzhou police chief.⁵⁶ The control of the police was important because not only did it provide a cover for Tzuu operations, it also gave the Tzuu operatives the power to carry out arrests.

During the Xi'an mutiny, Dai Li's network was temporarily destroyed by the Xibei and Dongbei armies.⁵⁷ Ma Zhichao was almost arrested by Yang Hucheng on the day of the mutiny.⁵⁸ Dai Li, however, quickly rebuilt his network after the incident was over. With the outbreak of the war of resistance against Japan in July 1937, the Tzuu Chu organizations in the Northwest were further expanded to meet the need to check communist wartime expansion. In 1941, the Northwest Region Office located at Xi'an was renamed Jinshaan Region Office, responsible for operations in Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces; a new Northwest Region Office was created in Lanzhou, responsible for operations in Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia provinces.⁵⁹ In addition, in 1942, Dai Li set up "Special Investigation Stations" in Hanzhong in Shaanxi province and Lichui in Gansu, with the special mission to cultivate CCP members to work as internal spies of the Juntong Ju. These "Special Investigation Stations" also trained Juntong operatives for infiltration operations.⁶⁰

The Tzuu network in the northwest China covering the five provinces was the biggest in China.⁶¹ The main task of this extensive organization was to gather intelligence on the Communist guerrillas for use in operations by the Bandit-Suppressing

headquarters.⁶² It was also responsible for the arrest of Communist underground workers, progressive elements, students and the suppression of all mass protests against the government so as to maintain order and stability.⁶³ From 1935, there was an increasing number of Chinese youths, most of them students, who travelled to Yanan to join the CCP in response to the Communist propaganda to resist Japan. To counter this, Dai Li ordered check-stops to be set up on all major transportation networks leading to Xi'an to prevent these patriotic youths from joining the Communists.⁶⁴ Many of these youths were arrested and sent to labor (concentration) camps in Xi'an.⁶⁵

In an effort to undermine the Communists from within and to carry out sabotage activities in Communist-controlled areas, Dai Li had ordered his operatives to infiltrate communist organization, particularly in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region. These operatives were usually trained by Communists who had defected and joined the Youxi Club and Junfeng Ju.⁶⁶ One of these renegade Communists was Zhang Guotao, a senior Communist leader, who defected from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the summer of 1938.⁶⁷ After breaking ranks with the CCP, Zhang escaped to Hong Kong with his family. From there, he was "invited" to Chongqing by Dai Li, who appointed Zhang the head of the "Special Operation Work Research Committee", responsible for planning operations aimed at getting CCP members to defect to the Guomindang.⁶⁸ Another renegade Communist, Cheng Muzi, was recruited by Dai Li to head the "Nansheng Special Operation Work Training Class" in Shaanxi province, to train mainly

patriotic youths for infiltrating Communist organizations in Yanan such as the Kangda (Resist Japan University), Lu Xun College of Arts and the various "mobile" schools organized by the New Fourth Army in Jiangnan (the area in the lower Yangtze delta, encompassing portions of the provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui and Zhejiang).⁶⁹

According to former Tewa operatives such as Zhang Yanfo and Shen Zui, the Tewa Chu's attempts to infiltrate the CCP organization were by and large unsuccessful.⁷⁰ One plausible reason was that the CCP's watertight organization was generally impervious to enemy infiltration. However, Dai Li himself revealed in 1936 that one of his operatives, Shen Zhiyue, succeeded in gaining admission to the Kangda and later joined the Communist Red Army.⁷¹ With the outbreak of the war of resistance and the formation of the second CCP-Guomindang United Front, the Red Army was reorganized as the Eighth Route Army. Shen Zhiyue was appointed a staff officer in the Eight Route Army; in this position, he was able to collect "valuable" intelligence on the Communists for Dai Li. Shen escaped arrest by the CCP secret police in 1939 when his identity was exposed following the arrest of a number of Junctong comrades who had infiltrated the CCP with his help.⁷² Other than this apparently isolated successful operation, the overall outcome of Dai Li's attempt to infiltrate the CCP ranks is difficult to assess due to a lack of relevant materials.

**Checking Communist Expansion
in the Occupied Areas**

Dai Li's involvement in anti-communist campaigns, however, was not confined to the Northwest. His outfit was also busy trying to uncover Communist underground organizations in cities in China.⁷³ Then, with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Dai Li's role in suppressing the Communists gained a new dimension. Instead of just concentrating on security operations against the Communists, Dai Li was ordered by Chiang to organize a guerrilla force to compete with the Communists over the control of occupied areas. Although the Japanese had swiftly defeated the Nationalist armies in east and north China, they had complete control over only 59 of the 796 counties they nominally occupied.⁷⁴ Thus, with the Guomindang military influence virtually eliminated from, and the Japanese unable to assume total control over the occupied areas, the opportunity for the Communists, and for that matter, any ambitious militarist, to expand their influence in the occupied areas was great.

Although the Communists had entered into an alliance with the Guomindang to resist the Japanese, Mao Zedong's policy during the war was "70 percent expansion, 20 percent dealing with the Kuomintang and 10 percent resisting Japan."⁷⁵ Thus the Red Army, which was reorganized into two combat groups, the Eighth Route Army, which operated in Yellow River region to fight the Japanese, and the Fourth Route Army, which was stationed in the south of Yangtze, concentrated their main efforts in expanding in north China and the Jiangnan regions respectively instead of resisting the Japanese invaders.⁷⁶

The Communist guerrillas quite easily defeated other poorly organized pre-Guomindang guerrilla forces in north China, particularly in Shandong and Hebei.⁷⁷ The guerrilla force of Dai Li, known as the Zhongyi Jiuguo Jun (Loyal Patriotic National Salvation Army), however, put up a serious challenge to the Communist guerrillas in central and south China.

Dai Li was ordered by Chiang to organize a guerrilla force in Shanghai during the Battle of Shanghai in August-November 1937. After the fall of Shanghai, the guerrilla force absorbed the remnants of the defeated Nationalist troops and continued to be active in the areas surrounding Shanghai and Nanjing. One of the main tasks of the Zhongyi Jun, besides harassing the Japanese with guerrilla warfare and sabotage activities, was to prevent the Communists from gaining a foothold in the Nanjing-Shanghai region. The reason was obvious for Nanjing was the former capital and Shanghai, a major financial and industrial city, was Chiang Kai-shek's chief source of financial support. Through the eight years of war, the Zhongyi Jun of Dai Li was able to defeat numerous attempts by the Communists to establish themselves in the surrounding areas of Nanjing and Shanghai. When the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the Zhongyi Jun were the first Nationalist troops to enter Nanjing and Shanghai.⁷⁸

While Dai Li's Zhongyi Jun was able to secure the surrounding areas of Nanjing and Shanghai from the Communists--and together with the Nationalist Army, it defeated an attempt by the Communists to reestablish themselves in border regions of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces⁷⁹ -- it did not have the manpower to keep the Communists

out totally from expanding their presence in the occupied areas. The Communists were particularly so well established in north China, in Hebei and Shandong provinces, that even the Japanese found them a threat.⁸⁰ In Shandong province, the guerrilla troops led by Qin Qirong, a senior Juntong Ju operative, were defeated by the Communists in 1943 and Qin committed suicide.⁸¹ By the end of the war, Mao Zedong could claim that the Communists were in control of eighteen "liberated areas" in North, South and Central China.⁸² This was the best indication of the failure of the Guomindang, including Dai Li's secret service, in fighting Communist expansion during the war.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution. China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 20-30.
2. See John Israel, Student Nationalism in China 1927-1937 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), 98-99, *passim*.
3. Zhongguo Faxiai Tanshi Zhenxiang (n.p.: Shandong Xinhua Shudian Zhongdian, 1948), 18-19.
4. Chen Gongshu, Baiguo chuijian (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1981), 122.
5. Israel, Student Nationalism, 129.
6. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun (n.p., n.d.), 3: 189.
7. Shen Zui, Wo da tanshi shengya (Hong Kong: Jinling Chubanshe, 1987), 1: 28-29.
8. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," in Dai Li qikan, eds., Shen Zui and Wen Qiang (Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1980), 93.
9. Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York: Da Capo Press, 1975), 113.
10. Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tanshi zuzhi de zhenxiang," Guangdong Wenshi Ziliao, no. 29 (1980): 204.
11. Smedley, Battle Hymn, 112.
12. *Ibid.*, 113; John K. Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 75-76; Cheng Yiming, Juntong tanshi, 204; Chen Shaociao, Hainang lu (Hong Kong: Zhicheng Chubanshe, 1966), 71-76.
13. Shen Zui, "Yang Xingfo, Shi Liangcai bei ansha de jingque," Wenshi Ziliao Xuekan (Chengde), no. 37, p. 196.
14. Si Natian, "Shi Liangcai beici kuimi," part 1, Zhongguo Zashi 36, no. 6 (December 1984): 27.
15. Chen Shaociao, Hainang lu, 73.
16. According to Agnes Smedley, two of the assassins were arrested by the French police. But Chen Shaociao mentions only one. See Smedley, Battle Hymn, 120; Chen Shaociao, Hainang lu, 74-75.
17. Smedley, Battle Hymn, 120. According to Chen Shaociao, Dai Li ordered his agent to poison the captured agent the very night of the arrest. See Chen Shaociao, Hainang lu, 75-76.

18. In fact, Shen Zui's article, "Yang Xingfo, Shi Liang'ai bei ansha de jingguo," was a blatant plagiarism of Chapter 8 of Chen Shaoxiao, Haiwang lu.
19. See Wei Deming, "Pingshu Dai Yunong xiansheng de shigong," part 1, Zhuanji Wenxue 38, no. 2 (February 1981): 44-45.
20. Ibid.
21. Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, ed., Dai Yunong xiansheng quanji (Taipei: Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, 1979), 1: 462 (hereafter cited as Quanji).
22. Quanji, 1: 383.
23. Quanji, 1: 363.
24. Dai Li, Zhangzhi Zhentan (n.p.: Political Bureau of the Military Commission, 1938), 76-77.
25. By far the best account of the Fijian rebellion is by Lloyd Eastman. See his, The Abortive Revolution, 85-139.
26. Quanji, 1: 31. See also Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1985), 1: 69; Qiao Jiakai, Tianan jiangzhong zhuan - Dai Li de guoshi (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1985), 61.
27. According to Dai Li's official biographers at the Taiwanese Intelligence Division, the Chinese Communists had telegraphed the Soviet Union for war supplies to be delivered through Fujian ports. The weapons included 30,000 assault rifles, 4,000 machine guns, 200 artillery pieces, 10 airplanes and various types of ammunitions. See Quanji, 1: 31.
28. Fei Yunwen, "Diyen qianqu sishi nian" Jianxing Yuankan, no. 176 (1972): 159.
29. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 70, Quanji, 1: 31-32.
30. Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li jiangjun he ta de tongzhi (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1981), 2: 200-01.
31. Quanji, 1: 40.
32. Ibid., 1: 41.
33. Ibid., 1: 40; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 72.
34. See Eastman, Abortive Revolution, 251-59.

35. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 74-76; Quanji, 1: 42. See also, Eastman, Abortive Revolution, 259; and Chen Shaoxiao, Haiyang lu, 92-96.
36. Qiao Jiacai, Tongzhi, 2: 200-02.
37. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 75; Quanji, 1: 41; Liu Peichu, Fusheng luaying ji (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1968), 259.
38. See Wu Tien-wei, The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1976).
39. Quanji, 1: 418; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 92.
40. Deng Yuanzhong, Renmin zhuyi lixing she (Taipei: Shijian Chubanshe, 1984), 578-79.
41. Wu Tien-wei, Sian Incident, 90-91.
42. Deng Yuanzhong, Renmin zhuyi lixing she, 604.
43. Ibid.; Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li de gushi, 102; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 90; Wen Qiang, "Dai Li qiren," in Dai Li qiren, eds., Shen Zui and Wen Qiang (Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1980), 200.
44. Quanji, 1: 46-47; Yu Junqun, "Gongshu Dai xiansheng shengping," Jianxing Yuekan, no. 164 (1971): 155-156.
45. Qiao Jiacai, "Dai xiansheng xunzhi qian de gushi," Jianxing Yuekan, no. 164 (1971): 100-01; Quanji, 1: 46.
46. Deng Yuanzhong, Renmin zhuyi lixing she, 604.
47. Yu Junqun, "Gongshu Dai xiansheng shengping," 156.
48. See Wu Tien-wei, Sian Incident, 135-53.
49. Yu Junqun, "Gongshu Dai xiansheng shengping," 156-57; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 90-91.
50. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 91.
51. Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tawu," 201.
52. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 95; Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhida de Dai Li," 16.
53. Yang Mingtang, though, claims without corroborative evidence that Dai Li played an important role in the defeat of the Communists in the Fifth Extermination campaign. See Yang Mingtang, Gang xunxing yingxiang de yunxing yingxiang: Dai Yunzhang xiansheng de fandan lichang (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1976), 87-88.

54. Zhang Yanfo, "Kangzhan qianhou Juntong tewu zai xibei de huodong," Wanshi Ziliao Xuanji (Baifeng), no. 64 (July 1979): 79. Zhang was the head of the Northwest Region Office from 1935 to 1939.
55. Ibid., 80.
56. Ibid., 86.
57. Ibid., 80-81.
58. Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li da gushi, 106-108.
59. Zhang Yanfo, "Kangzhan qianhou," 81.
60. Qianji, 1: 213; Zhou Jianguo, "Jishu Dai xiansheng xingyi shilue," Jianxing Yuankan, no. 164 (1971): 77; Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 110.
61. Zhang Yanfo, "Kangzhan qianhou," 80.
62. Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tewu," 226.
63. Zhang Yanfo, "Kangzhan qianhou," 79.
64. Shen Zui, Wo da tewu shengya, 64-65; Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tewu," 226.
65. Zhang Yanfo, "Kangzhan qianhou," 99.
66. Chen Gongshu, Lanyu she naimu (Shanghai: Guomin Xinwen Tushu Yinshua Gongsi, 1943), 16.
67. Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge: Mao Tse-tung and The Chinese Revolution, 1893-1954 (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1972), 314-15.
68. Zhou Jianguo, "Jishu Dai xiansheng xingyi shilue," 77; Shen Zui, "wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," 35; Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tewu," 226.
69. Zhou Jianguo, "Jishu Dai xiansheng xingyi shiyue," 77; Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 110, 261.
70. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," 35; Zhang Yanfo, "Kangzhan qianhou," 101-104.
71. Qianji, 2: 681-82.
72. Ibid., 1: 211-12.
73. Ibid., 1: 50-52; Liangxiang, Dai Li shuan, 1: 105-112.

74. Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1982), 118-19.

75. Quoted in F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1926-1949 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), 206.

76. Quanji, 1: 216.

77. Ch'i, Nationalist China at War, 119; Zhou Jianguo, "Jishu Dai xiansheng xingyi shiyue," 78; Yang Mingtang, Cong wuming yingxing, 95-96.

78. See Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 262-63; Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," 22; Quanji, 1: 217; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 364-66.

79. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 267-69; Quanji, 1: 218-20.

80. George F. Botjer, A Short History of Nationalist China, 1919-1949 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1979), 220; Ch'i, Nationalist China at War, 119.

81. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun, 3: 124; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 417.

82. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 3rd edition (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 619.

CHAPTER VI

DEALING WITH TRAITORS AND COLLABORATORS DURING THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Until the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, Japanese imperialism was the most serious external threat faced by the Nationalist government. Since the creation of the Tzu Chu in April 1932, besides coping with the many internal challenges to the Nanjing government, Dai Li had been preoccupied with the Japanese threat to national security. He had described the mission of his organization during the time of heightened Japanese aggression as "shadi chuajian":

Shadi is to fight against the Japanese so as to recover lost territories and sovereignty. ... Chuajian is to eliminate those who commit treason against the country [by collaborating with the enemy], oppose the revolution, and try to destroy national unity.¹

Before 1937, the Japanese threat was largely confined to North China where the Japanese militarists schemed to create an autonomous North China (including the provinces of Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Chahar and Suiyuan).² To realize this objective, Japanese aggression in North China continued after the end of hostilities following the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, which resulted in the creation of Manchukuo on March 9, 1932. In 1933, Japanese troops were on the offensive again, invading Hebei, Chahar and Rehe [Jehol]. The advance was halted by the Tangu Truce on May 31, 1933, which turned Jidong (Eastern Hebei) into a demilitarized zone.³

In response to the grave situation in North China, the Tewa Chu set up the Beiping and Tianjin stations towards the end of 1932.⁴ Dai Li selected Chen Gongshu, one of the top graduates of the first Tewa training classes conducted by Dai Li, and a graduate of the fifth class of the Huangpu Military Academy to head the Beiping station. Wang Tianmu, a member of the Michu Zu (Secret Investigation Section), was appointed chief of the Tianjin station.⁵ To coordinate the operations in North China, Dai Li sent his deputy, Zheng Jiemin, as the the Tewa Chu's special representative permanently stationed in Beiping.⁶ In April 1933, Dai Li was in Beiping to discuss with his operatives the task in the north. Wang Tianmu also met with Dai Li in Beiping. During one of the discussions Dai Li had with his operatives, he explained the crisis in North China and said that their task was to collect intelligence on Japanese military activities and to uncover efforts by the Japanese to support anti-Nanjing elements.⁷

From 1933 to 1938 the Beiping and Tianjin stations carried out a series of operations to zhicai (punish severely including by assassination) hanjian (traitors) who collaborated with the Japanese against the Central government. The aim of such zhicai operations, was, on the one hand, to undermine Japanese efforts to enlist the help of Chinese in their aggression against China, and, on the other hand, to warn potential collaborators against offering their services to the Japanese or they could face death for committing treason.

The first zhicai operation by the Tewa Chu was against a former Hunan warlord Zhang Jingyao. According to intelligence reports received by Dai Li's operatives, Zhang was being engaged by Japanese militarists to contact a few former Chinese militarists such as Ji Hongchang, Ren Yingqi, Fang Zhenwu, with the aim to stage a rebellion in the Beiping-Tianjin area in coordination with the Japanese incursion in the provinces of Hebei, Chahar and Rehe in 1933. The plot also called for the assassination of General He Yingqin, Chairman of the Beiping branch of the Military Affairs Commission.⁸ Because Zhang was operating from the Linguo Hotel, located in the diplomatic compound, an arrest was not possible, the government therefore ordered the Tewa Chu to zhicai Zhang. On May 7, 1933, Zhang was gunned down in his hotel room by Bai Shiwei, a field operative of the Beiping station.⁹

Of the subsequent zhicai operations by the Tewa Chu in North China, however, almost all ended in failure. For example, in November 1934, Dai Li's men failed in an attempt to assassinate an accomplice of Zhang's, Ji Hongchang, who had taken refuge in the French concession in Tianjin after Zhang was killed. In December, the Beiping station again failed in its attempt to zhicai Shi Youzan, who had helped the Japanese in policing the Eastern Hebei demilitarized zone.¹⁰ Because Chen Gongshu did not first seek Dai Li's approval in the recruitment of agents to carry out the Shi Youzan operation, both he and Wang Wen, the field operative in charge, were punished by Dai Li, who put them in detention for five months.¹¹

In 1935, the Japanese militarists, in particular, General Doihara Kenji, the chief of the Guangdong army's special services, intensified their efforts to create an autonomous North China. Following the signing of two agreements, the Qin-Doihara and the Ho-Umezumi agreements, which called for the further removal of Guomindang influence in North China,¹² Doihara succeeded in persuading Yin Rugeng, the administrative commissioner of the East Hebei demilitarized zone, to create, on November 25, 1935,¹³ the East Hebei Autonomous Anti-Communist Council, with Yin as Chairman. Nanjing responded swiftly to this by ordering the arrest of Yin on November 26.¹⁴

The task to abduct Yin Rugeng was given to the Towa Chu as Yin was under Japanese protection. Dai Li ordered his Beiping and Tianjin field operatives jointly to handle the case.¹⁵ However, after an attempt to poison Yin failed, they found no further opportunity to kill him.¹⁶ At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, Yin was arrested by the commanders of his Baoan dai (Peace Preservation Corps), created to police the demilitarized zone, who mutinied against Yin in Tengzhou and slaughtered more than 200 people, many of whom were Japanese. The Baoan dai then brought Yin to Beiping with the intention "to surrender him to the 29th Army [of General Song Zheyuan] as a pledge of their loyalty."¹⁷

The rebellion by the Baoan dai, however, was actually instigated by Dai Li. In 1936, Dai Li had ordered one of his operatives, Wu Anshi, to establish contact with the commanders of the first and second corps of the Baoan dai, Zhang Qingyu and Zhang

Yandian, with the aim to persuade them to switch their allegiance from Yin and the Japanese to the Central government. With the help of a former schoolmate of Zhang Qingyu, Wu arranged a meeting between Zhang Qingyu and Zhang Yandian with Li Guoshen, the chief of the Beiping Region Office, in Beiping. At the meeting, the Basan dai commanders declared their intention to switch loyalty. They also sent a proxy (Shen Enbo) to Nanjing to meet Dai Li to convey their intentions. On July 23, 1937, Dai Li sent an order to Wu Anzhi for Zhang Qingyu and Zhang Yandian to stage an uprising against the Japanese six days later. After staging the rebellion in Tongzhou, the Basan dai proceeded to Beiping where they were intercepted by Japanese troops. In the ensuing battle, Yin was rescued by the Japanese. Despite this, Zhang Qingyu and Zhang Yandian were rewarded by the Nationalist government for their efforts with military posts in the Nationalist army. They also travelled to Nanjing to meet Dai Li who expressed his gratitude to them.¹⁸

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, marked the beginning of a full-scale war between China and Japan. The better armed Japanese army conquered Beiping and Tianjin at the beginning of the war without much resistance from the Guomindang army. In Shanghai, however, the Japanese advance was slowed down by the stiff resistance put up by some of Chiang Kai-shek's best troops. By November, Shanghai fell. Nanjing followed in December. Chiang Kai-shek shifted his capital to Chengqing in the mountainous province of Sichuan to fight a long war with Japan. The war then reached a stalemate with neither Chengqing nor the Japanese having the

resources to launch any major offensive to finish off their opponent.

