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THE WAR FOR MEN'S MINDS: THE  
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE OF FOREIGN POLICY  
IN ASIA, 1945 - 1957

by

ERNEST A. LeVOS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1991



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
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
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
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
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
  
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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation attempts to trace the major foreign policy themes which formed the backbone of Canada's affairs in Asia from 1945 to 1957. There were no grand designs or schemes put forth before World War II to develop a foreign policy for Asia; instead, Canada had interests in specific countries in East Asia. However, these limited interests had expanded by 1947 to include the countries of South and Southeast Asia.

Department of External Affairs officials--the "secular missionaries"--under the leadership of Louis St Laurent and Lester B. Pearson developed a foreign policy based on dualism. Dualism acknowledged that Canadian ideology, with its emphasis on democracy defined as anti-Communism, worked in tandem with Canada's self-interests, which included expanding trade and foreign aid, developing collective security arrangements, and peacekeeping. Ideology was to complement rather than contradict fundamental Canadian interests in Asia; it was to serve the interests of the state rather than permit these interests to be undermined.

The focus of this study is on Canadian foreign policy in Asia and the contributions of the Department of External Affairs to the development of that policy. Emphasis is on the five major aspects of Canadian foreign policy. The doctrines of "good and evil" and of material self-help were the two major pillars of Canadian foreign policy in Asia. Intertwined with these two doctrines were the foreign policy

themes of humanitarianism, collective security and peacekeeping. Essentially, External Affairs officials fought a war for men's minds, seeking not only to weaken the influence of Communism but also to win the friendship of Asian countries that were not part of the western democratic bloc. Consequently, Canada supported decolonization as long as it was accomplished within an anti-Communist context. However, Canadian officials learned quickly that it would take more than an anti-Communist ideology to win the war for the minds of men.

This study concludes that at the end of the Second World War, the Department of External Affairs had basically no comprehensive foreign policy goals for Asia. The whole continent of Asia was not part of Canada's main foreign policy formation. But from 1945 to 1957, Canada developed a foreign policy based principally on self-interest, and where possible self-interest was linked to ideological issues. These dual considerations became the basis for foreign policy in Asia. The two initiatives that shaped Canada's image in Asia and in the rest of the Third World were its participation in the Colombo Plan and in peacekeeping. Thus, Canada preserved its reputation as a good Samaritan and a peacekeeping nation in order to inherit the goods of the Asian earth.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Scholars take pride that their work is original but no work stands solely on its own merits. Like other pieces of research this present study builds upon the contributions of other scholars, including those of the officials who served the Department of External Affairs.

A scholar and a former official of the DEA who took an interest in my work was the late John W. Holmes. I appreciated the interest he showed and for providing the names of his colleagues to be interviewed. Arthur Menzies also provided me with the names of External Affairs officials I could contact. I am grateful to these former officials of the DEA who allowed me to interview them; their names are listed in the bibliography.

Besides, I would like to thank the staff at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) in Toronto, and at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, for assisting to locate the sources needed for my research. At the CIIA, Gayle Fraser was instrumental in arranging the interview with John Holmes. Also, the help received from Dacre Cole, John Hilliker and E. A. Kelley of the Historical Section, Academic Relations Division of the DEA, and from Majorie Bull, head of the client services of the DEA library, is greatly appreciated.

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## INTRODUCTION

Before 1939 Canada made the preservation of national unity the main pillar of its foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> Since federal government officials were concerned that war and economic hardships would endanger the unity of the country, they displayed an attitude of isolationism towards Europe and Asia. These officials, led by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, were willing to participate in international conferences on peace and economic prosperity but made no firm commitment of military support to Canada's allies. By August 1945 the surrender of Japan to the Allied forces brought an end to the Second World War. With the conclusion of the war fundamental changes took place in the foreign policies of many countries, including Canada.

In addition, significant forces in post-war world affairs led Canada to pursue an internationalist outlook.<sup>2</sup> These were fear of the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism, fear of nuclear war, the establishment of the United Nations, the development of stronger Canadian ties with the Commonwealth and Canada's closer economic and military relations with the United States.<sup>3</sup> In spite of these developments, Canada's post-war foreign policy was Eurocentric, with emphasis on the North Atlantic Alliance. Asia received very little attention from Canada's Department of External Affairs (DEA), but because of changing circumstances from 1945 to 1957 DEA officials gradually attached more importance to Asian affairs.

In a broad sense, the purpose of this study, is to trace the major



foreign policy themes which formed the backbone of Canada's affairs in Asia from 1945 to 1957. It is possible to describe a foreign policy for Europe before 1945, but this was not the case for Asia. There were no grand designs or schemes put forth before World War II to develop a foreign policy for Asia.<sup>4</sup> What Canada had were interests in specific countries such as China and Japan. The work of Christian missionaries added to these interests, which eventually became known as Canadian Far Eastern or Pacific affairs. However, Canada's limited interests in Asia had expanded by 1947. The DEA included South Asia (India, Pakistan and Ceylon) and Southeast Asia (Burma, Indonesia, Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in addition to East Asia (China, Korea and Japan), in its foreign policy decisions. What was known as Canadian Far Eastern affairs should have been termed Canadian-Asian affairs, but officials in External Affairs continued to refer to Canadian interests in Asia as Far Eastern affairs. The term "Canadian-Asian affairs" will be used in this study, and "Asia" will include the countries noted above in the three regions.

The officials in External Affairs, under the leadership of Louis St Laurent and Lester B. Pearson, developed a foreign policy based on dualism. Dualism acknowledged that Canadian ideology, with its emphasis on democracy defined as anti-Communism, could coexist with Canada's self-interests, which included trade, foreign aid, collective security and peacekeeping. Ideology was to complement rather than contradict fundamental Canadian interests in Asia; in other words, ideology was to serve the interests of the state rather than permit trade, foreign aid,

collective security or peacekeeping to be undermined.

The adoption of dualism by many External Affairs officials was more than a reaction to the events that grew out of the Cold War. It was part and parcel of their world view. In dealing with the major issues of ideology, trade, foreign aid, collective security and peacekeeping, External Affairs officials found it difficult to prevent foreign policy from being laced with a moral imperative. Consequently, these officials acted as secular missionaries. An obvious tension existed between the idealism and pragmatism these secular missionaries subscribed to. They viewed democracy, which they defined as anti-Communism, as the most viable solution to the political, economic and social problems in the Asian region torn by civil war, revolution, poverty and social inequality. But in their contacts with various governments in Asia, these secular Canadian missionaries learned that not all Asian governments would accept the gospel of democracy; thus, Canadians had to become more practical and less doctrinaire.

The emphasis of this study is on the five major aspects of Canadian foreign policy. The doctrines of "good and evil" and of material self-help were the two major pillars of Canadian foreign policy in Asia. Intertwined with these two doctrines were the foreign policy themes of humanitarianism, collective security and peacekeeping. In the war for men's minds, officials in External Affairs sought not only to weaken the influence of Communist countries, such as the Soviet Union and China, but also to win the friendship of Asian countries that were

not part of the western democratic bloc. Some of the countries in this latter group were on the verge of seeking independence and were thought to be threatened by Communism. Canada's support for decolonization was accomplished within an anti-Communist context. However, Canadian officials learned quickly that it would take more than an anti-Communist ideology to win the war for the minds of men.

To strengthen its effort in the war for the minds of people at home and abroad, External Affairs, together with the departments of Finance and Trade and Commerce, used the doctrine of material self-help to build a new economic order. Trade, which had been a traditional pillar of Canadian foreign policy all over the world, especially in Europe and the United States, would be used to enhance Canadian self-interests. In advancing the interests of the state, External Affairs officials had no doubts about the advantages that would result from the ideological battle between democracy and Communism. Consequently, the economic prosperity of the country would be promoted by placing an economic interest - Canadian trade with Asia - within an ideological framework. It was within the same ideological structure that the sale of arms to India and Pakistan took place. In addition, trade was used as a means of making Japan a strong ally of Western democracies as well as for increasing Canadian prosperity.

External Affairs officials used foreign aid as well as trade as an additional weapon to thwart the growth of totalitarianism and the spread of Communism. External Affairs found it difficult to divorce

humanitarian motives from political and economic factors when Canada joined the Colombo Plan for co-operative economic development in South and Southeast Asia. Since humanitarianism was part of the spirit of liberal internationalism, humanitarianism complemented rather than contradicted the political and economic reasons for supplying aid.

Officials in External Affairs grappled with the problem of whether aid alone was sufficient to defeat the enemies of the Cold War. They feared that the Soviet Union and China could easily thwart the influence of western foreign aid with programmes of their own. Given the possibility of such aid programmes being developed and the growing threat of Communism, the western democracies looked to military measures to combat Communism. Thus, collective security became the fourth tenet of Canadian foreign policy in Asia. Whether Canada would subscribe to defence pacts in Asia was a crucial question. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was of paramount importance to Canada and an equivalent of this military alliance had to be established in Asia before Canada would consider joining a defence pact. Would Canada in the post-war period become a Pacific power? What would the country do if a war broke out in Asia? These were two additional questions that officials in External Affairs sought to answer.

There was also the idealistic side of collective security that External Affairs could not ignore. Collective defence measures called for the maintenance of peace as part of the creation of an orderly world. Peacekeeping was another cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy,

and Canada, being apprehensive of military involvements since the 1890s, subscribed in 1954 to peacekeeping duties in Indochina. While initial attempts at peacemaking were carried out in Kashmir and Indonesia within the context of decolonization, Canada's participation in the International Commission for Supervision and Control for Indochina was its first major endeavour in peacekeeping. It was peacekeeping in Indochina that eventually became the fifth tenet of Canadian foreign policy in Asia during the St Laurent administration.<sup>5</sup> Though it initially exhibited a reluctance to serve on the International Commission, Canada continued to battle the heresy of Communism and encourage decolonization in Southeast Asia. The implementation of peacekeeping measures rather than direct military confrontation was the final means Canada chose as it developed its role in Asian affairs, especially after 1954.

The focus of this study is on Canadian foreign policy in Asia and the contributions of the Department of External Affairs. Not all policymakers in External Affairs were trained in Asian affairs or took a direct interest in Asia. The officials who played an important role in the formation of foreign policy in China were Victor Odlum, T. C. Davis, Chester Ronning and Ralph Collins.<sup>6</sup> Victor Odlum was Canada's first ambassador to China, from 1942 to 1946. Odlum's successor, T. C. Davis, held the post of ambassador from May 1947 to July 1950. He was appointed head of the Canadian mission in Bonn, West Germany, after serving in China. In June 1951 he became the Canadian ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. In October 1954 Davis replaced Robert

Mayhew as ambassador to Japan. While Chester Ronning did not serve as an ambassador, he went from first secretary to counsellor and eventually to chargé d'affairs between 1945 and 1951. Ralph Collins served as third secretary in Chungking from 1943 to 1944 and as chairman of the Constitutional Committee on the Far Eastern Commission while stationed in Washington, D. C. Collins also made a contribution to Canadian foreign policy in Japan. Through his work in the United States and Canada, Collins remained an important contributor to Canadian policy on Asia.

The two Canadian officials who made significant contributions to Canadian-Japanese relations were E. Herbert Norman and Arthur Menzies, both of whom were scholars and diplomats.<sup>7</sup> Norman studied at the University of Toronto and at Cambridge Harvard universities, and served as head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo from August 1946 to October 1950. Menzies, who succeeded Norman in Tokyo in November 1950, studied at the University of Toronto and at Harvard. After returning from Japan in 1952, Menzies became a crucial contributor to External Affairs policy on Asian matters.

The individual who performed the most important role in India (South Asia) was Escott Reid. He studied at the University of Toronto and was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. From 1932 to 1938, Reid served as the national secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In 1939, he joined External Affairs as second secretary. By 1952, when he was appointed Canadian ambassador to India, Reid had served as acting

and deputy under-secretary of state for External Affairs. Reid was a prolific writer of foreign policy papers. He wrote scores of memoranda and working papers between 1945 and 1957, and he continued to make a significant contribution after he left the department in 1962. Even before 1945 Reid wrote papers on the general trends of Canadian foreign policy. He was a visionary but tried to present a fair summary of the trends in Canadian foreign policy. Although his insights were not always accepted, his colleague, Hugh L. Keenleyside, agreed that much of what he wrote was "substantially correct". In a paper entitled "Trends In Canada's Foreign Policy 1935-1936", Reid concluded that there was nothing new about Canadian policy after 1935.<sup>8</sup> What had been Canadian policy from 1921 to 1935 - the maintenance of Canadian unity, the strengthening of relations with Britain and the United States and the acknowledgement that Parliament was the final arbiter of economic and military sanctions - remained basic policy for Canada after 1935.

Other officials who had an important part in one foreign policy issue or another were Pierre Dupuy, John Holmes, Douglas LePan, Sherwood Lett and General A. G. L. McNaughton. Pierre Dupuy, Canada's ambassador to the Netherlands from 1945 to 1952, played a role in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict between 1945 and 1949. General McNaughton also played a crucial part in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict as well as in the Kashmir dispute. Douglas LePan, an economic officer for External Affairs, was involved in the Colombo Plan. Finally, John Holmes and Sherwood Lett were associated with the peacekeeping measures in Indochina.

External Affairs employed a set of brilliant officers, but it trained very few to become Asian specialists. In addition, the department ran into problems keeping the few Asian experts they had. Hugh Keenleyside was an East Asian specialist whose posting to Japan was not renewed. On his return to Canada in 1935, he continued to take an interest in Canadian-Japanese relations, and eventually, during the Second World War, he disagreed with Mackenzie King over the internment of the Japanese in Canada. In 1946 he became involved in Latin American affairs when he was appointed ambassador to Mexico.<sup>9</sup> Another Asian specialist who could have continued to play a significant role in Asia was E. Herbert Norman. Unfortunately, Norman became a victim of McCarthyism in the United States and was recalled from Tokyo to Ottawa in 1950. In June 1953 he was posted to New Zealand as the Canadian ambassador. While Norman was under investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Escott Reid and Arthur Menzies kept Canadian interests in Asian affairs alive. Menzies was responsible for much input into policy papers and reports on Asia.<sup>10</sup> He was constantly making suggestions on Asian policy and the nature of his work made him more of a "policy suggester" than a "policymaker".

It was Menzies who saw the need to distinguish between the terms "policymaker" and "policy suggester". Who made policy and who suggested what should be done was of paramount importance to Menzies. The formation of foreign policy prior to September 1946 was basically the duty of the Prime Minister, since he was also the Secretary of State for External Affairs. On September 4, 1946, Mackenzie King relinquished



that portfolio and handed it over to St Laurent. One of the most significant speeches the new minister of External Affairs gave was at the University of Toronto on January 13, 1947, inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship. The speech was important because it was a policy statement which would guide Canadian foreign policy for the next decade. It laid "the foundations of Canadian policy in world affairs" and it was based "upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population."<sup>11</sup>

St Laurent's speech not only contained the principles of foreign policy but also emphasized the need to be pragmatic. In addition, it mentioned the goals of Canadian foreign policy and the main institutions through which these goals would be achieved. The guiding principles would be national unity, political liberty, the rule of law, human values based on the Judeo-Christian heritage, and the pursuit of global duties that a middle power such as Canada could perform. Historical ties with Britain, France and the United States would not be ignored, and the country would work with the Commonwealth and functional bodies within the United Nations. As a result, Canadian interests in world affairs would not be selective and isolationist but comprehensive. Although Canadian policy was primarily oriented towards the United States and Europe, and the Gray lecture implied that Canadian relations would be extended to Asia.

It was generally accepted that the Secretary of State for External

Affairs enunciated policy "in Parliament or in public statements." This was done by St Laurent and later by Lester Pearson. The other officials in the department "suggest[ed] policies in memoranda submitted to ministers or in draft speeches. They then carried out the policies of [the] ministers." More specifically, as Menzies noted:

Drafts are submitted by junior officers to their seniors. The seniors examine these drafts in the light of their knowledge of the subject and of the mind-set of ministers. The original draft is discarded and does not appear on file. The next draft, approved at the Director of Divisional level, is submitted to an Assistant Under Secretary. At this level there is personal familiarity with the views of the responsible minister. Suggested new policy may be rejected orally or in writing, or it may be accepted for submission to the minister. Finally, if there is to be a new policy it is for the minister to give voice to it in Parliament or in a public statement.<sup>12</sup>

Menzies provided a technical difference when he distinguished between "policymakers" and "policy suggesters". While policy was enunciated by ministers and carried out by civil servants, it can also be said that the cabinet ministers - more specifically, the Secretary of State for External Affairs - and the senior civil servants in External Affairs were the individuals who made policy. It was the responsibility of these senior officials to put forth new recommendations when previous ones were discarded. This perspective on policy, which is not as technical as Menzies' explanation, was one Escott Reid subscribed to.<sup>13</sup>

The role of the senior civil servants was succinctly stated by Robert A. Spencer. He noted that:

With its wide range of information from its network of missions abroad, its batteries of zestful and often brilliant experts at home, its key position in interdepartmental committees, and its close connection with the Cabinet, the Department of External Affairs may not unfairly be described as the major factor in the formation of foreign policy. The traditional role of the civil service is to plan and to recommend. But the special nature of foreign policy made it natural and inevitable that there should be added the function of persuasion - once determined on the need for a certain course of action, it is not difficult to picture senior civil servants attempting to convince the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and he in turn the Cabinet.<sup>14</sup>

Because of the key role that senior civil servants played in policymaking, the term "policymaker" rather than "policy suggester" will be used in this study. Furthermore, the term "Canadian officials" or "External Affairs officials" will be used to refer to the combined efforts of civil servants and elected officials in the formation of Canadian foreign policy in Asia.

This study is intended to add to the research on Canadian external affairs. Much of the work done on the history of Canadian foreign policy focuses on the period between 1896 and 1948, and the two major areas these works cover are Europe and North America.<sup>15</sup> Asia remains on the fringes of research in the history of foreign policy. Even C. P. Stacey, the distinguished Canadian historian, hardly mentions Asia in his two-volume work covering Canadian foreign policy from 1867 to 1948.<sup>16</sup> It was in the 1970s and the 1980s that graduate students and scholars carried out further research on Canadian-Asian relations.<sup>17</sup> Most of the work covered has been specialized topics such as trade, aid, peacekeeping, and war in China, Japan, Korea, India and Indochina.<sup>18</sup>

Of these five countries, China has been of much interest to scholars.<sup>19</sup> However, Canadian foreign policy interests in Asia as a whole has not been fully studied. The individual who came closest to accomplishing this goal was John W. Holmes from External Affairs.<sup>20</sup> This present research work is an attempt to look at Asia after 1945 as a geographical unit rather than to examine a specific foreign policy issue in one Asian country and to place in perspective the principal foreign policy themes of the St Laurent administration.<sup>21</sup>

While the works of several students and scholars have added to the dialogue on Canadian foreign policy in Asia, this writer acknowledges the work of three individuals who have written on Canadian-Asian relations during selected periods: A. R. M. Lower, a distinguished Canadian historian, H. F. Angus, an officer in External Affairs, and Gregory Johnson, a budding historian in Canadian external affairs.<sup>22</sup> When Lower wrote Canada and the Far East-1940, he had China and Japan in mind, but he omitted Korea. His coverage of the Far East from 1886 to 1931 is contained in one chapter, and Canadian interests from the 1930s to the 1940s are covered in six chapters. Canadian interests were primarily of a limited nature dealing with Christian missions, trade, immigration and selected defence matters. The main issue in Canadian interests in the Far East, according to Lower, was the maintenance of peace, which meant the avoidance of war. It was Mackenzie King who had a considerable role in making peace the main tenet of Canadian policy.

Henry Forbes Angus, who served in the economics division of the Department of External Affairs, picked up where Lower left off. His work, Canada and the Far East, 1940-1953, in which he analyzed the factors that affected Canadian interests in the Far East, was published in 1953. Unlike Lower, who included only China and Japan, Angus added Korea, Indonesia, Indochina, India and Pakistan to his study. While Angus did not cover the work of Canadian missionaries, he touched on the topics of economic assistance, trade, defence and security. Undoubtedly, Canadian interests expanded after 1945. Canada worked through the United Nations on security matters covering Kashmir, Indonesia, China, Korea and Indochina, and through the Commonwealth by subscribing to the Colombo Plan. Angus placed more attention on national self-interest in explaining Canadian interests in Asia; he hardly touched on idealism in his analysis, a factor which Lower did not overlook.

Angus was more specific than Lower in his discussion of Canadian nationalism. He maintained that Canadian nationalism was not governed by fanatical goals; its main objective was "to lead the middle powers in the construction and maintenance of a peaceful world."<sup>23</sup> By a peaceful world, Angus was undoubtedly thinking, as Lower did, of a world free of global wars. As Canadian interests gradually developed in Asia after 1945, Canada's primary aim was "the pursuit of peace." Angus noted that this took "the form of willingness to live and let live, to practice give and take, to bear minor irritations with patience and understanding, to accept majority decisions as having a high persuasive

value which should be disregarded only when major vital issues are at stake."<sup>24</sup> Taking such a stand was an acknowledgement that foreign policy, to a large extent, was an extension of a nation's domestic policy. For Canada, the need to create the conditions for peace in all spheres of life cultural, economic, political and social - was of prime importance in its external relations.<sup>25</sup>

The third scholar who has analyzed Canadian relations in Asia is Gregory Johnson. In a recent doctoral dissertation, Johnson studied the impact of the Far East on Canada as it related to its two North Atlantic Triangle partners, Britain and the United States, from 1937 to 1948. This work fills a gap in the historiography of Canadian foreign affairs with respect to developments in the Far East, including

the government's decision to grant the West Coast of Canada defence priority status in 1937, the sending of troops to Hong Kong in 1941, wartime relations with the United States, the evacuation of Japanese-Canadians from the coast of British Columbia in 1942, and post-war matters such as Canadian participation on the Far Eastern Commission and the United Nations Commission on Korea.<sup>26</sup>

Johnson's study, which concluded that a North Pacific Triangle was a reality, is valuable because it covers the period before and after the Second World War when Canada moved from a position of isolationism to a position of active participation in world affairs. But like Lower's work, the focus is still on East Asia; that is, China, Japan and Korea. Canadian reaction to the Second World War in South and Southeast Asia is hardly mentioned.

The works of Lower, Angus and Johnson are important, but of equal if not greater significance is the mainstream interpretation of Canadian foreign policy. The main argument of this orthodox school states that Canada was closely tied to Britain and the United States in economic and military matters during the Second World War, but by the end of the war and with the economic decline of Britain, Canada drifted into the economic and military orbit of the United States while maintaining its links with the Commonwealth. The mainstream view also claimed that Canada identified with the American position on the Cold War. This view has been subscribed to by revisionists such as R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein, who have made an important contribution to the dialogue on Canadian foreign policy especially as it pertains to Canada-United States relations.<sup>27</sup> The revisionists take the position that the United States was explicit in its post-war foreign policy goals, that it attempted to restructure the economy of the world, and that it did not hesitate to use the fear of Communism as a weapon to support its national interests.<sup>28</sup> To these two scholars, Canada was not only part of this post-war picture; it willingly backed the United States.

The position of the revisionists has been challenged by historian John English and scholars such as Don Page and Don Munton.<sup>29</sup> Even Lester Pearson assailed the work of the revisionists.<sup>30</sup> When one looks at the forest and not the trees, one discovers that there are some significant points put forth by this "anti-revisionist" group.<sup>31</sup> This group recognized that officials in External Affairs were not deceived by the Americans. These Canadian officials were cognizant of their

decisions on policy matters and displayed a good measure of independent thinking in Canadian foreign policy issues. While officials in Canada's External Affairs department advanced economic interests overseas during the Cold War, they did not exaggerate the threat of Communism and were not fanatical opponents of this ideology as were the Americans.<sup>32</sup> In addition, External Affairs officials were willing to constrain the military might of the United States.<sup>33</sup> What the "anti-revisionists" also noted was the continuity of collective security measures in Canadian policy decisions. Again however, External Affairs officials were willing to forge new paths in foreign policy decisions in the post-war period and to look beyond the fears of Mackenzie King.

Revisionists are correct in their emphasis that the United States played a leading role in post-war issues and that Britain backed the United States. But revisionists need to look beyond the affairs of the North Atlantic region. They look at the oak trees but ignore the rest of the forest. While national interests played a crucial role in the formation of Canadian foreign policy in Asia, the role of ideology must not be overlooked. These two components comprise the dualism of Canadian foreign policy. In their reflections and in their scholarly exchanges on the Cold War with John English, R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein noted:

Canadian external policy could not be understood apart from its interaction with American postwar goals. It is, therefore, necessary to arrive at the fullest understanding of those goals, and at the moment it is the revisionists...who have contributed most to this understanding. It may be that nothing



distinguished Canada and the United States from each other at the beginning of the Cold War except that in Washington the delusions of grandeur were more pronounced. If so, we may have to decide that while American revisionists have judged their country too harshly, we have not yet assessed our own critically enough.<sup>34</sup>

The present study emphasizes the foundations laid by Canadian External Affairs officials in Asia after the Second World War. Because of the growing economic and political importance of countries of the Pacific Rim, the historical roots of Canadian external relations in Asia will shed light on the factors that shaped Canada's image in this part of the world. Much of the work done on Canadian foreign policy in Asia views Canadian activity from the perspective of the Great Powers. This work, while not ignoring the role of the Great Powers, endeavours to view Asia from a Canadian perspective. In doing so, it does not pretend to be exhaustive but focuses on the main paths Canadian External policymakers took in Asia from 1945 to 1957. While trade was one crucial path, two other that were significant in the war for men's minds were the Colombo Plan and Canada's peacekeeping initiatives.

### Notes to the Introduction

1. For an interesting discussion on whether Mackenzie King was responsible for creating disunity rather than unity in Canada, see Thomas Brent Slobodin, "A Tangled Web: The Relation Between Mackenzie King's Foreign Policy and National Unity." Ph.D. Thesis, Queen's University, 1986.
2. See John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943 - 1957, 2 Volumes (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979, 1982). See also John English, Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson Volume One: 1897 - 1948 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989), pp. 292 - 294 and chapter twelve; Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), chapter five.
3. Albert J. Ossman, in "The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy with Particular Emphasis on the Period 1943 - 1953," Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1963, noted that the threat posed by nuclear war and the Soviet Union made Canada broaden the scope of its foreign policy beyond the North Atlantic Triangle.
4. Reid thought up grand schemes for Canada. He was full of ideas, many of which were not adopted. Jim McCardle, interview, Ottawa, June 11, 1989. Ralph Collins said that he has "always envied the fact that Australia had a policy [but Canada did not]. We tried to do things sensitively; we did not go out and campaign for it." Ralph Collins, interview, Ottawa, May 24, 1989. Canada stayed out of the developments in East Asia. Critics of Mackenzie King's foreign policy may argue that having "no policy" was a policy in itself.
5. See J. L. Granatstein, "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality," Canadian Forum 54:643 (August 1974), pp. 14 - 19.
6. John W. Holmes noted that Ralph Collins was more influential than Chester Ronning in dealing with problems concerning China. John W. Holmes, interview, Toronto, June 15, 1988. In his later years, Ronning became an apologist for the regime in China. Jack Maybee, interview, Ottawa, June 14, 1989.
7. Both Douglas LePan and Ralph Collins described Arthur Menzies and E. Herbert Norman as being influential figures in Far Eastern Affairs. Douglas LePan, interview, Toronto, June 16, 1988; Ralph Collins, interview, Ottawa, May 24, 1989. Jim McCardle served in Tokyo as third secretary from 1947 to 1949. He said that being under E. Herbert Norman was like taking a post-graduate course. Jim McCardle, interview, June 11, 1989.
8. National Archives of Canada, (hereafter NAC), Department of External Affairs Records, RG 25, G 1, vol. 1832, file 278, "Trends in Canadian Foreign Policy 1935 - 1936," January 11, 1937.

9. Victor Odium wrote Arthur Menzies on August 29, 1946 about his concern about the departure of Hugh Keenleyside's influence in the DEA. He said that "ever since Dr. Keenleyside's departure, I have been conscious of a vacuum behind, and it has bothered me a great deal. While you and Dr. Keenleyside were there [i.e. in Ottawa], we always felt that we had friends who would not only support us, but would do it understandingly." See NAC, Victor Odium Papers, MG 30, E 300, vol. 9. Also Arthur Menzies, interview, Ottawa, May 22, 1989.
10. See Douglas LePan, Bright Glass of Memory: A Set of Four Memoirs (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), pp. 161 - 162. On the Norman affair, see John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 168 - 173. See also section 7, "The Norman Affair," in James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 153 - 160. Roger W. Bowen, "Cold War, McCarthyism, and Murder by Slander: E. H. Norman's Death in Perspective," in E. H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 46 - 71; James Barros, No Sense of Evil: Espionage, The Case of Herbert Norman (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1986), pp. 46 - 96.
11. See J. L. Granatstein, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986), pp. 25 - 33.
12. Letter, Arthur Menzies to Ernest LeVos, March 27, 1989. See also A. D. P. Heeney, "The Conduct of Canadian Diplomacy," Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 50/2, (1950), p. 2, for a description of the work of the Department of External Affairs. Also Arthur Menzies, interview, Ottawa, May 22, 1989.
13. Escott Reid, interview, Ottawa, June 4, 1989.
14. Robert A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs: 1946 to 1949 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 407.
15. See Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English - Canadian Historical Writing since 1900, second edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 276 - 282. Carl Berger noted that "Canadian foreign policy after 1921 stressed status rather than responsibilities and guarded autonomy against any kind of imperial co-operation." See The Sense of Power: Studies In The Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 264.
16. See C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume 1: 1867 - 1948 The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

17. See Donald Joseph Barry, "Continuity and Change in Canadian Foreign Policy: From the Pre-War to the Post-War Experience, 1935 - 1957," Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1977; Vivienne Bronson, "The International Control Commission for Vietnam: The Diplomatic and Military Context," M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1975.
18. See Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, p. 280. Berger noted that James Eayrs' series on the Defence of Canada, of which the latest is Indochina: Roots of Complicity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), and Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974), were "a highly descriptive, theoretically unadorned, analysis of the ways in which policy-makers attempted to enhance the functions of the United Nations as a means of imposing limits on American power." p. 280. Denis Smith has recently published another book, Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War 1941 - 1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). This work is very perceptive in its analysis of Canada's fear of participating in international bloc politics during and after the Second World War, which was evident in the inexperienced Department of External Affairs grappling with big power politics and in its subscription to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Berger also noted that officials who served in External Affairs "published valuable memoir - histories that were based on research as well as reflection." p. 279. Three examples of these are John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, Volumes 1 and 2 (Toronto, 1979 and 1982); Douglas LePan, Bright Glass of Memory (Toronto, 1979); and Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin (Toronto, 1989).
19. Graduate students, scholars and officials in External Affairs have given much attention to the issue of the recognition of China. See Francis Conrad Raabe, "The China Issue in Canada: Politics and Foreign Policy." Ph.D. Thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1970. He notes that the question of whether Canada should or should not recognize China recurred from 1950 to 1957. Even though the participation of China in the Korean war made External Affairs shelve the issue of recognition, it was not totally dead among DEA officials. Another excellent dissertation is Stephen J. Beecroft's, "Walking the Tightrope: Canadian China Policy 1948 - 57," Ph. D. Dissertation, Cambridge University, November 1986. Beecroft divided Canadian policymakers into three groups: advocates, such as Ronning and Reid; pragmatic proponents, such as St Laurent, Pearson, Holmes and Menzies; vacillators, such as Leger, Cadieux and Heeney. See p. 266 ff. Beecroft's three groups are similar to Douglas Ross' three groups of policymakers, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954 - 1973 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 10 ff.
20. See Holmes, Shaping of Peace, volume 2.

21. See note 19. The recognition of China was not ignored in the 1950s but it became more important in the 1960s. The issue was political rather than legal. See Ronald H. Wagenberg, "Canada and Red China: Problems of Recognition," M.A. Thesis, Assumption University of Windsor, 1962.
22. A. R. M. Lower, Canada and the Far East - 1940 (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941); H. F. Angus, Canada and the Far East, 1940 - 1953 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953); Gregory A. Johnson, "North Atlantic Triangle?: The Impact of the Far East on Canada and its Relations with the United States and Great Britain, 1937 - 1948," Ph.D. Thesis, York University, May 1989. Charles J. Woodsworth wrote Canada and the Orient: A Study in International Relations (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1941). There were a few studies done on the Far East in the 1930s.
23. Angus, Canada, p. 8.
24. Ibid., p. 34.
25. Ibid., p. 34 ff.
26. Johnson, "North Atlantic Triangle?" p. iv. Johnson argued convincingly that Far Eastern developments in the context of Anglo-American relations during World War II shaped Canada's defence policies in East Asia. Canada gave priority to its defence plans along the Pacific coast because it feared a Japanese attack.
27. R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From the Great War to the Cold War (Toronto: Hakkert, 1975), p. 129 and chapter 7. See also their article, "Looking Back at the Cold War, 1945 - 54," Canadian Forum 52:618-619 (July - August 1972), pp. 8 - 11.
28. For the view that containment was a failure in Asia see David P. Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," in Thomas G. Patterson, ed., Containment and the Cold War: American Foreign Policy since 1945 (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1973), pp. 187 - 207.
29. See John English, "Revisionism revisited: a response," Canadian Forum 52:623 (December 1972), pp. 16 - 19; See also Dor Page and Don Munton, "Canadian Images of the Cold War 1946-7", International Journal 32:3 (Summer 1977), pp. 577 - 604.
30. Munro and Inglis, eds., Mike, 2, pp. 24 - 25. See also Smith, The Diplomacy of Fear, pp. 6 - 8.

31. An example of how scholars have viewed "the trees" from different perspectives is the research done on Canadian involvement in Indochina; see chapter five of this thesis. The three main works covering Canada's involvement on the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) are Douglas Ross, In the Interests of Peace (Toronto, 1984); James Eayrs, Indochina (Toronto, 1983); and Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International Commission (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1984).

Ross has argued very convincingly that American policy in Vietnam failed and that Canada endeavoured to constrain the United States in the interests of peace. Eayrs examined the roots of Canadian involvement in Indochina, which were difficult to displace after 1957 because Canadian policies depended on its relations with the United States. Thakur argued that "peacekeeping is successful where it is limited to narrow, precisely defined tasks of overseeing a military disengagement upon the cessation of hostilities, but fails when extended to embrace political tasks of conflict resolution, and is not viable against the self-defined vital interests of a super power." Thakur noted that Canada and India, despite its close relations, pursued different policies. Canadians were "idealistic" and Indians "realists". (p.2) Although none of the three books "does justice to the complexity of the story," Ross' account is one the present writer subscribes to.

32. See A. F. W. Plumptre, Three Decades of Decision: Canada and the World Monetary System, 1944 - 1975 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), chapter 2 to 6.
33. See Stairs, Diplomacy of Constraint (Toronto, 1974). True to his word, Granatstein has provided us with another critical reassessment of Canada vis-à-vis Britain and the United States. See How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
34. Granatstein and Cuff, "Looking back once more - a rejoinder," Canadian Forum 52:618-619 (December 1972), p. 20.

CHAPTER ONE  
THE DOCTRINE OF "GOOD AND EVIL"

The Cold War was the conflict waged between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its satellites.<sup>1</sup> Commencing in 1947, the Cold War was "the product of two incompatible visions of post-war Europe and was essentially diplomatic and political, not military, in nature."<sup>2</sup> The two incompatible visions, with liberal democracy on the one hand and totalitarianism and communism on the other, resulted in the division of the world into mutually hostile blocs.<sup>3</sup> What began in Europe eventually spilled over into Asia and had a considerable effect on Canadian foreign policy in Asia.<sup>4</sup>

In 1951, Escott Reid wrote on various aspects of Canadian foreign policy and noted that "in addition to the political, the economic and the defence aspects of foreign policy, there is another aspect for which it is hard to find an appropriate name. Perhaps the best term, though it is not entirely satisfactory is the 'war for men's minds'." Reid also remarked that there was a three-fold strategy to this war. It involved "the improvement of morale at home and in friendly countries, with the weakening of morale in the camp of the potential enemy, and with winning the sympathies of those in the world who are not committed to either camp."<sup>5</sup> It was the war for men's minds,<sup>6</sup> evident in the perceived battle between "good" and "evil" and in the strategies adopted, that provided the officials in the Department of External Affairs (DEA) with one of the principal pillars of Canadian foreign policy in Asia between 1945 and 1957.

The doctrine of the war between good and evil arose from the two incompatible visions of democracy and totalitarianism. Democracy, with its emphasis on the rights and freedoms of individuals and on decolonization - the achievement of self-determination by European colonies in Asia - constituted the good. Totalitarianism and Communism were considered evil because they were oppressive. Wherever new governments were founded upon these forces, they denied basic individual rights and freedoms.

To Canadian officials in the DEA, democracy meant responsible government or parliamentary democracy, with the cabinet answerable to the Legislative Assembly or Parliament. DEA officials used the term "democracy" in the war between good and evil : sely to mean anti-Communism, but they did not ignore responsible government. Whenever and wherever Communism denied freedom and liberty, democracy was encouraged by the western democratic nations including Canada. Thus, DEA officials defined democracy as not only anti-Communist but also pro-Western. Furthermore, "democracy" during the Cold War meant being opposed to both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It must be noted that even though Canadian DEA officials were less enthusiastic about the Cold War than their American counterparts, Canadian officials accepted much of its underlying ideology.

However, it was not always easy for officials in the DEA to make democracy the sine qua non of Canadian policy. DEA officials questioned the application of responsible government when they



confronted governments in Asia that were authoritarian but were non-Communist. Canadian officials showed a measure of willingness to support authoritarian governments as long as these governments did not turn to the Soviet Union or to Communist China for ideological guidance. Moreover, DEA officials supported authoritarian regimes if they endeavoured to implement parliamentary democracy and/or if they improved the standard of living in their individual countries and respected the laws of international trade. In essence, DEA officials preferred to support an independent, anti-Communist democracy, but they would also support a country that was independent and had not yet established responsible government.

The two individuals responsible for much of the differentiation between Canada's two visions of the Cold War were Louis St Laurent, the Prime Minister, and Lester Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. They were the principal architects of Canadian Foreign Policy after 1948, although they sought the advice of a coterie of officials in External. St Laurent and Pearson may be viewed as representative of the two solitudes in Canadian society. The former was from a French-Canadian and Catholic background, the latter from an English Canadian heritage with a strong Methodist orientation.<sup>7</sup> In spite of their different religious and racial heritages, they both belonged to the same school of liberal internationalism, a school which called for an orderly world society based on international cooperation.

To Pearson the goals of any liberal internationalist in the Cold

War were clear: to prevent war, to encourage material progress, and to spread Christian humanitarian principles. He was the key official in the DEA and much of what he proposed for Canadian foreign policy St Laurent and other officials in the department endorsed. This did not mean that DEA officials thought alike, because variations in foreign policy perceptions did exist. However, despite their differences of opinion, there was one thread that held them together and that was the belief in liberal internationalism.

There were certain basic ideas that the liberal internationalists agreed upon. First of all, there was the need to prevent another world war.<sup>8</sup> One means by which this goal could be accomplished was to prevent Soviet expansionism, a second means was to become part of a Western European alliance, and a third was to promote peace.<sup>9</sup> There was a distinct fear of war among the liberal internationalists, whether they were conservative, liberal-moderate or left-liberal.<sup>10</sup>

The liberal internationalists were open to new ideas and subscribed to the belief in material and moral progress.<sup>11</sup> To them man was "the centre of the universe and the source of moral principle."<sup>12</sup> Mankind was capable of exercising goodwill, and it was possible for those who were benevolent to be stronger than those who were not. One body through which goodwill could be expressed was the United Nations (UN) and its functional agencies. Unfortunately, due to the lack of Soviet cooperation, Canadian liberal internationalists lost most of their faith

in the UN<sup>13</sup> and assuaged their loss of confidence by participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Two other tenets the Canadian liberal internationalists had confidence in were international trade and humanitarianism. International trade could enhance the standard of living at home and abroad, and humanitarianism could be a means of combating poverty overseas.

Pearson and other DEA officials who served their government from 1945 to 1957 believed in international human progress, peace and the principle of caring for the "down trodden"<sup>14</sup> materially and ideologically. The acceptance of these beliefs can be traced to the "imperialism [that] flowed from the tradition of Gladstone...."<sup>15</sup> According to Canadian historian John English, "the seeds of [Pearson's] internationalist vision germinated in the rich soil of liberal imperialism."<sup>16</sup> Perhaps it can be said that this vision of internationalism grew larger between the 1920s and the 1930s and reached its maturation after 1945. Pearson's belief in internationalism grew after the First World War, but the war itself "weakened his and many others' conviction that Christian belief invariably produced happiness and prosperity. It did not, however, dissolve [their] Christian faith."<sup>17</sup> Rather, Pearson and others began to view "Christianity chiefly in social and political terms."<sup>18</sup> This gave birth to a stronger emphasis on "the brotherhood of man", the promotion of charity, peace, tolerance and the search for truth.<sup>19</sup>

The emphasis on social Christianity in the context of liberal

internationalism was especially significant to the DEA officials who served in Asia. Diplomats such as Ralph Collins, Jack Maybee, Arthur Menzies, E. Herbert Norman, and Chester Ronning were sons of missionaries from either the Anglican, the Lutheran or the United Church tradition.<sup>20</sup> Their strong belief in moral responsibility had an effect on Canadian attitudes in China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam.<sup>21</sup> They also had a knowledge of either the Chinese or Japanese languages and this knowledge together with their training in Far Eastern affairs made them the East Asian experts in External Affairs.<sup>22</sup> Escott Reid, who served in India, was similar to the other officials in External in his religious and family backgrounds, being the son of a minister. Douglas Ross in his book on Canadian involvement in the peacekeeping effort in Vietnam from 1954 to 1973, classified Escott Reid, Chester Ronning and Herbert Norman as being left-liberal. These men

were by and large individuals who had spent a considerable amount of time in Asia, who usually appreciated Asian culture, and more important, were people who normally sympathized deeply with Asian determination to assert political and economic independence.<sup>23</sup>

Although Arthur Menzies was not classified as a left-liberal, he was one of those Canadian diplomats who developed a "capacity to identify with Asian life-styles" and interests.<sup>24</sup> Besides having an empathy for Asian culture, these Asian experts, including Pearson, were a group of men who believed in the maxim that a man acts in direct proportion to the way he thinks.<sup>25</sup>

The Canadian External Affairs officials tied the prevention of a

global conflict - that is, the promotion of peace - and the belief in progress, with its emphasis on humanitarianism to the promotion and preservation of democratic institutions. This link helped to define the opposing forces of a political and diplomatic conflict such as the Cold War, since Communism was seen to be opposed to the accomplishment of these goals. The war for St Laurent was between "the forces of freedom and civilization" and "the new Communist imperialism"; it was between "liberty and tyranny."<sup>26</sup> Underlying this perception of good and evil was the fear of the outbreak of another global conflict. St Laurent felt that if war broke out, it would be between "the atheistic communist world and our democratic Christian civilization."<sup>27</sup> But he had a solution to war. To him "the best way to avoid an atomic war was to make it clear to the Soviet leaders that the Soviet Union would suffer as much from starting one as would the West."<sup>28</sup> The diplomacy of deterrence was evident in St Laurent's solution, one which Pearson subscribed to. Where the war between good and evil was concerned, Pearson saw democracy and totalitarianism as juxtaposed. Totalitarianism was not only "the greatest menace to peace" but the rivalry between these two forces could result in another world war.<sup>29</sup> To prevent a global conflict, according to Pearson, not only should the diplomacy of deterrence be practiced, but democracy should be established as the most viable form of government.

St Laurent and Pearson agreed that a moral force, evident in the war between good and evil, was part of Canadian foreign policy. The idea that this war was between good and evil was quite evident in the

religious allusions St Laurent and Pearson used in their speeches when they talked about the conflict between democracy and totalitarianism. To Pearson, the term "Communism" was synonymous with Soviet totalitarianism or expansionism.<sup>30</sup> The use of religious allusions was more than political rhetoric, for these two men believed that a dualism existed in foreign policy. Reality and idealism were not incongruous in their minds, but they were certainly aware that the forces of political reality could be stronger than the forces of idealism. The words of Escott Reid succinctly summarize the views of St Laurent and Pearson on the doctrine of good and evil:

The essence of the Western Christian faith is that the individual is eternal and the state and the community are temporal. The individual is an end in himself. The state and the community are mere means by which the individual may be helped to attain the good life. Opposed to this faith is the totalitarian heresy that whatever serves the interest of the state or the community is right.

Reid also added that the way to fight heresy was to be "convinced of the truth of our gospel," which was democracy, and to preach and practice it "with fervour."<sup>31</sup> The moral imperative was thus one major reason why Canadian External officials joined the war for men's minds in Asia.

### Antagonism Towards Soviet and Chinese Imperialism and Expansionism

The war for the minds of men had three components and each will be discussed in this chapter. First, the DEA was antagonistic towards the ideology of the Soviet Union. It endeavoured to expose the Soviet

Union's past ambitions of imperialism and expansionism and its potential to continue to pursue these goals. When China became a threat to the balance of power in Asia, the DEA placed China in the camp of the enemy. However, although Soviet and Chinese goals of imperialism and expansionism came under heavy criticism by the DEA, western imperialism was not viewed as a threat, for obvious reasons. Second, the DEA was keen to expose the heresy of Communism and to promote democracy; and third, it supported decolonization and the achievement of self-government.

To the DEA "the mainsprings of Soviet action" were governed by the combination of the nationalist and ideological features of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma.<sup>32</sup> One important feature was the concentration of power in the hands of a few, which Pearson perceived as the root cause of a "wide range of state action, massive bureaucracy, extreme emphasis on the army, drastic use of force...[by] the secret police, [and the] semi-deification of the leader or sovereign."<sup>33</sup> The methods used to bring about social revolution in Soviet society were also unacceptable. They were "anti-war demonstrations, industrial disturbances, strikes, political agitation, desertion, mutiny, and colonial or minority rebellion."<sup>34</sup> While all these means were good examples of disaffection, the ultimate goal of the Soviets was the establishment of a communist form of government and the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The combination of the centralization of power and the achievement of social revolution by forceful means, according to Pearson, would certainly negate the rights

of individuals in society. This feature was also unacceptable to other DEA officials. Individual rights, freedom of choice, free speech and free elections did not thrive on Soviet soil. Pearson lamented that the Soviet Union was "bent on frustrating [the great experiment of freedom] and reducing the world to slavery." He added that

freedom had never for any length of time flourished sturdily in Russia; and now its Communist rulers have used their power to extinguish the slightest remnants of political freedom, to make independent thought impossible and to chain the work and spirit of every Soviet individual to the service of the state. Their power is absolute within the Soviet Union and virtually absolute within the unfortunate countries which have become its satellites.<sup>35</sup>

Pearson and the other officials in External knew that Soviet imperialism had a long history. It was viewed "as a continuation of three centuries and more of the expansion of White European Russia into contiguous lands" such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Tied to this long history of imperialism and aggression was what the DEA viewed as "the imposition of colonial regimes by trickery and force on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and East Germany."<sup>36</sup> Pearson believed that because of this history of imperialism and aggression, absolute power not only resided in the Soviet Union but was "extended in ever-widening circles" to its satellites. It was an "unbridled power [which] has proved expansive and aggressive,"<sup>37</sup> and DEA officials considered it to be a threat to Central and Western Europe. The possibility of aggression had serious implications for Canada since Western Europe was



its major area of foreign policy interest. Britain, the mother of the Commonwealth countries, and the other western democratic countries were Canada's main allies. Military demobilization after the war made Western Europe look rather weak in comparison to the USSR and its satellites. Pearson remarked that "it is in Western Europe that this relative weakness creates the greatest danger, since Western Europe would probably be the main objective of the initial Soviet attack in the event of a general war. For that reason, strenuous efforts are now being made to increase rapidly the forces in being in Western Europe as a deterrent to Soviet aggression."<sup>38</sup> Consequently, it was "to check the aggressive and expansionist policies of the Soviet Union" that Canada joined NATO.<sup>39</sup>

Furthermore, the agency upon which Soviet imperialism depended was "the Communist Party throughout the world." To Pearson it was the "combination of Communism and Russian imperialism" that presented Canada "and other free peoples with such a serious challenge."<sup>40</sup> That the Soviets would use the Communist Party in various parts of the world, including Asia, to embark on military ventures was seen to be a real threat to Canada. Consequently, Canada hoped that Soviet power would be constrained. The DEA wanted the Canadian government to try to convince the Soviets to "come to the conclusion that it would not be in their interest to touch off the third world war."<sup>41</sup> One body through which the DEA could get this message across was the UN. In addition, the UN would be the agency through which the Soviet Union and its satellites and the countries of the free world - those nations that favoured the

establishment of democratic institutions - could seek ways to prevent another global war. However, the DEA discovered between 1945 and 1948 that

the intransigence of the U.S.S.R., its ruthless disregard of the rights of small nations and the freedom of individuals, its deliberate attempt to wreck the social and economic systems of other nations, its use of international agencies, such as the United Nations, for purposes of propaganda rather than for the establishment of international order, and its exploitation of discontented peoples everywhere for its own sinister purposes, have so far prevented any reconciliation between the two camps.

These developments provided the DEA with sufficient evidence "that the preservation of freedom against expanding Soviet communism" was going to be its greatest challenge in the war for the minds of men.<sup>42</sup>

"The fear of aggression by Russian imperialism" was one foundation on which Canadian foreign policy in Western Europe was built.<sup>43</sup> However, in spite of their great fear of Soviet imperialism, DEA officials did not ignore Chinese imperialism and expansionism, which became a concern in 1949 when Mao Tse-tung and his Communist forces defeated the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The enmity the DEA had for Soviet imperialism and expansionism was eventually extended to Mao's China. Since the Soviet Union was going to use the Communist Party throughout the world to enhance its imperialistic ambitions, it was assumed in the DEA that the Soviets would collude with the Chinese.

