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Morgenthauian Realism and International Relations

by

Nancy Dhillon



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Edmonton, Alberta

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
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Abstract

This thesis explores the significance of Morgenthauian realism for international relations through time. Fundamentally, it is argued that Morgenthau's focus on war, peace, the state and power is key to understanding international relations both as a theoretical activity and as a practical enterprise. Moreover, it is reasoned that Morgenthau's paradigm is greatly beneficial at this historical juncture wherein the seeds of a new world order are being sown.


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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Morgenthauian Realism and International Relations by Nancy Dhillon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.


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INTRODUCTION

Hans Morgenthau's efforts to develop a realist paradigm have had an undeniable impact on the study of international relations (IR)¹. Especially in the United States - but not limited to this area - Morgenthauian realism marked a pronounced departure from the theories of the idealists in vogue during the inter-war period. Because his works garnered such attention and because they embodied a philosophy giving significant attention to power and interest, which was far different than the penchant of the idealists to focus mainly on cooperation and other means aimed at avoiding war, Hans Morgenthau had the effect of revolutionizing a discipline. In some ways, scholarship subsequent to the time when Morgenthau wrote can be seen as a response to, denial or exaltation of the paradigm developed by Morgenthau. In other words, Morgenthau has had a pervasive influence on the discipline of international relations.

Over fifty years have passed since the writing of Morgenthau's seminal work, *Politics Among Nations*. During that time many events have come to pass including the debate concerning globalization and the ending of the Cold War. Indeed, some have seen the present time as a critical juncture or an unprecedented moment in history wherein the seeds of a new world order are being sown. Therefore, it is necessary to

revisit Morgenthau's works so that we may better understand its relevance and potential for insight at this benchmark in time.

In one respect, Hans Morgenthau's body of work will be analyzed precisely because his efforts signify one of the first modern attempts to formulate a realist paradigm of international relations in a systematic manner with significant breadth and depth. In any case, a particular theorist's work is being used because there are distinctions to be made in the numerous strands of realism. There are nuances that must be differentiated among the various understandings of the paradigm. In other words, realism has come to be defined in many ways according to the penchant of the theorist. Consequently, a qualification is in order. It is best to state here that arguments made and insight derived will pertain to the realist paradigm as advanced by Hans Morgenthau.

Also, this thesis will not concentrate on interpretations of realism other than Morgenthau's nor on paradigms apart from realism. The reason for having a narrower scope is because this thesis is a precursor or a first, nascent step towards merging Morgenthauian realism with Coxian critical theory. In order to open up a dialogue ultimately between the two paradigms, Morgenthauian realism must first be understood as relevant to international relations today.

Have times indeed changed so much that Morgenthau's concerns can be relegated to an inferior position? Does Morgenthau have any

contribution to make to the discourse today? Of course, the prevalent argument in IR circles centers around the opinion that Morgenthauian realism was better suited for a nascent stage in the development of the international relations discourse and a different (and, perhaps, bygone) era in international relations. Coinciding with this line of thinking has been the rise in a discourse which decries the inadequacies of Morgenthau's paradigm. These inadequacies include – but are not limited to – the following: Morgenthauian realism is overly concerned with policy relevance and Morgenthauian realism tends to focus too narrowly on the state, power, war and peace to the neglect of the other facets of international life.

For the time in which he wrote and the so-called inadequacies his paradigm is assumed to be prey to, Morgenthau's realism is being warranted passing mention by academia as a footnote in the evolution of international relations theorization or being presented simply as a “hegemonic evil” which must be countered and opposed. Morgenthau's works are not being studied in sufficient breadth or depth to determine what exactly Morgenthauian realism is espousing much less whether assumptions about Morgenthauian realism are true. Academic oversight has helped promulgate and ardently uphold assumptions about Morgenthauian realism that bear little resemblance to the actual teachings and insights of the paradigm.

Since considerations of war form an integral part of Morgenthauian realism, they will form the dominant thread within the thesis. War will be the organizing principle of the thesis. War will be the means by which we access the criticisms leveled against Morgenthauian realism, explore human nature, grapple with Morgenthau's idea of interest and approach the implications of Morgenthauian realism for theorization. Fundamentally, the argument will be developed that war plays an integral role in international relations.

In exploring Morgenthau's understanding of war along with some of the more pressing criticisms of Morgenthauian realism and comparing them with what Morgenthau actually said in his works, we will be better able to access the realist paradigm as conceived by Morgenthau himself. In this way, we will be able to distinguish truth from falsehood and insight from oversimplification where Morgenthauian realism is concerned. Furthermore, by sifting through to the essence of the paradigm, we will be able to better evaluate the significance and degree of robustness of Morgenthauian realism. Also, it will be possible to understand fully the implications of this paradigm for IR.

In a related vein, the presence of Morgenthauian realism in the IR canon cuts to the heart of the third inter-paradigm debate centering on metaphysical – that is, ontological and epistemological – concerns.

Realism presents war, peace and the state as being the building blocks of

international relations. The goal is to consider whether these claims are indeed true and why or why not. What substantively is IR if not the study of statecraft and the concern with issues of war and peace? Moreover, how are we to speak of international relations if not largely in terms of the state, war and peace?

In situating the analysis of Morgenthauian realism within the broader context of the inter-paradigm debate, there emerge also issues related to the role international relations theory is to perform and the aims of the theorization process. Should the aim of IR theorization be towards achieving emancipatory goals to be realized through the Braudelian *longue duree* (along the lines of critical theory); or should the aim of theorization be towards unearthing the unchanging elements of international relations and grasping the machinations of the international arena to date (as done by Morgenthauian realism)? Alternatively, should theory aim to achieve emancipatory goals and grasp the unchanging elements of international relations (as done by critical realism)? What is the relationship between theory and policy relevance? And because Morgenthauian realism is inclined towards a long-range perspective and also considered to be policy oriented, its presence in the international relations discourse leads inevitably to questioning whether or not grand theory can be policy relevant in any ready and immediate

way. All these questions need answers if we are to proceed further in the Third Debate.

At this point some initial propositions should be made. The normative assertion underlying this thesis has to do with the idea that there is a greater complexity of thought present in the realist paradigm advanced by Hans Morgenthau than is popularly understood and which can be accessed through the process of demystifying the paradigm. Such access is of utmost importance because the continued demonization of Morgenthauian realism seriously hinders theory building in IR and undermines the credibility of the theorization process. That is, one could say that recent theories are developed simply to break the hegemony of a realism which presents a pessimistic view of human beings. Aiming to break the hegemony of an alternate and/or opposing paradigm detracts, in a significant respect, from the substantive elements of the theories themselves and brings IR debates to a lower (and possibly the lowest) level. In other words, the goal of this theoretical strategy may be perceived – especially by the student of international relations - to be much more about setting-up a paradigm which would enjoy the dominance Morgenthauian realism has had rather than making a contribution to the pool of knowledge about international relations.

In terms of structure, it will be necessary to begin the thesis by contextualizing the discussion of themes within a broader understanding

of Morgenthau's particular brand of realism. Having done this, we will first approach the issue of war by linking it with a discussion of human nature and the criticisms of realism where human nature is concerned. Next, the criticisms of interest will be addressed and this exploration made relevant to war. This last section on war and interest culminates by wrestling with the idea of war as an inevitability and introducing limited war as a potential solution to the problems attending modern war. The sections on war and statecraft build on the foundation laid by the previous sections and fully develop ideas surrounding limited war through examining not only the requirements for peaceful change but also the interplay amongst sovereignty, international law and the state. Finally, the thesis directs attention at the implications of Morgenthauian realism (and its associated focus on war) for theorization about international relations.

CHAPTER ONE MORGENTHAUIAN REALISM

Before launching into a substantive discussion it is necessary to provide a brief outline of Morgenthauian realism². To begin, this school of thought is founded on the premise that the world is imperfect and that this imperfection has roots in human nature. Consequently, absolutes, where morality is concerned, cannot be obtained but must be approximated to the best degree possible. From such a declaration it follows that Morgenthauian realism “appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good”³. Therefore, it is clear that Morgenthauian realism does attend to the ethical/moral dimension but makes a distinction between absolutes and what, in reality, is possible, all the while aiming for the possible.

Founded on such assertions are Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism. First, Morgenthauian realism understands politics to be governed by objective laws grounded in an unchanging human nature that must be understood if society is to be improved. Because Morgenthauian realism adheres to the belief in objective laws, it follows logically that Morgenthauian realists believe in the ability to develop a rational theory of international relations encompassing these laws⁴. Although the paradigm recognizes the role played by uncertainty, unique

occurrences, and other unpredictable elements, Morgenthauian realism also understands that the international realm needs be rendered intelligible and ascertained through reason. As a result, it is on the rational elements that IR theory must focus predominantly. Essentially, the role of the paradigm is to provide a “rational map” through the international realm⁵.

Second, Morgenthauian realism sees the concept of interest defined as power as being key to its analytical approach. This concept mediates between reason and the facts, helping “to distinguish between political and non-political facts”⁶. As well, through defining interest as power the political actor is rendered rational thereby eliminating the need to guess at illusive motives and ideological forces. The actions of the political actor are analyzed in terms of interest rather than the role played by ideology and other such motives. The goal is to determine to what degree the political actor is able to understand the workings of foreign policy and how adept he/she is at translating this basic understanding into political action. Despite the fact that the political actor is not always rational, deviations from rationality can be rendered coherent from the perspective of the rational observer. Cognizant of the fact that reality abounds with irrationalities, Morgenthauian realism must focus on the rational elements for theoretical understanding to be attained. According to Morgenthau the difference between the actual

workings of international politics and a theory of IR “is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait” where “the photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye” while the portrait, like Morgenthauian realism, shows “the human essence of the person portrayed”⁷.

Third, Morgenthauian realism recognizes that although the concept of interest defined as power is true in all times and places, it is not “fixed once and for all”⁸. Interest and power operating in any particular period are influenced by the political and cultural environment of the time. Power refers to anything which facilitates “the control of man over man” including all social relationships - violent and peaceful, moral or immoral⁹. Although this conception of power includes hostile relationships, Morgenthauian realism is not rigid in its stance on the reality of large-scale violence¹⁰. Rather, it does advance the idea that the use of violence may be changed¹¹. In a related vein, Morgenthauian realism sees the nation-state, not as a fixed entity, but as an effect of history, which will disappear and “be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world”¹². Finally, transformation of the international system will come about only through the “manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as

they will the future”, not through confrontation of the reality comprised of those forces¹³.

Fourth, Morgenthau’s paradigm is aware of the role morality plays in the political realm. Yet, it also understands that morality is often opposed to the requirements for success in the political sphere. As such, moral principles must be understood in light of the particular circumstances where the state is concerned¹⁴. Moral principles cannot be applied in the same way to both individuals and the state. An individual is accountable for only himself/herself. He/She can sacrifice his/her interests for morality. The state is created by and comprised of more than one person and may not be able to make sacrifices in the same way an individual does. Unlike the individual, the state must aim first for survival. The state is an artificial construct that has utility for its citizens so long as it exists (like any other man-made creation). Only if the state exists can it perform the very functions for which it was created. As for the relationship existing between the state and morality, prudence is the greatest political virtue whereby alternative political actions can be evaluated and a course of action taken¹⁵.