With the outbreak of the war of resistance, Dai Li's organization began to engage more and more in war-related operation work. As we have seen, Dai Li organized a 10,000-man strong Biedong Dai (Special Action Corps) in Shanghai to help the Guomindang troops fight against the Japanese. When it was known that Shanghai could be lost, Dai Li was given the additional task of helping to remove vital war supplies, such as fuel and food, from Shanghai.¹⁹ To provide intelligence on the Japanese troop movements, Dai Li set up small battlefield units equipped with radio sets operating in the Shanghai area. These units were also responsible for monitoring the morale and the conduct of Guomindang troops. When Shanghai fell, Dai Li left Nanjing via Hong Kong, leaving behind a network of underground agents to continue anti-Japanese activities in Shanghai and other occupied areas.²⁰

In March 1938, Dai Li was ordered by the Military Affairs Commission to "organize the remnants of the Nationalist troops scattered in Pudong, Jinghu and Nuhang areas to continue to fight a guerrilla war in the occupied area."²¹ This force was later named the Zhongyi Jinguo Jun (Loyal Patriotic National Salvation Army) and continued to operate in the Nanjing-Shanghai area, harassing Japanese as well as the Communist troops.

In March 1940, Dai Li was given another task; to form a bianyi lunzhong dai (Plainclothes Urban Commando Corps) to carry out sabotage activities in cities occupied by the Japanese. Members of the bianzhong dai numbering around 6,000 were selected from the

Nationalist army, trained and led by Juntong operatives. The main targets of the *hancheng dai* were the communication and supply lines of the enemies.²² The objective was to weaken Japanese ability to launch large-scale attacks against Chongqing.²³ A year after its creation, Dai Li was dissatisfied with the performance of the *hancheng dai*. Analyzing its failure so far, Dai Li concluded that it was due to the lack of training, poor planning and the difficulty in transporting explosives into the occupied areas.²⁴

In short, although in the battles their troops were badly routed by the Japanese, the Guomindang government was able to maintain some semblance of presence by continuing to harass, through the activities of Dai Li's Juntong agents, the Japanese troops in the occupied areas. However, as Dai Li's operatives were in enemy territory, they were subjected to continued harassment by Japanese who went all out to destroy Dai Li's clandestine networks, especially in the Nanjing-Shanghai area. In fact, the Japanese came close to destroying virtually the entire Juntong network in occupied China from 1939 to the outbreak of the Pacific War. But before discussing the intelligence battle between the Juntong Ju and the Japanese and their puppets, it is necessary to examine the political situation in occupied China after 1937 and Dai Li's efforts to undermine the puppet governments created by Japan.

After its initial success, Japan began to look for Chinese collaborators to help administer occupied China. In north China, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China headed by Wang Kemin, with jurisdiction over the five northern provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Honan and Shandong, was inaugurated on December 14, 1937 in

Beiping. Earlier on October 29, 1937, the Japanese established the Mongolian Autonomous Government led by the Inner Mongolia Prince De. The third puppet government was created in Central China in December 1937. Called the Weixin Zhongfu (Reformed Government), it was headed by Liang Hongzhi.²⁵

When the war reached a stalemate in 1938, the Japanese began their search for someone who had national stature (which none of the above three puppet leaders had) to form a united government. This would provide another rallying point for the Chinese and undermine Chiang Kai-shek's government, bringing an early end to the war peacefully on Japanese terms. The Japanese scored a major victory when Wang Jingwei, one of the most senior Guomindang leaders, decided to defect from Chongqing in December 1938, and agreed to lead a "Guomindang" government in Nanjing. It was inaugurated on April 1, 1940.²⁶

The puppet governments, especially that led by Wang Jingwei, posed a serious threat to Chiang Kai-shek's government. Chongqing therefore had to try to undermine and to disrupt the functioning of the puppet regimes. Only Dai Li's organization had the capacity to do the job. Naturally, the task was given to Dai Li. From 1938 to 1940, Dai Li ordered his field operatives to carry out a series of shikai operations in occupied China. The heads of the puppet governments were the main targets of these operations. On March 28, 1938, Dai Li's agents in North China shot and seriously wounded Wang Kemin. He escaped death because he was shielded by his Japanese advisor, who was killed.²⁷ In May 1938 Dai Li issued an order to

zhicai Liang Hongshi.²⁸ An attempt to kill Liang, by poisoning the food served at the function he was attending at the Japanese consulate in Nanjing on June 10, 1939, resulted in Liang suffering only minor discomfort, although three Japanese military men were not as lucky.²⁹ Then on July 25, 1938, in a show of force, Dai Li's men launched terrorist-style bombing attacks on a number of the establishments of the Liang regime.³⁰ Chen Lu, the foreign minister of the Weixin Zhongfu, was killed on February 18, 1939 by Liu Geqing, an agent of the Shanghai Region Office.³¹ Fu Xiaoen, the puppet mayor of Shanghai since October 1938 was killed on October 11, 1940 by his butler, Zhu Sheng, who was recruited by Dai Li's operatives with the promise of a Ch\$50,000 reward.³²

Perhaps the most important zhicai operations mounted by Dai Li's organization, although it did not succeed, was that against Wang Jingwei. After Wang had flown to Hanoi in December 1938, and announced his acceptance of the latest Japanese offer to work with a new Chinese government for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, Chiang Kai-shek recommended that the Guomindang Central Executive Committee expel Wang from the party and to strip him of all government positions.³³ Meanwhile, Dai Li had been ordered to monitor closely Wang Jingwei's activities in Hanoi.

Realizing the importance of this mission, Dai Li personally led a team of nine, among them Chen Gongshu, who was appointed leader, to Hanoi in January 1939 to oversee the initial stages of the operation. Dai Li remained in Hanoi for two days before leaving for Chengqing.³⁴ When all efforts by Chengqing failed to persuade Wang

to reconsider his decision to defect,³⁵ Dai Li was given the order to assassinate Wang. On March 19, 1939, Chen Gongshu received the order and the operation to kill Wang was executed two days later. At past midnight on March 21, Juntong agents entered Wang Jingwei's well-guarded residence but they mistook Wang's bedroom and killed his secretary, Zeng Zhongming, instead. Three of the operatives (Yu Jiansheng, Zhang Fengyi and Chen Benguo) were arrested and given seven-year prison terms each.³⁶

Dai Li was understandably upset over the whole affair. He reportedly was severely reprimanded by Chiang Kai-shek. Analyzing the main reason for the failure, Dai Li concluded that it was due to "poor planning".³⁷ Before the puppet regime led by Wang was formerly created, Dai Li planned another operation to assassinate Wang. The time chosen was May 1939 when Wang returned to China after a trip to Tokyo. The operative Dai Li selected was Liu Geqing,³⁸ an agent who had successfully completed many anti-Japanese operations in Shanghai, including the assassination of Chen Lu. He was so effective that the Japanese secret service had offered a Ch\$40,000 reward for his arrest.³⁹

In August 1939 Dai Li recalled Liu, who was then taking shelter in Hong Kong, to Chongqing to discuss the assignment with him. Dai Li explained to Liu that his task was twofold: to try to persuade Wang Tiansu and Chen Dirong, two former Juntong operatives who had recently defected to the Wang Jingwei camp, to become double agents; and to seek Wang Tiansu's assistance to assassinate Wang Jingwei. If Wang Tiansu and Chen Dirong agreed to these assignments, Dai Li was

willing to forgive their mistake of "betraying" the organization, which under the rules of Juntong Ju, was punishable by death. As Wang Tianmu was a close aide of Dai Li's before he defected, Dai Li also wrote him a personal letter, in which he expressed his disappointment over Wang's action and hoped he would redeem himself by taking advantage of his new position to help the organization and country to get rid of the "traitor" Wang Jingwei.⁴⁰ After reading the letter, Wang was reportedly very moved and immediately agreed to carry out Dai Li's order. However, as he alone could not carry out the mission, Wang Tianmu asked Liu Geqing to seek Chen Dirong's help as well. Chen, however, betrayed Liu by turning him over to Wang's newly established secret service. Thus, yet another attempt to zhicai Wang Jingwei had failed.⁴¹

Despite these setbacks, Dai Li continued to send his operatives to Nanjing to try to assassinate Wang Jingwei. Dai Li was probably under even more pressure to eliminate Wang after the Wang Jingwei government was inaugurated in April 1940. From the end of 1939 to 1942, Dai Li sent at least six senior-ranking field operatives to join the Wang government and to find an opportunity to kill Wang. However, none of them was successful.⁴² The identity of Huang Yiguang, for example, was blown in late 1940 as a result of the arrest by Wang's secret service of Qian Xinmin, the chief of the Nanjing Region Office.⁴³

Ultimately Dai Li succeeded in liquidating Wang Jingwei, or so he claimed. On November 10, 1944, Wang Jingwei died in Japan after months of failing health.⁴⁴ Two days later, speaking to a

gathering in Chongqing on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Guomindang, Dai Li announced the news of Wang's death and added that "of course we have something to do with the death..."⁴⁵ Dai Li, however, did not elaborate on the role his organization played in Wang's death. According to Dai Li's official biographers, after the various attempts to kill Wang failed, Dai Li was able to recruit a doctor in a Nanjing hospital to inject a type of poison, which would kill the victim over some time, into Wang's body, when Wang Jingwei was a patient there in January 1944.⁴⁶ If Wang was indeed killed by the poison, it left no trace at all. Officially, Wang's death was the result of an infection caused by the bullet which had remained in his back since the 1935 attempt on his life. Wang was seriously injured in that assassination attempt on November 1, 1935, when he and others were posing for pictures at the end of the opening ceremonies of the Fifth National Congress of the Guomindang. His assassin, a photographer of the Chenguang News Agency, was upset over Wang's, then the foreign minister, appeasement policy towards Japan. Although Wang recovered from the injury, his health was never fully restored because his surgeons failed in their attempts to remove one of the bullets.⁴⁷

