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Explaining the Canadian Response to the
Tiananmen Square Massacre:
A Comparative Examination of
Canadian Foreign Policy

BY

Paul Gecelovsky



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Edmonton, Alberta
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
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Explaining the Canadian Response to the Tiananmen Square Massacre: A Comparative Examination of Canadian Foreign Policy submitted by Paul Gecelovsky in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




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
Dr. Juris Lejnicks



Dr. Wenran Jiang



Dr. David Mills



Dr. Andrew F. Cooper

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To Ben, thanks for the company;
to Noah, thanks for the inspiration; and,
to Jacqueline, thanks for the faith.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the ongoing scholarly conversation concerning the determinants of Canadian foreign policy. It demonstrates the usefulness of the "interactive approach" approach in heightening the theoretical basis of the study of Canadian foreign policy and in providing a framework for further scholarly enquiry. In attempting to fulfil this objective, the study undertakes a comparative examination of alternative approaches used to explain Canadian foreign policy behaviour. In particular, explanations gleaned from an application of the dominant class, statist, middle power, and interactive approaches are compared according to the concept of explanatory richness.

The Mulroney government's decision to impose a range of sanctions against China in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989 is the case study analysed. Chapter One examines the literature concerning the Canada-China relationship, as well as outlining the four analytical approaches to be analysed. Chapter Two outlines briefly China's history of human rights abuses, the factors which led up to the massacre, and the international reaction to the student movement by the United States and Japan. This sets the international context within which the Canadian decision was formulated. Chapter Three traces

the development of Canada-China relations, especially from 1970 to Tiananmen, discusses the evolution of the theme of human rights in Canadian foreign policy, and outlines the Canadian response to the student movement. By exploring the nature of the Canada-China relationship and the place of human rights in that relationship prior to Tiananmen, Chapter Three sets the domestic context of the decision. Chapters Four and Five examine the international and the Canadian domestic reactions to the Tiananmen Square massacre. It will be shown, in Chapter Four, that the international community pressed for a lenient response. Chapter Five details Canada's then evolving China policy in light of the various state and societal pressures. Chapter Six examines alternative explanations of the Canadian response to Tiananmen obtained through an application of the dominant class, statist, middle power, and interactive approaches. Also included in Chapter Six is an evaluation of the quality of the explanation furnished by the various approaches according to the criteria of explanatory richness.

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Because of the efforts of all of the above, the finished work is of a much higher quality than one that could have been produced alone. As always, any inadequacies found herein are the sole responsibility of the author.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The groaning of armoured personnel carriers and the staccato sounds of automatic assault rifles penetrated the air as tens of thousands of troops from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) began to forcefully drive the demonstrators from Tiananmen Square, on June 4, 1989. Within hours, the campaign of terror waged against those citizens gathered in and around Tiananmen Square had left in its train an estimated 2,600 Chinese dead.¹

This 'restoration of order' was captured by the international mass media which was in Beijing to cover Mikhail Gorbachev's recently completed historic visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Mass media coverage of the event meant that in millions of homes across the globe people witnessed the brutality of measures which some Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun utilized in order to retain their hold on power.² Horror and revulsion at the pictures on television and in the press led to immense public sympathy for the fighters for 'freedom and democracy'.

The public abhorrence of the egregious violation of human rights committed by the Chinese leadership in

ordering force to be used against the unarmed protesters rendered a swift response by governments necessary. People in many states called out for the immediate imposition of harsh retaliatory measures. The most favoured means through which protest could be manifested was the imposition of a range of sanctions such as, *inter alia*, suspending military sales and contracts, delaying high-level visits, and extending the visas of Chinese nationals.

This study will explain the Mulroney government's decision to impose sanctions³ against China in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989.⁴ When compared with past sanctioning activities against other countries, the Canadian measures adopted on June 30 were fairly extensive, although many of the initiatives were symbolic in character and the overall effect on Canada-China relations was limited.⁵ The Canadian action, moreover, went beyond that of the United States, Japan, and the European Economic Community in terms of substance. The factors that led Canada to take this initiative, why this action was selected over a fuller range of sanctions, including the full suspension of bilateral aid, or conversely a more limited response, entailing perhaps only the use of quiet diplomacy, is discussed.

There are numerous studies in the literature that deal with many facets of Canada's relationship with the People's Republic of China.⁶ In the past, one of the most widely covered issues was the question of Canadian recognition of the PRC.⁷ The bilateral economic relationship has also been a subject of study.⁸ Related to the recognition question, Paul M. Evans and Daphne G. Taras conducted several studies looking at parliament's interest in and influence on Canada's relationship with China.⁹ Further, the problems associated with attempting to influence China through the application of sanctions has been another area of enquiry.¹⁰

With respect to China, studies attempting to explain why the Tiananmen Square massacre happened and what transpired during that period are readily available.¹¹ The PRC's nefarious history concerning human rights has been the subject of wide study during the past few years.¹²

The issue of human rights in Canadian foreign policy also has been a widely debated topic.¹³ Attracting some attention has been the subject of human rights in the Canada-China relationship.¹⁴ Included in this body of literature is some work pertaining to Canada's reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre. The Canadian reaction to

Tiananmen has been examined previously by B. Michael Frolic, David Gillies, Kim Richard Nossal, Maire O'Brien, and Jeremy T. Paltiel.¹⁵ This work can be divided roughly into two categories: descriptive and theoretical. Included in the former category is the work of Frolic and Paltiel whereas the work of Gillies, Nossal, and O'Brien falls into the latter. Both Frolic and Paltiel provide valuable contextual information concerning the Canadian response. Their treatment of the material is historical in form however, as neither attempts to examine the Canadian response in light of a theoretical framework.

Of the three theoretical works, only O'Brien's focuses on the policy-making process. She argues that the "pulling and hauling" among various state actors associated with the bureaucratic politics approach was prevalent in the policy-making process surrounding Tiananmen and that the bureaucratic politics approach can be used to explain the Canadian response.¹⁶ While the study provides useful insights into the policy-making process surrounding Tiananmen, there was little of the 'pulling and hauling' identified by the bureaucratic politics approach in crafting the Canadian response. The Canadian reaction was crafted by a small coterie of officials in the Department of External Affairs in collaboration with the Secretary of

State for External Affairs, as will be demonstrated herein, and as noted by Frolic.¹⁷

Gillies, in his treatment of the subject, does not examine the policy-making process in any detail.¹⁸ His purpose was to compare the reactions of Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway in response to violations of human rights in five Third World states. With respect to China, he takes the June 30 measures announced by Canada as his starting point and looks at the implementation of the measures. Little treatment is accorded the factors that shaped the Canadian response.

Similar to Gillies, Nossal gives scant attention to the policy-making process. He concentrates on the substance of policy instead. His analysis of the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen episode was undertaken to support his contention that the "orthodox theory of sanctions" does not offer "an adequate and sufficiently nuanced explanation of the sanctions policies" of non-great powers.¹⁹ Nossal argues that the Canadian response was determined primarily by state actors that sought to punish the Chinese leadership for their behaviour and to maintain group solidarity with other western states. There are three main problems with this explanation. First, Nossal does not provide any evidence to support the claim that Canadian

decision-makers were motivated by a desire to punish the Chinese leaders. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, is most often regarded as a minister prone to overanalyse issues and not allow emotion to dominate his thinking.²⁰ Linda Freeman, in her analysis of Canadian policy towards South Africa, even went as far as labelling Clark an "apostle of caution".²¹

In the case of China and Tiananmen Square, policy-makers may have been angered by the actions of the Chinese leaders at the outset. However, the period between the incident and the detailed Canadian reaction allowed plenty of time for this to dissipate. That this occurred is illustrated by the comments of Joe Clark, the minister responsible for crafting the Canadian response. At the outset, Clark expressed his abhorrence and outrage at the use of force to end the demonstrations. Two weeks later however he called for Canada to follow the course of a "considered, effective action" and not a "dramatic action".²² Any initial feelings of anger and punishment within the coterie of policy-makers was tempered with the passage of time between the initial response on June 5 and the more detailed response 25 days later, on June 30, 1989.

Second, Nossal does not provide an explanation for government officials, including the prime minister and

secretary of state for external affairs, taking time out of their busy schedules to meet with Chinese-Canadian community leaders throughout Canada in the aftermath of June 4 and, moreover, why the government held the National Round Table meeting on June 22, 1989. Canadian policy-makers were able to develop a response independent of societal actors but these actors were brought into the policy-making process. Nossal's analysis does not provide an explanation for this because it focuses mainly on the substance of policy and not the process. Nossal does outline the preferences of the actors within the policy community, but he does not tell us how the various actors interacted with one another over the course of June 1989. This is a crucial point. It was not enough that Canada acted, it also had to be recognised as having done so.

Finally, Nossal overemphasises the degree of societal cohesion in pressing Canadian policy-makers to adopt strict measures against China. He misrepresents societal actors as being "generally united" in pressuring decision-makers.²³ Preferences of societal actors spanned a continuum with the business and farming communities at one end pressing for 'business as usual' and some Chinese-Canadian groups at the other calling for the adoption of stern sanctions. Societal actors had assorted opinions as

to how Canada should respond to the incidents in China and this diversity was reflected in the detailed Canadian reaction announced at the end of June 1989.

In short, while work has been done on various aspects of the Canada-China relationship, on human rights in Canadian foreign policy, and on the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre, there is no work, prior to this one, that has explained fully the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre.

All explanations of state behaviour require the application of an analytical framework, implicit or explicit, to help reduce the highly complex and nebulous decision-making environment to a manageable dimension. As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have noted, all approaches are "intellectual fictions" in that they highlight certain variables believed to be the primary determinants of state behaviour.²⁴ The question then becomes do the highlighted variables provide satisfactory explanations for state behaviour or are they found wanting? This was the underlying question that animated this study.

In examining the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre, this also study seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly conversation concerning the determinants of Canadian foreign policy. In their review of the

Canadian foreign policy literature, David R. Black and Heather A. Smith wrote of the theoretical development of the field as being "marked by significant inadequacies and lacunae". While noting that over the past decade some "notable exceptions" have occurred, the authors concluded that overall there has been "limited refinement of promising theoretical beginnings".²⁵ In seeking to overcome some of the shortcomings identified by Black and Smith, this study undertakes a comparative examination of alternative "conceptual lenses" used to explain Canada's response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. Apart from the work of Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon and Denis Stairs, little of this type of work has been done in Canadian foreign policy.²⁶ It is anticipated that this study will demonstrate the usefulness of the interactive approach in heightening the theoretical basis of the study of Canadian foreign policy and, more importantly, that it provides a 'promising theoretical beginning'.

Much of the debate in the Canadian foreign policy literature concerning determinants of foreign policy has taken place between approaches that stress either domestic or international sources of state behaviour.²⁷ The focus in this chapter is on the four analytical frameworks examined in this study and the variables highlighted by

proponents of the various perspectives as primary determinants of a state's foreign policy.

In examining domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy, the statist and dominant class approaches have been most prominent. The most notable proponents of the statist and dominant class approaches have been Kim Richard Nossal and Cranford Pratt, respectively.²⁸ In comparing these two approaches both authors define the state in terms of individuals in positions of decision-making authority and both regard state actors as possessing a significant range of autonomous behaviour. Each, however, differs as to what determines state behaviour.

For Nossal, state actors have interests of their own and formulate policies in keeping with these interests. While acknowledging that societal actors may be active and may have their views heard, Nossal concludes that these groups exert "little influence" over the behaviour of decision-makers and cautions that "activity should not be mistaken for *influence*" (emphasis in the original). He accords little explanatory power to societal factors in shaping Canadian foreign policy: "Foreign policy outcomes have generally been the reflection and expression of the state's own interests, defined by state officials as the 'national interest', rather than a reflection of the

interest of any one group or class in society".²⁹

There are, however, differences in preferences among state officials. Officials are guided by a sense of what they believe to be the most propitious course of action for their country, their department, and themselves. Foreign policy is "the result of *interchange* between *players*" (emphasis in original).³⁰ These 'interchanges' are characterized by "trade-offs and compromises by officials from different parts of the government".³¹ The outcomes of these 'interchanges' are actions or decisions by government better regarded as 'collages' or 'political resultants' than choices arrived at through a rational assessment of the range of options available. Because they involve players from both the executive and the public service, 'interchanges' occur both within and between each of these levels.

While Pratt agrees with Nossal that state actors possess "significant autonomy", he argues that certain societal actors do have an "important influence" on policy.³² These certain societal actors comprise Canada's corporate elite, what Pratt terms the "dominant class". According to Pratt, members of the dominant class and the state share a "common view" in ensuring the continued economic strength of Canada.³³ Because of this, members of

the dominant class have "an intimacy of access, an acceptability, and an influence in policy-making circles" beyond that of other societal actors. They are "by far the most influential".³⁴ This has resulted in state officials attributing "far too high an importance to immediate, narrowly defined economic advantages" thereby "infus[ing]" Canada's foreign policy "with a bias towards the interest of the corporate sector".³⁵ Foreign policy, then, is seen as being largely reflective of a "consensus" operative among decision-makers that limits the range of feasible policy options to those that further the interests of the commercial class.

The primary determinant of state behaviour in the dominant class approach is the nature of the commercial relationship. The breadth and depth of bilateral commercial relations is regarded as determining the extent to which Canada censures states guilty of human rights violations.

By examining only the domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy, a partial picture of the determinants of Canada's foreign policy is provided. To complete the picture, attention needs to be focused on international or systemic sources of state behaviour thereby ending what Michael K. Hawes has noted as the "preoccupation with

domestic sources" that has characterised recent studies in Canadian foreign policy.³⁶ A starting point for most analysis of international sources of Canadian foreign policy has been Canada's "place" in the international hierarchy of states.³⁷ The dominant view of Canada's 'place' in the international structure is that of a "middle power".³⁸

In the middle power framework, state behaviour is largely determined by the state's position in the international structure. Position, in turn, is determined by a state's capabilities relative to other states.³⁹ States are "positional", that is they "determine their interests and strategies on the basis of calculations about their positions in the [international] system".⁴⁰

In a recent study of "middle powers", Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal argued that these states exhibit a "particular style of behaviour in international politics". They tend to: "pursue multilateral solutions to international problems"; "embrace compromise positions in international disputes"; and, "embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide their diplomacy".⁴¹

While the above authors noted that the combination of the widening of the international agenda as a result of

increased interdependence among states that began in the 1970s and the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union after the introduction of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the latter state opened up "new windows of opportunities (or, perhaps new windows of necessity) for middle powers"⁴², they found that middle powers were able to have a "particularly evident" influence on international issues when initiatives from the United States and Japan were "absent".⁴³ That is, as the number of issue-areas and the extent of influence middle powers could have on the international environment increased, control over outcomes continued to be determined, for the most part, by the presence or absence of major powers. As John Holmes so succinctly expressed it: "Middle powers are middle powers because they are weaker".⁴⁴

While the range of autonomous behaviour for middle powers may be circumscribed by the activities and interests of the major powers, middle powers, like Canada, can, and do, play a productive role in the international system in certain "functional" areas.⁴⁵ The idea behind this is that states with skills and resources in certain issue-areas take on greater responsibility in those areas in the international system. In this way, a middle power is able to concentrate its efforts in those areas in which it has

the requisite skills and resources thereby making maximum use of them. Middle powers could even provide "leadership" in dealing with concerns within one of its functional areas.⁴⁶

An additional component of middle power behaviour that needs to be addressed concerns the willingness of middle powers to use their functional capabilities in pursuit of what Arnold Wolfers has termed "milieu goals" rather than the more narrow "possession goals".⁴⁷ That is, it deals with a commitment to internationalism.⁴⁸ Robert Cox put it thusly: "Possessing middle-range capabilities (military and economic) is a necessary condition of the ability to play [the middle power] role, but it is not an adequate predictor of the disposition to play it".⁴⁹ For that an examination of a state's willingness to play the middle power role needs to be undertaken.

From the middle power perspective, foreign policy is largely determined by three interrelated factors. The first factor concerns the activities and interests of major powers. These may act as either a constraint on, or a catalyst for middle power behaviour. Of central concern here is the participants. A second factor is whether or not the issue falls within one of the functional issue-areas that the middle power has been attempting to play a

leading role in. Has the middle power developed an image for following a particular course of action within the issue-area in question? The final factor concerns the commitment to internationalism demonstrated by the middle power. Is the state in question willing to use its limited resources to pursue milieu, rather than possession, goals?

The tendency of scholars to construct artificial analytical boundaries separating the domestic and international levels has resulted, in part, in a "limited pursuit of interesting debates" in the study of Canadian foreign policy.⁵⁰ The creation of these "two solitudes" has led to little scholarly work which has attempted to bridge these artificial analytical realms, according to G. Bruce Doern, Leslie A. Pal, and Brian W. Tomlin.⁵¹ Michael Howlett has noted that the "the necessary empirical and conceptual work on international-domestic linkages has, for the most part, not been done".⁵² Further, George A. MacLean argues that "simply placing one prior to the other does not explain the more important questions which are at the heart of political analysis".⁵³ These 'more important' questions concern the intermixing of domestic politics and international relations to provide a "better and richer understanding of foreign policy".⁵⁴

That foreign policy decisions are the result of the

concurrent interplay of domestic and international factors is the core notion of the "interactive approach".⁵⁵ In this approach, "central decision-makers" are trying to "manipulate domestic and international politics simultaneously".⁵⁶ Central decision-makers are the focus because they are "directly exposed" to pressure from both levels and they, therefore, play a "special role in mediating domestic and international pressures".⁵⁷ They are, thus, forced to confront pressures from both levels concurrently.

Joining the domestic and international levels is the "win set", that is the set of deals that would be ratified by the relevant domestic actors. Ratification, in turn, is defined as any domestic-level decision process, formal or informal, needed to approve or implement a potential agreement.⁵⁸

At the domestic level, three factors are of particular importance in determining the boundaries of the 'win-set'. They are: (a) domestic political institutions; (b) domestic preferences and coalitions; and (c) decision-makers' preferences.⁵⁹ Domestic political institutions are of importance when determining the boundaries of the 'win-set' because they help to identify those state actors whose participation and support is required for taking a

decision, as well as the domestic context in which those officials act. The varying roles and degrees of influence of government officials is addressed by George Tsebelis in his comparative analysis of decision making in which he introduces the concept of a "veto player", that is "an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision". Tsebelis further differentiates between types of veto players with the "institutional veto player", those whose agreement to a change in policy is both "necessary and sufficient", being the most important.⁶⁰ The point being made is that state structures determine whose participation and support is required for a decision to be taken.

State structures are also "important", according to G. John Ikenberry, because they help to set the "framework that facilitates or inhibits access to political resources and the policymaking apparatus".⁶¹ The political institutions of a state outline the formal ratification procedures necessary for a decision to be taken. They determine the degree to which state actors can act independent of other domestic actors.⁶² James A. Caporaso has likened them to a "filter" allowing some factors to pass through while prohibiting others.⁶³

A second determinant of the size of the 'win-set' is

the "distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions" among societal actors.⁶⁴ While Jeffery W. Knopf has noted that societal actors are "active players" who participate in the shaping of the agenda and not simply "objects to be manipulated by the strategies of the statesman",⁶⁵ the autonomy possessed by state actors is heightened if, among societal actors, the distribution of power and preferences are widespread and possible coalitions are flexible.⁶⁶ The degree of heterogeneity within the societal level affects the possibility of domestic ratification of an agreement. If the domestic opinion is united in support of an international agreement, ratification is unproblematic. If domestic opinion is united in opposing an agreement then ratification is not possible. The agreement does not lie within the domestic 'win set'. Ratification, then, depends on the degree of domestic opposition and the composition of the ratifying and non-ratifying coalitions.

The relationship between state and societal actors is not held to be constant but varies across issue area and time. The process through which coalitions are formed between state and societal actors holding similar preferences and in opposition to the preferences of other state and societal actors is a topic of enquiry to be

investigated. In the interactive approach, no *a priori* assumptions are made concerning the state-societal relationship and the dominance of one over the other.

The final domestic-level determinant of the 'win-set' is decision-makers' preferences.⁶⁷ While attempting to reconcile the demands placed upon them by both the international and domestic levels, central decision-makers also have preferences of their own, that is, an "acceptability-set".⁶⁸ A decision-maker's "acceptability-set" is based on both the decision-maker's position within the institutional structure of the state and his/her individual beliefs and values, personality, prior experiences, and so on. In other words, what James N. Rosenau has referred to as the "role" and "individual" (or idiosyncratic) variables. The "role" variable refers to the behaviour of officials "that would be likely to occur irrespective of the individual characteristics of the role occupants", while the "individual" variable concerns those characteristics that are "unique" to a decision-maker, that "distinguish" a decision-maker's choices or behaviour from other decision-makers.⁶⁹

Domestic-level 'win-sets' are also affected by changes at the international level. One way in which a 'win-set' may be affected by a change at the international level is

that actions by one or more states may alter the expectations held by domestic groups in another state, that is "international pressures 'reverberate' in domestic politics, tipping the domestic balance".⁷⁰ Reverberation may occur on purpose as a result of suasive attempts by a foreign state or society, or they may occur unintentionally as a result of state actors responding to an event.⁷¹ Further, reverberation may be positive, i.e. it expands the domestic win-set and facilitates agreement, or it may be negative, i.e. it constricts the domestic win-set and impedes agreement. In short, 'reverberation' may provide strategic opportunities or dilemmas for the domestic-level decision-makers crafting a response to an event at the international level.

Following from this, foreign policy is the result of the "entanglement" of both international and domestic level factors.⁷² Explanations of state behaviour drawn from the interactive approach questions, not assumes *a priori*, the influence of international and domestic agents and structures on a state's foreign policy. There is, to borrow from Stephen Brooks, a "certain agnosticism" as to whether domestic or international forces are the more important determinants of foreign policy.⁷³

In sum, it has been demonstrated that no study, prior

to this one, has explained as fully as possible the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre, and that the interactive approach because it incorporates factors from both the domestic and international levels provides an analytical framework which will render a more complete explanation of the Canadian response.

The Study

In attempting to provide a deeper and more nuanced explanation of the Canadian response to Tiananmen, the case study research strategy is followed.⁷⁴ For Ronald Mitchell and Thomas Bernauer, a case study should "produce findings that compel, convince, and contribute".⁷⁵ The "ultimate goal" of case study research, according to Robert K. Yin, is to render "compelling analytic conclusions and to rule out alternative interpretations". To meet this objective, Yin has outlined a number of characteristics of an "exemplary case study".⁷⁶

The first component of an 'exemplary case study' identified by Yin was that a case must be "significant". An indication of significance is if a case concerns issues that are important in a theoretical and/or policy-making sense, or if it deals with an occurrence that is "unusual" or of "general public interest".⁷⁷

Three reasons can be put forward as to why a study of the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre is significant. First, the study is of intrinsic interest and importance. Along with Canada's recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1970 and the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the happenings in China in June 1989 marked an important historical event in the bilateral relationship. B. Michael Frolic has written that no other event in Canada-China relations has had the "dramatic impact of Tiananmen".⁷⁸ The experience of Tiananmen altered the Canada-China relationship. Therefore, a closer examination of this case will provide additional insights into this important bilateral relationship for Canada.

A second reason why a study of this particular decision is important is that it examines the relative importance of human rights considerations in Canada's foreign policy. Upon coming to power in 1984, the Mulroney government made a rhetorical commitment to increase the salience of human rights considerations in Canada's foreign policy. The Canadian response to the incidents of June 1989 in China provide some indication of the depth of this commitment.

Finally, a study of the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre is worthwhile because it provides

some insight into how Canada formulates a response to a human rights crisis in the international environment that does not threaten the security of the state. The "particularly awesome violation of human rights" perpetrated by the Chinese leadership on its citizens "triggered" a response by Canada, as well as other members of the international community.⁷⁹ In the period between the commencement of the 'crackdown' and the announcement of a detailed Canada response, various actors developed preferences as to how Canada should respond and, also, they mixed with one another in an effort to influence the final decision taken.

The second component of an 'exemplary' case study is that it must be "complete" and "display sufficient evidence".⁸⁰ That it is "demonstrate[d] convincingly" that an "exhaustive effort" was made to uncover "all relevant evidence" and that "the most compelling evidence" is presented "judiciously and effectively".⁸¹ In this study data is drawn from numerous sources, primary and secondary. As to the former, the relevant files at both the Department of External Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa and the Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs in Edmonton were examined. Also, interviews were conducted with the key players who participated in the crafting of

Canada's policy in the aftermath of Tiananmen at both the federal and provincial levels. With respect to secondary sources, pertinent information was obtained from both published and unpublished works.

The considerations of rival explanations furnished by alternative perspectives is a third characteristic of an exemplary case study.⁸² In this study, the dominant class, statist, middle power, and interactive analytical frameworks are applied to the data gathered to determine which provides the most complete explanation for the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre. In an effort to provide a set of criteria by which to determine the quality of explanation provided by the four approaches examined in this study, the concept of 'explanatory richness' is adopted as the "logic of appraisal".⁸³ Three criteria are used to determine 'richness' of explanation.⁸⁴ First, explanations need to include many relevant variables and not reduce foreign policy outcomes to a single variable. A variable is relevant to the degree that it has an influence on the outcome.

That foreign policy outcomes are the result of numerous factors is not a new, nor novel, insight. Over 30 years ago, James Eayrs cogently argued that foreign policy outcomes are explained by some combination of "the

ingredients of Fate and Will".⁸⁵ Substituting minds for "Will" and conditions for "Fate", Denis Stairs noted that "causation is the product of a murky combination of the two - not of minds alone, nor of conditions alone, but of the first applied to the second".⁸⁶ To explain a foreign policy outcome fully, both "Fate" and "Will", or conditions and minds, or, to use current discourse, structures and agents need to be combined in proper measure.⁸⁷ To overlook one 'ingredient' results in a loss in taste of the complex flavour of the mixture.

A second criteria of 'richness' concerns the determination of state preferences. Explanations are 'richer' to the extent that the preferences of state actors are determined, not assumed. That is, they need to be developed endogenously and not assumed to be given exogenously.

The final criteria of 'richness' pertains to the decision-making process. Explanations need to go beyond merely outlining the preferences of the relevant actors and then comparing the decision taken to those preferences to determine who had the greatest impact. This type of static analysis, while informative, does not provide a full and nuanced explanation. The ways in which state and societal actors mix with one another to determine a state's course

of action bear directly on the course of action followed. Explanations need to be able to capture this dynamic character of the decision-making process, as well as outlining the preferences of the various relevant actors. 'Rich' explanations are able to capture both the substance of policy and the process that produces it within its ambit.

Therefore, 'rich' explanations incorporate more relevant variables, derive the preferences of state actors, and account for the decision-making process, as well as the substance of those decisions. Analytical frameworks that furnish 'rich' explanations "plunge more deeply" into the relevant data than rival approaches.⁶⁸

The final component of an exemplary case study as outlined by Yin concerns composing the report in "an engaging manner". "A good manuscript is one that 'seduces' the eye".⁶⁹ This study follows a design similar to that of Denis Stairs' The Diplomacy of Constraint in which the author develops the case study in the first eight chapters of the work and then in the final chapter outlines alternative explanations for Canada behaviour in the Korean War period. The present study differs from this work in an important manner, however. Unlike Stairs' work, the present study undertakes a comparative examination of the

explanations obtained by the various analytical frameworks according to a common set of criteria. No such effort is made in The Diplomacy of Constraint.⁹⁰

This study is divided roughly into two sections. One section comprises Chapters One and Six. In this section the analytical frameworks are explicated and applied to the information presented in the other section. The development of the analytical frameworks is, in part, the subject matter of Chapter One while Chapter Six examines the alternative explanations of the Canadian response to Tiananmen obtained through an application of the dominant class, statist, middle power, and interactive approaches. Also included in Chapter Six is an evaluation of the quality of the explanations furnished by the various approaches according to the criteria of explanatory richness.