Fifth, Morgenthauian realism makes a distinction between universal moral laws and the moral dictates of any particular nation. Morgenthau is of the opinion that such differentiation saves us from idolatry¹⁶. Indeed, from time immemorial nations have claimed their

particular brand of morality to be the morality of the universe. Here, the concept of interest defined as power injects a sobering influence into moral zeal. By judging all nations according to this concept, an evenhanded justice takes hold because all are being judged equally according to the same standard. No one nation and its associated morality are being privileged. Application of this standard – judging all nations according to interest - may be the greatest manifestation of morality in an imperfect world.

Finally, Morgenthauian realism understands the political sphere to be a distinct arena in the same manner as are the economic, judicial and moral realms. All these realms are interconnected, but for analytical purposes these spheres also need to be understood individually. To elaborate, the Morgenthauian realist privileges the standards of politics despite the fact that it recognizes other standards of thought (like, for instance, those of economics). Upholding the individuality of the political sphere does not mean, however, that Morgenthauian realism ignores these other standards of thought. Rather, the paradigm assigns an appropriate realm and function to each. This assignment is based on a “pluralistic conception of human nature”¹⁷. An individual is complex and multi-dimensional. Yet, to understand any one facet of an individual, we must “deal with it on its own terms”¹⁸. In other words, to understand the

political nature of an act, we must concede priority to the standards of thought issuing from the political aspect.

Morgenthau's paradigm concedes that there are many limits to understanding, not the least of which is the reality that each event to be accessed, penetrated and analyzed is unique¹⁹. Yet, these events with which the international relations theorist must contend share the similarity of being social forces shaped by human nature. Through comparing events with one another it is possible to extract the actual principles of international politics and find answers to questions like the following: How are events similar? How are events distinct? What are the implications of these similarities and differences for foreign policy? Moreover, the Morgenthauian realist is to comprehend and internalize foremost "that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible"²⁰. The more we study international politics, the more aware we are of the ambiguity that surrounds the facts. This ambiguity arises from the opposing forces which comprise any political situation. For this reason determining an outcome is guesswork. In this vein, the scholar can only offer the potentialities and probabilities of one outcome prevailing over another.

Fundamentally, the study of international relations cannot be a disinterested pursuit. Rather, in its being international relations connects knowledge with action. Theory and policy exist in a symbiotic

relationship. Theory cannot ignore policy relevance, especially taking into consideration the knowledge that events in this century (including nuclear weapons proliferation and total war) have “given to the problem of peace an urgency it has never had before”²¹.

CHAPTER TWO

HUMAN NATURE, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In beginning to understand the reason why war is of such importance to international relations, it is necessary to draw links amongst war, human nature and, more specifically, the way the human psyche responds to the subject of war. In accomplishing such a task, however, we must first contend with the criticism leveled against Morgenthauian realism regarding human nature.

In reference to the criticism itself, scholars have found fault with Morgenthau's paradigm for being pessimistic. Here, Steve Smith is of the opinion - indicative of the belief held by many - that Morgenthau saw human nature "as merely selfish or downright evil"²². In the oft quoted *Man, the State, and War* Waltz goes to an extreme and argues that, like Niebuhr and St. Augustine, Morgenthau reflected the idea that the human soul is "the seat of evil"²³. Yet, nowhere does Morgenthau state or even imply that human beings are by nature evil. Of course, Morgenthau does view the desires "to live, to propagate, and to dominate" as being rooted in human nature²⁴. At the same time he understands that not all societies are composed of power-seekers when he cites anthropological evidence as proving that some societies are not based on the desire for power²⁵. As well, he comments that the desires for life, progeny, and power are dependent on social conditions²⁶. Therefore,

societal sanctioning may determine, in part at least, the degree to which the desires manifest themselves. This brings us to the nature vs. nurture debate.

With Morgenthauian realism there is the awareness of a greater complexity inherent in human nature. That vast chimera we call human nature is understood to be a myriad of inherent psychological drives, social conditioning, biology etc. It is facile to say that humans are by nature merely good or evil. Even the terms good and evil have been misunderstood and perhaps overused. Although a discussion about the nature of good and evil is beyond the scope of this work, it is sufficient to note that the inclinations to live and propagate - thereby enabling continuity for the species - is a good for which every species (including humans) aims. Domination (or the struggle for power) exists because only the fittest survive. In this way, *Homo Sapiens* evolved from their predecessors. Modern *Homo Sapiens* or humans are more rational beings who are subject to strict evolutionary influences (promoting a "dominate to survive" mentality) as well as cultural adaptation. Although cultural adaptation does have a role to play in the development of the human psyche, social conditioning may not be able to fully eliminate the desire to dominate because humans are not *wholly* rational. As with all other animals humans too are prey to their appetites, biology and pre-cognitive drives on some significant level. Moreover, even if the desire to

dominate can be squelched within the individual human being, this feat may not be possible for any particular society or nation as a whole to achieve. The motivations or drives present within the group cannot be equated with the psyche of individual human beings.

Some have seen Morgenthau as holding an unsavory outlook on human nature because he includes the desires for power and domination as being innate in humans. In fact, Michael Smith understands Morgenthau's discussions of humans as power-maximizers to imply that "men seek power because of some evil born in them"²⁷. In other words, it is Michael Smith not Morgenthau who connects power with evil. So, the question is not so much whether humans are by nature good or evil, but whether or not power and domination are evils. Michael Smith sees these drives for power in a negative light because he has conflated Morgenthau's discussions of power with the idea that humans are selfish and evil. At any rate this does not mean that power, domination and struggle are truly evil. It just means some theorists are of the *opinion* that these drives are evil.

In discussing human nature as it pertains to Morgenthau's paradigm, it is necessary to make a distinction between good and evil on the one hand and war and peace on the other. There has been a tendency to equate evil with being warlike and good with being peace-loving. As Lawrence H. Keeley details, Jamie Uys's film *The Gods Must*

Be Crazy contrasts the warlike penchant of Westerners with the harmonious and peaceful nature and culture of San Bushmen²⁸. Essentially, we see how the Westerners are portrayed in a negative light whereas the San Bushmen are depicted as an ideal for society. Furthermore, phrases in common parlance like “dogs of war” or “dove of peace” give indication of the way we conceptualize war and peace. Especially with Morgenthau’s realism it may be the case that readers inferred from his lengthy analyses of war, rather than his discussion of the innate nature of the struggle for power, the idea that he held human nature to be evil. So the question is not so much whether humans are good or evil, but whether or not they are warlike by nature. Furthermore, being warlike may not be an “evil”. Morgenthau focused on the rise and fall of many civilizations in his works. From this we get the sense that the history of civilization has indeed been a history of warfare. In fact, archeologist Lawrence H. Keeley states that “cross-cultural research on warfare has established that although some societies ... did not engage in war or did so extremely rarely, the overwhelming majority of known societies (90 to 95 percent) have been involved in this activity”²⁹. At any rate, it cannot be said with any certainty that because Morgenthau focused on war, he held humans to be evil.

Although we may not be able to say definitively whether humans are by nature warlike, we can nonetheless gain some insight about this.

In the first place, we know that humans are political³⁰ by nature. The individual needs the social group for protection and nurturing when young and for continuity when mature. A particular social group or organization may have an inclination towards war and militarism. A case in point here is Sparta as described by Thucydides in the *History of the Peloponnesian War*³¹. Undoubtedly, the group will inculcate the individual to this means of resolving disputes and attaining power. So, the individual psyche is being shaped by the group at large to be more warlike and human nature being altered or realized accordingly.

At a more basic level the human psyche responds to the subject of war in a particular manner whether or not the group has socialized the individual to value war and militarism. Reference to paintings depicting war can be helpful in developing the links. Delacroix was inspired to paint a picture of young French soldiers fighting in battle in *Liberty Leading the People*. In his brilliance, this painter was able to capture the anger, pain, idealism and spirit of the Revolution in these men. The faces of the soldiers hold fast our attention and draw us in. We are engaged by the subject matter of the painting in a manner distinct from the way we respond to Van Gogh's *Sunflowers*, or Monet's portraits. We call Delacroix's painting a masterpiece because it has the ability to elicit such a response. This response on the part of the observer/voyeur to the

subject matter of war gives insight into the human psyche. Little else so grips us the way war and the attempt to procure peace does.

That we are fascinated by war and peace is further evidenced by the fact that these subjects are not the concern of political science or, more specifically, international relations alone. Rather, it seems as if all spheres of learning and expression from the fine arts and literature on one hand to biology and genetics on the other have been pre-occupied at one time or another with war and peace. The topic of war has inspired not only the greatest of painters but also countless authors, composers, filmmakers and historians.

Yet, it is not sufficient to declare that Morgenthauian realism's main concerns revolve around issues of war and peace only because humans are drawn to the subject matter. Rather, we must place Morgenthauian realist concerns in the context of the study and evolution of the international relations discourse as a whole. The watershed of activity in international relations theorization has been linked intimately with the efforts of the idealists immediately after World War I and realists beginning during World War II. In effect, two wars had the result of crystallizing the emergence of a discourse in international relations and acted as catalysts for intellectual thought in the area. Before this time Thucydides, arguably the first word on international relations, channeled his insights on international relations through the detailing of

a war - the Peloponnesian war. That all these benchmarks in international relations took place as a result of war is indicative of the intimate relationship existing between international relations and the concerns with war and peace.

Apart from the fact that war has played a vital role in the development of the discourse, it is also the greatest source of disruption in the international system. This could be interpreted as the ability of war to transform the international stage. On the other hand, if there is a deeper coherence and logic to the international system and disruption wrought by war, the recurrence of war could be interpreted as the manifestation of an ever-present facet which makes its existence known from time to time. In any case, war has a ready and immediate impact on the practice of international relations. Consequently, the theoretical enterprise of international relations is affected as well. For instance, the beginnings and endings of wars have led to turning-points in the study of international relations. Indeed, the years following the onset of the Second World War marked a rise in activity in Morgenthauian realism along with a rise in its popularity. Indeed, Alan Gilbert states that "Professor Hans Morgenthau was the leading practitioner of international-relations theory in the Cold War era"³². Also, theory was affected with the ending of the Cold War. Immanuel Wallerstein's book *After Liberalism* develops the argument that the collapse of Communism

and the subsequent ending of the Cold War confirmed the collapse of liberalism³³. Douglas Lemke argues that the peaceful ending of the Cold War gives weight to the insights of power transition theory³⁴. Although worried that the “East (may) adopt some indigenous or borrowed form of parochialism” Vendulka Kubalkova comments that “in theory at least, international studies can now for the first time become a global discipline” with the ending of the Cold War³⁵.