Besides trying to undermine the Nanjing puppet regime through assassination, Dai Li attempted to destroy it by infiltrating. His agents sought to gather intelligence and to persuade senior puppet officials to fangzheng, to correct their past mistakes of collaborating with the Japanese by secretly working for Chongqing. Dai Li had started sending his people to infiltrate the Wang Jingwei

government when Wang was negotiating with the Japanese and the other puppet governments to set up a unified puppet government in Nanjing. In 1939, Dai Li ordered three of his field operatives in Shanghai, Cheng Kexiang, Peng Shou and Peng Shengmu to try to join the Wang Jingwei government.⁴⁸ To ensure their applications were approved, Dai Li managed to get Xu Langxi, leader of the secret society, Hong Bang, to write to Zhou Fohai, a high-ranking Guomindang leader before he defected with Wang Jingwei, recommending them to Zhou. Jin Xiangbai, a close aide of Zhou, who was appointed by the latter to oversee the recruitment of office-seekers for the puppet government, suspected that the three were Japanese spies but never thought that they were undercover Juntong operatives.⁴⁹ With the strong recommendation of the influential Xu Langxi, Cheng, Peng Shou and Peng Shengmu were appointed to positions in the newly created puppet Nanjing government.⁵⁰ In December 1941, Cheng and his two colleagues were arrested by Japanese military police because their identities were blown when the Japanese uncovered the Juntong clandestine network in Nanjing and got a list of names of Juntong operatives. When Dai Li learned of the arrests, he immediately sought Xu Langxi's help to secure their release. Zhou Fohai, who by then had been regretting his decision to defect from Chongqing, instructed Yang Xinghua, the brother of his wife, to help bring about the release of Cheng, Peng Shou and Peng Shengmu.⁵¹

One of the tasks given by Dai Li to Cheng Kexiang was to get close to Zhou and persuade him to "fangzheng". According to an account by Qiao Jiacai, Cheng Kexiang after his release, believing

that Zhou had the intention to "fangzheng", decided to have a talk with him. To do so, Cheng had to enlist the help of Yang Xinghua, who agreed to arrange for such a meeting. During the meeting, Zhou reportedly told Cheng that he was grateful to Dai Li, his good friend, for taking good care of his aged mother and father-in-law, (both of whom Dai had placed under his "protection")⁵² and asked Cheng to convey to Dai Li his willingness to do all he could.⁵³ Cheng Kexiang returned to Chongqing in late 1942 to report to Dai Li the progress of his operation and Zhou's offer. Dai Li appointed Cheng the head of the Jinghua Region Office and instructed him to ask Zhou to establish secret contact with Chongqing. For this purpose Cheng was given a secret code book and a radio set. The radio set for Zhou to communicate directly with Dai Li was located in Zhou's residence. Thus from 1943 onwards, Zhou Fuhai had begun to work secretly for Dai Li.⁵⁴

The success of the operation to recruit Zhou Fuhai by the Juntong Ju was an important victory for the Guomindang because after Wang Jingwei, Zhou was the most powerful man in the Wang puppet government. Although Chen Gongbo succeeded Wang as chief of state when the latter died in November 1944, Zhou was the person holding real authority in Nanjing.⁵⁵ Among the various positions Zhou held were vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, Mayor of Shanghai, Minister of Finance, and President of the National Bank. While Zhou Fuhai must have supplied Dai Li with intelligence about the Nanjing government and the Japanese, and helped in other ways, such as appointing Juntong operatives to positions in his

government as a cover to carry out intelligence activities,⁵⁶ the most important task he performed for Chongqing was at the end of the war. After the Japanese had surrendered, Chongqing appointed Zhou the commander of Shanghai Action Corps with the task to maintain law and order and to secure the financial and industrial city from falling into communist hands while awaiting the arrival of Nationalist troops to disarm the Japanese troops.⁵⁷

Besides Cheng Kexiang, Peng Shou and Peng Shengmu, another person Dai Li sent to infiltrate the Wang government was Xu Tianshen. Xu was able to get into the Wang government because Chen Gongbo, a close confidant of Wang Jingwei, and who was one of the senior Guomindang officials to join the Wang peace movement, was Xu's personal friend. When Chen was the mayor of Shanghai, he appointed Xu the director of the Shanghai Economic Branch. After Wang's death, Chen, who became the chief of state, appointed Xu the head of the Nanjing Civil Service.⁵⁸ Dai Li had given Xu three tasks:

- 1) to collect intelligence on the Wang puppet government;
- 2) to contact members of Wang's Central Committee who still showed some loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek and to try to persuade them to leave Wang and rejoin the Central government; and
- 3) to introduce Jungang operatives to work in the puppet organizations.⁵⁹

Specifically, Dai Li had ordered Xu to try to instigate Chen, who had "joined the Wang group out of personal loyalty to Wang rather than in the conviction that Wang was on the right course,"⁶⁰ to fangzhong and establish secret contact with Dai Li. Xu began his work on this

sometime in 1944 and secret negotiations were conducted between Chen and Dai Li through Xu. However, before any agreement between Chen and Dai Li was reached, the war had ended.⁶¹ Thus, unlike Zhou Fohai, Chen Gongbo had not changed sides in time and was therefore denied a chance to redeem himself.

By the end of the war of resistance, besides Zhou Fohai, Dai Li had enlisted Ren Yuandao, commander of the puppet's Peaceful National Reconstruction Army, and Ding Mocun, Provincial Governor of Zhejiang who together with Li Shiqun ran Wang Jingwei's secret service, to secretly collaborate with him. When the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, these Juntong collaborators were appointed by Chongqing to help the Guomindang secure the key cities and their environs from the communists. Ren Yuandao, for instance, was appointed the commander of the advance army of the Nationalist in Nanjing; Ding Mocun was appointed the military commissioner in Zhejiang.⁶²

While the use of key collaborators by the Guomindang to help gain control of cities, which might otherwise have been lost to the Chinese communists, proved to be controversial and might have tarnished the reputation and credibility of the Guomindang government after the war, the fact remains that Dai Li played an active part in securing the loyalty of these collaborators for the government. It will never be known how many of these collaborators might have chosen to cross over to the Communists side had Dai Li not enlisted their cooperation well before the war end. Zhou Fohai, for example, was approached by Communist agents to join the communist-led United Front, but he refused.⁶³

While Dai Li was largely successful in infiltrating the Nanjing government, and even succeeded in enlisting Ding Mocun to collaborate with him, this was achieved while fighting a fierce and sometimes bloody intelligence war with the Japanese and Japanese-supported Nanjing secret services. In the initial phase of this war, from 1939 to 1941, waged in the major cities in Occupied China, particularly in Nanjing and Shanghai, Dai Li's clandestine network was almost completely destroyed.

Ding Mocun and Li Shiqun were both experienced intelligence officers of the Nationalist government when they defected. Ding was the director of the Third Department -- Dai Li was the director of the second -- of the old Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS). When the BIS was reorganized in August 1938, the Third Department was abolished - Ding joined the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (Zhongtong Ju), which was created from the First Department of the old BIS. Li Shiqun was a subordinate of Ding before he fled to Hong Kong in 1938 to escape "severe punishment" for breaking the organization rules. He was recruited by General Doihara Kenji of the Japanese secret service and sent to work in Shanghai. When Ding was sent by Chungking to Hong Kong to arrest Li, he met Zhou Fohai, who persuaded him to join the Wang camp. Zhou was appointed by Wang Jingwei as Chairman of the Secret Service Committee. But he exercised little influence over both Ding and Li after the establishment of the puppet secret service.⁶⁴

The creation of the Nanjing puppet secret service, commonly known as No. 76 because its headquarters was located on No. 76 Jessfield Road in Shanghai, posed a serious threat to Dai Li's Juntong Ju for one of its major tasks was to destroy the underground network Dai Li had left behind in the Occupied areas. The defection of a few senior Juntong operatives in the occupied areas to No. 76 in the middle of 1939 proved disastrous to Dai Li in the beginning of this battle.

Wang Tianmu, the chief of the Shanghai Region Office, and Chen Dirong, Wang's personnel officer, were among the first of Juntong operatives to defect from Dai Li. Wang was a very senior agent in the Juntong Ju; he was a member of the Group of Ten of the Michu Zu days. He had served for many years in the Beiping and Tianjin areas. Following his defection, the Juntong underground networks were severely affected as Wang knew many of the operatives and their methods of operation. Many agents were arrested as a result of information provided by Wang.⁶⁵ In August 1941 the Shanghai Region Office was totally destroyed with the arrest of Chen Gongshu, who had replaced Wang after the latter's defection.⁶⁶ Two of Wang's operatives who defected with him, Fei Jishan and Zhang Fengxin, had helped the Japanese military police in the arrest of many Juntong operatives in the Beiping-Tianjin area. On September 27, 1939, Zeng Che, chief of the Tianjin Region Office, was arrested. The next day, in a massive round-up of Juntong agents in the French and British concessions, the Japanese arrested the station chief of Tianjin, Chen Ziyi, among others. Zeng and Chen were later executed.⁶⁷

Wang Tianmu also induced the head of the Qingdao station, Zhao Gangyi, to defect. Zhao then led the Japanese and No. 76 operatives to arrest Qingdao station agents, among them, the station chief, Fu Shenglan.⁶⁸ By November 1939, Beiping Region Office was also uncovered and destroyed. Among those arrested were the deputy chief Zhou Shiguang and radio commander Zhang Shude. Both were later executed.⁶⁹

When Chen Dirong defected, he surrendered the names and addresses of all the members of the units under the Shanghai Region Office, to the Japanese. However, total destruction of the Shanghai Region Office was temporarily averted when a Dai Li agent in the French concession police force learned of the impending arrest of Chongqing "terrorists" in the area and quickly informed Zheng Xiuyuan, the secretary of the Shanghai Region Office.⁷⁰ As Chen was once the personnel officer of the Nanjing Region Office, with the information he provided, the Japanese raided and captured the Juntong secret radio station in September 1939. To avoid capture, the Nanjing Region chief, Qian Xinming, left the city leaving behind his secretary, Shang Zhensheng, to take care of affairs.⁷¹ But in 1940, Qian was arrested. He cooperated with his captors, leading to the almost total destruction of the Juntong network in Nanjing.⁷²

A number of Juntong operations already in progress were also adversely affected by the defections. For example, two operatives, Huang Yiguang and Wang Luqiao, sent by Dai Li to join the Wang government with the aim to assassinate Wang were arrested when the defectors revealed their identities.⁷³ Cheng Kexiang and two

other operatives who were sent by Dai Li to infiltrate Wang's government were also arrested as a result of the arrest of Qian Xinmin. Cheng's identify was known by Qian because he had to use Qian's radio set to communicate with Juntong headquarters.⁷⁴

Dai Li was no doubt concerned and upset over the losses he suffered at the hands of the Japanese and Li Shiqun. He reportedly "had a fit" when Li Shiqun sent him a message, using the radio set of Chen Gongshu (who was arrested by Li in October 1941), inviting him to join Wang's government.⁷⁵