In the other section of the study, Chapters Two through Five, the data is presented in the form of an historical narrative. Little effort is extended to apply the analytical frameworks developed in Chapter One to the case study. Chapter Two outlines briefly China's history of human rights abuses, the factors which led up to the massacre, and the international reaction to the student movement by the United States and Japan. This sets the

international context within which the Canadian decision was formulated. Chapter Three traces the development of Canada-China relations, especially from 1970 to Tiananmen, discusses the evolution of the theme of human rights in Canadian foreign policy, and outlines the Canadian response to the student movement. By exploring the nature of the Canada-China relationship and the place of human rights in that relationship prior to Tiananmen, Chapter Three sets the domestic context of the decision. Chapters Four and Five examine the international and the Canadian domestic reactions to the Tiananmen Square massacre. It will be shown, in Chapter Four, that the international community pressed for a lenient response. Chapter Five details Canada's then evolving China policy in light of the various state and societal pressures, as well as examining the decision-making process.

At the outset, some clarification is needed regarding what is meant by the term "human rights". Encompassing a full range of civil, economic, political, and social rights, the International Bill of Human Rights is the basis for discussing human rights in the international realm.⁵² Although many states consider the International Bill to be the foundation for all human rights, some recognise different sets of rights as being pre-eminent. In Canada

and the west in general the focus has been primarily on furthering civil and political rights whereas in China and Asia in general the focus has been primarily on advancing economic and social rights.⁹²

While these differences were apparent at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, some movement towards agreement on a universal set of human rights was made.⁹³ Christina M. Cerna has noted that those states participating in the World Conference were "all willing to accept the universality of a certain core group of rights".⁹⁴ Even those critical of the universality of human rights such as Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore's Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accept that there are "minimal standards of civilized behaviour" that need to be maintained in order for persons to live a productive human existence including, among others, prohibitions against arbitrary killings, slavery and torture.⁹⁵ These 'minimal standards' are not culturally specific, they are the "lowest common denominator" of rights required for a productive human life.⁹⁶ For the purposes of this study, the focus is on these "standards of civilized behaviour".⁹⁷

CHAPTER ONE

1. Timothy Brook, Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement, (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), p.169. In the immediate aftermath, it was estimated the death toll, fell in the 700-7,000 range. See, Brook, pp. 151-69; and, Robert Delfs, "Tiananmen Massacre," Far Eastern Economic Review, 144, 24 (June 15, 1989), p.10.

2. The order to open fire on the demonstrators had to originate within the hierarchy of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Field officers and unit commanders do not possess the authority to issue that order. The directive had to come from the either the Vice-chairman of the CMC, Yang Shangkun, or the Chairman of the CMC, Deng Xiaoping. Both, however, would have been involved in the issuing of the order. See Brook, p.121.

3. There was some debate surrounding the use of the term 'sanctions' to describe the measures announced by the Canadian government in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. In the June 5 and 30 statements the term 'sanctions' does not appear, the term used is 'measures'. Those who argue that 'sanctions' was not the term used to describe the measures announced by Canada and, therefore, inappropriate includes former Canadian Ambassador to China, Earl Drake. Those who believe the term 'sanctions' appropriate include Paul M. Evans, Jean Prevost, Kim Richard Nossal, and Jeremy T. Paltiel. See, Earl Drake, "Human Rights and Trade Relations: A Personal Commentary," bout de papier, 11, 3 (Fall 1994), p.18; Paul M. Evans, "Canada's Relations With China Emergent," Canadian Foreign Policy, 1, 2 (Spring 1993), p.14; Jean Prevost, For Effective and Appropriate Sanctions, (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Policy Planning Staff Paper, no. 93/04, March 1993), pp.17-8; Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994), pp.155-87; and, Jeremy T. Paltiel, "Rude Awakening: Canada and China Following Tiananmen," in Maureen Appel Molot and F.O. Hampson, Eds., Canada Among Nations/1989: The Challenge of Change, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1990), pp.43-57.

4. The term Tiananmen Square massacre is a misnomer because the majority of those killed or injured were not killed or injured in the square, but rather in the surrounding roadways of Beijing. Also, the Tiananmen Square massacre

cannot be limited to June 4, 1989, since many of the participants were captured or punished after that date. It is also worth noting that the Chinese government claimed that the "turmoil" was a bloodless affair: "During the whole operation not a single person was killed." See China, The Truth About the Beijing Turmoil, (Beijing: Beijing Publishing House, 1989), p.5.

A similar claim was made by Yu Zhizong, Chinese Observer at the 41st session of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in August 1989. Yu claimed that "not a single person had been killed by the army or run over by military vehicles and to assert that there had been a bloodbath on the Square was a sheer fabrication". Quoted in Ann Kent, "China and the International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral Monitoring, 1989-94", Human Rights Quarterly, 17,1 (February 1995), p.12.

5. For an examination of the implementation of the Canadian sanctions announced after the massacre, see Paul Gecelovsky and T.A. Keenleyside, "Canada's International Human Rights Policy in Practice: Tiananmen Square," International Journal, 50, 3 (Summer 1995), pp.564-93.

6. For a general treatment of Canada's relationship with China since recognition, see B. Michael Frolic, "Canada and the People's Republic of China: Twenty Years of a Bilateral Relationship 1970-1990," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Series 1, vol. 1, 1990, pp.189-208. Also, see Charles Burton, "Development and Change in Canadian Perceptions of China," A paper presented to the Canadian Asian Studies Association, St. Catharines Ontario, May 30, 1996; and, Paul M. Evans and Daphne G. Taras, Canadian Public Opinion on Relations with China: An Analysis of the Existing Survey Research, Working Paper No. 33 (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1985).

7. On Canadian recognition of the PRC, see, *inter alia*, Robert Edmonds, "Canada's Recognition of the People's Republic of China: The Stockholm Negotiations 1968-1970," Canadian Foreign Policy, 5, 2 (Winter 1998), pp.201-17; Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic, Eds., Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1970, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1991); John D. Harbron, "Canada Recognizes China: The Trudeau Round 1968-1973," Behind the Headlines, 33, 1 (October 1974); John Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy, (Toronto: McClelland And Stewart, 1970), pp.201-

18; Maureen Appel Molot, "Canada's Relations with China Since 1968," in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, Eds., A Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), pp.230-67; and F.Q. Quo and Akira Ichikawa, "Sino-Canadian Relations: A New Chapter," Asian Survey, 12, 5 (May 1972), pp.386-98.

8. On the bilateral economic relationship, see Ralph W. Huenemann, "Chinese-Canadian Trade Relations," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Series 1, vol. 1, 1990, pp.227-40. Also, see Paul M. Evans and David Zweig, "China at Thirty-five: Reform, Readjustment, and Reorientation," Behind the Headlines, 42, 4 (April 1985); Gerard Hervouet, About Canada: Canada and the Pacific Basin, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1988); Jean McCloskey, "New Realities in the Pacific: The Political Perspective," Behind the Headlines, 46, 2 (Winter 1988-89); and Bruce Muirhead, "The Wave of the Future? Canada in the Pacific Basin," Behind the Headlines, 43, 4 (June 1986).

9. See, Paul M. Evans and Daphne G. Taras, Eyeing the Dragon: Extracts From Parliamentary Commentary on China and Sino-Canadian Relations, 1949-1982, (Toronto: Department of Political Science, York University, 1990); and ---, "Looking (Far) East: Parliament and Canada-China Relations, 1949-1982," in David Taras, Ed., Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: CIIA, 1985), pp.66-100.

10. On sanctions and the PRC, see Nossal, Rain Dancing; Paul M. Evans, Sanctions Against the People's Republic of China, (Toronto: Department of Political Science, York University, 1983); and, Peter Van Ness, Analysing the Impact of International Sanctions on China, Working Paper 1989/4 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University, December 1989). On sanctions in general, see Prevost; David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985); Margaret Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 2nd ed., (London: Macmillan, 1980); James M. Lindsay, "Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination," International Studies Quarterly, 30, 2 (June 1986), pp.153-73; and, Kim Richard Nossal, "International Sanctions as International Punishment," International Organization, 43, 2 (Spring 1989), pp.301-22.

11. For an interesting and informative discussion of the issue, see Brook. Also, see Marta Dassu and Tony Saich, Eds., The Reform Decade in China: From Hope to Dismay,

(London: Kegan Paul, 1992); Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy, (New York: Columbia UP, 1990); Suzanne Ogden, Kathleen Hartford, Lawrence R. Sullivan and David Zweig, Eds., China's Search for Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement of 1989, (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan and Marc Lambert, Eds., Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); Ranbir Vohra, China: The Search for Social Justice and Democracy, (Markham: Penguin, 1990); and Human Rights in China, Children of the Dragon: The Story of Tiananmen Square, (New York: Macmillan, 1990). For the official Chinese view, see China, The Truth About the Beijing Turmoil; and, ---, China After the Turmoil, (Beijing: New Star Publishers, n.d.).

12. Regarding human rights in China, see the many documents published by Amnesty International and the annual State Department reports, as well as Charles Burton, "Changes in China's Official Policy on Human Rights and Development," A paper presented to the Canadian Asian Studies Association, St. Catharines Ontario, May 30, 1996; Roberta Cohen, "People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception," Human Rights Quarterly, 9, 4 (November 1987), pp.447-549; John F. Copper, Franz Michael and Yuan-li Wu, Human Rights in Post-Mao China, (Boulder: Westview, 1985); Merle Goldman, "Human Rights in the People's Republic of China," Daedalus, 112, 4 (Fall 1983), pp.111-38; Ann Kent, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, Discussion paper no.3 1989-90, (Department of the Parliamentary Library, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, August 1989); and, Yuan-li Wu et al., Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, (Boulder: Westview P, 1988). For an informative examination of labour reform as an administrative method to silence dissent, see Hongda Harry Wu, Laogai-The Chinese Gulag, trans. Ted Slingerland, (Boulder: Westview P., 1992).

13. See Irving Brecher, Ed., Human Rights, Development and Foreign Policy: Canadian Perspectives, (Halifax: IRPP, 1989); Irwin Cotler and F. Pearl Eliadis, Eds., International Human Rights Law: Theory and Practice, (Montreal: Canadian Human Rights Foundation, 1992); Margaret Doxey, "Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy," Behind the Headlines, 37, 4 (June 1979); David Gillies, Between Principle and Practice: Human Rights in North-South Relations, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1996); Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, Eds., Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-

Queen's UP, 1989); T.A. Keenleyside and Patricia Taylor, "The Impact of Human Rights Violations on the Conduct of Canada's Bilateral Relations: A Contemporary Dilemma," Behind the Headlines, 42, 4 (November 1984); Maire O'Brien, "Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy: The Trade-Off Between Economics and Ethics," A paper presented to the Graduate Students' Conference on Federal Government Policy During the Mulroney Years: 1984-1991, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, May 10-12, 1991; Cranford Pratt, Ed., Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1994); and Gerald Schmitz and Victoria Berry, Human Rights: Canadian Policy Toward Developing Countries, Briefing 21, (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1988).

14. See, Gecelovsky and Keenleyside; Fred Bild, "Canada's Response to China in the 1990s: A View From the Field," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. Catharines, Ontario, June 4, 1996; Charles Burton, "Canadian Perspectives on Political Reform and Human Rights in China," A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. Catharines, Ontario, June 4, 1996; B. Michael Frolic, "Re-engaging China: Striking a Balance Between Trade and Human Rights," in Fen Osler Hampson, Maureen Appel Molot, and Martin Rudner, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1997: Asia Pacific Face-Off, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1997), pp.323-48; Errol P. Mendes, "Canada, Asian Values and Human Rights: Helping the Tigers to Set Themselves Free," in Fen Osler Hampson, Maureen Appel Molot, and Martin Rudner, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1997: Asia Pacific Face-Off, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1997), pp.167-86; Jeremy Paltiel, "Negotiating Human Rights with China," in Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1995), pp.165-86; and, Sarah Taylor, "Trade and Human Rights: The China Conundrum," A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. Catharines, Ontario, June 4, 1996.

15. B. Michael Frolic, "Canada and China After Twenty-five Years," Fairbank Centre, Harvard University, May 1994; Gillies; Nossal, Rain Dancing, pp.155-87 and 219-42; Maire O'Brien, "Canada China Policy in the Aftermath of Tiananmen: A Bureaucratic Politics Perspective," A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, May 31-June 2, 1992; and, Paltiel, "Rude Awakening," pp.43-57.

16. On the bureaucratic politics approach, see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971); --- and Morton T. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in G. John Ikenberry, Ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, (Harper Collins, 1989), pp.378-457. For a critique of this approach, see Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," in Ikenberry, pp.433-57; Lawrence Freedman, "Logic, Politics, and Foreign Policy Processes," International Affairs, 52, 3 (July 1976), pp.434-49; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," in Ikenberry, pp.419-32. For its application to the Canadian context, see Kim Richard Nossal, "Allison Through the (Ottawa) Looking Glass: Bureaucratic Politics in a Parliamentary System," Canadian Public Administration, 22, 4 (Winter 1979), pp.610-26.

17. Frolic, "Canada and China After Twenty-Five Years," p.31.

18. Gillies is aware that his work does not cover the policy-making process. See, Gillies, Chapter Six, Note 118, pp.315-16.

19. Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.6.

20. See, Heribert Adiam and Kogila Moodley, "The Background to Canada's Activist Policy Against Apartheid: Theoretical and Political Implications," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 30, 3 (November 1992), pp.293-315; and Charlotte Gray, "New Faces in Old Places: The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy," in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1992-93: A New World Order?, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1992), pp.17-18.

21. Linda Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1997), p.193.

22. Winnipeg Free Press, June 23, 1989. Also, see Drake, p.18; and Winnipeg Free Press, June 18, 1989.

23. Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.170.

24. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), p.64.

25. Black and Smith, p.746.

26. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada and the International Seabed: Domestic Determinants and External Constraints, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1989); ---, "Winners and Losers: Formulating Canada's Policies on International Technology Transfers," International Journal, 47, 1 (Winter 1991-92), pp.159-83; and Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, (Toronto: U. of Toronto P, 1974). Black and Smith also make this point, see Black and Smith, p.756.

27. For a review of the domestic-level literature, see David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 26, 4 (December 1993), pp.745-74; Michael W. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? (North York: York Research Programme in Strategic Studies, 1984); Tom Keating, "The State, the Public, and the Making of Canadian Foreign Policy," in Robert J. Jackson, Doreen Jackson, and Nicolas Baxter-Moore, Eds., Contemporary Canadian Politics: Readings and Notes, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1987), pp.356-73; Kim Richard Nossal, "Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal, 39, 1 (Winter 1983-84), pp.1-23; and David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, "Establishing the Limits of State Autonomy," in David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, Eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp.1-22.

For a review of the international-level literature, see Hawes, Principal Power; Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, or Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," International Journal of Canadian Studies, 1, 2 (Spring-Fall 1990), pp.77-96; David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada As a Principal Power, (Toronto: John Wiley, 1983).

28. Nossal has developed this perspective most fully in his The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1997), especially pp.95-137. Also, see Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing; ---, "Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy,"; ---, "Allison,"; and, ---, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Westminster Model," and "Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada's Interest in Development Assistance," in Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, Eds., International Conflict and Conflict Management, 2nd. ed., (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1989), pp.230-37 and 247-61;

For Pratt's work on the "dominant class" approach, see Cranford Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: the Case of the Counter-Consensus," International Journal, 39, 1 (Winter 1983-84), pp.99-135; ---, "Canada: An Eroding and Limited Internationalism," in Cranford Pratt, Ed., Internationalism Under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1989), pp.24-69; ---, "Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: Basis for an Explanation," in Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, Eds., International Conflict and Conflict Management, 2nd ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1989), pp.262-81; and, ---, "Competing Perspectives on Canadian Development Assistance Policies," International Journal, 51, 2 (Spring 1996), pp.235-58.

29. Nossal, Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, p.129.

30. Nossal, "Allison," p.615.

31. Nossal, Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, p.13.

32. Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory," p.116.

33. Pratt, "Competing Perspectives on Canadian Development Assistance Policies," p.244.

34. Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory," p.107.

35. Pratt, "Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: Basis for an Explanation," p.271.

36. Michael K. Hawes, "Structural Change and Hegemonic Decline: Implications for National Governments," in David G. Haglund and Michael K. Hawes, Eds., World Politics: Power, Interdependence, and Dependence, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) p.198.

37. For a discussion of Canada's "place" in the international system, see Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit?". For an insightful critique of this approach, see Denis Stairs, "Will and Circumstance and the Postwar Study of Canada's Foreign Policy," International Journal, 50, 1 (Winter 1994-95), pp.9-39.

38. In response to the "middle power" perspective some have argued that Canada has more freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy. That Canada is a "principal" or "foremost" power. Conversely, others have argued that

Canada has less room to manoeuvre and is better regarded as a "satellite," "peripheral", or, "dependent" state.

For more on Canada as a "principal" or foremost power, see Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit?" pp.81-2; Black and Smith, pp.756-60; Dewitt and Kirton, Hawes, Principal Power, pp.36-9; Nossal, Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, pp.62-4; Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon, 1997), pp.9-13; John Kirton, "The Diplomacy of Concert: Canada, the G7 and the Halifax Summit," Canadian Foreign Policy, 3,1 (Spring 1995), pp.63-80; and ---, "Contemporary Concert Diplomacy: The Seven -Power Summit and the Management of International Order," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, London, England, March 29-April 1,1989 found at <http://library.utoronto.ca/www/g7>.

For a review of the literature on Canada as a "satellite", "peripheral", or "dependent" state, see Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit?" pp.82-4; Cooper, Old Habits and New Directions, pp.13-19; Dewitt and Kirton, Hawes, Principal Power, pp.20-6; Nossal, Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, pp.60-2; Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler, "The World Economy and the Nation-State: The New International Order," in Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler, Eds., The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1991), pp.3-25; and, Philip Resnick, "From Semi-Periphery to Perimeter of the Core: Canada in the Capitalist World Economy," in The Masks of Proteus: Canadian Reflections on the State, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1990), pp.179-206.

39. There is wide disagreement regarding what criteria should be assessed to determine a state's position. For one example that adopts gross national product as the prime indicator of position, see Bernard Wood, Middle Powers in the International System, No. 1 in the series Middle Powers in the International System, (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1988).

40. Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert O. Keohane, Ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: Columbia UP, 1986), p.167.

41. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, (Vancouver: UBC P, 1993), p.19.

42. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, p.21.

43. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, p.173.

44. John Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p.37.

45. On the functional principle, see "Mackenzie King on the Functional Principle, 1943," in J.L. Granatstein, Ed., Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings, revised edition, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), pp.23-7; and A.J. Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," International Journal, 34, 2 (Spring, 1980), pp.309-28. The "functional principle" is also the idea behind the recent writings on "niche diplomacy". See, Andrew Fenton Cooper, "In Search of Niches: Saying 'Yes' and Saying 'No' in Canada's International Relations," Canadian Foreign Policy, 3, 3, (Winter 1996), pp.1-13; Evan H. Potter, "Niche Diplomacy and Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal, 52, 1 (Winter 1996-97), pp.25-38; --, "Redesigning Canadian Diplomacy in the Age of Fiscal Austerity", in Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1996; Big Enough to be Heard, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1996), pp.23-56.

46. See, Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal; and Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," International Organization, 45, 3 (Summer 1991), pp.281-308.

47. "Milieu goals" are defined as attempts to shape "the environment" in which a state operates, whereas "possession goals" are defined as "the enhancement or preservation of one or more things to which [a state] attaches value". See, Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1962), pp.67-80.

48. The classic statement on postwar internationalism was delivered in 1947, by the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, in the inaugural Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto. In his talk, St.Laurent outlined five principles of Canadian foreign policy: (1) national unity; (2) political liberty; (3) the values of a Christian civilisation; (4) the rule of law in national and international affairs; and (5) the acceptance of international responsibility. See, "St.Laurent on the Principles of Canadian Policy, 1947," in Granatstein, pp.28-37. For a discussion of internationalism, see Nossal

Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, pp.154-59.

49. Robert W. Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order," International Journal, 44, 4 (Autumn 1989), p.827.

50. Black and Smith, p.746.

51. G. Bruce Doern, Leslie A. Pal, and Brian W. Tomlin, "The Internationalization of Canadian Public Policy," in G. Bruce Doern, Leslie A. Pal, and Brian W. Tomlin, Eds., Border Crossings: The Internationalization of Canadian Public Policy, (Toronto: Oxford UP, 1996), p.5.

Foreign policy analysts have tended to oversimplify or underestimate the role of domestic politics and institutions, while domestic policy analysts tended to oversimplify or underestimate the impact of international fora, institutions, and regimes. See, Helen Milner, "International Theories of Co-operation Among Nations," World Politics, 44, 3 (April 1992), pp.466-96; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U. Of California P., 1993), pp.3-42.

52. Michael Howlett, rev. of G. Bruce Doern, Leslie A. Pal, and Brian W. Tomlin, Eds., Border Crossings: The Internationalization of Canadian Public Policy, and Keith Banting, George Hoberg, and Richard Simeon, Eds., Degrees of Freedom: Canada and the United States in a Changing World, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 30, 3 (September 1997), p.576.

53. George A. MacLean, "The Twain Shall Meet: Bringing Together Putnam and Krasner in Foreign Policy Analysis," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St John's, Newfoundland, June 8-10, 1997, p.15.

54. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Brining Transnational Relations Back In," in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), p.16.

55. For more on the interactive approach, see Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy, especially

the chapters by Evans, Moravcsik, and Putnam. For an application, see H. Richard Friman, "Side-Payments Versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations," International Organization, 47, 3 (Summer 1993), pp.387-410; Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two Level Games: Domestic -International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations," International Organization, 47, 4 (Autumn 1993), pp.599-628; and Leonard J. Schoppa, "Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why *Gaiatsu* Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but not Others," International Organization, 47, 3 (Summer 1993), pp.353-86.

56. Moravcsik, p.15.

57. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy, p.435.

58. Putnam, pp.438-9.

59. Moravcsik, p.30-1. It is interesting to note that Moravcsik alters Putnam's framework in an important way. The third determinant of the domestic win-set in Putnam's framework is "negotiators' strategies" whereas in Moravcsik's framework it is "statesmen's preferences". Herein Moravcsik's framework will be followed. See, Putnam p.443 and pp.450-4; and Moravcsik, p.23 and pp.30-1.

60. George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal Of Political Science, 25, 3 (July 1995), pp. 293 and 302, respectively.

61. G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy," International Organization, 42, 1 (Winter 1988), p.221.

62. See, Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly, 33, 4 (December 1989), pp.457-74. The literature concerning state structure and policy-making is voluminous. For a sampling of the diversity of this literature, see Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, Eds., Bringing the State Back In, (New York: Cambridge UP, 1985); Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced

Industrial States," International Organization, 30, 1 (Winter 1976), pp.1-47; Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978); and, Fritz Scharpf, "Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 2 (1989), pp.149-76.

For a Canadian examination of the subject, see Michael M. Atkinson, Ed., Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1993); William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, Eds., Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach, (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990); Grace Skogstad, "The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy: The Impact of Institutions," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25, 2 (June 1992), pp.319-47.

63. James A. Caporaso, "Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics," International Studies Quarterly, 41, 4 (December 1997), p.570. Also, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Structures of Governance and Transnational Relations: What Have We Learned?" in Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, pp.280-313.

64. Putnam, p.443.

65. Knopf, pp.627-8.

66. For an interesting discussion on this, see James K. Sebenius, "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties," International Organization, 37, 2 (Spring 1983), pp.281-316.

67. It should be noted that this study does not attempt to investigate the psychological dimension of how preferences are formed and other psychological influences on foreign policy. Analyses of this type are beyond the scope of this study. For an overview of this literature, see Jerel A. Rosati, "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy," in Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney, Eds. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp.49-70; James F. Voss and Ellen Dorsey, "Perception and International Relations: An Overview," in Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson, Eds., Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, (Boulder: Westview P, 1992), pp.3-30; and, Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, "Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations," Merston International Review, 42, Supplement 1

(May 1998), pp.63-96.

68. Moravcsik, p.30.

69. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R.B. Farrell, Ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1966), p.43. For an interesting discussion on this topic, see Hollis and Smith, pp.143-70.

70. Putnam, p.454.

71. Moravcsik, p.29; and, Putnam, p.455.

72. Putnam, p.436.

73. Brooks' comment pertains to the importance accorded state and societal factors in the policy community literature. However, it is just as relevant for the discussion herein. See, Stephen Brooks, "Introduction: Policy Communities and the Social Sciences," in Stephen Brooks and Alain-G. Gagnon, Eds., The Political Influence of Ideas: Policy Communities and the Social Sciences, (Westport: Praeger, 1994), p.2.

74. Robert K. Yin defines the case study research strategy as "an all encompassing method - with the logic of design incorporating specific approaches to data collection and analysis". See, Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), p.13.

For a sampling of the voluminous literature on case study research, see Yin; Ronald Mitchell and Thomas Bernauer, "Empirical Research on International Environmental Policy: Designing Qualitative Case Studies," Journal of Environment and Development, 7, 1 (March 1998), pp.4-31; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Posby, Eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol.7, (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp.79-137; Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, Ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, (London: Collier Macmillan, 1979), pp.43-68; Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane, and Verba's *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*," International Organization, 53, 1 (Winter 1999), pp.161-90; and, American Political Science Review, 89, 2 (June 1995), pp.454-81..

75. Mitchell and Bernauer, p.7.

76. Yin, pp.103 and 147, respectively.

77. Yin, p.147.

78. B. Michael Frolic, "Six Observations About Canada-PRC Relations Since Tiananmen," A paper presented to the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies' Conference on China Ten Years After Tiananmen, Toronto, Ontario, June 4-6, 1999, p.2. Also see Peter Mitchell, "China Faces the 1990s", Behind the Headlines, 49, 3(Spring 1992).

79. Thomas Risse-Kappen and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Impact of Human Rights Norms on Domestic Political Change: Introduction," A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Ontario, March 18-22, 1997.

80. Yin, pp. 148 and 150, respectively. It should be noted that Yin separates these into two different characteristics.

81. Yin, pp.148 and 150.

82. Yin, p.149.

83. See, Mark Blaug, "Kuhn Versus Lakatos, or Paradigms Versus Research Programmes in the History of Economics," History of Political Economy, 7, 4 (Winter 1975), pp.399-433.

84. Alexander L. George has defined a "rich theory" as "one that encompasses a relatively large number of variables that can influence the outcome of a policy". While I have adopted the term "rich", I use it in a manner different from that of George. I have used it as an adjective to describe the quality of an explanation rendered by an analytical approach. Furthermore, the criteria by which an explanation is determined to be "rich" has been expanded from just the number of relevant variables. See, Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace P, 1993); and ---, "Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History," International Security, 22, 1 (Summer 1997), pp.44-52.

85. James Eayrs, Diplomacy and Its Discontent, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1971), p.82.

86. Stairs, "Will and Circumstance," p.9.

87. For more on the agent-structure debate, see, *inter alia*, Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis," International Studies Quarterly, 36, 3 (September 1992), pp.245-70.

88. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p.25.

89. Yin, p.151.

90. See Chapter One, Note 24.

91. The International Bill of Human Rights comprises the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See, A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merrills, Human Rights in the World, 4th ed., (Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 1996).

92. For an interesting discussion of the contrasting approaches to human rights in Canada and China, see E.P. Mendes and Anne-Marie Treholt, Eds., Human Rights: Canadian and Chinese Perspectives, (Ottawa: The Human Rights Research and Education Centre, University of Ottawa, 1997).