The mere fact that the “scourge of war” has not been eliminated and that peace remains an elusive goal point to the need to direct utmost attention to issues related to war and peace. As for peace being central to the international relations discourse, we must note that precisely because a lasting peace has been elusive thus far, it remains uppermost in the consciousness of the international relations theorist.

Fundamentally, international relations longs for peace in everything it does. A Morgenthauian realist studies war in order to help actualize peace. Indeed, if we sift through to the normative basis motivating many international theorists including Morgenthau, we would find that the majority strive for peace in their academic endeavors. Peace is the Holy Grail of international relations. Because peace – like the Holy Grail – still evades us, we are even more pre-occupied with it.

War has crippled the utility and effectiveness of organizations directed towards maintaining peace. Because the reality of war still

exists, it will remain along with the subject of peace on the cutting-edge of IR debates. In one vein, the theorist, voluntarily or involuntarily, will wonder why war has not been eliminated; what can be done to mitigate its effects; and to what extent peace can find root in the international system. Our discussion of war vis-a-vis Morgenthau's paradigm will hinge on this last question as it will be shown that war will probably be a reality in the near future - a reality which circumscribes the extent to which peace and humane means can be founded and entrenched in the international system.

In regard to war Morgenthau is of the opinion that there is a discrepancy between theory and practice where humanity's position on war is concerned. That is, humanity is vehemently opposed to war philosophically - that is, dealing with war in the abstract³⁶. Yet,

humanity thus united reveals its impotence, and the apparent world public opinion splits into its national components, when the issue is no longer war as such, in the abstract, but a particular war, this particular war; not any war, but war here and now³⁷.

Upon reflection, it seems logical that this would be the case because actual wars are more proximate to us than are intellectual musings.

With our minds we are able to do many things - build utopias, conquer suffering, and conceive of justice in its perfect form. Yet, experience is our surest guide. The greatest test of our philosophic sentiments comes to pass when actual events transpire. Our entire being comes to be involved when particular wars are fought. They call forth a greater

emotive response from us as our senses of justice, morality, patriotism and compassion are all involved. All our abstractions are made real. Real people die. Real people kill. Even a pacifist may be hard pressed not to take up arms should his particular state be involved in war and his own family suffer at the hands of the enemy. Fundamentally, Morgenthau helps us understand that it is easier to speak of pacifist inclinations and peaceful means than it is to carry through with these beliefs.

CHAPTER THREE WAR AND INTEREST

Now that we have linked war with human nature in the context of the international relations discourse, we must explore why war will be of continued relevance to international relations. To do this, we will examine the relationship existing between war and interest. As with the previous discussion of human nature, the criticisms of Morgenthau's conception of interest will be addressed. Only then will the succeeding discussion of war and interest be understood as plausible and valid.

The one aspect of Morgenthauian realism which has received the most attention and rebuke is its core principle furthering the idea that states pursue interest defined as power. The specific criticism revolves around the opinion that this principle is an overly facile generalization about state activity which does not capture the complexity of modern political life. As early as 1960, Stanley Hoffman called the realist understanding of power a "monism" which "does not account for all politics, when power is so somberly defined"³⁸. As late as 1977 this ardent critic was calling Morgenthau's concept of power "ambiguous"³⁹. However, Morgenthau's comments are illuminating when confronted with such criticism. He indicates that "realism does not endow its key concept of interest defined as power with a meaning that is fixed once and for all"⁴⁰; and "the goals that might be pursued by nations in their

foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue"⁴¹. Thus, the criticism is totally undercut because the concepts are revealed to be sufficiently open and flexible to account for the changing reality of the political realm. They shift according to the demands of the time. Because times do change, a certain element of generality or ambiguity is needed to allow for an expansion in the understanding of a concept like interest defined as power to accord with the requirements of a specific era. For instance, if today's priorities in the Third World are basic needs, then interest and power will be defined in terms relating to procuring food, economic restructuring and issues of development and not to the military dimension. Promoting interest in terms of subsistence and development will be seen as contributing to the power of a state because citizens of said state will gain the benefits for which any state is formed. Citizens will have their basic needs met, and this will be understood to reflect the power of a state. The element of flexibility incorporated into the conceptualizations of power points to the recognition that politics is indeed multi-faceted; and Morgenthauian realism tries to grapple with it in its entirety. As well, in this manner of broadening the concepts and making them less definite, the rigidity often (mistakenly) associated with Morgenthau's paradigm is undercut.

Because war is a means of pursuing interest⁴² and gaining (or expressing) power, it is logical, in one respect, that issues of war – and associated with war, peace – would be the fundamental concerns of Morgenthauian realism. After all, interest defined in terms of power is a core principle in Morgenthau's paradigm. A lack of interest is a reason why states at large do not make greater efforts to prevent an aggressor from engaging in war or assist the individuals, nation, or state being victimized. On the other hand, interest is also a factor motivating states to go to war. Essentially, promoting interest via war will probably continue in the near future because nationalism, the desire to control scarce resources and advantages to be had through war because of its distinct properties will themselves continue to be influential factors. Because war will not cease to be a reality in the foreseeable future, the theorist of international relations cannot relegate issues of war to an inferior position within the discourse.

Under the rubric of interest, nationalist objectives – ie. the desire to increase the power of one's own ethnic/religious/cultural group - may be the single largest factors hindering the progression of peace and peaceful means. Strong bonds of kinship are forged amongst people who share a common past and aspirations for a similar destiny. Furthermore, many of these people share an affinity not only for one another but also for the land from which they believe their ancestors to

have emerged. Herein the patriotic impetus is born - a love of one's own (including one's own land). The desire of the group for statehood and autonomy is a natural extension of such thinking. Where there is a desire for statehood, there must also be a consideration given to war. Most often statehood has necessitated war. Many people engage in war because it is a powerful force to think you are fighting for your motherland; you are doing your duty and fulfilling your obligation to her. For instance, many Russians who hated the Soviet Union and its political agenda still believed in something called Mother Russia. It is overly simplistic to dismiss this type of nationalistic feeling as mere propaganda. On the other hand, it may be the case that propaganda and socialization manifest their desired effects on people precisely because there is a nationalist impetus within people which can then be manipulated. In any case, all types of people of varying intellects, socio-economic positions and ethnicity with differential gains to be had - and some none at all - are caught within the fervor of nationalism. Some members of the group jeopardize their lives and oppose their natural inclination to survive for the welfare and aspirations of the entire community. Many people of a given nation have gone so far as to back wars that they were bound to lose. If individuals of a group love their own, they will be willing to defend it fiercely.

Control of scarce resources is another factor that makes manifest to us the difficulty of cementing a global peace. There likely never will be an equitable distribution of these resources which include such interests as freshwater, oil and arable land. States are always in conflict of one form or another over accessibility. Here, war is an allocative mechanism. The prevalence of conquest oriented wars throughout history where commodities have been at issue attest to the formidable role war can play in achieving particular ends involving scarce resources. Although ultimately unsuccessful, one factor fueling the expansionist designs of the Japanese in the 1930's was the desire for land and resources. Moreover, states in the West have been responsible for instigating war with states of the Third World and depleting their resources to the point where these states no longer have viable economies. Examples of such activity include the Spanish and Portuguese wars of conquest in Latin America. Today, the overuse of scarce resources has exacerbated the situation and increased the value of scarce resources all the more. For instance, the processes of desertification and over-salinization of the soil have decreased the amount of arable land the world over. Extrapolating from this, it seems clear that greater food shortages will result in the future in Third world countries and probably in western industrial ones as well. Conflicts may ensue and wars result. Intense water rights disputes have taken place already in drought-laden areas.

War as a distinct phenomenon has innate qualities that can be of great utility for international actors today who are facing dire oppression. Wars have the ability to shape and reshape the structure of society in all its facets - from political and economic to cultural - more quickly than any other means. That is, the greatest potential for revolution is found in war. In gaining momentum, this revolutionary inclination can catapult warring factions further and faster in either direction - towards greater gains or losses. Because of these distinct properties inherent in war, in certain cases war can enable a group to achieve that which they could not do otherwise. In other words, the means chosen affect the character of the end obtained. It may not be possible for war and peaceful means to achieve the same ends in all instances today. The realization of a goal depends on the configuration of forces at a particular moment. It may be the case that the configuration of forces today has not changed enough to enable peaceful means to work efficiently and effectively in curtailing violence and alleviating situations of acute oppression quickly. The configuration present during a time of war may not be able to be replicated through use of other means at present. For instance, it could be the case that the Bolsheviks had to revolt in the manner they did so that a communist state could be born. Something similar could be said about the efforts of Che Guevara in Cuba or other

individuals fighting to overthrow the yoke of imperial oppression during the 19th and 20th centuries.⁴³

This last line of thinking is not meant to be taken as a glorification of war or an argument favoring the use of war. Rather, it is meant to develop the idea that in certain unendurable situations of despair and abuse today, war could be a salutary tool. We cannot rule out such a possibility at present. When we consider the dire situation in too many parts of the world today, the alternative to violent overthrow is more unbearable - the prospect of unending poverty, abuse, dependence and helplessness to be repeated generation after generation. In an international arena rife with self-interested actors where such scenarios have played themselves out without significant remedy, it may be the greatest injustice to argue that war is always undesirable. Every group's interest in basic subsistence and respect for the rights of the individual is justified. Therefore, Morgenthau's focus on interest and war are of great relevance for international relations.

CHAPTER FOUR WAR AND MORALITY

Thus far, it seems as if realism is overly militaristic and fixated on war. Furthermore, the preceding discussion raises the question as to where in Morgenthau's paradigm is there room for morality if war and interest are dominant concerns. Indeed, in any exposition of warfare and realist thought it is unlikely that the role of morality can be neglected. Grotius, Kant and many others have highlighted the importance of the ethical facet in the political realm. Since the issue has been of consequence historically in the discipline, it needs to be addressed in any debate about Morgenthauian realism. Of course, the argument commonly made against Morgenthauian realism is that it is inherently immoral or Machiavellian. That is, Morgenthauian realism is thought to ignore or severely limit the moral dimension of international relations and focus solely on the naked pursuit of power and gain. For instance, Jim George draws on Stanley Hoffman's belief that the response of the US and its allies during the Gulf War was shaped by a realist policy orientation favoring fighting and claims the response to be "the application of the first law of 'Machiavellianism': that *virtu* in international affairs demands that aggression must be met with greater aggression if meaningful order is to be maintained"⁴⁴. In fact, while outlining the realist paradigm in a book about the third inter-paradigm

debate within international relations, Ray Magroori comments that “the state-centric perspective shows little concern with moral issues in foreign policy”⁴⁵. This criticism seems dismissive of realism’s ability to attend to issues of morality. However, where Morgenthau’s paradigm is concerned this criticism does not hold true. In fact, all comments about the immorality of Morgenthauian realism ring false when we become cognizant of the fact that Morgenthau does acknowledge that there is a greater eschatological or metaphysical framework at play within politics.

As Morgenthau states:

Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible - between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place⁴⁶.