Policymakers in the DEA also feared that Chinese Communists harboured expansionist goals and that through the efforts and influence

of the Chinese, Communism would spread into Southeast Asia. This fear came about as a result of two factors: Southeast Asia's strategic location between South and East Asia and the abundance of natural resources in the region. The DEA perceived that these two factors made ideal the exploitation of Southeast Asia for military and economic reasons. In addition, Southeast Asia was rife with poverty, and this was a situation Communists could take advantage of to usher in social revolution. There was an additional apprehension that some DEA policymakers entertained, and that was that Communist China might dominate "all Asian communist states" and form "a new Asian alliance - linked neither with the Soviet Union nor the United States."<sup>44</sup> The formation of such an alliance was a disturbing thought because of Communist China's potential impact on the balance of power in the world. When the DEA tried to identify the Asian countries that might form an alliance with China, it discovered that the five most likely countries to do so - Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines - were all located in Southeast Asia. These five countries had a large expatriate Chinese population and many of these Chinese maintained strong ties with Communist China.

The DEA's perspective, including its suspicions, was generally similar to the hard-line anti-Communist views of the United States. However, Canada's attitude towards China and to a degree towards the whole Cold War was differentiated from its southern neighbour's by a widely held alternate viewpoint within the DEA. Victor Odium, a

Canadian ambassador to China from 1943 to 1946, took the position that the Soviets would take advantage of the Communist Party in China to advance the aims of Communism in Asia. On the other hand, Chester Ronning, who also served as a diplomat in China, believed that the Chinese would pursue a course independent of the Soviets. He also felt that even though the Communist Chinese would act independently, Canada should not fear that they would launch attacks on other Asian nations and spread the Communist ideology in Asia. The Chinese were more concerned with tailoring Marxist-Leninist ideology to China's needs. P. G. R. Campbell, another DEA official, said of Mao Tse-tung that he was "a convinced and persuasive Communist theoretician. He was always thought to be a nationalist first of all, however, and in his exposition of Communism, he has made it clear that he is the arbiter of how Communist theory should be made to fit Chinese requirements."<sup>45</sup> Chester Ronning was equally explicit in his evaluation of Mao. To Ronning, Mao was foremost a nationalist who wore the ideological cloak of Communism. Furthermore, the Chinese under Mao would pursue their own brand of nationalism. When it came to the interpretation of Marxist-Leninist principles, the Chinese would interpret and adapt the Marxist doctrine to suit their own needs.<sup>46</sup> To an old China hand such as Ronning, the basic difference between the Soviets and the Chinese lay in their interpretation and application of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism.

From outside the DEA there were voices cautioning Pearson that the Chinese and the Soviets would not work in collusion. Mary Endicott,

wife of the missionary James Endicott, was one of these voices. She reminded Pearson "that Communist parties in different countries act on their own - notably in China."<sup>47</sup> Drawing from her knowledge of Chinese history and culture, she concluded that China would not embark on a course of imperialistic conquest. She took the position that whatever imperialistic ambitions China embarked upon in the past were more of an exception than a rule. China, according to Endicott, was more concerned about internal unity and making its borders secure. Furthermore, of all the Asian Communist parties, the Chinese had the most experience, thus enabling them to pursue an independent course.

The DEA's perception that China was not ready to expand its influence in Asia was set aside by June 1950. With the advent of the Korean war and the intervention of Chinese troops in South Korea, the DEA reminded the rest of the Canadian government not to overlook Communist China's potential as a totalitarian and expansionistic power.<sup>48</sup> However, DEA officials such as Campbell and Ronning did not predict Chinese aggression in Korea. Arthur Menzies, of the Far Eastern Division of the DEA, observed that even though there were doctrinal differences between Chinese and Soviet Communism, the Chinese Communists were capable of spreading their influence throughout Asia.<sup>49</sup> DEA officials also believed, even after the Korean war, that Communist China would not rest until they had captured Formosa. The Chinese nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek resided in Formosa, and DEA officials believed that Mao was determined to preside over a unified China.

Writing from Canada House, London, England, where he was serving as High Commissioner, Norman Robertson warned Pearson in 1954 that Chinese totalitarianism and expansionism was still alive. Robertson expressed his concern about China's demands to force Formosa into the sphere of the Chinese mainland. He also noted that the act of political unification was rife with danger. While in principle the concept of political unification appeared to be expedient, Robertson advised that the situation of China and Formosa was to be regarded as a good example "of the tendencies towards totalitarianism which are the curse of our time." He wanted the policymakers in the DEA to be aware of the fact "that this new orthodoxy of unification everywhere and at all cost runs directly counter to the lesson of our own political experience, whether inside Canada or in our relations with the other countries of the Commonwealth. Judged by what we all agree are the lessons of our own experience, these new trends have a definitely reactionary cast."<sup>50</sup> The western democracies, especially the United States, would have applauded Robertson's point of view because Chiang's regime in Formosa was backed by the United States.

Besides the fear of Soviet and Chinese imperialism, officials in the DEA responded to the issue of western imperialism. Interestingly, they did not react to western imperialism in the same manner as they did to Soviet imperialism. Canada's attitude toward western imperialism - or western colonialism, as the DEA was prone to call it - was more "one of understanding than one of systematic criticism." There were obvious political reasons for this position. The DEA also accepted the argument

that Canadian attitudes towards western colonial matters were "motivated by the desire to consider the problem in its proper perspective."<sup>51</sup> Imperialism was not "visualized exclusively as a typical 'Western' phenomenon" because the Soviets were part of this picture.<sup>52</sup> Since Canada was an ally of Britain, France and the Netherlands, it understood the problems its three allies faced. Canada was also aware that the British, the French and the Dutch were not going to stay in their former colonies forever. The other major reason why Canada was more understanding of Britain, France and the Netherlands was their common membership in NATO. NATO was "based on a certain assessment of the main danger to the peace both in Europe and in the world generally" posed by Soviet aggression.<sup>53</sup> The threat of Soviet aggression had to be checked, and there was no better group to do it than through the alliance of western democratic countries. There was some sympathy among the DEA officials for western colonialism, but there was also a general belief that Britain, France and the Netherlands should give up their colonies. Although DEA officials were less critical of western colonialism, they supported decolonization in their propagation of the gospel of democracy.

### The Heresy of Communism and the Gospel of Democracy

On one front, Canada fought the war for men's minds by expressing its distaste for Soviet and Chinese aggression and expansionism. On another front, Canada through the DEA fought this ideological war by promoting democracy. The sharing of the political privileges and duties

of democracy was the answer to the Communist heresy of shared goods, property and services. In taking this position, officials in the DEA defined democracy as being anti-communist.

If the gospel of democracy was to be preached and practiced, its counterpoint, Communism, had to be exposed as heresy. Communism purported to uphold the rights of individuals, especially those who were exploited by capitalism. Unfortunately, this ideology was promoted by force, and it denied individuals the right to choose their own form of government. Since Communism derived its basic principles from Marxist-Leninist philosophy, it seemed logical to DEA officials to conclude that Communism was heretical. The religious ethos behind democracy emphasized the absolute concepts of good and evil and placed faith in the will of the majority. In addition, DEA officials believed that the implementation and practice of Communist doctrines should be questioned because these doctrines advocated the repression of the individual. Given these perceptions, DEA officials saw the need to win the support of Asian countries in which Communism posed a threat.

Victor Odlum played a part in warning the DEA of the dangers of Chinese Communism, and in doing so he made some questionable evaluations of these dangers. Nevertheless, through his consistent correspondence with Pearson and other DEA policymakers, Odlum reminded them not to overlook the threat that the "democratic forces" of the nationalist Chinese were confronted with. Odlum read a report of a meeting of heads of the divisions of the DEA, held on March 7, 1949, and became unduly



concerned about a comment that "'the prospects for peace negotiations with the Communists had improved'".<sup>54</sup> Writing from Ankara, Turkey, where he was serving as the Canadian ambassador, Odlum remarked to Arthur Menzies: "This surprises me and makes me wonder once again what is the real attitude of the Department of External Affairs towards Communism." He added:

The Government of Canada has joined with other governments, and in particular with those of the United States and Britain, in preparing to fight the forcible expansion of Communism in Europe. At the same time you, an important official in the Department of External Affairs, say that the 'prospects for peace' have improved because the unofficial delegation from National China has had satisfactory conversations with the Communists.<sup>55</sup>

Odlum, unfortunately, misread and misconstrued the report that menzies had written. In his reply to Odlum, Menzies said:

If you will reread the minutes I think you will see that I passed no judgment on political developments in China. I said that 'the prospects for peace negotiations with the Communists had improved during the past week'. By this I meant simply that there was a greater likelihood that peace negotiations would be held. Certainly, it is not to be inferred that I consider 'it is well for China and for the world when the Communists take a new step towards power'.<sup>56</sup>

Odlum was a die-hard anti-Communist and regarded any overture of friendship towards Communist states as taboo. But his concern about "the real attitude of the Department of External Affairs towards Communism" was an important one.<sup>57</sup> It was this question that Pearson and his colleagues in the DEA endeavoured to answer. Some of Pearson's clearest reactions to Communism came in response to the letters he wrote

James Endicott and his family. The Endicotts, who were missionaries in China, were friends of Pearson from his Victoria College days. Since they were adherents of the social gospel, they identified with the plight of the Communists who sought to eradicate corruption and injustice in China. In Pearson's correspondence with the Endicott family, three points on Communism were conspicuous. Communism was characterized by ruthlessness, and it served the interests of totalitarian states. In addition, Communist ideology served primarily the state rather than the welfare of individuals. Pearson also made it known that he distrusted and opposed Communist ideology because of his acquaintance with many individuals "who are moved by a high sense of idealism and a deep determination to aid their fellowmen, and who are used by the communist leaders cynically and unscrupulously for the purpose...of fostering a doctrinaire theory of social revolution."<sup>58</sup> He also held Communism in very low esteem because of "the theory that the end justifies the means." The Communist state did not hesitate to use the tools of internal repression. To Pearson, such a theory resulted in "the most terrible offences against the individual in society."<sup>59</sup> This, Pearson reminded the Endicotts, was true in politics and as well as in religion.

It was not the problems of corruption and injustice which Communism sought to eradicate that concerned Pearson. What was of concern to him were the means Communists used to rid society of economic and social problems. There was a good measure of perplexity in Pearson's mind over the fact that the leaders of the Communist Party in Canada failed to

offer constructive solutions to economic and social problems. In a letter to Mary Endicott he said:

We have, of course, great economic and social problems to solve in Canada, and injustices to remove. It seems to me that in a curious way, the communists, with their insistent attacks upon outworn 19th century conceptions of imperialism and monopoly capitalism, have become the real reactionaries in approaching these problems. The circumstances in which the political vocabulary of the communists was formulated have changed beyond all recognition, and the economic and social problems of our time are new ones which are being dealt with by forces in the community far more progressive than communism with its almost archaic analysis of the structure of society. In spite, however, of the outdated character of most of the comment which communists offer on our problems, I would have expected Canadian communists to make some contribution to the solution of these problems in Canada, were it not for the inescapable conclusion that the leaders of Canadian communism in the last analysis submit themselves to the control of agencies outside the country. By this enslavement the communists in Canada have destroyed any usefulness that they might have had. We must solve our problems on our own initiative and in our own interests. I hope that in solving them we may escape the fate of either part of China or of any country which has fallen under the control of communist leaders. In any event, we must make our own decisions to the best of our ability without becoming involved in the tactics of a campaign for world revolution, especially when those tactics are formulated in quarters close to the foreign office of the U.S.S.R.. 60

The attitude that the DEA officials took towards Communism was generally the position Pearson subscribed to: that Communism was ruthless, it denied the rights of the individual, and it fostered revolution. It was T. C. Davis, Victor Odum's successor in China, who commented that in spite of Canada's opposition to Communism, it did not

have the "fanatical obsession over Communism and Russia" that the United States had.<sup>61</sup> Even though the DEA did not entertain extreme positions, the fear that the Soviets would not renounce their aims to secure world domination was in the minds of many policymakers in Ottawa. These policymakers generally agreed that "there is little in Communist philosophy or Marxist doctrine that would encourage us to believe that the Communist Party ever could renounce its objective of securing the international communist society, or, in the language of real politics, Soviet domination of the entire world."<sup>62</sup> Even the countries of Asia were not safe from the threat of control by the Soviets.

In addition to the revolutionary aims of Communism, External Affairs officials also feared that the forces of democracy in Asia would be overrun by Communism. If Chinese Communism was permitted to spread its influence over South Asia, especially in India, "the whole position of [the]...Commonwealth powers in South East Asia" would be compromised.<sup>63</sup> Here, External officials may have thought of the economic interests of Britain and perhaps of the possibility that war could break out in South Asia. What External wanted was to keep India "safe for democracy" and a strong member of the Commonwealth.

With respect to Southeast Asia, DEA officials sympathized with the British in their war against Chinese Communists, who wanted to establish a government in Malaya based on communist ideology and one free from the taint of colonialism. However, the DEA had a different reaction to

events in Thailand, Malaya's northern neighbour, and expressed willingness to consider supporting its authoritarian but non-Communist government to enable the country "to maintain the integrity of [its] border against the Communists."<sup>64</sup> The goals of the Thai government under Phibun Songkhram were to keep Thailand relatively stable; that is, to keep its other political groups and the military under control and to implement some measure of parliamentary democracy. These goals were encouraging signs to DEA officials, but in spite of these developments, no direct aid came from Canada, although it continued to trade with Thailand.

Burma, too, had an authoritarian government in the immediate post-war period, but DEA officials preferred that the Burmese government and the Karens, an ethnic minority that clamoured for independence, resolve their own political difficulties.<sup>65</sup> Burma's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1948 undoubtedly had a major influence on Canada's decision to allow Burma to solve its own problems. With respect to Indochina, the DEA was willing to consider giving political and economic support "to the Vietnam administration of ex-emperor Bao Dai, provided that the French [were] willing to allow the Vietnam Government a sufficient degree of autonomy."<sup>66</sup> Because of their fear that Communism would overrun South and Southeast Asia, DEA officials were willing to support the British and work within the framework of the Commonwealth, offering political and economic support rather than direct military help.

Political and economic support rather than military aid was also emphasized for East Asia. Canada, for the most part, was willing to back Britain and the United States. In Hong Kong, Britain took the decision "to make...Hong Kong a point of resistance against the spread of Communism from China into South East Asia,"<sup>67</sup> and the DEA assured Britain that it would support the British position in the UN. But when confronted with the situation with respect to Formosa (Taiwan), DEA officials believed the island "should not be regarded as a strong point of resistance against Communism."<sup>68</sup> Formosa received political and economic support from the United States, and it was natural for the Americans to be the guardians of anti-Communism for the Nationalist Chinese. While Formosa would be left in American hands, the DEA was willing to give Korea moral support because of its unstable political and economic position. Just next door to Korea was Japan, which was under the aegis of the Americans, with General Douglas MacArthur in charge. There was not much concern among DEA officials that Communism would become a threat in Japan because democracy would be established. The real threat of Communism, as far as the DEA was concerned, lay in China. Nevertheless, DEA officials did not have a "fanatical obsession" about Communism in China.

Views about the heresy of Communism in China varied among the Canadian diplomats who served in China. Some of the positions taken by these officials were voiced within the context of the debate on Canada's recognition of China. The general position of the DEA was similar to the position taken by the British Foreign Office, which recognized the

Chinese Communist Party as the legal government. Victor Odlum was the only voice in the Canadian diplomatic service who wrote off Mao's regime. He doubted whether the DEA would be able to work with a Communist government in China, despite the uncertainty the DEA had about Chiang Kai-shek's abilities as a leader.<sup>69</sup> During his term as Canadian ambassador to China, Odlum urged the DEA not to deal with the Communist Chinese, since they would shape their national goals within the context of Marxism.

While Odlum was adamant against maintaining relations with Communist China, T.C. Davis took a more moderate position.<sup>70</sup> Initially, in 1948, Davis feared that Communism might be a political disaster for China and that, in addition, China would encourage the spread of Communism into Southeast Asia, where a large overseas Chinese population resided. While he entertained these fears, Davis did not go to the extremes of either deploring the existence of a Communist regime or encouraging the DEA to establish diplomatic relations with Nationalist China. Indeed, after October 1949, he recommended that Canada continue to trade with China in order to help the Chinese fight poverty and raise their standard of living.<sup>71</sup> By helping China resolve its economic difficulties, Canada could prevent it from being isolated in Asia and from becoming the battleground between the Americans and the Soviets in the Cold War. Davis hoped that by taking the moderate position of supporting economic growth in China, Canada could deter the United States from taking military measures to contain China.

While Odlum was antagonistic towards Mao's communist regime and Davis took a moderate stance, Chester Ronning saw the need to be a political realist. As a liberal internationalist and a Canadian nationalist, he recognized that the national interests of Canada were foremost. Ronning was bred and born in China, possessed valuable insights into that country, and maintained close contacts with the Chinese leaders. He agreed with Davis that Canada should be cautious in displaying hostility towards China because of the need to maintain trade relations. When it came to the issue of the recognition of China, Ronning believed that it would only be a matter of time before Canada recognized China.<sup>72</sup> He therefore urged the Canadian government not to postpone recognizing China, since diplomatic relations with China would work to the economic benefit of Canada.

It has been noted that DEA officials did not subscribe to overly virulent anti-Communist views when they discussed the heresy of Chinese Communism. What they tried to do was to prevent Communism from reducing its Asian neighbours to satellites. Consequently, they were determined to prevent Communist ideology from overthrowing the forces of democracy in Asia; thus, Pearson and his colleagues in the DEA cautiously supported nationalism as a counterforce to Communism. In addition, democratic ideals as an alternative to Communism were promoted by Pearson himself. He saw the advantage of promoting democratic ideals because he perceived Communism as "a threat to democracy and the inalienable rights of man" as well as a serious threat to the economic welfare of the Asian peoples.<sup>73</sup>



In seeking ways to promote democracy and thus to prevent Communism from gaining a stronghold in Asia, the DEA in 1949 studied the question of how vulnerable Asia was to Communism. One measure considered to counter the influence of Communism was to encourage the existence of "legitimate nationalism."<sup>74</sup> This term was not defined by the DEA, but perhaps what they had in mind was a nationalism that would not use violent revolution and would support the establishment of democracy rather than subscribe to Communism. The thesis that nationalism should act as a counterforce to Communism became very popular in the wake of China's establishment of a Communist government. Pearson informed Norman Robertson that "this thesis has both merit and force."<sup>75</sup> The use of violent revolution concerned Pearson, since Asia had begun systematically to resist colonial rule, especially the exploitation of its economic resources.

Nationalism, Pearson believed, was the force which led to the establishment of self-government or independence. But independence in turn,

added new problems to old [ones] throughout Asia...[such as] how to come to terms with religious complications...how to reconcile government by consent with ignorance, apathy and obstruction; how to find capital for essential reform; how to provide posts of sufficient status and reward to satisfy those with education; [and] how to deal with students for whom violent political demonstrations had become an easy and accepted alternative to work.<sup>76</sup>

These were some of the problems Pearson and the DEA were aware of, and

they believed that many of them had the potential to cause a revolution.

It became apparent to Pearson and his colleagues in External that nationalism could become a destructive force in Asian society. In China the political leaders had denounced western imperialism for their own ends. Given this stance, the DEA believed it would be advantageous for the western democracies, certainly Canada, to be viewed as the champions of national independence. But nationalism could get out of control, and many of Canada's allies would be put in an awkward position if DEA officials were over enthusiastic in promoting nationalism as a counterforce to Communism. Consequently, DEA officials were cautious and resorted to quiet diplomacy, emphasizing, first of all, the need to understand the Asian mind. The Asian mind, they believed, could provide clues as to what could be done to keep Asia "from being engulfed in the destructive tide of communism."<sup>77</sup> In seeking to understand the Asian mind, DEA officials maintained friendly contacts with the political leaders of Asia and attended international conferences held in Asian countries.

In their contacts with Asian leaders, DEA officials gained one important insight: Asians were desirous to bring about "change in the old economic and social order, which had given them so little in terms of human welfare."<sup>78</sup> Having been afflicted with the ills of colonialism, countries such as India and Pakistan were more concerned about solving their internal problems, for which they needed economic aid. Thus, in 1950 the Colombo Plan became the agency through which

this aid was channelled. To Canadian officials such aid had to be free of the taint of colonialism, and Paul Martin, the Minister of National Health and Welfare, in an address to the Kiwanis Club of Westboro, Ontario, on August 22, 1950, succinctly stated what Canada should do:

[It] must try to extend economic assistance in such a way that it will be most effective and in such a form that it will avoid any suspicion that Western countries, by economic means, are attempting to re-assert the dominance and control which they once exercised over these countries. Asian countries are profoundly opposed to what they regard as Western imperialism.

Martin added that "They have their own national and cultural birthrights which they are not willing to sacrifice in exchange for any amount of assistance from the West."<sup>79</sup> Canada eventually accepted the Colombo Plan as one of the means to help Asians work towards a higher standard of living and achieve a sense of national pride.

However, DEA officials realized that Canada's options for encouraging nationalism as a counterforce to Communism were rather limited and that Communism could not be fought simply by providing material aid. Additional means had to be used. It was Pearson who advocated the use of "intellectual and spiritual weapons"<sup>80</sup> because it was impossible to defeat communism by force. "There was a strong whiff of the old time moralist" in Pearson's attitude towards evil in the war for men's minds,<sup>81</sup> which was evident in Pearson's reaction to the Soviet Union as well as to Communism in Asia. To Pearson the battle between good and evil, between democracy and Communism, was for the convictions of individuals in society. The conflict could be won if

there was "a re-emphasis of those democratic ideals that make our way of life desirable."<sup>82</sup> Moreover, he noted that democratic ideals rather than "our type of Parliamentary democracy" could "establish the conditions of law and order, freedom and prosperity."<sup>83</sup> Pearson was not disparaging Canadian parliamentary democracy; rather, he left it open for Asian nations to adapt democracy to their own political, social and economic needs.

Pearson expressed these ideas in his book Democracy In World Politics. Although he advocated the establishment of democratic ideals long before the book was published in 1955, "the book reveals the temper of his mind."<sup>84</sup> Pearson underscored the need for the establishment of democratic ideals in the world because of the threat of nuclear war. In a letter to Pearson Robert Kertson, a Torontonionian, said of the book:

I was pleased to read in your recent book ... that material help is by no means the only way to combat communist imperialism in Asia -- or any part of the world, for that matter, but that all our intellectual powers must also be used. This was elegantly stated in your sentence: "... it is a basic plank of Communist propaganda throughout Asia -- that the West has nothing to offer but technology; no philosophy, merely plumbing; Coca-Cola for Confucius!"<sup>85</sup>

To Pearson, it was emphasis on democratic ideals and not on a philosophy or a world religion such as Christianity that was the answer to Communism. He doubted "whether organized Christianity [could] measure up to the task of unifying the people of the world." Another observation Pearson made was "that while Christianity has spread good tidings far and wide, it has on occasion caused strife and intolerance.

Christians have fought each other. Its missionary zeal has been commendable yet it has often led to contempt for the religions of other people."<sup>86</sup> The "exclusive zeal" of Christianity was not the weapon to be used to combat Communism. The answer was to be found in upholding democratic ideals.

One of Pearson's colleagues made a pertinent observation about the temper of Pearson's mind. Douglas LePan observed that Pearson "carried into diplomacy and into political life the moral fervour of his Methodist upbringing."<sup>87</sup> In turning to democracy rather than Christianity as the answer to the heresy of Communism, Pearson became a secular social gossamer in his own right. He agreed that the state would furnish the secular missionaries with the means to help battle Communist ideology. This turn towards democracy as a "religion" to combat Communism came after World War II, when atomic war was a grave reality. "In a period of cynicism and disillusionment", Pearson, like his colleague Escott Reid, "sought to apply the principles of democracy to international relations." Pearson "never ceased to believe that the foundation of democracy is faith in the capabilities of human nature and the freedom of the individual."<sup>88</sup>

Pearson often contrasted freedom and liberty with totalitarianism when he talked about democracy. In a free society, "man has rights and duties above and beyond the states and governments which have been created by him in order to protect his freedom and security under law and justice."<sup>89</sup> In espousing such a view, Pearson echoed the Lockean

definition of liberty. He noted that in a totalitarian state "the citizen is the mere servant of the state...."<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, "the individual is nothing but a mere cog in an inhuman machine, where there is no rule of law, and where the omnipotent state moulds the man into conformity with the mass, and if he will not so conform, crushes him."<sup>91</sup> In an address delivered at the University of Rochester in 1947, Pearson said that the division in the world between democracy and totalitarianism was "the greatest menace to peace."<sup>92</sup> He did not hesitate to say that the answer to the problem lay in making democracy "so demonstrably better than [totalitarianism], that the realization of its superiority will penetrate even the most powerful of curtains." Thus, democracy was "the new creed of life and hope and progress."<sup>93</sup> In advocating this new creed, especially after the disaster of World War II, Canada established its reputation as a defender of western democracy throughout the world.

Although Pearson emphasized the importance of individual liberty and freedom, he did not find a definition of democracy that was satisfactory. On the one hand, democracy meant anti-Communism, but on the other hand, there was one term which Pearson preferred that summarized for him "the essential principle of democracy,"<sup>94</sup> and that was responsible government. Responsible government was of paramount importance because it meant self-government. It was in this area that Canada was a pioneer and set an example for the Commonwealth with Confederation in 1867. It was the identification of decolonization with self-government that enabled DEA officials to support that process in Asia.

### The Support for Decolonization

In its support for decolonization, Canada subscribed to another means of fighting the war for men's minds. After the Second World War, the world witnessed two major events: the Cold War and decolonization of most of the world's dependent territories.<sup>95</sup> The boundaries of the Cold War, which were drawn by the Americans and British to halt the expansion of the Soviet Union in Europe, were eventually extended into Asia to contain Chinese Communism. Decolonization meant "the breakup of the old colonial empires"<sup>96</sup> and the achievement of self-government or independence by the former colonial territories of Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States. "The rise of nationalism and the weakness of the European colonial powers combined at the end of World War II to destroy a colonial system that had been an established feature of world politics for centuries."<sup>97</sup> Even though the impetus for decolonization occurred just after World War I, when President Woodrow Wilson of the United States espoused self-determination, decolonization materialized as a major movement principally after 1945.

Canada did not possess colonies, but because of its participation in the Cold War, Canadian DEA officials did not isolate the process of decolonization from the Cold War, a fact which was evident in Canada's diplomatic contacts with the Americans, British, Dutch, French, and in their opposition to Communist expansionism.<sup>98</sup> Colonies that sought independence in Asia, according to Canada, should be prevented from falling under the influence of Soviet and Chinese Communism. The

Soviets and Chinese were not to be given the edge in the Cold War since they, too, pressed for decolonization. It was within this historical context that the DEA subscribed to the process of decolonization, believing that it was through decolonization that responsible government would be achieved.

The officials in the DEA identified decolonization in Asia with the "Canadian experience;"<sup>99</sup> Canada had after sharp political struggles, created a Confederation of the disparate colonies that had been under British administration from 1763 to 1867. It was not until 1867 that internal self-government was achieved. Having achieved independence from Britain "in comparatively recent times, Canadians properly sympathize[d] with the ambitions and achievements of...Asian countries."<sup>100</sup> On the one hand, the DEA readily identified with the colonies - India, Pakistan and Ceylon - which eventually became part of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, close ties were maintained with Britain, the Netherlands, and France. Consequently, the DEA was "in a good position to understand the objectives and policies which they pursue[d] in the administration of their dependent territories."<sup>101</sup> Through these diplomatic relations, DEA officials were able to influence the British and the Dutch to grant their colonies independence. Canada itself did not want colonialism to be prolonged.<sup>102</sup>

As a member of the Commonwealth, Canada took some credit in influencing the achievement of self-government in India and



Pakistan.<sup>103</sup> India's drive toward independence was supported by Canada, and DEA officials worked to keep India within the Commonwealth, although it must be noted that this effort was principally a British initiative. As early as 1940, the British government tried to interest the Canadian government in exchanging high commissioners between Canada and India when India was ready to become independent. Vincent Massey conveyed the message from the British government to Mackenzie King that the exchange of diplomatic representatives "would demonstrate to [India] the true nature of the modern British Commonwealth, and it would also gratify Indian pride."<sup>104</sup> No decision was made on this issue until 1942; however, Mackenzie King and his cabinet approved in principle the appointment of a high commissioner. There was further delay because of World War II. Mackenzie King, reluctant to allow Canada to participate in the Asian theatre of the war, did not want to make a final decision until the war was over.

The DEA acknowledged that India was the brightest jewel in the British Crown and with the achievement of independence, it would become an important part of the new Commonwealth. Geographically, India's position was important because it was situated close to the Soviet Union and China. To DEA officials, it would be disastrous for India to fall under the influence of the Soviets. To get rid of colonialism and then come under the influence of Soviet imperialism would be "pointless". Canada, a senior member of the Commonwealth, wanted India to play an influential role in the Commonwealth. "India's decision in 1949 to

become a republic" was regretted by Canada; however, Canada "welcomed India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth."<sup>105</sup>

India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth was taken primarily by Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister, but Canada gave the strongest encouragement by another nation for India to do so. During the early period of the Cold War, from 1947 to 1948, DEA officials believed that India would play an increasing and effective role in Asian affairs and would thus make a difference in the battle between Communism and democracy. When Nehru attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1949, he underscored the fact that India had chosen the path toward democracy in spite of the threats it faced. "Free democracy as it obtained in the United Kingdom," he said, "was a form of government worthy of imitation. All the peoples of the world should be able to see that it was infinitely preferable to the regime established by the Soviet Government." Nehru added further that "Democracy was...threatened at the present time from two directions -- first, by a direct onslaught by communism; and secondly, by an internal weakening, largely due to unfavourable economic conditions."<sup>106</sup> Officials in External Affairs agreed wholeheartedly with Nehru's view.

Besides not wanting India to fall under Soviet influence, Canada did not want the Soviets to take the lead in encouraging decolonization. The Soviets, working from a Marxist perspective, were systematic in their attacks on western imperialism. With little difficulty, they could catalogue the exploitation by capitalists. To the Soviets

economic inequalities and racial inequalities were a consequence of western imperialism. In a memorandum to Hume Wrong, Escott Reid noted that the Soviets sought "to demonstrate that they [were] the defenders throughout the world of the rights of labour, of colonial peoples and of small nations."<sup>107</sup> He believed that since "the Russians do not practice racial discrimination," it was important to decolonize, giving former colonies self-government and removing discriminatory racial policies." This "advocacy of decolonization appears to have been directed at the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Belgium."<sup>108</sup> Of the five countries, only Belgium did not have a colonial territory in Asia.

In spite of the position Reid took, DEA officials had to deal with the question of "how far Canada can wisely and usefully go in supporting international action to promote freedom for colonial peoples and the abolition of racial inequalities."<sup>109</sup> While this question could not be readily answered, the DEA knew that the place to achieve some of its goals in decolonization was in the United Nations since the UN was the recognized forum for the discussion of international issues.<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, Canada had the support of the United States and other western democracies, which also wanted to prevent the Soviets from being the sole advocates of decolonization. Incidentally, the UN Charter of June 1945 "sounded the death-knell of the old colonial system, though it was not heard by all nations."<sup>111</sup> The Charter called for colonialism to be dismantled, but countries such as France and the Netherlands ignored the call for self-determination in Indochina and

Indonesia. It was in the UN that Canada helped its western allies "preach [their] own gospel and attack the heresies of the Soviet world."<sup>112</sup> Success could be achieved through good deeds, and one of the deeds was to "press for a rapid realization of the ideal of independence for non-self governing peoples."<sup>113</sup>

Canadian DEA officials moved quite freely in advocating decolonization at the UN for two further reasons. First, Canada did not possess colonial territories, and it did not contradict or oppose United States policy.<sup>114</sup> The United States had granted the Philippines independence in 1946, and it was now in an advantageous position to oppose the continued existence of colonialism. Second, Canadian DEA officials could count on the support of the United States and thus proceed confidently in promoting decolonization at the UN. Consequently, Canada proceeded to advocate decolonization and took an immediate interest in Kashmir and Indonesia. The Kashmir crisis between India and Pakistan and the Dutch-Indonesian dispute have been viewed as examples of "mediatory diplomacy,"<sup>115</sup> but the fundamental issue involved the preservation of self-determination in Kashmir and Indonesia, and the prevention of these two states' falling under the influence of the Soviet Union.

The issue in Kashmir resulted from the religious and political differences that arose between India and Pakistan in the wake of the achievement of independence from Britain. It involved the partition of the states of Jammu and Kashmir in North-West India. Jammu is

predominantly Hindu and Kashmir is mainly Moslem, but the Maharaja of Kashmir, a Hindu, declared Kashmir part of India rather than Pakistan.<sup>116</sup> The issue became much more difficult to resolve because Nehru, who wanted both states to be part of a united India, was a Kashmirian. In addition, India did not regard Pakistan "as having equal status with India in the dispute."<sup>117</sup> It was this point that Pakistan put forth so eloquently to the UN Security Council, presided over by General A. G. L. McNaughton, the Canadian soldier in diplomacy.<sup>118</sup>

In the Kashmir issue, what appeared contradictory to Canada and the other western democracies was that India, which had successfully rid itself of the shackles of British imperialism, was reluctant to permit Kashmir to exercise the right of self-government. The Kashmir issue was debated before the United Nations in February 1948. Since India was apprehensive that it might lose its case, it eventually requested that the Security Council adjourn the debate on Kashmir for a month in order to give its diplomats more time to discuss the problem. Pakistan obviously objected to adjournment. Meanwhile, India reflected on a set of proposals by Belgium and Canada which

called for (a) a peaceful settlement of the dispute about the Principality of Kashmir; (b) a cessation of hostilities in this region; and (c) both India and Pakistan to lend themselves to 'joint action', which included a plebiscite under Security Council supervision to decide whether the population of Kashmir wished to join India or Pakistan.<sup>119</sup>

The proposal was an attempt to bring an end to the stalemate in this dispute.

The plebiscite that was to be held in 1954 to determine the fate of Kashmir never materialized. Three years later, in 1957, when Escott Reid left India as the Canadian ambassador, the problem over Kashmir remained unsolved. A frustrated Reid remarked "that on balance Indian foreign policy had been a failure since India had failed to achieve the most important goal of any realistic Indian foreign policy, the establishment of good relations with Pakistan."<sup>120</sup> In essence, the dispute between India and Pakistan was a battle between the legal and moral perspectives on territorial claims. "The Indians claimed that the head of state had the legal right to decide which way Kashmir was to go, whereas the Pakistanis agreed that the overriding issue was a moral one: what did the people of Kashmir want?"<sup>121</sup> Kashmirians had a right to self-determination, and what they desired did not materialize.

The second instance of decolonization in which Canada took an interest was with respect to Indonesia. Canadian interests in and relations with Indonesia before 1945 were minimal, but on October 9, 1945, the Canadian government granted a loan of \$15 million to the government of the Netherlands East Indies.<sup>122</sup> Indonesia was still under Dutch rule, but just after the war Indonesian nationalists, under the leadership of President Sukarno, pushed for independence from the Dutch. The handwriting was on the wall for Dutch colonialism, and the Dutch "grudgingly recognized the inevitable."<sup>123</sup> With President Sukarno on the verge of taking over from the Dutch, the question arose as to which government, the Dutch or the Indonesian republican government, was obliged to pay back the loan. The three parties

involved eventually agreed that the loan would be the obligation of the new Indonesian government.

Between 1945 and 1949, Indonesia underwent a period of turmoil. The Dutch were reluctant to relinquish their colonial power, and the Indonesians were doubly eager to get rid of their colonial masters. On November 15, 1947, both sides concluded the Linggajati Agreement, hoping to bring about a smoother transition of power. The major political and constitutional issue that was discussed and accepted was the Indonesian right to self-determination. The Dutch extended internal self-government to the Indonesians, but unfortunately the control of foreign affairs remained under Dutch jurisdiction. This settlement proved unsatisfactory, and both sides even violated the truce that was part of the agreement. The Dutch added insult to injury when they embarked on "police action" against the Indonesians. At this juncture, through the influence of Australia and India,<sup>124</sup> the UN Security Council offered its Committee of Good Offices (CGO) to arrange a ceasefire and to encourage the Dutch and Indonesians to settle their differences.<sup>125</sup> On January 17, 1948, the Renville Agreement was accented. A truce was called and the Dutch were given sovereignty over Indonesia until it could be determined whether there was a united front among Indonesians to form a government. The Renville Agreement, like the Linggajati Agreement, was a failure. The Dutch embarked on further "police action" and imprisoned Sukarno and the other leaders of his government. The UN Committee for Indonesia, surprised by the Dutch action, called for a settlement to the dispute.

It was during this same period, between 1945 and 1949, that two DEA officials, Pierre Dupuy and General A. G. L. McNaughton, had a direct role in the dispute over decolonization in Indonesia. Of the two, McNaughton's was more significant. Dupuy served as Canadian ambassador to the Netherlands from 1945 to 1952. He had access to the court of Queen Wilhelmina and the Queen herself had contact with the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. The result of Dupuy's access to the Court was that he was kept informed of the Dutch reaction to decolonization. General McNaughton, the second Canadian involved in the decolonization question, was president of the UN Security Council from 1948 to 1949. "McNaughton was the ideal man for the job, not only because of his record as president of the Security Council but also because he had commanded Canadian forces; since the Netherlands had been liberated by Canadians, the Dutch trusted him and were willing to listen to his advice."<sup>126</sup>

General McNaughton took an active part in endeavouring to bring about a settlement in Indonesia. He put forth a Canadian resolution which called for a UN-sponsored Round Table conference.<sup>127</sup> George Ignatieff, an External Affairs official, noted that

it was [McNaughton] who organized the conference at The Hague at which the Indonesian nationalists under Sukarno and the government of the Netherlands worked out a cease-fire which ended the civil war and led to a more or less orderly hand-over of the reins of government.... [T]he Dutch knew by then that their situation in Indonesia was hopeless, because there was such a well-organized, popular movement for independence and the Americans had made it perfectly clear that they had no intention of backing the colonial claims of European countries, in the Pacific or anywhere else.



Ignatieff added that "what was required was some international initiative which would enable the Dutch to accept the inevitable without making it appear they they were being driven out of Indonesia."<sup>128</sup> This McNaughton kept in mind, hoping that the solution arrived at would become the basis for settling similar problems with decolonization.

As Canadian officials sought to help Indonesia preserve "the principles of free democracy,"<sup>129</sup> two areas of concern arose over how Canada would treat the Dutch. Both had to do with the efforts of Dupuy and McNaughton. Dupuy maintained close contact with principal members of the Netherlands government and informed the DEA of the progress on developments in Indonesia. One report that Dupuy sent back to Ottawa worried the DEA officials, who saw danger in siding too closely with the Dutch. "Indonesia," Dupuy observed in 1948, "is still in a state of reconstruction and possesses neither sufficient equipment nor experience to maintain its place in the world."<sup>130</sup> He also reported that the Dutch had the military potential to suppress the Indonesians.<sup>131</sup> From their perspective, officials in the DEA were concerned that Dupuy was rather sympathetic to the Dutch and suffered from 'localitis'.<sup>132</sup> The officials wanted Dupuy to remain neutral in his reporting, and they did not want to give the Dutch the impression that Canada would invariably take their side in the Security Council. This was also McNaughton's concern. The Dutch "might expect to have tacit support of the Canadian delegate to the Security Council or of the Canadian Government if they were to embark on another 'police' action."<sup>133</sup> The use of military force against the Indonesians was the last thing the DEA officials

wanted. They hoped that the Dutch would take a moderate position in dealing with the Indonesians and abandon any remaining colonial ambitions.<sup>134</sup> It can be said that "Canadian policy [was] based on a desire to balance long-standing friendships with the Netherlands and understanding of the problems facing the Dutch Government, with sympathy for the legitimate aspirations of Indonesian nationalism."<sup>135</sup> This was a difficult balancing act, but the Canadian officials were able to walk the diplomatic tightrope.

A compromise was reached at The Hague on March 23, 1949 "as a result of [the] Canadian initiative."<sup>136</sup> It called for the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesians. "Viewed in perspective this compromise proposal may be regarded as one of the vital turning points in the settlement of the Indonesian problem."<sup>137</sup> On December 27, 1949, Canada granted official recognition to the Sukarno regime. As a result of the Canadian efforts at the UN Security Council and its support for Indonesian self-determination, Canada earned "a special position of prestige" among the leaders of the Indonesian government,<sup>138</sup> which proved to be advantageous when Canada opened up trade and diplomatic relations with Indonesia.<sup>139</sup>

The war for the minds of men that grew out of the Cold War was first fought in Europe and later in Asia. The battle between good and evil, between democracy and Communism, consequently became the principal pillar of Canadian foreign policy in Asia. Officials in External Affairs gave Canada's position added support by subscribing to the

tenets of liberal internationalism. What eventually resulted was that from the Canadian perspective, democracy and decolonization came to be defined as anti-Communism. In perceiving democracy and decolonization as the antithesis of Communism, officials in External Affairs did not ignore their ideal form of democracy, which was responsible government.

However, External Affairs slowly recognized that although ideology was an effective force in the formation of foreign policy, it was not predominant and in fact had its own limitations. If the war for men's minds was to be victorious, it would be because the DEA used practical means to fight it. Officials in External Affairs recognized that doctrine had to be applied to practical situations. In so doing, these officials gave credence to the notion that ideas can be translated into actions.

The need to be practical became evident in Canada's approach to Communism in China and the decolonization process in India and Indonesia. Before the Second World War, Canada maintained diplomatic relations with China, and it wanted to maintain this continuity after the war. It did maintain relations for a few years, but the rising tide of Communism in 1949 prevented Canada from establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. While the secular missionaries in External did not subscribe to the revolutionary goals of Communism, they identified with the Chinese Communist aims to improve the social welfare of their citizens and to eliminate corruption. In addition, External officials were willing to go even further and

encourage the establishment of legitimate nationalism in China. This resulted because the Asian specialists in the DEA, especially the China hands, did not have an over-riding opposition to Communism, as their counterparts in the United States did.

It was in their reaction to western imperialism that DEA officials also recognized that ideology had its limitations. While they did not find difficulty rejecting the heresy of Soviet and Chinese imperialism, they were sympathetic towards western imperialism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization made the difference in this situation. Canada was an ally of Britain, France, and the Netherlands in this defence alliance. When it came to decolonization, External officials were not in a position to be over-critical of allies that possessed overseas colonies. Here, Canada maintained a balance between accepting the reality of its allies' colonies and supporting the pursuit of independence by its newfound friends in Asia. Consequently, Canadian involvement in decolonization was at best indirect but nevertheless evident in Canada's endeavour to prevent small crises from turning into larger ones.

Overall, the majority of External Affairs officials were firm but not fanatical in their ideological positions. Adhering to a doctrine of good and evil was one thing and practical application of the doctrine was another. In the formation of foreign policy, DEA officials could neither ignore the role of self-interest nor relegate it to a secondary place. This need to be realistic was foremost in the minds of Canadian officials as they upheld the doctrine of material self-help.

### Notes to Chapter One

1. NAC, Escott Reid Papers, MG 31, E 46, folder 14, D. V. LePan, SSEA Memoranda, telegrams, letters, etc., February 1, 1951 - March 31, 1951. See L. B. Pearson's speech on "Preparedness and Canada's External Policy." The Gouzenko affair made the relations between Canada and the Soviet Union uneasy. Igor Gouzenko was a cipher clerk at the Soviet Legation in Ottawa. He defected in 1945 and revealed that there were Canadians in the government who spied for the Soviets. See J. L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-68 (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1981), pp. 168 - 82. See also Smith, The Diplomacy of Fear, pp. 129 - 136.
2. Smith, The Diplomacy of Fear, p. 227.
3. Reg Whitaker, "What Is The Cold War About And Why Is It Still With Us?," Studies in Political Economy 19 (Spring 1986), pp. 8 - 9.
4. Smith, The Diplomacy of Fear, p. 219
5. NAC, Department of External Affairs Records, RG 25, G 2, vol. 86-87/160, box 143, file 5296-A-1-40, pt. 1, "Canadian Foreign Policy," talks by Escott Reid at Camp Borden and at the Modern History Club at the University of Toronto, November 5, 1951, pp. 1 - 2.
6. The University Hill Citizens' Forum in Vancouver, B.C., under the chairmanship of Lex McKillop, was a group that supported Pearson and the DEA in "the struggle for men's minds". They believed "that Communism wins the struggle for men's minds wherever the peoples concerned suffer from: (a) economic distress and (b) a feeling of inferiority." They also noted that the West "must demonstrate its willingness to grant an increasing measure of political autonomy in colonial areas. We should also assist economic autonomy wherever necessary to provide them with a fair share of their country's resources. The present programme of helping others to help themselves should be expanded because the West has a moral obligation to alleviate the material inequalities now existing." See NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 40., Lex McKillop to L. B. Pearson, December 4, 1953.
7. English, Shadow of Heaven, p. 269.
8. Reid, Radical Mandarin, pp. 85 - 86.
9. Ross, In the Interests of Peace, p. 12.
10. Ibid., pp. 10 - 12.
11. J. L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935 - 1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. xi; See also English, Shadow of Heaven, p. 143.

12. D. C. Masters, Canada in World Affairs: 1953 to 1955 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 6.
13. English, Shadow of Heaven, p. 294.
14. Ibid., p. 93.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 94
17. Ibid.
18. Masters, Canada in World Affairs: 1953 to 1955, p. 7.
19. Ibid.
20. See Klaus H. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across The Pacific: The Development of Economic and Political Relations Between Canada and Japan (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 104. See also Charles Taylor, Six Journeys: A Canadian Pattern (Toronto, 1977), pp. 109 - 110. John W. Holmes, interview, Toronto, June 15, 1988. R. C. Bryce, interview, Ottawa, May 30, 1989. Bryce noted that the "missionary kids" were very influential in the Department of External Affairs. Herbert Norman came from a Christian background, but he was more secular than religious and not as fervent in his practice of Christian beliefs.
21. Arthur Menzies, interview, Ottawa, May 22, 1989; R. B. Bryce, interview, Ottawa, May 30, 1989.
22. Escott Reid, interview, Ste Cecile de Masham, June 4, 1989.
23. Ross, In the Interests of Peace, p. 19.
24. Ibid., pp. 19 - 20. Men like Menzies, Norman and Ronning identified with Asian nationalism, unlike some of their counterparts in the U.S. State Department. Norman and Ronning can be classified in the left-liberal group of Ross' paradigm of policymakers, (see Introduction, note 19). They held on to their leftist views because of their belief in social justice. Such views found fertile ground in Canada, but would be seen as being too socialistic for American society. This writer concurs with Ross' and Beecroft's classification of Canadian policymakers.
25. Masters, Canada In World Affairs: 1953 to 1955, p. 8.
26. Louis St Laurent, "The Commonwealth and the World Today," Department of External Affairs. Statements and Speeches, 51/1, 1951, p. 5. (Hereafter referred to as S/S).

27. George Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemaker: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 115.
28. Dale C. Thomson, "The Political Ideas of Louis St Laurent," in Marcel Hamelin, ed., The Political Ideas of the Prime Ministers (Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, 1969), p. 151.
29. NAC, MG 26, L, vol. 345, L. B. Pearson. "Challenge to Freedom", Saskatoon Star - Phoenix, July 21, 1947. See also Daniel F. Harrington, "As Others Saw Us : A Canadian View of U. S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1947," Diplomatic History 7:3 (Summer 1983), pp. 239 - 244. He noted that officers in External Affairs, such as Escott Reid, Hume Wright and Hume Wrong, watched United States policy toward the Soviet Union very carefully. Harrington said: "Welcoming American power as a counterweight to that of the Soviet Union, they doubted that the United States could apply that power wisely. While praising the professed goals of U. S. policy, the document expresses deep concern about the ability of the United States to provide sound, steady leadership. It describes a nation transfixed by communism, hampered by a ramshackle governmental structure, ignorant of history, inexperienced in world affairs, and incapable of appreciating either the culture or point of view of other nations." p. 239.
30. Geoffrey Pearson, interview, Ottawa, May 23, 1989. For a brief discussion on the place of morality in foreign affairs, see Otto Pick and Julian Critchley, Collective Security, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974), pp. 60 - 62. They noted that "When complicated politico-strategic matters become items of public controversy they are often translated into ethics." p. 60. See also Percy E. Corbett, Morals, Law, & Power in International Relations (Los Angeles: The John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation, 1956), chapter 1. Corbett "developed the thesis that moral principles, adapted to the special setting of international relations, play a real though limited part in determining the foreign policy of States, and that any analysis of world politics that denies or ignores this gives a distorted and unrealistic account." p. 49. See also Escott Reid, "The Conscience of the Diplomat: A Personal Testament," Queen's Quarterly 74:4 (Winter 1967), pp. 574 - 592. Reid defined moral action as the wisest course of action an official can take. He noted that it was "his responsibility to take the fullest possible advantage of the opportunities which his position as a diplomat gives him to increase the chances of his government pursuing with vigour and intelligence a wise foreign policy on various issues, large or small, as they come up." p. 585.
31. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 5, file 8, Foreign Affairs - United Nations; See also Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p. 248.