For a flavour of the larger debate of an Asian versus a Western conception of human rights, see Kenneth Christie, "Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia," Political Studies, 43 (special issue 1995), pp.204-18; Bilahari Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard," Foreign Policy, 92 (Fall 1993), pp.24-41; and, Aryeh Neier, "Asia's Unacceptable Standard," Foreign Policy, 92 (Fall 1993), pp.42-51.

93. See, *inter alia*, Kevin Boyle, "Stock-Taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993," Political Studies, 43 (special issue 1995), pp.79-95.

94. Christina M. Cerna, "Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts," Human Rights Quarterly, 16, 4 (November 1994), p.744.

95. As cited in Cerna, p.745. Also, see Kausikan.

96. Kent, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, p.5. For a sense of the cultural relativist position, see Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim, Ed., Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1992); Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1989); and, Allison Dundes Renteln, "The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly, 7,4 (November 1985), pp.514-40.

97. Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?" International Affairs, 74,1 (January 1998), pp.1-24. This focus on a set of rights that are "basic", "core", or "first priority" rights has garnered widespread support. See, Gillies, Between Principle and Practice; Matthews and Pratt, Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy; T.A. Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Human Dignity," in Cranford Pratt, Ed., Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1994), pp.240-67; and, Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Substance, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980).

CHAPTER TWO

INTERNATIONAL-LEVEL BEFORE TIANANMEN

The international environment in early 1989 was characterised by an underlying sense of change. Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's twin policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* had begun to ease the tensions in the Soviet-American relationship. Relations between the two superpowers were being conducted in a "businesslike and constructive atmosphere of trust, if not actual friendship".¹ The 'iron curtain' was beginning to rend. Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan by the middle of February. The March 26 elections demonstrated Gorbachev's commitment to *glasnost* by introducing open and free elections to the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's 'new thinking' had also begun to affect the countries of Eastern Europe to the extent that some were beginning to plan for their future free from Soviet tutelage. By March 1989, Hungarian leaders were working on plans to open up the border between Hungary and Austria, and Polish leaders were working on plans to democratise the Polish political system. The extent of the impact of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' was evidenced by an editorial in the April 2 issue of the New York Times which declared the Cold War to be over.²

When the Chinese students began to demonstrate after the death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989 and, more importantly, when the workers and the general populace began to participate in the demonstrations, the feeling was that the People's Republic was entering a new era of state-societal relations, a Chinese version of *glasnost*. Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms had introduced *perestroika* to China, so some China-watchers believed that *glasnost* was the next step in the progression.³ The events of June 4, however, proved that the Chinese leadership was going to forge its own path and not follow the one laid out by Gorbachev.

The remainder of this chapter will examine briefly China's history of human rights abuses and the main developments of the Beijing Spring movement, as well as the reactions to the student demonstrations by the leaders in the United States and Japan. The analysis focuses on these two states because they were China's two most important partners in terms of commercial (aid and trade) and political/security relations and they were representative of a general reluctance on the part of the international community to reproach China for its human rights abuses. China, as Roberta Cohen noted, was "largely exempt from the concerns of the international human rights

community", it was the human rights "exception".⁴

International-Level

China

Historically, human rights violations in the Chinese People's Republic were flagrant and widespread. By whatever standards one employs, the "abominable record" in human rights of the Chinese leadership under Party Chairman Mao Zedong was indisputable.⁵ Even prior to the declaration of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mao's use of murder as a political tool was well known.⁶ Following the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1956 in which Mao proclaimed freedom of speech for all, "two to three million counter-revolutionaries [were] executed, imprisoned or placed under control," and, later, in 1958, during the "anti-rightist" campaign, "700,000 were arrested, imprisoned or sentenced to do hard labour".⁷ As General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Deng Xiaoping played a role in the 1958 campaign. It was also during this period that Mao decreed that five per cent of the people were 'class enemies' and 'reactionaries' and that they, therefore, had to be deprived of their rights.⁸ Notwithstanding the extent of the atrocities mentioned above, the worst of the Chinese leaders' excesses came in

the period of the Cultural Revolution from 1966-76. Mao had envisioned this as the time in which the "spiritual transformation of the nation" would occur.⁹ However, in reality, the Cultural Revolution was "a disaster without precedent in five thousand years of Chinese culture" and a period in which an estimated 100 million lives were affected, with close to one million being lost.¹⁰

Knowing that protestors in the past had been subjected to heinous abuses, some Chinese citizens still participated in demonstrations opposing the policies of the Chinese leadership. For example, in 1974, in Guangzhou, a trio of protestors, under the pseudonym Yi Li Zhe, in a 'dazibao' (wall poster) charged that China had been transformed into "a lawless society not only because of the Cultural Revolution, but because of the political system itself".¹¹ The protestors called on the government to legally guarantee democratic and individual rights. For their efforts, the members of the trio were arrested, subjected to an "education through labour" program and not fully "rehabilitated" (ie. released from prison) until February 1979. The anti-government demonstrations of the Mao era climaxed on April 5, 1976 at Tiananmen Square when several hundred thousand people gathered to commemorate the death of China's Premier, Zhou Enlai.¹² By honouring Zhou, the

mourners were implicitly supporting his and Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping's reform policies and, concurrently, attacking the policies of the Gang of Four and Mao. The police and public security forces were sent into the square where they "brutally suppressed" the demonstration.¹³

In March 1978, the first of the post-Mao anti-government campaigns was launched when a few people began pasting wall posters up at the Xidan crossing.¹⁴ The content of the messages relayed by the 'dazibao' generally fell within three categories: a reappraisal of the role of Mao and the other leaders during the Cultural Revolution and the 1976 Tiananmen Square incident; personal complaints regarding the arbitrary use of political persecution and miscarriages of justice; and calls for democracy, justice and human rights. As the year wore on, the number of posters increased to a point where Xidan was no longer large enough and so some began to affix their posters in Tiananmen Square and along Wang Fujian Street as well. This outpouring of commentary from the masses was not lost on Vice Premier Deng, who proclaimed on November 29, 1978 that the Xidan wall poster campaign was "a good thing and could go on forever".¹⁵

Deng gave impetus to the wall poster campaign because its presence aided him in his battle for control over the

Chinese leadership. The wall posters that criticized Mao and the other leaders attacked the same contingent which had twice 'purged' Deng from their ranks. In other words, these were his rivals. Therefore, by opposing Deng's rivals, the wall posters were, in effect, giving Deng the apparent support of the Chinese people and he utilized this support to gain the upperhand in the Chinese leadership during the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee which was convened from December 18-22, 1978. Interestingly, the decisions arrived at by the party were "identical" to the concerns put forward in the wall posters.¹⁶

With control of the party leadership, Deng no longer needed the support of the Xidan Democracy Wall activists. As well, the wall poster writers began to get critical of Deng and his policies, advocating reforms beyond those Deng was willing to make. On March 16, 1979, Deng met with a group of high-ranking officials and told them that the Xidan Democracy Wall movement had "gone too far".¹⁷ Henceforth, all political debate was to uphold the 'Four Cardinal Principles' upon which Chinese Communist society was based including supporting the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.¹⁸ Following Deng's announcement, the prominent members of the

democratic movement were arrested. One such individual was Wei Jingsheng, who had written an article entitled "The Fifth Modernization", charging that "without democracy, the Four Modernizations cannot be achieved".¹⁹ Another of his articles claimed that Deng had undergone a "metamorphosis" and was "no longer worthy of the people's trust and support".²⁰ For his writings, Wei was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment and an additional three years of deprivation of civil rights. The arrest of Wei for all intents and purposes ended the Xidan Democracy Wall movement.

In February 1980, the clampdown begun a year earlier was heightened when Deng proposed the abolition of the 'Four Big Freedoms' that had been guaranteed in the 1975 and 1978 constitutions. The 'Four Big Freedoms' included "speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing dazibao".²¹ A meeting in April 1980 of the Party Standing Committee upheld Deng's proposal and deleted the 'Four Big Freedoms' from the constitution.²²

When Deng 'opened' China to the West by way of his 'Four Modernizations Plan' which entailed re-equipping China's agricultural, defence, industrial and science and technology infrastructure with state-of the-art techniques and manufactures, he did not foresee all the social

implications of his actions. Deng's economic reforms resulted, by 1983, in a wealthier and more consumer-conscious Chinese society. Awash in Western influences, the populace of China was regarded by the Chinese leadership to be "spiritually polluted", so that in the fall 1983, the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign was begun. In order to "eradicate [the] immoral influences caused by contacts with foreigners, especially Westerners", the movement "assailed bright clothing, foreign music and art, dancing, pornography, women curling their hair and, among other things, persons raising goldfish"!²³

Also, during this period, the government instituted an "anti-crime drive" calling for sterner penalties for offenders to reduce crime and corruption. The situation in China quickly degenerated. Provincial officials were instructed to publicly execute a specific number of criminals as a deterrent for others. In total, 10,000 public executions were carried out throughout China in the fall of 1983.²⁴ The "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign and the "anti-crime drive" began having an impact on foreign investors, who regarded the measures as detrimental to their investments because these actions attempted to "isolate China from the world".²⁵ Due to the adverse investment climate caused by the introduction of the two

programs, they were suddenly halted in early 1984.

Another campaign was commenced in January 1987²⁶ in an effort to root out students and intellectuals believed to support "bourgeois liberalization".²⁷ In December 1986, students at various universities began to protest for electoral reforms, better living conditions, and higher pay for college graduates.²⁸ With respect to electoral reform, the students were dissatisfied by a lack of freedom to nominate candidates for the then upcoming elections for the National People's Congress. In total, 17 cities and about 150 campuses were affected by the demonstrations which ranged in size from a few hundred in Guangzhou to 30,000 in Shanghai.²⁹ On December 23, the Shanghai police banned further protests without a permit. Beijing followed Shanghai's lead seven days later. Defying local restrictions, about 2,000 students in Beijing took to the streets on January 1, 1987 when they marched from Beijing University to Tiananmen Square, a distance of 15 kilometres.³⁰ After the January 1 demonstrations, Deng's patience with the demonstrators quickly ran out. Deng has been reported to have remarked that the Chinese leadership needed to "deal severely with those who defy orders". "We can afford to shed some blood," he continued, "Just try as much as possible not to kill anyone."³¹

Deng's patience had run out not just with the students but also with Hu Yaobang, CCP General Secretary. Hu's unwillingness to deal with the student protestors drew the wrath of Deng and conservatives within the CCP like Peng Zhen.³² Later in January 1987, Hu was purged from the leadership of the PRC when he was forced to resign his position as General Secretary of the CCP. Along with Hu, Fang Lizhi, then Vice-President at the University of Science and Technology in Hefei (i.e., the university where the demonstrations began on December 5, 1986), Liu Binyan, a noted investigative journalist who had exposed corruption in the Chinese bureaucracy, and Wang Ruowang, President of the Writers' Association, were all expelled from the CCP.³³ As with the arrest of Wei Jingsheng in March 1979 that ended the Xidan Democracy Wall movement, the purge of Hu from the CCP leadership and the expulsion of Fang, Liu, and Wang from the party for all intents and purposes marked the end of the student demonstrations.

Although the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign, the "anti-crime drive", and the "bourgeois liberalization" campaign were all short-lived, they exposed the Chinese regime's "ruthlessness" and its "little regard for human rights".³⁴ In general, Deng attempted to silence dissent in China in ways similar to those used by Mao Zedong. In

fact, there were "the same mass meetings to participate in, more public executions, the same intimidation,...and the same mass fear, arrests and alienation".³⁵ Deng did, however, differentiate himself from Mao in some of the methods he used to control the Chinese masses in that he greatly expanded the practice of "education through labour". This is an administrative system whereby dissidents, political and social undesirables and the unemployed are assigned to labour camps for a period of up to four years. Anybody can be assigned to labour camps against their will by someone of a higher authority. The length of sentences also varies because persons are regularly rearrested or reassigned.³⁶

For China, the year 1989 was to be one of celebration.³⁷ The year marked the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic, and the seventieth anniversary of the 'May Fourth Movement'. There were, however, forces active in China attempting to initiate change which would stain the celebrations planned by the Chinese leadership.³⁸ There were intellectuals and students who pressed the leadership to open up China further to the West in terms of political freedoms.³⁹ The call for a general amnesty for all prisoners voiced by Fang Lizhi in letters to Deng Xiaoping was amplified in terms of

size and content.⁴⁰ In terms of size, it increased from a small group of intellectuals to include students from various universities throughout Beijing.⁴¹ In terms of content, the call for amnesty widened to a movement critical of the Chinese leadership and the socialist system. Official corruption and the growing disparity of income levels between regions and occupations were issues of concern to most Chinese⁴², but especially to those who had not benefited from Deng's reform policies, i.e. students, intellectuals and low-ranking civil servants.⁴³ By late 1988 and early 1989, there was an ever-increasing number of people in China who were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Deng regime. They believed that "something bad was going on, and worse was to come".⁴⁴

Concurrent to the increasing despair of the Chinese people and the increasing criticism of the Chinese leadership and socialist system by an ever-widening group within China, a split in the leadership of the Party was becoming more pronounced.⁴⁵ The economic reforms begun in December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee had seemed to come to an abrupt halt in September 1988 at the Third Plenum of the 13th Central Committee when the price reform programme initiated by Deng⁴⁶ in the summer of 1988 was quickly halted in the face of rising

inflation.⁴⁷ Zhao Ziyang, however, had seized upon the opportunity created by Deng to further the economic reform process then underway in the PRC.⁴⁸ When the inflation rate began to skyrocket in the summer of 1988 after the announcement of the price reform program, Deng distanced himself from the initiative leaving Zhao alone to defend his economic programme at the Third Plenum. As a result of the Third Plenum, price reform was "indefinitely suspended", capital construction was heavily curtailed, and ideological rectification and administrative recentralisation was begun. As well, Zhao was removed from his responsibility for economic policy-making and he was obliged to make a self-criticism. Assuming the responsibility for economic decision-making from Zhao was Li Peng and Yao Yilin.⁴⁹ Zhao's economic programme had failed: inflation was running at an all time high level (18.5 per cent)⁵⁰ and unrest was spreading throughout Beijing and possibly the country. It was rumoured that Zhao retained his position as General Secretary only because Deng wanted him to continue.

As a result of the failure of the economic reform programme, a "spring attack"⁵¹ was launched on Zhao by a group of 'hardliners' within the Party.⁵² By April 1989, opposition to Zhao within the leadership had grown strong

enough to cause the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee to be postponed.⁵³ This group of 'hardliners' wanted to stabilise China through a reassertion of party control over the Chinese population. The 'Four Cardinal Principles' needed to be upheld for China not to be thrown into chaos.

Chaos came, however, in the wake of the announcement of Hu Yaobang's death on April 15, 1989. Hu's death did not mark the beginning of the movement, it was a "catalyst"⁵⁴ for the "ongoing process of political ferment".⁵⁵ By mourning Hu, who was purged as General Secretary following the 1986 student demonstrations for being "weak", the students were indirectly criticising Deng.⁵⁶ Just as criticising Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four in 'dazibao' during the Xidan Democracy Wall Movement supported Deng, mourning Hu signalled displeasure with Deng.

Within days of Hu's death, hundreds of thousands of people began going to Tiananmen daily to mourn publicly. On April 19, the first clashes between the student demonstrators and the police in the square were reported.⁵⁷ On the day of Hu's funeral, April 22, over 100,000 Chinese came to Tiananmen, defying a municipal government prohibition, to show their respect for and admiration of

Hu. Later in the day, three students attempted to present the Chinese leadership with a petition. The three waited on their knees on the steps of the Great Hall of the People for thirty minutes but no one came out to receive the petition.⁵⁸ The day also marked the first appearance of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) whose soldiers had moved into positions in the Great Hall to guard the Chinese leaders assembled there for the funeral. On Deng's orders, all PLA forces within the Beijing Military Region had been placed on full alert on April 19 and moved into positions around the city on April 21.⁵⁹

On April 24, the demonstrations spread to include more than 20 universities in Beijing.⁶⁰ Believing that they were being "confronted with an anti-Party, anti-socialist struggle" which was being "conducted in a planned and organized way" and "manipulated and instigated by a small handful of people", the Politburo Standing Committee established a group from within its membership whose task it was to "quell the rebellion".⁶¹ It is interesting to note that Zhao and Wu Xueqian, Politburo and CCP Central Committee member, had travelled to Pyongyang on April 23 and they would not return to Beijing until a week later thereby effectively narrowing the options discussed concerning how to deal with the demonstrators to those put

forward by the 'hardliners'.⁶²

The next morning, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun met with Deng to inform him of the situation in Beijing. During their meeting, Deng took a 'hard line' against the student movement, he characterised it as a "turmoil".⁶³ He indicated the need for the Chinese leadership to take a "clear-cut stand" and to not let the students "have their way". Deng continued:

Those people who have been influenced by the liberal elements of Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union have arisen to create turmoil. Their motive is to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party and to forfeit the future of the country and the nation.

To protect China from the 'liberal elements', Deng stated that the Chinese leadership must "administer the political environment", as well as the economic environment and that they must "maintain a clear attitude and staunchly carry out measures" to put down the 'turmoil'. "We must do our best to avoid bloodshed", Deng continued, "but we should foresee that it might not be possible to completely avoid bloodshed". To help in 'quelling the turmoil', the Hong Kong Commercial Radio reported that at least 10,000 troops had been ordered into the Beijing Military District which circumscribes the capital.⁶⁴ Therefore, a tacit understanding seems to have been reached whereby force

would be used to put down the student movement if the demonstrators did not respond to the warnings issued by the Chinese leaders.

The first warning issued by the leaders appeared the next day, April 26, in an editorial in the People's Daily.⁶⁵ Drawing heavily from Deng's remarks a day earlier, the editorial characterised the activities of the students as a "disturbance" with the aim of "once and for all, negat[ing] the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system". In this "serious political struggle" the Chinese people should "unite to take a clear-cut stand to oppose the disturbance, and firmly preserve the hard-earned situation of political stability and unity". If the regime was to be "tolerant" and to let the "disturbance" go "unchecked" then a "seriously chaotic state [would] appear" and "A China with very good prospects and a very bright future [would] become a chaotic and unstable China without any future". In an effort to maintain order, the editorial went on to ban "unlawful parades" and the forming of any "illegal organizations". To reinforce their warning to the demonstrators, the Chinese leaders had the complete editorial read on the evening news.⁶⁶ To back up the effort to maintain order, it was reported that 20,000 troops from the 38th Group Army had been ordered into the

Beijing Military District since April 24.⁶⁷

Rather than striking fear in the students, the editorial moved them to heighten their efforts and commitment to the cause. On April 27, over 100,000 students took to the streets of Beijing where they were joined by 330,000-500,000 other Chinese.⁶⁸ As well, the Autonomous Student Union of Beijing Colleges and Universities⁶⁹ marked its official founding and it issued 'Order Number 1' that summoned marchers to Tiananmen to march in support of "communism" and the "socialist order" and in opposition to "bureaucracy, corruption, and special privileges".⁷⁰

On May 4, approximately 100,000 people came out to Tiananmen Square to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the 'May Fourth Movement'. When they returned to their homes and dormitory rooms, the celebrants were able to listen to the speech Zhao had given to the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) then meeting in Beijing. Zhao said:

I believe the situation will gradually quiet down. There will not be large-scale turmoil in China. I am fully confident about this.

What is needed now is calm, reason, restraint, order, and a solution to the problems arrived at in a way that is consistent with democracy and the rule of law. We also need to open extensive dialogues with the students, workers, intellectuals, the democratic parties, and people from all walks of life. In a way that is consistent with democracy and the rule of

law, in a rational and orderly manner, we must exchange opinions, promote understanding, and come together to discuss and solve problems that we are all concerned about.⁷¹

Zhao's remarks had an impact on both the other members of the Chinese leadership and the student demonstrators. By giving support to the student demonstrators, Zhao's remarks isolated him from the rest of the Chinese leadership and they lost him the support of Deng. Deng was "furious" over Zhao's remarks and he responded by saying that the General Secretary had expressed "his own personal point of view" and not the view of the Chinese leadership which was expressed in the April 26 editorial.⁷² For the students, Zhao's remarks were regarded as movement towards a dialogue between the two sides. Believing that they had achieved some progress in 'opening up' the Chinese political system, students began returning to class and the movement appeared to lose momentum.⁷³

To recapture the momentum, the tactic of the hunger strike was introduced on May 13. The sight of students willing to forego the necessities of life moved the population of Beijing to participate in the demonstrations.⁷⁴ The movement quickly spread from being a student movement to being a mass movement. This was the first time in the history of the PRC that workers and

ordinary citizens joined students and intellectuals in criticising the government and the CCP.⁷⁵ Moreover, some cracks were developing in the PLA and the Beijing Public Security Bureau (PSB) as to whether some in these organizations would use force to help end the demonstrations. A group of officers in the PLA sent a letter to the Central Military Commission stating that they "absolutely [could] not suppress the students and the masses by armed force".⁷⁶ As a tactic to recapture the lost momentum, the choice of the hunger strike was a brilliant move. The movement achieved its "greatest flowering" on May 17 when over one million people congregated in Tiananmen to support the Democracy Movement.⁷⁷ Some members of both the PLA and the Beijing PSB marched in support of the students, some even carried banners.⁷⁸

Also at this time, General Secretary Gorbachev visited Beijing to signal a new era in Sino-Soviet relations. After almost 30 years of strained relations, Gorbachev's visit was to be the "crowning achievement" of the Deng regime.⁷⁹ Deng was "furious" and "humiliated"⁸⁰ that the students were able to have events postponed and cancelled due to their occupation of the centre of the city.⁸¹

Further infuriating Deng and isolating Zhao from the

rest of the Chinese leadership, the Chinese General Secretary, during his meeting with Gorbachev, told the Soviet leader that Deng was still "at the helm" of the Chinese state even though he had held no formal position in the Chinese government since 1987.⁸² By telling Gorbachev this, Zhao was placing the blame for failing to make concessions to the students and for the 1987 crackdown squarely on Deng's shoulders. Zhao's total isolation from the others in the leadership of the PRC was evidenced by his being voted down 4-to-1 in a May 17 meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee. The Politburo Standing Committee supported the April 26 editorial and it also decided to invoke martial law.⁸³

The next day, May 18, Li Peng, Li Tieying, and Yan Mingfu met with student leaders at the Great Hall of the People. It was apparent from the beginning that the student and Chinese leaders were more interested in using the meeting to express their points of view than in actually participating in a dialogue. Therefore, the meeting quickly degenerated into a "confrontation" with each side interrupting the other to get its points across.⁸⁴

With China descending daily into 'anarchy' and with Gorbachev out of China, Li Peng appeared on television to

deliver an "important speech". On May 19, Li called on all Chinese to "mobilise" in an effort to "curb turmoil in a clear-cut manner, to restore normal order in society, and to maintain stability and unity".⁸⁵ The Chinese leadership had been "extremely tolerant and restrained"⁸⁶ as the "anarchic state [went] from bad to worse" and as "Law and discipline ha[d] been undermined".⁸⁷ Following Li's lead, Yang Shangkun announced that the way to overcome this 'state of anarchy' was to station PLA troops in the capital in an effort to "maintain public security".⁸⁸ It is interesting to note that Zhao did not attend the meeting at which the speeches were delivered, claiming that he was ill.⁸⁹ The Politburo attempted to solve the problem from the "root" when it stripped Zhao of his power and placed him under house arrest.⁹⁰ The next morning, Li Peng announced the imposition of martial law in Beijing. The imposition of martial law was a second warning issued to the students from the Chinese leadership to cease the demonstrations.

The imposition of martial law provided a new impetus for the dying student movement. It "reversed the tide".⁹¹ Even before the announcement of martial law, seven divisions of PLA forces began converging on Beijing and Tiananmen.⁹² Approximately 2 million citizens of Beijing

came out to block every access route to the square thereby halting the attempted invasion of the city.⁹³ The people remained alert and active until the PLA forces were ordered to retreat to the suburbs, on May 22. The day after the PLA pulled out to the suburbs, one million people marched for democracy and called for the removal of Li Peng.⁹⁴

The imposition of martial law also demonstrated the divisions within the CCP leadership. Those in the Party supportive of Zhao attempted to convene a meeting of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee to overturn the Premier's declaration of martial law.⁹⁵ They also issued a six-point statement which put the blame for the crisis on Deng and which called for meetings to examine past errors including the stripping of all powers from Zhao.⁹⁶ Further demonstrating dissension within the ranks, seven retired generals of the PLA wrote an open letter to Deng asking that he not order the PLA to be used against the people.⁹⁷ All these efforts failed to achieve the desired results, as the events of June 4 demonstrate.

A week after the PLA forces withdrew to the suburbs of Beijing, the students unveiled the "Goddess of Democracy" at Tiananmen.⁹⁸ The student movement was once again waning and in financial trouble so the 'Goddess' was to be a reminder of the progress that the student movement had made

in starting a dialogue with the Chinese leadership. The student leadership wanted to vacate the square in order to consolidate the achievements made.⁹⁹ However, students had continued to arrive in the city from the outlying regions and they too wanted to participate in the 'Movement'. So, the students remained at the square awaiting the next move of the Chinese leadership.¹⁰⁰

Also at this time, reconnaissance by undercover agents was increased, as well as the intensification of a propaganda campaign warning the people in Beijing against resisting the PLA forces should they attempt to enter the city again.¹⁰¹ Accompanying the propaganda campaign were a number of government-staged public demonstrations in support of martial law in an effort to give the impression of popular support for martial law and also to "cue the people" as to how they should react should the PLA attempt to enter the city again.

The Chinese leadership felt that they had given the students both numerous warnings and ample opportunities to leave Tiananmen and that the students had not heeded the warnings or taken the opportunities presented to leave the square. Believing that they had exhausted all avenues without success, the Chinese leaders felt "trapped" and so they resorted to the one method they were familiar with to

reestablish their authority: a military crackdown.¹⁰² While appearing to be inactive within the city - the majority of PLA forces were still encamped around the outskirts of Beijing - PLA forces had begun to infiltrate the city and the square as early as May 26.¹⁰³ Movement of PLA troops into areas around the square continued until early Saturday morning, June 3.¹⁰⁴ The commanders of the forces met at 4pm at the headquarters of the Beijing Military Region where they received final orders for the forcible occupation of Beijing. The operation was set to begin at 5pm.

The preceding helps to set the context of the Canadian decision. That the Chinese leadership resorted to force to end the demonstrations was not a novel approach to dealing with dissent in the PRC. As will be demonstrated below and in the next chapter, when the Chinese leadership had used force to end demonstrations prior to 1989 there had been little response from other states. Tiananmen, then, marked a turning point in China's relations with western states because human rights became an issue in those relationships.

United States

Since the Sino-American rapprochement in 1972, American policy towards China has been shaped predominantly by economic and security concerns with human rights considerations playing a limited role in the bilateral relationship.¹⁰⁵

On the trade side, the year 1989 began on a positive note for Sino-American relations. In the nine years since the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China¹⁰⁶, total bilateral trade had

TABLE 1
US Trade with China, 1979-1988
(in millions \$US)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>EXPORTS</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL WORLD EXPORTS</u>	<u>IMPORTS</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL WORLD IMPORTS</u>	<u>TOTAL TWO-WAY TRADE</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL TWO-WAY TRADE</u>	<u>TRADE BALANCE</u>
1979	1724	0.95%	656	0.30%	2380	0.59%	1068
1980	3755	1.70	1164	0.45	4919	1.03	2591
1981	3603	1.54	2062	0.75	5665	1.12	1541
1982	2912	1.37	2502	0.98	5414	1.16	410
1983	2173	1.08	2477	0.92	4650	0.99	(304)
1984	3004	1.38	3381	0.99	6385	1.15	(377)
1985	3856	1.81	4224	1.17	8080	1.41	(368)
1986	3106	1.43	5241	1.35	8347	1.38	(2135)
1987	3497	1.38	6910	1.63	10407	1.54	(3413)
1988	5017	1.57	9261	2.01	14278	1.83	(4244)

SOURCE: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, (Washington: IMF, 1986 and 1992), pp. 401 and 402, respectively.

increased almost 500 per cent from US\$2.38 billion in 1979 to US\$14.278 billion in 1988 (see TABLE 1 above).