There is the realization that what we ought to do often runs counter to what we can do. Even classical philosophers recognized that perfect justice and morality –ie. absolutes where these realms are concerned or that which is desirable - will never manifest themselves in our world because humans are imperfect by nature. Hence, the institutions people create and the goals they pursue will be imperfect and entail compromises. Furthermore, by pursuing a type of morality that is overly idealistic, greater injustices may be committed because such high-vaulting morality will never come to fruition. Focusing on perfect morality will only detract us from pursuing goals which are possible. In

other words, realism attends to issues involving morality by virtue of the fact that it recognizes the limited degree to which morality is capable of operating in this world.

Where the relationship between war and morality is specifically concerned, Morgenthauian realism does uphold the sanctity of human life. That is, Morgenthauian realism recognizes the need to impose limits on warfare in order to protect human life. The limitation on the means used in warfare like eliminating mass extermination as a tool states can use to further their interests “derives from an absolute moral principle which must be obeyed regardless of considerations of national advantage” and not “because of considerations of political expediency”⁴⁷. This means priorities like national interest⁴⁸ should be sacrificed when they run contrary to certain moral obligations.

In adhering to the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, Morgenthau further emphasizes the protection of civilian life as a moral and legal duty⁴⁹. From this concern, argues Morgenthau, has “emanate[d] all the international treaties concluded since the mid-nineteenth century for the purpose of humanizing warfare”⁵⁰. Despite the ineffectiveness of international law at certain times, there exists “a moral conscience that feels ill at ease in the presence of violence, or at least certain kinds of violence, on the international scene” which points to the “indirect recognition of certain moral limitations (on warfare)”⁵¹.

From these comments, we gain an awareness that the end does not justify the means. Rather, the end tempers what particular means are used. It is not possible to win at any cost and claim to be justified at the same time.

Although international law does not act as deterrent in all instances, I would say that the mere existence of international law contributes to the presence of a moral norm within the international arena which makes it difficult to ignore flagrant abuses committed during times of war. International law is like an ethics teacher in the international realm. At the very least, the presence of this teacher makes it impossible for warring parties to claim that they did not know any better. The knowledge of international law is shared with the members of the international realm. Distinctions between right and wrong are outlined. Incidentally, this knowledge of right and wrong may be the reason we feel ill at ease in the presence of large-scale violence and blatant abuses of human rights. Furthermore, through outlining the moral limitations on warfare, warring parties are understood to be conscious actors, mindful of these distinctions. In departing from these norms, actors are doing so with an awareness that cannot be denied.

Yet, the fact remains that flagrant abuses and heinous crimes have been committed by warring parties. The moral norms have not quelled this penchant for violence of the worst kind. International law has come

to be violated and ignored often enough that we must question why this is so. Apart from arguing that, in some cases, war crimes and crimes against humanity occur because of some perversity in an individual psyche – like, Hitler's - there are other reasons as well. Morgenthau argues that the seeds of such violence lie in the changed nature of warfare⁵². Over time, war has come to involve greater segments of the population. Corresponding with this state of affairs has been the increased level of technology used during times of war. Both these elements have come to encapsulate a phenomenon known as total warfare. Entire populations have contributed to the war-making machine and, consequently, had a vested interest in the outcome of war. Morality may not fare so well when confronted with such interests. As Morgenthau comments:

The worker, the engineer, the scientist are not innocent bystanders cheering on the armed forces from the sidelines. They are as intrinsic and indispensable a part of the military organization as are the soldiers, sailors, and airmen⁵³.

Along with greater involvement of the population through the operation of modern industrialization has also been the increased distance created between the battlefield and the participants in war. Indeed individuals, like those involved in developing and manufacturing arms or other related activities, do not necessarily confront each other. Even the airmen responsible for dropping a bomb on a specified location

may equate said location with a mark on a map or grid, not with hundreds or thousands of people - including women, children and the elderly - who are in the process of being annihilated. War has come to be more antiseptic, cold and scientific than otherwise. Accordingly, the human element in war has decreased. Thus, morality and international law will undoubtedly suffer. Soldiers, airmen and naval officers no longer have to be eyewitnesses to the murder they commit. Consequently, it becomes easier to commit horrendous acts of violence and betray international moral norms.

This desire to annihilate the "enemy" has been linked with the changed reasons for going to war as well. According to Morgenthau, people now fight for principles and particular lifestyles rather than for a monarch which has had the effect of diminishing the inclination "to spare the wounded, sick, the surrendering and unarmed enemy" and to fuel the desire to eliminate the enemy completely⁵⁴. Such sentiments ring true when we realize that any group's distinct principles and ways of life form the foundation of their worldview. People's understanding of morality and their identity are shaped by the ideals and principles upheld by the community. When such formative beliefs are challenged or when a vastly different alternative presents itself, fear and xenophobia may obliterate the impetus to be humane and merciful. For instance, we can mention in passing the American response to the

ascendancy of communism in the Soviet Union. McCarthyism was justified in the early days of the Cold War; later Reagan's "evil empire" discourse was accepted; in the recent past movies like Rocky, depicting a boxing match between the just American and the Soviet monster, gained popular appeal. These responses were elicited because, in one respect, Communist Russia was perceived to challenge the American way of life. Essentially, Morgenthau has given us insight into the reasons why wars have become more violent and the participants in war become increasingly unsympathetic.

CHAPTER FIVE

WAR AND ALTERNATE MECHANISMS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Similar to the claim that they are inherently immoral, Morgenthauian realists have also been painted as warmongers, seeing war as *the* only effective option for dispute resolution where other non-violent alternatives become secondary considerations. Taking our cue from the events transpiring in the world at present we must concede that war will probably be an inevitability at present and in the near future. Wars continue today despite the concerted efforts of many international actors and organizations to orient the international system towards peace. It seems highly unlikely that renegade actors like Milosevic would opt for peaceful means of dispute resolution. As of yet, we do not know for certain how durable peaceful means of dispute resolution will be or are. By not facing such a reality we will be slipping into a utopianism which is conducive neither to peace and stability for the many nor to insight on the part of the political scientist. Despite Morgenthauian realism's focus on the military dimension Morgenthau does indicate that the "current possibility of large-scale violence can be changed"⁵⁵. Moreover, he furthers the point that the political aim of military preparation is to make the actual use of military force unnecessary⁵⁶. Thus, engaging in war is not *the* option. In reflecting on the dynamics at

play within the international community, war seems to be *a significant* option *today*. However, by recognizing that the *status quo* can be changed, Morgenthau is optimistic about the possibility of having mechanisms of dispute resolution other than war take root in society. Non-military preparations could be undertaken to make the actual use of force unnecessary.⁵⁷

In regards to these non-military preparations themselves (or alternate mechanisms of dispute resolution), Morgenthau says that peace can be maintained in two ways, both of which ~~did~~ not work effectively during his time⁵⁸. They are the self-regulatory mechanism of social forces on the one hand and international law and morality on the other⁵⁹. Although different terms are used today by theorists in camps other than Morgenthauian realism, these alternate methods Morgenthau speaks of are really ideas of global governance⁶⁰ and an expanded role for civil society, both of which involve the mobilization of social forces. As well, Morgenthau urges the international community to respect principles like human rights which rely on international law. Morgenthauian realism does not deny the utility of means other than war when they actualize their full potential. In fact, we could say that Morgenthau is a foundation for these “newer” mechanisms of conflict resolution because he wrote at a time when the idea of global governance was not widespread in international relations parlance.

The members of the Commission on Global Governance have seen the end of the Cold War as heralding a new world order and present times to be a transitional phase between the post-war order, taking effect after World War II, and a new one which may cohere in the future⁶¹. In this transitional period “newer” security concerns have become more of a priority. These concerns include poverty, environmental degradation and economic instability. Because the old world order - focusing largely on the military dimension - is in the process of degeneration, the institutions and mechanisms in use to address security needs have sometimes been ineffective and inappropriate at this transitional time. For instance, a military solution is often insufficient in dealing with the threat to state security posed by acute poverty and the globalization of crime. The military dimension is only one aspect of security, not the totality. Consequently, there has emerged a discourse surrounding non-military means of resolving conflict and addressing security concerns. From this line of thinking emerge ideas including peace-building, peace-making and preventive deployment⁶².

However, we must realize that because these peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution are in their nascent stages, they have not become a full part of the international security structure. Additionally, if we factor into the discussion of newer security mechanisms the emphasis of Morgenthauian realists on the role of interest and power in relations

among international actors, we must conclude that all members of the international community do not favor non-violent means of conflict resolution today. Therefore, the use of these mechanisms will be in large part *ad-hoc* and disjointed while the use of brute force likely will be a reality at present and in the near future. Moreover, all international actors may never be inculcated to non-military means of conflict resolution in our time because renegade actors could still see force as being foremost in their interest. Since the possibility exists that some will never respect peaceful means of conflict resolution, there is always the danger that belligerent actors will be paying only lip service to peace and diplomacy. Ultimately, the possibility exists that these actors will be using non-violent means as tools for their own clandestine activities as Morgenthauian thinking leads us to presume. Hitler and Milosevic are cases in point. For instance, appeasement policies on the part of the western powers did not curb Hitler's ambitions and avert war. With the crises in the Balkans, history repeated itself. Once again, appeasement had little impact on an aggressor⁶³. Perhaps, because he was not fully receptive to international pressure during the Bosnian war, Milosevic went on to incite violence in Kosovo⁶⁴. The lowest common denominator does factor into the equation at present. The use of force at any early date may ensure a greater justice and good for humanity than would the

exhaustion of diplomatic means. This means Morgenthauian realism's focus on military means is apt and crucial to peace and security today.

In a related respect, the international community cannot make, keep or build peace in areas where renegade actors prevent them. As discussed by John Ruggie the solution entails the development and use of an international force to protect peace-keepers working in the field⁶⁵. Even in the cutting-edge debates on the development of an international force, Morgenthau still has insight to offer. He sees the utility of using these forces in circumscribed and local breaches of the law⁶⁶. He offers sobering thoughts to those optimists who see no real difficulty in instituting an international force. Morgenthau indicates that this international force would have to be large enough to counter aggression by a superpower and would entail the prospect of soldiers fighting against their own states⁶⁷. Both of these tasks are virtually impossible to achieve and so decrease the likelihood of creating an international force that is effective. In any case, force still has a sizable role to play in matters of peace and security whether it is at the state or international level. This also means that deterrence is of continued importance today. The threat of use (or actual use) of force still has a role to play in dissuading renegade actors from causing instability. For instance, the prospect of reprisal made manifest to Milosevic at an earlier date may have deterred him from pursuing policies involving ethnic cleansing.

However, diplomatic efforts were used extensively to little avail and more "heavy-handed" techniques downplayed. The result has been human suffering on a large scale.