Dai Li responded to the setback in a number of ways. On the one hand, he sent more new operatives to the occupied areas to rebuild clandestine field units. For instance, in order to rebuild and strengthen the Juntong network in Shanghai, Dai Li decided to create a second region office there. The new office had no horizontal ties at all with the existing region office, headed by Chen Gongshu. To lead this new office, Dai Li selected Jiang Shaome, his Wenxi Primary School schoolmate, who only joined Dai Li's organization in 1938.⁷⁶ When the first Shanghai Region Office was totally destroyed in October 1941, following the arrest of Chen Gongshu who subsequently agreed to work for Li Shiqun, Jiang had to shoulder all operation work in Shanghai.⁷⁷

On the other hand, Dai Li took steps to correct the major organizational weakness of his field units - the existence of too many horizontal relationships between his field organizations which brought about the virtual destruction of his network in occupied

China.⁷⁸ For a start, at the headquarters in Chongqing, Dai Li created the Shanghai Experimental Region which was actually a miniature Juntong headquarters with all the relevant sections dealing with such matters as communication, personnel, accounting, etc. In the field, Dai Li organized his operations into small units and created the so-called affiliated units which were placed directly under the control of the Experimental Region in Chongqing, instead of under a field headquarters, thereby reducing needless horizontal contacts between field units.⁷⁹ The Shanghai Experimental Region proved to be workable and effective in reducing horizontal ties between field operation units and between different departments at the Juntong headquarters. In 1943, the Shanghai Experimental Region was renamed the East China Region (Huanzhong qu) and three similar region departments were created. These four region departments were later amalgamated to form a directorate.⁸⁰

However, organizational changes alone could not defeat No. 76. Dai Li's objective was to destroy Wang's secret service; he also wanted to severely punish Juntong operatives who had defected. The punishment for this act of betrayal was death and all Juntong operatives knew this. After Wang Tiansu and three of his subordinates defected, Dai Li did not immediately order their zhichai. Instead, he sent Wu Anzhi to try to talk Wang into reconsidering his decision.⁸¹ One reason for this was that Dai Li and Wang were very close friends. However, a more important reason was probably that Dai Li wanted to persuade Wang to help in the zhichai of Wang Jingwei, since Wang Tiansu now had more opportunity

to get close to Wang Jingwei.⁸² However, when Wang Tiansu refused to cooperate, Dai Li decided to zhicai him and the others. Wu Anshi was responsible for this operation. On Christmas Eve 1939, Chen Dirong and He Xingjian (a commander of the Zhengyi Jiuguo Jun) were gunned down in the Huierdeng nightclub in Shanghai by Ma Hedou and two other Juntong operatives whose defection to No. 76 was planned earlier by the Juntong Ju to conduct counterspionage work. Ma and his colleagues escaped from the scene after the shooting. Wang Tiansu happened to be away when the shooting took place. However, as Ma was his man, he was arrested by Li Shiqun and taken for questioning.⁸³ Other defectors who Dai Li ordered to be zhicai were Li Kaifeng and Zhong Yunfei, both radio communicators whose defection had affected the Juntong Ju secret communication system.⁸⁴ Zhao Gangyi, formerly the head of Qingdao station operation unit was zhicai on December 8, 1939.⁸⁵

To retaliate against the arrest and execution of Juntong operatives and the near destruction of Juntong underground organization by Li Shiqun and the Japanese in the occupied areas, Dai Li ordered his operatives to zhicai Li Shiqun. Two attempts in May 1940 to assassinate Li, however, ended in failure and at the cost of the lives of two Juntong agents.⁸⁶ Li was finally poisoned to death in 1943. Most accounts agree that Li was poisoned by Okamura, a major in the Japanese Military Police Force, who invited Li to his home for a meal. At the end of the meal he served Li some Japanese delicacy which contained the poison. However, as to who recruited Okamura to kill Li is not very clear. According to some accounts,

Okamura was made use of by one Xiong Jiandong who exploited the differences between Li and the Japanese Military Police Force to instigate Okamura to kill Li.⁸⁷ According to Liangxiang, Xiong Jiandong was a Juntong operative sent by Dai Li to infiltrate the Wang regime to carry out the operation to kill Li.⁸⁸ Dai Li's official biographers, claimed that it was Dai Li who exploited the differences between Zhou Fohai and Li Shiqun to encourage Zhou to make use of the help of Japanese secret service to kill Li. Zhou by then had started to work secretly for the Juntong Ju.⁸⁹ John Boyle seems to suggest too that Li's death was related to the rivalry between Li and Zhou.⁹⁰ While it is not very clear as to who actually made use of Okamura to kill Li, it is quite clear that Dai Li was behind the plot to kill him. Dai Li reportedly was personally involved in directing the operation to kill Li.⁹¹

With the death of Li, Zhou Fohai was put in charge of No. 76 once again. Since Zhou and Ding Mocun had been secretly taking orders from Dai Li, the struggle between Dai Li and Wang's secret service therefore had actually ended with Li's death.

As the chief of the Juntong Ju, Dai Li also became a prime target for assassination. There is no indication to suggest that Li Shiqun, before he was poisoned, had made any attempts to assassinate his rival, Dai Li. The Japanese though, did try at least on three occasions to kill Dai Li. All three attempts occurred when Dai Li was in Japanese-occupied areas inspecting his field units. In June 1942, while accompanying Milton Miles of the U.S. Navy on Miles' first visit to the occupied areas, Dai Li and his party were

attacked by Japanese planes while they were in Busheng in Fujian.⁹² Again in the Lunar New Year of 1943, when Dai Li was at Zhengzhou in Henan, Japanese planes suddenly began bombing the town.⁹³ The last attempt by the Japanese to assassinate Dai Li occurred near the end of the War. In July 1945, Dai Li again accompanied Milton Miles to inspect SACO units and Juntong units in Occupied China. They were on their way to Shunan in northern Zhejiang to discuss with Du Yuesheng ways to maintain peace and order in Shanghai after the end of the war. Throughout their trip, they were being pursued by a special Japanese unit of about a thousand men led by a general whose specific mission was to kill Dai Li and Miles.⁹⁴ At Heqiao in Henan province, four assassins, one Chinese, who was a member of the Communists New Fourth Army, two Japanese and a Korean who had been trained at an "assassination school" in Shandong, broke into the house where Dai Li and Miles were staying. But before they could reach their targets, they were apprehended by guards.⁹⁵

In conclusion, Dai Li's organization had played an active role in resisting Japanese aggression in China since its creation in 1932. Because of the Japanese policy of supporting Chinese collaborators in its aggression in China, the task of eliminating these collaborators (*hanjian*) came to dominate the activity of Dai Li's organization. The number of Chinese branded as *hanjian* by the Guomindang and *shian* by Dai Li is not known. However, according to Chen Gongshu, more than 100 *hanjian* were killed by Juntong operatives in Shanghai alone during the period of 1939 to 1941.⁹⁶ According to statistics released by the Guomindang government after Dai Li was

killed in an airplane crash in March 1946, Dai Li's organization carried out 515 *zhichai* operations against the Japanese and their puppets.⁹⁷ It is inevitable that such *zhichai* operations had created an atmosphere of terror in the occupied areas, and had given Dai Li a bad reputation at home and abroad.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun (n.p., n.d.), 2: 319.
2. John H. Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1972), 35.
3. For details see *ibid.*, 29-31, and T.A. Bisson, Japan in China (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), 40-47.
4. Chen Gongshu, Raigun Chujian (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1981), 33-34.
5. *Ibid.*, 37-38.
6. *Ibid.*, 48; Fei Yunwen, Dai Li da yishang (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1980), 189.
7. Chen Gongshu, Raigun, 62.
8. Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju ed., Dai Yunmeng Xiansheng guanji (Taipei: Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, 1979), 1: 28 (hereafter cited as Quanji).
9. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe 1985), 1: 60-61. For details of the operations, see Chen Gongshu, Raigun, 72-118.
10. Bisson, Japan in China, 6; Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun (n.p., n.d.) 3: 309-10. See also Chen Gongshu, Raigun, 215-52.
11. Chen Gongshu, Raigun, 285-88.
12. Boyle, China and Japan, 35-37; Bisson, Japan in China, 53-58.
13. Bisson, Japan in China, 96-98; Boyle, China and Japan, 39-40; Qiao Jiasai, Tianna jingsheng zhuan - Dai Li da gushi (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1985), 90.
14. Chen Gongshu, Raigun, 294; Bisson, Japan in China, 98.
15. Chen Gongshu, Raigun, 294.
16. *Ibid.*, 304-22; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 63.
17. Bisson, Japan in China, 31; Boyle, China and Japan, 40.
18. See Quanji, 1: 64-65; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 63-64; and Chen Gongshu, Raigun, 352-356.
19. Quanji, 1: 69.

20. Quanji, 1: 71; Shen Zui, Wo de tewu shengya (Hong Kong: Jinling Chubanshe, 1985), 76-78.
21. Quanji, 1: 72.
22. Quanji, 1: 125-128.
23. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun (n.p., 1948), 1: 42.
24. *Ibid.*, 115-16.
25. See Boyle, China and Japan, Chapters 5 and 7.
26. See *ibid.*, chapter 6 for details.
27. Quanji, 1: 80-81; Chen Gongshu, Naiguo, 408-10.
28. Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 33.
29. Quanji, 1: 102.
30. Quanji, 1: 80.
31. Qiao Jiacai, Dai Li de sushi, 194-197; Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tewu sushi de shenxiang," Guangdong Wanchi Ziliao, no. 29 (1980): 129; Juwairon, "Ji dangnian Chuanshuo zhong de shisan taibao," Part 14, Chunqiu, 108 (1962): 10.
32. Chen Gongshu, Naiguo, 359-374; Juwairon, "Ji dangnian chuanshuo zhong de shisan taibao," part 15, Chunqiu, 109 (1962): 11-12; Guo Xu, "Manjian Fu Xiansen shisi," Wanchi Ziliao Xuanji, no. 33 (1980): 131-35.
33. Quanji, 1: 96.
34. Chen Gongshu, Manai Wangan shimo (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1983), 26-41.
35. See Boyle, China and Japan, 228; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 185.
36. For a detailed description of the operation, see Chen Gongshu, Manai Wangan, 212-239. See also, Quanji, 1: 94-99; Jin Xiengbai, Hong shengmen de Kaisheng yu shuosheng (Hong Kong: Chunqiu Zashi She, 1964), 5: Chapters 187-188; Dong Baoguang, "Juntong lingdao zhengxin Ju beibu ge shiqi de sushi ji huodong qingkuang," Wanchi Ziliao Xuanji (Beijing), no. 86 (April 1983): 184-85.
37. Dai Li, Yixun, 1: 219.
38. Dai Li, Yixun, 3: 314-15.