32. NAC, L. B. Pearson Papers, MG 26, N 1, vol. 22, "Survey of Present Strategic Situation," December 29, 1949, p. 2.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p. 3.
35. NAC, Douglas LePan Papers, MG 31, E 6, D. V. LePan, folder 14, L. B. Pearson, "Preparedness and Canada's External Policy," pp. 1 - 2.
36. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 9, file 26, see Appendix VIII, "Communism," p. 44.
37. NAC, MG 31, E 6, D. V. LePan, folder 14, L. B. Pearson, "Preparedness...", p. 2.
38. Ibid., p. 5.
39. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 6, file 11, Escott Reid, "The Free World's Approach To The Sixties," (revised draft), October 3, 1961.
40. NAC, MG 31, E 6, D. V. LePan, folder 14, L. B. Pearson, "Preparedness...", p. 2.
41. Ibid., p. 7.
42. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 22 "Survey...", p. 1.
43. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 7, file 15, Foreign Affairs Conferences, Colombo Conferences, 1950, vol. 1., Escott Reid, "Colombo Conference Notes," January 9, 1950.
44. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 7, file 16, Escott Reid, "The Balance of Power, 1953 - 1957," January 26, 1953.
45. NAC, RG 25, vol. 2138, China, pt. 1, Minute Sheet, February 21, 1951.
46. Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, External Affairs Files (hereafter DEA Files), file 50055-B-40, vol. 10. Chester Ronning and Herbert Norman were not hard-line anti-Communists.
47. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 4, Mary Endicott to L. B. Pearson, May 22, 1951.
48. Department of External Affairs, External Affairs 3:2 (February 1951), "Basis of Canadian Far Eastern Policy," Excerpts from a statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made in the House of Commons on February 2, 1951, pp. 39, 44.
49. DEA Files, file 50055-B-40, vol. 10.



50. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 13, N. A. Robertson to L. B. Pearson, September 2, 1954. Most English Canadians supported the presuppositions upon which the British Empire was built. See Carl Berger, The Sense of Power, for an analysis of the foundation upon which English Canadians built their support for imperialism.
51. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 34, Visit of Mr. Nehru to Ottawa. "Colonialism and Anti-Colonialism in the United Nations," December 14, 1956, p. 1.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid, p. 2.
54. NAC, Victor W. Odlum Papers, MG 30, E 300, vol. 9., Victor Odlum to Arthur Menzies, March 29, 1949. See Kim Richard Nossal, "Chunking prism : Cognitive process and intelligence failure," International Journal 32:3 (Summer 1977), pp. 559 - 576. Nossal questioned the assessments made by Odlum and viewed them as erroneous. Nossal noted that Odlum "thought wishfully" and that the General's interpretation on China was a reinterpretation of information that painted a positive picture of China under the Kuomintang. p. 569. Odlum thus suffered from 'localitis'. See also Nossal, "Strange Bedfellows: Canada and China in War and Revolution 1942 - 1947," Ph. D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1977.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., A. R. Menzies to Major General V. W. Odlum, April 22, 1949.
57. NAC, MG 30, E 300, vol. 9., Victor Odlum to Arthur Menzies, March 29, 1949.
58. NAC, MG 30, C 300, vol. 58, file 1218, L. B. Pearson to Mary Endicott, August 5, 1949.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 1., T. C. Davis to Arthur Menzies, March 9, 1949. T. C. Davis was more of an original thinker than Victor Odlum, who thought in military and strategic terms. Arthur Menzies, interview, Ottawa, May 22, 1989.
62. B. S. Keirstead, Canada In World Affairs: September 1951 to October 1953 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 12. See also p. 18.

63. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 22, "Survey of Present Strategic Situation," December 29, 1949, p. 21. There was also the fear that the position of the North Atlantic would be jeopardized by the spread of Communism into South Asia (India, Pakistan and Ceylon).
64. Ibid., p. 26.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., p. 25.
68. Ibid., p. 24.
69. NAC, MG 30, E 300, vol. 9, Victor Odlum to Arthur Menzies, December 13, 1948.
70. Davis initially believed that a Communist leadership for China would be a "drop back into the dark ages", see NAC, MG 30, E 300, vol. 3, T. C. Davis to Major General Victor W. Odlum, February 5, 1948.
71. DEA Files, file 50055-B-40, vol. 2, memorandum for Mr. Heeney, "Some notes on Mr. Davis' talk on China," October 27, 1949. p. 2.
72. DEA Files, file 50393-40, vol. 2, despatch No. 116, T. C. Davis to SSEA, July 27, 1949. See also Chester Ronning, A Memoir of China In Revolution: From the Boxer Rebellion to the People's Republic (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 172.
73. DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 1.
74. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 22, "Survey of Present Strategic Situation," December 29, 1949, p. 23.
75. DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 1, SSEA to High Commissioner for Canada, United Kingdom, January 3, 1950.
76. Christopher Thorne, Ideology and Power: Studies in Major Ideas and Events of the Twentieth Century (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1965), p. 189.
77. DEA, External Affairs 2:9 (September 1950), p. 327.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 328.
80. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 49, Toronto Daily Star, February 5, 1952; See also L. B. Pearson, Democracy in World Politics (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited, 1955), pp. 5, 86.

81. This quotation is taken from John English, Shadow of Heaven, p. 269. He gives credit to Reg Whitaker, "The Myth of Liberal Internationalism," paper presented to the Canadian Historical Association Annual Meeting, Winnipeg, 1986, p. 379.
82. NAC, MG 26, L, vol. 348, Quebec Chronicle - Telegraph, December 1, 1955.
83. L. B. Pearson, "The Far Eastern Situation," S/S, 55/10, p. 4.
84. Pearson's book was reviewed in the Ottawa Citizen, November 12, 1955, by Ronald Crantham, see NAC, MG 26, L, vol. 348. "Arnold Smith wrote Democracy in World Politics. Pearson changed one word." My thanks to Dr. John English for this insight.
85. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 67, Robert L. Kertson to L. B. Pearson, November 15, 1955.
86. NAC, MG 26, L, vol. 348, The London Free Press, August 20, 1955. In the Ottawa Citizen, August 20, 1955 Pearson's comments on Christianity were criticized by Dr. W. A. Cameron, Acting General Secretary of the Canadian Council of Churches. He said that "Mr. Pearson seems to be a prophet of gloom with a defeatist attitude."
87. LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, p. 163.
88. Alice K. Young, "Escott Reid as Cold Warrior?: A Canadian Diplomat's Reflections on the Soviet Union," in J. L. Black and Norman Hillmer ed., Nearly Neighbours, Canada and the Soviet Union: From Cold War to Detente and Beyond (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1989), p. 40.
89. Pearson. Democracy in World Politics, p. 80.
90. Ibid.
91. NAC, MG 26, L, vol. 345, Saskatoon Star - Pheonix, July 21, 1947.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid. See NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 49, The Ottawa Journal, September 20, 1948. In a speech delivered to the Canadian Teachers Federation in September 1948, Pearson settled on an informal definition of democracy which he found in the New Yorker: "It is the line that forms on the right. It is the 'don't' in 'Don't Shove'. It is the hole in the stuffed shirt through which the sawdust slowly trickles; it is the dent in the high hat. Democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than half of the time. It is the feeling of privacy in the voting booths, the feeling of communion in the libraries, the feeling of vitality everywhere."
94. Pearson, Democracy in World Politics, pp. 107 and 81.

95. M. E. Chamberlain in Decolonization: The Fall of the European Empires (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), noted that "Decolonization is a recent word. It only came into general use in the 1950s and 1960s, although it seems to have been coined in 1932 by a German scholar, Moritz Julius Bonn.... Nowadays it is commonly understood to mean the process by which the peoples of the Third World gained their independence from their colonial rulers." p. 1. A thorough study on the reactions of Canadian intellectuals toward decolonization has yet to be written, but see Paul Clay Sorum, Intellectuals and Decolonization in France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977).
96. George C. Herring, "The Vietnam War," in George C. Herring and John M. Carroll, eds., Modern American Diplomacy (Willington, Delaware: S R Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1986), p. 166.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 68, L. B. Pearson, Visit to U.S.S.R., Asia, Egypt, Tour Diary, September 30 - November 15, 1955, p. 47. Before 1945, Hume Wrong noted that Canada was not interested in assuming colonial responsibilities because it had its "own colonial problems inside [its] national boundaries." See Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941 - 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 220, footnote 31. Canada took very little part in the trusteeship debate in March 1945. As Hume Wrong noted: "Canada is interested in seeing that the colonial problem is not a source of friction between the United States and the United Kingdom or a cause of ill-will towards the United Kingdom on the part of the Canadians." Quoted in Ibid, p. 17.
100. Masters, Canada In World Affairs: 1953 to 1955, p. 118.
101. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 34, "Colonialism and Anti-Colonialism in the United Nations," December 14, 1956, p. 2.
102. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 7, file 15, Foreign Affairs Conferences, Colombo Conference, 1950, vol. 1.
103. Escott Reid, interview, Ste Cecile de Masham, June 4, 1989.
104. NAC, RG 25, G2, vol. 3323, box 44, interim 98, file 510004-40, vol. 1, "Exchange of High Commissioners Between Canada and India," October 24, 1946.
105. Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 15.
106. Quoted in Ibid, pp. 17 - 18.

107. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 5, file 8, "Suggestions for Revision of Mr. Wrong's Memorandum of February 20th on Impressions of the First General Assembly of the United Nations," February 25, 1946, p. 2.
108. Alice Young, "Escott Reid as Cold Warrior?," p. 36.
109. NAC, RG 25, G 2, vol. 86 - 87/160, box 43, file 5296-A-1-40, pt. 1.
110. NAC, MG 31, E46, vol. 5, file 8, "An Approach to Some of the Basic Problems of Foreign Policy, 1946," ER/HMP, February 9 - 11, 1946.
111. Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (New York: New York University Press, 1969), p. 21.
112. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 5, file 8, Foreign Affairs - United Nations.
113. Ibid.
114. Arthur Menzies, interview, Ottawa, May 22, 1989.
115. George Ignatieff, "General A. G. L. McNaughton: A Soldier in Diplomacy", International Journal 22:3 (Summer 1967), p. 411. According to Miles Kahler, peacekeeping was part of the decolonization process, see Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 381.
116. Ignatieff, Peacemonger, p. 96, chapter 7.
117. Reid, Envoy, p. 115.
118. Ignatieff, "General A. G. L. McNaughton," p. 402.
119. Ibid, p. 408.
120. Reid, Envoy, pp. 131 - 132.
121. Ignatieff, Peacemonger, p. 96. See also Reid, Envoy, p. 129.
122. Indonesia was under Dutch rule before World War II and was called the Netherlands East Indies.
123. Herring, "The Vietnam War," p. 166.
124. R. A. MacKay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1945 - 1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), p. 146.
125. The Committee of Good Offices was established on August 25, 1947.

126. Ignatieff, Peacemonger, p. 98; See also "General A. G. L. McNaughton," p. 412.
127. See NAC, General A. G. L. McNaughton Papers, MG 30, E 133, vol. 301, United Nations Security Council, s/PV456, December 13, 1949. In the Round-Table Conference at The Hague, McNaughton called for the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesians and the release of political prisoners. The U.S.S.R. opposed this position claiming that it did not correspond "to the true state of things in Indonesia, nor does it meet the principles, purposes and objectives of the United Nations." The Soviet view remained a minority one. It was defeated in the UN Security Council meeting.
128. Ignatieff, Peacemonger, pp. 97 - 98.
129. NAC, RG 25, 86- 87/159, vol. 27, interim 20, file 5495-G-40, vol. 1, despatch E-23, June 1, 1953.
130. DEA Files, file 50054-40, vol. 3, despatch no. 6, January 8, 1948.
131. DEA Files, file 50054-40, vol. 5, memorandum to the SSEA, July 20, 1948,; See also L. B. Pearson's reaction to Mr. Dupuy's despatch, no. 193.
132. Pierre Dupuy "suffered" from 'localitis'. It is the "occupational malady of diplomats which causes them to become so well disposed towards the policy of the government to which they are accredited that they lobby as strenuously for its causes as for their own." See Eayrs, Indochina, p. 14.
133. DEA Files, file 50054-40, vol. 5, memorandum to the SSEA, July 20, 1948.
134. DEA Files, files 50054-40, vol. 5, memorandum for USSEA, July 20, 1948.
135. R. A. MacKay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 147.
136. Ibid, p. 147.
137. Ibid, p. 148.
138. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86 -87 / 159, vol. 27, file 5495-G-40, vol. 1, memorandum, "Canadian Representation in Indonesia," April 5, 1950. See also NAC, Records of the Privy Council Office, Central Registry Files, RG 2, 18, vol. 142, file D-12, (vol. 1), Department of External Affairs, 1950 - 51, memorandum of April 8, 1950, "Regarding proposed new Missions to be opened in the fiscal year 1950 - 51."

139. Canada supported decolonization in Indonesia "which is in keeping with Mr. Nehru's emphasis on the need for emancipation of the people of Asia and Africa." See NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 34, memorandum for the Prime Minister, October 20, 1949, p. 4. In 1956, Nehru paid an official visit to Ottawa. Escott Reid, Canada's ambassador to India, noted that Canada would have urged the Netherlands and France to get out of their colonial territories if "had been able to guess eleven years ago what the effects of French and Dutch policy would be in Indonesia and Indochina." He added that the local nationalists in Indonesia and Indochina "would then have been willing to have accepted some interim system of dyarchy under direct United Nations administration to ease the passage to full independence.... If this had been done, France and the Netherlands would not have poured blood and money into dirty wars in Indochina and Indonesia; the governments in those countries would today be more stable, less communist or less endangered by communism; the reactions between the new independent states and their old overlords might now be friendly." See NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 9, file 26, Re: Nehru's Visit to Ottawa, 1956, p. 25.

CHAPTER TWO  
THE DOCTRINE OF MATERIAL SELF-HELP

The period after the Second World War was one of manifold hopes and great economic expectations, and Canada wanted to help create an orderly world economy. The economic planners in Ottawa looked forward to the "post-war ideal of a single world-wide economic community, based on the principles of multilateral trade, non-discrimination, and free convertibility of currencies."<sup>1</sup> Even before the war was over, these economic experts began their search for an "economic Holy Grail" filled with prosperity. In their search for prosperity, the best economic minds in the nation were asked to find the right answers, answers that would have a great impact on the future of the country.<sup>2</sup> They also looked to the days of the Dirty Thirties. Having lived through a period of economic dislocation, the master planners in Ottawa did not wish to witness a repetition of the Great Depression.<sup>3</sup>

Most of Canada's economic planners came from the departments of Finance and Trade and Commerce, but a few worked in External Affairs, where most of them were more concerned with the implementation of foreign policy. It was of paramount importance to Canada's economic officials that the domestic economy be linked to foreign policy and they were willing to use the doctrine of material self-help as a means of creating an orderly world economy. The doctrine involved the search overseas for material goods and resources to promote individual and national prosperity at home. These officials recognized that trade had



built Canada and trade would sustain it. With "the huge imbalance of trade between Western Europe and North America," Canadian officials in Finance and Trade and Commerce looked to Asia to cash in on the doctrine of material self-help.<sup>4</sup> It did not seem incompatible to these officials to use ideology to justify their pursuit of national self-interests in Asia.

As Communist aggression threatened Asia, Canada, as a member of the western democratic bloc, determined to thwart its spread by trading with the Asian countries. The same strategy used in the war for men's minds would also be used to promote Canadian interests. In other words, Canadian trade was to be conducted in Canada's interests, but where possible, trade policy was tied to and influenced by ideological issues. First, goals for increased economic prosperity at home and abroad would be set. Canada accomplished this aim by seeking ways to re-establish the trade and financial relations disrupted by the Second World War and by subscribing to multilateral trade. Second, trade policy focused on weakening the influence of Communism in India and Indonesia; this aspect of policy was carried out through the sale of arms. Apart from these two strategies, Canada developed a special interest in trading with Japan with the purpose of bringing the Japanese into the orbit of western democratic nations.

The two western democratic nations that played the most significant part in the creation of the new economic order were Britain and the United States, and this was evident during the Second World War. The

Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, passed by the U.S. Congress, became an important economic "aid" scheme to finance the war effort. Article VII of the Act called for the removal of discriminatory measures of trade and the reduction of tariff barriers. The American motive was to push Britain into the markets of the world and create a more favourable world wide free trade situation. In spite of the Canadian attempt to remain "aloof from Lend-Lease...in order to emphasize its independence from American charity," Canada signed an agreement with the United States and subscribed to Article VII.<sup>5</sup> "The principles enunciated in that article were made the starting point for concrete action looking towards the liberalization of world trade."<sup>6</sup> This was important to Canadian officials in Finance, Trade and Commerce, and External Affairs, who saw trade as the right arm of Canadian foreign policy. From the Canadian perspective, "multilateral tariff reductions represented the best of all possible trading worlds" because a "diversified Canadian trading pattern would avoid undue reliance on a single customer, the United States, with all the dangerous political consequences that might entail."<sup>7</sup> Many of these political results became apparent by 1953, but from 1939 to 1953 Canada continued to trade with its two North Atlantic partners.

As Britain and the United States continued to play a major role in the war, they gave more thought to the new world order they would usher in once the war was over. Both countries had colonial possessions in Asia. The United States favoured self-determination by European colonies, and at the war's conclusion it arranged for the independence

of the Philippines, its one colonial possession in Asia. President Franklin D. Roosevelt took the view that "the continued existence of the colonial empires [was] a possible cause of future wars."<sup>8</sup> To Britain, however, the loss of its colonies meant more than being deprived of territorial possessions. It involved an economic loss, especially critical in light of the enormous war debt it had accumulated. In the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt besides discussing the need for a United Nations and the problems relating to decolonization, dealt with the economic problem of preferential tariffs. Roosevelt pressed Churchill for a commitment to dismantle British preferential tariffs. Churchill stoutly resisted and managed to secure concessions from Roosevelt that would respect existing British economic obligations. Dana Wilgress, Canada's Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, noted that "subject to this proviso, the [Atlantic] Charter contained a commitment to further the enjoyment by all states of access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world."<sup>9</sup> To Canadian trade officials, the removal of preferential tariffs would be one way to enhance Canadian prosperity.

Further suggestions to create a new economic order were put forth by the United States. In July 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 28 countries agreed to establish the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). The IMF was set up to help countries meet their debts, while the World Bank would loan money for major development projects. Canada approved of the establishment of these two bodies in 1945. It joined

the IMF and the World Bank and hoped to cash in on the economic stability and prosperity that the new order would bring and thus avoid economic depression.<sup>10</sup>

The formation of a third body, the International Trade Organization (ITO), was discussed by the participating nations at Bretton Woods. But before such an organization could be established, the problem of tariff preferences had to be solved.<sup>11</sup> Plans for the ITO materialized in Havana in 1947 with the Havana Charter; unfortunately, however, the United States Congress did not ratify it. Because of the failure to implement the ITO, the future of an orderly economic community lay in the hands of the 23 countries which signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Geneva on October 30, 1947. Five of the original GATT nations came from Asia: Burma, Ceylon, China, India, and Pakistan. What the ITO initially sought to accomplish, GATT set out to do in doing. Tariff barriers were to be lowered and economic conditions created whereby nations could trade manufactured goods and special agricultural commodities such as wheat.<sup>12</sup> In 1948, GATT was formally established as a functional body within the United Nations.

Two GATT meetings were held after 1948, one in Annecy, France, in the summer of 1949, and another in Torquay, England, in the winter of 1950-51. It became evident to Dana Wilgress, the Canadian DEA official who played a leading role in GATT, that

the Torquay negotiations marked the end of the period which began with the conclusion of the 1935 trade agreement with the United States. Canada had pretty

well scraped the bottom of the barrel of meaningful concessions to be obtained from the United States on the basis of the reductions in duty made possible by the Trade Agreement Act and its subsequent extensions.<sup>13</sup>

While the United States remained Canada's major trading partner, by 1953 Canadians were contending with protectionism.

The policies of Britain and the United States had a major impact on the development of the post-war economic order. While the United States wanted to solve its balance of payments problem, the British endeavoured to find solutions to their huge war debt. Canada, a North American nation and an ally of the United States, saw itself caught in the American economic web. Canada as a member of the Commonwealth was bound to be approached by the British for financial help. It was primarily Europe, and later Asia, that all three North Atlantic nations looked to to solve their monetary problems and find new avenues for enhancing their prosperity. At first, the search for economic prosperity was carried out strictly on the basis of self-interest and not for ideological reasons, but once Communism became a threat and aggression a reality, ideology became a rationale for policies designed to realize material goals.

### Setting the Stage for Economic Prosperity

The quest for an orderly economic order was a reflection of Canada's national self-interest. The responsibility for setting the goals for

the nation's economic policies in the post-war period was held principally by the Department of Trade and Commerce. Its main duty was "to formulate a uniform and comprehensive policy with respect to the reviewing of trade agreements which have been suspended during the war."<sup>14</sup> Even though Trade and Commerce had a major voice in international trade relations, the formulation of the economic aspects of the nation's foreign policies was a joint affair involving the departments of Agriculture, External Affairs, Finance, Fisheries, National Revenue, and Transport, as well as the Maritime Commission and the Bank of Canada. While all of these departments had input into the economic aspects of the country's foreign policy, it was "the troika of Finance, External Affairs, and Trade and Commerce" that played the most significant part in formulating a foreign trade policy.<sup>15</sup>

The question of what Canada's post-war economic policy was going to be was discussed by senior officials in the "troika" even before the war was over. In 1943, Dr. W. A. Mackintosh and J. J. Deutsch from Finance stressed that if Canada were going to develop a strong foreign economic policy, the senior officials from Finance and the economic division of External Affairs would have to work closely together. Intelligence information regarding the political situations in other countries was necessary in order to make sound decisions about commercial and financial investments. "Close and continuous collaboration between the economic and political planners"<sup>16</sup> was necessary as Canada subscribed to a programme designed to expand trade on a multilateral basis and improve the standard of living at home and

in countries that were allies of Western democracies.

Lester Pearson accepted the challenge to work closely with economic experts when he became Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1948. Even though he had "too little knowledge about economic affairs and too little interest in them,"<sup>17</sup> he was neither indifferent to the importance of trade for Canada nor reticent about taking opportunities to make trade a diplomatic concern. For instance, Pearson wanted the Canadian ambassador to become more of a salesman and less of a bureaucrat.<sup>18</sup> This approach was significant for two reasons. First, it underscored the importance of trade as a means of furthering Canadian foreign policy. It was an accepted fact that Canada "was founded on trade and must trade to survive."<sup>19</sup> Second, Pearson wanted to reinforce the foundations of trade and commerce in order to make trade a major instrument of External Affairs. The role of the Canadian trade commissioners is illustrative of this point. Trade commissioners were strictly representatives of the Department of Trade and Commerce, but they also acted as unofficial representatives of the diplomatic service, spreading information on the resources and economic opportunities Canada had to offer.<sup>20</sup>

The symbiotic relationship between trade and external affairs became evident in the 1950s as more emphasis was placed on the need for Canada to be competitive in international trade. In August 1952 Dana Wilgress asked Douglas LePan to represent the DEA at the Commonwealth Economic Conference to be held in London, England, in early December 1952.

Wilgress stated that it was important for a DEA representative to be present

because I feel we are at the crossroads of a new phase of international economic policies. As you know, these policies are of vital concern to this Department. In fact our whole foreign policy can only be developed in the context of current international economic policies.<sup>21</sup>

This was a very significant statement in 1952 when the Korean War was being waged. Some of the highest volumes of trade with Asian countries had taken place between 1950 and 1952. During these years Canada sold large quantities of arms and other military equipment were sold to India and Pakistan with a view to prevent Communist aggression from spreading throughout South Asia.

A week later, on August 28, 1952, Wilgress reminded LePan that he ought to "attach great importance to the Department of External Affairs being strongly represented.... We wish you to have a sort of watching brief, looking after the main interests of this Department from the point of Canadian foreign policy generally."<sup>22</sup> There were two other examples of the close relationship between Trade and External Affairs. In 1949 when the DEA opened up a consulate general in Manila, it gave the trade commissioner the rank of consul general.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, in May 1953, George Heasman was appointed Canada's first ambassador to Indonesia; prior to his appointment, he had been director of the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service from 1945 to 1953. His appointment was in keeping with the DEA's, and especially Pearson's, wish for the ambassador to be more of a salesman and less of a bureaucrat. It became



the ideal bonding of Trade and Commerce with External Affairs.<sup>24</sup> No other appointments of trade commissioners to the ambassadorial rank were made in Southeast Asia. When considerations were made to open up diplomatic missions in Singapore and Bangkok, the same principle was applied. While diplomatic missions were not established in Singapore and Thailand, the trade commissioners were given the added responsibility of collecting pertinent political information.

Trade and External Affairs needed to work closely together because the liberal trade policy based on nondiscriminatory, multilateral trade was at stake. With the enlargement of Canadian international trading relations in various regions in Asia affected by the Cold War, political information on the stability of these regions was mandatory. Ostensibly, one major reason Canada became interested in enlarging its multilateral trading relationships was to prevent another world war. Pearson echoed Roosevelt when he stated that the "lack of trade may help breed the conditions in which men go to war."<sup>25</sup> It was thus essential to create the conditions for peace and stability,<sup>26</sup> which Article 55 of the United Nations Charter was designed to do. In accordance with this article, Canada was willing to maintain "peaceful and friendly relations" and to promote "economic and social progress" in order that "the principle of equal rights and self-determination" could be achieved.<sup>27</sup> It seemed to be the ideal goal to help thwart the influence of Communism and support decolonization in Asia.

The pursuit of multilateral trade and the need to prevent war were

complementary goals, although officials in Trade and External Affairs were aware that in the expansion of Canada's multilateral trading relations the aims of economic liberalism and national self-interest could be contradictory. Economic liberalism could clash with the goals of national self-interest because "government policy is a reflection of whatever groups have power in the society,"<sup>28</sup> and the most powerful group is usually the business class. In its purest form economic liberalism is concerned with the prosperity of the individual and the creation of situations in which businessmen would prosper.<sup>29</sup> It also "prescribes the complete absence of state interference in global markets regardless of economic or political provocation."<sup>30</sup> Canadian officials attempted to balance these two principles. They recognized that in the pursuit of economic self-interest they would favour the business community and, at the same time, senior officials representing the businessmen of the country would have input into trade policies. This approach to trade was taken during the Second World War and from 1945 to 1957.

The prevention of war and the possibility of Communist aggression were ideological reasons for expanding trading interests in Asia. In actuality, it was self-interest that made Canada conscious of the need to improve its trade contacts with Asia. Canada not only advocated multilateral trade as a means of thwarting war but also attempted to seek solutions to "the trading and financial relationships disrupted by [World War II]." Pearson went on to say:

There was also the need for assistance to countries which had been physically or economically damaged by the conflict. In this area questions of direct concern to Canada included financial and commercial relations with other countries; relief and rehabilitation programs; loans, the supply and financing of food and other commodities to countries still suffering from the war and its aftermath; foreign loans; exchange and balance of payment problems; shipping, aviation, and telecommunications questions; relations with existing international economic agencies, and the establishment of new ones.<sup>31</sup>

While idealism in the form of humanitarianism was evident in Canada's post-war trade and commercial goals, it was the benefits to Canada resulting from "financial and commercial relations with other countries" which remained the fundamental issue, and it was understood that this objective included Europe and Latin America as well.

If one were to cite a watershed date in Canadian trade relations with Asia, it would be 1950 when the Colombo Plan conference took place. Held at Colombo, Ceylon, the conference dealt primarily with economic concerns of South and Southeast Asia. The Canadian delegation included Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs; Escott Reid, an under-secretary; Arthur Menzies, head of the Far Eastern division; and Douglas LePan, a senior economic official. Pearson underscored Canada's further interest in trading with Asia when he spoke on this topic at the conference stating that he did not want Canada to remain a junior member of the Commonwealth nor to appear subordinate to the other dominions in the eyes of the Asian members. In a speech analyzing the conference, Pearson observed that Canadian interest in trade with Asia was similar to that of the United Kingdom and the United

States in that Canada wanted to contribute "to the growth and stability and healthy economic development of that part of the world which is so important to us."<sup>32</sup>

Canadian officials made a determined effort to enhance the economic growth of Asia. After 1950 Asia once again became an important focus for Canadian trade interests. One reason for this new situation was Canada's unfavourable balance of trade with the United States, which made imports from Asia an alternative to imports from the United States. Trade with Asia would be advantageous not only for Canada but also for the Asian countries in that it would help them "with exchange for the financing of additional Canadian imports."<sup>33</sup>

It was in an atmosphere of unfavourable trading conditions and monetary crisis that Canada pursued its self-interest in Asia. After World War II, the British were also confronted with a crisis in their balance of payments, the sterling crisis, which pushed Britain to the brink of economic collapse.<sup>34</sup> British gold reserves were depleted, and given such a serious economic crisis, it was natural for Britain to turn to Canada as it had once before. The Secretary of State for India and Burma during the war S. Amery, looked to the Commonwealth for help. Amery had been a very influential member of the Conservative Party and prominent among the business community in Britain. He hoped that he would in turn be influential with Commonwealth members, and he was convinced that the "maladjustment in the world" could be solved by a united effort of the Commonwealth.<sup>35</sup>

Amery tried to convince Canada to join the sterling countries - Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and her other colonies - and not be "tie[d] up with the American dollar."<sup>36</sup> Being tied to the American economy may have seemed "unnatural" for the British; this, however, was not the view of Dana Wilgress, who was then serving as Canada's high commissioner in Britain. Wilgress objected to the British proposal because Britain wanted to "purchase the largest proportion of Commonwealth primary products and in turn supply the manufactured goods in which the rest of the Commonwealth was deficient."<sup>37</sup> Moreover, he disagreed with Amery's proposal because it reminded him of the British scheme to centralize the affairs of the Commonwealth and because the British wanted to take a position "irrespective of the ups and downs of the United States economy."<sup>38</sup> Wilgress, like the other senior trade and finance officers, was aware that the British were worried about the consequences of the revaluation of the pound. These Canadian officials recognized that Britain had its own interests, but they would not allow British financial worries to eclipse Canadian interests.

Canada stood between the best and worst of two monetary blocs, the dollar and the pound sterling. National self-interest pushed the nation into expanding its trade and commercial contacts, which enabled trading dollars to flow to both blocs. Trade increased after Canada studied the obstacles it had to overcome, such as the level of foreign investment it could afford and the problems private investors had in the sterling trading area. The exchange rate and an unfavourable balance of trade

were two other problems facing Canadian investors. The solution was to invest in the free-world countries, such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, China, Japan and Korea, because doing so "would help to stimulate the production and export to Canada of goods which we now obtain from the United States and other dollar countries would contribute to a better trade balance with both areas."<sup>39</sup>

Given this investment objective, it was natural for the Department of Trade and Commerce to look for foreign investments that would benefit Canada. It also searched for ways by which overseas private investors could be convinced to purchase Canadian imports. Back home in Canada, the government would provide loans for potential private investors who were keen on the Asian market.

Canada subscribed to two broad subsidiary goals as it looked to the Asian region for trading partners. First, it continued to look for new and expanded markets so as to prevent future wars, and second, Canada encouraged the existence of moderate indigenous governments and strove to prevent them from falling under Communist influence. This broad approach to trade and commercial policies was in line with Canada's multilateral policy. The ideological thrust the economic goals took were in accord with the ideological developments of the Cold War. But it was self-interest which superseded ideological considerations. Stated in another way, ideology was to serve national self-interest. As H. F. Angus noted, trade "has been traditionally at the heart of Canadian interests in the Far East and the principal determinant of

Canadian policy there."<sup>40</sup> Interestingly, it was only after the outbreak of the Pacific war that Canada's exports exceeded its imports.

Table 1  
Canadian Trade With Asia 1939-1944  
(Percentage of the National Total)<sup>41</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
1939	5.1	4.8
1940	5.8	3.0
1941	5.2	4.3
1942	2.8	8.5
1943	1.3	6.0
1944	<u>1.9</u>	<u>6.2</u>
Average	<u>3.68</u>	<u>5.46</u>

The same trend continued after the war. Imports remained below 5 per cent of the national total of all trade, with an average of 3.33 per cent over a 13 year period. This export trade, as in the war years, exceeded imports. Export trade reached its highest level in 1945, with 10.5 per cent, but all exports generally maintained a consistent level from 1945 to 1957 with an average of 5.45 per cent, as the following table indicates.

Table 2  
Canadian Trade With Asia 1945-1957  
 (Percentages of the National Total) <sup>42</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
1945	2.5	10.5
1946	2.5	5.6
1947	3.4	4.8
1948	3.6	4.4
1949	3.3	6.5
1950	4.5	3.7
1951	4.8	4.9
1952	3.0	5.9
1953	2.6	6.3
1954	2.8	4.8
1955	3.4	4.1
1956	3.6	4.5
1957	<u>3.4</u>	<u>4.9</u>
Average	<u>3.33</u>	<u>5.45</u>

Canada's major trading partners in Asia were China (before 1950), Japan and India. Malaya and Singapore were also very important because of the large amounts of rubber and tin Canada imported from these two countries. Ceylon, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand played a secondary role in Canadian-Asian trade; for the most part, they were not among the 20 most important in Canadian foreign trade. A much smaller volume of trade was conducted with Burma, Korea, Indochina and Taiwan. The volume of Canada's trade with Asia, however, was smaller than that of trade with either Britain, the United States or Western Europe, which were Canada's three major trading partners. In 1947, for example, 56 per cent of Canada's total trade was with the United States.<sup>43</sup> The United States bought one-third of all of Canada's exports and supplied Canada with three-quarters of its



imports.<sup>44</sup>

Because Canada faced economic and political problems in Asia from 1946 to 1957, the western hemisphere remained its major trading zone. But Canada did not overlook Asian markets even though its major trading partners were from the West. Considering income from export trade to be "the most important factor determining our prosperity and employment in peace time,"<sup>45</sup> the government in 1946 instituted a programme of export credit through which foreign countries could buy Canadian goods on credit. While there was a dollar shortage during this period and sterling countries imposed fairly rigid import restrictions in 1947, Canadian trade prospects with five Asian countries improved. Canadian trade officials were pleased that by the end of October 1947, Burma, Ceylon, China, India and Pakistan had signed the GATT agreement.

In his budget speech on May 18, 1948, D.C. Abbott, the Minister of Finance, noted that Canada had experienced "an unprecedented rate of economic activity,"<sup>46</sup> with Britain, the United States and Western Europe continuing to be Canada's major trading partners. Asia, however, was not mentioned. Nevertheless, conditions of post-war prosperity continued in 1949 in spite of monetary problems, and Canada did not ignore the Asian markets.<sup>47</sup> There were dollar shortages, and the pound sterling was devalued by 30.5 per cent in relation to the U.S. dollar. As a result of this devaluation, Canada faced exchange difficulties and discriminatory restrictions on its imports.<sup>48</sup> Despite these problems, Canada carried on a lucrative trade with the

Asian Commonwealth countries in wheat, wheat flour, newsprint and manufactured goods. Between 1946 and 1948 export trade increased from 0.9 per cent to 2.1 per cent. This slight increase did not discourage Canadians from trading with Asia.<sup>49</sup> Canadian export trade with Asia in 1949 was at its highest levels since the end of World War II. In 1949, it stood at 6.5 per cent of the national total.

Prior to 1950 little attention had been paid to Asia by Canada's Finance ministers, but the Korean war in 1950 changed this picture. Canadian export trade with Asia increased from 3.7 per cent of the national total in 1950 to 6.3 per cent in 1953. The Korean war had a major impact on Canadian trade, especially when Canada began to fear that the Soviet Union might become involved in the conflict.<sup>50</sup> Canada's defence budget increased, while at the same time the war led to difficulties for Canadian export trade with Korea, Hong Kong and China.<sup>51</sup> The major reason for this disruption was that the United States would not permit strategic and non-strategic goods to be shipped from United States ports to these three countries.

In addition to the increase in Canadian-Asian trade during the Korean war, other factors boosted Canadian-Asian trade from 1951 to 1953. In 1951, Korea and the Philippines signed the GATT agreement after lengthy negotiations. As a result, Canadian exports to Korea and the Philippines continued to increase. In spite of inflation caused by the Korean war, 1953 was a significant year for Canadian trade with Asia because Japan became a very important market for Canadian goods.<sup>52</sup>

By 1956, Japan was Canada's fourth-largest market and became its major export market and trading partner in Asia. It was from 1950 to 1953, too, that Canada conducted a fairly sizeable arms trade with India and Pakistan. Attempts were made to sell arms to Indonesia as well, but this ended in futility, with Canada agreeing to sell aircraft and their spare parts instead. Much of this trade was undertaken with the ideological goal of combating possible Communist aggression, but on the whole, arms trade with Asia was part of the broader goal of creating more favourable terms of trade with Asia.

#### Trade Interests to Weaken the Influences of Communism

There was a reason for trading in arms, although the Canadian arms trade was small compared to its overall trade with Asia. Canadian officials used ideology to justify their pursuit of national self-interest and as a means of weakening the prospects of Communism in India, Pakistan and Indonesia. India and Pakistan were important trading partners of Canada. But where export and import trade was concerned, Canada traded more with India than with Pakistan, while trade on a smaller scale, also to Canada's advantage, was carried on with Indonesia. In all three cases, trade not only benefited Canada economically but was also critical to realizing the ideological goal of protecting these countries from the threat of Communism.

Of the three countries, India and Pakistan were considered strategically crucial for several reasons. Their two neighbours, the

Soviet Union and China, were the two great Communist powers. In addition, India and Pakistan were leading members of the Commonwealth in Asia, and Canada worked hard to keep India within this body. India was important because it had the potential to be a world power in Asia. Indonesia, the third country to which Canada shipped arms, was recognized for its strategic and economic importance. Even though the Indonesian islands were fairly scattered in the seas of Southeast Asia, DEA officials viewed Indonesia as "the foremost country of Southeast Asia and a potential world power."<sup>53</sup> It was a populous region, rich in natural resources and one with which the Americans, British, Chinese and Dutch carried on lucrative trade. Indonesia's economic and strategic importance was taken into consideration by DEA officials not only in seeking to expand Canadian trade prospects, but also in attempting to establish diplomatic relations with that country in 1953.

The rationale for the trade in arms was a sensitive issue for Canada. Canada would have been the last of the western democracies to sell arms and military equipment, given its aversion to defence arrangements. It did not want to be pulled into a military involvement in South or Southeast Asia. Before 1948, Mackenzie King did not wish to get involved in war in the Far East because of Canada's primary commitments in Europe and because further commitments in Asia could easily divide both the country and the Liberal Party. The arms trade was also a touchy issue for India and Pakistan, since they had the Kashmir dispute to settle. The sale of arms to Indonesia was also a risky enterprise because the Indonesian dispute had yet to be settled,

and Canada would lose its reputation for impartiality if it sold arms to either the Dutch or the Indonesians

The motive for selling arms and military equipment to India and Pakistan was to weaken the enemy in the war for men's minds in South Asia. Canada traded more arms and equipment with India and Pakistan than with Indonesia for one important reason, according to the officials in the DEA: "to resist possible communist aggression."<sup>54</sup> The economic division of the DEA, which provided much input on trade matters, endorsed the sale of arms to India and Pakistan. Canada had a surplus of military equipment which could readily be used to help these two newly independent countries, and the economic division eventually agreed that the sale of arms would be "the democratic world's best insurance against further communist expansion in South or South East Asia."<sup>55</sup>

The same ideological grounds used for selling arms to India and Pakistan, situated in South Asia, were used to justify the arms trade with Indonesia, located in Southeast Asia. Indonesia requested arms after World War II while the Dutch continued to hold on to power, but Canada did not consider the request until after Indonesia gained independence from the Dutch. Canada, in fact, experienced great difficulty in selling arms to Indonesia because of objections from Britain and the United States that arms might fall into the hands of dissident elements. What eventually resulted was the sale of aircraft and spare parts. All trade negotiations were carried out to help

Indonesia resist the spread of Communist influence and possible aggression. The officials in the Far Eastern division of External Affairs recognized that the problem of Communism in Indonesia was not only an external but an internal one. A memorandum for the Economic division on the export of arms to Indonesia, sent out by officials of the Far Eastern division on September 5, 1952, noted that

unlike other South-East Asian countries the Communist Party is legal in Indonesia and is represented in Parliament by fifteen members. The Communists have also had some success recently in persuading other left-wing parties to support them in Parliament. While no Communists have been members of the government since 1948, there seems to be evidence that Communist influence in Indonesia is gradually increasing, not decreasing.<sup>56</sup>

While there was a need to weaken the prospects for Communist influence with the sale of arms and military equipment to India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, officials in the DEA were deeply concerned about the ultimate use of these weapons. They feared that in India arms could be used against Pakistan and vice-versa, which was a possibility in the light of the unsolved dispute between Hindus and Moslems over Kashmir. DEA officials were apprehensive that even a small misunderstanding could result in a religious war. No doubt Canadian motives would be questioned if such a war broke out, especially after Canada had worked so hard to keep India within the Commonwealth. Thus, the response to this sale of arms was an outburst of criticism from the editor of the Indian News Chronicle in New Delhi. Canada was a strong ally of India, and for it to give the impression that it sought to

interfere with India's pursuit of neutrality was an anathema. The editor of the Indian News Chronicle was angry that foreign powers, including Canada, were not helping matters by selling arms but were in fact encouraging India's "war-mongering and predatory adventures in Kashmir." The editor of the newspaper called upon the Commonwealth countries to recognize that if they really desired "the peaceful co-existence of Pakistan and India," they would at least try to impose "a voluntary embargo on the export of war materials to both countries. Consequently, this would be a genuine contribution to the creation of stability in Asia."<sup>57</sup> Richard Grew, an official in the office of the high commissioner for Canada, tried to dismiss the criticism of the Indian News Chronicle as "being more strident on Indo-Pakistan relations than a great many newspapers."<sup>58</sup> But despite this comment, Pearson became concerned about the newspaper's criticism and saw the need to review Canadian policy on the export of arms to India and Pakistan. In reviewing the arms policy, officials in External Affairs consulted Britain and the United States. Neither country contemplated any change in their policy of providing arms or military equipment and other essential spare parts, and given that situation, Pearson recommended to the cabinet that there be no change in Canadian policy.<sup>59</sup>

Concern for Canada's foreign policy motives and national reputation was also expressed when it attempted to sell arms to Indonesia. In fact, Canadian officials were rather apprehensive about selling military weapons to Indonesia. Before 1949, they were not only concerned about the unsettled conditions which arose from the Dutch-Indonesian dispute,

but were also zealous about protecting the Canadian "reputation for impartiality." In seeking a solution to the dispute, the chairman of the United Nations Security Council, General A. G. L. McNaughton, did not favour either the Dutch or the Indonesians but took the same position that Arthur Menzies articulated as advisor on the sale of arms in the American and Far Eastern divisions. The Canadian government, according to Menzies, should move cautiously and wait for the political situation to change. The government took Menzies' advice and eventually decided that the unsettled conditions in Indonesia did not warrant the sale of arms.<sup>60</sup>

Canadian DEA officials had further concerns about the sale of arms to Indonesia. With the unstable political situation in Indonesia and with the country being on the verge of independence, it was possible for weapons to fall into the hands of militant and extremist groups or army deserters. During the Indonesian revolution, from 1945 to 1950, the Darul Islam, led by a charismatic Javanese mystic, S. M. Kartosuwirjo, proclaimed the formation of the Indonesian Islamic State. The Darul Islam was a regional rebellion in West Java, and its leaders used "banditry, extortion and terrorism," as the means to establish an Islamic state.<sup>61</sup> It was groups like the Darul Islam that the DEA officials feared.<sup>62</sup> External Affairs was also concerned that arms could fall into the hands of dissident groups and eventually be traded off to other militant groups or smuggled to Communist Chinese guerrillas in Malaya or the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines. The Chinese guerrillas in Malaya were part of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Malayan



Races Liberation Army (MRLA). The original aim of these two groups "was to subvert the economy by disrupting the rubber plantations and tin mines that provided most of Malaya's wealth, to destroy authority by attacking and defeating government security forces, and to win mass support from the populace."<sup>63</sup> Their ultimate goal was to overthrow the British colonial administration and establish an independent regime in Malaya.

In their consultations with the British government on the sale of arms to Indonesia, Canadian officials were reminded of the situation in Malaya and the consequences the loss of the major resources of tin and rubber would have for the economies of Canada, Malaya, and the world in general. During the Korean war much attention was paid to the unstable political situation in Malaya and the rest of Southeast Asia because natural resources such as rubber and tin were found in abundance in this region and were desperately needed for the manufacture of goods for the war effort.

It was also from 1950 to 1952 that the Americans showed concern about Canada's planned sale of arms to Indonesia. The United States was concerned that arms bound for Indonesia could easily find their way into the hands of the Hukbalahaps, or Huks, as they were commonly known. The Huks were "a peasant effort to redress grievances with landlords" as well as "a guerrilla resistance movement in central Luzon."<sup>64</sup> To the Americans, the Huks were a threat to their remnant economic interests in the Philippines. With the advent of the Cold War, especially "as

communism triumphed in China and Vietnam, America became increasingly afraid that it could triumph in the Philippines as well."<sup>65</sup> A Communist victory would have disastrous political, military and economic consequences for American interests in the Philippines. Consequently, the United States poured in aid and backed the government of Ramon Magsaysay, who was elected president of the Philippines in 1953. Because of the possibility of a Communist victory in Malaya and the Philippines, officials in External Affairs became more reticent about selling arms to Indonesia.

In 1952 the political and military situation looked grim for the Indonesian government. Militant and dissident groups continued to threaten the stability of the country. Chester Ronning, having been informed of the situation, notified the economic division on September 5 that "there seems little doubt that the Indonesian government needs further military equipment and that it is to our general advantage to help them in any way we can."<sup>66</sup> There was no question that Indonesia needed more arms to restore law and order. Ronning further noted that Indonesia should be assured that the Canadian government would "assist them by deeds as well as words."<sup>67</sup>

But because of its desire not to interfere with British and American interests in Southeast Asia, the Canadian government continued to hesitate to sell arms to Indonesia. Another reason for Canada's reticence was the absence of diplomatic relations with Indonesia; it was not until May 1953 that George Heasman became Canada's first ambassador

to Indonesia. But the main reason for Canada's vacillating on its commitment to supply arms to Indonesia was evident in an evaluation made by External Affairs in late 1949 and early 1950 on Canadian-Indonesian relations:

Owing to the increasing significance of Southeast Asia in world affairs, Canada has become more interested in the area. As events there have been moving swiftly and as Canadian commitments elsewhere...are heavy and resources limited, Canadian policy on Southeast Asia has, however, had to be reversed. The Government's view is that it is preferable for the time being to maintain an attitude of watchful waiting there, to limit military commitments in the area, owing to priorities elsewhere, and to try to stem Sino-Soviet influence among self-governing nations there by raising their living standards through technical assistance and increased trade. In keeping with this approach, Canada has made no military assistance available to Indonesia or Southeast Asia, but has encouraged Indonesian participation in the Colombo Plan.<sup>68</sup>

Consequently, no arms deal was struck with the Indonesian government. But the Canadian government permitted the Canadair Limited Company and the Babb Company of Montreal to sell PBV-5A aircraft and aircraft parts to Indonesia. These sales were limited. In 1950 the total sales of civilian aircraft and spare parts amounted to \$368,525 and in 1951 to \$80,160.<sup>69</sup> The Department of Trade and Commerce did not lament the "loss" of the arms nor the small trade in aircraft and aircraft parts. The increased trade with Indonesia in other manufactured goods (shown in Table 3) and agricultural products from 1949 to 1953 was a good indication that national interests were being served. However, Trade and Commerce did not refer to this favourable balance of export trade as a side benefit to their efforts to help

thwart the influence of Communism in Indonesia because Canada had experienced difficulty in selling arms to Indonesia.

Table 3  
Canadian Trade With Indonesia 1949-1957  
(Thousand of Dollars) <sup>70</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Canadian Balance</u>
1949	4,640	1,454	+ 3,186
1950	3,052	728	+ 2,324
1951	5,227	1,052	+ 4,175
1952	6,250	893	+ 5,357
1953	1,990	598	+ 1,392
1954	1,321	611	+ 710
1955	944	1,001	- 57
1956	1,243	1,143	+ 100
1957	1,633	965	+ 668

With the exception of 1955, trade with Indonesia from 1954 to 1957 was in Canada's favour. Although the Canadian balance of trade was much lower from 1954 to 1957 than it had been from 1949 to 1953, Canadian businessmen found the Indonesian archipelago a lucrative area for trade. They exported wheat, wheat flour, newsprint and automobile parts to Indonesia, while imports from Indonesia consisted principally of crude rubber, palm oil and spices.

While Canadian exports to Indonesia exceeded imports, as was the case with Pakistan, the reverse held true with India (see Table 4). Canada imported mainly jute, tea, peanuts and vegetable oil from India and Pakistan. In turn, it exported major items such as wheat, flour, newsprint, locomotives and material for railway lines. It was well known in the Canadian business community that India was a very important trading partner for Canada. The special diplomatic bond that existed

between the two countries was a significant factor that contributed to this strong trading relationship. Over the 10 year period from 1948 to 1957 India went from fourth to thirteenth in import trade with Canada. In export trade with Canada, India went from third to seventeenth.