For these newer and non-violent security mechanisms to take hold in the international consciousness, an element of altruism is demanded of states that they may not necessarily possess. States must take a greater interest in the welfare of all humanity rather than thinking about the narrow gains to be had only by the people (or certain groups of people) within their borders. This means that states must come to perceive their interests as being served through international efforts aiming at peace and security. However, the reality remains that all states are not possessed of such a vision at present. Rather, states probably still see their activities as furthering the interest of people within their own borders, not as benefiting all people everywhere. For instance, we must ask why states at large waited so long before they intervened in the Balkans. The answer probably lies in a lack of gain to be had by states from such an undertaking.

Although an ambiguous term we see that national interest is a reality to a significant extent, not some artificial construct Morgenthauian realists have conjured. Understood loosely as the "collective national aspirations for power"⁶⁸, national interest may be the greatest obstacle to having these more peaceful means - whether it is

global governance, the development of an international force or peace-making efforts - entrenched in the international security structure. Peace-making, peace-building and preventive deployment are all intrusive mechanisms. At present and in the near future it seems improbable that all states would accept the implementation of mechanisms which could be perceived to undermine the strength of a state. With this perception on the part of states intrusive mechanisms would not be in keeping with the national interest. All this speaks to the reality that the discussion of national interest by Morgenthau bears heavily on the debate about security mechanisms. It is not an outmoded concept.

CHAPTER SIX NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The entire discussion of war inevitably comes to the issue of nuclear weapons. No exposition on war – or realist thought for that matter – would be complete without considering the role of nuclear weapons. Today, we think nuclear weapons to have changed the face of international politics to such a degree that it is unrecognizable in comparison with the past. As such, it could be argued that Morgenthauian realism does not account for the reality of the nuclear age. Morgenthau's works could be ignored because they are thought to be pre-atomic and thus of little use to theorists today. Yet, when we take a moment to consider the present debate concerning nuclear weapons, we must concede that Morgenthau's works are of consequence to the discourse. To begin, Morgenthau does understand that reality has changed through the development of nuclear weapons. In the *Purpose of American Politics* he states that in the nuclear age “perplexity derives from an inability to reconcile traditional ways of thinking and acting with the requirements of a *novel age*”⁶⁹. He sees the need to adapt and/or change the realist (and any other) paradigm so that it corresponds with the current reality of the nuclear age.

In discussing nuclear weapons in the context of the Cold War, Timothy W. Luke finds fault with rational choice in deterrence theories.

He claims that “at the heart of deterrence theory is a myth of rational action for strategic actors as well as mythology of explaining strategic action for theorists of rational deterrence”⁷⁰. The evidence for the existence of a rational myth comes with the fact that “nuclear weapons...are mistakenly treated as simple functional objects” but that this conventional attitude about nuclear weapons as military tools is completely anachronistic⁷¹. Because Morgenthau stresses rationality, criticisms such as Luke’s could be applied to Morgenthau’s paradigm. We can extract out a particular argument in the deterrence/rational choice debate in order to address the criticism. The particular argument has to do with the idea that the build-up of nuclear weapons arsenals in terms of vertical proliferation, thereby increasing the power of a state, is a fundamentally irrational activity. States can only destroy the world once. So there is no need to acquire more nuclear weaponry at this maximum threshold level.

In response, a Morgenthauian realist could argue that Morgenthau did understand the politics surrounding nuclear weapons to be utterly irrational. Where vertical proliferation is concerned, Morgenthau does realize that the world can be destroyed only once. He comments that the acquisition of additional warheads is a waste when “the destructiveness of available weapons exceeds the number of targets”⁷². Also, Morgenthau indicates that “the *threat* of use of this force is rational but its actual use

is irrational” and that the magnitude of destructiveness “renders nuclear force unusable as an instrument of foreign policy”⁷³. The recognition exists that the effects of nuclear weapons use cannot be limited or localized.

Steve Smith intimates that realism has dominated US policy concerns and claims that the paradigm “has had a lasting impact on the way the subject [of international relations] has conceptualized the issues involved”⁷⁴. How we conceptualize an issue impacts how we deal with it. By extension, some could argue that the dominance of realism in policy-making has hindered the move to eliminate nuclear weapons precisely because realists would focus on nuclear weapons as contributing to the power, security and national interest of states. With this line of thinking, nuclear weapons would be conceptualized in such a way that they would be seen as being salutary for states and not as a threat to humanity. Here, both policy-makers and other officials would be encouraged to view nuclear weapons in a realist bent as a means to increase the power of a state. However, it could be said that policy-makers rarely attend to the theories being put forward by academics. Essentially, theories may not figure heavily into policy-making. Nonetheless, Morgenthauian realists can address the potential criticism as it stands as well. In *Politics Among Nations* a distinction is made between usable and unusable power. Nuclear weapons fall under the latter category because nuclear power is

not necessarily conducive to an increase in political power⁷⁵. As for state security, Morgenthauian realists acknowledge that it is impossible to achieve total security in the nuclear age despite what states do or do not do. For instance, Morgenthau remarks that states must choose between total insecurity and a degree of insecurity that is tolerable⁷⁶. Coupling this idea with Morgenthau's comment that "no nation-state is capable of protecting its citizens and its civilization against an all-out atomic attack"⁷⁷ we see that Morgenthau gets to Gorbachev's idea (as well as the belief of those involved in the discourse on global governance) about the indivisibility of security⁷⁸. There exist not discrete pockets of security but an interrelated one. In light of our understanding of such phenomena as nuclear fallout and the potential of nuclear winter, we become cognizant of the fact that the security of one state does depend on the non-use of nuclear weapons by other states.

To gain a greater understanding of the debate today we can focus on the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on this matter and the Report of the Commission on Global Governance (titled *Our Global Neighborhood*). Although the international community managed to extend the NPT, there was little consensus on any of the issues discussed at the extension conference. Non-nuclear states were generally opposed to the indefinite extension and wanted the NPT to be

extended for fixed periods where further extension would depend on the compliance of nuclear states with the objectives of the NPT. Nuclear states campaigned against fixed periods of extension because compliance with the terms of fixed extension would undermine their power and bargaining position. They would have to reduce nuclear stockpiles by a preset date. The nuclear states won, and the non-nuclear states were outraged because they realized that the nuclear states were not negotiating in good faith. This division in the international community is not surprising since power is at the heart of the issue. Non-nuclear states want power, and nuclear states are unwilling to relinquish their claim to it.

In analyzing the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on nuclear weapons we come to recognize how this international body is playing equivocator. It has ruled that the use of nuclear weapons goes against humanitarian law⁷⁹. Yet, in cases of extreme defense the ICJ could not decide if the use of nuclear weapons was legal. Finally, the Report of the Commission on Global Governance basically outlined a new definition of security; made suggestions as to how international organizations could be reorganized and redirected to deal with the threat posed by nuclear weapons; and called for a supranational body to oversee the limitation and eventual abolition of nuclear weapons⁸⁰.

In light of this debate on nuclear weapons Morgenthau's works become relevant because he basically outlined the whole discussion about controlling nuclear weapons found in the Commission's report years earlier in the *Purpose of American Politics*⁸¹. Morgenthau reveals that we are still grappling with the same issues and obstacles that confronted the international community when nuclear weapons were first developed and used. He recognizes the need for supranational control but understands that states would not undermine their own sovereignty⁸². This may be part of the reason why nuclear states campaigned for indefinite, and not fixed, extension at the NPT conference. In fact, Morgenthau goes further and isolates the inherent problem facing international bodies where nuclear weapons are of issue. He comments:

atomic power would still pose a threat to (the state's) existence which no strategy operating from the nation as its base could do more than mitigate. For the existential threat atomic power poses to all nations of the world cannot be answered at all from within a state system whose basic unit is the nation state⁸³.

That is, logic dictates that the solution be transcendental. Morgenthau has the insight to offer on how to approach the nuclear weapons dilemma. In regard to the struggle for power Morgenthau sees conflict as a competition for military advantage⁸⁴. Consequently, "the problem of nuclear disarmament can only be solved through a settlement of the power conflict from which it has arisen"⁸⁵. Therefore, the root of the

problem is the issue of power not necessarily the existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are a means to gaining power. All this while we have been treating the symptoms, not the illness itself for which there may not be a cure.

We must also consider why nuclear weapons have not been eliminated from a philosophical standpoint. Although Morgenthau seems unforgiving, he is probably correct in stating that “the interest in the mass destruction of civilian life and property coincided with the ability to carry such mass destruction through, and this combination has been too strong for the moral convictions of the modern world to resist”⁸⁶. Paradigms and theories are intellectual constructs. They are not responsible for the continued development and use of nuclear weapons. We must lay blame not with them but with ourselves.

Considering the threat posed by nuclear weapons along with the clandestine activities of renegade actors in the international system, the enormous loss of life in warfare and the increased brutality attending modern war, it is not sufficient to conclude that war will likely be an inevitability in the near future without qualification. Otherwise, humanity would be rendered impotent in the face of oncoming destruction and devastation. As outlined earlier, Morgenthau traces the lineage of war through history and extracts certain respects in which modern warfare is distinct from war waged in the past. Extrapolating

from his observations, it is feasible for us to consider the possibility of once again limiting warfare, thereby changing the way war is configured. Put baldly, war has never ceased to be a reality thus far despite concerted efforts to institute peace and orient the international system towards peaceful methods of dispute resolution. Since theorists cannot know what the future holds, we cannot state absolutely whether war will remain a reality or not throughout human existence. Indeed, I have tried to emphasize that war will likely be an inevitability today and in the near future – ie. as long as the old world order persists. However, in the spirit of the *longue duree*, we must also consider the possibility that war may be outmoded with the incarnation of a new world order. At any rate, it is better to err on the side of caution than an optimism that may prove dangerous. By saying that war is inevitable today does not mean that certain elements of warfare cannot or should not be controlled. Indeed, the first step towards curtailing the total nature of war, decreasing its capacity for destruction and pointing towards a potentially peaceful order that is yet distant is to limit the scope and effects of war. Of course, limited war in the modern era will not resemble limited war as played out in the past. We cannot do away with the knowledge of the military technology that has wrought so much destruction. Yet, limited wars of a different kind could emerge. This latter idea will be developed fully in the sections on the state.

CHAPTER SEVEN THE STATE SYSTEM AND WAR

THE STATE IN PRACTICE

Upon examining the relationship between the state and war the significance of the state for issues of war and the whole of international relations becomes clear. Where the state is concerned in practice, we use Clausewitz as our guide and find that war is "the continuation of policy by other means"⁸⁷. Therefore, war is not an anomaly in the international system or a representation of a systemic breakdown where chaos reigns and passions rule over reason. Rather, war is an instrument of statecraft. It is an arm of politics at the disposal of states to utilize when necessary or desirable. The state renders war as being a rational activity. As examined earlier, states have reasons for going to war. They plan strategy and determine probabilities of achieving success. Their every move can be a calculated action involving foresight.

Examining war in light of this relation to the state shifts our perspective on the international realm and the insight we derive. Only when war is considered rational can we penetrate the inner machinations of the phenomenon. War as a rational activity becomes amenable to analysis. In this way, we can attempt to know what war essentially is, what the purposes of select wars or war in general are and how war works its effects in the international arena. As the logic goes, if we can

understand something, we can curb its effects and limit its scope even if we cannot contain it altogether. By understanding war to be a fit of madness or a systemic breakdown, we can only appease our sense of moral outrage. We cannot understand the nature of its being and find solutions to the problems created by war.