39. Quanji, 1: 111.
40. Quanji, 1: 112.
41. Quanji, 1: 114; see also Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 228-30.
42. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 188-190; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 217-222; Quanji, 1: 116-19.
43. Dai Li, Yinun, 2: 66. Huang, a Mexican Chinese, met Wang Jingwei in Paris in 1935. In 1938 Huang decided to return to China to join the Chinese people in resisting Japanese aggression. Dai Li recruited Huang sometime in 1939 and sent him to infiltrate the Wang puppet government in 1940 with the mission to assassinate Wang. See Quanji, 1: 118-19.
44. Boyle, China and Japan, 323.
45. Dai Li, Yinun, 1: 219.
46. Quanji, 1: 119; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 1: 190.
47. Boyle, China and Japan, 38, 323; Jin Xiongbei, Wang Zhongquan, 5: 120-21.
48. Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li jiangjun he ta da tongzhi (Taipei: Zhongwai Tushu Chubanshe, 1981), 2: 321.
49. Jin Xiongbei, Wang Zhongquan, 2: 70.
50. *Ibid.*, 2: 71.
51. Quanji, 1: 210; Jin Xiongbei, Wang Zhongquan, 2: 71; Qiao Jiakai, Tongzhi, 2: 323-24. Feng Shengmu died shortly after his release.
52. According to Jin, both Zhou's mother and father-in-law were treated well by Dai Li, although they had lost their freedom. Dai Li even sent pictures of Zhou's mother to Zhou on a regular basis to ensure Zhou that he was taking good care of her. See Jin Xiongbei, Wang Zhongquan, 1: 63.
53. See Qiao Jiakai, Tongzhi, 2: 324-26.
54. Quanji, 1: 210; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 437; Jin Xiongbei, Wang Zhongquan, 2: 72-73; Qiao Jiakai, Tongzhi, 2: 326-28.
55. Boyle, China and Japan, 323-24; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 436.

56. One Juntong operative, for instance, was appointed commander of the 12th Army of the Nanjing government through Zhou's influence. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 438.
57. Quanji, 1: 226; Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 301, 303; Wang Anshi, "Juntong Ju 'ce fan' hanjian Zhou Fohai de jingguo," Wanshi Ziliao Xuanji (Beijing), no. 64 (July 1979): 199-200.
58. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 434; Quanji, 1: 110.
59. Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 51. This is a paraphrase of Dai Li's directive to Xu.
60. Boyle, China and Japan, 261-62.
61. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 434-35.
62. Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 301, 303; Quanji, 1: 110-11, 233; Wang Anshi, "hanjian Zhou Fohai," 199; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 330.
63. Quanji, 1: 204.
64. Jin Xiongbei, Wang Zhanguan, 1: 34-37, 61; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 324-26; Boyle, China and Japan, 281-82.
65. Dai Li, Yixun, 3: 315; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li da gushi, 228; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 327.
66. Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 116; Chen Gongshu, Shanghai Kangri dibu xingdong (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1984), 283.
67. Quanji, 1: 106
68. *Ibid.*, 1: 108-109; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 327.
69. Quanji, 1: 109.
70. *Ibid.*, 1: 106.
71. *Ibid.*, 1: 107; Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 53.
72. Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 66; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 377; Qiao Jiakai, Tongzhi, 2: 323.
73. Dai Li, Yixun, 2: 66; Quanji, 1: 106.
74. Qiao Jiakai, Tongzhi, 2: 323-24.
75. Deng Baoguang, "Juntong lingdao," 189.
76. Quanji, 110; Qiao Jiakai, Tongzhi, 2: 157-63.

77. Chen Gongshu, Kangzhan houqi fangjian huodong (Taipei: Zhuanji Wensue Chubanshe, 1986), 92.
78. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 327.
79. Chen Gongshu, Fangjian huodong, 92; Deng Baoguang, "Juntong Lingdao," 190; Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," in Shen Zui and Wen Qiang eds., Dai Li siren (Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1980), 38.
80. Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," 39.
81. Chen Gongshu, Dihou xingdong, 131; Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li de gushi, 228; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 331-32.
82. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 332.
83. Qiao Jiakai, Dai Li de gushi, 229-32; Chen Gongshu, Dihou xingdong, 134-38; Jin Xiongbei, Hang Zhengquan, 1: 66; Quanji, 1: 116. Li Shiquan retaliated the shicai of Chen and He by executing three captured Juntong operatives the following day. See Chen Gongshu, Dihou xingdong, 256.
84. Dai Li, Yimn, 2: 63; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 328.
85. Chen Gongshu, Dihou xingdong, 139.
86. Quanji, 1: 132-33; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 329.
87. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 330; Jin Xiongbei, Hang Zhengquan, 1: 143-45.
88. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 330.
89. Quanji, 133.
90. Boyle, China and Japan, 285.
91. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 330.
92. Milton Miles, A Different Kind of War (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967), 48-55. Miles was in China seeking the cooperation of Dai Li for the U.S. Navy to set up weather stations in China to collect weather intelligence for the U.S. Navy operating in the western Pacific Ocean, and to make all necessary preparations for U.S. troops to land on the Chinese coastal areas in a general offensive against Japan in the near future. Miles had requested an observation trip to the coastal regions of China and Dai Li agreed to accompany him on a tour of the areas.
93. Yu Junqun, "Gongshu Dai xiansheng shengping," Jianguo Yunnan, no. 164 (1971): 160.

94. Miles, Different Kind of War, 515.
95. *Ibid.*, 515-16; Quanji, 1: 225.
96. Chen Gongshu, Dihou xingdong, 348.
97. Cited in Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 455.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

About seven months after the war of resistance against Japan had ended, Dai Li was killed in an airplane crash. During the last months of his life, Dai Li was mainly preoccupied with the task of arresting Chinese who actively collaborated with the Japanese and with the future of his organization. Since Dai Li was given the task to *zhicai* (punish severely, including assassination) collaborators during the war, it was natural that he was ordered to continue to deal with the matter after the war. To deal with this new task, Dai Li formed the *Suqing hanjian anjian chuli weiyuanhui* or *Sujian hui* (Committee for dealing with collaborators' cases) at the Juntong headquarters in Chengqing and set up branches in the various war zones, armies and major cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Beiping, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Hankou, Qingdao, Jinan, Xuzhou, Taiyuan, Nanchang, Changsha, Anqing, Hangzhou, Fuzhou and Kaifeng.¹

The arrest of leading collaborators, however, did not begin immediately after Japan's surrender mainly because, as pointed out earlier, the Guomindang needed the help of some of these collaborators to secure key cities such as Nanjing and Shanghai from being captured by the Communists as well as to maintain law and order. It was only towards the end of September 1945 that Dai Li, who set foot on Shanghai on September 8 and established his temporary office at No. 70 Dumi Road, began the task of arresting these collaborators.² Many of the collaborators in Shanghai in fact

surrendered to Dai Li's men after they had been told to do so by Zhou Fohai. Zhou had earlier been given the list of names of collaborators to be arrested by Dai Li.³ On September 30, Zhou and Ding Mocun and a few other collaborators were arrested and flown to Chongqing, escorted by Dai Li.⁴

Dai Li had given his personal guarantee to protect those collaborators who had worked secretly for him, although there is no evidence to show it. The fact that the decision to send these collaborators to stand trial was handed down just weeks after Dai Li's death suggests that their fate had been in Dai Li's hands. As long as Dai Li was around, there was little doubt, at least among these collaborators, that he would use his influence to protect them. Thus, when Zhou Fohai heard in prison that Dai Li had died, he reportedly said: "Yunong [Dai Li's alias] is dead, I am finished!"⁵ Zhou was sentenced to death by the court despite evidence produced by the Juntong Ju at his trial that Zhou had already switched his allegiance to the Central government before the war ended. However, in view of the important services he had performed for the Guomindang government at the end of the war, Chiang Kai-shek commuted Zhou's death sentence to life imprisonment.⁶ According to Dai Li's official biographers, Chiang's decision was a result of an appeal by the Juntong Ju to spare Zhou's life because the execution of Zhou would have a damaging effect on the credibility of the Juntong Ju. This could jeopardize future attempts by the bureau to recruit people to work for the organization.⁷

Another matter which was to preoccupy Dai Li in the last few months before his death was the question of his future and that of the Juntong Ju. Following the end of the War of Resistance against Japan, both the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had begun talks, with U.S. mediation, aimed at avoiding a civil war. In the talks, one issue raised by the Communists was the activities of Dai Li's organization which they feared and therefore wanted some kind of restrictions imposed, if not complete abolition.⁸ Some senior members in the Guomindang apparently felt that to reach a political settlement with the Communists, Dai Li should resign because of "his strong anti-Communist views" and that "the Juntong Ju be abolished."⁹ The subject of the future of the Juntong Ju was raised in the Guomindang's second Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Executive Committee held from March 1, 1946 to March 18.¹⁰ Dai Li revealed on March 10 in Beiping that before he left Chongqing for Beiping "someone tells me that there are people [in the C.E.C.] calling for the abolition of the Juntong Ju...." Those who opposed the existence of the Juntong Ju, according to Dai Li, however, was "a very small minority" among the C.E.C. members, "the majority supported Juntong Ju, believing that the Juntong Ju has made contributions during the War of Resistance...."¹¹ Dai Li, therefore, was confident that his organization would not be abolished.

Whether any decision was made on the future of the Juntong Ju at the C.E.C. meeting we do not know. But Chiang Kai-shek had called for a separate meeting with Dai Li and other military officers on

March 19 to discuss the reorganization of the Nationalist intelligence system.¹² On March 16, before Dai Li left Beiping for Qingdao, where he was to meet with Admiral Charles Cooke, Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, to discuss the problems faced by the U.S. Navy in getting land to build barracks for U.S. troops, he received an urgent telegram from his secretary, Mao Renfeng, requesting him to attend that meeting.¹³ To ensure that he could make it to this important meeting, Dai Li insisted on flying to Shanghai from Qingdao on March 17 despite the fact that weather conditions in the Nanjing-Shanghai region were not suitable for flying. Dai Li never made it to that meeting. His airplane crashed near the mountainous region of the eastern outskirts of Nanjing.¹⁴

Dai Li's death was officially announced on March 25, although by March 19, news of it had reached the public. The Tianjin Dagong had reported on the crash on March 19, quoting the Communist-controlled Xinhua News Agency.¹⁵ Chiang Kai-shek, who reportedly wept at the news of Dai Li's death, ordered Dai Li to be honored with an official burial and he also awarded Dai Li the rank of Zhongjiang (Lieutenant-General). Dai Li was buried in Nanjing in the cemetery reserved for participants of the National Revolution.