Table 4  
Canadian Trade With India 1948-1957  
(Thousand of Dollars) <sup>71</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Canadian Balance</u>
1948	33,698	33,400	+ 298
1949	72,551	26,233	+46,278
1950	31,520	37,262	- 5,742
1951	35,737	40,217	- 4,480
1952	55,423	26,822	+28,601
1953	37,187	26,627	+10,560
1954	17,689	28,054	-10,365
1955	24,669	35,147	-10,478
1956	25,714	30,898	- 5,184
1957	28,991	29,248	- 257

Canadian export trade with Pakistan was much greater than its import trade. Canada's very favourable balance of trade between 1950 and 1951 was the result of the sale of rifles, aircraft parts, radio and radar equipment, and parts for military vehicles. India and Pakistan placed the largest order for arms from Canada, and between 1950 and 1951, Pakistan ordered three times more arms than India. While India purchased \$3,723,839 worth of arms and other subsidiary materials, Pakistan bought \$11,643,144 worth of firearms. Between January and September 1952, Pakistan bought six and one half times more arms than India; Pakistan's bill stood at \$6,245,000 and India's at \$930,000. In

a memorandum from A.E. Ritchie of the economic division to A. J. Hicks of the Commonwealth division in September 1952, Ritchie noted that "since the 1949 'cease-fire' order in the Kashmir dispute, no export permit for items of a military nature has been denied for either India or Pakistan."<sup>72</sup> External Affairs wanted both countries to be treated equally when it came to their requests for arms. But, Ritchie continued, "due to the increased state of tension last year between the two countries, the Government reviewed Canadian policy with respect to the export of arms to India and Pakistan."<sup>73</sup> One thing the government did was to scrutinize each individual application before giving approval. The sale of arms was significant because the largest volume of trade in arms with India and Pakistan occurred during the Korean war, from 1950 to 1953. By 1954 some of the equipment that was part of the Canadian export trade, such as parts for civilian aircraft and military vehicles, was provided through Colombo Plan aid.

The reasons given for large amount of arms traded to Pakistan from 1950 to 1952 was the possibility of Communist aggression in South Asia. While ideology affected trade with Pakistan, the overall trading pattern after 1952 indicated that self-interest superseded ideological considerations. The following table shows the export and import trade in favour of Canada.

Table 5  
Canadian Trade with Pakistan 1948-1957  
 (Thousands of Dollars) <sup>74</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Canadian Balance</u>
1948	7	1	+ 6
1949	18	1	+ 17
1950	8,681	1,706	+ 6,975
1951	4,486	2,233	+ 2,253
1952	16,016	191	+ 15,825
1953	32,103	558	+ 31,545
1954	8,970	556	+ 8,404
1955	6,202	816	+ 5,386
1956	10,502	1,306	+ 9,196
1957	11,395	504	+ 10,891

Overall, Canada looked to Asia after the Second World War for improved trade prospects. It found in Asia the raw materials it needed and provided the goods Asians would require. But this Canadian export and import trade was small compared to its national total. The Canadian doctrine of material self-help became filled with paradoxes when used to weaken the influence of Communism. While trade in arms with South Asia was very small compared to the total amount of Canadian trade in this region, it was motivated by Canada's self-interest. With respect to Indonesia, Canada was willing to trade vigorously, but it discovered that there were distinct political and military considerations to take into account. As well as turning to South and Southeast Asia for additional markets during the Cold War, Canada also looked for markets in East Asia. And, as in other Asian trading arrangements of the post-war era, Canadian officials were not hesitant to couch self-interest in ideological terms when they engaged in trade with Japan.

### A Special Trading Relationship With Japan

National self-interest was at the root of Canada's trade relations with Japan.<sup>75</sup> However, complex political considerations pulled Japan into the orbit of western democratic nations. Trade was the means by which Japan became "a strong and reliable ally," and by 1952 "Japan was Canada's fourth largest market."<sup>76</sup> In 1954 when St Laurent was in Tokyo as part of his tour in Asia, he emphasized the importance of peace and trade that governed Canada's relations with Japan. In addition, he continued to emphasize the need to be watchful, or the spread of totalitarianism would destroy peace, international trade, and "eventually threaten the freedom we ourselves cherish for its own worth in our land."<sup>77</sup> For St Laurent, the loss of freedom and international trade would spell defeat in the war for men's minds at home and abroad.

The foundations of the lucrative Canadian trade with Japan and the good diplomatic relations which followed were re-established after the Second World War, not after the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. After 1945 Japan "lacked the goodwill of the world in general which is necessary for successful international trade." It needed raw materials and new economic opportunities to enlarge its markets. Given Japan's needs, the United States was willing "to restore Japan to economic health."<sup>78</sup> Canada shared the same objective and expressed its enthusiasm for reopening trade relations with Japan.



In August 1946, J.E. Kenderdine, the Canadian economic attaché with the Canadian Liaison Mission, was put in charge of preparing "the way for the eventual resumption of Japanese-Canadian trade relations."<sup>79</sup> In January 1947, Kenderdine was appointed the chairman of the Canadian Restitution and Reparations Team. "While the Canadian Government was concerned about securing the payment of reparations as compensation for losses of Canadian property and to reduce Japanese war potential, this concern was balanced by the consideration that a viable economy for Japan was more important than the exaction of reparations."<sup>80</sup> But the factor which would prevent the establishment of a viable economy would be procrastination. By September 1947 Brooke Claxton, the Minister of Defence, urged that trade relations be restored because he predicted the loss of a very rich market if trading relations were not re-established right away.

It was almost a year later, in 1948, that Canada indicated its willingness to treat Japan "on [the] same basis as any member of GATT."<sup>81</sup> Going a step further, Canada was even willing to discuss giving Japan most-favoured-nation (M-F-N) status, since the United States had already done so with Japan and Korea. Consequently, the St Laurent cabinet conducted a study weighing the pros and cons of according Japan M-F-N treatment.<sup>82</sup> In March 1949 it recommended deferment until Canada had the assurance that Canadian goods "would receive fair and equitable treatment in the Japanese market."<sup>83</sup>

By August 1949, the discussion on giving Japan M-F-N status became the object of a study by the interdepartmental subcommittee on external trade policy chaired by H. O. Moran. Disagreement arose in the subcommittee because of information received from Britain which strongly objected to granting Japan the M-F-N status. Many officials in the British foreign service feared that the Japanese still cherished their pre-war ambitions of military conquest. But the British government's objections did not eclipse the advantages the interdepartmental subcommittee perceived in giving Japan the M-F-N status. It wanted the Japanese economy to be revived because a healthy Japanese economy would result in "healthy commercial and trade relations in the Pacific area." In addition, it recommended that Canada take advantage of the Japanese market before the United States gained a monopoly on Pacific trade.<sup>84</sup>

In spite of these perceived advantages, senior officials of the foreign trade service remained hesitant about offering Japan preferred status. They noted that Japan's foreign policy was still in the hands of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), and Canada would have to wait until it could negotiate directly with the Japanese. Other concerns of officials in External Affairs and in Trade and Commerce were the practices of erecting discriminatory trade barriers and dumping goods that the Japanese indulged in. These practices were carried out before 1939, and they made Canadian textile merchants apprehensive that Japan would continue them after 1945. An M-F-N treaty that was concluded with Germany after the war "resulted in discrimination against Canada, because of United States predominance in

Germany's trade relations."<sup>85</sup> Because of their experience with German trade, Canadian trade officials were reluctant to establish full trade relations with Japan.

In addition, officials in External feared that the importation of cheap textile goods from Japan would result in a backlash from the Canadian textile industry. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association (CMA) was opposed to the dumping of cheap Japanese goods in Canada, viewing the practice as a threat to employment and industry. J. T. Stirrett, the general manager of the CMA, wrote Pearson that "if the benefits of the most-favoured nation tariff treatment are extended to Japan we believe that industry in Canada will face a repetition of the former disastrous competition" from the Japanese.<sup>86</sup> Strengthening the CMA's position was the support it received from C. D. Howe, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, who was a loyal advocate of Canada's business interests.

The concern that Canada would get an unfair deal with Japan was real, but in spite of this fear, Frederick Bull of Trade and Commerce urged in 1949 that Canada should not postpone giving Japan the M-F-N status. If Canada waited until "Canadian and Japanese production [was] at a higher level...the Canadian economy would be susceptible to severe competition."<sup>87</sup> In 1950 two officials from External Affairs followed Bull's recommendations with their own. Ralph Collins noted that "it didnot appear reasonable for Canada to postpone indefinitely M-F-N status for Japan, particularly since a successful peace treaty would

depend in part on our willingness to co-operate economically with Japan." Arthur Menzies, speaking from a political perspective, saw the desirability "for Canada to take as liberal an attitude as possible in the hope of directing Japanese trade away from Communist-dominated areas."<sup>88</sup> The positions of Collins and Menzies were echoed by Pearson at the 1950 Colombo Plan Conference. Recognizing that there was a growing need in Asia for Canadian products, he emphasized that Canadian trade in Asia, of which Japan was a significant part, would be a means of contributing "to the stability and healthy economic development of that part of the world."<sup>89</sup>

The prospects for giving Japan M-F-N status looked brighter in 1951, when Japan sent a trade mission to Canada. Ryuki Takeuchi, the leader of the mission, underscored his country's desire for nickel, asbestos and pulp and paper. He also stressed two other factors influencing Japan's move to improve trade relations with Canada. One was its desire to integrate its economy with the economies of the western democracies "so that [it] would be less tempted to be drawn into the Communist orbit;"<sup>90</sup> the other was Japan's aim to join the international wheat agreement and GATT.<sup>91</sup> The visit of the Japanese trade mission was not wasted, and there was hope by the summer of 1951 that Canadian-Japanese trade relations would be improved. The most significant development affecting Japan and, in turn, affecting the western democracies, was the peace treaty it signed on September 8, 1951. Article 12 of the treaty called for the "reciprocal extension of M-F-N treatment" between Japan and the nations which signed it. Consequently, although Canadian trade

officials remained somewhat apprehensive of "the recurrence of undesirable practices" the Japanese might engage in, they did not want to vote against Japan's entry into GATT because of her pre-war trading practices.<sup>92</sup> Thus, Canada continued to straddle the fence in according Japan M-F-N status after the peace treaty was signed. It took E. Herbert Norman to urge Canada not to be double-minded and withhold the M-F-N status from Japan. He advised that Canadians officials be "as correct as possible in [their] communication with the Japanese Government" and not be evasive.<sup>93</sup> Canada had procrastinated on the M-F-N issue, and it was time it dealt directly with the Japanese. Norman's advice did not go unheeded.

Negotiations on the M-F-N status continued after the signing of the peace treaty. Canadian trade officials wanted to be certain they would receive a fair deal. Furthermore, other sources of irritation had to be removed. One of these was Canada's and Japan's disagreement on pre-war fishing rights, which the Japanese claimed for the eastern Pacific Ocean. Article 9 of the peace treaty paved the way for Japan to negotiate fishing rights with Canada and the United States. Accordingly, a fisheries treaty signed on May 9, 1952, in Tokyo became effective on June 12, 1953. Canada agreed not to fish for red salmon in the east Bering Sea, and Japan would refrain from fishing for halibut, herring and salmon off the coast of British Columbia and Alaska.<sup>94</sup>

By June 1953, there were further indications of improvement in Canadian-Japanese trade relations. Japan was willing to offer nondiscriminatory treatment to Canada on items such as wheat, wood-pulp, copper and milk powder. The trade in wheat was significant because Japan wanted to join the international wheat agreement. Canada reciprocated by not imposing any discriminatory rates on additional wheat Japan wanted to purchase from Argentina.<sup>95</sup> The removal of discriminatory tariffs in Canadian-Japanese trade relations was the main issue in M-F-N negotiations which the three members of the Canadian team, J. J. Deutsch of Finance, C. M. Isbister of Trade and Commerce, and A. E. Ritchie of External Affairs, pushed for. It was not until Japan showed its willingness to make concessions in removing discriminatory measures that Canada finally indicated its willingness to grant Japan M-F-N status.

The final move towards improved trade relations with Japan was made by Canada in March 1954 with a draft proposal for an M-F-N trade agreement. By June 7, 1954, an order in council was passed to accord Japan M-F-N status,<sup>96</sup> and C. D. Howe commented that Canada "could not continue for much longer to withhold most-favoured-nation treatment from ...Japan."<sup>97</sup> To Howe, the M-F-N trade agreement would be an advantage for Canada. Since the M-F-N agreement was "the first major post-war agreement" between Canada and Japan, External Affairs requested that the Prime Minister, Louis St Laurent, ratify the agreement in Tokyo while he was on his Asian tour.<sup>98</sup> The agreement was thus ratified, and it

displaced for the time being doubts Canada had about Japan's unfair pre-war trading practices.

Overall, the figures for Canadian-Japanese import and export trade were relatively small from 1946 to 1947, but the volume of trade increased after 1948. Japan was Canada's fourth largest trading partner in 1951, its third largest from 1953 to 1955. Improved economic relations together with an expanding Canadian export trade were significant reasons for the change in Canada's attitude towards Japan. As table 6 indicates, Canada did not experience an unfavourable balance of trade. Besides, the favourable balance of trade was also an indication that Canada wanted to establish a very lucrative market in East Asia. The economic conditions present in this region after the war pointed towards Japan as the most favourable country for Canada to trade with.

Table 6  
Canadian Trade With Japan 1946-1957  
(Thousand of Dollars) 99

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Canadian Balance</u>
1946	3	1,027	+ 1,024
1947	350	559	+ 209
1948	3,140	8,001	+ 4,861
1949	5,551	5,860	+ 309
1950	12,087	20,533	+ 8,446
1951	12,577	72,976	+ 60,399
1952	13,162	102,603	+ 89,441
1953	13,629	118,568	+104,939
1954	19,197	96,474	+ 77,277
1955	36,718	90,893	+ 54,175
1956	60,826	127,870	+ 67,044
1957	61,605	139,152	+ 77,547

Canadian import and export trade with Japan between 1946 and 1947 was below a million dollars. Import trade increased steadily from 1948 to 1957, going from \$3.1 million in 1948 to \$61.6 million in 1957. This increase was true, too, for export trade, which climbed from \$8 million in 1948 to \$118 million in 1953. There was a slight drop in trade between 1954 and 1955, but export trade picked up again between 1956 and 1957. In 1956, Japan was still Canada's fourth largest market, and by 1957, it was Canada's fifth most important trading partner in imports and fourth most important in export trade. Compared to that of Britain and the United States, trade with Japan was lesser in volume, but there were two consolations. First, what Canada lost in trade with China after 1949, it gained by trading with Japan; secondly, Canada had a favourable balance of trade with Japan.

Policymakers in Ottawa utilized the doctrine of material self-help to create an orderly world community. The promotion of multilateral trade in North America, Western Europe, and in Asia was an important means for promoting material self-help to benefit Canada. Canadian officials did not hesitate to use ideological reasons for enhancing their nation's goals of economic self-interest. But they wavered and procrastinated in making decisions on economic and political issues that would be disadvantageous to the country. Canada's arms trade with India and Pakistan between 1950 and 1952, during the peak of the Korean war, indicated how ideology affected trade. Both of these South Asian countries faced the threat of aggression from China and the Soviet Union. Canada experienced less success in its attempts to sell arms to



Indonesia, mainly because of the unstable political situation there and the pressure put on Canada by Britain and the United States. British and American officials were apprehensive that arms sold to Indonesia would in turn be traded by dissident elements to insurgents in Malaya and the Philippines.

An ideological basis for enhancing Canada's own interests was also applied to Japan. Canada wanted to ensure that Japan did not move toward the Communist bloc. Consequently, Canada traded with Japan, and imports from and exports to Japan grew steadily after 1946. By 1957, when the St Laurent government was defeated in the federal election by John Diefenbaker and his Conservative Party, Japan was Canada's fourth largest export trading partner. In that same year and in all three regions of Asia -- South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia -- the balance of trade worked in favour of Canada. Although Canadian trade in Asia was relatively small compared to the national total, Canadian self-interests were well served.

There was another area trade interests were linked to, and that was Canada's foreign aid programme. It was in this aspect of Canadian foreign policy that Canadian national interests were also advanced.

## Notes to Chapter Two

1. Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 123. See also John Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1 The Early Years, 1906 - 1946 (Montreal and Kingston, 1990), pp. 296 - 298.
2. Doug Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State 1900 - 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 301.
3. Ibid. See also David M. L. Farr, "A View of History in the Making of Canada's External Policies," Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers (Ottawa, 1978), pp. 1 - 17. He noted that the Department of External Affairs relied "heavily on perceptions of the past in developing rationales for decisions." p. 2.
4. Creighton, The Forked Road, p. 123. See also C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 1, p. 15. He commented on the significance of economic policy in foreign affairs: "For all countries economic policy is a vital aspect of foreign policy, simply because it affects the livelihood of so many citizens. For Canada it is particularly vital...."
5. Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism, revised edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 62 - 63.
6. L. Dana Wilgress, Canada's Approach to Trade Negotiations, The Canadian Trade Committee Private Planning Association of Canada, May 1963, p. 16.
7. Bothwell, et. al., Canada since 1945, p. 63.
8. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 3.
9. Wilgress, Canada's Approach, p. 15.
10. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 2, p. 386.
11. Wilgress, Canada's Approach, p. 15.
12. Bothwell, et. al., Canada since 1945, p. 65 - 66.
13. Wilgress, Canada's Approach, p. 20. The treaty signed between Canada and the United States on November 15, 1935, was the first one since 1854. "By the terms of the treaty, Canada and the United States granted each other most-favoured-nation status. In Canada's case, this meant the intermediate as against the preferential British rate." See also Edelgard E. Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations, second edition (Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson, 1989), p. 148.

14. NAC, Department of External Affairs Records, RG 25, Acc 86-87/159, vol. 31, file 6750-40, pt. 1, H. R. Kemp to M. W. Mackenzie, July 19, 1945.
15. O. Mary Hill, Canada's Salesman to the World: The Department of Trade and Commerce 1892 - 1939 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), p. 570.
16. NAC, RG 19, E-3 (K) 2, vol. 3612, "Post-War International Economic Policy," see comments by Dr. W. A. Mackintosh, March 12, 1943. See also NAC, Louis St Laurent Papers, MG 26, L, vol. 345, see the article from the Winnipeg Free Press, October 31, 1949. These senior officials and others - A. F. W. Plumptre, M. W. Mackenzie and H. F. Angus - echoed the principles of the economic policy found in the Atlantic Charter and Article 7 of the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941. See also NAC, RG 25, Acc 86-87/159, vol. 31, file 6750-40, pt. 1, address by M. W. Mackenzie, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce at the Fifth National Foreign Trade Conference of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce held at Vancouver, May 21, 1947.
17. LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, p. 164.
18. NAC, MG 26, L, vol. 345, file: St Laurent 1946 - 1948, "Pearson sees Trade As [A] Diplomatic Concern."
19. Bothwell, et. al., Canada since 1945, p. 61.
20. Hill, Canada's Salesman, p. 568. She also noted that the foundation for a Canadian foreign commercial service with "representatives in all parts of the world" had been in place by 1939. p. 567.
21. NAC, Douglas LePan Papers, MG 31, E 6, vol. 3, file 25, L. D. Wilgress to Douglas V. LePan, August 21, 1952.
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23. DEA, Annual Report, 1950, p. 17.
24. George Heasman, interview, Ottawa, June 3, 1989.
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27. Quoted in J. King Gordon, The New International Economic Order, Behind the Headlines Series 34:5 (1976), p. 6.
28. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials, and U. S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 28.
29. Ibid., p. 29.

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31. Munro and Inglis, Mike, 1, pp. 289 - 90.
32. L. B. Pearson, "The Colombo Conference," Statements and Speeches, 50/6, 1950, p. 10. (Hereafter S/S).
33. Ibid.
34. Robert Bothwell and John English, "Canadian Trade Policy in the Age of American Dominance and British Decline, 1943 - 1949," Canadian Review of American Studies 8:1 (Spring 1977), pp. 52 - 53.
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37. Ibid.
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42. Adapted from Canada Year Book, 1946 - 1959, see section on external trade.
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45. Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, Ottawa, 1946, p. 5.
46. Ibid., 1948, p. 1.
47. Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Annual Report, 1949, p. 9.
48. Ibid.
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50. Ibid., 1951, p. 1.

51. Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Annual Report, 1950, p. 19.
52. Ibid., 1953, p. 15.
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64. Ibid., p. 432.
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68. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86-87/159, box 27, file 5495-G-40, vol. 1, "Indonesia and Southeast Asia," see p. 2, Canadian Policy on Southeast Asia.

69. NAC, RG 25, vol. 2201, file 11044-AY-40, pt. 1. See also in full, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia to Minister for External Affairs, Ottawa, July 9, 1952.
70. Adapted from Canada Year Book, 1950 - 1959, see section on external trade.
71. Adapted from Canada Year Book, 1950 - 1959, see section on external trade. These figures do not reflect Canada's contributions to the Colombo Plan, of which India received the largest amount (see chapter 3, Table 8). This explains the apparent decline in the Canadian balance of trade with India. The increase in the balance of trade in 1952 and 1953 was due to a larger volume in the arms trade.
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73. Ibid.
74. Adapted from Canada Year Book, 1950 - 1959, see section on external trade.
75. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86-87/160, vol. 117, file 10389 - 40, pt. 2, Address by the Prime Minister of Canada to Hon. Louis St Laurent, Women's Club, Victoria, British Columbia, September 5, 1952.
76. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86-87/160, vol. 117, file 10389-40, pt. 1., "Canadian Trade With Japan," January 12, 1953. See also note on "Canadian Trade With Japan," January 12, 1953.
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82. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86/87/159, vol. 54, file 10389-40, pt. 1., memorandum for Cabinet, March 18, 1949.

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84. NAC, RG 25 G2, vol. 1-FP, file 6750-40, Interdepartmental Sub-Committee on External Trade Policy, August 11, 1948.
85. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86-87/159, vol. 54, file 10389-40, pt. 1., memorandum for Mr. Anderson, March 17, 1949.
86. NAC, Records of the Privy Council Office, Central Registry Files (hereafter PC Records), RG 2, 18, vol. 193, file T-50-J. J. T. Stirrett, General Manager, to L. B. Pearson, SSEA, March 3, 1949. See also Stirrett's letter of December 23, 1948.
87. NAC, RG 20, vol. 1987, file: Meeting of Seven Officials, pt. 1., January 17, 1949.
88. NAC, RG 2, 18, vol. 193, file T-50-1, Vol. 2, Interdepartmental Sub-Committee on External Trade Policy, April 20, 1953, p. 3.
89. L. B. Pearson, "The Colombo Conference," External Affairs 2:3 (March 1950), p. 89.
90. Pringsheim, Neighbors, p. 113.
91. Ibid., p. 114.
92. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86-87/159, vol. 54, file 10389-40, pt. 1., "The Questions of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment For Japan," February 27, 1952.
93. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86-87/160, vol. 117, file 10389-40, pt. 2., memorandum to Economic Division, July 2, 1952.
94. Pringsheim, Neighbors, p. 116. The fisheries agreement is well summarized here.
95. NAC, PC Records, RG 2, vol. 2653, Cabinet Conclusions, "Trade Negotiations with Japan," p. 3. September 29, 1953.
96. NAC, PC Records, RG 2, vol. 2655, Cabinet Conclusions, May 25, 1954.
97. Pringsheim, Neighbors, p. 118. For a good coverage of Canadian Japanese trade relations between 1952-1957, see Pringsheim, pp. 113 - 148.
98. NAC, PC Records, RG 25, Acc 86-87/160, vol. 117, file 10389-40, pt. 5., memorandum for the Minister, "Agreement on Commerce with Japan," January 18, 1954.
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### CHAPTER THREE

#### HUMANITARIANISM: THE LEAST OF THESE MY BRETHREN

Canada's decision "to participate in the Colombo Plan was the most revolutionary of the four revolutionary changes in Canadian foreign policy which took place from 1947 to 1952."<sup>1</sup> The other three changes were Canada's participation in the North Atlantic Alliance, its support of India's membership in the Commonwealth, and its decision to join the United Nations forces in the Korean war. Canada endorsed humanitarianism as the third tenet of its foreign policy in Asia when it joined the Colombo Plan. Humanitarianism involved promoting the welfare of the poorer nations through foreign aid from the richer nations. Yet like so much else, humanitarianism in Asia was tied to broader policy concerns. In the war for men's minds, External Affairs officials recognized that foreign aid would be one weapon to defeat totalitarianism and the spread of Communism. While humanitarian motives were a major reason for Canadian involvement in the Colombo Plan, the merger of political and economic factors played an important part in Canada's decisions to contribute to foreign aid. Thus, idealism acquiesced in the objectives of national self-interest, and humanitarianism and national self-interest remained complementary rather than contradictory.

When Canada considered participating in Southeast Asian defence arrangements, it had the North Atlantic Treaty as its model. In the case of foreign aid, however, there was no previous arrangement to use as a precedent. The only example to draw from was the American model of



the Marshall Plan, whose chief architect, George C. Marshall, was the United States Secretary of State from 1947 to 1951. While America would supply financial aid for a programme of economic recovery in Europe, the Marshall Plan "sought to contain Communism using American economic power."<sup>2</sup>

Canada supported the American effort to contain Communism. External Affairs welcomed the Marshall Plan to bring order out of chaos, to replace poverty with prosperity, and to clothe and feed the hungry in Western Europe. In addition, foreign aid was recognized as the key with which to unlock the door of hope and to rebuild Europe's industrial and technical base destroyed by the war.<sup>3</sup> Canada accepted the Marshall Plan and contributed to it. But when the plan was first put forth, Canadian officials had reservations about the implementation of the aid programme in Western Europe and whether such a plan could be used as a model in Asia. In the case of Western Europe, officials worried about the impact aid would have on Canadian trade. In the spirit of multilateralism, the Department of Trade and Commerce was apprehensive as to "what would become of Canada's exports if European purchases of goods under the Marshall Plan were restricted to the United States."<sup>4</sup> The Americans, who wanted Canada to remain a staunch ally, quelled Canadian fears by reassuring Canada that the Europeans would be permitted to purchase Canadian goods with American dollars.<sup>5</sup>

The other reservation Trade and External Affairs officials had was whether the Marshall Plan could be used as a model for Asia. They were

quick to acknowledge that Asia did not possess "an advanced technology with a trained population [or] a basic infrastructure including an established administrative framework" such as the Western European countries had.<sup>6</sup> What the Asians possessed in technology and industry had to be expanded, improved and updated. In addition to the difference in technological expertise, two other conditions existed in Asia that set it apart from Europe. One concerned the role of Communism and the other involved Asia's balance of payments. Officials in External Affairs anticipated that China would play the same role in Asia as the Soviets did in Eastern Europe, but this relationship did not materialize. China did not intervene in the affairs of Asia directly except in North Korea in 1950 and Tibet in 1951.<sup>7</sup> In spite of China's lack of involvement, External Affairs did not totally accept the notion that it would remain dormant. Where the economy was concerned, the Asian countries did not face immediate balance of payment difficulties as did Western Europe. Therefore, the United States paid more attention to Europe. But in the meantime, "Marshall Plan assistance had acquired its own momentum," and by 1949, Europe was beginning to stand on its own feet and the United States "was able increasingly to transfer its money and its attention to Asia."<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the Marshall Plan, there were some significant political and economic developments from 1947 to 1949 that influenced Canada's participation in the Colombo Plan. Decolonization was taking place and countries were struggling to maintain internal stability amid threats of civil war. The push towards independence and self-government

was not always accompanied by positive political, social and economic results. In the area of economics, Asian countries continued to battle economies damaged by the war and plagued by increased population and widespread poverty. Canadian officials hoped that these conditions in South and Southeast Asia could be improved through a programme of foreign aid.

In South Asia, both India and Pakistan became independent on August 15, 1947. Independence was achieved after lengthy political disputes over the type of government each country, one predominantly Hindu, the other Moslem, wanted to establish. In addition, the territorial dispute over Kashmir was a post-war problem these two countries inherited, and it remained a thorn in the flesh of India and Pakistan for a long time to come.

Ceylon (Sri Lanka) was fortunate to escape the religious problems faced by India and Pakistan, but separatist and leftist groups lurked in the background of this supposedly tranquil country. In 1948, under the leadership of D. S. Senanayake of the United National Party, Ceylon declared its independence, but following the examples of its sister countries in South Asia, it remained within the Commonwealth. Two years later in 1950, Senanayake was one of two Commonwealth officials who was responsible for placing the idea of an economic plan on the agenda of the Colombo Conference.<sup>9</sup>

The process of decolonization was riddled with civil war not only in South Asia but in Southeast and East Asia too. On January 4, 1948, Burma declared its independence from Britain and chose to remain outside the Commonwealth. The path to Burmese independence and the road thereafter were laden with political turmoil and bloodshed. Prior to independence, Aung San, a Burman political leader and president of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, was assassinated along with seven of his associates on July 19, 1947. His death "removed from the political scene the one figure who had been able to bridge the warring political factions."<sup>10</sup> U Nu, who succeeded him "had neither the support of the army nor the trust of the Communists that Aung San had managed to hold."<sup>11</sup> After independence (Thakin) U Nu witnessed the economy of his newly independent country devastated by intertribal warfare.<sup>12</sup>

When political turmoil accompanied decolonization, it delayed the movement towards independence. In Indonesia, the Dutch fought to preserve what they considered was rightfully theirs politically and economically. They tried to institute "rust en orde" (calm and order), but a long and bitter struggle ensued between the colonials and the colonized. As David Steinberg and other Southeast Asian historians have noted, this struggle dragged on until the Dutch were willing to sit down and negotiate the passage of independence with the republican leaders of Indonesia and eventually allow them to take hold of the reins of government. It was on December 27, 1949, that "the Dutch flag was hauled down for the last time."<sup>13</sup> With independence, Sukarno and his

colleagues in the Indonesian Nationalist Party were faced with the dual challenge of bringing about political unity of a motley group of political and religious movements and bolstering the country's economy.

Next door to Indonesia, in Malaya, the granting of independence was delayed by the British colonial government's declaration of the Emergency against the insurgents from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). These bandits began to systematically assassinate British officials, planters and miners. The aim of the MCP was to remove the British and to declare independence for Malaya. While the Emergency had a shattering effect on the socio-political structure in Malaya, it also had devastating consequences for the rubber industry and thus for world trade, especially since Malaya was a principal supplier of the world's rubber.

Another country torn by insurrection in Southeast Asia was the Philippines. Under the charismatic leadership of Luis Taruc, whom External Affairs officials viewed as the leader of the Philippine Communists, the agrarian Hukbalahaps began to agitate against the Filipino government to redress the grievances of the peasants.<sup>14</sup> The government sought to uproot this left-wing movement, which had originally been established as a movement to eliminate the Japanese, but it failed partly due to the country's economic problems and the political corruption that was rife within the government. What helped to paralyze the Huks was American aid given to the government of Ramon Magsaysay. In turn, the newly elected president of the Philippines used

military force to break the backbone of the Huks.<sup>15</sup> From the Canadian perspective, the fear among External Affairs officials was that Luis Taruc had "connections with the Chinese Communists and the leaders of other Communist movements in the Far East."<sup>16</sup>

One of the Communist groups Taruc was supposed to have contacted was the Viet-Minh in Indochina. As with much of Southeast Asia, Indochina after the Japanese occupation was torn apart by political turmoil and civil war. The uncompromising attitude of the French toward nationalist aspirations was met with stiff resistance by Ho Chi Minh and his followers. The aims of the Viet-Minh were similar to the goals of the Chinese communists in Malaya; the studied purpose of the Viet-Minh was to eliminate colonialism and unite the country. What resulted was not independence but a prolonged battle between the French and the Viet-Minh that eventually ended with a French defeat in 1954.

The political unrest and civil war which characterized much of South and Southeast Asia were generally present in the East Asian region, especially in China and Korea. In Japan, while the Far Eastern Commission worked out the terms of the Japanese surrender, the reconstruction of the country's political, constitutional and economic structures took priority. The war-weary Japanese made the rebuilding of post-war Japan their main aim because they wanted to find a niche in the new world order, and the means by which they would find a place in the world would be through trade.

As with Japan, the Allies' plans for Korea, a former Japanese colony, were laid before the war ended. At Yalta, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill hoped for the unification of the two Koreas, but this never materialized. North and South Korea were occupied by Soviet and American forces respectively, and the elections planned for both Koreas were not held. What resulted was a country divided along the 38th parallel; the Republic of South Korea was proclaimed on August 15, 1948, and on September 9, 1948, the Korean People's Democratic Republic came into existence.

In China, civil war prevailed even after the surrender of the Japanese on August 15, 1945. Communist and nationalist forces battled each other for the control of the country. Though Mao's Communist forces triumphed and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China came into effect on October 1, 1949, the animosity between Mao Tse-tung on the mainland and Chiang Kai-shek on the island of Taiwan continued. The role Communist China might play and the influence it could exert on Asian affairs became the concern of several Canadian officials. China's potential ideological influence on Asia was also a concern of the British foreign service and the United States State Department.

Apart from decolonization, insurrections, civil wars, the fear of Communism, and economic concerns made South and Southeast Asia a focus of international affairs in the immediate post-war era. The decline of British foreign exchange reserves spelled economic disaster for the sterling and soft currency countries in the region. In addition, these

countries had to be rescued from poverty and food shortages.<sup>17</sup> Ironically, South and Southeast Asia were rich in natural resources, and prior to the war had "supplied other countries of the world with a third of their oils and fats, nearly two-thirds of their tin, more than three-quarters of their tea, almost all their jute and rubber. These commodities were paid for by the industrial products of the West - textiles, machinery, iron and steel."<sup>18</sup>

Adding to poverty and food shortages was the problem of increased population growth not only in India but in the whole region of South and Southeast Asia. The main concern in connection with the increased growth in population was whether there would be sufficient food to feed the extra mouths.<sup>19</sup> It was natural for countries such as India to blame former colonial governments for some of the "economic maladies" of this region, and undoubtedly part of the problem was caused by them. The countries in South and Southeast Asia had not yet requested aid. Consequently, what was needed were "salvage men" - that is, "post-revolutionary leaders" - who could usher in economic and social reform. There were enough people in the governments and the civil service of India, Pakistan and Indonesia who could help in the process of economic renewal, but what was also needed to quicken the pace of recovery was help from outside the region.<sup>20</sup>

Such help arrived in the form of an economic recovery plan, somewhat similar to the Marshall Plan, that countries such as Australia, Britain and Canada agreed to implement in South and Southeast Asia. It would



eventually be called the Colombo Plan. From January 9 to 15, 1950, three months after the formation of the People's Republic of China, Commonwealth foreign ministers and economic officials met in Colombo, Ceylon, to lay the foundation for a foreign aid scheme for South and Southeast Asia. This conference was significant because it was "the first time that India, Pakistan and Ceylon attended such a meeting on a basis of complete equality and with a background of absolute sovereignty and self-determination."<sup>21</sup> The other countries in attendance were Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand.

At the Colombo Conference the Canadian delegation, headed by Lester B. Pearson, learned first-hand about the nature of the major problems -- Communism, civil war, decolonization, economic and social reform -- that Asians were confronted with. The conference also gave the Canadian officials an opportunity to contemplate making Canada a donor country to help solve the problems of inflation, unemployment, poverty and overpopulation. Participation in aid programmes was not a new experience in itself for Canada, but being involved in the Colombo Plan was novel and revolutionary because previous Canadian aid measures in Asia were minuscule.

### Humanitarianism and Aid

The Colombo Plan was a revolutionary development in Canadian foreign policy. This was not Canada's first experience in foreign aid participation but it became a precedent because of the degree of

Canada's commitment and the way in which this commitment evolved. Government sponsored foreign aid was primarily a post World War II phenomenon. Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries, although not official representatives of the Canadian government, were responsible for much of the pre-war humanitarian gestures. After 1945, however, officials in External Affairs, who subscribed to the tenets of Christian benevolence, worked through the United Nations to provide multilateral relief for nations devastated by the war.

The saving of souls and not the correction of social inequalities or the development of economics was the main aim of the missionaries.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, in their efforts to convert Asians, they became agents of economic and social improvement. To be successful, missionary work relied on financial contributions. To meet the financial needs of the mission fields they were working in, the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, and the United Church raised large sums of money for China, Japan and Korea,<sup>23</sup> probably more than \$1 million in 1935 alone.<sup>24</sup> While this large contribution was used to win converts to Christianity, missionaries, especially from the United Church tradition, also accepted the philosophy that "the justice of any social and economic system was shown by its consideration for the weak, the widows and the hired labourers."<sup>25</sup> They saw their work as contributing to this doctrine of social justice and humanitarianism.

Although Christian missionaries were not employed by the DEA, officials from the DEA, such as Ralph Collins, Arthur Menzies, Herbert

Norman, Lester Pearson, Escott Reid and Chester Ronning, who were the sons of ministers and missionaries, also adhered to the doctrine of social justice. These diplomats were sympathetic with the work of Christian missionaries, but they realized that first and foremost they were officials of the state and that it was their duty to separate the activities of church and state. Nevertheless, they did not totally lay aside their humanitarian upbringings when developing foreign aid policies.<sup>26</sup> In fact, there was a strong component of humanitarianism underlying basic policies. They were officials of the state, yet their foreign aid goals resembled those of religious missionaries; consequently they may be termed "secular missionaries".

In the post-war era, these officials, working primarily in conjunction with the Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada, supported United Nations-sponsored contributions in the form of grants and loans for relief and reconstruction. Canada contributed to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) programme to help repair the "economies damaged and dislocated by the war."<sup>27</sup> It was through participation in UNRRA that the DEA "got directly involved...in Canadian aid abroad. Moreover, UNRRA constituted the first substantial aid programme to be mounted on a pooled, multinational basis."<sup>28</sup> The DEA wanted Canada to accept its share of the load.<sup>29</sup> This was evident, too, in post-UNRRA relief. In addition to this UN relief aid, Canada made contributions to the International Children's Emergency Fund in the form of clothing, food and medicine for "victims of aggression."<sup>30</sup> In addition to UNRRA, Canada joined

another post-war aid programme. In 1949, the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance [EPTA] was established "to co-ordinate previously disjointed U.N. technical assistance."<sup>31</sup> Through this body, the Canadian government made major financial contributions to four specialized UN agencies: the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Labour Organization (ILO).<sup>32</sup> Grants were also made to the International Refugee Organization for Palestinian refugees and to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). While Canada advanced more in credits and loans to the United Kingdom and other foreign governments from 1945 to 1951, Canadian contributions to external relief programmes through the United Nations was much less, but it provided the DEA with a base to work with if called upon to consider further aid programmes. (See Table 7)<sup>33</sup>

Participation in multilateral grant-giving through the UN seemed to become a sacred part of Canadian foreign aid. With the advent of the Cold War, Canada continued to make contributions to an organization dedicated to peace and the welfare of mankind. When the time arrived for Canada to join the Colombo Plan programme, the DEA "did not want to see the UN undercut in its aid programmes."<sup>34</sup> However, Canada found it difficult to free itself from Cold War politics, a fact which was evident in the political and economic reasons for Canada's involvement in the Colombo Plan.

Table 7

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO RELIEF PROGRAMMES

1945 - 1951  
[Figures in Millions of Dollars]<sup>33</sup>

	<u>1945-46</u>	<u>1946-47</u>	<u>1947-48</u>	<u>1948-49</u>	<u>1949-50</u>	<u>1950-51</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
UNRRA	142.9						142.9
Military Relief	34.5						34.5
Post-UNRRA Relief			16.9	0.3			17.2
I.R.O.			5.5	5.4	5.8	2.1	18.8
UNICEF					1.1	0.6	1.7
Arab Refugees						1.5	1.5
U.N. Technical Assistance					0.85	0.85	
Commonwealth Technical Assistance						0.4	0.4
TOTALS	<u>177.4</u>	<u>      </u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>5.45</u>	<u>217.85</u>

Along with political and economic aspects, humanitarianism was one of the three main reasons for Canadian participation in the Colombo Plan. In his book Democracy In World Politics, Lester Pearson cited humanitarianism as the foremost reason for providing aid to Asia.<sup>35</sup> National self-interest and the pursuit of peace were listed as secondary reasons. A similar order of priorities was echoed by Malcolm Macdonald, the United Kingdom's high commissioner to Canada, in a farewell address delivered at a dinner held by the Ottawa branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs on March 27, 1946. Macdonald pictured Canada as "a new moral force in the world." He based this assessment on the generosity of Canadian contributions to mutual aid programmes. The motives for Canadian participation in these programs - humanitarianism, enlightened self-interest - contributed to "the strength and purpose and wisdom of the nation."<sup>36</sup> In spite of his emphasis on humanitarianism, Macdonald saw enlightened self-interest as the main motive behind Canada's aid programme. A similar viewpoint was put forth by Hugh L. Keenleyside, who served as a Canadian diplomat in Tokyo from 1929 to 1935. In September 1950, he began a term in the United Nations as the director general of technical assistance administration. To Keenleyside, Canada was a "trustee of a great inheritance." Consequently, the country had a responsibility "to the people of the world who urgently needed the resources with which [Canadians] have been so generously endowed."<sup>37</sup> By participating in foreign aid, Canadians in turn would benefit themselves.

The part humanitarianism plays in decisions to provide aid to

foreign countries has become an issue for debate. Keith Spicer, in his discussion on Canada as a Samaritan state, has argued that when humanitarianism is the primary reason for providing foreign aid, it may be regarded as being too benevolent because "altruism as foreign policy is a misnomer, even if sometimes the fruits of policy are incidentally beneficial to foreigners." He further argued that the inclusion of humanitarian motives with other objectives of Canadian foreign policy is "to confuse policy with the ethics of individuals moulding it, to mix government objectives with personal motives."<sup>38</sup> Pearson may have denied that he mixed personal motives and government policy, but he agreed that moral, economic and political reasons were intertwined in Canada's aid programmes. Humanitarian motives, Pearson may have further noted, were complementary and not contradictory. As Bruce Thordarson has observed, it is difficult to divorce an individual's upbringing from his actions:

[Pearson] explained to Canadians why their country should become involved in foreign aid. If Asia were not to be conquered by Communism, he said, it was up to the countries of the free democratic world to prove that they could do more than the Soviet Union to improve the standard of living of the people of Asia. But while his support of foreign aid was at first motivated by political considerations of this kind, his Methodist-inspired humanism soon came to the fore. By 1955 he was defending foreign aid programmes on humanitarian grounds: 'If we of the West provide material aid only or primarily for cold war motives, we are likely to fail in achieving any good and permanent results'. Little by little a new and increasingly important aspect of Canada's external relations was developing.<sup>39</sup>

Political and economic reasons for wanting to participate in

foreign aid programmes may appear to contradict Pearson's essentially humanitarian motives. However, this apparent contradiction can be explained by comparing events which transpired between 1945 and 1950 with conditions that existed after 1950. With the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 and Canada's fear of the spreading influence of Chinese Communism, Pearson had political and economic reasons for providing aid to Asian countries. But with the end of the Korean crisis, Pearson turned once again to humanitarian arguments to gain support for the Colombo Plan in Canada. After 1950, Canada's major aid contributions were for relief purposes and were undertaken through the United Nations.

Consequently, being a provider for the needs of its "Asian brethren" was one reason for Canadian involvement in the Colombo Plan.<sup>40</sup> Political and economic factors were the other two reasons for providing aid to South and Southeast Asia. While the countries in these regions were rich in cultural traditions, they had to be liberated from poverty and economic chaos;<sup>41</sup> in addition, the Cold War added to the sense of urgency to save Asia, including South and Southeast Asia, from Communism.<sup>42</sup> Canada, as one of the western democracies, wanted peace and democracy in Asia rather than to witness the spread of totalitarianism and Communism.<sup>43</sup> Speaking on the need to preserve democracy, Pearson stated "that the stronger any nation is, the less likely it is to be attacked, and the less likely, therefore, war becomes."<sup>44</sup> This position was a reflection of the principles of post-war internationalism and liberal democracy.<sup>45</sup>



Pearson was sufficiently wise to recognize "that the forces of totalitarian expansion could not be stopped by military power alone." He also realized that:

They could not be checked if, through stupidity or shortsightedness, totalitarianism were allowed to ally itself with the forces of national liberation and reform. If the region were not to be conquered by Communism, the free democratic world, including the Asian states themselves, would have to demonstrate that it was they, and not the Russians, who stood for liberation and social progress. The problem was for these states to show that by democratic methods they could improve the standard of living of the masses of their people. Their problem was one of self-help. Our problem...was one of mutual aid.<sup>46</sup>

Another individual who advanced the argument that mutual aid was necessary to battle Communism was R.G. Nik Cavell. In 1951 he was appointed administrator of the Colombo Plan economic development and technical co-operative division with the Department of Trade and Commerce. The main objective of the Colombo Plan, as Cavell saw it, was the need to prevent "the spread of Communism in Asia."<sup>47</sup> He took the official position for providing foreign aid and stressed the main aim of the Plan at a meeting of senior officials of the Department of Trade and Commerce in 1952, stating "that the Colombo Plan was initially devised to make friends of the Eastern nations involved in order to keep them from behind the Iron Curtain."<sup>48</sup> Cavell consistently pushed the official position that aid was necessary to fight the war for men's minds. In a speech to the Empire Club of Canada in 1952, he spoke to a group of converts. Drawing a line from Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address, Cavell noted "that a nation cannot exist half-slave and

half-free. World events today show that a free democratic world cannot exist half-fed and half-starved," and it was for this reason that Canada should be "concerned with the maintenance of a free democratic world."<sup>49</sup>

As early as March 31, 1950, two and a half months after the initial meeting of those concerned with the Colombo Plan, officials in the DEA saw the need to provide South and Southeast Asia with economic aid so that this region would not succumb to "the spread of Communism from China."<sup>50</sup> In linking political factors to economic ones, the DEA accepted the fact that the most important problem after decolonization was the need to find solutions to poverty and disease. The standard of living in Southeast Asia could be raised with the help of foreign aid, but there was no doubt that such a position was self-serving. Canada and the other Colombo Plan donors would strengthen their economies by helping the poor nations. This factor, of course, tied aid to trade. What self-interest did for the Colombo Plan donors was to leave them to Communist accusations that their aid was part of a neo-colonial scheme. But as Guy Wint observed: "The Colombo Plan is based on the principle that economic advance is possible under a system of liberal government and by use of capital borrowed at home and abroad. Its sponsors believe that new capital is still the best instrument by which to effect rapid economic change without inflicting great hardship upon the peoples whose lives are to be transformed."<sup>51</sup>

There was no doubt that Canada, along with Australia, Britain and the United States, took advantage of the economic opportunities in South and Southeast Asia in order to prevent the Soviets from doing so. In fact, there were two instances where the Soviet Union gained an advantage. Speaking at the directors' meeting of the Department of Trade and Commerce, Nik Cavell warned that the Soviet Union was gaining an economic edge in South and Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union, he noted, could have been prevented from marketing Burmese rice. Burma produced excellent rice in the post-war period but lost some markets in Southeast Asia because countries in this region could not purchase Burmese rice. According to Cavell, "The imaginative thing to have done would have been to move in and buy her rice surpluses and distribute them to the countries who needed her rice but could not afford to buy it."<sup>52</sup> This solution was suggested by the Burmese but the western democracies did not buy the idea. The Soviets did, however, and thus won an economic and psychological victory in Asia. Cavell was critical of the fact that a similar victory was won by the Soviets through their building of a steel mill in India.<sup>53</sup> He could not comprehend that in the battle against Soviet Communism, the western democracies would be "so fearful in coming down on the side of the free system of capitalism under which we prosper."<sup>54</sup> The answer to such a problem for Cavell was found in the Colombo Plan.

The Colombo Plan - A Merger of Political and Economic  
Interests and the Influences Behind it

The original meeting of the Colombo Plan organizers held, in Colombo, Ceylon was principally a meeting of Commonwealth foreign ministers, but Commonwealth economic officials also met to discuss the sterling issue and other economic matters. The foreign ministers also dealt with broad issues such as "the general international situation; the Chinese situation; the Japanese peace treaty; the situation in Southeast Asia; the situation in Europe, more particularly the development towards European political and economic union and the effect of such development on the Commonwealth of Nations."<sup>55</sup> The merger of political and economic interests was the factor which made the Colombo Plan possible. The foreign ministers and economic officials were interested in South and Southeast Asia's position in international affairs because of its strategic and economic importance.

While Commonwealth foreign ministers discussed the broader political picture and the economic officials the sterling crisis, the merger of political and economic issues was "the comparatively accidental convergence of the two meetings in Colombo."<sup>56</sup> It seemed that fate brought about the merger, for it was not the studied purpose of the foreign ministers "to consider the economic problems of countries in the area and to discuss the granting of foreign aid."<sup>57</sup> Interestingly, Canada, and more specifically Lester Pearson, was given the credit for suggesting the marriage between the two meetings. As Douglas LePan

wrote:

At the end of the first meeting of foreign ministers, he suggested that it would be desirable to establish some contact between the ministerial meetings and the meetings of officials. He did not press the point. But it showed a prescience, to which he had not been prompted...by any of his advisers, and an instinctive understanding of the underlying fundamentals of a diplomatic situation. For, before the week was out, the two meetings were to come together.<sup>58</sup>

We do not have any information as to whether Pearson asked himself what Mackenzie King would have done at the Colombo meeting. It is also unknown whether he looked at the hands of the clock in the meeting room and indulged in numerology. But he saw the connection that existed between the two meetings. He was also aware of the complexity of international affairs and saw the need to be pragmatic. The need to be practical was, in a way, a necessity for Pearson and his country since he "was not in a position to be very forthcoming towards a nebulous and far-reaching scheme for continuing economic assistance to countries on the other side of the globe, especially at a time when Canada had recently entered into large new commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty."<sup>59</sup> Moreover, Pearson was aware that his government would be cautious about using taxpayers' money for a new foreign aid scheme, and he was also unsure of what the American position would be on the Colombo Plan.<sup>60</sup> Back in Ottawa, Pearson "received little support from other members of the Cabinet."<sup>61</sup> In spite of this lack of support, he remained convinced of the plan's worth.