Throughout the 1979-88 period, the average annual increase of American exports to and imports from the PRC totalled 17.24 per cent and 32.63 per cent, respectively.

Furthermore, the trade balance had been in favour of China since 1983 reaching a high of US\$4.244 billion in 1988.

Although the trade balance increased in China's favour in 1988, the growth in US exports outpaced that of imports by 9.45 percent (US exports increased by 43.47 per cent and imports by 34.02 per cent) over the 1987-88 period. China, by 1988, had become the US's thirteenth-largest trading partner and the US had become China's second-largest export market. In terms of investment, the Chinese market attracted a record 630 American projects which committed approximately US\$3.5 billion to China, in 1988. This was an increase of 57.50 per cent from the previous year.¹⁰⁷

These notable increases in both trade and investment led the then American Ambassador to the PRC, Winston Lord, to proclaim 1988 as the "most positive year ever" in Sino-American economic relations.¹⁰⁸

On the security side, the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement came at a time of increased Sino-Soviet tension. The thaw in US-China relations consummated in the

1972 'Shanghai Communique' had begun in 1969 when President Nixon announced the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and the abandonment of the domino theory which had influenced US Asian policy since the end of the Second World War.¹⁰⁹ By fostering better relations with China, the Nixon Administration sought to further divide the Chinese and Soviet leaders. Thus, the 'strategic triangle' linking the Soviet Union, China, and the United States was to dominate US-China bilateral security relations in the pre-Tiananmen period.¹¹⁰

The importance of the 'China card' to the US in terms of international security was evident. First, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China possessed the power to veto any UNSC motion. Second, the People's Republic was prominent as an international arms dealer, earning US\$11 billion between 1980 and 1987.¹¹¹ In the 1980-83 period, China provided 84 per cent of total arms exported to the Middle East and South Asia and in the 1984-87 period this increased to 94 per cent. The majority of these sales were to countries of some interest to American foreign policy, such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, as well as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.¹¹² The sale of arms, especially Chinese missiles, to Third World countries was regarded by Winston Lord as

the "most serious problem" in Sino-American relations.¹¹³ Finally, China had amassed a nuclear arsenal which consisted of between 246 and 288 warheads with 465 megatons of force. In megatonnage, the Chinese nuclear force was surpassed only by those of the US and the USSR which had 15,000 megatonnes each.¹¹⁴

Prior to June 1989, Sino-American relations were dominated by trade and international security concerns. The violations of internationally recognized human rights in the PRC was a minor irritant in the bilateral relationship, if it was a factor at all. There were no groups, societal or state, calling China to task for its treatment of its citizens.

Within the US, the activities of Amnesty International notwithstanding, "no organized lobby for human rights in China" had emerged prior to June 1989.¹¹⁵ As well, Chinese-Americans were not active in pressing their government to include human rights criteria in US-China policy. While a Tibetan lobby had formed in the 1970s to press for improvements in the human rights situation in the Tibetan "autonomous region", no similar lobby formed to urge the American government to call the Chinese leadership to task for human rights violations occurring within the PRC.¹¹⁶

While the issue of human rights took on greater

importance within Congress during the 1970s, the focus of this debate was almost exclusively on states that received military or economic aid, and China was not such a state. Even after the State department began including China in its annual human rights reports in 1979 and after Congressional hearings into China's human rights practice in 1980, Congress tended to "largely exempt China from the human rights initiatives applied to other countries".¹¹⁷ Therefore, prior to June 1989, Congress had been "generally silent" about the human rights situation in the People's Republic.¹¹⁸

Within the executive, even President Carter, the American president credited with making human rights a "central feature" of American foreign policy, did not press the Chinese leadership on human rights issues because of the overriding importance attached to economic and security considerations.¹¹⁹

These considerations achieved even greater importance during the Reagan Administration, downgrading human rights considerations further. Evidence of the reduction in importance of human considerations in US-China relations during the Reagan Administration is provided by the sale of police equipment to the People's Republic in the wake of the clampdown on the Xidan Democracy Wall activists, as

well as the reclassification of China as a "friendly non-ally" allowing for the sale of some American advanced military technology and weaponry to China.¹²⁰

President Bush continued the trend of playing down human rights considerations in what he described as the "strong, important strategic and commercial and cultural" Sino-American relationship.¹²¹ The secondary importance that the Bush administration attached to human rights in the bilateral relationship was evidenced by the subject being broached only during a "quiet discussion" between Bush and Deng during the president's February 1989 visit to the People's Republic.¹²² Instead, human rights concerns were discussed primarily at a "low key" meeting between the American Secretary of State, James Baker, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen.¹²³ This is particularly noteworthy because Fang Lizhi had been prevented by Chinese authorities from attending a Texas-style barbecue hosted by the American embassy in Beijing during Bush's visit. The incident passed with only "mild protest" from the American embassy.¹²⁴

During his February 1989 visit, Bush spoke of the "comfortable relationship" between himself and the Chinese leaders that had been fostered since his days as head of the US Liaison Office in Beijing in 1974-75.¹²⁵ One of the

leaders Bush became reacquainted with during his visit was his "good friend", Deng Xiaoping.¹²⁶ The Chinese leader informed the American president, during their talk, of the need to continue the reform programme underway, but he cautioned against going too far, too fast with reform commenting on the "need for stability" that "overrides all other problems".¹²⁷

Another 'friend' whom Bush became reacquainted with during his visit was General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. Zhao attempted to explain to the American president the precarious position in which he found himself within the Chinese leadership. As presented earlier herein, Zhao was being buffeted on one side by the students and academics and on the other side by 'hardliners' within the leadership. He told Bush that he was at the centre propelling China's reforms and that "One view, complaining that the reforms have gone 'wrong', wants to go back to the old road...[and that the] other blames difficulties in reform on political factors [and] call[s] for the introduction of Western-style multi-party parliamentary politics".¹²⁸ Bush's close relations with China's leaders and his personal experience in the Liaison Office led him to be personally active in the making of China policy, he knew China and its leaders.¹²⁹

When the demonstrations began occurring in Beijing after the death of Hu, Bush and his administration were relatively quiet: "Washington gave no indication that it cared how China chose to deal with domestic dissent".¹³⁰ When asked about the situation in the PRC, Bush usually gave only his "encouragement for freedom and democracy". After the declaration of martial law, he merely encouraged the students to "continue to fight for what you believe in".¹³¹ To the Chinese leaders, Bush said that he did "not want to see bloodshed" and that he "encourage[d] restraint".¹³² In a May 23 meeting with NPC Chairman Wan Li, when Wan was in Washington, Bush repeated his commitment to "democracy around the world" and "urge[d] nonviolence and restraint" as the method to deal with the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.¹³³ In reacting to events in Beijing, Bush's statements were "so balanced and neutral" that he seemed to be "primarily concerned about not offending the Chinese leadership".¹³⁴

Following the president's cautious lead, the Secretary of State, James Baker, commented that it would not be in the "best interests" of the US to have "significant instability" in China and that the Bush Administration supported the reforms and wanted them to "proceed apace to the extent...possible".¹³⁵ In a May 23 meeting with NPC

Chairman Wan Li, Baker informed him of the Bush Administration's desire for political and economic reform in China to continue and that any regression would have an "adverse effect" on Sino-American relations. Wan replied to Baker's comments by noting that "Some things are unavoidable" and that "One should not exclude the possibility of unfortunate incidents". "There might be a possibility that bloodshed cannot be avoided," Wan continued. Baker retorted that if restraint was to give way to violent measures, it would have a "significant" impact on the bilateral relationship.¹³⁶

Throughout the pre-Tiananmen period, neither Bush nor Baker ever warned the Chinese leaders of any repercussions should the leaders order the PLA troops to use force to end the demonstrations. This lack of comment moved Congress to become increasingly frustrated with the administration's "reluctance to speak clearly on American policy regarding the democracy movement".¹³⁷ It appears then that the Bush Administration continued to use the technique of "creative ambiguity" in dealing with issues in the bilateral relationship.¹³⁸ The measured and 'creatively ambiguous' reactions of both the president and the secretary of state in support of the demonstrators and in opposition to the Chinese leaders' declaration of martial law led to a

"perception of White House neutrality".¹³⁹ Adding to any Chinese uncertainty that there may have been as to official American support for the demonstrators, neither Bush nor Baker gave any strong indication of support for Zhao Ziyang or his 'middle-of-the-road' policies. As well, President Bush renewed China's Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) trade status without conditions on May 31. Furthering the perception of 'White House neutrality' was the "conspicuous absence" of an invitation from the president to a representative group of Chinese students who were studying in the US to meet with him.¹⁴⁰ A meeting of this sort would have demonstrated to the Chinese leadership the importance that the president and his administration attached to the continuation of the political and economic reform process then underway in the PRC. Without such a meeting and with the measured and 'creatively ambiguous' reactions of both President Bush and Secretary of State Baker, the Chinese leadership was unsure as to the extent of the possible official American disapprobation should force be used to end the demonstrations in China.

Japan

Since the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978, Sino-Japanese relations

have been characterised by a "superficial mood of 'friendship' ". The two sides have attempted to deal with only the current obstacles in their relationship, avoiding any "long-standing frictions".¹⁴¹ The majority of the current obstacles concern economic matters whereas the 'long-standing frictions' concern political matters.

The Sino-Japanese economic relationship is made up of a "tripod of trade, loans and aid, and investment"¹⁴². While two-way trade has steadily increased, reaching a high of US\$19.347 billion in 1988 (see Table 2 below), the trade relationship has been highly asymmetrical with China far more dependent on Japan than vice versa. Over the 1979-1988 period, Japanese exports to and imports from China have averaged only 4.00 per cent and 4.16 per cent of Japan's world totals, respectively. For China, over the same period, exports to and imports from Japan averaged 19.92 per cent and 26.56 per cent of China's world totals, respectively. Furthermore, the trade balance has been in Japan's favour for most of the period, reaching a high of US\$6.056 billion in 1985. Since 1985, the inflow of Japanese goods to China has decreased due to the Chinese government limiting the availability of foreign exchange and the availability of consumer goods.¹⁴³ During this same

TABLE 2

Japan's Trade With China, 1979-88
(in millions \$US)

YEAR	EXPORTS	% OF TOTAL WORLD EXPORTS	IMPORT \$	% OF TOTAL WORLD IMPORTS	TOTAL TWO-WAY TRADE	% OF TOTAL WORLD TRADE	TRADE BALANCE
1979	3674	3.59%	2933	2.67%	6607	3.11%	741
1980	5109	3.92	4346	3.08	9455	3.48	763
1981	5076	3.35	5283	3.70	10359	3.52	(207)
1982	3500	2.53	5338	4.06	8838	3.27	(1838)
1983	4918	3.35	5089	4.02	10007	3.66	(171)
1984	7199	4.24	5943	4.37	13142	4.30	1256
1985	12590	7.11	6534	5.00	19124	6.22	6056
1986	9936	4.72	5727	4.49	15663	4.63	4209
1987	8337	3.60	7478	4.96	15815	4.14	859
1988	9486	3.58	9861	5.26	19347	4.28	(375)

SOURCE: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, (Washington: IMF, 1986 and 1992), pp. 241 and 240, respectively.

period, China has increased its exports to Japan thereby decreasing the trade imbalance and eventually turning the trade balance in China's favour in 1988. Japan is China's most valued trading partner, apart from Hong Kong which serves primarily as an entrepot for Chinese interaction with other countries.

In terms of loans and aid, the second leg of the 'tripod', Japan has been the primary source of developmental assistance for the People's Republic. Japan has pledged a total of US\$8.8 billion (1610 billion Yen) in

development loans to the PRC over the 1979-1995 period.¹⁴⁴ This corresponded to approximately 70 per cent of China's bilateral official development assistance (ODA).¹⁴⁵ Because Japanese ODA is in the form of development loans and not grants, approximately 70 per cent of China's foreign debt was also held by Japan.¹⁴⁶

With respect to the third leg of the 'tripod', Japanese firms ranked third behind Hong Kong and American firms in setting up joint ventures in China, at the end of 1988. Japanese investors had set up 467 joint ventures totalling US\$1.4 billion.¹⁴⁷ In short, Japan has been "committed...to an active role" in helping China implement its modernization programme.¹⁴⁸

The 'long-standing frictions' in the Sino-Japanese relationship concern primarily what Barry Buzan has called the "long shadow of the Second World War".¹⁴⁹ At issue is the extreme brutality of Japan's behaviour before and during the Second World War, including the invasion of Manchuria, the 'Rape of Nanking', the use of Chinese women as sex slaves, and the treatment of prisoners of war. Also, Japan's historical legacy of aggressiveness and brutality in the region in the half-century before the Second World War is still fresh in the minds of most Asians, especially Chinese and Koreans. These historical

animosities have resurfaced in the heated debate between China and Japan over the contents of secondary school history textbooks¹⁵⁰, the visit by Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone to Yasukuni Shrine¹⁵¹, and the ownership of the Kokuryo student dormitory.¹⁵² As well, Japan and China have continued to have conflicting claims to the Senkaku Islands, known in Chinese as Diaoyutai.¹⁵³

The "long shadow" extends to affect China's recurrent fear of Japanese militarisation. When Japan surpassed its self-imposed limit on defence spending of one per cent of Gross National Product in 1987 (1.004 per cent) and 1988 (1.013 per cent), it was regarded as "a watershed event marking Japan's arrival as a military power" in official Chinese commentaries.¹⁵⁴ The Chinese preoccupation with Japanese militarisation was also evident in China continually citing Japan as ranking third in defence spending without reference to the order of magnitude which separates Japan from the top two spenders, the US and USSR.

While the "long shadow" still cast a darkness over the relationship, the August 1988 visit of Japanese PM Takeshita marked, what a Chinese government official called, a "second normalisation".¹⁵⁵ During the visit, the Japanese PM announced a development loan package totalling US\$5.2 billion (Yen 810 billion). This package

was larger than the previous two development loan packages combined signalling an increasing interest in China by Japan.¹⁵⁶ PM Takeshita also announced the signing of an investment protection agreement between the two countries which gave Japanese firms in China similar access to raw materials and labour as Chinese firms. Japan is the only country to secure the Chinese guarantee of "local" treatment.¹⁵⁷ Relations were so cordial between the leaders of the two countries that Deng expressed his desire for "a new type" of Sino-Japanese relations "based on mutual trust" and Takeshita opined that Sino-Japanese relations had moved to a stage where the two were "friends who can open their hearts to one another".¹⁵⁸

The amicable state of relations present during the Takeshita visit were to be built upon during the visit to Japan by Chinese Premier Li Peng in April 1989. Li journeyed to Tokyo in the hope of attracting additional Japanese direct investment to the PRC. The Chinese complained that Japanese direct investment in China was too low compared to the trade relationship and that it tended to be in short-term, high-profit, service-oriented ventures, such as hotels and office space.¹⁵⁹ Premier Li hoped to attract long-term investments in an effort to increase China's productive capabilities. To this end, the

two countries agreed to establish an investment promotion organization.¹⁶⁰ To mark the formation of the investment promotion organization, both sides agreed to attend an inaugural conference in Tokyo on June 7, 1989. The conference had to be postponed, however, due to the events of June 4, 1989.

While some of the underlying 'long-standing frictions' remained unresolved, by 1989, Sino-Japanese relations had reached a stage of "unprecedented harmony".¹⁶¹ During the spring of 1989, it became apparent that all the leading politicians of the Japanese government were involved in the Recruit company influence-buying scandal, including the prime minister.¹⁶² A barrage of public criticism continued until April 25, 1989 when PM Takeshita announced his resignation. With the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in turmoil, the remaining party leaders looked for a replacement for the prime minister. After eliminating many acceptable candidates, Sosuke Uno, the Foreign Minister at the time, "emerged...out of the middle-echelon LDP woodwork" to become Takeshita's successor.¹⁶³ "Uno was not the best or even the second best option," remarked a senior member of the LDP.¹⁶⁴ His "chief qualification" was his lack of connection to the Recruit scandal.¹⁶⁵ Although he lacked any base of power within the

LDP, Sosuke Uno became Japan's 47th prime minister on June 2, 1989. The new prime minister's leadership would be tested within two days of assuming office when the events occurring in Tiananmen Square became known.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to set the international context for the study. It showed that human rights violations had been ongoing in China since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and that human rights considerations had little, if any, impact on the two states that had the most extensive relations with the PRC, the US and Japan. While economic and security interests prevailed over concern for human rights in Sino-American relations, economic interests and a historical legacy of brutality overshadowed human rights considerations in Sino-Japanese relations.

There was a prevailing sense of optimism in the international environment as demonstrated by the easing of tensions in the Soviet-American relationship, the planning and holding of free elections in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union respectively. So when the students took to the streets of Beijing in the name of 'democracy', it seemed that China was taking its next step in its movement

to greater participation in the international system. Deng had opened the Chinese economy to the West in 1978 and it seemed as if the Chinese political system would be opened up in 1989. The events of June 4, however, ended quickly the sense of optimism prevailing in the international system. Once again, it was demonstrated that the Chinese leadership would strike its own path, in its own time.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Eduard Shevardnadze's remarks to James Baker at the Conventional Forces in Europe talks during March 1989 in Vienna. As cited in, James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992, (New York: Putnam, 1995), p.65.
2. New York Times, April 2, 1989.
3. This is a general appraisal of the press coverage of the student demonstrations over the month of May. In particular, see Robert Delfs, "Watershed for Glasnost," Far Eastern Economic Review, 144, 20 (May 18, 1989), pp.10-11; Globe and Mail; and, New York Times.
4. Roberta Cohen, "People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception," Human Rights Quarterly, 9, 4 (November 1987), p.451.
5. John F. Copper, Franz Michael, and Yuan-Li Wu, Human Rights in Post-Mao China, (Boulder: Westview P., 1985), p.90.
6. Simon Leys, "After the Massacre," New York Review, 36, 21 (October 12, 1989), p.17. See also John King Fairbank, China: A New History. (Cambridge, Ma: Belknap Press, 1992), pp. 315 and 324-5.
7. As quoted in Cohen, p.456-7.
8. Copper, Michael & Wu, p.24; and, Cohen, p.456. Based on an estimate of the population in 1949, Mao's statement meant that over 25 million Chinese were to be interned. In 1996, with a population of 1.2 billion, Mao's 5 per cent corresponds to 60 million people being imprisoned.
9. Ranbir Vohra, China: The Search for Social Justice and Democracy, (Markham: Penguin, 1990), p.79.
10. Merle Goldman, "Human Rights in the People's Republic of China," Daedalus, 112, 4 (Fall 1983), p.116. For a personal account of the Cultural Revolution, see Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai, (London: Grafton, 1987).
11. Goldman, p.118. See also Ann Kent, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, Discussion Paper No.3 1989-90, (Department of the Parliamentary Library: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, August 1989), p.22; Kjeld Erik

Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-79: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns and Underground Journals," Asian Survey, 21, 7 (July 1981), pp.747-74; and, Susan L. Shirk, "Human Rights: What About China?" Foreign Policy, 29 (Winter 1977-78), pp.113-19.

12. It has been estimated that there was up to 100,000 people in Tiananmen Square at any one time and that total participation in the demonstrations totalled 2,000,000. As reported in Charles Burton, Political and Social Change in China Since 1978, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), p.16.

13. Goldman, p.118

14. This section on the Xidan Democracy Wall movement is based on information found in the following: Brodsgaard, pp.762-74; Goldman, pp.118-26; James C.F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics, 2nd. ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp.203-6; and, John Fraser, The Chinese: Portrait of a People, (Toronto: Totem, 1980).

15. Fraser, p.242 and Brodsgaard, p.761.

16. Wang, p.204.

17. Brodsgaard, p.770; and, Andrew J. Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy, (New York: Columbia UP, 1990), p.117.

18. For an analysis of the changes instituted by Deng, see Burton.

19. As quoted in Brodsgaard, p.767. The "Four Modernizations Plan" was announced by Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. Deng sought to modernize China's agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defence.

20. As quoted in Brodsgaard, p.771.

21. Brodsgaard, p.772; Wang, p.206; and, Goldman, p.126.

22. Brodsgaard, p.772.

23. Copper, Michael, and Wu, p.29; and, Burton, p.65. For an examination of this event, see Thomas B. Gold, "'Just in Time!' China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984," Asian Survey, 24, 9 (September 1984), pp.947-74.

24. Vohra, p.130.

25. Vohra, p.130; and, Gold, p.948.

26. This section on the Chinese government's campaign against 'bourgeois liberalization' is based on information found in the following: Nathan, pp.177-82; Vohra, pp.133-37; Robert Delfs, "Now the Rights Turn," Far Eastern Economic Review, 135, 2 (January 8, 1987), pp.8-9; and, Julia Kwong, "The 1986 Student Demonstrations in China," Asian Survey, 28, 9 (September 1988), pp.970-85.

27. A resolution of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Twelfth Party Central Committee defined 'bourgeois liberalization' as "negating the socialist system and advocating the capitalist system". See Beijing Review, 30, 8 (February 23, 1987), p.21.

28. Kwong, pp.970 and 979; and, New York Times, December 14, 1986 and December 21, 1986.

29. DEA file, 20-1-4, WJGR 1426, December 10, 1986 and WJGR 1486, December 22, 1986; and, Kwong, p.971-72. Along with Shanghai and Guangzhou, activity was reported on campuses in Beijing, Hangzhou, Hefei, Kuming, Nanjing, Suzhou, Tienjin, and Wuhan.

30. DEA file, 20-1-4, WJFC 0001, January 2, 1987 and 580967, January 5, 1987; Robert Delfs, "A Demo at Dawn," Far Eastern Economic Review, 135, 3 (January 15, 1987), pp.8-10; and, New York Times, January 2, 1987.

31. New York Times, January 14, 1987.

32. By mid-January, 1987, internal party divisions within the CCP leadership were already apparent and solidifying. Moderates such as Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Wan Li, and Zhu Houze were squared-off against conservatives such as Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Deng Liqun, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, and Hu Qiaomu. These differences were very much evident in the speeches delivered by Zhao and Bo to the Central Commission for Guiding Party Rectification meeting held in May, 1987. See, DEA file, 20-1-4, WJGR 0029, January 14, 1987; David Bachman, "Differing Visions of China's Post-Mao Economy: The Ideas of Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhao Ziyang," Asian Survey, 26, 3 (March 1986), pp.292-321; Robert Delfs, "Liberal Tendencies Spell Hu's Demise," Far Eastern Economic Review, 135, 5 (January 29, 1987), p.13; and, Press Research Unit, "The Conservatives Exalt Deng For

Their Own Purpose," Report, no. 555 (July 15, 1987), p.3035.

"Factions" or "clusters" have been a characteristic of Chinese politics in post-1949 era. For a discussion on this aspect of Chinese politics, see Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988), pp.35-62; Nathan, pp.23-37; and the articles in the special journal symposium on the nature of Chinese politics in The China Journal, 34 (July 1995), particularly those by Pye and Dittmer.

33. Kwong, p.983-84; Robert Delfs, "Nipped in the Bud," Far Eastern Economic Review, 135, 4 (January 22, 1987), pp.10; and, New York Times, January 13, 1987 and January 19, 1987.

34. Copper, Michael, and Wu, p.27.

35. Copper, Michael, and Wu, p.92; and, Stephen Mosher, "Three Steps Toward Opening Mainland China," Orbis, 31, 3 (Fall 1987), p.333. For a detailed discussion concerning the methods of silencing dissent in China during this period, see Hongda Harry Wu, Laogai- The Chinese Gulag, trans. Ted Slingerland, (Boulder: Westview, 1992).

36. Copper, Michael, and Wu, pp.94-5.

37. What follows is an overview of the happenings in China in the April-June 1989 period. For a list of works more complete in detailing the events and the reasons underlying them, see Chapter One, Note 11.

38. On May 4, 1988 approximately 300 students had gathered at Beijing University to hear Fang Lizhi talk about democracy. Fang talked about the need for greater democracy and the students' role in making this come about. A month later, on June 8, 800-2,000 students marched to the Public Security Ministry to protest the lack of security around the universities in Beijing. The beating death of a Beijing University student while near the campus by a group of local youths precipitated the march. Demands made by the students included the following: the attendance of the Mayor of Beijing and the Minister of Public Security at the student's funeral; the march be "justly appraised"; the security to be increased in and around the universities; the Minister of Public Security to apologize for the death; the speedy resolution of the case; the case to be accurately reported in the press; and, the accused killer(s) to be tried publicly on the Beijing University

campus. As well, during the period of these small protests, 'dazibao' appeared intermittently on the campus of Beijing University complaining of things ranging from hooliganism to the plight of the intellectuals (low wages and poor living conditions) to corruption among high government and party officials. In late June, approximately 1,000 farmers in Fangshen county were "violently thrashed with metal bars" by an "overwhelming" police force. The police were sent to the area to end the farmers' protest over the spilling of polluted water into their fields thereby destroying their crops. In December 1988, a conference was organised in celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee where Deng had announced the 'Four Modernizations'. The more than 300 reform-minded intellectuals who were in attendance heard a "bold" speech by Su Shaozhi. In the speech, Su "attacked" the Chinese leadership's earlier campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalism.

For the May and June protests, confidential correspondence with the author. For the December conference, see Lowell Dittmer, "China in 1989," Asian Survey, 30, 1 (January 1990), p.27.

39. In January 1989, Fang Lizhi, Su Shaozhi and approximately 100 others gathered to organised a 'neo-enlightenment saloon'. The group was to be "completely critical" of the Chinese leadership. See Chen Xitong, "Report to NPC on Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion, in Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, Eds.. Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict, (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), p.58; and, Kathleen Hartford, "Summer 1988-Spring 1989 The Ferment Before the 'Turmoil'," in Suzanne Ogden, Kathleen Hartford, Lawrence R. Sullivan and David Zweig, Eds., China's Search for Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement of 1989, (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p.16.

40. On January 6, 1989, Fang Lizhi wrote an open letter to Deng Xiaoping asking for "general amnesty [to] be granted nationally" and for the release of all political prisoners, especially Wei Jingsheng. Later in January, in another letter, Fang wrote that the "forty years of Maoist China [had] been a failure," and that "even the past ten 'years of reform' ha[d] produced nothing". "Socialism, in its Lenin-Stalin-Mao version", he continued, "has been entirely discredited". For a complete text of the letters, see Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, pp.164-7.

41. In February, a group of 33 Chinese intellectuals took up Fang's lead and wrote an open letter to the NPC Standing Committee and to the CCP Central Committee asking for the release of all political prisoners, particularly Wei Jingsheng. Later in the month, a group of 42 scientists joined the campaign to free political prisoners by writing their own open letter to the Chinese leadership. The next month, an additional 43 writers joined the campaign started by Fang. As well, 'dazibao' began appearing more frequently on the campuses of Beijing University and Qinghua University denouncing Deng, the Party, and the 'Four Cardinal Principles'.

For the first letter, see Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.167-8; Nathan, p.182; and, Chen Xitong, "Report on Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion," Beijing Review, 32, 29 (July 17-23, 1989), p.iii. For the second letter, see Nathan, p.182; and, Xitong, p.iii. For the third letter, see Nathan, p.182. For the 'dazibao', see Xitong, p.iii.