The Juntong Ju was not abolished, as some of its critics had wished. However, given the political atmosphere of the time (the Guomindang was trying to make some democratic changes to the government hoping to achieve some kind of political unification after the end of the war), the Juntong Ju could not exist as it was. In August 1945 about four months after Dai Li's death, the Juntong Ju

was reorganized. It was renamed Baomi Ju (Bureau of Secret Affairs) and placed under the Ministry of National Defence, which had been created in May 1946 following the abolition of the Military Affairs Commission.¹⁶ Mao Renfeng, a longtime aide to Dai Li, became the director. Zheng Jiemín, Dai Li's deputy, was made a junior minister in the Ministry of National Defence cum director of its Second Bureau, which was responsible for military espionage.¹⁷ In 1955, the Baomi Ju was renamed Guofang bu Qingbao Ju (Intelligence Division, Ministry of National Defence).

Dai Li had devoted the last twenty years of his life to serving Chiang Kai-shek and helping him control China. So unswervingly loyal was he to Chiang that he was prepared "to commit suicide if he let the *lingxiu* (leader) down."¹⁸ Although a powerful personality in Nationalist China, Dai Li claimed to have "no interest in politics at all."¹⁹ After the war with Japan ended, Chiang Kai-shek in fact nominated him to be a member of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee, but he rejected it. Instead of going into politics after his retirement, Dai Li had revealed to his comrades and Milton Miles that he would like to go back to his hometown, Baocen in Jiangshan xian, to become a farmer and look after his mother. Another option was to become a river conservationist for he believed that the Yellow River, if properly controlled and managed, could become China's blessing instead of curse.²⁰

There is little doubt that an important reason for Dai Li's rise was that he had Chiang Kai-shek's complete trust and confidence. However, had Dai Li also not shown great ability in building and leading such an important organization, his loyalty to Chiang would not have mattered much. This was especially so when Chiang was facing so many challenges to his rule. He could not afford to have a less than efficient security organization. Furthermore, had Dai Li failed to deliver, he most probably would have been replaced by other Huangpu graduates, many of whom were as loyal to Chiang. Finally, considering the fact that Dai Li's appointment as head of the Tewa Chu had been challenged by his comrades in the Lixing She (Earnest Action Society), Chiang Kai-shek would be under great pressure to replace him should he fail to perform. Thus, an equally, if not more, important factor to Dai Li's success was his own ability. And since Dai Li did not just take over an existing organization but had to build one almost from scratch, his achievement was even more remarkable. He was one of the few (if not the only one) Huangpu graduates from the last two classes (i.e. sixth and seventh) to attain such power and prominence in Nationalist China.

Dai Li, of course, could not have achieved this feat alone. In this endeavour, he was fortunate to be able to draw from a pool of equally dedicated and committed people, mainly his classmates from Huangpu, to assist him. Apart from Zheng Jiemia, a graduate of the second class of trainees from Huangpu and appointed as Dai Li's deputy by Chiang Kai-shek, most of the rest of Dai Li's senior agents were recruited by him. These included Mao Renfeng, his secretary and

who in 1926 had encouraged Dai Li to enter Huangpu. (As noted earlier, Mao succeeded Dai Li as head of the Baomi Ju.) Other able assistants of Dai Li included Qiao Jiakai, a graduate of the sixth class at Huangpu, who served in a number of posts in the organization, including as chief of Beiping Region Office and inspector of internal discipline in the Juntong Ju, and Chen Gongshu, a graduate of the fifth class, who served as the chief of Beiping station, Tianjin station and Shanghai Region Office. Without the help of these Huangpu graduates, Dai Li might not have been so successful in running the Toum Chu/Juntong Ju.

Did Dai Li receive outside help? Western intelligence reports had alleged that Dai Li's organization was "modelled on the German gestapo" and that Dai Li showed "strong German sympathies".²¹ Dai Li in fact had rejected this suggestion: "Our organization shall never adopt either the Russian G.P.U. or the German Gestapo's intelligence methods!"²² Except for the one-month intelligence training camp conducted by a German advisor of Chiang Kai-shek at the beginning of 1932 before the creation of the Toum Chu, there is no other concrete evidence to show that Dai Li had received foreign help on how to run his establishment. But Dai Li did engage a foreigner to help improve one technical aspect of his operation: signals intelligence, especially to break Japanese codes. That person was Herbert Yardley, an American, who founded and directed the "American Black Chamber" during World War One. Yardley was recruited by Dai Li's top agent in the U.S., Major Xiao Bo, assistant military attache to the Chinese Embassy in Washington, to work for Dai Li from 1936 to 1940.²³

In the final analysis, the *Towu Chu/Juntong Ju* was basically a security agency created by Chiang Kai-shek to serve the political objectives of the Guomindang. Its ultimate mission was to maintain China's security in general and in particular, to protect the Guomindang government from being overthrown. Its task therefore was to suppress and to eliminate all anti-Guomindang forces which posed a threat to the government. While the main pillar of Chiang Kai-shek's power was the military, the *Towu Chu/Juntong Ju* was an important tool to consolidate his grip over China. On the eve of the war with Japan, the Guomindang government appeared to be much stronger than it was in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. The Communists in Jiangxi were defeated and after completing the historic Long March, were fighting for their survival in Northwest China. While Dai Li's organization did not play a substantial role in the Fifth Extermination Campaign which defeated the Communist rebels, it did participate more actively in the suppression of the Communists after they had established themselves in the Northwest. By 1937, Nanjing had also extended its authority, (nominally in some regions), to many parts of China. In terms of territory and population, Nanjing "could credibly claim to govern 25 percent of the area and 60 percent of the population of China"²⁴ compared with just 8 percent and 20 percent respectively in 1929. To what extent was this attributable to the activities of Dai Li's *Towu Chu* is difficult to assess as there were other agencies involved. But, clearly the activities of the *Towu Chu* had some impact. For example, Dai Li's organization was actively involved in the suppression of the Fujian and

Guangdong-Guangxi rebellions, leading to the expansion of Central authorities to these provinces.

When the war with Japan broke out, Dai Li's organization became indispensable to Chiang Kai-shek. With Chiang's armies defeated and his government taking refuge in the mountainous region in southwest China only Dai Li had the capacity to continue to harass the Japanese and their collaborators, as well as attempt to check (though not very effectively), Communist expansion in the occupied areas. Dai Li also accepted new tasks and responsibilities such as checking subversive economic activities (smuggling, hoarding) and to help secure war supplies for Free China.

By and large, the operations by the Junctong Ju against the Nanjing puppet regime were successful. By dealing harshly with collaborators and traitors, they had the effect of discouraging other prominent people from collaborating with the Japanese. The cultivation of key collaborators such as Zhou Fohai also was important to the Guomindang, especially towards the end of the war. Without the services of these collaborators, who had been secretly working for Dai Li, the Guomindang would certainly have had a harder time taking over the occupied areas from the Japanese and preventing them from being captured by the Communists at the end of the war.

Critics of the Guomindang, however, saw the Nationalist military secret service as an instrument of oppression and of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship. It cannot be denied that the Toum Chu/Junctong Ju was involved in the suppression of opposition to the Guomindang. Indeed, that was one reason for its creation and Dai Li

himself had stated on many occasions that his task was to eliminate all "counterrevolutionary forces" in China, by negative means if necessary. Furthermore, Dai Li was indirectly in control of the police force, the most immediate and visible instrument used to suppress the opposition. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that Dai Li's Tewa Chu/Juntong Ju was not the only organization engaged in this activity. There was another security agency, the Zhongtong Ju (Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics) which came under the control of the Guomindang party and was responsible for maintaining security within the party and in the social, educational, cultural and labor scene. Thus, Dai Li's role in the oppression of domestic opposition should be seen in this context.

Dai Li had been described as a "political assassin" and the "Hitler of China". We have seen the numerous assassinations for which his organization was responsible and there were probably more in which his organization was involved. The question is whether Dai Li deliberately promoted and glorified violence and terror. Lloyd Eastman has argued that Dai Li did, citing the assassinations and illegal arrests attributed to the Tewa Chu. He also argues that the Lixing She (or the Blue Shirt Society), to which the Tewa Chu belonged, approved of acts of violence against opponents of the Guomindang.²⁵ Another scholar, however, has disputed this claim. According to Maria Hsia Chang, there is a difference between the instrumental conception of violence which the Lixing She members advocated and the glorification of violence as promoted by Italian and German fascists. The former refers to the use of violence "for

instrumental purposes to be applied toward those judged to be inimical to China's well-being," whereas the latter "provided a rationale for violence. For the Fascists, violence was a necessary, natural evil. They conceived violence as somehow critical and essential to man's fulfillment as a moral agent."²⁶ Chang also points out that the instruction book written by Dai Li, Zhangzhi Zhentan, did not glorify violence as Eastman has claimed.²⁷

I agree with Chang's argument. There is no evidence in Dai Li's book that he promoted terror and violence. In fact, Dai Li had told his agents that:

We must all know that lingxin [the leader, referring to Chiang Kai-shek] has asked us to do secret work [mimi gongzuo]; not to create terror like in the Soviet Union and Germany, but to use secret work to cultivate a group of revolutionary cadres who are most well-disciplined, correct, hardworking and able to endure hardship, realistic and quietly immerse themselves in hard work.²⁸

Dai Li also did not allow his men to carry out unauthorized assassinations. Once, a former Shanghai Region Office chief (name not known) killed a person in Shaanxi province without the approval from the headquarters. He was sentenced to death by the organization for breaking the rules, although he did not kill the person out of personal reasons.²⁹ In short, Dai Li's organization did carry out assassinations but they were entirely to serve certain political objectives. Especially during times of war, the assassinations of traitors and collaborators were deemed a legitimate occupation.

Many of Dai Li's agents lost their lives and many others were arrested and tortured by their captors, mainly by the Japanese and their collaborators. Altogether 1704 men were killed during Dai Li's career as chief of the Nationalist military secret service.³⁰ The majority probably were killed during the War of Resistance.

The importance of Dai Li and of the security establishment cannot be exaggerated. It is clear that it was actively involved in helping the Guomindang government cope with the various internal and external threats. Dai Li was ruthless, but his motives were patriotic. He was able and efficient. He believed in the use of violence to achieve the objectives of the organization, but he did not glorify it. But because the chief targets of his organization were the Chinese people themselves, and because he was closely associated with the authoritarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek, Dai Li and the organization he led will remain a controversial subject in the history of Nationalist China.

FOOTNOTES

1. Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju ed., Dai Yimeng xiansheng quanji (Taipei: Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, 1979), 1: 253-54; Wang Zhichao, "Yi Dai xiansheng shicha qingdao," Jianxing Yuankan, no. 164 (1971): 68.
2. Quanji, 1: 233; Deng Baoguang, "Jungtong lingdao zhongxin Ju benbu ge shiqi de zuzhi ji huodong qingkuang," Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji (Beijing), no. 86, (April 1983): 195.
3. Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chuban She, 1985), 2: 489; Jin Xiongbei, Wang zhengquan de kaishang yu shuozhang (Hong Kong: Chunqiu Zashi She, 1960), 3: 84.
4. Jin Xiongbei, Wang zhengquan, 3: 82, 92; Quanji, 1: 255; Xu Zhaoming, "Hanjian Zhou Fohai goujie Jungtong ji qi xiachang," Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji (Beijing), no. 64 (July 1979): 213.