From May 15 to 20, 1950, a follow-up meeting on the proposed Colombo

Plan was held at Admiralty House in Sydney, Australia. It was attended by delegates from Australia, Britain, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand and Pakistan. During this meeting the Colombo Plan consultative committee was established; co-operative assistance became a reality with the establishment of this body. The Colombo Plan was in actuality more of an arrangement than a plan; it has been described as "a purely permissive association. Nothing is done under its auspices to which any member government formally and firmly objects."<sup>62</sup> It was an arrangement which involved bilateral rather than multilateral aid, and such an arrangement was readily accepted, at least in principle, by Canada. Canada agreed that each of the Commonwealth nations should determine its own policy rather than have Britain dictate what the rest should do.

A second meeting of the Colombo Plan consultative committee was held in London, England, in September 1950. At this meeting the Colombo Plan Report was issued and the council for technical co-operation established.<sup>63</sup> It was also at this London conference that concrete plans were laid down for economic development in South and Southeast Asia. Interestingly, the outbreak of the Korean war stimulated the discussions, for it reinforced in the minds of the representatives of the participating countries that the possibility of aggression and the spread of Communism should be taken seriously. The countries co-operating in the Plan entered into bilateral agreements for capital assistance and agreed on specific development projects. It was at this stage that Canada pledged \$25 million towards the Colombo Plan. By

February 1951, the third meeting of the consultative group was held in Colombo, Ceylon, and it was at this meeting that the United States attended as a full member. By March 1952, a meeting of political and economic experts met in Karachi, Pakistan. Here, not only were the details of the Colombo Plan reviewed, but the member nations agreed that annual meetings would be held to monitor the progress of the plan. The original mandate of the Colombo Plan was to consist of a three-year tenure running from July 1, 1950, to July 1, 1953.

By the end of 1951, however, it was clear that the speed with which a scheme of this kind could be brought into operation had been over-estimated. Canada...agreed with other participating governments, therefore, that the Colombo Programme should continue to run for the same period as the economic development part of the Colombo Plan, that is, until June 30, 1957. 64

It was not accidental that the first and second meetings of the consultative committee were held in Sydney and London, since both Australia and Britain played crucial roles in the formation of the Colombo Plan. For the most part, their participation in the plan was motivated by self-interest. Australia was principally concerned about the revival of Japanese militarism and the spread of Communist aggression in its backyard. According to Guy Wint, British concerns centered on "peace and prosperity, and neither could be assured if so large a part of the world as South Asia was suffering from chronic instability."<sup>65</sup> After the Second World War, it became a British imperative "to give any aid within its power to help shore up the independent countries of South Asia in their zealous struggles to

organize their new life."<sup>66</sup> Britain, in turn, recognized that by fighting the battle against poverty and economic underdevelopment through aid and trade, its economic prosperity could be promoted. It was not coincidental, either, that the United States participated, since Australia and Britain wanted it to be part of the Colombo Plan. Both of these Commonwealth countries realized that the Americans held superiority in economic and military power in the post-war world.

Australia's foreign policy was oriented towards Asia, and especially Southeast Asia much more so than Canada's, and this was a major reason why Australia took a great interest in providing aid to South and Southeast Asia. Australia, in fact, has been given credit for developing the plan; the individual responsible was Sir Percy Spender, Minister for External Affairs. "Without him there might well have been no Colombo Plan."<sup>67</sup> The Spender Plan, as it became known, especially in Australia, was a plan that called for economic aid to solve the problem of poverty in South and Southeast Asia. Spender noted that Australia did not wish to change

the institutions of the Asian countries; it does not represent any attempt to bargain for their political allegiances, but it does recognize that poverty is both a fruitful field for disruptive political extremism and that wherever it exists in the world it in some way involves us all. The Plan looks to the ultimate defeat of poverty: it seeks ways in which peoples of the world can live at peace while accepting different institutions and ideas drawn from different upbringings, different cultures and different national standards.<sup>68</sup>



Lurking behind this humanitarian goal to eliminate poverty, however, was Australia's economic and strategic interest in Southeast Asia.

It was well known that Southeast Asia was an area potentially rich in natural resources and that it would be to Australia's economic advantage to tap these resources. In addition, Spender acknowledged that the Asian region "might make a substantial contribution towards [the] solution of the dollar problem."<sup>69</sup> Spender also emphasized the need for trade, since it would eliminate any misunderstanding about giving "handouts" to poor Southeast Asians; he noted that trade would be mutually beneficial both to Australia and Southeast Asia. Consequently, the Spender Plan became much broader in scope because it tied trade to foreign aid. Under this plan "trade, credit, technical assistance and supplies of both capital and consumer goods would circulate within the area."<sup>70</sup>

The other interest that Australia had in Southeast Asia was strategic. The blood debt of Japan had not been forgotten, and Australia wanted the reassurance that Japan would bury her ambitions for military conquest once and for all. Apart from the fear of Japanese military resurgence, the fear that Communism might spread in Southeast Asia made Australia a ready convert to the Kennan concept of containment. It was George Kennan, a United States State Department policy planner, together with President Harry Truman and Secretary of State General George C. Marshall, who wanted the United States to use the weapon of containment to block the spread of Communism by armed

intervention and/or economic assistance. This concept was first applied to Europe, but after 1949 it was applied to Asia.

Spender recognized that Australia's economic and strategic objectives for Southeast Asia would be realized with support from Commonwealth countries, including Canada. Realizing that Canada displayed a measure of reluctance to become fully committed to the Colombo Plan, Spender tried to convince Pearson that Canada should participate. Canada's participation could be accomplished by fully accepting "the recommendations concerning economic assistance in South and Southeast Asia" which were discussed at the Sydney conference of the Commonwealth consultative committee. The fundamental issue of the recommendations was that donor nations would contribute monetarily to the plan. Spender also added that not just Australia but the whole Commonwealth would benefit from Canada's participation.<sup>71</sup>

Britain and the United States also accepted Pearson's idea of the merger of the political and economic factors that eventually led to the establishment of a foreign aid scheme for South and Southeast Asia. The British and the Americans recognized the urgency to provide aid for a region torn by political turmoil. What Pearson had joined together, Canada's two other North Atlantic partners were not going to put asunder. But Britain's reasons for wanting to be involved in the Colombo Plan went much deeper than Canada's. As Lester Pearson noted, Britain attempted to "reconcile her European and her Commonwealth positions" as she confronted the Colombo Plan.<sup>72</sup> In actuality,

the Colombo Plan "was itself a part of a rather ambitious strategy in British foreign policy. The Second World War had made it clearer than ever that the future would be dominated by two super-powers, the USA and the Soviet Union. But in the post-war world the delimitation of their control remained unclear, and so did the role of the Europeans and of the empires they had controlled."<sup>73</sup> Within the context of this international situation, Britain sought to capitalize on the changing political and economic situation in South and Southeast Asia. The British, like the Australians, feared the spread of Communist influence in Southeast Asia. Britain continued to hold on to its remaining colonial possessions in Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. Britain did realize, though, that its continued presence in Southeast Asia would provide the Communists with an excuse to wage a battle against imperialism, since the Marxist-Leninist position called for decolonization and the elimination of western capitalism. Given the Communists' position, Britain needed a means by which to prevent Communism from winning a moral and political victory.

The urgent need to find a way to prevent a Communist victory in Asia became greater when the British in 1948 declared the Emergency in Malaya against the Chinese Communists, who wanted to overthrow the British colonial government. The sense of urgency increased in 1949 when Mao Tse-tung took over China. In Malaya, there was a large Chinese population, many of whom maintained strong ties with their homeland. Consequently, British administrators in Malaya feared that Chinese

Communism would not be confined to the Chinese mainland and that the expatriate Chinese, especially those sympathetic with Mao, would spread the heretical ideology of Communism and establish new military bases in Malaya as well as in other parts of Southeast Asia. The insurrection in Malaya and the establishment of the People's Republic of China made the British realize that something had to be done to ensure the political and economic stability of Southeast Asia.<sup>74</sup> It was also willing to solicit the help of the United States to rid not only Southeast Asia but all of Asia of Communism.<sup>75</sup>

The formation of a united front composed of the Commonwealth countries and the United States was one solution Britain put forth to combat Communism. These countries would act as a regional barrier against Communism and would help "to restore political and economic stability to South"<sup>76</sup> According to Malcolm Macdonald, the British commissioner-general for Southeast Asia, this regional buffer zone could be supported by "the equivalent of the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact" in the region. What Macdonald contemplated was tying foreign aid and defence; after all, "economic development would not of itself stop Communism."<sup>77</sup> But the British idea of a regional united front received a lukewarm response from the Americans, while the Dutch and French shrugged it off, since they still held on to their colonial possessions in Indonesia and Indochina respectively. But these considerations did not dampen the British interest in a united front.

The British were concerned about which country would lead the united front. Fearful of further accusations of "neo-colonialism", the British were hesitant to assume that role themselves. Canada could have served as leader, since it was free from the taint of imperialism, but it was not called upon to do so. Australia, too, could have assumed a leadership role but did not. Since the united front would include the Asian Commonwealth, it would have been logical to look to India to take charge of it. While Pandit Nehru might have agreed that India could assume that role, the British were reluctant to accept India; they were apprehensive that "Nehru might seek to build up a front on an anti-Western basis."<sup>78</sup> Such a position would certainly be unacceptable to Britain and the United States. Nehru did not take the western view that the Cold War in Asia was strictly "one of Communism versus anti-Communism;" indeed, he chastised the western democracies for overlooking the fact that nationalism was an essential doctrine in Asia's search "for collective political freedom."<sup>79</sup> India also questioned the strategic argument that a military pact would be the answer to Communist aggression.<sup>80</sup> Where Britain was concerned, it not only questioned India's ability to lead a united front, but it wondered whether the Asian nations would even accept India's leadership.

The British fear that Communism would destroy the political, economic and social stability of South and Southeast Asia was in actuality a lament for the loss of her political and economic influence in the region. Given its loss of colonial possessions in Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan, as well as the sterling crisis, it was natural that

Britain would accept "the Pearsonian merger" of political and economic measures as a solution to the question of aid for South and Southeast Asia. For the British this merger was, indeed, a face-saving device, but by accepting the merger, Britain also acknowledged the senior role Canada played in the Commonwealth.

It was the idea of political and economic merger that became the basis for the Colombo Plan. "The Colombo Plan that developed was in one sense a great success, but it fell short of achieving the optimistic goals in the minds of the British."<sup>81</sup> Britain had hoped for a military pact - the Pacific Pact - that would have provided a collective defence arrangement for the Pacific area. But in spite of not achieving all of its objectives, the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, who endorsed the Marshall Plan and who played a crucial role in reconciling Britain's European and Asian interests at the Colombo meeting, hailed the Colombo Plan as a successful example of East-West co-operation that was achieved "through the agency of the Commonwealth."<sup>82</sup> While Bevin did not set out to disprove Rudyard Kipling's maxim that "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet," he endeavoured to give Britain a renewed sense of effectiveness within the "new" Commonwealth.

Australia and Britain made significant contributions that brought about the creation of the Colombo Plan. Both countries had economic and strategic interests in South and Southeast Asia. Consequently, they were interested in seeking the United States' support for and

participation in the Colombo Plan. The United States, which initiated the Marshall Plan, would have readily accepted the idea of a union of political and economic concerns of the Colombo Plan to help fight Communism. It would have also wanted to protect its economic and military interests in Asia. After a year of adopting a wait-and-see policy, the United States became a member of the Colombo Plan, joining Australia and two of its traditional allies of the North Atlantic, Britain and Canada, on January 24, 1951.

As part of their policy of ensuring the furthering of their self-interests, Australia and Britain wanted American dollars to flow into South and Southeast Asia. This would not only stimulate trade but would help the sterling and soft currency countries in the region reduce their debts.<sup>83</sup> Australia and Britain also wanted American military support, although military support did not materialize until the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. While defence arrangements were acceptable to Australia, Britain and the United States, military pacts were less attractive to Canada. Having participated in the North Atlantic Pact, Canada did not wish to spread itself too thinly by being involved in any defence pacts in Asia. By not joining a defence pact in Asia, Canada maintained a practice established in World War II.

Although Canada did not want to be part of defence arrangements in Asia, it was willing to accept the economic advantages that would result from participating in a foreign aid programme. A message to that effect

had to be relayed to senior officials in Ottawa, but a telegram from Canberra to Ottawa, was delayed. In spite of this difficulty, Douglas LePan, Canada's leading economic official at the Colombo Plan meeting in Sydney, succeeded in keeping alive in "the minds of ministers and officials in Ottawa the importance of an initiative which [he] believed held great promise for the future." He also tried to convince his colleagues that participating in the Colombo Plan would "be of considerable economic advantage to Canada, however indirectly, if it facilitated a new flow of United States dollars into world trade."<sup>84</sup>

While Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States were eager to thwart the menace of Communism, these four countries also wanted to strengthen their individual economies. What became apparent was that practical considerations superseded moral considerations. Australia barely mentioned humanitarianism as a reason for its participation in the Colombo Plan, while Britain and the United States were reluctant to discuss that aspect openly. Canada, too, in spite of making humanitarianism the foremost reason for participating in a foreign aid plan, soon found itself subscribing to economic reasons as well. It was not the weak appeal to humanitarianism on the part of Australia and the absence of a humanitarian emphasis by Britain and United States that weakened Canada's stand on the idea of brotherhood as a motive for providing foreign aid; it was a fact of the post-war order that idealism by itself could not be sold successfully on the international scene. Nevertheless, humanitarian ideals were involved to help the Asian



nations save face and to enable Canadian officials to seek support for the plan at home. Even India, Pakistan and Ceylon acknowledged the need for practical economic assistance to solve the economic distress they were in. Furthermore, outside capital was needed for industrialization. These practical considerations had a stronger appeal than idealism.

Despite his defective understanding of the details of international political economy, Pearson intuitively saw a need to tie political and economic interests. In doing so, he did not ignore his colleagues' pertinent evaluations of the Colombo Plan. Pearson might be compared to a church minister making a call for an offering on behalf of the poor. He convinced his colleagues that Canadian foreign aid could be used as a means to thwart the tide of aggression and Communism. Countries faced with poverty could use capital and technical assistance to increase their industrial production, and aid could help the needy peoples of South and Southeast Asia to raise their standard of living.

#### **Canada and Examples of National Self-Interest in the Colombo Plan**

The Colombo Plan was an arrangement which provided a "useful framework to the donor members for promoting their political and economic interests" in South and Southeast Asia. The same was true of the recipient countries. India, the biggest recipient of Canadian foreign aid, found "the Plan equally useful for promoting her political

and economic interests in the area."<sup>85</sup> Similarly, the plan also became a useful tool for promoting Canadian national self-interest. In an address to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on March 19, 1954, A.D.P. Heeney, the Canadian ambassador to the United States, stated that "in our opinion [the Colombo Plan] is an enterprise of the highest importance and one which must not be allowed to fail."<sup>86</sup>

The importance and success of the Colombo Plan became evident as early as 1952. After visiting India and Pakistan in 1952, Nik Cavell assured senior officials in the Department of Trade and Commerce that the plan would increase Canadian trade in the region. It was significant that in the first aid appropriation of \$25 million, voted by Parliament in 1951-1952, \$15 million went to India and \$10 million to Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the greater contribution to India underscored its importance as a recipient country in the eyes of Canadians. One basic problem India faced was lack of food. Of the \$15 million given to that country, \$10 million was in the form of Canadian wheat. With a touch of humanitarian concern but one that was certainly not separated from national self-interest, Cavell stated that:

The Indian Government asked us for 10 million dollars worth of wheat to help her famine condition. It was never contemplated that the Colombo Plan should be a food relief measure, but, nevertheless, how could we refuse our Commonwealth partners, suffering from a severe famine? And so we resorted to the device of the counterpart fund. We sent the wheat and India created a counterpart fund of approximately its equivalent value in rupees, some at least of which she will obtain by the sale of the wheat to her Indian distributors.<sup>87</sup>

The money from the counterpart fund India established was used for the development of the Mayurakshi dam project in West Bengal.<sup>88</sup>

For Canada, the progress of the Colombo Plan programme in India was not free of problems. In 1955, after returning from a trip to India, Cavell reported on one aspect of the apparent progress of the plan to the officials in the Department of Trade and Commerce, stating that "a training plan had been set up to prepare people to go out into the villages and interest the peasants in improving communication, sanitation, housing accommodations, etc."<sup>89</sup> Cavell undoubtedly saw this programme as a means to strengthen the infrastructure of democracy in India, but he was quick to remind the officials that there was a shortage of Canadian technical personnel to train people in India. Cavell also lamented this shortage before the committee of External Affairs of the House of Commons. He noted that there was "a limit to the number of Canadians we can find and send out. In this connection, of course, the boom situation in Canada mitigates against us. It is not easy in the first place to find these highly trained men in Canada." Cavell further observed that Canada's difficulty in recruiting sufficient technical personnel was due to the reluctance of some to leave lucrative positions. Some of those who went to India demanded better living conditions, and others failed to adapt to their new social surroundings. Nevertheless, by the fall of 1955, Canada was able to send 57 experts overseas.<sup>90</sup>

While technical aid was an important aspect of the Colombo Plan, capital aid constituted its essential part. It was capital aid which "help[ed] to put a floor under the economic lives of the people of the country concerned."<sup>91</sup> Canada provided aid to build a dam in Masanjori, India, which was named the Canada Dam. Another was built at Warsak in Northwest Pakistan and named the Maple Leaf Dam.<sup>92</sup> The construction of this particular dam was beneficial to "some ten thousand troublesome Pathan tribesmen" who worked on the project, plus several hundred who "received skilled training of value on other power or irrigation projects."<sup>93</sup> The building of the dam not only provided necessary employment but also helped to quell a potential civil war involving the Pathan tribesmen.

In conjunction with capital aid projects, Canada supplied India, Pakistan and Ceylon with diesel and steam locomotives, equipment for airports and harbours, electrical and hydroelectric equipment, and copper and aluminum for industrial production. Canada also sold India a "high-powered atomic research and experimental reactor," similar to the one built at Chalk River, Ontario.<sup>94</sup> The reactor was installed at the government atomic research centre near Bombay, and it was made available to the scientists of the other Colombo Plan countries in Asia, a move which had the effect of defusing any criticism that Canada favoured India at the expense of other participating Colombo Plan countries, especially Pakistan. By the end of 1955, India had received the largest share of all allocations, commitments and expenditures for capital projects. The following figures bear this fact out:

**Table 8**  
**Colombo Plan Contributions to India and Pakistan 1951 - 1955**  
 [Figures in Millions of Dollars] 95

	<u>INDIA</u>	<u>PAKISTAN</u>
Allocated	\$ 55,125	\$ 47,734
Expended	40,808	21,053
Additional Commitments	8,196	8,131
Under Active Negotiation	3,125	13,977
Balance	2,995	4,573
Totals	<u>\$110,249</u>	<u>\$ 95,468</u>

The large allocations of Canadian foreign aid to India were a result of a combination of humanitarian, economic and political factors. In his report to the House of Commons standing committee on External Affairs in 1956, Cavell had to justify the motives for providing foreign aid. The Canadian public would have accepted a combination of all three reasons, but Mr. Flemming, a member of the House of Commons standing committee on External Affairs, saw Canadian participation in the Colombo Plan as economic self-interest.<sup>96</sup> Cavell did not disagree. Canada, Cavell observed, was in South and Southeast Asia to help create markets for itself. Markets were created indirectly, with Canadian capital invested in India, rather than directly, with Indian capital invested in Canada. Humanitarian motives were also questioned by members of the House of Commons standing committee for External Affairs in the light of "the probable effects of foreign aid upon the standards of life and productivity of its recipients."<sup>97</sup> Despite the fact that aid may not yield "spectacular transformations" because of "the Malthusian devil", and the possibility that aid recipients "with

measurable time would be able to stand alone", Cavell endeavoured to convince the committee that "there will be aid to those underdeveloped countries for as long as any of us in this room are alive, and even beyond that day in some form and some auspices."<sup>98</sup> He also recognized the biblical admonition that the poor, and in this case the underdeveloped nations, would always coexist with the rich.

National self-interest was evident as a motive not only for Canada's contributions to India but for those to Indonesia too. In 1953, Canada established diplomatic relations with Indonesia for trade and commercial purposes. That same year, Indonesia was represented as a full member at the fifth meeting of the consultative committee on co-operative economic development in South and Southeast Asia, held in New Delhi. The Indonesians were attempting to improve their economy after independence, but it was a slow process. Hit with high rates of inflation and unemployment, Indonesia desperately needed foreign aid.

Joining the Colombo Plan in 1953 was another way by which Indonesia could obtain the further technical and capital assistance that it badly needed. Indonesia was already receiving technical assistance from the United States and the United Nations, but because of budget restrictions, it failed to obtain more aid from UN specialized agencies.<sup>99</sup> Because of this predicament, Indonesia turned to the countries of the Colombo Plan for help. On the one hand, added assistance would give Indonesia the technical assistance it was looking for; on the other hand, aid would help "to establish a liaison with the

Asiatic Commonwealth countries, whose problems are analogous to those of Indonesia." Indonesia also recognized that "for training purposes, there are definite advantages in an exchange of personnel between underdeveloped countries, since the training received in advanced countries often [is] inapplicable to the situation."<sup>100</sup>

Along with its request for further aid, Indonesia asked for a team from the International Labour Organization to survey its manpower needs. The survey team discovered that there was a serious shortage of technical personnel, especially for the positions of foreman and subforeman in factories. While foreign-owned factories in Indonesia were run efficiently, "the factories run by Indonesians themselves lack trained personnel;"<sup>101</sup> consequently, Indonesia requested Colombo Plan technical assistance to help operate its factories. In addition, Indonesia required capital assistance, but its government did not want such aid if it would lead to inflation. In 1952 and 1953 Indonesia operated on a deficit budget because the government found it very difficult to trim its budget without causing manpower cuts. To ease this dilemma, Indonesia looked to capital projects for transportation and hydroelectric projects financed by foreign aid.

Indonesia turned to Canada for this aid. There was no doubt that Indonesia capitalized on the good relations that had been established with Canada since 1949. For Canada, it was an opportunity to strengthen its economic position in a country rich in raw materials. Indonesia looked to Canada because it "had [the technical] experts in the

specialized fields desired by Indonesia, because her sound financial position commanded respect and also because there were no bad political connotations connected with Canada."<sup>102</sup> Unlike the United States, Canada was not a military power. In addition, it did not possess colonial territories in Southeast Asia and thus had not left behind a trail of bad relations. Indonesia also wanted Canadian technical assistance because "Canadians are much more suitable and would receive a more enthusiastic welcome than experts from such countries as the Netherlands, the United States and Australia."<sup>103</sup>

Indonesia eventually received technical and capital assistance from Canada even though it was not for transportation and hydroelectric projects as had originally been anticipated. The Canadian contribution to Indonesia in 1953 was a trickle; nevertheless, it paved the way for further aid. One step Canada took was to conduct a survey in Indonesia on the need for technical education, which eventually led to the placement of 48 Indonesian trainees in Canada, 10 of whom were admitted to the universities of New Brunswick and Saskatchewan to pursue a BSc degree in engineering. Besides offering technical education, Canada also undertook an aerial survey of certain areas of Indonesia which was useful for the purposes of land development and the future exploitation of natural resources through mining.

By 1954 two realities were becoming evident: one, Indonesia wanted more aid from Canada, and two, the technical assistance contributions from Canada were steadily increasing. Between 1954 and 1955 Canada



contributed \$64,304, and just over twice that amount - \$148,324 - between 1955 and 1956. Its contributions tripled from 1956 to 1957, to \$215,650. Capital assistance may have been eclipsed by technical assistance, but in 1957, Canada allotted \$400,000 for road-building equipment in Northern Sulawesi.<sup>104</sup> Colombo Plan aid to Indonesia increased several times through the 1950s but aid remained very small compared to the millions of dollars given to the two Commonwealth countries of India and Pakistan. Evidently, Canadian aid to Indonesia was given as a measure of goodwill to a country that just happened to be rich in natural resources.

Undoubtedly, Canadian aid to South and Southeast Asia was motivated by the Cold War context. Lester Pearson recognized that "Canadian foreign policy was greatly influenced by [the] consciousness of two dangers: the 'aggressive imperialism' of the USSR and the increase of communism through the inability of countries to deal with their own economic and social problems."<sup>105</sup> Not only was there the danger of Indonesia's inability to deal with these problems, but there was also the danger of the Soviet Union gaining an economic advantage there. In 1953, the same year Canada established diplomatic relations with Indonesia, "the new Soviet leadership began to use economic assistance as an instrument of foreign policy." The Soviets had been "a late starter in the field" of foreign aid and wanted "to make up for lost time."<sup>106</sup> They were slowly but surely escalating their own battle between "good and evil" in Southeast Asia, recognizing that it was better late than never to prevent the United States and its allies from

triumphing in the Cold War. Consequently, the Soviets decided to provide aid to Indonesia as well as India and Burma. Given this situation, Canada considered its presence in Indonesia to be essential if it was going to help Indonesia become part of the western democratic bloc. But what became slowly evident was that the best means for helping Indonesia was through the economic aid programme of the Colombo Plan.

Although foreign aid was principally a post-World War II phenomenon, no policymakers in the DFA after 1945 would have thought that Canadian interests in South and Southeast Asia would take on the proportions they did through its involvement in Colombo Plan technical and capital aid. It was not difficult to participate in multilateral relief programmes administered by the United Nations specialized agencies. However, the idea of joining a foreign aid programme in Asia was a new one. By 1950 Canada had joined the Colombo Plan. Humanitarianism was cited as the main reason for Canada's involvement, but it soon became apparent that because of the context of the Cold War and the need to win on the economic front, national self-interest took precedence over humanitarian motives. But these motives complemented rather than contradicted the political and economic goals.

In the war between "good and evil", the question arose as to whether economic aid was sufficient to win it. It is by examining the tenet of collective security that one may be able to discover whether military measures and defence pacts were necessary to help Canada win this war.

### Notes to Chapter Three

1. Reid, Envoy to Nehru, p. 18. Jim McCardle, interview, Ottawa, June 11, 1989. McCardle noted that the Colombo Plan was "the most important single institution that drew Canada into Asian affairs." See also Escott Reid, "The Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy 1947 - 1951," New Delhi, Sapru House : Indian Council of World Affairs, 1958, p. 195. R. C. Bryce, Secretary of the Treasury Board, worked the Colombo Plan aid contributions into the budget. For Bryce, providing foreign aid to Asia was a new departure for Canadian foreign policy. R. C. Bryce, interview, Ottawa, May 30, 1989.
2. Richard S. Kirkendall, A Global Power: America since the Age of Roosevelt, second edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 25.
3. Creighton, The Forked Road, pp. 155 - 156.
4. Bothwell, et.al., Canada since 1945, p. 71.
5. Ibid.
6. John G. Hadwen, The Future of Aid and the Colombo Plan or Goodbye Victoria, unpublished manuscript, (August 1972), ch. 2
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 4.
9. Guy Wint, What is the Colombo Plan? (London: The Batchworth Press, 1952), p. 13.
10. Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, p. 396.
11. Ibid.
12. Wint, What is the Colombo Plan, p. 16.
13. Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, p. 422.
14. NAC, RG 25, vol. 3279, file 6809-40, "Canadian Consulate General In the Philippines," September 27, 1949, p. 2.
15. Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, pp. 433 - 434.
16. NAC, RG 25, vol. 3279, file 6809 - 40, "Canadian Consulate General In the Philippines," September 27, 1949, p. 2.
17. LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, pp. 212 - 213.
18. W. E. C. Harrison, Canada In World Affairs: 1949 to 1950 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 226.

19. Wint, What is the Colombo Plan?, pp. 9, 15.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
21. Nik Cavell, "South East Asia and the Colombo Plan," S/S, 57/29, May 24, 1957, p. 3.
22. Hugh L. Keenleyside, International Aid: A Summary (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), p. 100.
23. Stephen Endicott, James G. Endicott: Rebel out of China (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 91, 128: See also Lower, Canada and the Far East - 1940, pp. 43 - 44.
24. Lower, Canada and the Far East - 1940, p. 44. The "Oriental Fields" Lower referred to are China, Japan and Korea.
25. Endicott, James G. Endicott, p. 182. See also pp. 114, 230 - 231.
26. LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, p. 163. LePan noted that Pearson carried into diplomacy and into political life the moral fervour of his Methodist upbringing. That was part of his strength. But it could also lead him astray."
27. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs: 1949 to 1950, p. 122. See also NAC, Records of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, RG 20, vol. 1950, file 20-22-1, pt. 1., Cabinet Committee on External Trade Policy, document 6, memorandum to Cabinet, "Post-UNRRA Relief." See also John Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume I The Early Years, 1906 - 1946 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), pp. 298 - 300.
28. A. F. W. Plumptre, "Perspective on our Aid to Others," International Journal 22:3 (Summer 1967), pp. 485 - 486. During the Second World War, Canada had provided the United Kingdom with loans. Mutual aid was also given to Australia, China, France, India, New Zealand, the U.S.S.R. and the West Indies. In 1945, short-term and medium-term loans were given to foreign governments under the Exports Credits Insurance Corporation (ECIC). For this latter point, see Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), pp. 203 - 209.
29. NAC, RG 20, vol. 1950, file 22-22-1, pt. 1, Cabinet Committee on External Trade Policy, CCEPT document 6, memorandum to Cabinet: "Post-UNRRA Relief," p. 3. Escott Reid, interview, Ste Cecile de Masham, June 4, 1989. He noted that Canada joined UNRRA because of moral responsibilities.
30. Ibid., p. 2.

31. Spicer, A Samaritan State?, p. 199. For a more detailed discussion of the UN programmes of technical assistance, see Keenleyside, International Aid, pp. 140 - 201.
32. Spicer, A Samaritan State?, p. 199.
33. Adapted from NAC, RG 25, vol. 3172, file 36-FB-1951/1, Appendix A. From April 1945 to March 1949, Canada advanced \$537.6m to foreign governments under the Export Credit Agreements. From March 1946 to March 1951, \$1,165m in loans were advanced to Britain. The total amount in credits advanced from 1945 to 1951 were \$1,702.6m. During this same period, Canada advanced a total of \$1,940.45m in credits and grants.
34. Munro and Inglis, Mike, 2, p. 111; See also Harrison, Canada in World Affairs, 1949 to 1950, p. 224.
35. Pearson, Democracy In World Politics, p. 88.
36. Malcolm Macdonald, "Canada, A New Moral Force in the World," International Journal 1 (1946), pp. 159 - 163.
37. H. L. Keenleyside, "The International Significance of Canadian Resources," International Journal 5:2 (1950), p. 120.
38. Spicer, A Samaritan State?, p. 11.
39. Bruce Thordarson, Lester Pearson: Diplomat and Politician (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 66 - 67.
40. Citizen's Forum, "Our Aid to Underdeveloped Countries: Is the Present Program Western Window Dressing?," (Toronto: The Canadian Association for Adult Education, 1954), p. 1.
41. NAC, Escott Reid Papers, MG 31, E 46, vol. 7, file 19, Escott Reid to C. S. A. Ritchie, September 3, 1953.
42. Escott Reid, interview, Ottawa, June 4, 1989. Keith Spicer noted that "after about 1957, direct official references to Cold War objectives become rarer. Perhaps this change in tone owed something to the new Conservative ministry's sharper emotional emphasis on Commonwealth brotherhood, and to unease before the flamboyant, messianic anti-communism of U.S. aid programmes. Whatever its source, the shift in language can hardly be taken to mirror a fundamental detente in Canadian relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc." See A Samaritan State?, pp. 23 - 24.
43. NAC, Douglas LePan Papers, MG 31, E 6, folder 101, Notes on Meeting of Commonwealth Consultative Committee, Sydney, May 15, for use in connection with possible press inquiries, April 27, 1950.
44. Pearson, Democracy In World Politics, p. 88.

45. Spicer, A Samaritan State?, pp. 24 - 30.
46. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs: 1949 to 1950, p. 222. For some similar insights, see, L. B. Pearson, "The Colombo Conference," External Affairs 2:3 (March 1950), pp. 80 - 82.
47. NAC, RG 20, vol. 1987, Meeting of Senior Officials, pt. 3, December 10, 1951.
48. NAC, RG 20, vol. 1987, Meeting of Senior Officials, pt. 4, September 9, 1952.
49. R. G. Nik Cavell, "Canada and the Colombo Plan," The Empire Club of Canada Addresses 1952 - 1953, December 4, 1952, p. 117. See also, pp. 118 - 119, and Nik Cavell, "The Colombo Plan," External Affairs 4:12 (December 1952), pp. 426 - 430.
50. NAC, MG 31, E 6, folder 10, memorandum for Mr. LePan, March 31, 1950.
51. Guy Wint, The British in Asia (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1954), p. 209; see also p. 210.
52. NAC, RG 20, vol. 1988, Talk by Nik Cavell to the Director's Meeting, Department of Trade and Commerce, April 17, 1956, p. 4.
53. Ibid., p. 4.
54. Ibid., p. 7.
55. L. B. Pearson, "The Commonwealth Conference," External Affairs 2:3 (March 1950), p. 79.
56. LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, p. 158.
57. Ibid., p. 155.
58. Ibid., p. 171.
59. Ibid., pp. 176 - 177; For further insights on this issue, see NAC, MG 31, E 6, folder 101, Notes on Meeting of Commonwealth Consultative Committee, Sydney, for use in connection with possible press enquiries, April 27, 1950.
60. LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, pp. 220 - 222.
61. NAC, RG 20, vol. 1987, Meeting of Senior Officials, pt. 3, August 28, 1951.
62. John Hadwen, "What Is The Colombo Plan - Really?," pp. 2 - 3. See also Spicer, A Samaritan State?, p. 71.

63. At this meeting in London, Cambodia, Laos and the Republic of Vietnam attended as full members for the first time.
64. DEA, Annual Report, 1952, p. 29.
65. Wint, What is the Colombo Plan?, p. 11.
66. Ibid.
67. LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, p. 174. Ceylon, too, played a significant part in placing the idea of the Colombo Plan on the conference agenda.
68. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 281.
69. NAC, MG 31, E 6, folder 101, memorandum for Mr. D. V. LePan, United Nations Division, 1950.
70. Ibid.
71. NAC, MG 31, E 6, folder 101, F. M. Forde to SSEA, February 18, 1950.
72. L. B. Pearson, "The Colombo Conference," External Affairs 2:3 (March 1950), p. 87.
73. Nicholas Tarling, "The United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo Plan," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 24:1 (March 1986), p. 3.
74. Ibid., p. 7; for a detailed explanation see pp. 4 - 7.
75. Ibid., p. 10.
76. Ibid., p. 17.
77. Ibid., p. 26.
78. Ibid., p. 13.
79. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 7, file 18. Nehru put forth this view at the June 1953 meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. He was speaking within the context of the fact that the West could not truly be a liberating force "if the anti-Communist world continued to offer willing support to certain individuals who in fact had no representative power and whom history had now passed by - e.g., Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee."
80. N. Tarling, "The United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo Plan," p. 27.
81. Ibid., p. 31.

82. Ibid., p. 30.
83. NAC, MG 31, E 6, folder 101, memorandum for Mr. LePan, March 31, 1950. See also NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 22, Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Conference, 1950, Colombo Conference, Part III, Canadian Delegation to External, January 17, 1950; DEA Files, file 50092-B-40, vol. 1, Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy, Document no. 64, copy 2, Consultative Committee for South and Southeast Asia, D. V. LePan, DEA, March 3, 1956.
84. LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, p. 203. Escott Reid described Douglas LePan as an individual who had a rare combination of qualities: "imagination, knowledge and common sense." See NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 6, file 10, Escott Reid to L. B. Pearson, July 31, 1954.
85. L. P. Singh, The Colombo Plan: Some Political Aspects (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1963), p. 41.
86. NAC, Arnold Heeney Papers, MG 30, E 144, vol. 11, "Canada: A Growing Power in a Shrinking World."
87. DEA, External Affairs 4:12 (December 1952), p. 427.
88. Ibid.
89. NAC, RG 20, vol. 1988, senior officials and directors' meeting, pt. 7, May 2, 1955, p. 3.
90. DEA, External Affairs 8:6 (June 1956), quoted in Masters, Canada in World Affairs: 1953 - 1955, pp. 127 - 128. See also RG 20, vol. 1988, talk by Nik Cavell to the Directors' meeting, Department of Trade and Commerce, April 17, 1956; Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957, pp. 203 - 204.
91. DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 3, John English to M. P. Carson, February 17, 1956.
92. Masters, Canada in World Affairs: 1953 - 1955, p. 124.
93. Spicer, A Samaritan State?, p. 17.
94. Ibid., p. 127; see also James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume III: Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 273 - 274, and Thomas P. Peterson, "Canada and the Colombo Plan, 1950 - 1960 A Study in Government Policy and Public Opinion," M. A. thesis, University of Manitoba, March 1962, p. 83. John Hadwen, interview, Ottawa, June 6, 1989. He gave Ed Ritchie the credit for putting forth the idea about nuclear power.



95. Adapted from Appendix 'C', Canada House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 6, May 3, 1956, p. 176. See also Appendix A, pp. 156 - 167, for allocations of specific projects. Similar figures are cited in Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957, p. 201. The figures in Table 8 are for capital projects, and \$16,280m was given to Ceylon (Sri Lanka).
96. Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, pp. 204 - 205. See also Commons Standing Committee, pp. 137 - 138.
97. Ibid., pp. 205 - 206.
98. Ibid. p. 206. Quoted from Commons Standing Committee, No. 6, May 3, 1956. p. 144.
99. NAC, RG 25, G 2, Acc 86-87/159, box 27, file 5495-G-40, vol. 1, memorandum for the file, "Visit by Professor Higgins concerning economic development needs in Indonesia," February 16, 1953.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. NAC, RG 25, G2, Acc 86-87/160, box 79, file 5459-G-40, "Canadian Colombo Plan Assistance to Indonesia," September 12, 1957.
105. Munro and Inglis, Mike, 2, p. 107.
106. Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, p. 211.

#### CHAPTER FOUR

#### COLLECTIVE SECURITY: A TWO-EDGED SWORD

Collective security was the fourth creed that governed the formation of Canadian foreign policy in Asia. The principle of collective action called for the maintenance of peace as part of an orderly world. In addition, through the united effort of countries which participated in a defence arrangement, there was the responsibility to contain or stop an aggressor nation.<sup>1</sup> The officials in External Affairs discussed and debated the issue of collective security even before the Second World War ended. They realized that the position of isolationism endorsed in the 1930s and the detached attitudes towards European, let alone Asian affairs, were not tenable in the post-war period. These same officials, particularly people such as Menzies, Reid and Ronning, who had a direct hand in Asian issues, did not want collective security to undermine the other three articles of Canadian policy in Asia, which were the battle against Communism and the support for decolonization, the pursuit of material self-interest, and participation in the Colombo Plan for foreign aid. In line with the interests of the state, collective security was to serve Canadian self-interest rather than thwart it.

The Canadian position towards collective military action was not inconsistent with Canadian foreign policy's characteristic of dualism that was slowly evolving as External Affairs officials developed a greater interest in Asia. Ideology and the practical application of the fundamental tenets of foreign policy not only coexisted but served each other. Two of the tenets of Canadian policy, trade and peace, the

latter eventually developing into peacekeeping, were its traditional cornerstones. Without peace Canadian trade opportunities would be gravely curtailed. Peace, as the events of the 1930s displayed, was fragile. One lesson External Affairs officials such as Pearson and Reid learned from the decade of the 1930s was that idealism should balance realism. Such a stance was evident with the commencement of the Cold War in 1947 and the possibility of an outbreak of another war with atomic weapons. If war broke out, Canada together with the western democracies expected either the Chinese or the Soviets to be the possible aggressors. Japan was eliminated as a country that might conceivably start another war, although Australia and New Zealand did not write off the possibility of a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Yet while the likelihood of a declaration of war by Japan was shrugged off by Canadian officials, they did not ignore the need to contribute to Asia's political, economic and social stability.<sup>2</sup>

It was part and parcel of Canadian policy in Asia to shy away from unnecessary military commitments, but at the same time Canada saw the need to create and maintain peaceful conditions in order to fulfill its own self-interests. One major reason for the indisposition towards collective action was the distrust of military involvement. Misgivings about being involved in wars were natural for Canadians because war violated the sacred Canadian creed of peace, order and good government. Besides, Mackenzie King would have said that wars threatened national unity in Canada. One example that illustrates this point is the Boer War from 1899 to 1902.<sup>3</sup> The English Canadian decision to support the

British with money and troops had grave consequences for Canadian national unity. The deep division among French and English Canadians, as well as within Wilfrid Laurier's government, was one major result of Canadian participation in the Boer War.<sup>4</sup> The Boer War was significant because it painfully foreshadowed the division that would occur between French and English Canada as a result of the conscription crises during the First and Second World Wars.<sup>5</sup> Robert Borden's decision in May 1917 to implement conscription provided French Canada with the political ammunition it needed to oppose the Union Government, resulting in the failure of conscription in Quebec. Strong opposition by French Canadians to compulsory military service in World War II contributed to further division between French and English Canadians.

Further fear of unnecessary military involvement became evident when the desire for collective security was discussed after the two world wars. The reluctance to be involved in military conflicts governed Canada's reactions to the concept of collective security in the aftermath of these global conflicts, although it did become involved in the Korean war. However, its decision to fight on the side of the United States and under the banner of the United Nations in Korea was viewed by some DEA officials as a sideshow.

After the First World War, there was a glimmer of hope that war would not break out again. Collective security, to be developed through the efforts of the newly created League of Nations, would preserve peace

by settling international disputes through arbitration. The establishment of the League of Nations covenant at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the League's headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, had much of the world expecting that peace could be sustained. Echoing Woodrow Wilson, "the chief apostle of collective security,"<sup>6</sup> several nations believed that war would be set aside as a means of settling grievances. But it was not long after the covenant of the League was put in place that serious doubts arose.

From the Canadian perspective, Articles X and XVI of the League's covenant troubled five men who were or had been associated with External Affairs. Robert Borden, Loring C. Christie, Sir Joseph Pope, Sir Clifford Sifton and O. D. Skelton had serious misgivings about the depth of involvement Canada should undertake in the post-war period. Mackenzie King shared their sentiment that Canada should stay out of European problems.<sup>7</sup> King had a great distrust of centralized control in the area of defence and, together with this "Canadian cabal", was aware that the First World War resulted "from the pitiless manipulation of power by immoral men, acting behind closed doors in defiance of the democratic process."<sup>8</sup> Thus, they did not want Article X to pull them into unnecessary battles in some remote corner of the world.

Canada's principal concern with respect to Article X was that it did not want to be involved "in conflicts in some far-away section of Europe, or in some distant portion of South America," nor did they want

to be at "the beck and call of a Council not responsible to the nation for its actions."<sup>9</sup> In response to this unfavourable article, Canada recommended that the obligation for a country to participate in a conflict in some distant part of the globe be removed from Article X. The Canadian measure "failed by one vote to receive the unanimous support required for adoption, [and it] had the desired effect of weakening the obligations of League membership."<sup>10</sup> Consequently, the members of the League were left to decide how aggression would be defined and whether they should participate in a war or not.<sup>11</sup>

The League was weakened right after its formation by the failure of the United States Senate to ratify its membership in that international body. In the 1930s the League was further weakened by the withdrawal of Nazi Germany and Japan's and Italy's aggression in Manchuria and Ethiopia respectively. In the wake of these developments, Canada, like its closest neighbour, the United States, retreated into isolationism. It backed away from taking a stand in either case and sought to maintain peace on its own terms and within its own national boundaries. As James Eayrs noted, the "distrust of European politics contributed to [the] isolationist sentiment in Canada in the years between the wars."<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, this attitude "helped to thwart understanding" of the implications of the rise of totalitarianism in Italy and Germany.<sup>13</sup> Mackenzie King, for one, did not offer any new solutions to the political developments in Europe, which he viewed as "merely an aggravation of the malaise from which Europe traditionally suffered."<sup>14</sup> Perhaps King saw these developments as part of the

battle between "good and evil" and believed that good would ultimately triumph. The same Mackenzie King who fought against centralized control with his British colleagues at the 1923 Imperial Conference would, 14 years later in 1937, "support Britain's appeasement of Germany."<sup>15</sup> In King's mind both events would ensure peace at home and enhance Canadian unity. He wanted Canada to keep away from military commitments, and that was one-half of his formula for collective security. The other half involved the preservation of peace in Europe. However, in seeking to keep away from defence commitments, King was rudely surprised when on September 3, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany for violating the territorial integrity of Poland.<sup>16</sup> According to James Eayrs, "a low dishonest decade" had ended and a new one was about to begin.<sup>17</sup>

Further attempts at collective security in the 1920s proved to be temporary measures rather than ones of any lasting value. The Locarno Treaties of December 1925 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 1928 were two such measures. Similar to the covenant of the League, these two treaties, which had been formed to stop aggression, ended in futility. "Locarno was little more than an attempt to guarantee the existing frontiers in Europe; as far as the League was concerned it merely demonstrated that security had become synonymous with the status quo in the minds of most European statesmen". Furthermore, the effort made "to outlaw the use of force in international relations by means of the [Kellogg-Briand] Pact...was equally meaningless for it was not taken seriously."<sup>18</sup> In the light of the failure of these renewed attempts

at collective security, Mackenzie King's decision to stay out of war and unnecessary European problems became firmer.

The concept of collective security was strengthened with the commencement of the Second World War. This term was used loosely by the allied powers as a means of uniting the countries on the Allied side in an effort to defeat the Axis powers and eventually bring about peace. In October 1943, the foreign ministers of the allied powers met in Moscow to lay plans for a new international organization that would implement, among other things, a scheme to make possible collective military action. While further discussions took place at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and Yalta in 1945, it was not until April 1945 at a meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco, that the concept of collective security was again seriously discussed. As Escott Reid noted:

By 1943, I had come to the conclusion that if we were to preserve peace after the war there had to be an end to the international anarchy, which was in my opinion the cause of the two world wars. In its place there had to be created a system of international government consisting of strong international functional agencies and a strong centralized organization, a strengthened League of Nations.<sup>19</sup>

When Canada joined the United Nations, it subscribed to the principle of collective security enshrined in the UN Charter. Only time would reveal how Canada would react to collective defence measures in the post-war period.



For Canada there was a moral obligation to subscribe to collective security, since it involved the preservation of national unity at home and peace overseas.<sup>20</sup> According to Escott Reid, at the United Nations meeting in San Francisco in 1945, Canada cautiously fought for the adoption of this principle.<sup>21</sup> If collective action was to be adopted, it was to be accomplished within the United Nations. Moreover, it would involve more than just military might, and for this reason Canada wanted to serve on the functional agencies of the UN. Canada also pushed for the adoption of the principle of collective security because it did not want collective action to be used to dismantle colonialism.<sup>22</sup> The process of decolonization was the responsibility of the countries that had colonial territories, and being directly involved in decolonization could mean military involvement. Canada was apprehensive of such military solutions but had no hesitation in encouraging decolonization by other means.

As Canada continued to fight for the preservation of the doctrine of collective security, its hope that the UN would be the body to preserve this creed gradually faded. The Soviets exhibited a lack of co-operation with the UN's efforts to establish collective security by its continual overuse and abuse of its veto privilege.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, Mackenzie King and senior officials in the DEA - St Laurent, Pearson, and Reid - saw merit in looking for an alternative to the UN. They found the answer in the idea of "a regional Atlantic pact of mutual assistance."<sup>24</sup> Reid was responsible for arguing the advantages of a new defence arrangement. He noted that the emphasis

of this new pact would be on the protection of individual freedoms by upholding "the principles of parliamentary democracy," the need to battle "tyranny and external aggression," and the necessity to strengthen "the political, economic, and social and cultural ties" of the North Atlantic community.<sup>25</sup> Acknowledging that the Soviets were unco-operative in the UN General Assembly, Reid realized that it would be advantageous for Canada to work with its western allies towards strengthening the western democracies.

It was Reid who best summed up Canada's attitude toward a new defence arrangement:

Just as in the last war, so also today we are engaged in a "struggle for the control of men's minds and men's souls". It is therefore necessary constantly to keep in mind the necessity of the defence agreement being a basis for what might be called a spiritual mobilization of the liberal democracies, as well as being a basis for political, economic and military cooperation against Soviet threats. It is essential that the states which are members of the defence agreement should be bound together not merely by their common opposition to totalitarian communist aggression, but by a common belief in the values and virtues of western civilization, by a common concept of democracy and a positive love of it and of their fellow men, and by a determination to make their kind of democracy work for the promotion of mutual welfare and the preservation of peace for others as well as for themselves.<sup>26</sup>

In a time of fear, men like Reid were looking for new rays of hope. Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, agreed with Reid that the best defence for Canada was a regional collective security arrangement. Claxton was pleased that Canada could work out such a

defence plan so that "much of the tenseness and fear which now possess all people will be removed."<sup>27</sup> St. Laurent, Pearson and Reid were not unaware of the fact that the new defence arrangement would be overwhelmingly military in nature. Nevertheless, while they were quick to recognize that the political and military aspects of defence treaties were of paramount importance, they sought to remove some of the "tenseness and fear" of a North Atlantic treaty by emphasizing the fact that this treaty was also to be an economic and moral force.<sup>28</sup>

There were some distinct benefits for Canadian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The advantages, as political scientist Ramesh Thakur pointed out, outweighed Canada's apprehension about having to subscribe to the purest form of collective security, that of fighting a war in some distant place in the world:

[NATO] brought Canada into a formal alliance with the three countries closest to it historically, politically, economically, and even geographically: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The continued viability of the organization would also free Canada of the need to make a choice between America and Britain. Participation in an alliance decreased for Canada the degree of domination by its neighbor; NATO and the Commonwealth could be said to provide military and politico-diplomatic counterweights respectively (or alternative forums) to the United States. NATO resolved one of the problems Canada had encountered during the war, that of lacking a share in the formulation of defence policy. By stressing the multilateral approach to decision making, Canada was in fact arguing for a role in the shaping of policy, instead of being allocated a share in its implementation.<sup>29</sup>

The North Atlantic defence agreement was undoubtedly designed for Western Europe, Canada's main area of foreign policy interest, and not for Asia. However, Canada drafted a collective security agreement for the North Atlantic, and Escott Reid suggested that the principles of this agreement could be applied to the Asian region. It was only a matter of time before DEA officials would discover whether the principles of the North Atlantic treaty could be applied to Asia.<sup>30</sup> The Canadian attitude towards collective defence arrangements in Asia became evident as it confronted the idea of a Pacific pact as well as the defence agreement signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS); the Korean war from 1950 to 1953; the Locarno-type pact for Southeast Asia; and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) of 1954.