42. In general, Deng's reform policies have favoured coastal areas more than the inland and occupations like farmers and small business operators more than civil servants and educators. See, Marie-Claire Bergere, "Tiananmen 1989: Background and Consequences," in Marta Dassu and Tony Saich, Eds., The Reform Decade In China: From Hope to Dismay, (London: Kegan Paul, 1992), pp.134-47; Stephen K. Ma, "Reform Corruption: A Discussion of China's Current Development," Pacific Affairs, 62, 1 (Spring 1989), pp.44-5; and, Sakutaro Tanino, "The Recent Situation in China and Sino-Japanese Relations," Japan Review of International Affairs, 4, 1 (Spring-Summer 1990), p.24.

On corruption, see, inter alia, Ma; Yan Sun, "The Chinese Protests of 1989: The Issue of Corruption," Asian Survey, 31, 8 (August 1991), pp.762-82.

43. In April 1988, a group of 18 students and one teacher carried out a 'sit-in' protest in Tiananmen Square to bring attention to the lack of funding for education and the poor living conditions for students and teachers. Students from Beijing University, Qinhua University, and Beijing Teachers University attended the demonstration. In trying to make their point, the students began shining shoes for money before they were "unceremoniously bundled away". DEA file, 20-1-4, WJGR 3279, April 17, 1988.

44. Hartford, p.4.

45. This split in the CCP leadership stems from the differences between Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. Deng seemed to push for more extensive reforms to the Chinese economy, while his "arch-rival" pushed for a retrenchment of the reform program. See Chapter 2, note 31 for more on splits in the Chinese leadership.

46. Deng's abortive attempt at price reform was motivated in part by a desire to reduce the opportunities for corruption within the CCP due to the workings of the two-level pricing system. For example, those in control of scarce raw material resources who had procured them at low state fixed-prices could resell the raw materials on the 'open' market for great profit. In 1987, the state-fixed price for wire rods was 700 yuan while the market price was 1,400 yuan. During that year, 52 per cent of output was allotted at state-fixed prices and the remaining 48 per cent was to be sold at market prices. Therefore, high ranking managers had both the opportunity and the incentive to reap large personal profits at the expense of the workers by buying at the state-fixed price and selling at the market price. This two-level system was operational for most commodities in the PRC, including agriculture and food products. The exploitation of 'guanxi' (personal connections) for 'guang dao' (official profiteering) was the largest threat to further economic reform in the PRC. It had achieved epidemic proportions by the end of 1988: "Reform had become a trough from which the privileged could drink their fill at the expense of others". Hartford, p.8.

For more on corruption within China, see Ma, pp.40-52. For more on the two-track pricing system, see Hartford, pp.59-62; and Nathan, pp.97-8.

47. Nathan, p.97; and Dittmer, "China in 1989", p.26.

48. Zhao, in his 'New Order for the Socialist Commodity Economy', incorporated Deng's price reform initiative into his overall export-led growth strategy. Zhao's plan called for the ending of all state price controls in four to five years and a devaluation of the Chinese currency. The first of these initiatives was an attempt to increase the competitiveness of China internationally and to curb corruption domestically while the second was an attempt to promote the export of Chinese goods. In February 1988, Zhao had received approval from the Politburo for his 'Coastal Development Strategy'. The 'Coastal Development Strategy' called for the entire coast of China to be 'opened up' to foreign investment, as well as the raw material and capital markets in China being 'opened up' to foreign competition.

For a discussion of the 'New Order for the Socialist Commodity Economy', see Dittmer, "China in 1989," p.26. For a discussion on the 'Coastal Development Strategy', see Nathan, pp.98-101.

49. Dittmer, "China in 1989", p.26.

50. Dittmer, "China in 1989", p.40; and, Nathan, p.104. Double-digit levels of inflation, while troubling in any country, is even more so in China where more than three decades of state-fixed pricing has prevailed. The problem of poverty, an ever present one in China, by the end of 1988, had become acute when more than one-third of rural and one-fifth of urban Chinese were living below a subsistence level and an additional one-third of urban Chinese had suffered a reduction in real income during the year. See, Hartford, p.7.

51. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert p.173.

52. Participating in the 'spring attack' were Bo Yibo, Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Li Peng, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen and Yao Yilin. See, Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert p.173; and, Dittmer, "China in 1989", p.29.

53. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.181. The official reason given for the postponement was that the education plan, the theme of the session, was not yet ready.

54. Lowell Dittmer, "Tiananmen Reconsidered," Pacific Affairs, 64, 4 (Winter 1991-92), p.534.

55. Melanie Manion, "Introduction: Reluctant Duelists," in Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.xv.

56. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert p.204.

57. Manion, p.xv, note 3.

58. This seems to have been one of the major incidents which inspired students to join with the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. Chai Ling, a Chinese student who was to become the leader of the student movement, has remarked that this was the incident that initiated her involvement with the student demonstrators. See, "Tiananmen Square," The Koppel Report, created by Ted Koppel, prod. Coronet Films, 1989.

59. Timothy Brook, Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement, (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), p.27. The Beijing Military Region encompasses the provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia.
60. Manion, p.xvii; and, Corinna-Barbara Francis, "The Progress of Protest in China," Asian Survey, 29, 9 (September 1989), p.905.
61. Xitong, p.vii; and, Lucien Pye, "Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The Escalation of Confrontation from Moralizing to Revenge," Asian Survey, 30, 4 (April 1990), p.338.
62. Also travelling to Pyongyang were Hong Xuezhi and Zhu Liang. For more details of the visit, see Beijing Review, 32, 19 (May 8-14, 1989), p.10.
63. For a report of Deng's remarks to Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, see Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, pp.203-6.
64. Brook, p.28.
65. For a copy of the complete editorial, see Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, pp.206-8. It is interesting to note that the phrases used in the editorial to denounce the 1989 demonstrations repeated verbatim the language used in to put down the 1987 demonstrations. See, Pye, "Tiananmen," p.339.
66. Pye, "Tiananmen", p.339.
67. Brook, p.28. It is interesting to note that group army troops larger than a unit (120 soldiers) could be moved only by order of the chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC). At that time, the position of chairman of the CMC was Deng Xiaoping's only formal post within the Chinese hierarchy.
68. Manion, p.xxv.; and, Brook, pp.32-5.
69. The Autonomous Student Union of Beijing Universities and Colleges first appeared on April 23 and its leaders agreed upon a list of demands to be presented to the Chinese leadership. The list of demands included the following: a reassessment of Hu Yaobang; a reassessment of the 1986 student movement and the campaign against bourgeois liberalization that had followed the movement; an

increase in the freedom of the press; an increase in funds for education; an increase in measures to combat official corruption; accurate reporting of the protest movement; and, an investigation and public disclosure of police violence against the students on April 20. See Manion, p.xvi; and Francis, pp.903-6.

The formation of the Autonomous Student Union is important because it marks the first time in the history of the PRC that a "unified, independent organization based on broad representation" had been created. Representatives from 41 universities elected a standing committee of seven members with one chosen as the chairperson. In forming their own union, the students had adopted an "utterly subversive" form of protest which presented a fundamental challenge to the CCP's monopoly of leadership and its "exclusive right to solve problems and promote democracy". See, Manion, p.xxii; Francis, pp.903-4; and, Nathan, p.185-6.

The student example was later adopted by some of the workers in Beijing. On May 25, the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Union was formed. The membership of the worker's union was decidedly smaller than that of the student's union; however, its existence was just as disturbing to the CCP leadership who feared any mass mobilization of the working class. Brook, p.85.

70. Pye, "Tiananmen," p.339; Francis, pp.906-8; and, Xitong, p.viii.

71. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.46.

72. Marlowe Hood's comments in "Tiananmen Square", The Koppel Report. For a similar appraisal, see Xitong, pp.viii-ix. For a differing appraisal, see Dittmer, pp.31-2. Dittmer reports that upon his return from Pyongyang Zhao went to Beidaihe, the summer residence of the Chinese leaders, to discuss the April 26 editorial which Zhao believed to be too "strident". Zhao was able to move Deng to a 'softer' position concerning the student demonstrators and that Zhao put forward this new 'soft line' in his speech at the ADB meeting.

73. For comments from students in Beijing, see Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, pp.256-8.

74. It is reported that over the course of the hunger strike (May 13-24), 32 hospitals in Beijing treated 9,158 cases of collapse with 8,205 needing hospitalization. As

cited in Brook, p.37.

75. Pye, "Tiananmen", p.343; Bergere, p.133; and, Brook, p.41-2.

76. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.282.

77. Brook, p.38.

78. Brook, p.39.

79. Marlowe Hood, The Koppel Report.

80. Marlowe Hood, The Koppel Report.

81. On May 15, Gorbachev was formally welcomed to the People's Republic of China on the airport tarmac instead of at a ceremony in Tiananmen Square and his meeting with President Yang Shangkun was delayed for two hours because his motorcade had to be rerouted in order to avoid demonstrations. On May 16, the formal meetings scheduled for Gorbachev with Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang had to be moved from the Great Hall of the People to the state residence where the Soviet General Secretary was staying. Also that day, a ceremony scheduled for Tiananmen Square had to be cancelled as did a visit to the Forbidden City scheduled for May 17. See, Brook, p.38.

82. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.261; Dittmer, "China in 1989," p. 33; Manion, p.xxxv; Pye, "Tiananmen," p.342; and, Xitong, p.xii.

83. Dittmer, "China in 1989," p.33; and, Brook, p.41.

84. Brook, p.41; Nathan, p.185; and, Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, pp.269-82.

85. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.309.

86. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.311.

87. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.309.

88. Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.314.

89. Dittmer, "China in 1989," p.33; Melinda Liu, The Koppel Report; Xitong, p.xv; and, Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.294.

90. Both Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, in subsequent speeches, talked about the 'root' of the problem emanating from the Party having 'two voices' and the need to rid the Party of one of these 'voices' if the problem was to be solved. The 'root' was obviously Zhao. See, Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, pp.317-27.

91. Brook, p.43.

92. For a detailed account of this activity, see Brook, pp.48-77.

93. Dittmer, "China in 1989," p.33

94. Brook, p.68; and, Melinda Liu, The Koppel Report.

95. To force an emergency meeting of the NPC Standing Committee, 83 signatures are needed (i.e. 50% of the membership). Those supporting Zhao could only muster 57 signatures. Brook, p.83; Nathan, p.172; Dittmer, "China in 1989," p.34; and, Xitong, p.xv.

96. Nathan, p.177.

97. Brook, p.65; and Dittmer, "China in 1989," p.34. The Party leadership was aware that sending the PLA into Beijing was not going to be popular within the PLA hierarchy. What the CCP leadership did was to involve units from every one of China's seven military regions so that "the entire military structure was implicated". No leader, political or military, could later emerge and condemn the actions taken. Brook, p.75.

98. Approximately 100,000 attended the unveiling of the statue. Brook, p.88.

99. On May 27 Wang Dan, the Beijing University student leader, announced that Tiananmen Square would be vacated after a closing demonstration on May 30. Brook, p.87.

100. A vote was taken among the students as to whether they should vacate or remain in Tiananmen Square. Reports differ on the results of the vote. One report maintained that the student leaders voted to vacate but were prevented from leaving due to an agreement made at the outset to be led by the minority. Other reports had the students from Beijing voting to leave and those from the provinces voting to remain. See, Brook, p.88; Manion, p.xxxvii; and, The Koppel Report.

101. Brook, p.91.
102. Nathan, p.182.
103. Brook, p.89.
104. Brook, pp.78-107.
105. For a similar appraisal of U.S.-China relations, see, inter alia, Cohen; Nathan, pp.82-88; Marie Gottschalk, "The Failure of American Policy," World Policy Journal, 6, 4 (Fall 1989), pp.667-84; Steven W. Mosher, "Three Steps Toward Opening Mainland China," Orbis, 31, 3 (Fall 1987), pp.331-37; and, David Zweig, "The Downward Spiral: Sino-American Relations Since Tiananmen," in William A. Joseph, Ed., China Briefing, 1991, (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp.119-42.
106. The formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC occurred on December 15, 1978.
107. Winston Lord, "China and America: Beyond the Big Chill," Foreign Affairs, 68, 4 (Fall 1989), p.20.
108. Lord, p.20.
109. For a more complete discussion of American policy during this period, see Nayan Chanda, "The External Environment for Southeast Asian Foreign Policy," in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton, Eds. The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia, (New York: St.Martin's, 1990), pp.54-73; and, Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
110. One of the more interesting security relationships that the Americans had with the Chinese concerns the construction and operation of five primary and four secondary "seismic monitoring posts" within China directed at Soviet nuclear test sites and missile launch sites. Construction of the stations was completed in 1987. See, New York Times, June 25, 1989.
- Many commentators have argued that China's importance in the international system has not greatly diminished with the decline of the U.S.S.R. For an elaboration of this viewpoint, see Yahuda; Barber B. Conable, Jr. and David M. Lampton, "China: The Coming Power," Foreign Affairs. 71, 5 (Winter 1992-93), pp.133-49; Lawrence Eagleburger, "U.S. Actions Toward China," Current Policy, No. 1247, U.S.

Department of State, Washington, February 1990; Michel Oksenberg, "The China Problem," Foreign Affairs, 70, 3 (Summer 1991), pp.1-16; and, David Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," Survival, 34, 2 (Summer 1992), pp.88-106.

For an elaboration of the contending view that China's importance vis-a-vis the U.S. has diminished, see Gottschalk, pp.672-78; Roger W. Sullivan, "Discarding the China Card," Foreign Policy, 86 (Spring 1992), pp.3-23; and, Tiafa Yu, "The Conduct of Post-Tiananmen U.S. China Policy: Domestic Constraints, Systemic Change, and Value Incompatibility," Asian Affairs: An American Review, 19, 4 (Winter 1993), pp.237-42;

111. Nayan Chanda, "The Third World Race for Ballistic Missiles," Far Eastern Economic Review, 140, 22 (June 2, 1988), p.22; and Zweig, p.138.

112. The problem of Chinese arms sales was of such importance that, in 1988, George Schultz, then Secretary of State, and Frank Carlucci, then Secretary of Defense, travelled separately to Beijing to convey American concerns over Chinese actions. See, Jing-Dong Yuan, "United States Technology Transfer Policy Toward China: Post-Cold War Objectives and Strategies," International Journal, 51, 2 (Spring 1996), pp.324-5; and Zweig, p.138.

113. Lord, p.15.

114. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 47 (November 1991), p.49.

115. Cohen, p.508. Amnesty International played a pioneering role in attempting to report on human rights violations in the PRC. It was the first NGO to report on human rights violations in China in its Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China (London: AI, 1978).

116. Cohen, pp.468-71, and 508-11.

117. Cohen, p.474. Also, see Gottschalk, p.671; Mosher, p.333; Yu, pp.233-35; David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered, (Gainesville: U of Florida P, 1988); and, Eric Hyer, "United States' Response to the Tiananmen Massacre: Congressional Values and Executive Interests," Conflict, 11, 3 (July-September 1991), p.170.

118. Gottschalk, p.671.

119. Cohen, p.475. When officials of the Carter Administration met with their Chinese counterparts they made only "passing references" to the human rights situation in the PRC. While critical of other states for their human rights practices, the Carter Administration's protestations of the human rights violations in the PRC were "low key, infrequent, and mostly unspecific". Cohen, pp.475 and 479.

For a discussion on the place of human rights in the Carter presidency, see Cohen, pp.475-80; Shirk, pp.109-27; Yu, p.238; and David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Two Levels, Two Worlds," Political Studies, 43, (special edition 1995), pp.111-30.

120. Cohen, p.480; and Gottschalk, p.683, Note 16. The sale of police equipment to the PRC was an apparent violation of Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits the "security assistance" to any state that engages in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights". The prohibition extends to such items as crime control equipment, law enforcement assistance, domestic intelligence assistance, military training, and economic support funds. See, Forsythe, Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, p.9; and Cohen, p.479.

121. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, Book 1-January 20 to June 30, 1989, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1990), p.23.

122. Public Papers: George Bush, p.179.

123. Robert Delfs, "Regrets Only," Far Eastern Economic Review, 143, 10 (March 9, 1989), p.11 and New York Times, March 1, 1989.

124. Delfs, "Regrets Only," p.11 and New York Times, March 1, 1989. As a sign of his importance to the Chinese leadership, Fang Lizhi was the only dissident not allowed to attend the barbecue. Su Shaozhi, a member of the 'neo-enlightenment saloon' with Fang, was allowed to attend the event.

125. New York Times, February 25, 1989. Also, see George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), pp.90-91.

126. New York Times, February 26, 1989. For more on the conversation between the two leaders, Bush and Scowcroft, pp.93-96.

127. Beijing Spring, 32, 29 (July 17-23, 1989), pp.22-23.

128. Delfs, "Regrets Only," p.11; Bush and Scowcroft, pp.96-98; and, Li Haibo, "Bush Visits China and Friends," Beijing Review, 32, 10 (March 6-12, 1989), pp.9-10..

129. Bush and Scowcroft, pp.90-91; Baker, p.100; Zweig, p.120; and, William McGurn, "The U.S. and China: Sanctioning Tiananmen Square," in George Hicks, Ed., The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen, (Chicago: St.James, 1990), p.234.

President Bush and other key administration people for China policy (i.e., Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleberger, and Winston Lord) had been influenced heavily by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger was the Secretary of State when Bush served as head of the Liaison Office in 1974-75. Brent Scowcroft, Bush's National Security Advisor, and Lawrence Eagleberger, Deputy Secretary of State, were both "key aides" to Kissinger, when he was forming Nixon's China policy; and both were "central figures" in Kissinger and Associates. Hyer, p.171; and, McGurn, pp.234-5.

130. Gottschalk, p.678.

131. New York Times, May 22, 1989; and Public Papers: George Bush, p.586-7.

132. Public Papers: George Bush p. 586.

133. Public Papers: George Bush, p.595; New York Times, May 24, 1989; Gottschalk, p.678; and McGurn, p.235.

134. Statement by Senator Christopher Dodd, as quoted in Hyer, p.172. For similar appraisals of the president during this period, see Public Papers: George Bush, p.587; Gottschalk, p.678; McGurn, pp.234-5; and, New York Times, May 24, 1989.

135. New York Times, May 21, 1989.

136. Baker, p.102.

137. Hyer, p.172. Also, see New York Times, May 24, 1989; and, Public Papers: George Bush, p.595.

138. "Creative ambiguity" had been the technique of dealing with contentious issues in the Sino-American relationship used by the all the previous presidential administrations since the 1972 rapprochement. "Creative ambiguity" meant "framing issues in language that each side could claim represented its position, while refraining from correcting or contradicting the other side's interpretation". For more on this technique, see Sullivan.

139. McGurn, p.235.

140. McGurn, p.235.

141. Hidenori Ijiri, "Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization," The China Quarterly, 124 (December 1990), p.643. This notion of a 'superficial mood of friendship' is also found in Tanino, pp.30-1; Robert A. Manning, "Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International System," The Washington Quarterly, 17, 1 (Winter 1994), pp.45-58; Allen S. Whiting, "China and Japan: Politics Versus Economics," ANNALS, 519 (January 1992), pp.39-51; and, Allen S. Whiting and Xin Jianfei, "Sino-Japanese Relations: Pragmatism and Passion," World Policy Journal, 8, 1 (Winter 1990-1991), pp.107-35.

142. Whiting, p.40. For more information on the Sino-Japanese economic relationship during this period, see Tanino; Kim Hong-Nack, "Perspectives on Recent Sino-Japanese Relations," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 4, 2 (Summer/Fall 1990), pp.403-34; and, K.V. Kesavan, "Japan and the Tiananmen Square Incident: Aspects of the Bilateral Relationship," Asian Survey, 30, 7 (July 1990), pp.669-81.

143. Whiting, p.41. Import controls were placed on Japanese automobiles and television sets lowering the level of importation by 92 per cent and 86 per cent respectively. See, Hong-Nack, p.414.

144. In total, three loans were made to China. In 1979, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira pledged US\$1.5 billion (Yen 330 billion) over the period 1979-83. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone followed this by a second loan of US\$2.1 billion (Yen 470 billion) for the 1984-90 period. A third loan of US\$5.2 billion (Yen 810 billion) was made by Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita in August, 1988 to cover the 1990-95 period. See, Tanino, pp.39-40; and, Kesavan, p.679.

145. Tanino, p.39; and, Kesavan, p.679.

146. The People's Daily reported on January 5, 1989 that the amount of foreign debt owed to Japan by China totalled US\$49 billion. As cited in Ijiri, p.659.

147. Tanino, p.32.

148. Kesavan, p.670.

149. Barry Buzan, "Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles," International Affairs, 64, 4 (Autumn 1988), pp.557-574.

150. Buzan, p.558; Hong-Nack, p.410; Ijiri, pp.644-48; Asai Motofumi, "Japan's China Policy - A Pattern of Consistency," in George Hicks, Ed., The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen, (Chicago: St.James P, 1990), p.302; and, Ienga Saburo, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," International Security, 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp.311-33. For an indication of the still-present Chinese sensitivities to the issue of responsibility for World War Two, see Beijing Review, 32, 10 (March 6-12, 1989), pp.10-12.

151. On August 15, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the Japanese surrender, Japanese PM Nakasone, in his official capacity as prime minister, visited the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine in Tokyo. The Shrine houses Japan's 2.5 million war dead, including Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime Prime Minister. The Chinese government denounced the visit and Chinese students demonstrated on campuses throughout the country. The students demonstrated against the Nakasone's visit and, more importantly, the 'economic invasion' of China by Japanese consumer goods. Hong-Nack, p.410; Ijiri, p.648-52; Motofumi, p.303; Whiting, p.45; and, Whiting and Jianfei, p.116.

152. This refers to the ownership of a student dormitory in Kyoto. The dormitory was rented to students from China during the war and was purchased in 1952 by Taiwan. When Japan switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1972, ownership remained with Taiwan. Subsequently, through a series of court cases, ownership has shifted from Taiwan to China to Taiwan. The issue was still festering when Li Peng visited Japan in April, 1989. See, Hong-Nack, pp.411-2; Ijiri, pp.652-56; and, Beijing Review, 32, 17 (April 24-30, 1989), p.10.

153. These islands have been administered by Tokyo since the early 1970s when Washington turned them over to Japan along with Okinawa. In 1978, the two sides agreed to leave the matter unresolved in favour of signing the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. Vast oil reserves are believed to be under the islands in the East China Sea. Whiting, p.48.

154. Manning, p.48. Also see, Jun Liu, "Japan: Military Budget a Blow to Peace," Beijing Review, 31, 3 (January 18-24, 1988), p.14.

155. As cited in Hong-Nack, p.416.

156. See Chapter Two, note 142, for more on the development loan packages offered.

157. Hong-Nack, p.416.

158. As cited in Hong-Nack, pp.415-6.

159. Whiting and Jianfei, p.109.

160. Hong-Nack, p.417; and, Beijing Review, 32, 18 (May 1-7, 1989), p.14.

161. Beijing Review, 32, 17 (April 24-30, 1989), p.10.

162. Although the actual passing out of favours occurred under the previous administration of Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-87), it was not until Takeshita had assumed office that the scandal became public. Some of those implicated in the scandal, along with PM Takeshita, were Kiichi Miyazawa (Finance Minister and Vice Prime Minister), Shintaro Abe (Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party), and Michio Watanabe (Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the LDP). See, Takeshige Kunimasa, "Uno Sosuke and the Windfall of Crisis," Japan Quarterly, 36, 3 (July-September 1989), pp.252-55.

163. Kunimasa, p.252. The first choice to replace Takeshita was Masayoshi Ito, Chairman of the LDP Executive Council. When asked to become prime minister Ito presented the party executive with three conditions upon which he would consider the request. The LDP party leadership could not agree to Ito's conditions. A number of other candidates were also considered for the post before Sosuke Uno was decided upon, including the former PM Takeo Fukuda.

164. Kunimasa, p.253.

165. Washington Post, June 1, 1989; and, New York Times,
June 3, 1989.

CHAPTER THREE

DOMESTIC-LEVEL BEFORE TIANANMEN

An understanding of the Canada-China relationship prior to the events of June 1989 is required if one is to grasp fully the changes in that relationship because of those events. Prior to 1989, the human rights situation in the People's Republic had little if any impact on Sino-Canadian relations. It was regarded more as a "condition" of, than a problem in the bilateral relationship.¹ This chapter provides evidence that, prior to the events of June 1989, those domestic forces within Canada, state and societal, pressing for human rights considerations to be given greater weight in the foreign policy decision-making calculus were largely absent from the debate concerning Canada's relationship with the PRC. To this end, the first part of the chapter outlines those forces pressing for human rights to become a prominent feature in Canadian foreign policy. This is followed by a discussion of Canada's relationship with China and Canada's preoccupation with fostering good relations with the PRC primarily for commercial reasons. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the Canadian response to the student movement in Beijing before the incident at Tiananmen

Square.

Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy

It was not until the late 1970s that Canada acknowledged "a moral and legal obligation" to promote human rights both at home and abroad.² The approach then followed in Ottawa was "to determine the relative weight of human rights considerations in the light of overall objectives in particular circumstances".³ In this context of trying to "assimilate human rights considerations into the broader matrix of foreign policy"⁴ on a case-by-case basis, it is not surprising that Terence A. Keenleyside and Patricia Taylor found Canada's human rights policy to be "dubious[ly] selectiv[e]...in taking limited measures against some, but not all, states which it and the international community at large ha[d] acknowledged as serious offenders".⁵

With the publication of three documents in 1986 and 1987, the Mulroney government elevated the salience of human rights considerations in Canada's foreign policy.⁶ In its response to the report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations (i.e. the Hockin-Simard committee) human rights were declared a "fundamental, integral part of Canadian foreign policy".⁷ Several

initiatives were taken to demonstrate the Mulroney government's commitment to enhancing the place of human rights in Canadian foreign policy including, *inter alia*, linking levels of official development assistance (ODA) with a state's human rights record,⁸ implementing a training programme in human rights for Department of External Affairs (External) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) officials,⁹ creating a human rights unit within CIDA, and developing a manual for human rights reporting for use by External officials at posts abroad in order to facilitate the preparation of annual reports of the human rights records of all states receiving Canadian aid.¹⁰

The increased importance attached to human rights considerations was the result of numerous factors both international and domestic. At the international level, Canada had been an active participant in the development of the international human rights regime centred in the United Nations (UN).¹¹ Beginning with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Canada has signed all the major UN covenants and conventions concerning human rights. In addition, Canada has participated in the various UN bodies that deal with human rights issues, including the Human Rights Committee and the Commission on Human Rights.¹² In

short, Canada has been a "strong supporter of and an active participant in the work of the United Nations on human rights".¹³

The strong support of the international human rights regime by Canada was, in part, a response to the increasing awareness of the particularly egregious character of human rights violations occurring throughout the world in places such as Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Kampuchea and Uganda, as well as the continued racist policies of apartheid operating in South Africa. This increasing awareness of human rights violations occurring throughout the world also was due to the emergence of what Kathryn Sikkink has referred to as an international "human rights issue-network".¹⁴ The increased attention accorded human rights concerns in the United States Congress beginning in the early 1970s also drew attention to the above abuses.¹⁵ Further raising the awareness of Canadians to rights issues were the debates within Canada concerning constitutional change and, in particular, those pertaining to the entrenchment of a Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.¹⁶ As a result of the increased awareness of rights issues within Canada and rights violations outside of Canada, societal pressure for a stronger emphasis on human rights concerns in Canada's foreign policy grew.