THE STATE AS A CONCEPT

Because the state renders war as rational, the state as a concept is of great value to the theorist of international relations. It provides the theorist with access to the dynamics of warfare and affords the theorist the opportunity to devise solutions to the problems attending war. However, it would be unfair to suggest that the state is important to the discipline of international relations solely because of its relationship to war. The state is vital to the study of international relations because of its relationship to war, but the state as a concept is important for many other reasons as well (all of which can be connected to war).

First, we can analyze the state as a heuristic device. As a concept, the state gives the anarchical system an order. In this way international relations can be seen, at one level, as an extension of individual state politics (called foreign policy). Upon this foundation, another tier is founded where the collision and/or cooperation of the foreign policies themselves contribute to the emergent properties of the international system. To this other tier can be added the efforts of non-governmental

organizations, international organizations and the like. In any case, the state system patterns the anarchy of the international realm. The state provides the theorist with a means of accessing the international realm. Once access is gained the theorist can build on the foundation established by the state.

Second, international entities define themselves in relation - and most often opposition to - the state. Examples include non-state actors, non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations. Reference is being made to the conception of the state. The state is the point from which these other actors depart and distinguish themselves or render themselves similar. They define themselves in terms of their relation to the state or the lack thereof.

Finally, we can invert the pattern of discussion thus far and ask ourselves whether it is possible to speak of the international system without reference to the state and still convey what IR is substantively. Because the feat would be difficult, it is likely that states are a necessity in the process of ordering the reality of the international realm. The concept of the state is a useful pedagogic tool. Without such a device the study of international relations will become disjointed. In other words, we may be able to talk about the various facets of international relations without the state and not a cohesive totality. This is not to say that there are not other aspects of international relations which are of significance

and relevance. Rather, the state may be architectonic in an international realm of anarchy, however patterned and ordered that anarchy is.

In rendering the international realm rational, the state as a concept embeds the reality of war in a rational context. The international realm becomes intelligible for the theorist so that the effects of war on actors comprising the international realm can be traced, assessed and limited. Otherwise, the links between war and its effects on the international realm could not be drawn at all. There would be no way to connect the rationality of war (however limited it is) with the chaos of the international realm. Of course, such thinking is only the tool of the theorist. In reality there are irrational elements and chaos in war and the international realm. However, the only way to approach insight and solutions to war is to render war and international relations rational on some level.

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE

In rendering war a rational activity two paths can be taken. The first is to try to instill peace fully in the international system having gleaned the requirements for such a feat to be actualized from the insights regarding war. Morgenthau is helpful in outlining the requirements of the first path. In *Politics Among Nations* Morgenthau talks of peaceful change within the state and the ability of the state to maintain peace within its borders⁸⁸. From this discussion we gain a

keen sense of what is necessary to eliminate war altogether from the world stage - a Leviathan writ large on the international stage which controls the means of violence like a state most often does in relation to the people within its borders. A world state is needed and not a world community because the latter is not potent enough a force to compel obedience to peaceful methods of dispute resolution. Moreover, a consensus is needed for communal cooperation and action that probably is virtually impossible given the scope and scale of the international realm. A world state would have the ability to *force* cooperation. Yet, the establishment of such a state is an impossibility primarily because individual states may never undermine their own power or existence. In effect, state sovereignty is the greatest impediment to the development of the ultimate state - the world state - and the mistaken possibility of eliminating war altogether in the near future.

THE STATE AND LIMITED WAR

With the second path one tries to establish peace to the degree it is possible while still recognizing that war is a reality today. As was mentioned previously, the solution to the problems attending war lie in limiting the effects of war rather than eliminating war altogether at this stage. Although states give rise to wars, they also have the greatest role to play in limiting war. This role of state in addressing the greatest challenges to peace makes the state an indispensable element of

international relations. In analyzing the interplay amongst states, international law and sovereignty the underlying logic behind such a conclusion will be made manifest.

Morgenthau illuminates the intimate relationship between international law and sovereignty by detailing how the former emerged as a consequence of the latter. Because states are sovereign - ie. invested with supreme authority within their borders - there needed to be codes of conduct established for contact between these sovereign entities and an outline of the rights of states with respect to one another developed for there to be peaceful interaction⁸⁹. International law then matured from this nascent stage to include thousands of treaties regulating interactions resulting from modern communications⁹⁰. Of greatest relevance for this discussion seems to be Morgenthau's comment that the overwhelming majority of international law owes its existence to the consent of the state⁹¹; and that "no rules of international law are binding upon it but those it has created for itself through consent"⁹². We realize that without the involvement and consent of member states of the international system, no rule of international law will be given significant merit or force.

The discussion of international law leads up to the fact that states must devise rules limiting warfare anew in the post-Cold War era given the new developments in warfare, the particular brutality of crimes

committed and the plethora of states now in existence. If states are part of the development process of limiting warfare in our day, they will have a vested interest in making a success out of what they have created. Moreover, because states largely control the means of violence, they are the only ones who can curb its use. In bringing the discussion of the state full circle, it should be emphasized again that if war is an arm of politics, then states can limit war because they control that means of politics. In this vein, Morgenthau indicates that "a social agency is needed strong enough to prevent that use [of violence]" and that "society has no substitute for the power of the Leviathan"⁹³. There can be no stronger force or solid foundation than that created by the concerted efforts of many such Leviathans we call states.

As for the explanations for not abiding by the tenets of limited war we can make reference to Morgenthau again who says that "whoever is able to use violence will use it if the stakes seem to justify its use"⁹⁴. The stakes involved in total war are too high today considering the fact that increasing numbers of states and non-state actors have at their disposal technologies of mass destruction. The real possibility exists that what goes around can come around, especially where the use of nuclear weaponry and its associated effects are concerned. There is no greater interest for a state than its continued existence. For these reasons, limited war must be a possibility in our day.

Some may interject that state sovereignty would impede the enforcement of such rules of limited warfare should they be developed anew. After all, it has been assumed that sovereignty gives states free reign and regulating warfare would circumscribe such autonomy. However, as Morgenthau asserts, the concept of sovereignty is not to be equated with "freedom from legal restraint"⁹⁵. Morgenthau first develops the idea that the number of legal obligations through which states limit action do not limit the sovereignty of the states. It is the quality of the obligations that limit sovereignty⁹⁶. He elaborates further and indicates that being bound by international law in those areas which are the auspices of the individual states is compatible with the idea of state sovereignty because international law "depends upon the policies pursued by individual nations"⁹⁷. That is, states employ their rights as sovereign entities by giving their consent to the development of regulations on warfare and to being bound by them. Moreover, there would be no international law in the area of warfare of significant weight or merit without the support of individual states.

LONGEVITY OF THE STATE

Limited war can be understood as a feasible and lasting alternative only after we have grappled with the idea of the longevity of the state (or state-like entities). Even if the state undergoes reconfiguration, the basic

functions of the state will be performed by entities taking the place of the state (as currently configured) including limiting warfare.

The state system as it is currently configured has not been an ever-present fact of political life. Rather, it emerged only in the 17th century. When we look back at history, we see that the international realm has been comprised of city-states (during the heyday of ancient Greece and the Achean League), fiefdoms, principalities, kingdoms and republics. Hence, it is plausible to assert that the state as conceived along the lines of the Westphalian system will undergo change and re-configuration. However, it must be emphasized that there have always been basic political units in the international arena which interact with one other, whether they are conceived of as ancient Greek city-states, principalities or states themselves. They all perform similar functions from securing access to scarce resources for their citizens to defending those individuals' property and procuring a safe existence for them.

Where the longevity of the state is specifically concerned, a few comments can be made and Machiavelli's writings used to illustrate the point. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli details how it would be possible for Lorenzo de Medici to gain control of the Italian state⁹⁸. In this way Machiavelli's *Prince* enables us to gain a longitudinal perspective on the state itself. We gain an awareness that the state has endured for over 500 years. To those who assume that the state is in acute stages of

demise, such a realization is a sobering thought. Nonetheless, we cannot deny that the international arena has changed, witnessed by the increase in the number of actors. However, the state has proven to be a constant amidst the dynamism and impetuosity of the international realm.

THE STATE, THE BLACK-BOX AND SECURITY

Establishing the longevity of the state could be mistakenly understood to mean that Morgenthauian realism supports the state system without being sensitive to the legitimacy of regimes or the particular needs of the different states. In this way Morgenthauian realism would be perceived to support the continued existence of states at any cost. Furthermore, war would be perceived to affect only the artificial entities called states and not specifically individuals or select groups within a particular state. Therefore, it is necessary to qualify the comments made about the state thus far and have a side-discussion about the state-society complex and state security which will illuminate better the Morgenthauian realist understanding of the state itself.

In regard to the state-civil society complex, Morgenthauian realism does not black-box the state and ignore the internal dynamics of insecurity. At the very basic level, a distinction is made between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power where the legitimate use of power is considered to be the most effective⁹⁹. In this vein, legitimacy can be said to be the foundation of democracy. Moreover, democracy

must be substantive and actualized within the infrastructure of society, not existing in name only¹⁰⁰. Therefore, Morgenthauian realism does not deny people living under oppressive regimes the reality that they have suffered injustice and have become prey to the effects of insecurity, nor does it equate security simply with the security of any ruling regime within a state. By including discussions of democracy and subsistence (to name but a few) Morgenthauian realism understands that the totality which is security goes beyond security of an abstract entity called a state.

Today, the perspective of Third World states is better understood and has prompted a re-definition or expanded understanding of security to include elements like basic needs, development and democracy. Unlike states of the industrialized North, the greatest threats to the security of states in the Third World are internal. They involve such factors as overpopulation and the illegitimacy of regimes. Here Morgenthauian realism does not ignore the reality faced by people in this area of the world. As a concept power is understood to be the means through which a state realizes its goals whether it's procuring food and subsistence or something else¹⁰¹. For instance, Morgenthau states explicitly that the scarcity of food is a source of permanent weakness in international politics¹⁰². Consequently, Morgenthauian realism attends to the distinct nature of every regime rather than treating them as

generic types. The concept of the state is not crude, but open and dynamic. This dynamism, in turn, enables Morgenthauian realists to be sensitive to the particular needs of a state and/or particular societies within that state.

Subsequently, war must be understood to affect the multiple and varied dimensions of society as well. War is waged in many arenas, not simply in the militaristic sphere. War is not merely an inter-state affair but also an intra-state one. Modern warfare to be recognized and understood must account for the reality confronting the peoples of the Third World. At heart, this means that sources of human insecurity, abuses of the rights of the individually and, essentially, non-military components of insecurity must be linked with the phenomenon of warfare. Furthermore, Morgenthau enables this connection between the components of insecurity and warfare to be made by incorporating ideas of democracy, subsistence and a flexible understanding of power into his paradigm.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THEORY

In situating Morgenthauian realism and its associated focus on war within the context of greater inter-paradigmatic analysis of the international relations discourse, a number of implications can be drawn and general comments made about theorizing which will explain why Morgenthauian realism has evolved as it has.