### **Canada: A Pacific Power?**

In January 1946, W. L. Morton's article "Canada and Future Policy in the Pacific" was published in the International Journal. Canada, he argued, was a Pacific country but not a Pacific power.<sup>31</sup> One major reason for this distinction was its lack of a "definite official policy" in the Pacific. When Morton referred to the Pacific, he had China and Japan in mind. Canadian contacts with these two countries were limited, and immigration from them was restricted. Canadian missionaries aroused much interest in China and Japan, but this "led neither to a vigorous or definite action by the Canadian government nor to the formulation of national policies or popular attitudes."<sup>32</sup> In

short, Canada's interests in foreign policy with respect to Asia were limited. This was the picture before World War II, but as Morton observed, "events since 1941 clearly indicate that continuation of such an attitude will be perilous for Canadian interests in the Pacific and for relations with the United States."<sup>33</sup>

During the Second World War Canada was hardly involved in the Pacific war because it placed a very low priority on that region and lacked sufficient manpower to fight a two-theatre war. Canada's participation in the war against Japan "was not on a scale or of an importance decisive to the outcome of the war."<sup>34</sup> Even with the loss of 1,973 men of the Royal Rifles of Canada and Winnipeg Grenadiers in Hong Kong, the country's greatest tragedy in the war in the Pacific,<sup>35</sup> Canada's participation was very minute compared to that of the United States. Canada still did not consider itself a Pacific power.

Even with the end of the war and the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, Canada did not see itself playing a leading role in the Pacific. It was not willing, given the need to help rebuild Western Europe, to spread its economic resources too thinly. Senior External Affairs officials, especially the non-Asian experts in the department, such as R. A. D. Ford, A. D. P. Heeney and Charles Ritchie, were anxious to see that the Soviets would not be a threat to democracy in Europe.<sup>36</sup> They were interested in helping Canada renew its contacts with Western Europe rather than with Asia. This was quite a natural position, since Europe before the war had been the major region of

Canadian foreign policy interest.

It took the officials who served in Asia to make others in External Affairs aware that Asian affairs should not be overlooked. T. C. Davis, writing from his ambassadorial post in China, informed Arthur Menzies, one of the DEA experts on Far Eastern affairs, that Canada could no longer ignore the developments in Asia. It was time, according to Davis, that Canada become "Pacific-minded."<sup>37</sup> He anticipated that the communist Chinese forces would ultimately be victorious as they struggled for power against the Nationalists. The struggle for power in China was one of the main events in the Pacific region that affected Canadian interests in Asia and its relations with the United States.

As circumstances changed in Asia, Canada developed a greater interest in events there. One country that it was especially interested in, mainly through its ties with the United States, was Japan. In December 1945, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), which replaced the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC), was established to oversee the implementation of the terms of the Japanese surrender and to help lay the foundations for a "new" Japan. Canada was one of the 11 original countries that served on the FEC, but its participation did not necessarily make it a Pacific power. Nevertheless, in the minds of two External officials, E. Herbert Norman and Hume Wrong, the contributions Canada made to Japan before the war and just after, however minute they may have been, were significant enough to categorize Canada as a Pacific power. To Norman, the diplomat and scholar, Canada made and was making

valuable contributions in the fields of culture, commerce and diplomacy.<sup>38</sup> In the area of commerce and diplomacy, it was through the efforts of Hugh L. Keenleyside from 1929 to 1935 that valuable trade and diplomatic contacts between Japan and Canada were maintained. To Hume Wrong, Canada was a Pacific power by virtue of its presence on the FEC because "Canada wished to contribute to a settlement that would eliminate Japan as a threat to peace, to help form a stable and democratic government in Japan, and to provide for future peace and prosperity in East Asia."<sup>39</sup> What eventually occurred was that democracy served Canada's pursuit of prosperity. Canada accomplished this objective in the name of self-interest and to support United States policy in Japan.<sup>40</sup>

It was because of its support for United States policy in Asia that Canada took the renewed interest in Japan that resulted in Canada's membership on the FEC. Canada's membership on the commission also came about because of its participation in the Japanese peace treaty. By participating in the affairs affecting Japan, Canada was able to further promote its commercial interests, and in fact, Canadian trade and foreign aid in South and Southeast Asia were enhanced too. By endeavouring to win Japan over to the camp of the western democracies, Canada may have played a part in keeping the influence of Communism away from that war-torn nation. Yet while it did not hesitate to help "revitalize the decadent Japanese civilization,"<sup>41</sup> it did not welcome the idea of joining a defence arrangement in the Pacific, and instead chose to let the United States take the lead in this initiative.

Canada and the United States held similar perspectives on Asian affairs, but there were differences too. Unlike Australia and New Zealand, which viewed the Pacific region from the southwest, Canada and the United States viewed it from the northeast.<sup>42</sup> According to both Canada and the United States, it was from the northeast that Japan was most liable to launch an attack on North America; nevertheless, following the war Canada and the United States differed in their perceptions on Asian affairs. Because the United States played a major role in defeating Japan, it had no hesitation about being the main occupying power in Japan; Canada, however, "did not think it was a good idea to perpetuate the concept of the Commonwealth as a unit for Occupation purposes"<sup>43</sup> in Japan. Officials in External Affairs continued to dread the idea of centralized decision-making within the Commonwealth because Canada did not want Britain to dominate the affairs of the Commonwealth.

Canada and the United States also differed in their assessments of which Asian countries were most important to their self-interests. To Canada, India, Pakistan and Ceylon were of paramount importance, while the Americans saw the People's Republic of China, Formosa, the Philippines and Japan as critical, although the People's Republic of China was excluded after 1949. Canada and the United States did agree, however, that the principal enemy of all countries of the free world in Asia was the Soviet Union, and both countries showed a great interest in keeping Japan free of Communism. Canada's participation on the FEC and in formulating the Japanese peace treaty were two examples of its



attempts to keep Japan under the "guardianship" of the western democracies.<sup>44</sup>

Pearson, who had been appointed ambassador to the United States in 1945, was chosen as Canada's representative on the FEC. E. H. Norman, who was stationed in Tokyo, became Pearson's alternate. With the transfer of Pearson to Ottawa in 1946 to become under-secretary for External Affairs, Hume Wrong, who replaced Pearson as ambassador in Washington, became Canada's main FEC representative. In August 1946, Norman was appointed head of the Canadian liaison mission in Tokyo. In turn, Ralph Collins, an External Affairs secretary in Washington, replaced Norman. Both Norman and Collins played significant roles in Japanese affairs. Since the Canadian mission was associated with General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the allied powers (SCAP) in Japan, Norman worked very closely with him.<sup>45</sup> Norman was an expert on Japan and won the respect of MacArthur for the role he played in "the deliberations of the FEC frequently acting as chairman and contributing his knowledge and powers of mediation in the disputes that naturally arose between the delegates of the eleven countries."<sup>46</sup> Despite Norman's role, Pearson harboured a misgiving about the United States as the main occupying force in Japan. He was concerned that the United States shielded MacArthur from pressure and that he did not respect the decisions of the FEC. Pearson believed that MacArthur ignored and even overruled the FEC and ran Japan the way he saw fit, by "taking his cue from increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union."<sup>47</sup> As the role of the FEC was being undermined,

Pearson consoled himself with the thought that at least "the projected Canadian liaison mission in Tokyo might prove a more effective instrument for influencing U.S. policy on Japan."<sup>48</sup>

Norman was also well respected by the Japanese. As an expert on Japanese social and state structure, he influenced Canadian attitudes toward Japanese affairs when Canada showed little interest in the Pacific.<sup>49</sup> However, when Norman was appointed to head the Canadian liaison mission, Collins replaced him on the FEC in August 1946. As an expert on Asian and American affairs, Collins was able to play a significant role on the FEC. He served on the constitutional and legal reform committee, whose accomplishments turned out to be very important. This committee removed the sting from Japanese militarism by reducing the status of the emperor to "a symbol of the nation's unity" and by having Japan renounce "war as an instrument of national policy." In addition, the FEC "abolished the ministries of the army and navy"; it called for power to be vested in the National Diet, for elections in the Upper House, and for the vote to be given to women.<sup>50</sup> Collins' presence on the constitutional committee was significant because it underscored the importance Canada placed on the restoration of responsible government in Japan. Overall, while Norman and Collins were not called upon to initiate any specific proposals for the FEC, they did "not...hesitate to make clear Canadian interest[s] and concern[s]."<sup>51</sup>

Notwithstanding the reservations Pearson entertained on the limits Canada had in influencing United States policy on the FEC, the role

Canada played on the FEC was watched closely by the Department of Trade and Commerce. It hoped that through Canada's influence on the FEC a door would be opened to strengthen trade relations with Japan. In December 1945, Trade and Commerce asked Col. L. M. Cosgrave, one of its officials, to go out as an economic consultant to obtain "first hand knowledge of commercial and economic conditions in Japan," "particularly as they affect Canadian trade."<sup>52</sup> In August 1947, General H. D. G. Crerar, who headed the Crerar mission, was asked "to study the possibility of reviving trade with Japan and also to help formulate Canadian policy on the peace settlement."<sup>53</sup> The need to revive trade with Japan was indicative of where Canadian interests lay. By working towards the restoration of democracy in Japan and by making Canada part of the Japanese peace treaty, Canadian officials in External Affairs and Trade and Commerce indicated that they were always alert in looking out for opportunities to promote Canada's national interests.

Apart from serving on the FEC, the other means by which Canada took a renewed interest in the Pacific was in its support for the Japanese peace treaty.<sup>54</sup> Canada's attitude towards the occupation of Japan stemmed from the possibility of sending its Sixth Division as part of the Commonwealth plan to defeat Japan.<sup>55</sup> This attack did not materialize. However, with the defeat of Japan, the DEA officials were interested in a peace treaty, one that "should be integrated with [the Canadian] plans for security, responsible government and the economic welfare of the Far East."<sup>56</sup> Besides wanting the peace treaty to serve national goals, the DEA saw the need for an early peace settlement to

enable Japan to rebuild as a democracy. Pearson underscored this goal when he visited MacArthur in 1948 and reminded him that Japan had surrendered its overseas possessions and showed a desire to re-establish Japanese society according to western democratic ideals.<sup>57</sup> A strong and renewed Japan, Pearson reasoned, would join "in the struggle against Russian and Chinese communist imperialism."<sup>58</sup> Thus, it was undesirable to postpone the signing of a Japanese peace treaty.

Thus, it was for both ideological and economic reasons that Canada took a great interest in a peace treaty. Even before Pearson's visit with General MacArthur, External Affairs underlined the importance of the treaty. In August 1947 General Crerar assured MacArthur that Canada would support the peace treaty. A month later, in September 1947, while attending the Commonwealth conference in Canberra, Brooke Claxton voiced Canada's desire for the restoration of Japan into the international community. Such a move was urgent because of the commencement of the Cold War and the emergence of the Truman doctrine. With the Truman doctrine, the United States pledged its support for countries that wanted to resist internal and external political oppression. The Cold War meant that the threat to the world was no longer the revival of Japanese militarism but the spread of Communism and totalitarianism. Given these developments, Canada felt it was essential to help Japan rebuild its economy and strengthen its foundation of democracy. These two objectives were wholeheartedly endorsed by the DEA officials.<sup>59</sup>

The importance of signing a peace treaty with Japan without delay

was underscored at the Colombo conference of Commonwealth foreign ministers in January 1950, during which a meeting of the Commonwealth working party on the peace treaty was slated for May 1950 in London. Much discussion on the merits of the treaty took place at this meeting, but no concrete recommendations were forthcoming except to study the terms of the peace settlement. The signing of a peace treaty was also important to the United States. However, it hesitated to make a final decision. In the meantime, President Truman requested the State Department to consult the other members of the FEC regarding the kind of treaty they envisaged.<sup>60</sup> The United States' minimum requirement was that the proposed treaty was "to restore Japan as an equal in the society of free nations."<sup>61</sup> But in spite of the important developments that took place in 1949 and 1950, the signing of the peace treaty was postponed.

The final decision with respect to when the treaty would be signed was in the hands of President Truman and his senior policymakers. But the final step that Canadian officials wanted to take "in establishing peace and in extending world markets" to Japan had to wait until the treaty was signed.<sup>62</sup> Further delay was inevitable as draft treaties were circulated to the interested countries for their written comments. However, the outbreak of the Korean war meant that Korea's crisis became top priority in the United States, and it seemed that there would be more delay in signing the peace treaty with Japan. Because demilitarization in Japan had been accomplished and because it was no longer a threat to peace, policymakers in the United States were not in

a hurry to put the finishing touches on a peace treaty. By August 1951, 13 months after the Korean war had commenced, Canadian External Affairs officials reasoned that signing a peace treaty in 1951 might affect "the settlements of Far Eastern issues." One issue involved the recognition of the People's Republic of China. A decision had to be made whether Formosa or the People's Republic would be permitted to sign the peace treaty. The other important issue concerned Korea. The war was still being fought, and a settlement to the crisis had to be reached. In any case, the peace treaty called for the recognition of an independent Korea.<sup>63</sup> But American policymakers did not share Canadian concerns because the United States recognized Formosa, and viewed the People's Republic of China as the aggressor in Korea. Instead, the United States started to lay the final plans for a peace treaty to be signed in September 1951. There were economic and strategic considerations that American policymakers had in mind as they moved in this direction. Military bases were needed in Japan to help fight the war in Korea, and if Japan could be convinced that aggression and the spreading influence of Communism were serious threats, it might also be persuaded to provide the moral and material support that the United States needed to win the war in Korea.

After much delay, the peace treaty was signed on September 8, 1951. It was described by External Affairs as "the most important development affecting Japan" in 1951.<sup>64</sup> In addition, the treaty was viewed as being "generous, restoring sovereignty to Japan and placing no restrictions on its economy or on its ability to defend itself.

Reconciliation, and not revenge, was the main goal."<sup>65</sup> The Canadian delegation which attended the signing of the treaty was headed by Pearson and R.W. Mayhew, the Minister of Fisheries. Pearson hoped that Japan would live up to its new commitment "in maintaining peace and security and in building up the international community in the Pacific area."<sup>66</sup> There was no doubt that Pearson had Canadian interests in mind. The preservation of peace and security would benefit Canadian trade and keep Canada out of unnecessary military conflicts. Finally, the increase in trade and the continuation of peace would promote national prosperity and unity.

While the principle of collective security was uppermost in Pearson's mind, he did not ignore the other issues of war reparations and the need to negotiate a fisheries treaty with Japan. Canada was ready to negotiate such a treaty with Japan and the United States. With its support for the United States on the FEC and by virtue of being a signatory to the Japanese peace treaty, Canada slowly edged its way back into the Pacific region and was ready to command some respect among Asian nations. As a North American nation, it had "never been aggressive about its participation in Pacific affairs," especially where defence pacts were concerned.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, Canada seemed compelled "to take a part in attempting to solve a number of Far Eastern problems,"<sup>68</sup> particularly those involving trade issues. It remained, however, unenthusiastic about collective defence arrangements. But if anything would shake Canada out of its complacency, Arthur Menzies noted, it would be some major world disaster.<sup>69</sup> Perhaps in such an

event Canada would seriously consider joining a Pacific security arrangement. Even if a major disaster did not occur, there would be at least one advantage in joining a Pacific pact: Canada could act as a deterrent to aggression and to the spread of Communism in Asia.

Canada lacked Australia's and New Zealand's sense of urgency about a Pacific pact. The reactions to proposed pacts in the Pacific were a result of geographical, historical and cultural factors. Geographically, Canada is far removed from Asia. Historically, its contacts with Asia were limited, and it hardly made an impact in the Pacific war. Culturally, there was little that Canada identified with in Asian society. Asian immigration from China, Japan and India was small compared to the vast number of people who immigrated from Europe and the United States. One link Canada had with Asia, though, came through the Commonwealth, of which Australia and New Zealand were members. Since Canada was a member of this organization, New Zealand urged Canadians to become partners in the co-ordination of Pacific affairs. New Zealand viewed Canada as a Pacific nation that had the potential to be a Pacific power. It was natural for New Zealand to make such a proposal because its security was tied not only to the western democracies but to Asia as well. The response from External Affairs in Ottawa was one of appreciation, but it declined the offer to co-ordinate Pacific affairs. Canadian officials realized that it was not in the United States' plan that Australia, New Zealand and Canada should play even a subordinate role "in the post-war security system in the Pacific."<sup>70</sup>



By virtue of having defeated the Japanese, the United States became the predominant western military power in the Pacific. But this ambition in itself, did not mean that Canada could not join the United States in a defence alliance if war broke out again in the Pacific. The country that did not hesitate to join the United States in a defence pact was the Philippines, a former American colony that had benefited from the services of General MacArthur's forces, which eventually defeated the Japanese on Luzon. On learning that President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines had suggested a Southeast Asian union to combat the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, Arthur Menzies wrote to Frederick Palmer, the Canadian consul general in Manila, to collect information on this new defence pact. In the Philippines, Quirino had failed to combat the Huks and hence was willing to seek support from the United States. Little did the officials in the DEA realize that Quirino's proposal for a military union in Southeast Asia would be the beginning of what was later called the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This was signed in Manila on September 8, 1954, by the United States and its allies: Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan and the Philippines. SEATO was a call for collective defence co-operation if any of its members were undermined by Communism. Realizing that Canada was apprehensive of military alliances, especially those in Asia, Menzies told Palmer to be cautious not to convey "the impression that the Canadian government is anything more than an interested observer...at the present time."<sup>71</sup>

There were other reasons why Canada would be only an observer of

defence arrangements in Asia. Defence and External Affairs officials did not think that "a formal Pacific pact would make... [a] contribution to our immediate security;"<sup>72</sup> they did not think Canada could repel aggression in the Pacific area. In addition, they did not want new military demands placed on their shoulders. What took top priority was Western Europe, and they did not want "home defences and...commitments" in NATO weakened.<sup>73</sup> At the same time Canadian officials took comfort from the thought that the United States was the country most capable of battling aggression in the Pacific.

A further reason why Canada did not subscribe to the idea of a Pacific pact was that, because of its support for decolonization, it did not want to prop up the "bastions of Western influence."<sup>74</sup> External Affairs acknowledged that this duty was the responsibility of the United States and Britain. The Americans were interested in Thailand, while the British were committed in Hong Kong and Malaya. The question of membership in the Pacific pact was also a concern for the DEA. India, an important member of the Commonwealth, would not join a United States-sponsored security pact. Its neighbour, Pakistan, was more willing to join a Pacific pact, but supporting a Pacific pact that brought Pakistan in and left India out would pose a major problem for Canadian foreign policy. What Canada did not wish to witness was the undermining of "the degree of mutual confidence among Commonwealth countries which has been developed since the war."<sup>75</sup> Apart from its support for decolonization and its concern about a Pacific pact that excluded India, Canada's political, economic and cultural affinity with

the collective security needs of Western Europe made it reluctant to join a Pacific pact.<sup>76</sup> Canada did not have much in common with the Asian nations, compared to its historical and cultural ties with Europe. The DEA policymakers cautioned Pearson that a "marked divergence [existed] in their political institutions and their economic development, in culture and religion, and in their ability to assume military commitments." They stated further that the "development of a common defence policy will of necessity be slower in Asia than in Europe."<sup>77</sup> These seemed adequate reasons to many External Affairs officials to keep Canada's commitments in defence arrangements in Europe and not extend them to Asia.

Canada wanted to stay out of a Pacific pact because the doubts it entertained and the difficulties it faced outweighed the advantages for Canadian membership in a Pacific security arrangement. It would continue to monitor American decisions in connection with its military commitments in Asia, which would give Canadian officials an opportunity to clarify Canada's military commitments. As it sought to bolster its national interests in Asia, Canada recognized that the United States presence in Asia would be advantageous in the advent of a war; Canada could at least seek shelter under the United States' military umbrella. But in the meantime, Canada fell back on one of its traditional positions: it would work through the United Nations to guarantee "mutual protection in the Pacific."<sup>78</sup> In addition, if east-west relations were to be strengthened, this goal would be achieved through the Commonwealth.<sup>79</sup>

If there was one event which should have jolted Canada out of its hesitancy about joining a Pacific Pact, it should have been the Korean war. Ironically, however, with the advent of the Korean war, Canada's reasons for staying out of a Pacific security pact seemed to be further justified. It continued to be cautious about joining a pact that would involve unnecessary military commitments. Moreover, Canada realized that the United States had already signed a network of bilateral defence treaties with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Philippines, all of which faced a bigger threat to their national security than Canada. Canada accepted the fact that "the network of treaties centered on the United States meets the needs of the situation as well as they can be met in present circumstances."<sup>80</sup> Consequently, Canada did not join ANZUS, the defence pact signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States on September 1, 1951. It did not even seek an invitation to join this regional defence pact.<sup>81</sup> Sir Percy Spender, Australia's Minister of External Affairs, wanted Canada to be a member of ANZUS, but although Pearson, Spender's counterpart in Ottawa, was grateful for the Australian invitation, he was not going to commit his country to ANZUS, since Canada's major commitments were in the North Atlantic. Thus, in response to this invitation, the DEA conveyed the message that while Canada was interested in the development of ANZUS, it was not likely to participate.<sup>82</sup>

ANZUS was of paramount importance to Spender. In his view, the arena of world problems was shifting from Europe to Southeast Asia in the wake of such considerations as the possibility of a revival of

Japanese militarism, the emergence of Communist China, and the outbreak of the Korean war. Surprisingly, Sir Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, took the Canadian view that Western Europe and NATO were more important than security arrangements in Asia.<sup>83</sup> But Spender did not overlook the point "that the Atlantic Pact could not have an exact counter-pact in the Pacific." In addition, he hoped that Canada would change its mind and look more towards the Pacific than it had done in the past.<sup>84</sup> Where Canada was concerned, it was satisfied that the United States remained the backbone of ANZUS, and it was pleased that Australia and New Zealand, two of its Commonwealth partners, were part of the ANZUS treaty.<sup>85</sup>

In his continued attempts to justify Canada's decision not to join a Pacific pact, Pearson stated in the House of Commons on October 22, 1951, that a Pacific pact for Canada "would be an artificial creation" and that none of the bilateral treaties the United States signed "constitute anything like a Pacific pact." Six months later, he noted that "a Pacific pact...would produce not stability but instability."<sup>86</sup> His principal reason for calling the pact "artificial" was that he did not believe that a reasonably effective military, economic and cultural alliance, similar to the North Atlantic treaty, could be established in Asia.<sup>87</sup> Such an explanation was readily accepted in Canada. Perhaps the ghost of Mackenzie King cautioned Pearson to put all of Canada's interests into one basket and stay out of military commitments that would engulf it in a military quagmire. Canada did, however, become involved in the Korean war, and

not wanting to give the impression that Canada was totally indifferent to a collective security arrangement for the Pacific region, policymakers in External Affairs said that they would continue to study the issue of whether a defence arrangement in the Pacific would be suitable for Canada.<sup>88</sup>

In the meantime, Canada was quite satisfied with the defence arrangements it had signed along with the United States and Western Europe: the Ogdensburg Agreement (1940) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949). While Ogdensburg, New York, was miles away from Seoul, South Korea, the roads that Canada travelled to these two places, the former before Mackenzie King's death and the latter after, were paved by the United States. These roads were paved with military defence commitments that strengthened U.S.-Canada relations. ANZUS was also part of the road paved by the United States, but for Canada this treaty remained outside the main orbit of American-Canadian relations.

### Involvement in Korea

Canada was reluctant to join a Pacific security pact as part of the collective security arrangement initiated by the United States. Such a response came from Mackenzie King when he was confronted with the question of Canadian membership in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). Although he handed over the portfolio of External Affairs to his trusted colleague Louis St Laurent, King "never lost his jealous, proprietorial interest in the conduct of the

department or his watchful concern for Canadian foreign policy."<sup>89</sup> Mackenzie King would have stayed out of UN-sponsored defence arrangements in Asia if he had had his own way. Consequently, he was opposed to working through the UN as "a great stabilizing and moderating influence in world politics."<sup>90</sup> Ironically, however, as King sought to keep out of any form of military involvement in Korea, he indirectly laid a stronger foundation for the preservation of Canadian trade, foreign aid and even peacekeeping in Asia.

After August 1945, Korea was divided along the 38th parallel; the north was occupied by Soviet troops and the south by American forces. Decisions made at Yalta in February 1945 by Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States created the situation in Korea. The Big Three had decided that elections would be held to preserve the unity and independence of Korea. While the presence of foreign troops had the effect of convincing the majority of Koreans that independence was desirable, the Americans and the Soviets failed to reach a final decision on the future of Korea. The south, under American supervision, was apprehensive of the growth of Communism in the north. The north, in turn, would not budge to join a democratic south.<sup>91</sup> To break the stalemate, the Americans placed the Korean issue in the hands of the United Nations General Assembly. This move came after the Soviet Union rejected a United States proposal for a four-power conference to discuss the Korean issue.<sup>92</sup> "After some debate, the United Nations approved an American resolution to create a temporary commission which was to include Canada."<sup>93</sup> It was given a mandate to call "for free elections

in Korea and the withdrawal of foreign troops under UNTOCK supervision."<sup>94</sup>

The United States' request for Canadian membership on the commission was initially turned down by External Affairs. Only after being pressured by the United States, especially through the insistence of John Foster Dulles, did Canada agree to become a member of UNTCOK. Dulles did not want debate to be reopened on the Korean issue. He wanted a solution to the Korean problem so that the Soviet Union could not take advantage of any apparent division among the western democracies.<sup>95</sup> Even though Dulles' insistence paid off, External Affairs viewed Canadian membership on the commission as temporary.

To Mackenzie King, however, the whole Korean affair was anathema. It was indeed a treacherous road to Asia where King was concerned.<sup>96</sup> He "was suddenly roused to vehement opposition. He was terrified of attempting to mediate between the two great powers and still more terrified of the equivocal appearance of acting as the agent or puppet of one of them."<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, he was angry that the United States wanted to include Canada with countries like El Salvador and the Philippines in the commission, and he was afraid that Canada would have difficulty refuting "the charge that in political, as well as in economic affairs, the country was under the domination of the United States."<sup>98</sup> Finally, he worried that Canada would get involved in another global conflict, this time in Asia, where the United States, the



Soviet Union and China were endeavouring to carve out areas of influence for themselves.<sup>99</sup> While another world war was a possibility, King's reluctance to take Canada into the untested waters of international commitments in Asia stemmed from the fact that he had to establish "his supremacy over the two strong members of his cabinet, Mr. St Laurent and Mr. Ilesley" and that he had a desire to maintain unity within his cabinet.<sup>100</sup> St Laurent and J. L. Ilesley, the Minister of Finance, threatened to resign after King "suggested that Canada should simply leave its seat on the Korean commission vacant."<sup>101</sup>

Ilesley's threat of resignation and the possibility of cabinet disunity came after Pearson was sent to Washington, D. C., "to plead [King's] case with President Truman."<sup>102</sup> Truman conveyed to Pearson that he hoped Canada could be counted on to support the United States. He assured Pearson that Canada did not have to be anxious about getting into trouble in Korea, but if that happened, the United States would be behind Canada.<sup>103</sup> Truman even gave Canada further assurance that the work of UNCTOC would not "lead to or contribute to a clash with or even an intensification with the U.S.S.R." He added: "I can assure you that we, on our part, are going to do everything we can to prevent this."<sup>104</sup> If it had not been for threats of resignation from two powerful cabinet members, King might have ignored Truman's guarantee. King was not interested in a military involvement in Korea.

Canadian involvement in UNCTOC became a battle between King's isolationist stand and St Laurent's liberal internationalism.<sup>105</sup> The

latter won out and King conceded that Dr. G. S. Patterson, the Canadian representative who had served as a diplomat in Asia, "might remain on the Commission but only so long as it enjoyed the co-operation of both the United States and the Soviet Union and did nothing to profit the one at the expense of the other."<sup>106</sup> But two things become apparent: "the impossibility of meeting these exacting conditions" and "the wisdom of King's original objection to Canada's involvement."<sup>107</sup>

One of the commission's responsibilities was to supervise elections for all of Korea. But the Soviet Union did not permit UNTCOK to enter North Korea. This refusal was the first act in "the Korean dilemma" which eventually led to war and the difficulty in reaching a peace settlement.<sup>108</sup> Faced with this predicament, the United States decided to hold free elections in South Korea. It had the support of Nationalist China, France and the Philippines, but Canada, together with Australia, India, and Syria, opposed the United States' decision, suggesting that the issue of free elections be placed in the lap of the interim committee of UN General Assembly. Canada opposed the United States' position because the Americans indulged in diplomatic presumption by not consulting the Canadian officials about its membership in UNTCOK. Lurking in the minds of Canadian External Affairs officials, especially Mackenzie King, was the fear that a war fought between the Americans and the Soviets would contravene a fundamental tenet of the emerging Canadian policy of peacekeeping in Asia. But with a good amount of influence and some vigorous lobbying, the United States won out. The UN General Assembly voted in favour of allowing the

Americans to proceed with elections in South Korea. Canada and Australia voted against the idea. Pearson, who had already played an active part in the Korean issue, warned that tensions could increase if elections were not held for both Koreas. Canada could have threatened to pull out from UNTCOK in protest, but it did not. Instead, it called upon its representative, Dr. Patterson, to protest the South Korean elections, which he did but to no avail.<sup>109</sup> The elections were held, and on August 15, 1948, the Republic of South Korea came into existence. What the Canadian experience in Korea indicated was that Korea was becoming a sideshow for Canada.<sup>110</sup>

After Canada's initial involvement in Korea through UNTCOK, External Affairs officials hoped that it would not be pulled into any further problems in Korea. Pearson was confident that the chances for further involvement were remote.<sup>111</sup> Part of the DEA's thinking stemmed from the belief that the political and military side of collective security was more costly and demanded a greater commitment than peacekeeping. It was the political and military aspects of collective security that became a great concern to the DEA, particularly whether Canada would be able to raise a force for Korea in the post-war demobilization era if a war broke out.<sup>112</sup> War did eventually break out after June 1950, and the DEA's fear that it might not be able to raise a military force for Korea became a reality. Realizing that the nation had only a small force on hand, the St Laurent government played for time.<sup>113</sup> St Laurent recognized that his government had not made provision for a trained expeditionary force in the event of a crisis.<sup>114</sup>

But a decision had to be made regarding whether Canada would join a collective defence arrangement and get involved in the Korean war, a remote possibility while Mackenzie King was alive. But King died July 22, 1950, almost a month after the war broke out. The question of Canadian participation could not be kept in the background any longer; it had to be reviewed. As Denis Stairs succinctly noted,

It was a small caprice of Canadian history that on the day [Mackenzie King] died, leaders of opinion among the populace whose isolationist views he had nurtured for so long were clamouring to send troops to an obscure and ugly war in the Far East. It was also a melancholy commentary on the short-lived influence of departed politicians that some of Mr King's former colleagues used the train-ride back to Ottawa from his funeral in Toronto as the occasion to reach agreement on the principle of a Canadian ground force contribution to the conflict in Korea.<sup>115</sup>

It may have been a sad testimony to their lack of respect for their former leader, but this move was indicative that a decisive change had taken place not only in Canadian-American relations but in Canadian interests in Asian affairs. In addition, Canada's deepening involvement in Asia was evident in its desire to trade and to become a peacekeeper.

Canadian involvement in the Korean war was far removed from a Pacific pact. External Affairs viewed the war as a threat "to the very existence of the United Nations,"<sup>116</sup> recognizing that divisions between the Soviet Union and the United States over Korea had spilled onto the floor of the UN General Assembly, beginning when the question of the supervision of elections in Korea was brought to a vote. With

the blatant aggression of North Korea against its southern counterpart, a series of fierce battles ensued, not only on the fields of Korea but on the floor of the UN.

In the Korean war Canada fought under the banner of the UN.<sup>117</sup> It did so because it subscribed to collective security, and its decision was consistent with Canadian foreign policy. Over the previous three years, especially since 1947, External Affairs recognized that "evil", in the form of aggression and Communism which halted the growth of independence, had to be opposed. To prevent a possible backlash from the Canadian public, St Laurent was quick to remind the country that Canadian participation resulted from its membership in the UN and its support of UN efforts against blatant aggression.<sup>118</sup> The St Laurent government received much public support for the country's participation in the Korean war when China entered the conflict in November 1950. It seemed obvious at this point that Communism had to be defeated.

Although in 1948 External Affairs was dubious about the legitimacy of the government of South Korea, the invasion of this US-sponsored fledgling democracy was not viewed as an isolated case, but was tied to the whole international scene. Pearson best summarized the situation when he noted that the aggression of North Korea was "a breach in the outer defences of the free world."<sup>119</sup> It was natural for the Korean war to be viewed within the context of the war for men's minds. Escott Reid, for one, saw the link between moral and strategic arguments. A moral victory in this conflict would have a "considerable strategic

significance" for the West.<sup>120</sup> The Toronto Daily Star was quick to voice the need for a moral victory in Korea, viewing the war as "a phase of the world contest between democracy and totalitarian communism. That contest, being essentially a war of ideas, will ultimately be decided in the minds of men rather than on battlefields."<sup>121</sup>

Given the close defence co-operation that developed between the United States and Canada during the Second World War, it was difficult for Canada to remain totally aloof in the Korean war. In not wanting to lose face by joining the collective security arrangement of which the United States was the major partner, Canada endeavoured to exercise a measure of independence in the actions and decisions it took in the UN. Such moves put Pearson in a predicament. On the one hand, he recognized that Canada could not ignore close defence co-operation with the United States because of the increasing international tensions that developed from the Korean war. On the other hand, Pearson recognized that in spite of Canada's consultations with Britain, France and the United States on policy matters in the war, it had to maintain a good measure of independence in the decisions it made.<sup>122</sup> Canada was a sovereign member of the Commonwealth, and it did not want to be mistaken for a satellite of the United States. Pearson even instructed Hume Wrong in Washington that he should, above all, "tell them frankly that we are maintaining the right to determine our own attitudes to whatever action may be proposed in the United Nations when the time comes to take such a decision."<sup>123</sup> Above all else, Pearson wanted Canada to be cautious about accepting United States policies based on strategic explanations

alone.<sup>124</sup>

An example of the possibility of accepting American policies under these conditions can be found in the U.S.'s linking of Formosa to the Korean issue. On June 27, 1950, President Truman announced that "as a result of the Korean crisis, he had made the defence of Taiwan a responsibility of the United States fleet."<sup>125</sup> This move came in response to the possibility that China might be drawn into the war. The United States did not recognize China because it "was unalterably the ally and satellite of Soviet Russia, and her adherence to the Communist cause had disastrously altered the balance of power in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia."<sup>126</sup> Thus, the U.S. placed its Seventh Fleet between Formosa and China, a move which resulted in increased tensions between China and the United States. MacArthur, who viewed Communism as an international threat, had Formosa in mind for additional bases and forces if they were needed in the event that China entered the war. To Canada, however, Formosa was a United States policy issue and not a concern of the United Nations. Canada would do its share to defend Korea, but it would not get involved if Formosa was included. External Affairs made it known that Canada wanted the United States to maintain a strict distinction between what it was taking on "on its own authority for the defence of Formosa and the action which it is taking under the auspices of the United Nations for the defence of Korea."<sup>127</sup> Confronted with the issue of Formosa, Canada took the position that it would support "any appropriate resolution authorizing the neutralization of [Formosa]...so long as the war in Korea made it necessary."<sup>128</sup>

Canada had two reasons for demanding Formosa's neutrality. First, it did not want to spread its military commitments too thinly. This was based on the rationale that in the defence of Korea the UN troops were also fighting for the defence of Formosa and Southeast Asia. Second, it did not desire to make the question of the recognition of China any more complicated by exchanging short-term gains for long-term benefits. Although for Canada the question of the recognition of China was temporarily quashed by the Korean war, it realized that it was only a matter of time before China would be recognized. A month after the outbreak of the Korean war, A.D.P. Heeney, an under-secretary in External Affairs, prepared a memorandum for Pearson on Chinese representation in the United Nations. He said that "there seems to be no doubt that in the long run the admission of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations will be necessary if any solution to the present situation in the Far East is to be found and maintained."<sup>129</sup> But as long as the Korean war continued, the question of recognition was shelved. The placing of the United States' Seventh Fleet between China and Formosa had the same effect, not only increasing tensions between the United States and China, but ultimately delaying the question of China's recognition in the UN.

To men like Heeney, whose primary interest was Europe and not Asia, the issue of Formosa was a good indication that Korea was a sideshow, "a theatre of secondary importance" because Canada's obligations to NATO in Europe, where the Soviets were seen as the real threat, were of paramount importance. He also distrusted military involvement. Heeney



reminded Pearson about where Canadian priorities should lie:

Serious as is the Korean situation, and important as it is that we should not fail in our responsibility as a member of the United Nations, it would seem, at least as yet, that Korea is but a "side show" in the overall struggle between the U.S.S.R. and the Western world. There is no reason to believe that Western Europe is not still the main theatre, and it would be unfortunate if our attention should be diverted from Europe by reason of Korea. It is suggested therefore that any Canadian contribution should not be at the expense of our capacity to fulfil our responsibilities for the direct defence of Canada and under the North Atlantic Treaty. Indeed, the Korean incident stresses the need for stepping up Canadian defence preparations and the whole North Atlantic programme.<sup>130</sup>

The importance of NATO and Canadian obligations in the North Atlantic was underscored by Charles Ritchie, another non-Asian specialist in External Affairs. He was apprehensive that the Korean war would undermine NATO and that NATO could not "go on indefinitely without taking stock of the changes which the Korean War is bringing about and of the possible results of more extended trouble in the Pacific."<sup>131</sup> DEA officials were also concerned that if South Korea fell into Communist hands as a result of the Korean war, Southeast Asia would be vulnerable to the influence of Communism. Furthermore, the loss of this region would have moral consequences for the Cold War. But Heeney, a supporter of NATO, tried to quell the fear of a chain reaction. He himself hoped that that would not occur. It would have given him untold worries if Asia had replaced Western Europe as the main theatre of possible military conflict, but fortunately it did not.

The war that began on June 25, 1950, ended with an armistice on July 27, 1953. What started off for Canada as an idealistic contribution to collective security in which "the UN response to the North Korean attack could be shaped into a genuine example of collective security enforcement," ended with the practical application - that is, the political and military aspects - of collective security.<sup>132</sup> As Denis Stairs wrote:

The experience nevertheless drove home the fact that the response to the North Korean invasion was an enterprise in 'collective security' only in form. Its political reality was that it was an act of containment initiated by western allies under the leadership of the United States. Only through fortuitous circumstances had the American government managed to acquire for its decisions the official stamp of United Nations approval. Except as a place for marshalling friends and irritating enemies, the United Nations as a collective body was not in itself a significant actor in the crisis.<sup>133</sup>

Lester Pearson may have been modest or at best diplomatic when he compared the collective security involvements in NATO and Korea by stating that an imperfect political form of collective security was exhibited in Korea.<sup>134</sup> There was no doubt that even Pearson viewed NATO as of paramount importance to Canada's collective defence agreements. It is no surprise, therefore, that after the Korean war Canada resorted to 'pactomania' in Asia.

### 'Pactomania' after the Korean War

Before the outbreak of the Korean war, Canada subscribed to the doctrine of collective security under the United Nations Charter, but it refrained from joining regional defence arrangements in Asia. During the Korean war, Canada fought as an ally of the United States under the auspices of the United Nations. It was obliged to join the collective force to repel the aggression of North Korea and Communist China.<sup>135</sup> At the end of the Korean war, Canada shied away from defence pacts in Asia. It would study the issues involved in a Locarno-type pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) but was not willing to join a regional defence arrangement.

The principal advocate of a Locarno-type pact, one that would prevent the fall of Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia to Communism, was Sir Anthony Eden of Britain. This pact was similar to the Locarno treaties of 1925, "a reciprocal defensive arrangement in which each member guarantees" to come to the defence of an ally faced with blatant aggression.<sup>136</sup> To the policymakers in the United States State Department, Eden stated that "Locarno was associated with appeasement and the 'bad old days'." But even before the idea of a Locarno-type pact could be implemented, the United States was ready to shelve it. Eden tried to persuade "the Americans that Locarno was not a dirty word" and that "Locarno had nothing to do with Munich in either time or temper."<sup>137</sup>

While Eden was suggesting the idea of a Locarno-type pact, John Foster Dulles and officials in the U.S. State Department talked about a Southeast Asia defence agreement. Escott Reid's role in this scenario was to convince the other policymakers in External Affairs that India would be more willing to participate in a Locarno-type pact than to be a member of an American-sponsored SEATO. Reid noted that "it would be more difficult for India to become a co-guarantor of a sort of a Locarno pact for Indochina if the conclusion of this pact were accompanied by the establishment of an anti-communist SEATO, which, inter alia, would guarantee Indo-China."<sup>138</sup> Reid also noted that there was a fundamental ideological difference between India and the United States. Compared to the United States, India was more willing to accept "the coming into power of Communist governments as the result of internal [nationalist] movements" in Asia.<sup>139</sup>

The United States was interested in a defence arrangement that would contain the spread of Communism in Indochina and thwart the ideological influence of China and the Soviet Union in Asia. A defence agreement in the form of SEATO best fulfilled its aims. For External Affairs, especially Reid, the failure to establish a Locarno-type pact was "one of the tragic lost opportunities of the middle fifties,"<sup>140</sup> because India and the United States would move farther apart in the search for political solutions to the problems of Asia. "It was clear that the United States preferred a SEATO treaty without India and China to a Locarno-type treaty with India and China."<sup>141</sup> Canada was unable to do much even though it had a prophet in the form of Escott Reid

crying in the wilderness, warning that India would view the membership of Britain, France and the United States in SEATO as "the return of western domination to Asia thinly disguised as an alliance between western countries and two or three Asian satellites."<sup>142</sup> Reid realized, too, that the United States had written off the Locarno-type pact in exchange for a Southeast Asian defence arrangement, and he found the United States moving rapidly to implement this plan. Showing great concern for India, Reid wrote Pearson to warn his boss that "it looks as if the Americans are pressing ahead dangerously fast with the proposals for a SEATO, that they are likely to get out of SEATO no more allies than they now have, and that SEATO will not lead, therefore, to an increase of Western strength in this area but that, by greatly offending India, it will lead to a weakening of the Western position."<sup>143</sup> The United States was not excessively worried that India would be slighted. There were eight other nations - Britain, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia - that it could count on.<sup>144</sup>

On September 8, 1954, the Southeast Asia defence treaty, called the Manila Pact, was signed in Manila. In one sense, this American-sponsored western alliance was a defence arrangement that neatly replaced the Japanese East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,<sup>145</sup> but the primary purpose of this treaty was "to prevent any further advances of militant international Communism, either by overt aggression or by subversion, in the general area of Southeast Asia, by military guarantees and by economic and military assistance to member countries

in Southeast Asia."<sup>146</sup> One important development in Southeast Asia that helped create SEATO was the rapid decline of French military power in Indochina which aroused the military ambitions of the United States to do something about a defence plan for the region. The Philippines and Taiwan shared the Americans' concerns. In addition, there was no doubt that SEATO was formed in response to the Cold War in Asia, and the motive to contain China was obvious.<sup>147</sup>

When it came to the defence of Southeast Asia, Canada "remained completely aloof,"<sup>148</sup> "and Pearson would have nothing to do with it."<sup>149</sup> Canada was satisfied to fight the Cold War on the economic front, but it was cautious in engaging in military commitments which would not serve its traditional positions of working through the United Nations and of maintaining a strong relationship with the Asian Commonwealth.<sup>150</sup> External Affairs had stipulated that unless defence arrangements in Southeast Asia "were consistent within the UN Charter, were divorced from any taint of colonialism, embraced the political and economic fields as well as military, and were worked out with the advice, cooperation and assistance of the free Asia countries," Canada would not join SEATO.<sup>151</sup> This attitude implied that unless SEATO resembled NATO, it was unlikely that Canada would participate in it. Much of the explanation External Affairs provided for not joining SEATO was based on information that Britain had collected in its consultations with Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan and Indonesia. Burma, India and Indonesia were apprehensive that tensions in the region would increase if SEATO was formed, although Pakistan accepted

the idea of a defence plan. But Canada was fearful that Pakistan's support for the American-sponsored alliance would antagonize India. Furthermore, there were concerns in External Affairs that Britain, France and the United States would jostle for "the support and friendship of the South East Asia states," which in turn might destroy the principle of co-existence and co-operation that any Asian country might subscribe to. Finally, External Affairs believed it was essential for Canada to maintain good diplomatic relations with India. Consequently, Canada "did not intend to become involved in security arrangements for South East Asia."<sup>152</sup>

Pearson, resembling his old master Mackenzie King, did not want to take rigid positions on issues that would divide the country; he saw the necessity of maintaining domestic unity. Consequently, he was very cautious about joining a collective defence arrangement for Southeast Asia, and he did not conceive that his decision was "inconsistent and weak."<sup>153</sup> Pearson was quite content to live in the shadow of the United States, the predominant western power in Asia. Together with the other policymakers in External Affairs, Pearson recognized that "although Southeast Asia is a long way from [Ottawa] - half way round the world - [Canada was] concerned to see the newly independent nations of that area consolidate their independence in peace and security."<sup>154</sup> Thus, to Pearson - in fact, to the entire St Laurent government, as diplomatic historian James Eayrs has noted - "SEATO seemed to be not only an imperfect but also an improper instrument with which to attain its stated objectives, namely 'to strengthen the fabric

of peace and freedom and to uphold the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area'.<sup>155</sup> It seemed obvious that Canada's support for its fundamental tenets of foreign policy -- its support for democracy and decolonization, trade, aid and peace -- should not be undermined by a defence arrangement for Southeast Asia.

To fulfill its goal of maintaining freedom and peace, Canada accepted in 1954, the same year SEATO was organized, a position on the International Supervisory Commission for Indochina. Initially, Canada was reluctant to serve on the commission, but External Affairs was interested in easing the tensions between France and Indochina and in finding a solution to the question of who would rule Indochina. Canada's involvement in the peace process in Indochina has been cited as another reason for its not being a member of SEATO. However, the fact that Canada did not join SEATO did not mean that it ignored "the legitimacy of [SEATO], of which not only its close neighbour but also four of its Commonwealth partners are members."<sup>156</sup>

One Asian Commonwealth partner that joined SEATO was Pakistan. India stayed out but did not shun the conference of nonaligned Afro-Asian countries held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. The Bandung conference, composed mainly of Asian countries, was held as an answer to SEATO<sup>157</sup> and involved Afro-Asian countries that had difficulty identifying either with the Soviet bloc or the Western



democratic countries in the Cold War. By avoiding the "military alliances in the cold war" these Afro-Asian countries "sought to break through the dichotomy prevailing between alliance membership and withdrawal from international political activity."<sup>158</sup> Consequently, as the diplomatic historian Michael Donelan noted, these nonaligned nations, "whether through blindness or greater understanding than they were often credited with, rapidly concluded that their security must lie primarily in neutrality, diplomacy and in economic progress. The Bandung Conference...was a curious meeting of many cross currents, but in sum it was a manifestation of this spirit."<sup>159</sup>

Given Canada's reluctance to join a defence arrangement in Southeast Asia and given that this first Afro-Asian conference was to be an answer to SEATO, it would seemed that Canada might have participated as an observer because of its anti-colonial stance. However, all it did was show an interest in the proceedings at Bandung; it did not seek an invitation to attend the conference or endeavour to send an observer.<sup>160</sup> Since Canada was not a member of SEATO, Pearson did not hesitate to send a telegram to Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Prime Minister of Indonesia, saying that he hoped "that the Conference will contribute to the welfare of the people of Asia and Africa and promote the settlement by peaceful means of all disputes likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."<sup>161</sup> A similar message was not sent by Australia, Britain and the United States, and the reason for this was obvious: they were the three main western members of SEATO. Canada was concerned that it might be "the only

western country sending one."<sup>162</sup> In sending the message of goodwill, Pearson not only had the Indochina situation in mind, but by implication he mentioned that Canada would keep tabs on the issues of "colonialism, co-existence and economic cooperation," which were the three main topics discussed at Bandung.<sup>163</sup> Because Canada had opposed colonialism, it was interested in what the nonaligned countries would have to say on racialism and the anti-colonial resolution it would adopt. However, the resolution adopted by these countries was a foregone conclusion, one that Canada identified with. They declared "that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should be speedily brought to an end."<sup>164</sup>

Anti-colonialism unified the Afro-Asian countries, but apart from colonialism, Canada had two further concerns about the Bandung conference, one involving China, and the other the Colombo Plan. Canadian External Affairs officials were pleased that China was invited to the conference, and they hoped that "the Chinese [would be brought] out of their dangerous tête-à-tête with Moscow" and that it might "lead them to a better appreciation of the attitudes of other countries."<sup>165</sup> The last thing Canadian policymakers wanted was for China to be dragged into the Soviet sphere of influence. With respect to foreign aid, Canadian officials hoped that whatever discussions the Afro-Asian countries had on economic co-operation, the Colombo Plan scheme would not be replaced by the nations it served.<sup>166</sup> Replacing the Plan would not only undermine a major tenet of Canadian foreign policy but would sabotage Commonwealth relations and those among the

western democracies. But to Canada's relief, the Afro-Asian nations did not replace the Colombo Plan, although they did express in principle their interest in accepting foreign investments and atomic energy technology for peaceful purposes.<sup>167</sup> External Affairs officials were also satisfied that the main tenets of Canadian foreign policy in Asia were not weakened by the decisions taken at the Bandung conference and by Canada's confrontation with collective defence arrangements.