The extent of this growth was such that, by the mid-1980s, Cranford Pratt wrote of a "counter-consensus" that was "particularly active" in pressing the government to be more sensitive to ethical considerations in its foreign policy.¹⁷ This "substantial cluster of groups" argued that Canadians, and the government that represents them, have "ethical obligations...[that] extend beyond Canada's borders".¹⁸ While these groups were active in raising domestic concern for human rights and in keeping human rights on the foreign policy agenda of decision-makers, their influence was restricted primarily to making recommendations to parliamentary committees and to consultations with External and CIDA officials.¹⁹

The increased attention of Parliament and Parliamentarians to human rights concerns was another domestic source of pressure for a more human-rights oriented foreign policy. In particular, the activities of Parliamentary Committees raised the profile of human rights considerations in Canada's foreign policy.²⁰ For example, during its one year tenure, 385 organisations and businesses and 306 individuals appeared as witnesses before the Hockin-Simard committee, and an additional 568 organisations and businesses and 630 individuals submitted briefs.²¹ While not to the extent of Parliamentary

Committees, some Parliamentarians have focussed attention on human rights issues in Canada's foreign policy.²² As well as focussing the public's attention on Canadian foreign policy, the recommendations of the reports of the committees and the activities of Parliamentarians have had to be responded to thereby focussing governmental and bureaucratic attention on the issue. Therefore, not only did Parliamentary activities confirm the public's interest in human rights considerations as a component of Canada's foreign policy, but they also "laid the groundwork for, . . . , a more prominent and systematic role for human rights in Canadian foreign policy-making".²³

A final reason why human rights considerations assumed greater importance in the late 1980s was that both Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney made a commitment to the furtherance of human rights internationally. This commitment was most evident by their implementing a range of sanctions in reaction to the continuation of the practice of apartheid in South Africa. The approach embraced by Mulroney and Clark helped to create a "progressive image" both within Canada and internationally that Canada under their leadership was committed to the propagation of human rights internationally.²⁴

While human rights considerations assumed a more prominent position in Canada's foreign policy after 1987, a sizeable "rhetoric gap" remained.²⁵ Canada's verbal declarations of concern were not backed up by consistent action. Hampering efforts to bring human rights considerations to the forefront of Canadian policy was the "recurrent reluctance" of External officials to "give prominence to human rights" issues.²⁶ While Clark had "clearly set a positive tone concerning human rights" within External, there was "minimal understanding of the role that human rights could play in formulating and conditioning" Canada's foreign policy due to a lack of administrative mechanisms to "ensure consistent consideration" of human rights issues.²⁷ Overriding concern for human rights were the "largely unchallenged presumptions" that framed decision-making within External that stressed harmonious relations with the United States, economic and strategic interests, as well as considerations of sovereignty.²⁸

In sum, human rights considerations assumed greater importance in Canada's foreign policy as a result of pressures from both the international and domestic level. With respect to the former, Canada supported firmly the human rights activities of the UN, while at the latter,

human rights concerns increased due to public, parliamentary, and executive interest. Devoid of executive leadership, however, "only perfunctory effort" was made to include human rights considerations in the decision-making calculus by External officials.²⁹

Human Rights in the Canada-China Relationship

Turning to Canada's response to the human rights environment in China, international pressures worked against a forceful Canadian human rights policy. As presented in Chapter Two, the aversion of the US and Japan to press China on its human rights record was representative of a general reluctance on the part of the international community to criticise the PRC for its treatment of its citizens. At the domestic level, efforts to bring human rights considerations to the forefront of Canada's China policy were hampered by the absence of those pressing for human rights to be accorded a higher priority in Canada's foreign policy and the presence of those stressing the increased attractiveness of the PRC as a market and outlet for Canadian goods and services as a result of the economic reforms of the 1980s.

Lacking credible evidence regarding the extent of the population affected and the brutality of the measures

inflicted upon the Chinese people by their government, there was little that Canada or any country could do about the human rights situation in China. Proof of the dearth of reliable evidence concerning human rights abuses in the PRC can be found in a 1985 dispatch from the Beijing embassy to Ottawa. In the dispatch, Embassy officials reported in broad terms of China remaining "repressive", and of the Chinese leadership's "willingness to take necessary steps to limit political expression". It also reported that "unknown numbers of political prisoners [were] still in detention in labour camps and prisons" throughout the country.³⁰

As well, the activities of the Chinese propaganda apparatus made it more difficult for foreign organizations and governments to collect accurate data on China. Fang Lizhi wrote that "about once each decade, the true face of history is thoroughly erased from the minds of Chinese society".³¹ In this manner, the Chinese Communist Party, through its policy of "Forgetting History", has been successful in keeping its "nefarious record of human rights violations...banned from memory and discussion inside China,...[and] largely overlooked by the rest of the world".³² The Chinese propaganda machinery was thus successful in covering up human rights abuses or at least

in raising doubts in the West as to the number of Chinese affected and the harshness of their punishment.

The Canadian media's biased coverage of the People's Republic over the years immediately preceding Tiananmen was a further impediment to obtaining accurate information on China. In general, prior to 1989, the Canadian print media portrayed China to its readership in an "almost exclusively positive" and "upbeat tone".³³ Negative aspects of China were down-played while the positive aspects were stressed, causing the Canadian populace to have a distorted impression of China. The effect of this heavily positive reportage on the Canadian public and policy-makers was to make China, prior to 1989, "a country of almost hypnotic allure".³⁴

Lacking a credible basis from which to draw information on China due to a paucity of reliable sources, to the efficient operations of the Chinese propaganda apparatus and to biased media coverage, the Canadian general public was not aware of the extent of the human rights abuses occurring in China. It is true that there were occasional stories in print, on radio or on television portraying the abuses of people, but these "prisoners were undefined hordes of people...[they] were nameless, faceless and anonymous".³⁵ As well, there were no groups in Canada

pushing the Canadian leadership to call China to task for its treatment of its citizens.³⁶

Prior to Tiananmen, the Chinese-Canadian community had remained "relatively quiescent" in debates on Canadian foreign policy.³⁷ A reason for this quiescence had been the community's "extraordinarily fragmented" character with any form of unity being "rare and precarious".³⁸ Evidence of the community's inability to unite can be found in the absence of a mention of a Chinese-Canadian interest group in Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon's survey of Canadian interest groups.³⁹ Divisions within the Chinese-Canadian community stem from many sources: demographic (old versus young); place of origin (mainland China versus Hong Kong); and, political (Kuomintang versus PRC factions). In this struggle, it has been speculated that the PRC has used diplomatic personnel to pressure Chinese in Canada to join various Chinese-Canadian organizations with pro-PRC sentiments. Tactics of intimidation and economic coercion were reportedly used to ensure membership in these organizations. Through these bodies the PRC attempted to present its views, disguised as those of the Chinese-Canadian community, to Canadian decision-makers. In so doing, the PRC wanted to portray itself in a more positive light to Canadian officials.⁴⁰

As for human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), while these groups did constitute a "counter-consensus" they were in the process of forming the Network on International Human Rights (NIHR) from a "weak and largely disorganized policy community".⁴¹ Moreover, of the twenty-eight groups that attended the 1988 pre-External consultation meeting of the NIHR, none concerned itself with the human rights violations occurring in China specifically.⁴² There were groups, such as Amnesty International and Oxfam, that were active in pressing Ottawa to increase the salience of human rights considerations in Canadian foreign policy. None of these groups, however, concerned itself solely with human rights violations occurring in the People's Republic.

In addition to a general lack of awareness of the extent of the violations of human rights taking place in China and the absence of any group pressing the Mulroney government to call the PRC to task for its treatment of its citizens, there was an overall government neglect of the persisting human rights abuses in China. In a study of Canada-China relations covering the period 1949-82, Paul M. Evans and Daphne Taras found that "China's internal conditions" were addressed in the House of Commons on only 27 occasions.⁴³ This corresponded to a mere 1.0 per cent

of Parliamentary discussion on China, with the country's domestic conditions ranking last among seven specific issues addressed by members of parliament (MPs). The other issues were trade (22.6 per cent of the total), Canada-China exchanges (7.7), recognition (7.2), China's external relations (6.6), Taiwan (6.4), and United Nations admission (3.4). Moreover, during the period in which China's most egregious abuses of human rights occurred, the Cultural Revolution, the House of Commons discussed the domestic situation in China a mere 7 times (0.5 per cent of the discussion related to China). As well, between 1974 and 1982, there was no mention of China's internal conditions in Hansard, meaning that the 1976 Tiananmen Square incident, as well as the 1978-79 Xidan Democracy Wall movement and the clampdown thereafter passed unnoticed or were at least not issues of enough importance to capture the attention of MPs. Similarly, the demonstrations commenced in the wake of Hu Yaobang's death on April 15, 1989 received scant attention from MPs. The issue was only broached twice prior to June 4 and then in a cursory manner.⁴⁴ The lack of comment in the House of Commons concerning the internal conditions in China was indicative of an overall government inertia regarding human rights in China.

Proof of executive indifference to the persisting human rights abuses in the PRC can be found in Prime Minister Mulroney not mentioning the subject of human rights when he visited China in 1986. Instead, he "delegated the thorny task to lower functionaries" and they were "coy on the human rights question", addressing it "not as a government concern, but as a concern to some Canadians".⁴⁵ Influencing Mulroney's views of China was his close relationship with Paul Desmarais, the Chief Executive Officer of Power Corporation and the principal founder of the Canada-China Trade Council.⁴⁶ Desmarais had been active in China since 1978 when the Chinese government had "formally invited" him to assemble a delegation of Canadian corporate leaders to travel to the PRC in an effort to increase trade links.⁴⁷ Later, in 1985, Desmarais used his close ties to Mulroney to plan the visit of Rong Yiren, Chairman of the China International Trade and Investment Company (CITIC), to Canada. Desmarais organized the visit directly with the Prime Minister, bypassing External. In fact, External was not asked to provide any briefings or to contribute to the visit by the "extremely powerful and influential figure" in the Chinese leadership.⁴⁸ Still later, when Mulroney was informed of the various opportunities for Canadian businesses in China,

prior to his 1986 visit, he replied that "no" deals were being made and he referred solely to the failure of Desmarais, to that point in time, to sell the Chinese a large pulp and paper project.⁴⁹ Mulroney did not seem to be aware of agreements that had been made, or were in the process of being made by, *inter alia*, Babcock and Wilcox⁵⁰, Bombardier⁵¹, Canadian Marconi⁵², Lavalin⁵³, Litton Systems⁵⁴, Mitel⁵⁵, Northern Telecom⁵⁶, and SPAR⁵⁷. Power Corporation later entered into a joint venture agreement with the CITIC to operate the Celgar pulp mill in Castlegar, British Columbia, as well as an agreement to operate a pulp mill in China.⁵⁸ Having invested a substantial amount of time and money in developing commercial links with China, Desmarais would have stressed the positive benefits to the Chinese people that flow from increased trade links in talks with Mulroney on Canada's relations with China.

For Clark, China seems to have been a country of little interest.⁵⁹ While a host of other government officials travelled to China, including Mulroney and Jean Sauve, then Governor General, Clark did not.⁶⁰ A point that was not lost on the Chinese who wanted to know why Clark, an "active minister", had not visited Beijing but had visited all other capitals of importance. Chinese officials made it "abundantly clear" to those in the

Beijing embassy, in late 1987, that they expected an official visit from the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1988.⁶¹ That visit, however, never happened. There are two main reasons for Clark's lack of interest in China. First, as will be demonstrated below, the Canada-China relationship was primarily a commercial one, a subject Clark was "consistently reluctant to take up" and one that he left to John Crosbie, Minister for International Trade.⁶² Second, Clark's interest in ending the system of apartheid in South Africa resulted in his spending "an extraordinary amount of time" on that issue "at the expense of other foreign policy concerns".⁶³

Finally, China's human rights record had not been an important component of Canada's China policy because the Canada-China association was often regarded as an important, even a 'special relationship'. This 'special relationship' was viewed as having preceded even official recognition of the PRC.⁶⁴ From the outset of Mao Zedong's tenure in 1949, Canada favoured recognition of the new government in Beijing, but the commencement of hostilities on the Korean peninsula prevented this from happening.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, prior to recognition the "danger of losing contact with the Chinese [was] a theme more stressed by Canadian spokesmen than [was] a fear of exposure to

Communist propaganda".⁶⁶ However, hampering Canada's ability to proceed with recognition was, as John Holmes wrote, the "fact of American policy".⁶⁷ American policy was based on the "fact" that the communist states were seeking to expand their influence by fomenting proletarian uprisings in non-communist states, and American policy-makers responded to the communist challenge by attempting to 'contain' communist states both in their geographic boundaries and in their international influence. In general, Canadian foreign policy decision-makers sought to bridge the ideological chasm separating Canada from China and, thereby, to bring about a more peaceful international environment, but they were halted by the overriding reality of American resistance to such an approach.

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in October 1970, Canada continued to foster the notion of a 'special relationship' with China. Of particular importance to Canada was the further development of the Canada-China trade relationship. Another important factor in the bilateral relationship was the evolution of an aid program for China. Finally, visits by high-ranking Chinese and Canadian politicians and public servants, as well as cultural, academic and athletic exchanges increased the personal linkages between both countries.

With respect to the trade relationship, economic linkages between the two countries pre-dated the 1970 Canadian recognition of the PRC. Indeed, former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker initiated wheat sales to China in 1960.⁶⁵ Subsequently, Canadian exports rose from \$4.3 million in 1959 to \$125.5 million in 1961. In 1971, Canadian exports to China totalled \$204.1 million, with grain comprising \$190.7 million or 93.4 per cent of exports (see Table 3 below). Exports increased by 26.7 per cent in 1972 to total \$258.6 million, of which \$227.3 million or 87.9 per cent was wheat shipments.

After the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in January and September 1976 respectively, a struggle ensued for the leadership of the PRC and it was not until 1979 that effective control was exercised by Deng Xiaoping. Upon coming to power, Deng implemented a program of sweeping reforms that affected "virtually every aspect of political and economic life in the PRC" and that represented the "most decisive shift in Chinese society since the communist accession to power in 1949".⁶⁹ The "Four Modernizations Plan" was announced at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. In this Plan, the Chinese leaders sought to re-equip China's agricultural, defence, industrial, and science and

TABLE 3
CANADA'S TRADE WITH CHINA: 1961-1988
(in millions \$C)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>EXPORTS</u>	<u>IMPORTS</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL WORLD EXPORTS</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL WORLD IMPORTS</u>	<u>WHEAT EXPORTS</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL CHINA EXPORTS</u>
1961	125.5	3.2	2.2	0.05	122.7	97.7
1962	147.4	4.5	2.3	0.07	147.2	99.9
1963	104.7	5.2	1.5	0.1	104.4	99.7
1968	163.2	23.4	1.2	0.2	157.8	96.7
1969	122.4	27.4	0.8	0.2	119.8	97.9
1970	142.0	19.0	0.9	0.1	121.6	85.6
1971	204.1	23.3	1.2	0.2	190.7	93.4
1972	258.6	48.4	1.3	0.3	227.3	87.9
1973	287.7	52.9	1.2	0.2	186.8	64.9
1978	503.4	94.6	1.0	0.2	347.5	69.0
1979	596.1	167.5	0.9	0.3	411.5	69.0
1980	865.4	155.1	1.2	0.2	527.4	60.9
1981	1017.6	220.0	1.3	0.3	686.6	67.5
1982	1228.8	203.7	1.5	0.3	736.6	59.9
1983	1605.0	245.9	1.8	0.3	916.9	57.1
1984	1236.5	333.5	1.1	0.3	602.2	45.4
1985	1259.3	403.5	1.1	0.4	445.6	35.4
1986	1097.5	566.5	0.9	0.5	353.5	32.2
1987	1432.1	812.2	1.3	0.8	675.5	47.2
1988	2596.4	955.4	2.4	1.0	1665.9	64.2

SOURCE: Statistics Canada, Exports By Country and Imports By Country, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, published annually).

technology infrastructure with state-of-the-art techniques and manufactures.

In 1979, in response to the Chinese enunciation of the "Four Modernizations Plan," Canada, through the Export

Development Corporation (EDC), extended a \$2 billion line-of-credit to China. Up to that time this was the largest line-of-credit ever awarded to a foreign country and it was only one of two extended by Canada in the 1980s.⁷⁰ It is interesting to note that this further cementing of the Canada-China economic relationship happened at a time when the Chinese leadership was in the midst of clamping down on the Xidan Democracy Wall movement (see Chapter Two).

China's 'Open Door' was pushed ajar a little farther in December 1984 when the "Four Modernizations Plan" was expanded. The Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang, in an article in The Atlantic magazine, wrote that, "for the purpose of speeding up China's modernization", the PRC was "ready to develop trade with all countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, to import advanced technology and key equipment from abroad, to draw on foreign management experience, and to make use of foreign funds".⁷¹ China later identified the importation of advanced technologies for the energy, telecommunications and raw materials sectors; the importation of thermal, hydro and nuclear power generation equipment; enhancement of mining and mechanization capabilities; solutions for transportation difficulties; and the development of oil and natural gas reserves, as priorities for its economic development.⁷²

All of the above priorities set for China's development were in market areas where Canadian businesses were capable of competing internationally.

When Mulroney returned to Canada after his 1986 visit to China, the government decided that the time had come for Canada to fully review its relations with China. The volume and dollar value of transactions conducted by Canadian business with the PRC had become overwhelming.⁷³ In conducting the review, External turned to those knowledgeable in Canada-China relations in the academic and business communities for input. Consultations between External and academics had been occurring sporadically since 1984, while those between External and businesspersons had been happening since Jean Luc Pepin led a trade mission to the PRC in 1971.⁷⁴ The review process ended in April 1987 with the articulation of the "Canadian Strategy for China". The plan was to "ensure a focussed, co-ordinated and dynamic policy approach to Canada's relations with China".⁷⁵ The new "strategy" was to build upon the recent achievements in the Canada-China relationship, including China being targeted as a "priority market" in the National Trade Strategy, the opening of a Consulate General in Shanghai, and the doubling of CIDA's bilateral aid contribution to China to \$200 million between

1987 and 1992.⁷⁶

Also included in the "Canadian Strategy for China" was the \$350 million concessional financing line within the EDC's \$2 billion line-of-credit for China that Mulroney had announced during his 1986 visit to China. The concessional line was required because of the difficulties Canadian businesses were facing in China including the continuing perception of Canada by Chinese officials as a provider of agricultural goods due to the dominant position of the Canadian Wheat Board and the Saskatchewan Potash Corporation within the bilateral trade relationship.⁷⁷ As an indication of the interest of Canadian businesses in the China market, a total of \$472.6 million of loans had been obtained under the EDC's \$2 billion line-of-credit for China, in the three years preceding Tiananmen.⁷⁸

Joint-ventures also played a role in fostering the Canada-China 'special relationship'. In addition to Power Corporation's agreement with CITIC mentioned above, Northern Telecom became involved in a joint-venture to produce digital watches and the Nova Corporation in a variety of energy and petrochemical projects. Numerous joint-venture hotels were also launched. The attractiveness of the joint-venture option became more apparent in 1988 when External published a guide book for

Canadian business entitled Joint Ventures with the People's Republic of China: A Primer for Canadian Business.⁷⁹

The Chinese have also been affiliated with Canadian businesses in Canada (e.g., the CITIC-Power Corporation joint-venture in the Celgar pulp mill in Castlegar B.C.). As a result of both the Canadian government's and business' efforts, by 1989, over 30 Canadian companies with approximately \$240 million in capital were operating in China⁸⁰ and 40 Chinese companies were operating in Canada in industries as diverse as fox-breeding, furniture, petrochemicals, pulp and paper, and coal.⁸¹

While numerous efforts were undertaken to diversify the Canada-China trade relationship, the sale of Canadian wheat still dominated (see Table 3). As an indication of the continued importance of wheat in the bilateral commercial relationship, in 1988, one-in-three Canadian farmers' income was tied to grain sales to the PRC.⁸² Moreover, the benefits from the bilateral commercial relationship largely accrued to western Canada. Of the \$2.6 billion that Canada exported to the PRC in 1988, \$2.3 billion or 88 per cent originated in western Canada. That same year, a ranking of the provinces in terms of exports to the People's Republic would have listed as the top four: Saskatchewan (\$1.1 billion); Alberta (\$642 million);

British Columbia (\$270 million); and, Manitoba (\$248 million). If the ordering was done on a percentage of overall trade basis, those same four provinces would have also topped that list. The importance of the bilateral commercial relationship to Saskatchewan and Alberta was further highlighted by China ranking second as a market for exports behind only the US for Saskatchewan and third behind the US and Japan for Alberta.⁹³

The results of the numerous efforts to foster more extensive economic linkages between the two countries are displayed graphically in Table 3. By 1988, Canadian exports to China had climbed to \$2.6 billion with China accounting for 2.4 per cent of Canada's worldwide exports. It also ranked in that year as Canada's fourth largest export market. Throughout the period 1960 to 1988, Canada regularly enjoyed a surplus in trade with the PRC, reaching a high of \$1.6 billion in 1988. Concurrent with the increase in Canadian exports to China was the steady expansion of Canadian imports from China so that the balance in Canada's favour which at one time exceeded a 10 to 1 ratio had altogether disappeared by 1989. In short, an important commercial relationship gradually developed between the two countries.

Another important aspect of the Canada-China

relationship was the extension of Canadian bilateral assistance to China through CIDA starting in 1981.⁸⁴ Cabinet's decision to commence a bilateral aid program to China was influenced by China's acceptance of assistance from multilateral sources.⁸⁵ Throughout the seventies, Canada and China had conducted a large number of scientific and technology exchanges.⁸⁶ Furthermore, the International Development Research Council began providing assistance to China in 1979 after it "concluded an agreement with the PRC to establish China's first bilateral development assistance program with a Western country since the Communist victory in 1949".⁸⁷ The announcement by the Chinese leadership of the adoption of the "Four Modernizations Plan" meant that China would require greater technology and knowledge transference than hitherto had been the case. For China to develop according to the "Plan", it required massive inflows of both technical knowledge and capital.

Canadian bilateral aid disbursements to China soon grew to comprise one of the largest bilateral aid components within CIDA, from a modest beginning of \$4 million in 1981-82 (see Table 4). Within four years, China became an important recipient of Canadian aid, receiving \$8.37 million in 1984-85, ranking China sixth in Asia and 24th in the world as a recipient of Canadian bilateral aid.

TABLE 4

CIDA BILATERAL AID DISBURSEMENTS TO CHINA:1981-1989

YEAR	CHINA (in mmm)	% of ASIA	% of WORLD	AID RANK:	
				Asia	World
1981-82	4.00	1.6	0.6	7	38
1982-83	0.02	0.01	0.003	12	104
1983-84	0.09	0.03	0.01	9	96
1984-85	8.37	2.5	0.96	6	24
1985-86	15.46	4.4	1.9	6	16
1986-87	27.04	7.6	2.9	6	10
1987-88	35.30	8.1	3.1	5	6
1988-89	38.91	8.4	3.1	4	6

SOURCE: CIDA, Annual Reports, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, published annually).

By 1988-89, China had jumped to fourth position in the region and sixth in the world, with bilateral disbursements totalling \$38.91 million. Within less than a decade, Canada's aid program to China had evolved to become "one of the most valued instruments" in the Canada-China relationship.⁸⁸

Also included in cultivating the 'special relationship' was the increase in visits to both countries by government officials, as well as those of a cultural, academic and athletic nature. In October 1973, Trudeau became the first Canadian head of state to visit China.⁸⁹ Trudeau's familiarity with China and its leaders, as a

result of his previous sojourns to the Middle Kingdom in 1949 and 1960, was evident during his 1973 visit when he met with both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong.⁹⁰ The congenial spirit of the meetings and the amicable relations between the two countries led Zhou to sign a bilateral trade agreement, something that "as a rule" he never did.⁹¹ In addition, the two sides signed agreements and understandings in the areas of medicine, culture, sport, education, science and technology, consular matters and the re-unification of families.

As part of the reforms instituted by Deng in 1978, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Canada in January 1984. During his visit, Zhao became the first Communist leader to ever address Parliament.⁹² Following Zhao's visit to Canada a number of other high-level Chinese officials made calls, including Li Xiannian, the President of the PRC, who visited in 1985.⁹³

In the year following Li Xiannian's visit to Canada and thirteen years after Trudeau's visit, Prime Minister Mulroney travelled to China to signal that Canada was still interested in fostering the 'special relationship'. Mulroney's visit was followed the next year, 1987, by one from Jean Sauve, the Governor-General.

In addition to official visits, cultural, academic and

athletic exchanges were fostered in an effort to increase the people-to-people linkages of ordinary citizens of both countries. There had, in fact, been an increasing number of these exchanges since the 1970 recognition, leading Joe Clark to state in 1989 that exchanges between Canadians and Chinese had become "common".⁹⁴ Of note was the decision in 1976 by the Trudeau government to not allow Taiwanese athletes to represent China in the Montreal Olympics. Taiwanese athletes could participate only as representatives of Taiwan.⁹⁵ The Canadian government effectively withstood pressure from the Ford Administration in the US, the International Olympic Committee and the Taiwanese government to allow athletes from Taiwan to participate as the representatives from China. The ramifications of this act on Canada-China relations are difficult to ascertain. However, the Chinese government was "grateful" for Canada's support on the issue.⁹⁶ This was a tangible signal to China by the Canadian government of its commitment to the PRC.

The practice of twinning Canadian and Chinese provinces and cities also played a role in further developing the Canada-China relationship by fostering people-to-people linkages. For example, the Canadian province of Ontario is twinned with Jiangsu; Alberta with

Heilongjiang; Saskatchewan with Jilin; British Columbia with Shandong; and Manitoba with Liaoning. The Canadian city of Edmonton is twinned with Harbin; Toronto with Chongqing; Calgary with Daqing; Saskatoon with Shijiazhuang; Victoria with Suzhou; and Regina with Jinan.⁹⁷

The closeness of relations between Canada and China prior to 1989 is evidenced by the comments of two noted China observers, Allen Abel and Earl Drake. When he was a correspondent for the Globe and Mail in Beijing, Allen Abel noted that Canadian officials were "hard-pressed to find a single bone of contention lodged in the craw of Sino-Canadian relations".⁹⁸ In an interview shortly after being named Canadian Ambassador to China, Earl Drake remarked that Canada's political relationship with China was "excellent" and that there were "no standing political problems" between the two and that Canada and China "share[d] general objectives".⁹⁹

The preceding analysis suggests human rights considerations had little if any impact on Canada's relations with China prior to June 1989. Those actors pressing to elevate the importance of human rights considerations in Canada's foreign policy were largely absent from the debates concerning Canada's relationship

with the PRC. Working against an active Canadian human rights policy towards China was the general reluctance of other states to allow human rights concerns to impact their relationship with the PRC, the efficient operation of the Chinese propaganda apparatus which was successful in raising doubts as to the number of persons arrested and the harshness of their treatment, the generally positive and upbeat media coverage of China by the Canadian media, the lack of an organised interest group pressing the Mulroney government to call China to task for its treatment of its citizens, and a lack of sustained interest in the human rights situation in the PRC by parliamentary and executive actors. There were also those in both the Canadian farming and business communities who had very profitable relations with the PRC and would have actively opposed any government interference in the bilateral relationship due to concerns over the human rights situation in the PRC. As well, there were bureaucratic actors who had worked hard for many years to develop the commercial and development aspects of the relationship and who believed China was 'opening up' and becoming more western. The end result was that, prior to June 1989, the Canadian government was relatively quiet on the question of human rights in China.