Altogether, 4,692 collaborators were arrested by the Jungtong Ju. Of these, 4,291 were later referred to the civil law courts for trial; the rest were court-martialed. Quanji, 1: 256.
5. Jin Xiongbei, Wang zhengquan, 3: 87-88.
6. John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1972), 322.
7. Quanji, 1: 256-57.
8. George C. Marshall, Marshall's Mission to China. Intro. by Lyman Van Slyke (Arlington, Va.: University Publications of America, 1976), 1: 7, 43; China Handbook, 1937-1945, comp. Chinese Ministry of Information (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 738.
9. Quanji, 1: 257.
10. Wen Qiang, "Ribei touxiang hou Dai Li lai ping qingkuang suoji," Wenshi Ziliao Xuanbian (Beijing), no. 16 (1983): 120-21.
11. Quanji, 1: 417.
12. Quanji, 1: 280; Wen Qiang, "Ribei touxiang," 127.
13. Wen Qiang, "Ribei touxiang," 127; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 546.
14. Quanji, 1: 281-82; Wang Zhichao, "Yi Dai xiansheng," 67-73; Liang Ruejie, "Jinian sanyiqi daonian Dai xiansheng," Jianxing Yuankan, no. 176 (1972): 17-21; and Shen Zui, "Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li," in Dai Li sisan, eds., Shen Zui and Wen Qiang (Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1980), 164-66. Officially, Dai Li's plane crash was due to bad weather. It was an accident. There is no evidence to

suggest that the plane crash was caused by an act of sabotage, although this cannot be ruled out. There were rumours at the time that the Communists were responsible for Dai Li's death. See Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, The Chinese Secret Service, trans. from the French by Christine Donougher (London: Headline, 1989), 192-94.

15. Quanji, 1: 281; Liangxiang, Dai Li zhuan, 2: 547.
16. Quanji, 1: 259.
17. Cheng Yiming, "Juntong tewu zuzhi de zhenxiang," Guangdong Wenshi Ziliao, no. 29 (1980): 250, 260-61.
18. Quanji, 1: 387.
19. Dai Li, Dai xiansheng yixun (n.p., n.d.), 2: 245.
20. Liu Feichu, Fusheng luoying ji (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1968), 72-73; Roy Stratton, SAGO: The Rice Paddy Navy (New York: C.S. Palmer, 1950), 22.
21. Harris R. Smith, O.S.S. The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972), 247.
22. Quanji, 1: 317-318; Liu Feichu, Fusheng, 58-59.
23. See Herbert O. Yardley, The Chinese Black Chamber: An Adventure in Espionage. Intro. by James Bamford (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983).
24. Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 272.
25. Ibid., 46-47; Maria Hsia Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt Society: Fascism and Developmental Nationalism (Berkeley, California: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985), 19-20.
26. Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirt, 20.
27. Ibid., 21.
28. Quanji, 1: 337.
29. Chen Gongshu, Naiguo Chuanlian (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Cluben She, 1981), preface, p. 19.
30. Quanji, 2: 616. It is not known whether this figure included those who were sentenced to death by the organization.

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GLOSSARY

Bai Chongxi	白崇禧
Bai Shiwei	白世维
Baoan	保安
Baoan Chu	保安处
Baoan dui	保安队
Bao mi Ju	保密局
Bianyi huncheng dui	便衣混成队
Biedong dui	别动队
Biedong jun	别动军
Cai Jinjun	蔡劲军
Cai Tingkai	蔡廷锴
Cai Yuanpei	蔡元培
Chen Bangguo	陈邦国
Chen Chao	陈超
Chen Dirong	陈鼎蓉
Chen Gongbo	陈公博

Chen Gongshu	陈恭澍
Chen Guofu	陈果夫
Chen Jiongming	陈炯明
Chen Jitang	陈济棠
Chen Lu	陈录
Chen Mingshu	陈铭枢
Chen Shaohiao	陈少校
Chen Zhenxing	陈振先
Chen Ziyi	陈资一
Chen Zhuolin	陈卓琳
Cheng Kexiang	程克祥
Cheng Huiyi	程慕颐
Chiang Kai-shek	蒋介石
Chongqing	重庆
Dagong bao	大公报
Dai Chunfeng	戴春凤
Dai Guanying	戴冠英

Dai Li	戴 笠
Dai Yunlin	戴 云 木木
Dai Yunong	戴 雨 農
Dai Zhenglan	戴 征 兰
daizui ligong	戴 罪 立 功
Deng Wenyi	邓 文 仪
Ding Mocun	丁 耐 村
Disen Ke	第 五 科
Dongbei	东 北
Du Yueheng	杜 月 笠
Fan Guogang	潘 国 纲
fangzheng	反 正
Fang Zhenru	方 振 武
Fei Jishan	费 吉 珊
Fu Shenglan	傅 胜 蓝
Fu Xianan	傅 筱 安
Gen Guocun	干 国 勳

Gui Yongqing	桂永清
Guofang bu Qingbao Ju	国防部情报局
hanjian	汉奸
Hanzhong	汉中
Heqiao	河桥
He Yingqin	何应钦
He Zhonghan	贺衷寒
He Xingjian	何行健
Hongbang	洪帮
Hu Qingan	胡靖安
Hu Zongnan	胡宗南
Huangpu	黄浦
Huang Yiguang	黄逸光
Huang Zhigang	黄志刚
Huhang	滬杭
Huier dang	惠尔登
Huyuan guanli chu	货运管理局

Ji Hongchang	吉 鴻 昌
Jiang Guangnai	蔣 光 霁
Jiang Shaomo	姜 紹 謨
Jiangnan	江 南
Jiangshan xian	江 山 县
Jianou	建 瓯
Jidong	冀 东
Jisi Ju	緝 私 局
Jinghu	京 滬
Jingshen jianghua	精 神 讲 话
Jingshen xunlian	精 神 训 练
Jinshan	晋 陕
Junshi Weiyuanhui Diaocha Tongji Ju	军事委员会调查统计局
Juntong Ju	军 统 局
Kangda	抗 大
Lan Yuzi	蓝 月 喜
Li Guoshen	李 果 谌

Li Jishen	李 济 琛
Li Kaifeng	李 开 峰
Li Shiqun	李 士 群
Li Zongren	李 宗 仁
Liang Ganqiao	梁 干 乔
Liang Hongzhi	梁 鸿 志
Liangxiang	良 雄
Lin Hu	林 虎
lingxiu	领 袖
Liren	立 人
Lishui	丽 水
Liu Geqing	刘 芳 青
Liuguo	六 国
Lixing She	力 行 社
Lujun junguan xuexiao	陆 军 军 官 学 校
Luojiawan	罗 家 湾
Ma Hehu	马 河 湾

Ma Zhichao	马志超
Mao Renfeng	毛人凤
Mao Weishou	毛维寿
Mao Xiucong	毛秀丛
Micha zu	密查组
mini gongsuo	秘密工作
Peng shengmu	彭盛木
Peng Shou	彭寿
Pucheng	浦城
Pudong	浦东
Qian Xinmin	钱新民
Qianyang	黔阳
Qiao Jiacai	乔家才
Qin Qirong	秦启荣
Qingbang	青帮
Qiu Kaiji	邱丕基
Qu Shoumian	区寿年

- Ren Yingqi 任应岐
- Ren Yuandao 任援道
- Sanmin zhuyi Lixing she 三民主义力行社
- shadi chujian 杀敌除奸
- Shang Zhensheng 尚振声
- Shaojiang 少将
- Shen Enbo 沈恩波
- Shen Guanghan 沈光汉
- Shen Zhiyue 沈之岳
- Shen Zui 沈酉萃
- Shenbao 甲报
- Shenzhou guangfu shi 神州光复志
- Shi Liangcai 史量才
- Shi Ming 史明
- Shi Youren 石友三
- Shiren tuan 十人团
- Song Qingling 宋庆龄

- Song Zheyuan 宋哲元
- Seong, T.V. (Song Ziwon) 宋子文
- Suqing hanjian anjian chuli weiyuanhui 肃清汉奸案件
处理委员会
- Sun Chuanfang 孙传芳
- Sunhe xingdong weiyuanhui 苏浙行动委员会
- Tang Shengzhi 唐生智
- Tao Xingzhi 陶行知
- Tong Jie 滕杰
- Towu Chu 特务处
- Wang Aqiao 王亚樵
- Wang Kemin 王克敏
- Wang Luqiao 王鲁翘
- Wang Tianmu 王天木
- Wang Wen 王文
- Wenxi 文溪
- Wei Daming 魏大铭
- Weixin zhengfu 维新政府

Wu Anzhi	吴安之
Xiao Zanyu	萧赞育
Xifeng	息烽
Xiao Bo	萧勃
Xiaozhang	校长
Xibei	西北
Xiong Jiandong	熊剑东
Xu Langxi	徐朗西
Xu Tianchen	徐天琛
Xuan Tieyu	宣铁吾
Yang Hu	杨虎
Yang Hucheng	杨虎城
Yang Quan	杨权
Yang Xingfo	杨杏佛
Yang Xinghua	杨惺华
Yin Shagong	殷沙耕
Yongfeng	永丰

Yu Haimo	余 汉 谋
Yu Jiansheng	余 荃 声
Yu Junqun	于 钧 群
Zeng Che	曾 澈
Zeng Zhongming	曾 仲 鸣
Zhang Fengxin	张 奉 馨
Zhang Fengyi	张 逢 义
Zhang Guotao	张 固 焘
Zhang Jingyao	张 敬 尧
Zhang Qingyu	张 庆 馥
Zhang Shude	张 树 德
Zhang Xuoliang	张 学 良
Zhang Yandian	张 砚 田
Zhang Yanfo	张 严 佛
Zhang Yunfei	张 云 飞
Zhang Zhen	张 贞
Zhao Gangyi	赵 刚 义

Zheng Jiemín	郑介民
Zheng Xiuyuan	郑修元
Zhicai	制裁
Zhongjiang	中 将
Zhongshanling	中 山 陵
Zhongyang Diaocha Tongji Ju	中央调查统计局
Zhongyang jinguan xuexiao	中央警官学校
Zhongyi Jiuguo Jun	忠义救国军
Zhou Fohai	周 佛 海
Zhou Nianning	周 念 行
Zhou Shiguang	周 世 光
Zhou Weilong	周 伟 龙
Zhou Zhaoqiang	周 绍 璋
Zhu Sheng	朱 升
Zuoguan	做 官