The Asian experts in External Affairs were responsible for making Canada more Pacific oriented. Since the Canadian perspective was generally similar to that of the United States, Canada expressed its renewed interest in the Pacific by supporting American measures. In addition, Canada made its views known on the Far Eastern Commission and at the negotiations of the Japanese peace treaty. It was willing to allow the United States to prevent Japan from once again becoming a military threat in Asia and to initiate bilateral defence arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Philippines. From the Canadian perspective, bilateral defence treaties did not constitute a Pacific pact. This position lay behind Canada's reasoning for its involvement in the Korean war. One of Canada's preoccupations in fighting under the UN flag in Korea was to make a distinction between idealistic and political aspects of collective security. Once the war was over, Canada continued to skirt collective security arrangements in Asia. In addition, Canada saw avoiding defence alliances as a means of preventing its foreign policy goals of democracy and decolonization, trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping from being weakened.

Overall, then, the Canadian approach to defence alliances after 1945 was one element of continuity in its foreign policy from the pre-war and wartime periods. Officials in External Affairs avoided joining regional defence alliances because they violated the traditional Canadian desire to avoid military involvements in Asia. Canada also feared that defence pacts were flawed because of their emphasis on military co-operation. If Canada had joined a regional defence alliance, Canadian officials would have pushed for a stronger emphasis on economic co-operation. Since Canada had joined the Colombo Plan, becoming a member of a defence alliance such as SEATO might have defeated a Canadian foreign policy objective. Furthermore, the importance it attached to NATO pre-empted Canada's need to be part of the defence pact in Southeast Asia. But in 1954, amidst the development of a Southeast Asian defence plan and concern for the growing turmoil in the region, Canada subscribed to another means of fighting the war for men's minds: contributing to peacekeeping efforts in Indochina.

### Notes to Chapter Four

1. NAC, L. B. Pearson Papers, MG 26, N 1, vol. 22, "Survey of Present Strategic Situation," December 29, 1949, p. 8.
2. DEA Files, file 50273-40, vol. 6, SSEA to High Commissioner for Canada, London, August 21, 1954.
3. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, I, p. 57.
4. Ibid., pp. 61-70.
5. Ibid., p. 70.
6. Pick and Critchley, Collective Security, p. 25.
7. James Eayrs, "'A Low Dishonest Decade': Aspects of Canadian External Policy, 1931-1939," in Hugh L. Keenleyside et. al., The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs (Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1960), pp. 65 - 68; see also Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, II: Appeasement and Rearmament (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 81.
8. Pick and Critchley, Collective Security, p. 25.
9. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1919, (Special Session, pp. 102, 103, quoted in Eayrs, "A Low Dishonest Decade," pp. 65 - 66.
10. Ibid., p. 55.
11. Pick and Critchley, Collective Security, p. 26.
12. Eayrs, "A Low Dishonest Decade," p. 68.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 68.
15. Ibid., p. 74.
16. Ibid., p. 64.
17. Ibid., This is taken from the title of Eayrs' article. For a succinct coverage of Canadian foreign policy from 1935 to 1939, see J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, "'A Self-Evident National Duty': Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935 - 1939," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 3:2 (January 1975), pp. 212 - 233.
18. Pick and Critchley, Collective Security, p. 28.

19. Escott Reid, On Duty: A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations 1945-1946 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983), p. 11. See his discussion on the San Francisco Conference, p. 66 ff.
20. L. B. Pearson, "Some Thoughts on Canadian External Relations," S/S, 53/31, p. 4.
21. Reid, On Duty, p. 27.
22. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, 2, pp. 323 - 324.
23. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs: 1946 to 1949, p. 100.
24. Smith, The Diplomacy of Fear, pp. 224 and 228; NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 2, memo for Mr. Brooke Claxton, May 5, 1948.
25. NAC, Escott Reid Papers, MG 31, E 46, Vol. 6, File 12, "Provisional and Tentative Draft of a Collective Security Agreement," Working Paper, March 19, 1948.
26. Ibid., "Canadian Attitude Towards a North Atlantic Defence Agreement," June 26, 1948, p. 2.
27. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 2, memorandum for Mr. Brooke Claxton, May 5, 1948. See also Robert A. Spencer's analysis of Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty in Canada in World Affairs, p. 243, where he noted that the North Atlantic defence arrangement was "consistent with the principal aims of Canadian foreign policy" and "that Canada should play a significant role in the adjustment to the new situation of the later forties." It is easy to detach foreign policy matters from domestic issues. B. S. Kierstead in Canada and World Affairs: September 1951 to October 1953, p. 32, wrote on the close link between NATO and domestic politics: "Canada's strong adherence to NATO...is to be explained...by the fact that no alternative form would so easily have won the support of both the English- and French- speaking elements of our population. Canada's contributions to NATO were also influenced by domestic considerations. French Canada supported the idea of collective resistance to the encroachments of world Communism but at the same time retained her old suspicions of foreign commitments and her willingness to contribute to overseas armies."
28. See NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 6, file 12. "Provisional ...," March 19, 1948. For insights on NATO as "an overloaded alliance freighted down with a lot of ideological baggage", see James Eayrs, Northern Approaches: Canada and the Search for Peace (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1961), pp. 65 - 67. India was not in favour of Canada's membership in NATO. Krishna Menon complained that his hope, "about [Canada] becoming a Westward-leaning nonaligned state", was dashed. Canada, unfortunately, was given to "bloc politics". See Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam, p. 12. For a more detailed account of the formation of NATO, see Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, IV:

Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) and Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947 - 1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

29. Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam, p. 12.
30. Dale Thomson in his article on "The Political Ideas of Louis St Laurent," p. 151, noted that India's Nehru viewed NATO as "an instrument to perpetuate Western domination outside the Atlantic area, and that there could be no detente in the cold war as long as the West maintained a state of battle readiness in Europe, inciting the U.S.S.R. to do the same."
31. W. L. Morton, "Canada and Future Policy in the Pacific," International Journal 1:1 (January 1946), p. 55. See also W. L. Morton, "Canada's Far Eastern Policy," Pacific Affairs 19:3 (September 1946), pp. 241 - 249. In this section, the term 'Pacific Affairs' includes all of Asia and Australia and New Zealand. See RG 25-A-12, vol. 2089, file AR-23, 17, R. A. D. Ford to A. R. Menzies, March 4, 1949.
32. Ibid., p. 56.
33. Ibid. See also Thomas Peterson, "Canada and the Colombo Plan, 1950 - 1960: A Study in Government Policy and Public Opinion," M. A. Thesis, University of Manitoba, March 1962. He noted that Canada had no Pacific policy until 1950. This was due to geography, the small amount of trade, and the lack of diplomatic representation, except in Tokyo, before 1946. See p. 4.
34. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, p. 87.
35. A. R. Menzies, "Canadian Views of U. S. Policy Towards Japan, 1945 - 1952," in A. Hamish Ion and Barry D. Hunt, eds., War and Diplomacy Across the Pacific 1919 - 1952 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid University Press, 1988), p. 159.
36. NAC, Canada House, Secret & Confidential Files, 1936 - 1955, RG 25-A-12, vol. 2089, file AR 23-17, R. A. D. Ford to Arthur Menzies, March 4, 1949. Ford, from time to time, took an interest in Far Eastern issues. It was Ford, too, who advised the DEA to talk to the leaders of India and Pakistan on Far Eastern issues rather than just consult the traditional allies of Canada. See also the letter from A. R. Menzies to N. A. Robertson, February 5, 1949. See DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 1, SSEA to High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, Pakistan, October 16, 1950. The DEA did not wish to support any regime in Asia "which might become as discredited as the Kuomintang in China."
37. DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 1, T. C. Davis to Arthur Menzies, March 9, 1949.

38. Ibid., despatch 61, February 7, 1950. R. C. Bryce, interview, Ottawa, May 30, 1989. Also, Jack Maybee, interview, Ottawa, June 14, 1989. See NAC, MG 30, E 300, vol. 4, J. K. Fairbank to General Odium, November 27, 1943, and NAC, MG 30, E 300, vol. 9, Arthur Menzies to Victor W. Odium, December 19, 1950. I would like to thank Irene Norman for bringing to my attention the works and contributions of E. Herbert Norman. Irene Norman, interview, Ottawa, June 9, 1989. Norman was noted for his three publications on Japan: Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (New York, 1940); Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription (New York, 1943); Ando Shoeki and the Anatomy of Japanese Feudalism (Tokyo, 1949). See also Roger W. Bowen, Innocence is not Enough: The Life and Death of Herbert Norman (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1986), pp. 111 - 139 and 268 - 289. Also Bowen, ed., E.H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship, pp. x - xi, and the essay by Edwin O. Reischauer, "Herbert Norman: The Perspective of a Lifelong Friend," pp. 3 - 12.
39. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, pp. 96 - 97. See his reference, DEA files, file 50061-40 (1), top secret, Wrong to Pearson, October 27, 1945.
40. In his memoirs, Pearson lamented the fact that Canada was deceived by the United States in subscribing to collective security. He said that "Washington kept the Cold War hot for its own power purposes. Canada and other western countries, therefore, were hoodwinked into seeking 'collective security' under United Nations leadership which was as unnecessary as it was unwise. We should have adopted the cautious attitude of Mackenzie King in the twenties and thirties, this time toward Washington, and should have remained uncommitted to either side in Cold War initiatives." See Munro and Inglis, eds., Mike, 2, pp. 24 - 25. See also pp. 29 - 30. This passage describes the revisionist views that Pearson later denounced in his book.
41. Gregory A. Johnson, "North Pacific Triangle?", p. 302.
42. Eiji Takemae, "Canadian Views on Occupation Policies and the Japanese Peace Treaty," interview with Dr. Arthur R. Menzies, The Journal of Tokyo Keizai University 144:1 (1986), p. 353.
43. Ibid.
44. A. R. Menzies, "Canadian Views of U. S. Policy Towards Japan, 1945 - 1952," p. 170.
45. DEA, Annual Report, 1946, p. 29-30. See also Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, p. 98.
46. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, p. 97.
47. Ibid.



48. Ibid.
49. R. C. Bryce, interview, Ottawa, May 30, 1989; also Arthur Menzies, interview, Ottawa, May 22, 1989. See also DEA Files, file 50061 - 40, vol. 2, memorandum for the Prime Minister, November 28, 1945: "The United States Army was anxious that he remain [in Japan] so that his extensive and special knowledge of Japanese political conditions would be available to General MacArthur's staff. For the last two months he has, in effect, been the head of the United States Army Counter-Intelligence Division in Japan."
50. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, pp. 99 - 100.
51. DEA Files, file 50061 - 40, vol. 1, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, October 30, 1945.
52. DEA Files, file 50061 - 40, vol. 2, draft letter to E. H. Norman, December 14, 1945. Col. L. M. Cosgrave was also asked to make a short visit to Shanghai after the Commission completed its work in Tokyo.
53. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, p. 100.
54. See DEA, Annual Report, 1950, p. 20, and Annual Report for 1951, pp. 23 - 24.
55. Eiji Takemae, "Canadian Views on Occupation Policies and the Japanese Peace Treaty," p. 336.
56. DEA Files, file 50062 - 40, vol. 1, "The Problems of Asia," October 26, 1950, p. 10.
57. DEA Files, file 50061 - 40, vol. 4, memorandum for Mr. Pearson, June 1, 1948. L. B. Pearson, "The Colombo Conference," S/S, 50/6, p. 7.
58. NAC, MG 26 N 1, vol. 10, L. B. Pearson to R. W. Mayhew, December 16, 1952. The letter was sent to the "S.S. President Cleveland" which sailed on December 20, 1952, from San Francisco.
59. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, pp. 100 - 101.
60. DEA, Annual Report, 1950, p. 19.
61. Ibid., p. 20.
62. NAC, RG 25, Acc 86 - 87/160, vol. 117, file 10389 - 40, pt. 3.
63. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 7, file 16, "Recent and Current Questions in the Relations Between Canada and the United States," August 10, 1951. See also RG 25, vol. 2125, file 928, Japan: Peace Settlements," pt. 3, May 1, 1951 to May 31, 1951. The DEA noted

that "it might be undesirable, from the point of view of future stability in the area, that Japan be bound to accept the signature of any Chinese government, upon which the opinion of the allied powers is divided, to a Treaty with such important implications for itself and China." See also Ibid., file 929, Japan; Peace Settlement, pt. 4, report by Norman in talks in London re: Japanese Peace Treaty and Far Eastern matters, Minute Sheet, June 26, 1951; and file 931, pt. 6, August 1, 1951 - August 20, 1951. Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the peace treaty dealt with the recognition of the independence of Korea and the renunciation of Japan's claims on Formosa.

64. DEA, Annual Report for 1951, p. 23.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 24.
67. NAC, RG 25-A-12, vol. 2089, file AR 23-17, Arthur Menzies to Alfred Rive, February 4, 1949.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941 - 1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), p. 713. He noted that "in American plans, Australia and New Zealand were to play an important but strictly subordinate role in the post-war security system in the Pacific." The concept of a Pacific Security arrangement was put forth by Sir Winston Churchill in 1943. The world would be divided into three security regions - Europe, North America, and the Pacific. At the end of the war "the idea of a regional security arrangement for the Pacific was talked about but never got off the ground." Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 20.
71. DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 1. A. R. Menzies to R. H. Palmer, May 5, 1950.
72. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 7, SSEA to High Commissioner for Canada, August 1, 1950.
73. Ibid.
74. DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 1, despatch Y, SSEA to High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, Pakistan, October 16, 1950.
75. Ibid.
76. There was also the questions of whether Japan should be included in a Pacific Pact - the U.S. would support Japan's membership but Australia and New Zealand would oppose it - whether Nationalist

- China should be included; how to deal with Burma, Malaya, the Philippines and Vietnam, which faced internal security problems; and whether France and the Netherlands should be included in this Pact, because they still had colonial possessions. See DEA Files, file 50073-A-40, vol. 2, memorandum for the Minister, March 20, 1952; memorandum for American and Far Eastern Division, February 11, 1952; DEA Files, file 50073-40, vol. 1, memorandum for the Minister, October 20, 1951.
77. DEA Files, file 50073-A-40, vol. 1, memorandum for the Minister, June 26, 1950.
  78. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 7, SSEA to High Commissioner for Canada, August 1, 1950.
  79. Ibid.
  80. DEA Files, file 50073-40, vol. 2, memorandum for the Minister, January 31, 1952; memorandum for American and the Far Eastern Division, February 11, 1952. The U.S. signed three bilateral defence arrangements within a week and a half: on August 30, 1951, a mutual defence treaty with the Philippines; on September 1, 1951, the ANZUS treaty with Australia and New Zealand; and on September 8, 1951, a security treaty with Japan. All three treaties were ratified on April 15, 1952.
  81. Keirstead, Canada in World Affairs: September 1951 to October 1953, p. 106.
  82. DEA Files, file 50073-40, vol. 1, memorandum for Mr. Pearson, February 27, 1951.
  83. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 54.
  84. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 7, file 15, Foreign Affairs Conference. Colombo Conferences, 1950, Vol. 1. See Sir Alan Stewart Watt, Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972). Watt noted that a regional security arrangement in the Pacific region would give added strength to defence arrangements not only in Southeast Asia but "in Europe itself." p. 218. Canada did not want to become involved in the Dutch New Guinea problem. The question of uniting the western half of the island under Dutch rule and the eastern half, which came under the jurisdiction of Australia in 1901, was an issue that Canadian External officials thought should be settled in the United Nations. See DEA Files, file 50073-A-40, vol. 2, "Notes for the visit of Mr. Casey of Australia," November 27, 1951, and "Memorandum For Commonwealth Division," from E. H. Norman, December 26, 1951.
  85. See A. R. Menzies, "Canadian Views of United States Policy Towards Japan, 1945-1952," p. 169. See also Eiji Takemae, "Canadian

- Views on Occupation Policies and the Japanese Peace Treaty," p. 330 - 331.
86. DEA Files, file 50073-A-40, vol. 2. Pacific Security Arrangements, December 29, 1952.
  87. Ibid.
  88. DEA Files, file 50073-A-40, vol. 1. memorandum for the Under-Secretary, July 8, 1950.
  89. Creighton, The Forked Road, p. 149.
  90. Ibid., p. 148.
  91. Ibid., p. 149.
  92. Johnson, "A North Pacific Triangle?," p. 328.
  93. Ibid.
  94. Ibid.
  95. Ibid., pp. 328 - 329.
  96. See NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 35, Canadian Membership UNTCOK, 1947-1948.
  97. Creighton, The Forked Road, p. 149.
  98. Ibid., p. 150. See also NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 35, memorandum re: Korean Commission, December 30, 1947.
  99. Ronning, A Memoir of China in Revolution, p. 188 - 190; see also Munro and Inglis, Mike, 2, pp. 165 - 166.
  100. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 35, Canadian Membership UNTCOK, 1947 - 1948. See Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, pp. 7 - 19, for a detailed discussion.
  101. Ignatieff, Peacemonger, pp. 101 - 102.
  102. Ibid., p. 101.
  103. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 35, Canadian Membership UNTCOK, 1947-1948, "Mission to Washington on the Korean Commission, January 1 - 6, 1948."
  104. Ibid., The Canadian Consulate General to SSEA, January 6, 1948.
  105. Smith, The Diplomacy of Fear, p. 217.
  106. Creighton, The Forked Road, p. 150.

107. Ibid.
108. See G. F. G. Stanley, "The Korean Dilemma," International Journal 7:4 (Autumn 1952), pp. 278 - 282.
109. For a good discussion on the Canadian predicament on UNTCOK and the opportunity Canada missed to take a firm stand on a foreign policy issue, see Denis Stairs, "Confronting Uncle Sam: Cuba and Korea," in Stephen Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto, 1968), pp. 57 - 83.
110. It was also becoming evident that the Korean situation was more of an extension of United States - Canada relations than an integral part of Canadian foreign policy in Asia. Ibid., pp. 67 - 68. John A. Stiles, in his work Developing Canada's Relations Abroad (Sackville, New Brunswick: Mount Allison University, 1980), pp. 69 - 70, noted that "Although there were numerous personal ties with Korea prior to World War II, especially through the work of Canadian missionaries, official Canadian-Korean relations may be said to have commenced when Canada was nominated as a member of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in 1947." See also Munro and Inglis, Mike, 2, pp. 135-145, and Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), pp. 221 - 222.
111. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs: 1949 to 1950, p. 281.
112. John W. Holmes, interview, Toronto, June 15, 1989.
113. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 6, "Chinese Intervention in Korea," November 29, 1950.
114. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 9, "Canada and the Korean Crisis," August 25, 1950.
115. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, p. 84.
116. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 5, "Canada and the Korean Crisis." July 22, 1950.
117. NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 7, W. L. Mackenzie King to L. B. Pearson, July 14, 1950: see also Munro and Inglis, Mike, 2, p. 148; Donald H. Gardner, Canadian Interests and Policies in the Far East since World War II (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1950), pp. 11 - 12; Stanley, "The Korean Dilemma," p. 278. Stairs noted in The Diplomacy of Constraint, p. 108, that "in the world of 1950 the equation of the purposes of the United Nations [was linked] with the security interests of the western powers."
118. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 3, memorandum for the United Nations Division, July 4, 1950.

119. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 9, "The Korean Crisis - The International Crisis", August 25, 1950. See also DEA 50062-40, vol. 1, "The Problems of Asia," October 26, 1950.
120. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 7, file 16, "The Role of the United Nations in Collective Security," October 16, 1951.
121. NAC, Brooke Claxton Papers, MG 32, B 5, vol. 106. The quotation is taken from an article in the Toronto Daily Star, "Moral Failure in Korea," September 7, 1951.
122. Ronning, A Memoir of China in Revolution, p. 201.
123. NAC, MG 31, E 6, folder 14, SSEA to the Canadian Ambassador, February 9, 1951.
124. NAC, MG 31, E 46, vol. 6, file 10, "Some lessons to be drawn from the Korean Crisis," February 19, 1951.
125. Ronning, A Memoir of China in Revolution, p. 192.
126. Keirstead, Canada in World Affairs: 1951 to 1953, p. 55.
127. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 3, SSEA to the Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D. C., July 6, 1950.
128. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs: 1949 to 1950, p. 298.
129. DEA Files, file 50069-40, vol. 6, memorandum for the Minister, July 25, 1950.
130. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 5, memorandum for the Minister, July 18, 1950. See also NAC, MG 31, E 6, folder 14, on the notes for a speech by Walter Gordon, Esq., at Hart House on February 21, 1951; Korea was not viewed as the only danger spot and that Western Europe was more important since it was open to Soviet aggression. See also James Eayrs, "A Pacific Pact: Step in the Right Direction?," International Journal 7:4 (Autumn 1952), pp. 293 - 302. Eayrs questioned whether "a Pacific security pact similar in purpose and in content to NATO" was needed with the advent of the Korean War. p. 293
131. DEA Files, file 50069-A-40, vol. 5, memorandum for the Under-Secretary, July 18, 1950.
132. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, p. 94.
133. Ibid., p. 101.
134. Munro and Inglis, Mike, 2, p. 135. See also Norman Altstedter, "Problems of Coalition Diplomacy: The Korean Experience," International Journal 8:4 (Autumn 1953), pp. 256 - 265.

135. Pearson, Democracy in World Politics, p. 27.
136. Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 133.
137. Ibid.
138. Reid, Envoy to Nehru, p. 74.
139. Ibid., p. 77.
140. Ibid., p. 74.
141. Ibid., p. 78.
142. Ibid. See also Ralph Braibanti, "The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty," Pacific Affairs 30:4 (December 1957), pp. 339 - 340; John Meisel, "Pactomania," The Canadian Forum 36:423 (April 1956), where he noted that "the psychology of the Maginot line has been replaced by Pactomania," p. 1, and that there was a need for a treaty to be worked out "in Asian, not in European or American terms," p. 24. For a detailed study of SEATO see George Modelski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1962).
143. DEA Files, file 50273-40, vol. 6, despatch 833, High Commissioner for Canada in India, New Delhi to SSEA, August 2, 1954.
144. See George Modelski, "SEATO: Its Function and Organization," in Modelski, SEATO: Six Studies, pp. 3 - 8.
145. DEA Files, file 50273-40, vol. 7, Consul General of Canada, Manila, to USSEA, (Letter 101), September 15, 1954.
146. DEA Files, file 50273-40, vol. 7, "SEATO," October 23, 1957.
147. A. W. Stargardt, Australia's Asian Policies: The History of a Debate 1839 - 1972 (Otto Harrassowitz, Weisbaden: The Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg, 1977), p. 236.
148. Masters, Canada in World Affairs: 1953 - 1955, p. 96.
149. Creighton, The Forked Road, p. 239.
150. Arthur Menzies, interview, Ottawa, May 22, 1989.
151. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 1, "Indian Interests in Indochina," August 13, 1954.
152. Ibid.
153. L. B. Pearson, "Some Thoughts on Canadian External Relations," S/S, 54/31, pp. 4 - 5. Masters, in Canada in World Affairs: 1953 to 1955, pp. 99, noted that there were critical remarks in the

press on Pearson's and the DEA's attitude toward SEATO. "The Vancouver Province was extremely critical of Mr. Pearson's cautious policy in regard to SEATO and on June 14, 1954, in a scathing editorial the editors accused him of running out on collective security. 'What is Mr. Pearson trying to do,' asked the Province, 'repeat Canada's shabby performance in the League of Nations in the 1930's?'" See the same reference for the comments made by the Globe and Mail.

154. DEA Files, file 50273-40, vol. 2, memorandum for the Minister, May 18, 1956.
155. Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957, p. 85.
156. John Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays in Canadian Diplomacy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), p. 207.
157. Masters, Canada in World Affairs: 1953 - 1955, pp. 69 - 70. See also Stargardt, Australia's Asian Policies, p. 244.
158. Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam, p. 16.
159. Michael Donelan, The Ideas of American Foreign Policy (London: Chapman & Hall Ltd., 1963), p. 194.
160. John W. Holmes, interview, Toronto, June 15, 1988.
161. NAC, RG 25, G 2, Vol. 86 - 87/414, box 453, file 12173-49, vol. 2, SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Djakarta, April 15, 1955.
162. NAC, RG 25, G 2, Acc 86 - 87/414, box 453, file 12173-40, vol. 2, The Canadian Embassy, Djakarta to SSEA, April 14, 1955.
163. Ibid.
164. Masters, Canada in World Affairs: 1953 - 1955, p. 70, quoted from the Globe and Mail, April 25, 1955.
165. NAC, RG 25, G 2, Vol. 86 - 87/414, box 453, file 12173-49, vol. 2, Weekly Divisional Note - Asian African Conference, April 27, 1955.
166. NAC, RG 25, G 2, Acc 86 - 87/414, box 453, file 12173-40, vol. 2, The Canadian Embassy, Djakarta to SSEA, April 4, 1955.
167. Ibid., SSEA to High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, April 12, 1955.



**CHAPTER FIVE**  
**PEACEKEEPING: BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS**

In the post-war period of liberal internationalism, the United Nations was a major agency through which Canada pursued the goal of maintaining peace. Even after the formation of the UN, the fear of aggression remained, and it became more pronounced with the advent of the Cold War. The lack of Russian co-operation on the UN Security Council and the Czech coup of February 1948 were two significant factors that caused External Affairs and National Defence officials to seriously consider the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A European-based military alliance which included economic and cultural co-operation was acceptable to Canada; nevertheless, as has been shown, the idea of a military alliance with Asian countries was hardly entertained. With the outbreak of the Korean war, however, Canada had to modify its stand on collective security for Asia. The Korean crisis made External Affairs officials rethink their strategy in the war for men's minds. They discovered that another effective way to fight this war was to advocate peacekeeping. Pursuing dialogue and supervising peacekeeping efforts were perceived as more effective weapons for Canada in this ideological warfare than engaging in direct military confrontation. Moreover, peacekeeping would serve the domestic goal of national unity; as a goal for foreign policy, it would prevent another world war, perhaps even a nuclear war.

Canada subscribed to peacekeeping even before it accepted the invitation, in July 1954, to serve on the International Commission for

Supervision and Control (ICSC) established by the Geneva Conference on Indochina. By serving on the ICSC with India and Poland, the Department of External Affairs endorsed Canada's participation in peacekeeping efforts in Asia, which was significant because it gave Asia a central place in Canadian foreign policy. The Colombo Plan of 1950 was the knock on the door for Canada to become involved in Asian affairs, while participation in the Korean war opened the door half way. By July 1954, the door was thrown wide open.

Peacekeeping was interwoven with the doctrines of "good and evil" and material self-help. The first arose from the ideological battle between democracy and Communism. In this conflict, democracy came to be readily identified in the minds of External Affairs officials with anti-Communism. Canada, as one of the western democracies, encouraged the promotion of the rights and freedoms of individuals and the achievement of self-determination. However, independence did not always result in the protection of democratic liberties. Canadian officials found it difficult to encourage democratic liberties as an important part of their foreign policy when they confronted authoritarian but non-Communist governments. Instead, they tended to support authoritarian governments as long as Communism was not part and parcel of their national ideology.

It was within the context of the battle between "good and evil" that Canada took an interest in peacekeeping in Indochina. In Indochina, the French, who seemed oblivious to the fact that colonialism was finished,

tried to regain their lost colonial territories. It was only after their defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 that they finally realized that colonialism was a lost cause. Two years before this devastating defeat, Canada had accorded recognition to the associated states of Indochina -- Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. This was a tough decision to make because France was a NATO ally. Consequently, Canadian officials were cautious not to appear to be too anti-French.

Peacekeeping was also tied to the doctrine of material self-help. While war created a market for strategic and manufactured goods, it generally disrupted normal trading patterns. After the Second World War was over, Canadian officials in Ottawa looked forward to a worldwide economic community based on multilateral trade. They were willing to create an orderly world community based on the search overseas for material goods that would enhance national prosperity. In other words, Canadian officials built up trade prospects in Asia for the sake of Canadian self-interests. But as Communist aggression threatened Asia, it was not unacceptable in the minds of these officials to use ideology to justify increased Canadian export trade to Asia. Canada thus sold arms to India and Pakistan and attempted to do the same with respect to Indonesia. In addition, Canada became a partner with the United States in increasing Canada's trade with Japan and helping to strengthen Japan's ties with the western democracies. Overall, Canadian trade figures for Asia were small compared to national totals. This was true, too, of trade with Indochina. But Canada's interests were well served in spite of the small volume of trade that was conducted with Asia

compared to that with Europe and the United States.

In addition to peacekeeping, humanitarianism and collective security were two other aspects of Canadian foreign policy in Asia from 1945 to 1957 that were linked to the doctrines of "good and evil" and material self-help. Humanitarianism involved the promotion of social welfare for the poorer nations in South and Southeast Asia through technical and capital assistance. Such aid became part of the scheme of the DEA's "secular missionaries" to promote anti-Communism. In a sense, these officials made foreign aid the right arm of the doctrine of material self-help. But like material self-help, humanitarianism remained complementary to national self-interest in purpose.

The three countries in South Asia - India, Pakistan and Ceylon - rather than the four in Southeast Asia - Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Indochina - were the major recipients of capital and technical assistance from Canada. The three countries in South Asia made up the Asian Commonwealth. In addition to its ties with the Asian Commonwealth, Canada was responding to the economic needs of India, Pakistan and Ceylon when it poured much aid into South Asia. While keeping the need to battle the evil of Communism in mind, Canadian officials took part in the Colombo Plan primarily to find viable solutions to the political, economic and social problems of South and Southeast Asia. Incidentally, participation in the Colombo Plan as well as its involvement on the ICSC were new external affairs experiences for Canada.

In addition to humanitarianism, collective security was also a motive for the emphasis officials in External Affairs placed on anti-Communism. One of the presuppositions of collective security was the need to maintain peace as part of developing an orderly world. In this sense, collective security can be tied to material self-help, which called for similar conditions to be established in order for multilateral trade to function. External Affairs officials did not want collective security measures in Asia to undermine Canada's main foreign policy interests. If Canada were to subscribe to collective security measures, it would do so to promote national self-interest. With the exception of the Korean war, fought under the auspices of the UN, Canada did not become militarily involved in Asia. This was in line with its approach to defence alliances in its pre-war and wartime days. Because of their aversion to joining defence alliances, DEA officials saw peacekeeping as a constructive means of promoting Canadian interests in Indochina.

#### The Canadian Perspective on Indochina before 1954

From December 1946, a month before St Laurent enunciated the main principles of Canadian foreign policy, until July 1954 when Canada accepted a position on the ICSC, the French fought the Viet Minh for the control of Indochina. Even during the Second World War, they sought to defeat any form of Indochinese resistance. In 1940, for example, they made attempts to destroy the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). For over three years, between December 1941 and March 1945, the pro-Vichy

forces in French Indochina collaborated with the Japanese to become the nominal rulers. During this period, they continued efforts to defeat the ICP. However, the setbacks the ICP experienced did not diminish their ultimate goal of driving the French out of their country. Having learned from history that an Asian country was capable of defeating a European power, the Viet Minh were determined to recoup their losses. This was done by rebuilding the party and bolstering its military strength under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.<sup>1</sup>

By March 1945, the French prepared for what they thought would be their final onslaught on the Viet Minh. "On 9 March 1945, as the French were preparing to move in strength against the Viet Minh, the Japanese Army mounted a successful coup de force against the pro-Vichy regime, imprisoning and interning its officials and troops."<sup>2</sup> The defeat of the French by the Japanese was a very good signal to the Viet Minh, "the communist-led politico-military organization," that the French had lost their ability to govern Indochina.<sup>3</sup> From March to August 1945, when they were finally defeated in the war, the Japanese were in control of Indochina, but "the Viet Minh was in control of north and south Vietnam by early September 1945."<sup>4</sup>

On September 2, 1945, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Indochina. For nearly all his life, he had worked for the self-determination of his people. He had even endeavoured to gain recognition for the Annamese at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, but he failed to achieve his aim. He tried during the Second World War to

obtain the support of the Allies for the recognition of an independent Indochina.<sup>5</sup> But in the Potsdam Conference, the last of the wartime conferences between "the superpowers" - this one included Britain, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and lasted from July 16 to August 1945 - Britain was "assigned, with China, a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia and the mission of disarming and repatriating the defeated Japanese forces there."<sup>6</sup> The southern portion of Vietnam up to the 16th parallel was placed under the control of British troops, while the Nationalist Chinese troops were stationed in the northern part. The British troops did not recognize the legitimacy of the Viet Minh in South Vietnam, and taking advantage of this situation, the French overthrew the Viet Minh in Saigon<sup>7</sup>. In the north, Ho Chi Minh tried to hold on to power by negotiating with the French, but his effort was futile. Consequently, the frustrated Viet Minh launched an attack on the French. Thus, in December 1946, the first Indochina war commenced when General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Viet Minh military leader, began a guerrilla campaign to drive out the French. Most of the battles were fought in North Vietnam, where the majority of the Viet Minh forces were stationed. The Viet Minh were confident that they would eventually win the protracted war against the French imperialists on their own soil. They attacked the French when they "had a clear numerical or tactical superiority."<sup>8</sup> The Viet Minh suffered setbacks especially from 1950 to 1951, but these did not discourage them, and they even extended their battle lines into the south. "The Viet Minh chose its moments and its locations to attack the French with care to avoid the possibility of swift French reinforcement of its forces or the ready use

of air power, a weapon that was never available to the Viet-Minh throughout the duration of the war."<sup>9</sup> Such a strategy paid off for the Viet Minh. On May 7, 1954, they inflicted the final and devastating blow on the French in the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

It was the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu that ushered in the Geneva Conference on the three Associated States of Indochina. This conference took place simultaneously with the conference on the Korean armistice in late April 1954. Canada participated in the Korean conference, but it was not involved in the one concerning Indochina. The fact that the Canadian officials were more interested in making a final contribution to the Korean settlement than having a direct role in the future of Indochina should not be interpreted as lack of interest on their part in the affairs of Indochina. While Canada had no direct interest there, it did have officials in External Affairs who were concerned with the process of decolonization in the area. They may not have known much about Indochina when they were asked to serve on the ICSC in 1954, but they were not totally ignorant of Indochinese affairs even after the commencement of the Cold War turned their main foreign policy efforts towards Europe.<sup>10</sup>

After 1947, the DEA officials gradually acquainted themselves with the general problems of Indochina as well as of Southeast Asia in general. They were aware of Indochinese attempts to free their country from the shackles of colonialism, and they knew that Indochina had been under Chinese, French and Japanese rule and that they longed for a



unified nation. The DEA was also aware of the threat of Communism in the country. Information on Communism in Indochina was derived principally from Western European and American sources, which spoke of the threats of Soviet and Chinese expansionism and emphasized the need to contain Communism. But on the whole the officials in the DEA did not hesitate to encourage efforts towards self-determination, and they were critical of French colonial policy and its attempt to support the government of "its native client," Bao Dai.<sup>11</sup> But this criticism was voiced mainly in private.<sup>12</sup> In private, the DEA perceived Bao Dai to be an unreliable leader. The French, on the other hand, viewed Bao Dai as an anti-Communist and thus the answer to Ho Chi Minh. Canadian officials believed that the French were making the same mistake as the Dutch had in Indonesia.<sup>13</sup> The Dutch had not wished to negotiate with Sukarno, whom they perceived as a Communist rather than a nationalist, and the French, the DEA feared, would make the same mistake with Ho Chi Minh.<sup>14</sup>

In spite of the blunders the French committed in Indochina, the DEA officials, in the tradition of the liberal internationalists, hoped that the conflict between the French and the Vietnamese would eventually be solved in the United Nations. They did not want the French to keep the Indochinese problem a domestic one; in other words, it was from a position of national self-interest that Canada wanted the problem of decolonization taken to the UN. Canada did not have any immediate interests in the region, and "a colonial war in Vietnam did not appear to place any Canadian interest at stake."<sup>15</sup> But the formation of a UN

committee, Canadian officials believed, could provide a concrete solution to the French-Indochinese problem.

Although the conflict in Indochina did not threaten Canada's national interests, DEA officials reminded their government that Indochina "occupied a key position in southeast Asia." It was important "politically because of the clashes that have occurred there between the communists and the nationalists, and economically because this country is the rice bowl of that part of the world."<sup>16</sup> Another reason for the importance of Indochina was its "strategic position on the most feasible inland lines of communication in South-East Asia."<sup>17</sup> Although the region was a significant rice-producing area, Canadian trade figures for the region were small compared to the national total.<sup>18</sup> The Department of Trade and Commerce talked about the possibility of sending a trade commissioner to Indochina, but these plans were eventually shelved because the Canadian trade offices in Singapore and Hong Kong were already servicing the Southeast Asian region.

Canada took a greater interest in Indochina after 1949 when NATO was established. As members of NATO, France and Canada became close allies, and in any case, St Laurent maintained that Canada had "a tradition of common interests" with France and recognized that France formed "an integral part of the framework of...international life." In addition, Canada was willing to support France's post-war recovery "not merely out of sympathy, but because we know that her integrity is a matter of great consequence to us."<sup>19</sup>

Given its friendship with Canada in NATO, France thought it could count on Canadians in a time of need. When it came to the question of the recognition of Indochina, they tried to influence Canada to recognize the regime of Bao Dai. It was at this point that a Canadian Indochina policy developed in embryonic form. Rather than openly recognize Bao Dai, the DEA conveyed the message to the French that Canada would take more interest in Asian affairs, a position that was taken not only for ideological and commercial reasons - to keep Communism at bay - but also for diplomatic reasons and to help "facilitate the activities of Canadian missionaries in Indo-China."<sup>20</sup> Behind all these Canadian interests in Indochina lay Canada's support for the decolonization of the region. Moreover, External officials favoured independence because it would aid in the restoration of peace and stability in the region.<sup>21</sup> On the one hand, Canada was sympathetic to the plight of the French and favoured decolonization in Indochina, and on the other hand the French became impatient with Canadian officials in January 1950 because they delayed their recognition of Indochina. To help Canada make its decision, France claimed that grave ideological difficulties would transpire if the western democracies did not recognize the new regime of Bao Dai. What the French were trying to convey was that if Communism was not stopped in Indochina, it would eventually engulf all of Southeast Asia.<sup>22</sup>

In not wanting to succumb to French pressure nor to display a lack of co-operation, External Affairs officials consented to examine further

the question of the recognition of Indochina. At the Colombo Conference held in Ceylon in January 1950, Lester Pearson determined to learn the views of the Asian Commonwealth on this issue and other related matters. He also wanted the opportunity to understand the Asian mind. Because Canada had established good relations with India, it was quite willing to listen to Indian views. India's prime minister, Nehru, impressed on Pearson that Ho Chi Minh was first and foremost a nationalist rather than a Communist. Although Ho Chi Minh worked within the ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism, his first desire was for an independent Indochina. Pearson also learned that the question of recognition had the potential of becoming a divisive issue that could drive a wedge between the Asian and the western countries of the Commonwealth. Unity rather than division was important to Pearson. At this point Canada could have been a model for the Commonwealth and offer it the moral leadership that was badly needed, yet Pearson straddled the fence. To maintain good relations with the French, Pearson hinted that perhaps Bao Dai was "the West's best and only hope."<sup>23</sup> While Pearson sympathized with Nehru's position, the expedient thing for Canada to do was to delay further the question of recognition, since it had no immediate national interests in Indochina.

While Pearson addressed the question of recognizing Indochina overseas in Ceylon, at home in Ottawa the responsibility of examining how External Affairs should handle the issue of recognition fell on the shoulders of Charles Ritchie, the assistant under-secretary. After much research, Ritchie decided that Canadian recognition of Indochina

would send a signal to the Soviets and the Chinese that Canadian officials were not indifferent to participating in the Cold War and would also convey to France that it had a staunch ally in Canada. But what Ritchie also discovered was that the UN's legal requirement for recognition was missing in the Indochinese situation. Unlike Mao in China, Bao Dai, the puppet of the French, was a nominal ruler whose regime did not have the full support and control of the country.<sup>24</sup>

But Ritchie, who saw Canadian foreign policy chiefly through the filter of European affairs, was in favour of recognition. France to him was an important ally of Canada. The other Asian specialists in the DEA, Chester Ronning and Arthur Menzies, agreed with Ritchie's views on recognition, but to them "Bao Dai was a bad bet."<sup>25</sup> Ronning and Menzies were more aware of the impact nationalism had on Asia in general and Indochina in particular. Although they did not make a public statement favouring Ho Chi Minh, they favoured him by implication, and support for Ho would have been forthcoming if he had not been a Communist. Ronning and Menzies hoped that their support for nationalism would not be equated with support for Ho's Communist ideology. Escott Reid, another of the Asian experts, was sympathetic with Ronning's and Menzies' position, but he preferred his government to wait before making a decision on recognizing Indochina.<sup>26</sup> It was difficult for Canada to decide, when "Bao Dai was barely in the saddle, whereas Ho was estimated to be in control of 75 percent of the area with a loyal following of as much as 80 percent of the people."<sup>27</sup> In a memorandum to Pearson, one Reid endorsed, A. D. P. Heeney recommended

that no action be taken at this time to recognize the Indo-Chinese states. A further recommendation is made that, in order to avoid misinterpretation of this by the French, you might, under appropriate circumstances in the House of Commons, make a sympathetic reference to the establishment of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos as associate states in the French Union.<sup>28</sup>

In the meantime, the conflict in Indochina became a significant international issue. By July 1950, with "the outbreak of the Korean war and the emergence of China as a formidable force in land conflicts in Asia," the question of supporting the French and according Indochina recognition and self-determination took on greater significance.<sup>29</sup> Added pressure was put on Canadian DEA officials by their French counterparts, who wanted Canada to recognize Indochina.<sup>30</sup> The outbreak of the Korean war and the continued pressure from France made Canada reconsider the question of recognition. In the DEA, Heeney urged that Canada recognize

the Bao Dai administration and the French, even if this means suppressing our scruples as to the legal entity of the states. A move which would align us with the United States and the United Kingdom in this matter, and contribute towards a manifestation of political solidarity of the democracies in the Far East, would probably gain support at this time.<sup>31</sup>

Even Brooke Claxton, the Minister of Defence, recommended that Canada recognize the three associated states of Indochina. Heeney prepared a memorandum for the cabinet in the hope that this time "the hawks," those who opposed recognition, would change their minds. But Canada remained slow to recognize Indochina.

Pearson had accepted the idea of recognition in principle by November 1952. There was not much Canada could lose since it did not have any national interests at stake in Indochina, although Pearson did acknowledge the deprivation of commercial advantages and the possibility that Communism might spread if France lost Indochina. While Pearson and even St Laurent were ready to urge Canada to recognize Indochina, the cabinet, especially the ministers of Finance and Trade and Commerce, had to be convinced that the government of Bao Dai was legal and that Indochina was a lucrative area to invest in. Claxton stressed the need for cabinet ministers to open their eyes to "the most critical soft spots in Asia which the Communists are probing." In his efforts to get the cabinet to recognize Indochina, Claxton underscored two further considerations. The first was that the war for men's minds was conducted in the context of the Cold War and there was political urgency to include Indochina in the camp of the western democracies. Second, Claxton saw the need for Canada to come to the aid of France, which was "facing grave difficulties in supporting major military efforts in both Europe and Indochina and in maintaining its position in North Africa." Claxton also stressed that "NATO considerations [should] override the legal and other objections."<sup>32</sup> Once again, NATO became the yardstick for Canadian reaction and participation in Asian affairs. But Claxton did make one strong recommendation: that Canada should urge France not to weaken its position on decolonization in the process of asking its allies to recognize Indochina. Perhaps what Claxton had in mind was full self-determination rather than internal self-rule under French control.

Canada's delay in recognizing the Indochinese states was a result of three factors. First, Canada questioned whether the regime of Bao Dai constituted the legal government; second, it was aware of India's position on Ho Chi Minh and did not wish to see the Commonwealth split on racial lines; and third, Canada entertained doubts as to whether France would accord Indochina complete independence. There was a common denominator to these three factors, and that was that Canada did not want to undermine the situation by giving the Viet Minh an advantage. At the same time, it did not want to be accused of thwarting the growth of democracy in Indochina, which would be at cross purposes with the goals of the United States, Britain and France.

Canadian recognition of the associated states of Indochina was a slow and cautious process. But the act of extending recognition, which was finally accorded on December 30, 1952, had a permanent impact on Canadian policy in Indochina. "By recognizing the Associated States of Indochina," as James Eayrs noted, "Canada was drawn closer to the conflicts of southeast Asia. It was drawn closer still by becoming - albeit briefly, and on a small scale - a supplier of arms to the French forces fighting there."<sup>33</sup> That these arms had been diverted from Paris to Saigon infuriated Prime Minister St Laurent, who, like his predecessor, Mackenzie King, did not wish to be drawn into a colonial war. Two developments transpired from this incident. It was difficult for DEA officials to "keep NATO and Indochina in water tight compartments,"<sup>34</sup> but Canadian policymakers accepted the fact that "the conflict in Indochina [was] part of the world-wide struggle between free



societies and communist power[s]."<sup>35</sup> After displaying a measure of reluctance, Canada took the alternative route of serving on the ICSC. After all, service on the ICSC was part of the idealism of liberal internationalism, and Canada would play the role of helpful fixer. In addition, it desired to build a bridge to India and other Asian nations that would lead it into this position.

### To Serve or Not to Serve - Canada on the ICSC

Like its decision to recognize Indochina, Canada's decision to participate on the ICSC has been generally described as being characterized by reluctance and caution. But caution in decision-making should not be interpreted as weakness. It was a normal diplomatic procedure for a country to weigh the pros and cons of involvement in international issues before committing itself. Furthermore, national self-interest was always taken into consideration before a commitment was made. Canada undoubtedly took these two factors into account before consenting to join the ICSC, but once it agreed to do so, it not only participated "in the interests of peace"<sup>36</sup> but also showed willingness to choose sides in the Cold War. Canada had the right credentials to serve on the ICSC with India and Poland. Together these three countries represented the forces of "neutralism, communism and anti-communism" that served on the ICSC.<sup>37</sup>

Canada's ability to work amiably and productively with India, its capacity to field officers, both diplomatic and military, fluent in the lingua franca of the region, the proficiency at which its armed

forces had been trained and equipped, its special relations with the United States which could be regarded...as offsetting to some degree the influence of the Soviet Union's pliable Poles - all these credentials served to provide Canada with the requisite salience for nomination.<sup>38</sup>

In spite of these credentials Canada's participation on the ICSC on behalf of the interests of Indochina was a new experience. It could be said that being involved in the Colombo Plan and serving on the ICSC were the two new paths Canadian foreign policy followed in the Asian region. Canadian involvement on the ICSC came as a result of its membership in the international community rather than its being under the umbrella of the United Nations or the Commonwealth. The newness of this experience in peacekeeping was underscored in the letter of instruction given to Sherwood Lett, the Canadian Commissioner for Vietnam on the ICSC. The DEA informed Lett that "the supervision of the cease-fire in Vietnam will be an extremely important and difficult one, and one for which there are no precedents in Canadian experience to guide you." The DEA then reassured Lett that he could "count on the full cooperation and assistance of this Department."<sup>39</sup>

One of the major reasons why there were no precedents to guide the DEA was the confusion surrounding the definition of peacekeeping. In the legal sense, peacekeeping refers to "the threat or use of force to deter or repel aggression."<sup>40</sup> Canada had difficulty accepting this definition given its adverse reaction to military commitments, and it would not accept the term "armed police work." Furthermore, it was well aware that "peacekeeping forces can never keep the peace, for they lack

both authority and military ability to do so."<sup>41</sup> Canada could accept, however, a peacekeeping effort which would be limited "to non-fighting forces and other operations of a non-violent character." It accepted the type of peaceful enforcement "envisaged in 1945" and enshrined in the UN Charter, which consisted "of measures taken in support of the principle of collective security."<sup>42</sup> Canada served in the collective security effort in Korea, but it discovered that there was a clear distinction between collective security and peacekeeping. Alan James explained this difference in his analysis of the political aspects of peacekeeping. "The cardinal distinction between the two activities," he noted, "was seen to lie in their attitudes towards the associated issues of force and consent, collective security relying, ultimately, on the mandatory use of force, while peace-keeping eschewed force, except in self-defence, and required the consent of the host state for the admission of UN personnel."<sup>43</sup> Ideally, it was this latter form of peacekeeping that Canada preferred.

Having experienced and witnessed the difficulty in making collective security arrangements in the League of Nations in the 1930s and during the Korean war, Canada was now willing to participate in peacekeeping as a means by which to reduce the tensions on the international scene. It hoped to do so by subscribing to "quiet diplomacy" and "preventive diplomacy", and by actively seeking a solution to the Dutch-Indonesian crisis of 1948 and the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Canada participated in preventive peacekeeping in the hope that neither of these disputes would turn into larger crises.<sup>44</sup> The

Canadian experience also indicated that there was a subtle difference between "preventive diplomacy" and "the peaceful settlement of disputes." This distinction is evident "in that the latter consists of facilitating the establishment and maintenance of peaceful relations. The former aims chiefly to confine the conflict within local limits. It is a policy designed to contain the cold war, to achieve a kind of 'disengagement before the fact'.... Both resulted from the impracticability of collective security."<sup>45</sup> The Canadian experience in Indonesia, Kashmir and Korea "seems to suggest that there is no necessary incompatibility between keeping the peace and remaining largely committed in the cold war."<sup>46</sup> This distinction was discussed by External Affairs officials as they contemplated serving on the ICSC.