Canadian Response to the Student Movement

In Ottawa, soon after the demonstrations began in Beijing, External officials started to meet and discuss the situation in China and the possible future scenarios that might play out there. Within External, responsibility for Canada's political relations with the PRC fell to the North Asia Relations Branch while responsibility for Canada's trade relations with China fell to the East Asia Trade Development Branch. A 24-hour watch was established in External and a crisis management team was "loosely assembled" from officials of the North Asia Relations Branch in an effort to keep the government informed of the events happening in China.¹⁰⁰ At this time a larger intradepartmental group, the Task Force, was also formed.¹⁰¹ The Task Force was made up of officials from the North Asia Relations Branch, the East Asian Trade Development Division, the Asia Pacific Programs Division, the Communications and Culture Branch, the Political and International Security Branch, the Legal, Consular and Immigration Affairs Branch, and the Canadian International Development Agency.¹⁰² As well, there was an interdepartmental China Working Group (CWG) comprised of officials from the departments of Agriculture, Communications, Defence, Employment and Immigration,

Energy, Finance, Fisheries, Health and Welfare, Justice, Regional Industrial Expansion, Science and Technology, and Transport, along with officials in the Canadian Commercial Corporation, Investment Canada, the Export Development Corporation, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Privy Council Office.¹⁰³

During this period, the crisis management team began immediately to compile a list of all Canadians in the PRC and to devise an evacuation plan for those Canadians should the need arise. The Canadian Embassy contacted Canadians in the PRC and advised them to leave the country as soon as possible. The Task Force assisted in locating Canadians in China, getting them to airports, and arranging military and civilian flights out of the PRC.¹⁰⁴

In order to keep informed of the happenings in China during the chaos, an internal classified document entitled "China Daily" was circulated by the crisis management team to those ministers whose departments had an interest in China. Because of a news blackout in China from mid-April onward, officials in External relied heavily on information supplied by Earl Drake, the Canadian Ambassador in Beijing. In addition to providing information on the events occurring in the PRC, the document also examined the policy implications of the events for Canada's China policy. For

most of the period, "China Daily" was published, as its name implies, once a day. However, at the height of the crisis, the document was being published three times per day.

In Beijing, Drake had warned Ottawa of the April 26 editorial and officials at the Embassy and External maintained a "watching brief".¹⁰⁵ In response to the April 26 editorial, the secretary of state for external affairs called on the Chinese government to exercise restraint and to avoid the use of force in managing the students.¹⁰⁶ This was the first such communication from the Canadian government to the Chinese government. With the concern over the possibility of violence in China growing, Canadian officials in Beijing conferred with officials from other Western governments. The Canadian ambassador was in "close touch" with his Australian counterpart and with several other ambassadors, including those from the US, Britain, Germany, India, and Sri Lanka.¹⁰⁷ Before June 4, the Western diplomats continued to make it known to their Chinese counterparts their desire for a peaceful resolution of the differences between the students and the Chinese leadership.

Early in 1989, External, as an indication of the continued amicable state of Canada-China relations, had

designated May 1989 as 'Friendship Month' between Canada and China. In accordance with the 'Friendship Month' designation, the Canadian Embassy in Beijing sought to create new, more diversified linkages between Canadian and Chinese businesses, and in this context the Embassy adopted the theme 'Sharing Our Future'.¹⁰⁸ The visit to Canada by NPC Chairman Wan Li was a further indication of the amicable state of Sino-Canadian relations in the pre-Tiananmen period. There is "no record" of discussion concerning the student demonstrations in Beijing even being broached in formal diplomatic talks. The Chairman was "treated with the quiet and routine courtesy" that had come to characterise Sino-Canadian relations.¹⁰⁹

To demonstrate the Canadian government's desire for a peaceful resolution to the demonstrations in Beijing, Joe Clark, in reaction to the announcement of martial law on May 20, "called on the Chinese leadership to exercise restraint and to avoid the use of force" in settling the situation. Clark commended the Chinese government's display of "considerable restraint" in dealing with the demonstrators up to that point in time.¹¹⁰ Even after martial law was declared, officials in the Canadian embassy in Beijing did not expect force to be used to resolve the crisis.¹¹¹

A belief in the ability of the Chinese leadership to resolve the crisis without bloodshed was also shared by most 'China-watchers' within Canada. For example, noted Sinologist, B.M. Frolic, in a column in the Globe and Mail, outlined six reasons why China could not turn back: (1) Chinese politics have been permanently transformed; (2) the army cannot be trusted; (3) fear is disappearing; (4) China's young people have shown that they are real revolutionaries; (5) economic change, sooner or later, leads to political reform; and, (6) the real cultural revolution is under way.¹¹²

After the declaration of martial law, some in Canada, particularly Chinese-Canadians and Chinese visa students, took to the streets to show their support for the demonstrators in China. In Toronto, on May 20, more than three hundred Chinese students gathered outside the Chinese consulate in an effort to present a list of demands to the Chinese consul.¹¹³ Nine days later, the site of the demonstrations moved to Nathan Phillips Square in downtown Toronto where 3,000 met to back the protestors in Beijing.¹¹⁴ On the same day, 2,000 Chinese-Canadians rallied in Vancouver to support the demonstrators.¹¹⁵ The Chinese Consul-General, on June 2, would not accept a petition supporting the democracy movement in China signed

by 2,200 residents of Vancouver. The assistant consul-general informed the crowd that the Chinese leadership wanted "stability" and he expressed hope that the "overseas Chinese [would] not support the movement in Tiananmen Square".¹¹⁶

Conclusion

Since recognizing China in 1970, Canadians continued to be "optimistic" and "naive" about China, they "looked the other way" believing that "through diplomatic recognition" they "had encouraged a slow process of liberalization in China".¹¹⁷ As one official cogently summed up the Canada-China relationship prior to June 1989:

...the Canadian government, media and many sections of the public had looked at China with rose-coloured glasses. China was the home of a wonderful culture, fascinating economic and political experiments and a booming economy...[so] no-one ever asked about how many people suffered during the cultural revolution or how many Chinese were in jail because they dared to be Christians or to advocate democracy.¹¹⁸

In short, Canadians allowed themselves to be deceived about China because they "want[ed] to be deceived".¹¹⁹

The preceding analysis suggests that Canada's China policy prior to June 1989 was characterised by three factors. First, Canada's China policy was crafted, for the most part, by those in the public service. Ministerial and

Parliamentary involvement was sporadic and short-term. Second, the main societal actors in the policy community included the business and farming communities and academics. They were pushing for increased ties to the PRC. Chinese-Canadian and human rights non-governmental organizations were not active participants in the making of China policy. Finally, fostering closer Canada China relations was the primary consideration in formulating Canada's China policy. The continued development of the commercial relationship, the commencement of an aid program, and the increased personal links between citizens of the two countries can all be regarded as attempts to cultivate the 'special relationship'. The result of all this was that human rights considerations were a "condition" of, not a problem in, Sino-Canadian relations.

Similar to other states, human rights concerns had little if any impact on Canada's relations with the PRC prior to the Tiananmen Square massacre. In regarding the Canada-China relationship as 'special', Canadians in general, including the government, misperceived the PRC, creating an illusion of China as progressing towards the twin goals of 'freedom and democracy' when what Deng wanted was to increase the economic resources of the state while preserving political control.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Kingdon distinguishes between "conditions" and "problems" in the policy process as follows: "Conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we should do something about them. Problems are not simply the conditions or external events themselves; there is a perceptual, interpretive element". In short, "a condition is a problem when people want to change the condition, not necessarily when they have a solution". See, John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, (Ann Arbor: Harper Collins, 1984), p.115.
2. Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 78/13, October 26, 1978, p.1.
3. Canadian International Development Agency, Elements of Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1984), p.35.
4. Elements of Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy, p.35.
5. T.A. Keenleyside and Patricia Taylor, "The Impact of Human Rights Violations on the Conduct of Canadian Bilateral Relations: A Contemporary Dilemma," Behind the Headlines, 42, 2 (November 1984), p.25. In a study comparing Canadian bilateral aid disbursements with recipient states' human rights records, Keenleyside and Serkasevich found that approximately 70 per cent of Canadian bilateral aid was received by states with serious to extreme human rights violations and that 48.5 per cent of bilateral disbursements went to extreme violators of human rights. See, T.A. Keenleyside and Nola Serkasevich, "Canada's Aid and Human Rights Observance: Measuring the Relationship," International Journal, 44, 1 (Winter 1988-89), pp.138-69.
6. See Department of External Affairs, Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, November 1986); CIDA, Canadian International Development Assistance: To Benefit A Better World, Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, September 1987); and CIDA, Sharing Our Future: Canadian International Development Assistance, (Ottawa: Supply and

Services Canada, 1987).

7. Canada's International Relations, p.23. Also, see Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations Independence and Internationalism, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, June 1986).

8. Sharing Our Future, p.31.

9. Canada's International Relations, p.72. For more on training activities, see Allan McChesney, "Teaching Human Rights to Foreign Service Officers and Other Public Officials: Developments in Canada and Abroad," in Irving Brecher, Ed., Human Rights, Development, and Foreign Policy: Canadian Perspectives, (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989), pp.179-211.

10. For a more detailed discussion of the preparation of the manuals, see the Third Report of the Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons, Human Rights Considerations and Coherence in Canada's Foreign Policy, (Ottawa, June 1990).

11. For more on the U.N. and human rights, see, Philip Aliston, Ed., The United Nations and Human Rights : A Critical Appraisal, (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1992); David P. Forsythe, "The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1985," Political Science Quarterly, 100, 2 (Summer 1985), pp.249-69; and, A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merrills, Human Rights in the World, 4th ed. (Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 1996).

12. For a discussion of Canada's participation in these fora, see John W. Foster, "The UN Commission on Human Rights," and Cathal J. Nolan, "The Human Rights Committee," in Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, Eds., Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1988), pp.79-100 and 101-14 respectively.

13. Kathleen E. Mahoney, "Human Rights and Canada's Foreign Policy," International Journal, 47, 2 (Summer 1992), p.558.

14. See, Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," International Organization, 47, 3 (Summer 1993), pp.411-41. Also, see David Weissbrodt, "The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Implementation of Human Rights," Texas International Law Journal, 12, 2 and 3

(Spring-Summer 1977), pp.293-320; and, Laurie Wiseberg and Harry M. Scoble, "Recent Trends in the Expanding Universe of Nongovernmental Organizations Dedicated to the Protection of Human Rights," Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 8, (special issue 1979), pp.627-58.

15. See David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered, (Gainsville: U of Florida P, 1988).

16. For a discussion of the influence of international factors on human rights in Canada, see, Alan C. Cairns, Charter versus Federalism: The Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1992); Andrew F. Cooper and Leslie A. Pal, "Human Rights and Security: Canadian Foreign and Domestic Policy Dynamics," in G. Bruce Doern, Leslie A. Pal, and Brian W. Tomlin, Eds., Border Crossings: The Internationalization of Canadian Public Policy, (Toronto: Oxford UP, 1997), pp.207-36; Donald J. Fleming, "Canadian and International Human Rights Law: An Interrelationship," in Brecher, pp.91-114; and, Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989).

17. Cranford Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus," International Journal, 39, 1 (Winter 1983-84), p.118.

For a discussion of the development of the 'counter-consensus', see Robert O. Matthews, "The Christian Churches and Foreign Policy: An Assessment," in Bonnie Greene, Ed., Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy, (Toronto: Lorimer, 1990), pp.161-79; and, Brian K. Murphy, "Canadian NGOs and the Politics of Participation," in Jamie Swift and Brian Tomlinson, Eds., Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the Third World, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991), pp.161-212.

18. Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory," pp.117 and 127. For an interesting discussion linking domestic welfare policy and foreign assistance as a reflection of Canadian political culture, see Jean-Philippe Therien and Alain Noel, "Welfare Institutions and Foreign Aid: Domestic Foundations of Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 27, 3 (September 1994), pp.529-58.

19. Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, "A World of Difference? Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy," in The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics: Cases in Process and

Policy, 3rd ed., (Peterborough: Broadview P, 1994), p.239; and, Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making," in Matthews and Pratt, p.72. For an illuminating discussion on the human rights NGOs and Canadian foreign policy, see Leslie A. Pal, "Competing Paradigms in Policy Discourse: The Case of International Human Rights," Policy Sciences, 28 (1995), pp.185-207.

Beginning in 1979, External started holding consultations with human rights NGOs prior to the annual meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

20. See, Independence and Internationalism; House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1982); and House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, For Whose Benefit? Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987).

21. Canada's International Relations, p.1.

22. See, Cathal J. Nolan, "The Influence of Parliament on Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy," Human Rights Quarterly, 4, 3 (August 1985), p.381; and Gerald Schmitz and Victoria Berry, Human Rights: Canadian Policy Toward Developing Countries, (Ottawa: North-South Institute, Briefing 21, 1988), p.12.

23. Berry and McChesney, p.73.

24. Chris Brown, "Canada and Southern Africa 1989: Autonomy, Image and Capacity in Foreign Policy," in Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1989: The Challenge of Change, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1990), p.208. Also see, Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, "The Background to Canada's Activist Policy Against Apartheid: Theoretical and Political Implications," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 30, 3 (November 1992), pp.293-315; Margaret Doxey, "Constructive Internationalism: A Continuing Theme in Canadian Foreign Policy," The Round Table, 311, (1989), pp.288-304; Linda Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1997); ---, "Canada's South Africa Policy: Does it Live up to the Rhetoric?" CUSO Journal, (July 1990), pp.15-17; Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid, (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1995),

pp.55-72; and, Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994), pp.91-110 and 243-51.

25. Doxey, "Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy," p.10.

26. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, "Conclusion: Questions and Prospects," in Matthews and Pratt, p.293.

27. Berry and McChesney, pp.69, 59, and 65.

28. Berry and McChesney, p.59.

29. Berry and McChesney, p.65.

30. DEA file, 20-1-4, WJGR 7164, October 22, 1985, p.10.

In a study of the number of persons placed under detention and sentenced in China in the period 1949-1984, Yuan-Li Wu et. al. found that of the 38,565 who were reported to have been arrested by the PRC news media, only 17,387 were sentenced. Interestingly, during the Cultural Revolution, only 14,118 people were officially reported arrested and of those only 2,401 sentenced. The authors acknowledge the inaccuracy of the data set: "...the picture our data present is only the visible portion of a massive iceberg. There is no way of telling precisely what is the size of the submerged portion of the iceberg". Harry Wu estimates that "at least 50 million" people have been sent to labour reform camps between 1949 and 1989. See, Yuan-Li Wu et. al., Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, (Boulder: Westview P, 1988), p.298; and Hongda Harry Wu, Laogai-The chinese Gulag, trans. Ted Slingerland, (Boulder: Westview P, 1992), p.15.

For more on the lack of information regarding human rights abuses in China, see Amnesty International, Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China, (London: Amnesty International, 1978) p.xii; and Roberta Cohen, "People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception," Human Rights Quarterly, 14, (November 1989), p.452.

31. Fang Lizhi, "The End of Forgetting History," in James H. Williams, Ed., Bringing Down the Great Wall: Writings on Science, Culture and Democracy in China, (New York: Knopf, 1990) p.271.

32. Lizhi., p.274. Interestingly, this technique was used after the Tiananmen Square massacre causing, the "official"

version to be deemed the "Big Lie".

33. Kurtis Simpson, "The Canadian Print Media's Portrayal of China, 1988-91," (Unpublished paper for the degree of Master of Arts, York University, 1992), p.3.

34. Simpson, p.12.

35. Cohen, p.457.

36. Of the 21 groups listed in the 1989 edition of the Directory of Associations in Canada under the title 'China and the Chinese', 13 would be labeled as 'fledgling', 3 as 'nascent', and, 3 as 'institutionalized', according to the interest group classification framework developed by Pross. The three groups classified as 'institutionalized' are the Federation of Canada-China Friendship Associations, the Chinese-Canadian National Council, and the Canada-China Trade Council (now the Canada-China Business Council). The FCCFA's focus is on strengthening Sino-Canadian relations and enhancing the status of Chinese-Canadians in Canada. The CCNC was formed to promote the full and equal participation of Chinese-Canadians in Canada, so only when Chinese politics affects the Chinese community in Canada does it take an interest in the matter., The CCTC is a business association which advocates strong Canada-China ties and concerns itself with political events only if they impact business relations.

For a listing of the groups, see Liba Barry, Directory of Associations in Canada, 10th ed., (Toronto: Micromedia, 1989). For a discussion of Chinese-Canadian groups in Toronto, see Haitao Wen, "Organizations in the Chinese Community and Sino-Canadian Relations: A Case Study of Seven Organizations in Toronto," (unpublished paper for the degree of Master of Arts, York University, 1992). For an elaboration of the classification framework, see A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford UP, 1992), pp.86-113.

37. B. M. Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre: A Canadian Perspective," A paper presented at the Conference on Political Order in Changing Societies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 27-September 1, 1989, p.5.

38. Edgar Wickberg, Ed., From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), p.270.

39. As cited in Kim Richard Nossal, "Domestic Politics and International Sanctions: Australian and Canadian Reactions to Tiananmen," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Kingston, Ontario, June 2-4, 1991, p.7, note 18.

40. Confidential correspondence with the author. For additional information, see Globe and Mail, September 5, 1995; and, Reid Morden's testimony before the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, June 15, 1989, 8:26-28. Haito Wen writes that Chinese organizations in Toronto, if they ally themselves with the PRC, can increase their influence both inside and outside the Chinese community. Wen also makes the connection tacitly that the PRC's influence within the Chinese community in Canada can be increased through this alliance. A majority of immigrants from mainland China are retailers of Chinese products, especially those engaged in the restaurant or grocery business, and so they are heavily dependent on the PRC for their profitability. As well, many have relatives still living in China. See, Wen, p.9.

41. Campbell and Pal, p.238.

42. Campbell and Pal, p.271, note 48.

43. The material from this section is derived from Paul M. Evans and Daphne Taras, "Looking (Far) East: Parliament and Canada-China Relations, 1949-1982," in David Taras, Ed., Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: CIIA, 1985), pp.66-100; and, ---, Eyeing the Dragon: Extracts From Parliamentary Commentary on China and Sino-Canadian Relations, 1949-1982, (Toronto: Department of Political Science, York University, 1990).

44. Hansard, May 29 and 31, 1989, pp.2257-8 and 2368. The disinterest in Chinese matters was demonstrated by John Crosbie having to tell some opposition MPs to "at least have the good manners to listen" to his response to a question concerning Canada's position on the student demonstrations in Beijing.

45. Ottawa Citizen, May 10, 1986.

46. Paul Desmarais had maintained a close relationship with Brian Mulroney since 1972. Mulroney, then a labour lawyer, was hired to negotiate a settlement to a labour dispute at the Desmarais-owned newspaper La Presse. As well, he contributed \$10,000 to Mulroney's bid to become the leader

of the Progressive Conservative party, in 1976. In 1987, Desmarais broke his 'Greta Garbo-like silence' to defend Mulroney when accusations of public drunkenness at Desmarais' daughter's 1984 wedding were raised by Claire Hoy. Desmarais has been described as 'Mulroney's mentor in the business world' by Ian MacDonald, Mulroney's friend and biographer. The friendship between the two continued after Mulroney left politics with Mulroney being named to the board of directors of many Desmarais' controlled companies. See, Calgary Herald, May 3, 1995 and May 12, 1995; Globe and Mail, March 4, 1994; Montreal Gazette, February 10, 1990; David Greber, Rising to Power: Paul Desmarais and Power Corporation, (Toronto: Methuen, 1987), p.175; and, Peter C. Newman, The Canadian Establishment, Seal edition, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), pp.43-90.

47. Greber, p.227. It was at this time that Demarais founded the Canada-China Trade Council.

48. DEA file, 37-16-1, PET 0760, May 28, 1985.

49. DEA file, 37-16-1, PED 0260, June 11, 1985.

50. Globe and Mail, March 14, 1985; June 12, 1986; and Montreal Gazette, February 5, 1986.

51. Information provided to the author by Project Ploughshares.

52. Information provided to the author by Project Ploughshares.

53. Canadian Business, 59, 7 (July 1986), p.19.

54. Information provided to the author by Project Ploughshares.

55. Financial Post, March 9, 1985; and, Globe and Mail, August 23, 1984.

56. See Financial Post, March 9, 1985, and July 13, 1985.

57. See Globe and Mail, July 30, 1982, January 20, 1984, and September 15, 1984.

58. The joint-venture arrangement was agreed to in September 1986 and called for CITIC to maintain 50 per cent of the ownership and for Power Corporation and Consolidated-Bathurst to maintain 25 per cent each. Power

had a controlling interest in Consolidated-Bathurst through its holdings of 38 per cent of Consolidated-Bathurst voting shares. For more details, see Greber, pp.227-8; Jeremy T. Paltiel, "Rude Awakening: Canada and China Following Tiananmen," in Maureen Appel Molot and F.O. Hampson, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1989: The Challenge of Change, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1990), p.45; Maclean's, April 24, 1989, p.30.

59. See, Charlotte Gray, "New Faces in Old Places: The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy," in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1992-93: A New World Order?, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1992), pp.15-28.

60. Mulroney traveled to China in 1986 and Sauve followed the next year. From 1971-1988, the list of federal ministers and provincial premiers who visited the PRC is extensive. In total some 40 persons made the trip in their official capacities including Secretaries of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp (1972), Don Jamieson (1978), and Mark MacGuigan (1981). Information provided to the author by External Affairs and International Trade Canada.

61. DEA file, 20-1-2, WJGR 5403, December 24, 1987.

62. Gray, p.17. Also, see Joe Clark, " 'The First International Country'," International Journal, 52, 4 (Autumn 1997), pp.539-45.

63. Adam and Moodley, p.297.

64. See Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic, Eds., Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1991).

65. The issue of Canada recognizing the PRC has been widely covered. See, *inter alia*, Evans and Frolic; Robert Edmonds, "Canada's Recognition of the People's Republic of China: The Stockholm Negotiations 1968-1970," Canadian Foreign Policy, 5, 2 (Winter 1998), pp.201-17; John D. Harbron, "Canada Recognizes China: The Trudeau Round 1968-1973," Behind the Headlines, 33, 1 (October 1974); John W. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), pp.201-18; Maureen Appel Molot, "Canada's Relations With China Since 1968," in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, Eds., A Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing

World, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), pp.230-67; and F.Q. Quo and Akira Ichikawa, "Sino-Canadian Relations a New Chapter," Asian Survey, 12, 5 (May 1972), pp.386-98.

66. Holmes, p.204.

67. Holmes, p.215.

68. For a detailed discussion of the commencement of wheat sales to China, see Patrick Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations," in Evans and Frolic, pp.168-86.

69. Paul M. Evans and David Zweig, "China at Thirty-Five: Reform, Readjustment and Reorientation," Behind the Headlines, 42, 4 (April 1985), p.1. For a detailed discussion of Deng's reforms, see Charles Burton, Political and Social Change in China Since 1978, (Westport: Greenwood P, 1990).

70. Maire O'Brien, "CIDA's China Program, 1981-1991: A Neo-Conservative Agenda," Paper presented at the Annual Canadian Political Science Association meeting at the Learned Societies Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, June 6-8, 1993. p.15.

71. Zhao Ziyang, "The Opening of China," The Atlantic, December 1984, p.25.

72. B.J. Punnett & Ping Yu, "Attitudes Towards Doing Business With the PRC," International Studies of Management and Organizations, 20, 2 (Summer 1990), p.149.

73. For example, at a 1985 Marketplace sponsored by External Affairs, trade commissioners from the world over came to Canada for one month in order to inform Canadian businesses of the various economic opportunities that their markets held for Canadian businesses. During the month, the Chinese trade commissioners conducted over 1,000 interviews with potential Canadian investors, second only to the number for the U.S.. In 1986, one observer noted that "the sheer volume of contracts being tendered and the number of Canadian firms interested in that market make it almost impossible for those in External Affairs in Ottawa responsible for China and those in the embassy in Beijing to cope with the press of requests for information." Bruce Muirhead, "The Wave of the Future? Canada in the Pacific Basin," Behind the Headlines, 43, 4 (Summer 1986), p.12.

74. Meetings between academics and DEA officials occurred in April 1985 and January 1987. Those between businesspersons and DEA officials happened in January and February 1987. See, DEA file, 20-1-4, PED 0167, April 17, 1985; 20-1-2, PNRE 0097, January 26, 1987; and, 20-1-2, PNRE 0184, February 12, 1987.

75. Gerard Hervouet, About Canada: Canada and the Pacific Basin, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1988), n.p..

76. Hervouet; Paltiel, p.44; and, B. Michael Frolic, "Canada and the People's Republic of China: Twenty Years of a Bilateral Relationship 1970-1990," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 1, 1 (1990), p. 200.

77. See Evans and Zweig; and William Saywell, " Pierre and the Pacific: The Post-Mortem," International Journal, 33, 2 (Spring 1978), pp.408-14. The concessional line of financing did aid Canadian business in overcoming some of the obstacles impeding trade with the Chinese. Other sources of financing were, however, also used to expand Canadian exports to China. The \$2 billion EDC line-of-credit was drawn down by \$472.6 million between 1985 and 1988 inclusive. An additional \$22.15 million was provided to Canadian businesses under various government programs including the Program For Export Market Development (\$5.4 million), the National Trade Strategy (\$1.75 million) and the Industrial Cooperation Program of CIDA (\$15 million).

78. Hansard, September 28, 1989, p.4014.

79. Department of External Affairs, Joint Ventures with the People's Republic of China: A Primer for Canadian Business, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1988).

80. Ottawa Citizen, June 6 and 7, 1989.

81. Maclean's, April 24, 1989, p.30; and, Globe and Mail, June 9, 1989.

82. B. Michael Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre: A Canadian Perspective," A paper presented at the conference on Political Order in Changing Societies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 27-September 1, 1989, p.4.

83. Export data was drawn from Statistics Canada, Exports: Merchandise Trade, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, published annually). Also, see Calgary Herald, June 11, 1989; and Alberta, Ministry of Economic Development and

Trade, Alberta: 1988 International Trade Review, (Edmonton: Economic Development and Trade, 1988), p.10. For an overview of the relationship between Canadian provinces and China, see George MacLean and Kim Richard Nossal, "Triangular Dynamics: Australian States, Canadian Provinces and Relations with China," in Brian Hocking, Ed., Foreign Relations and Federal States, (London and New York: Leicester UP, 1993), pp.170-89; and, Globe and Mail, March 17, 1986.

84. The data in this section are largely drawn from B. Michael Frolic, "Everybody Benefits: Canada's Decision to Establish a CIDA China Aid Programme in 1981," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. Catharines, Ontario, June 4, 1996; Frolic, "Canada and the PRC"; O'Brien, "CIDA's China Program"; and Martin Rudner, "Canadian Development Cooperation with Asia: Strategic Objectives and Policy Goals," in Cranford Pratt, Ed., Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1994), pp.292-312.

85. To further its rate of economic development, in 1978, China joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and asked to join the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The next year, China accepted \$19 million of indirect aid from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in order to ease the financial difficulties caused by the inflow of Vietnamese refugees. Decisions by the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to commence programs in China meant that Canada was indirectly involved in providing assistance to the PRC before the initiation of its bilateral program.

86. The science and technology exchanges were still constrained by Canada's membership in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM). COCOM was a corollary of NATO. COCOM and later CHICOM (China Committee) were created in order to ensure that strategic materials and knowledge was not transferred from the Western bloc to the Eastern bloc. CHICOM was created in 1952 as a result of Chinese intervention in the Korean War. CHICOM's complete embargo list totaled more than 500 items and applied to China, Korea and, later, North Vietnam. Due to a difference between the US and British regarding the extent to which COCOM and CHICOM sanction lists should differ, CHICOM was re-integrated into COCOM in 1958. For a more complete

treatment of COCOM and CHICOM operations, see Paul M. Evans, Sanctions.

87. Frolic, "Canada and the PRC," p.198.

88. Frolic, "Canada and the PRC," p.199.

89. Trudeau was not the first Canadian official to visit the PRC after recognition in 1970. In June 1971, Jean Luc Pepin, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, led a trade mission to China, and, in August 1972, Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, opened a solo Canadian Trade Fair in Beijing. The fair was the largest one Canada had ever held outside of its own jurisdiction, it included 200 Canadian companies with over 500 representatives. In Canada, at this time, the Chinese Foreign Minister opened the Chinese Trade Fair at the Canadian National Exhibition in Toronto. See, Molot, "Canada's Relations with China Since 1968," p.240; and, Frolic, "Canada and the PRC," p.194.