Theory is interconnected with philosophy mainly because both phenomena attempt to order reality so that it becomes comprehensible to the human mind. Because it is linked with philosophy, issues of epistemology and ontology (which are of considerable significance to philosophy) bear heavily on any discussion of theory-building in general and the realist paradigm in particular. Often, political philosophers contend that theory cannot lead to a complete understanding of reality because theory encourages the observer to approach phenomena with a narrowed outlook, viewing reality through the limiting visors or constructs of the theory itself. With Morgenthauian realism there is the recognition of unpredictable and changing elements in politics that are not amenable to theorization. Yet, Morgenthauian realism also recognizes that there are immutable elements of politics holding true through time and space where it is possible for Morgenthau's paradigm to offer insight. For instance, the insights given by Morgenthauian realism about the dynamics of war and peace will always be of great use

to international relations in both theoretical and practical terms precisely because the "scourge of war" has not been eliminated while peace remains a fragile hope. The dual themes of war and peace will be of perennial concern to the discipline. Therefore, Morgenthau's paradigm has a significant contribution to make in their analysis. Moreover, Morgenthau highlights the importance of stressing these rational elements of politics because they make reality intelligible for theory¹⁰³. Without the apprehension of these rational elements, people may never become master of their own destinies. Rather, humans would build their lives on superstition and fear as in the Dark Ages. Likewise, the academic would be cast into this same lot because he/she would have no tools available with which to sift through the dogma and approach truth. As well, understanding reality even to a small degree helps the individual to potentially control a threatening situation and offer solutions. In essence, some knowledge gained through use of a theory is better than confusion and a naive sense of wonder.

If we are to move through the universe and make sense of phenomena, there arises the need to be selective. That is, we must attend to certain elements while limiting the focus we give to others. This is true for all facets of life including theorization. Yet, with realms other than theorization like language and vision we are unconsciously selective, making a distinction between noise and speech, foreground

and background. With theorization we deliberately choose the elements to be given attention.

Abstracting out certain elements as foci in the theorization process while relegating others to the background has the effect of skewing reality and presented what seems to be a biased interpretation of the international realm. On the other hand, if theory were to attend to most or all phenomena, the undertaking could not be called theorization but description. It is a difficult task to both widen the parameters of analysis and deepen understanding at the same time while still maintaining a level of abstraction necessary for theory to be called theory. After all, theory presents a model of the world, not analysis in minute detail. Therefore, Morgenthau's decision to highlight phenomena including the state, war and peace as the building blocks of the realist paradigm becomes a necessary step in the theorization process. As for the particular subject matter chosen for study, Morgenthau is quick to add that the interest of the theorist is a determining factor¹⁰⁴. In other words, whether consciously or otherwise, the idiosyncratic bent of the observer shapes what elements become the focal points of a theory.

There are limitations to theorization apart from selective attention. As Morgenthau mentions, these limitations revolve around the uncertainty of theory and the uncertainty of the subject matter of international relations¹⁰⁵. From such musings we could infer that both

of these elements arise from the fact that the theorist of international relations cannot know for sure that he/she knows something absolutely. The international realm is comprised of occurrences, which may be dissimilar and not amenable to systematization or analytical rigor. Yet, such analytical parameters need to be applied if the international realm is to be made intelligible. This line of thinking culminates in the idea that no theory of international relations can be said to be definitive in the field. Theories of international relations can give a partial view of the international arena not its totality. Although the political scientist will inevitably exalt one particular theory and relegate others to an inferior position, it is impossible to ignore the contributions of these other theories because they may be dealing with facets of the international realm that the chosen theory does not focus predominantly. For instance, Morgenthau chose not to focus on the relation between the economic and political dimension despite the fact that the analysis of the relationship between these two arenas is important in understanding international relations. In this respect, Morgenthau's paradigm has certain limits to its utility for international relations in not attending to the economic sphere. Again, as Morgenthau was aware "this limitation of theoretical analysis is inherent in the very subject matter of international relations"¹⁰⁶. Consequently, Morgenthauian realism must understand itself to expose and penetrate *certain* dominant threads in international

relations, not all of them. Hence, it could not deny the role of theories purporting to illuminate the other facets of international life. It would be too obvious a contradiction to do so.

Any exposition on theorization about international relations could not be complete without discussing its relationship with policy relevance. Indeed, realism has often been associated with American foreign policy concerns. In this vein, Morgenthau's observation that "all great and fruitful political thought...has started from a concrete political situation with which the political thinkers had to come to terms for both intellectual and practical reasons"¹⁰⁷ is helpful in drawing the connection between international relations as a theoretical undertaking on one hand and a practical enterprise on the other. Practical situations have given birth to international relations as theory, and continued developments in the theoretical sphere have been fueled by the realities of the day. For instance, the advent of nuclear technology and the subsequent threat of annihilation through nuclear war have forced theorists to reconsider their paradigms. For fear of stating the obvious, a practical situation necessitated a revolution in theory.

Nonetheless, there is a deeper level on which an understanding of theory and policy relevance can be founded as well. Disinterested interest is an approach few can achieve. Most often emancipatory goals or other normative elements are great motivating factors for the theorist.

Through penetrating to the inner machinations of international relations the theorist will gain knowledge. And the desire to use this knowledge to effect change may be irresistible and possibly the noblest of motivations. However, the desire to be policy relevant also presents problems. Morgenthau can be included in this exposition when he comments that "it is exactly this commitment of modern political science to practical ends which has powerfully contributed to its decline as theory"¹⁰⁸. Any attempt to be policy relevant entails compromises. The pursuit of ultimate insight, truth and knowledge has to compete with the need to accommodate the powers that be and to present a theory salutary to the intellectual fashions of the public including their prejudices. We may conclude that the relationship existing between theory and practical ends is not benign. In fact, it can undermine the theoretical pursuit. Yet, policy relevance may be a necessary element of any theory of international relations.¹⁰⁹

At this point, we must determine what essentially theorization about international relations is meant to accomplish. In this vein, Morgenthau has definite ideas to offer. In the *Dilemmas of Politics* Morgenthau argues that the purpose of theory "is to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible"¹¹⁰. Hence, the role of theory is to render the international realm rational. In an essay entitled "The Intellectual

and Political Functions of Theory” Morgenthau develops the idea that in the nuclear age the task of IR theory should be “to prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it”¹¹¹. For this to happen, Morgenthau would have to accept the fact that theories other than his version of realism could best address what is needed to usher in that new international order. In synthesizing Morgenthau’s ideas we see that the role of theory is to present an understanding of the world while at the same time recognizing the limits of said theory. At its greatest, theory would contribute to circumstances leading to its own demise – a new order where the potential exists that the particular theory contributing to that world order is of limited or no use.

In linking up all the elements developed thus far in this section into a whole, we may begin with the discussion of policy relevance as a necessity in IR theorization. Here, Plato’s *Republic* is of great use in developing the argument. Once having broken the shackles and emerged from the cave into the light of day, the philosopher of *The Republic* must then return to that same cave to enlighten those within as much as is possible despite the fact that the cave represents an inferior place than outside¹¹². In a similar manner, the theorist of international relations must accept some of the compromises involved with policy relevance and fulfill an obligation to the society he/she observes - to work for the

betterment of people, whether in a localized capacity or writ large across the whole of the international arena. Perhaps Morgenthau is correct in stating that international relations as a theoretical undertaking cannot achieve disinterested interest in the manner of philosophers because it cannot “endeavor to free itself completely from its commitments to the society of which it forms a part without destroying itself in the attempt”¹¹³. The pursuit of knowledge about the international realm is inextricably bound with the will to act¹¹⁴. It is this normative element which pushes IR theory forward. After all, human lives could be saved and better a world order instituted. This may be the single greatest motivating factor to get theory as close to the reality of the international world as is possible.

Morgenthauian realism focus on war becomes greatly significant for international relations when we consider that issues of war encourage the theorist to work in a policy relevant manner. The subject of war holds our attention, but the suffering and abuses attending war demand that the theorist of international relations act. The theorist “acts” via theorization, by putting the theory into action. This action takes the form of policy relevance. To understand the phenomenon of war and devise solutions to the problems attending war are perhaps the greatest motivating factors for the student to study international relations and for the theorist to work in a policy relevant vein. Frankly speaking, why

study international relations or theorize about international relations if not to effect change, most especially where war is concerned?

Since theorization and policy relevance are linked, it could be the case that all levels of theorization, be they explicit or implicit in their aims, are policy relevant in some dimension. That is, whether it is meta-theorization and grand theory we are dealing with or middle range theories and direct policy orientation, all these processes involve policy relevance. If grand theory also involves a concern with practical ends as do the other levels of theorization, then it could be said that all successive levels of theorization encapsulate preceding ones. For instance, grand theory could be understood to build on and include short-range theories and middle-range ones. It could be the scope and degree of change desired that differs from level to level. In this way theorization is understood to be a circular process beginning with immediate policy relevance and ending with policy relevance as well. Yet, grand theorization has most often been conceived in terms of the Braudelian *longue duree* whereby changes will be effected through many generations and the incarnation of many world orders. If, as Morgenthau indicates, policy relevance or the "commitments to the society of which it forms a part" is key to the survival of IR as an academic discourse, then the goal now is to make grand theory more

policy relevant in a ready and immediate way so that the process comes full circle.

Finally, we must address the idea of an inclusive and encompassing theory of international relations. As of yet, international relations does not have such an overarching paradigm or theory which encompasses all facets of international relations in great breadth and depth. Rather, the idea of multiple realities has been popular in the international relations discourse where most theories representing each of the realities are held to be equally valid. Drawing on these two facts of international relations theorization at present, there is a need to re-orient the discourse. The idea of multiple realities can be problematic if taken to its extreme because some theorist working in reality X could say to another theorist working in reality Y that the two realities are so divergent that reality X could not be understood from the perspective of reality Y. Here, the dialogue would break down which, consequently, would hinder inter-paradigmatic discussion. It may be more useful to conceive of the international realm as one reality to which all theorists have access. For reasons outlined before, any one theorist cannot penetrate all aspects of international relations and capture the reality of that world perfectly. All theories can be seen as capturing a part of that reality – for instance, critical theory as exploring the dynamics of change

and Morgenthauian realism as illuminating the fundamentals or ever-present facets of international life.

In this way, we come to Holsti's conception of the link between theories where there exists the potential for all theories to be complementary; and that the goal is to foster awareness of the contributions of the various theories¹¹⁵. Using his conception as a foundation, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Combining theories aids in the ability of theorists and students alike to view international relations in more of its totality. As well, this process of combination can be the stepping stone to the development of an overarching theory if it is possible. After all, there may be a "fit" amongst paradigms which captures reality more or less perfectly. However, we must be humble enough to admit that we have not yet been able to unify the parts and conceive of a greater paradigm. Perhaps all we can do at this point is foster awareness.