Canada's participation on the ICSC came after some initial attempts to clarify its role thereon. Canada was not a member of the Geneva conference of 1954, and it was not involved directly in the negotiations.<sup>47</sup> While it did not participate directly in the conference, however, it was interested in the proceedings "and offered to give any help she could." Canadian officials had "frequent discussions with Anthony Eden and occasionally with Americans [which] gave Canada an opportunity to express views and to keep informed about developments without direct participation."<sup>48</sup> The searches for peaceful settlements in Indochina and Korea were held conjointly. Since Indochina and Korea were distinct crises, Pearson saw the need to differentiate between the Korean involvement of which Canada was part and the Indochinese situation of which it was not. Participation in the

Korean war came under UN sponsorship, but this was not the case for the Indochina problem. Pearson made this distinction in anticipation of the possibility that Canada would be asked to help bring about a cease-fire in Korea,<sup>49</sup> but he feared that once the Korean armistice went into effect, the Communist Chinese might intervene in Indochina. In his mind, Pearson linked the "strategic connection between communist aggression in one part of the world with communist aggression in another."<sup>50</sup>

Interestingly, it was Chou En-Lai of Communist China, upon being advised by Krishna Menon of India, who proposed that Canada should serve on the ICSC with Poland and India.<sup>51</sup> As John Holmes noted, China accepted the Indian view that Canada "would be the best Western candidate" since it did not take strict ideological positions. Holmes added that Canada had also developed, because of its involvement in Korea, the reputation for being "the most objective of the NATO countries."<sup>52</sup> What India may have had in mind was that Canada did not possess colonial territories and that its foreign policy was not governed by a mission of military adventure. Britain also wanted Canada to serve on the ICSC. To Britain, Canadian membership was vital since the Canadian representative would be able "to keep matters on the rails." In addition, Canada's presence would "have [an] excellent effect on India...[and]...would also help enormously with Pakistan who might otherwise object to India being singled out."<sup>53</sup> India's and Britain's desire to have Canada serve on the ICSC undoubtedly enhanced Canada's value as a senior partner in the Commonwealth.

Canada seemed destined to become a member of ICSC in spite of its initial reluctance to participate on the commission. Writing from Geneva, Pearson told St Laurent that in his discussions there, he "tried to avoid indifference, on the one hand, and commitments on the other."<sup>54</sup> But the other senior policymakers in External Affairs knew that their country could not practice the art of fence-sitting too long. What seemed more important was not whether Canada was a member of the ICSC but whether Canadian membership would imply "Canadian 'neutrality'" or the "Canadian advocacy of French interests."<sup>55</sup> DEA officials, especially Pearson, were also concerned about how and where Canada should submit its reports and reactions on the ICSC since the Geneva conference had disbanded. Finally, they wanted to "make absolutely certain that no one member can decide that a question is of such importance that unanimity is required in respect of any decision." If agreement was to be reached, it would be by a majority vote rather than forced by one member of the commission.<sup>56</sup> The possibility of Canada being outvoted made Pearson view Canadian involvement on the ICSC as a "politically dangerous enterprise."<sup>57</sup> He did not want his country to be involved in an extremely serious decision which could bring untold trouble and embarrassment. Here, Pearson echoed Mackenzie King's fear of getting involved in Asia. King viewed military involvement in Asia as anathema; Canada, after all, knew very little about the region. By 1954, even though Canada was more acquainted with Asian issues, its apprehension about military involvement persisted. To counteract his fear, Pearson suggested that "moral support from the United States" would benefit Canada.<sup>58</sup> He was aware that the lack of

such support would have serious consequences for Canada, and it was important to him that Canada know how the Americans would perceive Canadian membership on the ICSC.<sup>59</sup>

According to London's Manchester Guardian, the reason for the Canadian reluctance to serve on the ICSC was linked to politics in North America. The editors of the newspaper wrote that "the real source of Canada's reluctance to accept the invitation of the Geneva conference... was its knowledge that the armistice is very unpopular in the United States and a fear that, no matter how careful the Canadian mission might be in making an impartial and objective appraisal of all the problems which would confront it, some of its decisions might provoke hostile criticism in the United States." They further added that Canada did not wish to offend the United States "because it is engaged in delicate negotiations...for an agreement about the construction of the St Lawrence Seaway and it wants the Eisenhower Administration to restrain the Republican protectionists who are demanding higher duties on Canadian products such as lead and zinc."<sup>60</sup>

Pearson also feared that Canadian membership on the ICSC might be a "politically dangerous enterprise" because the Geneva agreement was viewed as ambiguous, difficult to implement and "so badly drafted."<sup>61</sup> Pearson's worries increased when three factors became apparent by November 1954, four months after the ICSC was established. First, the Viet Minh were exploiting the Geneva conference to pursue their own objectives in Indochina. Second, India showed signs of departing from

its position of "active neutralism" and was willing to compromise with the Polish delegation. Third, the Poles were "not playing according to the book" and they made no attempt to be impartial. Although India's new position was a surprise, Pearson should have expected the Viet Minh and the Poles to exploit the situation because they were ideological partners. He shared his concerns with R. C. Casey, Australia's Minister of External Affairs, who stated that "the best contribution Canada can make in Indochina is to pursue a line of scrupulous adherence to the terms of the agreement, without any abandonment of the basic principles of [Canadian] foreign policy."<sup>62</sup>

This position was conveyed by R. M. Macdonnell, one of the Canadian commissioners, to Pham Van Dong, a senior Viet Minh representative, who was told that it was the desire of the Canadians "to do everything they could to contribute to a successful carrying out of the Agreement."<sup>63</sup> While fears multiplied in Pearson's mind, he realized that the Canadians would reflect "a western outlook in their approach" but he was confident that the Canadian commissioners would "at all times do their utmost to maintain an attitude of judicial impartiality."<sup>64</sup> Such impartiality was one reason why Brigadier Sherwood Lett was chosen as the Canadian commissioner for Vietnam.<sup>65</sup> At the time of his appointment, he was "a corporation lawyer outside both active diplomatic and military service." He "had fought valorously in both world wars; during the Second, wounded at Dieppe, he became deputy Chief of the General Staff. Rising from the ranks to commanding heights in both soldiery and law, Lett seemed admirably qualified for the arduous assignment awaiting him



in Hanoi." As a judge he was "dedicated to the principle of impartiality." As a soldier he knew what was involved in military battles as well as in the Cold War.<sup>66</sup>

Pearson best reflected the tension that Canada would confront as a representative of the western democracies on the ICSC. It was difficult for it to remain judicially impartial and at the same time be the mouthpiece for the western democracies. Ideological commitment, Pearson hoped, would not clash with political responsibilities.<sup>67</sup> This was one major reason why Canada placed a strong emphasis on its commitment to judicial impartiality, which was so essential to Pearson that he objected to Pat Conroy's suggestion that a trade union representative serve on the ICSC. Conroy served as the secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Congress of Labour. In 1954, he was the Labour attaché at the Canadian embassy in Washington, D.C. He corresponded with J. H. Oldenbrock, the general secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), on the idea of sending a French-speaking trade union organizer to Indochina on behalf of the ICFTU. Conroy, acting in the same spirit as the secular missionaries, was deeply concerned about the appalling social conditions of the Indochinese. It was his aim that a trade union representative would enhance Canada's reputation for being the champion of the downtrodden. Pearson was very sympathetic with social goals, but he turned down Conroy's proposal because of the need for Canada to remain impartial while it served on the ICSC.<sup>68</sup>

Pearson's concern for impartiality was linked to Canada's duties as a member of the ICSC. Its responsibilities were of both a practical and idealistic nature. On the surface it appeared that Canada would have little difficulty in carrying out its duties as an impartial judge, but after three months on the commission, Canada showed indications that impartiality was giving way to partisanship.<sup>69</sup> Its main responsibility as a member of the commission was "to contribute to the establishment of peace."<sup>70</sup> This principle reflected one of the nation's domestic goals: the achievement of peace and unity among disparate regional groups. Pearson did not consider the pursuit of peace a waste of time, since peace was not only a policy but "a prayer" as well.<sup>71</sup> Of course, there was an obvious political reason for this position. Another global war could easily resurrect the conflict between French and English Canada over conscription, and of course there was the spectre of nuclear war to think about. It may have been an ardent prayer of Pearson's that neither event would occur; therefore, his pursuit of peace was practical as well as idealistic. These positions were not contradictory in his mind, since he believed in the dual nature of peacekeeping. Escott Reid echoed similar sentiments. To Reid, the determining factor in deciding Canadian foreign policy was the need to bring about and preserve peace. This principle was applied not only to military issues but also to cultural, economic and political issues, and it was a principle to which he subscribed before the Second World War broke out. To him "peace is not a policy; it is a condition or state of being brought about as the result of policies founded upon right principles."<sup>72</sup> Reid did not accept the notion that peace could

be legislated, but he seemed to change his mind after having lived through the trauma of the Second World War. While still maintaining that peace could not be legislated, Reid believed that it could at least be implemented as a policy of the state. If the DEA wanted to adopt the principle of peace as a major tenet of Canadian foreign policy in Asia, it certainly could. But to do so, a change in the attitude of its officials was necessary. Reid perceived that in the aftermath of the war Canada should not be reluctant to offer solutions to conflicts and that the position of isolationism that Canada took in the 1930s had lost its validity. In the war for the minds of men, peace, freedom and democracy remained indissoluble to Reid. In taking this stand, Reid again revealed himself as a liberal internationalist and a secular missionary.

Pearson and Reid accepted the fact that the pursuit of peace was Canada's major goal as a member of the ICSC. While this was an idealistic principle, the Canadian commissioners were sufficiently practical to realize the enormity of the task before them. They discovered that they were "faced with the task of supervising and controlling the implementation of the Geneva agreement by two different parties. On one side, there is a dictatorial, totalitarian and ruthlessly efficient regime; on the other, authority is divided between the French and Vietnamese Government and to some extent democratic freedoms are allowed."<sup>73</sup> The commissioners were apprehensive, even from the inception of the ICSC, about whether the Geneva accords could be effectively implemented. They recognized that while peacekeeping was

the long-term and idealistic goal, there were also military objectives to be met, including the need to control the importation of war materials. Given the sharp ideological differences between North and South Vietnam, the commissioners realized that there would be difficulty carrying out the specific goals of the ceasefire arrangements, whose implementation was principally the duty of Canadian military personnel on the ICSC rather than the job of External Affairs officials.<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless, DEA officials were anxious to see the ceasefire arrangements implemented. While in India as part of his Asian tour in February 1954, St Laurent told a group of Indian journalists that he was in favour of the ceasefire arrangements and viewed their implementation as a practical goal.<sup>75</sup> Primarily, the ceasefire arrangements, which began in July 1954, involved "separating the forces of the two parties into zones assigned to them on either side of a demilitarized buffer area." In addition, there were two further provisions which Canada, India and Poland were responsible for implementing. One involved the exchange of prisoners of war, civilians and political internees; the other prevented reprisals and attempted to control the importation of war materials and troops. The Commission viewed these two tasks as "a logical pattern for establishing and maintaining a status quo [and] as a pre-requisite to the search for a political solution to the division between North and South."<sup>76</sup>

By October 1954, three months after the Geneva conference disbanded, the ICSC was gratified by some achievements. It was able to pressure the French and the North Vietnamese to release or hand over

approximately 9,000 and 12,000 prisoners respectively. The majority of the civilian and political internees were also released, and the complicated business of regrouping forces was completed. But the commission had much difficulty preventing the smuggling of war materials "by jungle trails or across open beaches."<sup>77</sup> Some of the arms imported were reported to have come from China. Consequently, Canada began to question the motives of the North Vietnamese in wanting to implement the Geneva agreement. According to John Holmes, this problem added to Canada's difficulty in remaining impartial.<sup>78</sup>

There was one other task the Commission performed in its search for a peaceful and political solution to the Indochinese problem. It involved supervising the freedom of movement of refugees from North to South Vietnam and vice-versa.<sup>79</sup> No restrictions were to be placed on any Vietnamese who wanted to change their domicile for political or religious reasons. Freedom of movement was a significant issue because of its deep implications for democratic rights. As a country that encouraged decolonization and was interested in the establishment of democracy, Canada took a special interest in ensuring that refugees were free to relocate.

#### Canada and Freedom of Movement

Article 14(c) and (d) of the Geneva Agreement on Indochina was of major concern to the ICSC when its members handled the issue of freedom of movement. Article 14(c) focused on the "freedom from fear of

reprisals or discrimination because of activities during the hostilities."<sup>80</sup> The ICSC was aware that an outbreak of hostilities could occur if it became difficult to implement Article 14(c) within the first 300 days, "when the forces of the two sides were being separated and regrouped."<sup>81</sup> Article 14(d) dealt with the freedom of movement of refugees. Vietnamese in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) and in the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) were given the opportunity "to vote meaningfully with their feet" by crossing the 16th parallel to the region of their choice.<sup>82</sup> It was this article, with its emphasis on democratic rights, that "caused the Canadian government and its Commission personnel much misgiving and concern - more, perhaps, than any other supervisory task."<sup>83</sup>

Adding to External Affairs' misgivings and concerns regarding Article 14(d) was the question of how the ICSC would define the concepts of "democracy", "freedom" and "liberty". These terms were not defined at the Geneva conference of 1954, and it became the responsibility of the "Freedoms Committee," made up of members of the ICSC, to do so. But the committee failed to arrive at any satisfactory definitions.<sup>84</sup> The reason was obvious: Canada and Poland represented two diametrically opposing ideologies, and they disagreed on the possibility of guaranteeing democratic liberties "in a totalitarian society such as North Vietnam or in an authoritarian society such as South Vietnam."<sup>85</sup> Moreover, India was inclined to side with Poland because it perceived that western democracy could not be successfully implanted in Vietnamese soil. Ironically, M. Maneli, a Polish legal adviser who

broke with his delegation's position, proposed that "democratic liberties" be interpreted "in the sense of the American and French bills of rights from the eighteenth century and in the spirit of the Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the United Nations."<sup>86</sup> While this position was satisfactory to Canada, India was not convinced that European ideas of liberty and democracy could be applied to Vietnam. Thus, the democratic liberties specified in Article 14 (c) and (d) were hardly defined.

The Canadians, more so than the Indians or Poles, were pressured by other groups to have the freedom of movement clause effectively implemented.<sup>87</sup> One reason for this pressure lay in Canada's deep interest in the issue, another in the importance it attached to Vietnam as opposed to Cambodia or Laos. Canada believed that the greatest threat from Communism existed in Vietnam. In the minds of Canadian officials, Laos and Cambodia would fall victims to Communism only if Vietnam did. The status External Affairs and the Canadian ICSC delegation attached to Vietnam was indicative of this fragile situation,<sup>88</sup> as was the fact that the Canadian commissioner for Vietnam was the only official given a special set of instructions and recalled for diplomatic consultations.<sup>89</sup> Thus, Canadian officials "attached the utmost importance to implementation of the cease-fire agreement and political settlement envisaged in the Geneva Accords for the largest, most populous, most developed and most militarized of the three Associated States."<sup>90</sup>

Difficulties also arose over the implementation of Article 14(d), the freedom of movement clause. Since this article was of utmost significance to Canada, Sherwood Lett saw the need to meet General Vo Nguyen Giap of the DRV to underscore its importance to Canada and to remind Giap that Canada counted on North Vietnam to co-operate with the ICSC. Although Giap seemed impressed with Lett's request, he made no formal commitment.<sup>91</sup> Lett also realized that problems would arise from the implementation of Article 14(d), but he and his colleagues in the DEA were determined to accomplish their goal. External Affairs thus endorsed the following suggestions made by the ICSC to facilitate the free movement of people from North to South Vietnam: there was to be "a freer access across the demarcation line than has previously existed for civilians," application forms and permits would be made accessible to civilians who needed them, and better transportation facilities would be provided. Finally, "restrictions or pressure of any kind aimed at ...inducing people to move from one zone to the other" would be removed.<sup>92</sup>

These suggestions were constructive ones, but it was not long afterwards Lett discovered that Article 14(d) had "been unsatisfactorily implemented,"<sup>93</sup> primarily due to the lack of adequate transportation, the failure to grant permits, and the lack of co-operation from North Vietnam in allowing civilians to move south. There were other reasons that caused Canada misgivings over implementing the freedom of movement clause, one dealing with North Vietnam and the other with the future of "the large number of Roman Catholics" in the northern region of the



DRNV.<sup>94</sup> Canada faced the challenge of convincing the DRNV that the democratic rights of civilians who wanted to move south should be respected. It seemed ironic in the Cold War to change the thinking of a Communist regime so that it would allow its people to vote with their feet, but the ICSC faced perhaps an equally challenging task, and that was asking that Roman Catholic North Vietnamese be given religious liberty.

Canadian commissioners made two observations about the situation faced by Roman Catholics in North Vietnam. In October 1954, Marcel Cadieux, an assistant commissioner on the ICSC, informed the DEA officials in Ottawa that the Roman Catholic residents in Nam Dinh were not anxious to move. They were willing to remain in their ancestral lands because they had "deep attachments to [their]...land and village." In addition, they enjoyed religious freedom.<sup>95</sup> But Sherwood Lett noted in November 1954 that there may have been Roman Catholics living in small villages who would be afraid "to give notice that they are dissatisfied and that they wish to leave."<sup>96</sup> Interestingly, the two observations were equally valid. Furthermore, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Indochina accepted the fact that they could not force a believer to take advantage of freedom of movement. The Bishop of Vinh respected the right of those who wished to remain in the North to do so, but he also "expressed doubt that they would be permitted to carry-on their religious practices or doctrines of the Catholic Church which is completely contrary to Communism." He added that "there was no reconciliation possible between God and atheism."<sup>97</sup> Pearson sensed

the urgency of the issue of freedom of religion. "The plight of the Christians in North Vietnam", he said, "has a special appeal for the whole free world, and we naturally feel charged with a special responsibility on this issue."<sup>98</sup>

The predicament of the Roman Catholics was also a concern of the South Vietnamese authorities, the French Liaison mission, and the apostolic delegate in Ottawa. The French and South Vietnamese shared their concern with R. M. Macdonnell, a Canadian commissioner, that the Catholics living in Viet Minh controlled areas would face grave difficulties if they wanted to leave.<sup>99</sup> Back in Ottawa, the apostolic delegate, the Most Reverend Giovanni Panico, lobbied External Affairs to impress upon the ICSC that Article 14(d) should be respected and honoured and expressed to Pearson his concern that the democratic rights and the spiritual welfare of Roman Catholics be respected.<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, Panico expressed confidence that Canada would promote the rights of individuals in this area since it had the reputation for upholding "the noble sentiments of equity and justice which have always inspired the rulers of the Canadian people."<sup>101</sup>

While attempts were made to facilitate the freedom of movement of refugees, a tug-of-war took place between North and South Vietnam on the freedom of movement clause. What occurred was essentially a war of minds between the advocates of Article 14(c) and (d). On the one hand, the North Vietnamese meticulously listed the beatings, murders and other atrocities committed by the South. They used any violation of

Article 14(c) "with the most damaging effect" in South Vietnam. On the other hand, "in spite of the totalitarian methods employed in the North," the South Vietnamese and the French authorities had "yet to present the Commission with a well-founded charge of a violation of Article 14(c) by the Northern authorities."<sup>102</sup> Moreover, the Poles, the "ideological partners" of the North Vietnamese, reported that law and order was nonexistent in the South,<sup>103</sup> in the hope of discrediting the South and underscoring the point that the South Vietnamese government "is neither popular nor effective and that democratic liberties cannot be enjoyed under its authority."<sup>104</sup> The litany of South Vietnamese failures to advocate democratic liberties damaged their reputation and the work of the ICSC;<sup>105</sup> consequently, Canadian officials feared that the implementation of the Geneva armistice would benefit the North more than the South, and they were apprehensive that upcoming elections would also work to the advantage of the North.

External officials observed that in many ways the North Vietnamese charges were valid. Moreover, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam did not have a satisfactory record in upholding democratic liberties. As a Canadian student of Asian affairs noted, "the Diem Government did not sign the Agreement and since the time of the Geneva Conference has been openly hostile to the settlement that was concluded by France."<sup>106</sup> This the DEA officials were aware of. They knew, too, that Diem did not have the support of his people. Furthermore, they questioned his leadership abilities<sup>107</sup> and were apprehensive that his

government might not be able to cope with the influx of refugees as a result of freedom of movement.<sup>108</sup> While these factors seemed to reduce Canadian sympathy for the plight of South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese authorities continued to seek the help of Canadian commissioners. R. M. Macdonnell informed External Affairs that the South Vietnamese authorities "come to us with complaints about the French and take the line that as we have had experience of a colonial regime, we are their natural allies in their effort to achieve complete independence from French administration."<sup>109</sup> But the DEA officials reacted with caution, not wanting to embarrass their country with a hasty decision to side with the South Vietnamese. Such a position would antagonize the French, their "friends in court," who "might attempt to bring influence to bear on the Canadian Commission."<sup>110</sup>

In the meantime, Canadian officials exercised caution toward Diem's government. They doubted that South Vietnam was prepared to hold elections, and they openly questioned whether the South could "be relied upon to carry out the spirit of free democratic elections."<sup>111</sup> Given the weak position of the South, External Affairs assumed that the North would press for free elections. They well knew that the North Vietnamese "will not rest until the victory in 1954 of Dien Bien Phu is matched by what...will be [a] victory in 1956 at the polls throughout Vietnam."<sup>112</sup> Consequently, should they decide to supervise free elections in Vietnam, the Canadian commissioners would be caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, the South was not bound by the Geneva agreement; on the other, the North failed to co-operate fully with the

implementation of the freedom of movement clause. It appeared risky for Canada to side with either the North or the South. If it supported the North, Canada could be accused of abetting Communism in the Cold War, but taking the side of the South would mean that it could be easily accused of being pro-United States and thus no more than a puppet on the ICSC, especially since the Americans had begun to supply aid to the South Vietnamese. Canada was indeed caught between a rock and a hard place, and its aim of implementing the freedom of movement clause seemed destined for failure. Furthermore, its work on the ICSC was not helped by Diem's display of personal independence when he held a referendum on October 23, 1955, "by which he had deposed Bao Dai."<sup>113</sup> "The Polish and Indian delegations argued that Diem's actions violated the Geneva Agreement and that the Commission should notify the Conference co-Chairmen [Britain and the U.S.S.R.] to this effect." But Canada "sought to dissuade them from doing so," since the main responsibility of the ICSC lay in preserving the ceasefire agreement.<sup>114</sup> Diem's move caused two rifts, one within the ICSC, the other between Canada and India. As a result of Canada's reaction to the referendum, India accused Canadian officials of being pro-American. This Indo-Canadian rift led eventually to a souring of relations between the two nations.<sup>115</sup>

Another factor that contributed to Canada's failure to become an effective advocate of the freedom of movement clause was the possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. "According to Arnold Smith, Lester Pearson had himself been involved in a consultation evidently initiated

by John Foster Dulles in the spring of 1954 concerning possible use of tactical nuclear weapons to aid the embattled French forces at Dienbienphu." But "on that occasion both Prime Minister St. Laurent and Pearson had emphatically rejected any such consideration by Washington."<sup>116</sup> Notwithstanding the discussions on the use of nuclear weapons before the formation of the ICSC, the fear of a nuclear war was so great among DEA policymakers that they were "forced to swallow [their] reservations and halt a campaign to pressure Hanoi to fulfil its obligations under the Geneva armistice agreement pertaining to civilian freedom of movement during the first 300 days after the agreement entered into force. Pearson judged that making a major issue of North Vietnamese non-compliance that had been well documented by Canadian investigation would be very dangerous in the climate of confrontation that had developed in the Formosa Strait."<sup>117</sup> A strategy of nuclear deterrence on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union was indeed a political reality. Douglas Ross was correct when he pointed out that "the Canadian decision to back effective partition of the country after the successful defiance by Ngo Dinh Diem's government of the Geneva Final Declaration's call for elections, was in fact both a recognition of political realities and the beginning of a new effort to try to stabilize peace in the region by promoting a deterrent balance of military forces."<sup>118</sup> In the spring of 1955, Pearson and Holmes even suggested that Canada leave the ICSC since it was not accomplishing any useful work, and in any case symbolic peacekeeping was not the route for Canada to take.<sup>119</sup> But it did not withdraw in spite of the limited success of the ICSC.<sup>120</sup>

In the long run, partial success in peacekeeping was better than none. Canadian officials succeeded in deterring the Americans from using nuclear weapons in Indochina.<sup>121</sup> Canada regarded itself as a "smaller power." One direct consequence "of nuclear weapons upon smaller powers was to make them, whatever their geographical position or political affiliation, potential victims of attack."<sup>122</sup> Needless to say, the last thing Canada wanted nuclear war, and given this aversion, Canadian officials were content to practice the art of deterrence.<sup>123</sup>

Peacekeeping was a new and significant venture for Canada. It had been involved in endeavours to keep a local conflict from turning into a larger one in Kashmir and Indonesia, but this experience was not a precedent to guide its peacekeeping duties in Indochina. Canadian commissioners quickly realized that Canada was not there to become involved in armed police work but to monitor the cease-fire and to help establish peaceful relations between the French and the Indochinese. Generally, peacekeeping did not contradict Canadian objectives in Asia. Equally important, the achievement of peace and the maintenance of unity was in line with Canada's domestic goals. The St Laurent government sought on one hand to maintain unity between the French and English and on the other to steer clear of unnecessary military commitments. In seeking to maintain peace and unity at home and abroad, officials in External Affairs, always the secular missionaries, wanted peace to be "a prayer" as well as a policy.

But there was a major contradiction in Canada's role in peacekeeping. Canada took two opposing stances: it was the idealistic anti-colonial friend of the Third World, yet it was part of the Western alliance and adhered to the alliance's anti-Communist foreign policy. Although Canada did not want to be caught in the American and British conflict over the issue of colonial territories, Canadian officials supported decolonization in Southeast Asia. However, they ran into problems with India when they took their anti-Communist stand.

When Canada reluctantly agreed to join the ICSC, it sought the normal support of the United States. Once Canada joined the ICSC, it experienced difficulty in remaining judicially impartial and at the same time being a spokesman for the West. To India, the latter position was taken to mean that Canada was pro-United States. India also accused Canada of being on the side of the Americans when Canada failed to take a firm stand to oppose the Ngo Dinh Diem's referendum to depose Bao Dai. India further questioned whether western ideas of liberty and freedom, which Canada readily supported in the battle against Communism, could take hold in Vietnam. Though Canada's and India's differences as members of the ICSC were few, they led to a deterioration in relations.

In spite of the contradiction of Canada's support for decolonization and its stand on Communism, it accomplished an important foreign policy objective in Indochina by deterring the Americans from the "possible...first use of nuclear weapons" in the region.<sup>124</sup> In brief,



Canada's experience in peacekeeping in Indochina from 1954 to 1957 was the fulfillment of "a prayer" and a policy. Between idealism and political realities, idealism intertwined with ideology remained the lesser half of the dualism that marked Canadian interests in Indochina.

### Notes to Chapter Five

1. Eayrs, Indochina, pp. 6 - 7.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Douglas A. Ross, "The Dynamics of Canadian Indochina Diplomacy: Pearson, Holmes and the Struggle with the Bureaucratic Right, 1955," in D. Middlemiss, K. Nossal, D. A. Ross, et. al., An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays in Honour of John W. Holmes (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1981), p. 56.
4. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 7.
5. Ibid., pp. 7 - 8.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
7. Ibid.
8. Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), p. 148.
9. Ibid.
10. Vivienne Bronson contends that External Affairs knew little about Indochina when it was asked to serve on the ICSC. See her thesis, "The International Control Commission for Vietnam: The Diplomatic and Military Context," M. A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, March 1975, p. 2. What was unknown in External Affairs was the extent to which "Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh...and Annamite nationalism" had become a force to be reckoned with in 1945. "No Canadian official had been posted in the region. The policy community's ignorance of it was vast. The earliest reference in its files to [Ho Chi Minh], Vietnam's leading personality," was that he was a Communist rather than a nationalist. See Eayrs, Indochina, p. 5.
11. Eayrs, Indochina, pp. 11 - 12.
12. L. B. Pearson, "The Colombo Conference," External Affairs 2:3 (March 1950), p. 84.
13. George C. Herring noted that the French "refused to concede the inevitability of decolonization", while "the British and Dutch grudgingly recognized the inevitable and granted independence to their colonies within several years after World War II." p. 166. He added that the French "ran against one of the main currents of post-World War II history", which was nationalism p. 172. See George C. Herring, "The Vietnam War," in Modern American Diplomacy.
14. Eayrs, Indochina, pp. 11 - 12.

15. Ibid., p. 13.
16. L. B. Pearson, "The Colombo Conference," External Affairs 2:3 (March 1950), p. 84.
17. PC Records, RG 2, 18, vol. 248, file F-5, memorandum to the Cabinet, "Recognition of the Indo-Chinese states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos," 1950.
18. Ross, In the Interests of Peace, p. 27.
19. Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings, p.31. See "St Laurent on the Principle of Canadian Policy, 1947," pp. 25 - 33.
20. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 14. Quoted in DEA files, file 50052-40, SSEA to Ambassador to Paris, 24 September 1949 (telegram).
21. L. B. Pearson, "The Colombo Conference," S/S, 50/6, 1950, p. 6. See also L. B. Pearson "Canadian Policy in the Far East," External Affairs 9 (September 1950), p. 326.
22. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 14. This was an early version of the "domino theory."
23. Ibid., p. 17.
24. NAC, PC Records, RG 2, 18, vol. 248, file F-5, memorandum to the Cabinet, "Recognition of the Indo-Chinese States of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos," 1950; See also Eayrs Indochina, pp. 15 - 16.
25. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 19.
26. See Ross, In the Interests of Peace, pp. 10 - 12, for a very good account of the three schools of policymakers in External Affairs on peace keeping in Indochina: the liberal-moderate, conservative and left-liberal.
27. Eayrs, Indochina, pp. 21 - 22.
28. NAC, Records of the Department of Finance, RG 19, vol. 3967, file 74, memorandum for the Minister, February 21, 1950.
29. Stargardt, Australia's Asian Policies, pp. 235 - 236.
30. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 23.
31. DEA Files, file 50052 - 40, A. D. P. Heeney, memorandum for the Minister, quoted in Ibid., p. 24.
32. NAC, PC Records, RG 2, 18, vol. 222, file I-21, memorandum to the Cabinet, November 1, 1952.

33. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 26.
34. Ibid., p. 27.
35. Ibid., p. 29.
36. This is taken from the title of Ross' book, In the Interests of Peace, John Holmes saw Canadian participation as a "pseudo-involvement", interview, Toronto, June 15, 1988. Also Ralph Collins, interview, Ottawa, May 24, 1983.
37. Pacificus, "Canada In Indochina," International Journal 11:4 (Autumn 1956), p. 271.
38. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 50.
39. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 2, Indochina - Letter of Instruction for Canadian Commissioner on International Supervisory Commission, August 24, 1954.
40. Alan James, The Politics of Peace-keeping (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 1.
41. Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam, p. 8.
42. James, The Politics of Peace-keeping, p. 5.
43. Ibid., p.3.
44. Ibid., pp. 8 - 9.
45. Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam, pp. 6 - 7.
46. David Cox, "Peace-Keeping in Canadian Foreign Policy," in Stephen Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p. 192.
47. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour, p. 218.
48. Ronning, A Memoir of China In Revolution, p. 239.
49. Ibid.
50. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 29.
51. Krishna Menon was influenced by Canada's attitude towards Korea between 1951 and 1953. Chester Ronning, a senior DEA official, made informal contacts with Chou En-lai. He tried to abate the fears of the DEA and stated that China would not intervene directly in the affairs of Indochina. See NAC, Victor Odium Papers, MG 30, E 300, vol. II, file: Chester Ronning. See also Paul Martin, Canada and the Quest for Peace (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 55; Watt, Australian

Diplomat, p. 215.

52. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour, p. 219.
53. DEA Files, file 50273-40, vol. 6, telegram, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London, to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Ottawa, July 19, 1954.
54. NAC, L. B. Pearson Papers, MG 26, N 1, vol. 34, L. B. Pearson to L. St Laurent, May 6, 1954.
55. DEA Files, file 50272-40, vol. 6, SSEA to the Canadian Representative to the European office of the U.N., Geneva, July 19, 1954.
56. DEA Files, file 50273-40, vol. 6, SSEA to High Commissioner for Canada, London, July 26, 1954.
57. Ibid., SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Washington, July 22, 1954.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 1, Manchester Guardian, August 5, 1954.
61. John W. Holmes, "Geneva: 1954," International Journal 22:3 (Summer 1967), p. 459.
62. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 4, L. B. Pearson to R. C. Casey, November 1, 1954.
63. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 1, The Canadian Commissioner, Hanoi to USSEA, August 19, 1954.
64. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 1, "Indian Interests in Indochina," August 13, 1954; See also Paul Martin, Canada and the Quest for Peace, p. 45.
65. Lett was first and foremost a representative of the DEA. See file 50052-A-40, vol. 2, memorandum for the Minister, August 23, 1954.
66. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 61. Lett succinctly summarized Canadian foreign policy in Asia on July 1, 1955. This came eight years after Louis St Laurent spoke on the principles of Canadian foreign policy at the University of Toronto on January 13, 1947. Lett remarked "that Canada cannot live in isolation, and that our own peace and well-being depend upon the peace and well-being of other states and other peoples." He went on to add that as Canadians "we are fortunate in our international friendships. We share membership in a Commonwealth which brings us in touch with Asia

and its problems and we have pledged our support to the principles of the United Nations and its Charter." Lett also underscored the point that Canada's main aim in Indochina was "to maintain the peace" and "in so doing, [Canada] hope[d] to make some contribution to the maintenance of peace in South East Asia and in the world." NAC, RG 25, vol. 3068, file 4, Sherwood Lett Diary, July 1, 1955, pp. 1 - 2.

67. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 69.
68. DEA Files, file 50062-40, vol. 2, P. Conroy to L. B. Pearson, February 16, 1951. DEA Files, file 50062-A-40, vol. 3. L. B. Pearson to Pat Conroy, September 13, 1954. Also from the same file, L. B. Pearson to Milton F. Gregg, Minister of Labour, September 13, 1954, and memorandum, SSEA to Mr. Leger, Under-Secretary, September 13, 1954.
69. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 68 - 69.
70. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 2, Indochina - Letter of Instruction for Canadian Commissioner on International Supervisory Commission, August 24, 1954; DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 5, The Commissioner, Canadian Delegation, International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam, Hanoi to SSEA, November 23, 1954.
71. Munro and Inglis, eds., Mike, 2, p. 35.
72. NAC, Escott Reid Papers, MG 31, E 46, vol. 6, file 11, part I, Material prepared for P.M.'s speech, April 8, 1946.
73. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 4, Acting Commissioner, Canadian Delegation, International Supervisory Commissioner for Vietnam, Hanoi to SSEA, October 19, 1954.
74. Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau & Wayne, 1987), p. 181.
75. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 32.
76. NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, file 1, Sherwood Lett's Diary, despatch 341, Canadian Delegation to the International Commission for Supervision and control in Viet Nam, Hanoi, July 4, 1955, p. 1. See also DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 2, Indochina - Letter of Instruction for Canadian Commissioner on International Supervisory Commission, August 24, 1954.
77. Ibid., NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, file, 1, p. 3.
78. Holmes, "Geneva 1954," p. 475.
79. Ibid., p. 474.

80. DEA, Annual Report, 1955, p. 25.
81. NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, file 1, Sherwood Lett's Diary, despatch 342, The Commissioner, Canadian Delegation to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet Nam, Hanoi, July 4, 1955, p. 1.
82. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 137.
83. Ibid., p. 135.
84. Eayrs, Indochina, pp. 165 - 166.
85. Ibid., p. 163.
86. Ibid., p. 165.
87. Eayrs, Indochina, pp. 144 - 145.
88. Reid, Envoy to Nehru, p. 83.
89. Eayrs, Indochina, pp. 125 - 126.
90. Ibid., p. 125. Compared to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos occupied a place of secondary importance. Canada favoured elections in Cambodia, and the DEA was pleased when they were held. Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk won almost 85% of the popular vote. In Laos, Canada took an interest in the question of national integration. It wanted the elections to be conducted under the laws of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) and recommended that the Pathet Lao, the Communist party, be permitted to participate in the elections if it respected the laws of Laos. See NAC, MG 26, N 1, vol. 67, Pearson Tour Diary, September 23, 1955.
91. Ibid., p. 150.
92. NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, file 1, Sherwood Lett's Diary, memorandum, May 23, 1955, pp. 298 - 299.
93. Quoted in Paul Bridle, 'Canada and the International Commissions in Indochina, 1954 - 1972,' Behind the Headlines 32:4 (October 1973), pp. 24 - 25, in Eayrs, Indochina, p. 157.
94. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 2, The Canadian Commissioner, Hanoi to USSEA, August 21, 1954.
95. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 4, Acting Commissioner, Canadian Delegation to International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, Hanoi, October 19, 1954.
96. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 5, The Commissioner, Canadian Delegation, International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet Nam, Hanoi, November 25, 1954.

97. NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, File, Sherwood Lett's Diary, June 5, 1955, p. 319.
98. Quoted in Eayrs, Indochina, p. 143. This is also found in Sherwood Lett's Diary.
99. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 3, Canadian Commissioner, Hanoi to SSEA, September 18, 1954.
100. DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 2, Apostolic Delegate, Ottawa to L. B. Pearson, September 1, 1954.
101. Ibid.
102. NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, file 1, Sherwood Lett's Diary, despatch 341, July 4, 1955, p. 5.
103. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 218.
104. See NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, file 1.
105. Douglas Ross made this observation on the violations of the South Vietnamese government: "From 12 December 1955 to 28 February 1961, the ICSC for Vietnam operating for the most part under Indo-Canadian majority teamwork issued over 180 declared violations or 'citations' against the Saigon government. For the same period Hanoi was censured only 6 times. Many of the Saigon citations were multiple in character. But despite this highly skewed 'conviction' rate Saigon was the beneficiary of determined inaction by the Vietnam control commission." Douglas Ross, "Canada, Peacekeeping and the Vietnam War: Where did Ottawa Go Wrong?," in B. J. C. McKercher and E. J. Errington, eds., The Vietnam War as History (New York: Praeger Publishers, forthcoming), p. 45, endnotes.
106. Pacificus, "Canada In Indochina," p. 277. Pacificus identified himself as "A Canadian Student of Asian Affairs."
107. Graffen, In the Eye of the Storm, p. 190.
108. Eayrs, Indochina, pp. 159 - 160.
109. DEA Files, file 55052-A-40, vol. 2, Canadian Commissioner, Viet Nam to SSEA, September 10, 1954.
110. Ibid.
111. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 173. Here Eayrs relied on Sherwood Lett's Diary.
112. NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, file 1, Sherwood Lett's Diary, despatch 342, July 4, 1955, p. 6. Also DEA Files, file 50052-A-40, vol. 2, memorandum for Mr. Menzies, August 24, 1954.



113. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 181.
114. Ibid., p. 182.
115. Ibid., p. 183.
116. Ross, "Canada, Peacekeeping and the Vietnam War", p. 43, endnotes.
117. Ibid., pp. 43 - 44. Ross noted that John Lewis Gaddis' book, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 169 -170, mentioned that a nuclear war was a real possibility.
118. Ibid., p. 22.
119. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 259. John W. Holmes "was a central figure in the Indochina policy debate of the Department of External Affairs between 1954 and 1960." Ross, In the Interests of Peace, p. 21.
120. Lett acknowledged that the ICSC did not accomplish all its goals but that the results of Article 14(d) were satisfactory. He blamed the lack of success on the North Vietnamese display of bad faith. But in spite of the problems and handicaps faced, "some 930,000 people are estimated to have gone South by one means or another, some with permits, most without." See NAC, RG 25, vol. 3069, file 1. Sherwood Lett's Diary, despatch 341, July 4, 1955, p. 6.
121. Eayrs, Indochina, p. 253.
122. Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957, p. 4. See also, p. 5.
123. Munro and Inglis, Mike, 2, p. 79.
124. Ross, In the Interests of Peace, p. 6; See also pp. 64 - 66.

### CONCLUSION

At the end of the Second World War, the Department of External Affairs had basically no foreign policy goals for Asia. It had interests in China and Japan, but no grand scheme existed for the whole Asian region from South Asia to Southeast Asia and across to East Asia. In 1945 Mackenzie King and the officials in External Affairs were generally unconcerned with problems in Asia. A greater Canadian interest may have developed there if Canada had participated in the Pacific war against the Japanese, but its involvement in Asia during the war in the Pacific, though important in the military sense, was of small consequence. Canada's lack of involvement in Asian affairs continued in the post-war era. When it had to participate in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, King was reluctant and apprehensive. Canada eventually participated on the commission, with the support of the United States, but this involvement was perceived to be a temporary measure, one that was not supposed to lead to further involvement in Korea.

However, sweeping changes were taking place in Asia. Political changes such as decolonization, along with civil wars and regional shifts in the economic and social conditions in several countries, made Asia important in international affairs. Britain and the United States could not remain isolated from Asian affairs as these sweeping changes occurred; rather they had to resolve the issue of their economic interests in Asia. By virtue of being the country largely responsible for the defeat of the Japanese, the United States recognized its

military superiority and the fact that it was replacing Britain as the leading western nation in the Far East. Because Canada was an important ally of Britain and the United States, it could not remain isolated from Asian affairs. Its association with Britain and the United States influenced what interests and roles it would develop in Asia. As a senior partner in the Commonwealth, Canada was willing to give Britain moral support and in turn enhance its own self-interests. Also because of its role as a strong ally of the United States, Canada was able to restrain American military power and simultaneously promote its own interests.

In its efforts to constrain United States military power in Asia, Canada became involved in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (1947) and the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indochina (1954). In a period of seven years, from Korea in 1947 to Indochina in 1954, Canada moved from a position of being hardly aware of Asian problems to one where it was very well acquainted with those issues. During this seven-year period, Canada participated in three significant foreign policy issues: it worked diligently to keep India within the Commonwealth; it joined the Colombo Plan in 1950; and it fought in the Korean War. In formulating Canadian foreign policy, External Affairs officials attached an order of importance to the geographical areas of the world. The North American region was given first priority. It was in Ottawa, the nerve centre, that the planning of policy strategy took place, but Canada's relations with the United States were very significant. Europe, the traditional area of

Canadian foreign policy contacts, was next in importance. Finally, Canadian interests in foreign affairs were eventually extended by the secular missionaries in External Affairs to the uttermost part of a very important region in the world, which was Asia. The trade Canada conducted with the United States, Europe and Asia reflected the importance it attached to these respective areas.

In addition to the priorities Canadian officials assigned to geographical areas, a hierarchy of foreign policy ideals also existed. The doctrine of material self-help was the pillar that upheld almost all of Canadian policy in Asia. Trading interests built Canada and trade would sustain it, even in Asia. Although Canadian national interests took priority, it also was willing to help the countries of Asia improve their economic conditions. Because of the threat of aggression and the growing influence of Communism, the need to improve economic conditions in Asia took on greater urgency. Canada as well as other western democracies wanted the Asian region to be prosperous. In turn, Canada hoped that prosperity would contribute to the stability of regimes and the efforts to thwart the growth of Communism.

Officials in External Affairs encouraged the establishment of democratic institutions when they sought to improve the economic conditions in Asian countries. They believed that responsible government was the ideal form of government; however, Canadian officials were also willing to support authoritarian regimes that would improve trade relations with Canada and the standard of living in their

respective countries.

The most important instrument after trade was foreign aid, the right arm of material self-help. In the area of aid, the St Laurent government took a direct hand in promoting the economic and social welfare of the countries in South and Southeast Asia, notwithstanding their own self-interests. The stimulus for its participation in the Colombo Plan was the Commonwealth's need in 1950 to find solutions to the threat of Communism and to develop ways to enhance the internal political stability of these two regions.

The third ideal underpinning Canadian external affairs in Asia was peacekeeping. Canada viewed peacekeeping as the best alternative to defence alliances in Asia. Rather than send combat troops to Asia, Canadian peacekeeping officers would try to prevent small crises from becoming larger ones. In its participation on the International Commission for Supervision and Control for Indochina, Canada confronted problems when it sought to have granted the democratic rights explicit in Article 14(d), the freedom of movement clause of the Geneva Accords. Besides this limitation that Canadian officials faced in Asia, India's accusation that Canada too closely supported American policy aims at the expense of its peacekeeping efforts in Indochina was another serious stumbling block to its success as a member of the ICSC.

In trying to pursue an independent course in foreign policy, Canadian External Affairs officials learned that in spite of their

attempts, the foreign policy goals of the United States in Asia modified Canadian objectives. Canada would have recognized Communist China, as Britain and India did, and carried on a lucrative trade with the Chinese if it had not been for the restraining influence of the United States. External Affairs officials, when faced with the issue of the recognition of China, subscribed neither to the American view on Communism nor its crusading zeal.<sup>1</sup> But by virtue of their predominant role in Asia, American decision-makers in the State Department were able to influence Canadian officials, especially Lester Pearson.

Notwithstanding American influence in Asia, Canada developed a solid reputation among the major political leaders of Asia. Canadian officials were known for their efforts to understand the Asian mind and the economic, social and political problems Asians faced. Also enhancing Canada's diplomatic prestige were its views, as a senior member of the Commonwealth, on external affairs. In addition, it played an indirect but significant role in encouraging decolonization in South and Southeast Asia. Asian countries such as Burma, India, Indonesia and South Vietnam recognized that Canada had not been a colonial power like Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States; consequently, they were more at ease with Canada's involvement in Asian affairs. However, Canada's principal advantage was that it was not part of the United States. To Asians, Canada lacked the assertiveness that characterized much of American foreign policy.

The respectability Canada earned helped shape its image in Asia, and

in turn this reputation contributed to a good measure of success in fighting the war for men's minds at home and abroad. External Affairs officials under Pearson's leadership reached a consensus to focus on the essentials, which were the tenets of liberal internationalism. Equally important in making this war successful was the absence of any serious opposition at home on major foreign policy issues, such as trade, aid and peacekeeping. There was substantial public support in Canada for its participation in the Korean war and its effort to defeat Communism in that region of East Asia. In the war for men's minds, Canada was instrumental in assisting India to become a significant member of the Commonwealth. In addition, it played a crucial role in keeping Indonesia, Japan and South Korea within the sphere of the western democracies.

Canada's presence in Asia, which began in 1947 and was characterized by its efforts to keep India within the Commonwealth and in its decision to serve on the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, continued even after the Diefenbaker government came to power in 1957. Despite Diefenbaker's meager experience in foreign affairs, his disregard for advice from External Affairs, and his suspicion of the 'Pearsonalities', the Chief and his coterie of officials continued to uphold the three principal ideals of Canadian policy in Asia: trade, aid and peacekeeping.<sup>2</sup> It was within the context of the much-debated issue of the recognition of China that the Diefenbaker government searched for ways to sell wheat to China. Basil Robinson, an External Affairs official and liaison officer in the Diefenbaker government, noted that

the new Conservative government was looking for ways to sell Canadian grain overseas and "at Canada's responsibilities in foreign aid."<sup>3</sup> In its concern for the plight of the poor in South and Southeast Asia and for the need of these regions to continue to achieve a higher industrial output together with a better standard of living, the Diefenbaker government sustained the humanitarian ideal begun by Pearson and his secular missionaries. Diefenbaker's government also upheld the doctrine that Canadian self-interest should be served as well. Consequently, the Conservative government increased Colombo Plan aid for South and Southeast Asia, which in turn strengthened Canada's ties with the Asian Commonwealth. In addition to trade and aid, Canada remained committed to peacekeeping. Its peacekeeping forces in Indochina continued to prevent, amidst much frustration in implementing the cease-fire, a civil war from turning into a global catastrophe. While Canada's Indochina policy was pursued in the interests of peace, it was going to take more than "a prayer" for External Affairs officials and the Canadian commissioners in Indochina to find a viable solution to this Southeast Asian problem.<sup>4</sup>

From 1945 to 1957, Canada developed a foreign policy based principally on self-interest, but where possible self-interest was linked to ideological goals. This dualism became the basis for foreign policy in Asia. The two ideals that shaped Canada's image in Asia and in the rest of the Third World were participation in the Colombo Plan and in peacekeeping. Canada preserved its reputation as a good Samaritan and a peacekeeping nation in order to inherit the goods of the Asian earth.



### Notes to the Conclusion

1. See Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Social Myths in the 'Cold War,'" Journal of International Affairs 21:1 (1967) pp. 40 - 56.
2. H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp.103 - 106, 121. On the topic of 'Pearsonalities', see Ibid., pp. 89, 97. See also John F. Hilliker, "The Politicians and the 'Pearsonalities'," Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers, 1984, pp. 151 - 167.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
4. James Eayrs noted that the roots of complicity that were sown in the early stages of the ICSC's duties were difficult to uproot. See Indochina, pp. 251 - 283. See also Charles Taylor, Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam 1954 - 1973 (Toronto: Anansi, 1974). Taylor noted that Canadian External Affairs officials were "snowed under" by the Americans and their strong emphasis on anti-Communism. Consequently, Canada did not perform well on the ICSC between 1954 and 1956. Taylor added that Canada should have pulled out from the Commission after South Vietnam failed to hold elections. See also Douglas Ross, "Canada, Peacekeeping and the Vietnam War," p. 30.

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