That Morgenthau was not antithetical to such co-existence of theories and that his paradigm is amenable to such symbiosis becomes evident when we consider Morgenthau's discussion of the function of theory in the *Dilemmas of Politics* of which a fragment is reproduced here:

Hypothetically one can imagine as many theories of politics as there are legitimate intellectual perspectives from which to approach the political scene. But in a particular culture and a particular period of history, there is likely to be one perspective which for theoretical and practical reasons takes precedence over the others¹¹⁶.

If circumstances determine which elements in the international realm should be stressed, then Morgenthau must have agreed that there would be periods in history when the elements developed by his paradigm would not need to be stressed. This is not to say that the fundamentals of Morgenthau's paradigm are not important or that they do not form part of the order at the time but merely that they do not need to be emphasized. At these times other theories could be useful in stressing those elements of the international realm which need attention. If Morgenthau accepted the co-existence of theories through time, it would not be a great stretch that he would accept the co-existence of theories at the same time.

CONCLUSION

If we are to contend with, penetrate and analyze international relations – to understand what international relations is both as a theoretical activity and as a practical enterprise – we must treat with sympathy, at least initially, all paradigms, including Morgenthauian realism, if we are to derive greatest insight into the matter. As for the subject matter of IR, Morgenthauian realism presents war, peace and the state as being of great importance. This is the case because these three elements are indeed the pivot-points within the discourse. They are the animating forces of international relations. The question “what is IR?” is linked directly to the ideas of war, peace and the state.

Using war as a dominant focus of study in Morgenthauian realism is not only apt but highly beneficial and valuable for gaining insight into the international arena. The focus on war is apt since this phenomenon in its varied facets is the ever-present reality of our day. There is no other aspect of international relations that has pre-occupied the international psyche nor catalyzed activity/theoretical efforts in the academic sphere in the way war has. War makes the state of vital concern and use to both the theorist and practitioner of international relations. It also makes international relations theorization policy-relevant in a manner that may not be possible without war being of greatest importance.

The reality of war has hindered the procurement of a lasting peace and peaceful means. In turn, the theorist must come to grapple first with the idea of limiting war before he/she can ever consider the possibility of eliminating war altogether. Saying that limited war is the first, plausible step in a march towards peace does not mean that the Morgenthauian realist has goals entirely different than those engaged in paradigms with emancipatory goals. Rather, the end for which a Morgenthauian realist aims should be the same as, for instance, a critical theorist – betterment for humanity and relief from the abuses attending modern warfare. However, the path to be taken towards this destination is different. For the Morgenthauian realist, the path entails a continued presence of war (at least for the foreseeable future).

In addressing the challenges posed by critics, Morgenthauian realism has proven to be a more complex and multi-dimensional body of thought than popularly held. Through the flexibility of its concepts, Morgenthauian realism is imbued with a dynamic quality. This quality enables the paradigm to interact with the reality it is meant to observe and to adapt itself to the changing demands of the time. Therefore, Morgenthauian realism will be able to contribute to the understanding of international relations even if there is a change in world order.

Morgenthauian realism has a valuable contribution to make to the IR discourse today not simply because it acts as a catalyst for thought

but also because it has the ability to unearth the fundamental and ever-present facets of international life and give insight. Hence the explanation for the resilience of the paradigm. It is simple to say that Morgenthauian realism has enjoyed longevity because it is tyrannical or hegemonic. Yet, it is far more accurate to assert that Morgenthauian realism has lasted as long as it has because it contains kernels of truth about international relations however partial or inclusive.

Morgenthauian realism presents a vehicle into the inner workings of the international realm so as to facilitate analysis. Morgenthauian realism fulfills its role as a paradigm. Even if we are to broaden the parameters of the study of IR to include a multiplicity of actors, entities and concerns, the focal points of Morgenthau's paradigm must remain the foundational elements of the discourse.

I understand the present to be an unprecedented moment in time where the seeds of a new world order oriented towards peace can be sown *fully*. Only when the concerns of realists like Morgenthau become focal points in this process of building a new world order can peace be entrenched fully and gain durability. It is too dangerous not to ponder and attend to some of the hard-line assertions of Morgenthauian realism, including those centering around the continued reality of war. Otherwise, we will be constructing a world order on shifting ground with a weak foundation.

Endnotes

- 1 International relations is understood to be in dominant part the study of statecraft and issues of war and peace.
- 2 Note: The outline of the realist paradigm corresponds to the discussion of realism taking place in Hans J. Morgenthau's book *Politics Among Nations* (5th ed.), p. 1-25.
- 3 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p. 4.
- 4 For intents and purposes of this thesis rational/rationality means the ability to apprehend through reason.
- 5 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p.5.
- 6 Ibid
- 7 Ibid, p.8.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid, p.9.
- 10 Ibid, p.9-10.
- 11 Ibid, p.10.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid, p.11.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid, p.14.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid, p.18.
- 20 Ibid, p.21.
- 21 Ibid, p.24-5
- 22 Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science," *Millenium* 16:2 (1987) p. 193.
- 23 Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) p. 21.
- 24 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p.37.
- 25 Ibid, p.36.
- 26 Ibid, p.37.
- 27 Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986) p. 136.
- 28 Lawrence H. Keeley, *War Before Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 23.
- 29 Ibid, p. 27-8.
- 30 Here, political means "needing the group" or "needing the social unit".
- 31 Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley (London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1963) p. 208, 294.
- 32 Alan Gilbert, *Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?: Great-Power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) p. 66.
- 33 Immanuel Wallerstein, *After Liberalism* (New York: The New Press, 1995).
- 34 Douglas Lemke, "The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War," *Journal of Peace Research* 34:1 (Feb 1997) p.23ff.

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- 35 Vendulka Kubalkova, "The Post-Cold War Geopolitics of Knowledge: International Studies in the Former Soviet Bloc," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 25:4 (Dec 1992) p.411-12.
- 36 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p.271.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Stanley Hoffman, *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960) p. 31.
- 39 Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. James Der Derian (New York: New York University Press, 1995) p. 218.
- 40 Ibid, p.8.
- 41 Ibid, p. 9.
- 42 I adhere to Morgenthau's understanding of interest (as explained in the previous paragraph) throughout my succeeding discussion of interest. Like Morgenthau I understand the concept of interest to be open and flexible, referring to any objectives "any nation has every pursued or might possibly pursue" in their foreign policy. Interest includes nationalist objectives - ie. objectives furthering the power of a particular group.
- 43 This discussion about the salutary aspect of war naturally leads to a discussion about the concept of just wars. Because a detailed analysis of the normative and religious assertions underlying the various incarnations of this concept would be required along with the implications of such assertions, just war is not being dealt with here. It is considered as being beyond the scope of this work.
- 44 Jim George, "Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the New/Old World Order," *Millenium* 22:2 (1993), p. 200.
- 45 Ray Magroori, "Introduction: Major Debates in International Relations," *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate*, ed. Ray Magroori and Bennett Ramberg (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982) p. 16.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Ibid, p.240.
- 48 National interest has something to do with the "collective national aspirations for power" (Ibid, p.110).
- 49 Ibid, p.241.
- 50 Ibid, p.242.
- 51 Ibid, p.244.
- 52 Ibid, p.244-5; 366-382.
- 53 Ibid, p.245.
- 54 Ibid, p.246.
- 55 Ibid, p.9.
- 56 Ibid, p.28.
- 57 The arguments made about war in this paragraph will be developed more fully in a succeeding part of the thesis.
- 58 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p.22.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Global governance "is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest." This definition is taken from *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, p. 2.

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- ⁶¹ The views of the members of the commission are detailed in *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)
- ⁶² Discussed at length by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*.
- ⁶³ For detailed analysis and insight into the deleterious impact of appeasement during the wars in the Balkans see *The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of Appeasement*, ed. Nader Mousavizadeh (New York: BasicBooks, 1996).
- ⁶⁴ Mortimer B. Zuckerman is of the opinion that the threat of force made manifest to Milosevic at an early date could have had the potential to avert war in Kosovo. From: "The Evil of Two Lessers," *U.S. News and World Report* 126:15 (1999) p. 92.
- ⁶⁵ The development of an international force is discussed in detail by John Gerard Ruggie in his piece "Wandering in the Void: Charting the UN's New Strategic Role," *Foreign Affairs* 72:5 (November/December 1993) p. 26-31.
- ⁶⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p.427-8.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid, p.110.
- ⁶⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960) p.176.
- ⁷⁰ Timothy W. Luke, "What's Wrong with Deterrence? A Semiotic Interpretation of National Security Policy," *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, ed. James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989) p. 214.
- ⁷¹ Ibid, p. 221.
- ⁷² Ibid, p.414.
- ⁷³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p.32.
- ⁷⁴ Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science," *Millenium* 16:2 (1987) p. 198.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid, p.31.
- ⁷⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1960) p.177.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid, p.170.
- ⁷⁸ Discussed by Gorbachev in *Perestroika and Soviet American Relations*.
- ⁷⁹ Section 103, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
- ⁸⁰ *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) Ch. 7, p.114ff.
- ⁸¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1960) p.172-4.
- ⁸² Ibid, p.173.
- ⁸³ Ibid, p.169.
- ⁸⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p.404.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid, p.405.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid, p.245.
- ⁸⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rapoport (New York: Penguin Books, 1968) p.119.
- ⁸⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th.ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p.495 ff.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid, p.280.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid, p.281.

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- 91 Ibid, p.317.
- 92 Ibid.
- 93 Ibid, p.498.
- 94 Ibid.
- 95 Ibid, p.319.
- 96 Ibid, p.319-20.
- 97 Ibid, p.320.
- 98 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985).
- 99 Ibid, p.32.
- 100 This point I have inferred from Morgenthau's essay "The Coming Test of American Democracy" found in *Truth and Power* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970) ch. 21 where he develops ideas about governments resting on either consent or violence, unequal treatment of African Americans and morality.
- 101 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p.29.
- 102 Ibid, p.121.
- 103 Ibid, p. 7.
- 104 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Commitments of Political Science," *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) ch.2, p.37.
- 105 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory," *Truth and Power* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970) p.255.
- 106 Ibid, p.257.
- 107 Ibid.
- 108 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The State of Political Science," *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) ch.1, p.16.
- 109 And this will be developed in a succeeding part of discussion
- 110 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Commitments of Political Science," *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) ch.2, p.36.
- 111 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory," *Truth and Power* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970) p.259-60.
- 112 539e
- 113 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Commitments of Political Science," *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) ch.2, p.30.
- 114 Or, as Morgenthau puts it, "a theory of politics presents not only a guide to understanding but also an ideal for action". Ibid, ch.2, p.40.
- 115 The idea is developed at length by Kal Holsti in *The Dividing Discipline* (Winchester: Allen and Unwim, 1985) ch.7.
- 116 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Commitments of Political Science," *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) ch.2, p. 37.

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