90. After his 1949 visit to China, Trudeau had committed himself to support Canadian recognition of the People's Republic of China in the pages of Cite Libre. Later, after his 1960 visit, Trudeau co-authored with Jacques Hebert a book about their travels in China entitled Two Innocents in Red China, (Toronto, 1968). It was during his 1960 visit that Trudeau had met and befriended the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai. As a sign of the congenial relations between the two leaders, Zhou Enlai during an official banquet in the midst of the 1973 visit even went as far as calling Trudeau his "old friend". It is interesting to note that Trudeau's interest in China continued as demonstrated by his visiting that country in 1979 as opposition leader and in 1983 as prime minister. On Trudeau's China policy, see Evans and Frolic; Frolic, "Canada and the PRC"; and, Harbron.

91. Frolic, "Canada and the PRC," p.195.

92. Frolic, "Canada and the PRC," p.200.

93. Other notables in the Chinese government to visit Canada during this period included Bo Yibo, Yao Yilin, and Tian Jiyun when they were Vice-Premiers in 1980, 1986, and 1988 respectively. Information provided to the author by External Affairs and International Trade Canada.

94. Statement, 89/28, June 5, 1989. p.2.

95. For a discussion of this episode, see B. Michael Frolic, "Logical and Unsatisfactory: Canada's China Policy and the Exclusion of Taiwan from the 1976 Montreal Olympics," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Asian Studies Association, St. Catharines, Ontario, May 30, 1996.

96. Frolic, "Canada and the PRC," p.197.

97. This is not a complete list. For fuller details see CIDA, "China Country Program Review," Appendix B, p.19 as cited in O'Brien, "CIDA's China Program," p.12; MacLean and Nossal, pp.170-89; and Globe and Mail, March 17, 1986.

98. Globe & Mail, January 7, 1984.

99. Beijing Review, 31, 8 (February 29-March 6, 1988), p.32.

100. Confidential correspondence with the author.

101. External Affairs had developed the standard operating procedure of forming a Task Force so that there would be a "formal mechanism of crisis management" whenever it was required. The Task Force was a formal unit which was located in the Operations Centre on the second floor of the Pearson Building. The Operations Centre "is basically a large cluttered room crammed with desks, television screens, secure and insecure faxes and phones, new and old computers, and other very refined gadgetry such as a large blackboard and chalk". It also has a meeting room with clocks set according to the time in various time zones, a kitchenette to prepare food, and some small rooms with cots to sleep. For more on this, see Michael Shenstone, "Foreign Service Crisis Management in the Nineties," in Donald C. Story, Ed., The Canadian Foreign Service in Transition, (Toronto: Canadian Scholars, 1993), pp.73-82.

102. Maire O'Brien, "Canada China Policy in the Aftermath of Tiananmen: A Bureaucratic Politics Perspective", A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, May 31-June 2, 1992, p.12.

103. The CWG had been created in order to ensure interdepartmental input in the forming of the 'Canadian Strategy for China' which was articulated in April 1987. Since the announcement in April 1987, the full CWG had continued to meet biannually while some of the Sectoral

Working Groups continued to meet on a more frequent basis. Sectoral Working Groups had been created in agriculture, energy, transportation, telecommunications, and petroleum. See, DEA file 20-1-2, 155-55 w282, August 4, 1987.

104. O'Brien, "Canada China Policy," p.11.

105. Confidential correspondence with the author.

106. O'Brien, "Canada China Policy," p.10.

107. Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.171.

108. For more on the 'Friendship Month' activities, see Beijing Review, 32, 20 (May 15-22, 1989), pp.33-35.

109. Calgary Herald, June 11, 1989. Chairman Wan travelled to Victoria, Regina, Toronto, and Ottawa during his stay. He received an honorary degree from the University of Regina, as well as addressing the Saskatchewan legislature and being introduced in the House of Commons.

110. DEA, News Release, 117, May 20, 1989.

111. Edited copies of embassy dispatches were released under the access to information law and published in the Vancouver Sun. See, Vancouver Sun, May 28, 1990.

112. Globe and Mail, May 27, 1989. For some of Frolic's other predictions, see Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre," p.1.

113. Toronto Star, May 20, 1989.

114. Toronto Star, May 29, 1989.

115. Vancouver Sun, May 29, 1989.

116. Vancouver Sun, June 2, 1989.

117. Confidential correspondence with the author.

118. Confidential correspondence with the author.

119. Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre," p.2.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERNATIONAL-LEVEL AFTER TIANANMEN

This chapter examines the international-level response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. In the immediate aftermath of the 'crackdown', with China in chaos, Western states reacted largely in a measured and cautious manner. When 'order' had been restored in China and when 'counter-revolutionaries' were beginning to be executed, the Western states responded with additional sanctions.

The response to the assault on Tiananmen Square on June 4 by the United States and Japan was of concern to the Chinese leadership. The US, in 1988, comprised China's second-largest export market and largest source of foreign direct investment. Moreover, American and Japanese support was necessary for China to secure funds from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank for its modernization program. Both the US and Japan were senior members of the Group of Seven and so would play a central role in formulating the response of that body to the incidents in the People's Republic. For any coalition of states to be effective in applying sanctions, the participation of the target state's major partners is required.¹ For China, this meant that the participation of the US and Japan was

essential to the success of any attempt to apply sanctions in response to the decision to use force against the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. In short, the US and Japan were the two states most important in terms of setting the international response.²

Similarly, the reactions of both the US and Japan were of concern to Canada. The importance of the American response to Canada is obvious. The Canadian and American governments consult regularly on a wide range of issues and the two sides did discuss the Tiananmen incident. Canadian decision-makers would, therefore, have been aware of the initiatives planned in both chambers of Congress and the Bush Administration's reluctance to impose a wide range of strictures on the PRC.³

Although not to the extent of the US, Japan is considered when formulating Canadian foreign policy, especially if the target of the policy is a Pacific Rim country. Japan, in 1988, was Canada's second most valued trading partner with a larger market for Canada than the combined British, French, and West German markets.⁴ Without Japanese support any measures taken by Canada and other western states would have had little affect on China due to Japan's extensive and substantial aid, investment, and trade links with China. Japan occupied a "unique

position to exert effective pressure" on the PRC.⁵

Canadian decision-makers, then, had to be mindful of the actions taken by Japan in responding to the events in China in June 1989.

Because of the importance of the US and Japan to both Canada and China, the examination of the international level response will focus on the American and Japanese reactions. The responses of other states had little impact on the Canadian response and so are included only to provide additional contextual information.⁶

In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, President Bush stated that he "deeply deplore[d] the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators" and he "urge[d] a return to nonviolent means" to deal with the situation.⁷ The President, in an effort to stop the bloodshed and to contain the damage to the US-China relationship, attempted to telephone Deng Xiaoping and talk with the Chinese leader directly. He was, however, "rebuffed".⁸ Later that day, the Chinese Ambassador in Washington, Han Xu, was summoned to the State Department to be informed of the "deep concern" of the US regarding the killings in Beijing.⁹

On June 5, President Bush asserted that, while the United States could not "condone the violent attacks", this was "not the time for an emotional response, but for a

reasoned, careful action that takes into account both our long-term interests and recognition of a complex internal situation in China".¹⁰ The Bush Administration believed it important that the President should announce the measures in order to demonstrate that the White House would formulate American policy in the aftermath of Tiananmen, not Congress. That the President announced the American response also signaled the importance attached to the issue to both the American public and the Chinese leadership. Departing from usual American practice, the President rather than the State Department outlined the American response stating that the government intended to:

- (1) suspend all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons¹¹;
- (2) suspend all visits between senior US and Chinese military officials;
- (3) sympathetically review requests by Chinese students in the US to extend their stay;
- (4) offer humanitarian and medical assistance, through the Red Cross, to those injured during the fighting; and,
- (5) review other aspects of the bilateral relationship as events unfold.¹²

Later in the day, the visit to Washington of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, scheduled for June 12 was postponed. As well, Bush met with a group of Chinese students to signal his concern in a more symbolic

way. The next day the Bush Administration announced that all Chinese students studying in the US would have their visas extended for one year.¹³ In an address on the evening of June 5 to the Annual Meeting of the Business Roundtable, Bush reiterated that the US reaction to the events in the People's Republic should be limited to reducing military links and that Sino-American economic links should be maintained.¹⁴

As a further signal to the Chinese leadership of American disapprobation, Han Xu was summoned to meet with the American Secretary of State, James Baker, on June 7. During the meeting, Baker reminded the Chinese ambassador that "while this President is a friend of China the actions of [the Chinese] government cast a serious pall over [Sino-American] relations". Han Xu responded to Baker's comments by repeating that what had happened was a domestic affair and that he would pass on the American objections to Beijing.¹⁵

While both chambers of Congress followed President Bush in condemning the People's Republic, most Representatives and Senators felt that the June 5 measures were not enough.¹⁶ The experience of Tiananmen "metamorphosed" Congress' attitude toward China, moving it to be a more active participant in the making of US-China

policy.¹⁷ As evidence of the extent of opposition to Bush's measures and of Congress's new attitude toward the PRC, a coalition of "human rights liberals" and "anti-communist conservatives" was forged.¹⁸ Representative Stephen Solarz, leader of the 'human rights liberals', threatened that Congress would take action if Bush failed to take the initiative in crafting a stern American response.¹⁹ Demonstrating the commitment of the 'anti-communist conservatives' to press for a harsh American response, on June 8, Senator Jesse Helms introduced a bill requiring the president to impose a wider range of economic and political sanctions on the PRC, if "significant progress" towards democracy and human rights was not achieved.²⁰

The reactions of Britain, France and West Germany followed closely to that of the US. The leaders of all three countries expressed their abhorrence at the bloodshed.²¹ All three suspended military sales and contacts, and Britain and France allowed Chinese nationals to stay within their borders.²² Moving beyond the American reaction, Britain postponed all talks concerning the turnover of Hong Kong to Chinese control on July 1, 1997, suspended all high-level and diplomatic visits, postponed new economic agreements, and halted a US\$585 million line

of credit to China.²³ France froze government relations at all levels with the PRC, save for those pertaining to Cambodia, and reviewed its trade relations with the PRC. All agreements concerning economic and technical cooperation concluded before June 4 continued unaffected by the happenings in the People's Republic.²⁴ West Germany ordered its aid advisors and experts in China to return home. It also suspended support for approximately 125 aid projects which were in progress, canceled upcoming development missions, and postponed a DM620 million aid agreement and a DM110 million development grant. Only those projects which, according to a West German official, were "to the advantage of the Chinese people" remained in place.²⁵

The immediate Japanese response was one of extreme caution. On June 5, a Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that the Japanese government was "gravely concerned" about the situation in Beijing and hoped that it did not "deteriorate any further". He, moreover, characterized the student demonstrations as "anti-government", a move which lent support to the Chinese leaders' actions. Foreign Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka was equally cautious when, later that day, he said that it was "regrettable" that blood was shed and he hoped for calm to return as soon as possible.²⁶

The next day, a full day after most Western states issued reactions to Tiananmen, the Japanese government responded officially to what had occurred in Beijing. Prime Minister Sosuke Uno expressed "concern" and "regret" about developments in China, yet he made no movement towards initiating sanctions or even verbally condemning the Chinese leaders.²⁷ Later, when it became known that the Americans had imposed a range of sanctions on the PRC, Uno, backed by Mitsuzuka and Seiroku Kajiyama, Minister of International Trade and Industry, still resisted any movement towards initiating sanctions.²⁸ Uno recited Japan's record of military invasion of China in an attempt to explain why Japan had failed to take any punitive measures against the PRC.²⁹ The Japanese leaders had to be "very careful in choosing words" to relate to the Chinese leaders the extent of Japanese displeasure at the use of force.³⁰

Knowing that any Japanese announcement of retaliatory measures would be reacted to negatively by the Chinese and also knowing that some response was necessary in order not to further damage Japanese-American relations, on June 7, the Japanese "reluctantly" announced a range of measures to be applied to the PRC.³¹ The measures were a reaction to the chaos in China and did not reflect a "policy decision"

by the Japanese government.³² The "emergency measures" included the following: (1) the suspension of economic development and cultural missions planned for the near future; (2) the review of current aid projects on a "case-by-case" basis; and, (3) the extension of visas of Chinese students studying in Japan until the "unsettled situation" ended.³³ It should be noted the extent to which the measures outlined by Japan followed closely those outlined by the US, both in time and substance.³⁴

The Chinese reaction to the measures announced by Western governments in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy was initially one of "surprise". The Chinese leaders regarded their actions as being "remarkably restrained by Chinese standards".³⁵ The Chinese policy was clearly outlined in a June 6 press conference held by State Council Spokesperson Yuan Mu in which he warned states that, while China may face some "temporary difficulties" as a result of international disapproval, China was "not afraid". He cautioned states not to be "too short-sighted" in responding to what the Chinese leadership believed to be a domestic matter.³⁶

As an indication of the Chinese leadership's disregard for international disapprobation, Deng, in his first speech after Tiananmen on June 9, praised the efforts of the PLA

in 'quelling the turmoil' and stated that "this was a test, and we passed".³⁷ At a later celebration marking the founding of the CCP, Premier Li Peng deplored the "unwarranted accusations of China" for the method by which it "quell[ed]...the counter-revolutionary rebellion" and for its "punishment of criminals according to the law". The premier also castigated those who used the "banner of human rights" to create an "anti-China adverse current" internationally.³⁸ In the aftermath, it was clear that the Chinese leadership felt that the matter was a domestic one and that their policies should not be the subject of international debate or censure.³⁹

In an effort to maintain levels of foreign investment, the Chinese government commenced a "high pressure campaign" in the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen. In one instance, foreign investors in Beijing were invited to a meeting sponsored by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the body which issues licenses for foreign businesses, where an important announcement was to be made. When foreign investors arrived at the meeting, a Chinese television crew was present to film them in order to demonstrate a return to 'business as usual' in China. No announcement was made at the meeting.

As well, some companies were promised meetings with

Chinese officials who had been previously unavailable for months and/or offered new more favourable terms.⁴⁰ An official at the China Desk of the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) commented that one positive outcome of situation in China for foreign businesses was the "increasingly favourable treatment" that they were receiving for their investment.⁴¹ It was also reported that foreign companies with operations in China were being sent Telex messages inviting them to "demonstrate their commitment to their business in China". Included in this message was an implicit threat that if they did not return promptly other businesses would take their place.⁴² The Chinese even went so far as to threaten an American company with a lawsuit if its executives did not return to China promptly.⁴³

As many Western companies exited China, Japanese firms stepped into the breach. Many Japanese businesses had begun "streaming back" to Beijing immediately following Tiananmen in an effort to take advantage of the retreat of Western business, the favourable terms of investment being offered, and the sudden availability of Chinese officials. Some businessmen even went so far as to return to Beijing as "tourists".⁴⁴ This hasty return to the PRC did not go unnoticed both in the west and in China. International

criticism of the hasty return of Japanese business to Beijing prompted the Japanese Foreign Minister to call for "self-restraint" from Japanese businesses in returning to the PRC.⁴⁵ He even went so far as to portray Japanese business as "trying to make money like a thief at a fire".⁴⁶ The return to China by Japanese business also did not go unnoticed by Chinese officials who were quick to publicly thank the Japanese for returning to Beijing so soon after Tiananmen.⁴⁷ A China Desk official at JETRO commented that the Chinese were "seizing" on the "difference in nuance" between the Japanese and Western reactions to Tiananmen in an attempt to "quickly pull Japan back into a normal relationship" with the PRC.⁴⁸

To capture those who participated in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, on June 7, a telephone 'hot line' was set up so that people could report protestors.⁴⁹ Six days later, June 13, orders were issued to PLA forces in Beijing authorizing them to shoot on sight anyone suspected of participating in or inciting 'counter-revolutionary' activities.⁵⁰ The trials of those captured began on June 15, in Shanghai, with three workers being found guilty of rioting and obstructing railway traffic by burning a train car. The three were sentenced to death and, after their appeals failed, were executed on June 21.⁵¹ The next day,

seven were executed in Beijing after being found guilty of wounding troops and burning military vehicles during the June 4 'quelling'.⁵² Trials and executions continued throughout the rest of the period under study.

When the American President began receiving reports on the holding of show trials and the executions being carried out, he made a formal appeal to the Chinese government for clemency for the dissidents.⁵³ The American appeal fell on deaf ears, however. To make known the extent of American disapproval and to preempt a more vigorous reaction from Congress, on June 20, Press Secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, announced a range of additional sanctions to be applied, including the suspension of all high-level formal exchanges between the two countries and the postponement of consideration of new loans to China by international financial institutions.⁵⁴

The Japanese Prime Minister responded to the executions of the three men found guilty of rioting and obstructing railway traffic by labeling the Chinese action as being "not acceptable".⁵⁵ The Foreign Ministry, in reaction to the executions, related to the press that Japan had suspended Overseas Development Agency assistance for projects in China until the situation there "stabilize[d]".⁵⁶ It is interesting to note the additional

measure was made public after "close consultation" with the US⁵⁷ and that an official statement announcing the measure was not released.⁵⁸ The press were merely told that it had been implemented. The limited nature of the new Japanese measure and its similarity to the American initiative announced a day earlier lent support to the 'soft' response being pursued by the Bush Administration in its fight over control of China policy with Congress.

In an effort to co-ordinate their responses, the Japanese government sent Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka to Washington on June 25 to hold talks with US President Bush and Secretary of State Baker. The People's Republic was the "most important" topic in discussions between Mitsuzuka and the American leaders. During the talks, both sides agreed that for regional security concerns China should not be pushed into a position of isolation and that both should impress upon the Chinese leadership the benefits to be achieved by continuing with the implementation of the economic modernization program.⁵⁹ As well, both agreed to take "concerted action" in responding to the situation in the PRC.⁶⁰

Also on June 25, President Bush received a reply to a personal letter he wrote to Deng Xiaoping in which he asked the Chinese leader to receive secretly two American

emissaries. Deng agreed to Bush's request.⁶¹ The two emissaries, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser, and Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State, traveled to Beijing on June 30 and returned to Washington 24 hours later.⁶² The purpose of the trip was to "make it clear to the Chinese [leadership] very privately" that President Bush found their behaviour "unacceptable and couldn't be ignored". However, the President "took no joy in imposing sanctions and was seeking ways to reconcile [the Sino-American] estrangement".⁶³ Upon their return from Beijing, Scowcroft and Eagleburger informed the president and the secretary of state that visit had been "neither easy nor pleasant".⁶⁴ The Chinese leaders had "complained bitterly" about the American sanctions and they had repeated the argument that the US was interfering in China's internal affairs.⁶⁵

To help overcome increasing pressure from Congress for a more stern American response, Secretary of State Baker, in his appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on June 22, appealed to members of the House to follow the president's "properly measured" response which included "carefully targeted actions, while not being inflammatory in...rhetoric" and preserving American options for the

future.⁶⁶ Baker's efforts notwithstanding, on June 29, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously to pass an omnibus package of sanctions as an amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill. The amendment called for the suspension of: arms sales to China; the operations of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a body that supports US investments abroad by providing American investors with insurance; a 1988 agreement which allowed China to use its missiles to launch American satellites; and, licences for exports to China of nuclear power plant supplies and technology.⁶⁷ Additional measures included the elimination of China's eligibility for the trade promotion program run by the Agency for International Development, the broadening of the president's prohibition on American nuclear supplies exports to the PRC, the slowing of plans by the Co-ordinating Committee on Multinational Export Controls (COCOM) members to increase China's access to high technology goods, and the stopping of exports to the People's Republic of equipment used by police forces for crime control and detection.⁶⁸

The package of sanctions passed by the House allowed President Bush to remove the economic sanctions at his own discretion, however. For the president to do this, Bush was required to claim that lifting the sanctions was in the

'national security interests' of the United States.⁶⁹ A claim that Bush made on July 7 when he authorized the delivery of four Boeing 757 jet aircraft to the PRC. The aircraft were thought to be subject to export controls because their navigation systems could be used for military purposes, but the commercial nature of the purchase was the overriding concern of the Bush Administration.⁷⁰

The House measures followed the announcement of the reaction to Tiananmen adopted by the European Economic Community (EEC) on June 27. When the leaders of the twelve-nation EEC first met in Madrid to discuss the happenings in China, some were reluctant to impose sanctions on China. An agreement was later reached that included suspending arms sales to China, postponing high-level ministerial contacts, suspending additional economic aid, and opposing Chinese requests for loans from the World Bank. Pushing for even stronger sanctions was French President Francois Mitterrand. He was, however, rebuffed by the other leaders of the EEC, especially British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.⁷¹

In responding to the additional sanctions imposed, Chinese officials "carefully distinguished" the Japanese reaction from that of other states. The main target of Chinese criticism was the US. Li Jinhua, a spokesperson

for the Chinese foreign ministry, responded to the American sanctions by "firmly oppos[ing] the United States government's interference in China's internal affairs". She added that China has "never yielded to external pressure" and that it was "unwise and fruitless" for the US to attempt to exert political and economic pressure on the PRC.⁷²

The Chinese response to additional sanctions was repeated in a June 22 meeting between China's Vice-Premier Tian Jiyuan and Viscount Errington, managing director of the Inchcape Group of Britain. The Vice-Premier cautioned the British investor against the "shortsighted[ness]" of some countries which were attempting to punish the Chinese: "Whoever abandons this market will regret it afterwards. There is trade to be done and money to be made....[and] If one country does not come, another will".⁷³

The Chinese disregard for international opinion was also evident in the first meeting after June 4 between Li Peng and a foreign delegation. Premier Li met with a delegation from Pakistan led by Foreign Secretary Humayun Khan, on June 21. In the meeting, Li cautioned that it would be "shortsighted and unwise" for countries to attempt to exert economic and political pressure on China and that "In times of difficulty, it is very clear who are true

friends".⁷⁴

Throughout the period, the Chinese remained "indignantly unapologetic" for the actions taken at Tiananmen.⁷⁵ There was a reluctance on the part of the Chinese leadership to move to mend the rift in foreign relations caused by the events in and around Tiananmen Square. The Chinese maintained the position that what had occurred was a domestic matter and that relations between the PRC and other states should not be affected by the incident. Further, there was benefits to be gained for states and businesses which resumed 'business as usual' quickly after June 4. For those states and businesses which endeavoured to punish China, there was the threat of the loss of access to the China market by the Chinese leadership and by others willing and ready to fill the breach. It is also noteworthy that the Chinese leadership felt that the West's rebuke of China would be short-lived, Deng Xiaoping stated it thusly: "Don't worry, after one year, these guys will come back".⁷⁶ The message to the international community from the Chinese leadership was simple and clear: accept what was done as an internal matter and get back to 'business as usual'.

In the US, President Bush and Congress vied for control over China policy resulting in a mixed American

response to Tiananmen. The President was determined to "take control" of US-China policy in the face of Congress's "assertive posture" towards China.⁷⁷ President Bush's initial response to Tiananmen was limited to freezing the bilateral military relationship, he did not want the incident to interfere with the bilateral economic or security relationships. Fearing a loss of control over China policy, the Bush Administration later was pressed into announcing a range of further sanctions in an effort to preempt a more vigorous Congressional reaction. As well, the American President sought to retain control through the use of 'executive orders' and by vetoing Congressional initiatives.⁷⁸ It should be noted that Bush targeted his measures to those which Congress had traditionally used to demonstrate American disapprobation of a regime guilty of violating human rights.⁷⁹ Moreover, the dispatching of two high level emissaries to Beijing signaled to the Chinese leadership the commitment of Bush to maintaining the relationship and indicated that bilateral relations would get back on track after pressure from Congress waned. Congress, however, continued to press the president to assume a more censorious position advocating harsher retaliatory measures. As well, US policy towards China continued to be an issue in American

domestic politics throughout the remainder of the Bush presidency. The reluctance of President Bush to announce additional sanctions in the face of Congressional pressure for such measures was not lost on the Chinese. The Chinese Ambassador to the US commended Bush for his resistance to Congressional pressure.⁶⁰ The pulling and hauling between Congress and the Bush Administration, especially the president himself, characterized American policy towards the PRC in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre.

In reacting to the Chinese massacre at Tiananmen, the majority of Japan's senior political officials and businessmen, including Sousuke Uno, the Prime Minister, and Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, the Foreign Minister, believed that the appropriate response to the "restoration of order" in Beijing was to mute any criticism.⁶¹ Thus Uno's soft-pedalled response entailed abstract expressions of concern and regret. None of the Japanese measures were taken in response to the 'crackdown' ordered by the Chinese leadership, but rather in reaction to the chaos in China. The extent of the Sino-Japanese economic relationship that the two states had worked hard to build mitigated against a harsh Japanese reaction. As well, Japan's wartime history of atrocities in China made it "extremely dangerous" for Japan to criticize China without appearing hypocritical.

Many Japanese senior officials and businessmen believed that regional stability was more important than the preservation of "Japan's credentials as a member of the Western democratic club".⁸²

Further prohibiting the Prime Minister from taking a more stern approach was, to some extent, the fact that he had only taken office on June 2. Uno was seen to be a "caretaker prime minister"⁸³ because of his apparent lack of political base with the LDP party and because he was attacked unrelentingly from the outset of his tenure for a past long-term affair with a geisha.⁸⁴ Therefore, Japan, in responding to Tiananmen, was "cautiously reactive" allowing the US to take the lead in criticizing China.⁸⁵

Conclusion

The Canadian response to the happenings in Tiananmen Square can be partly explained by an examination of the American and Japanese responses to the incident. Because of the extensive and ongoing consultations between Canada and the US, Ottawa would have been cognizant of the initiatives planned in both houses of Congress, as well as the president's aversion to imposing a wide range of sanctions on China. That the US reacted to the happenings in the PRC in June 1989 was in itself important. Previous

violations of human rights in the PRC had passed with little response from prior administrations.

As well, the level of the US reaction impacted the responses of other western states. The American prohibition on high-level contacts and military sales "rippled through the sanctions policies" of Western states, including Canada.⁸⁶ Once the US had reacted in a limited way, a stern Canadian response would have had little, if any, affect on the PRC and would not have been in Canada's economic interests. This is not to say that Canada acted in response to or in collusion with the US in determining Canada's reaction, but, rather, that Ottawa knew its initiatives would not be inconsistent with the US action.

For its part, Japan, instead of implementing meaningful restrictions on its relations with China, opted for a soft response and this had a "particularly deleterious impact on other nations' efforts to exert constructive pressure on the Chinese government".⁸⁷ The 'softness' of the Japanese response was important because it could be used by domestic groups in Canada that favoured a relatively more lenient approach as evidence that a strict response was not needed and, indeed, would be inconsistent with Canada's economic interest.

Thus, the American and Japanese reactions were

important in helping to set the international parameters for the Canadian response and, more importantly, for outlining possible specific alternatives for Canadian policy. By responding to the Chinese leaders' actions in a chary fashion, the US and Japan effectively narrowed the feasible range of options of other western states, including Canada, for only these two states had extensive enough relations with the PRC to be able to punish its leaders for their actions and to effect some change in its behaviour regarding human rights.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. See, Margaret Doxey, "International Sanctions," in David G. Haglund and Michael W. Hawes, Eds., World Politics: Power, Interdependence, and Dependence, (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990), pp.242-61. Also, see Chapter One Note 10.

2. See, Timothy A. Gelatt et al., Business as Usual...? The International Response to Human Rights Violations in China, (New York: International League for Human Rights, May 29, 1991); Peter Van Ness, Analysing the Impact of International Sanctions on China, Working Paper 1989/4, (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1989); and, Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

3. Mulroney and Clark met with US Senate Majority Leader, George Mitchell, when he traveled to Canada in late June 1989. Office of the Prime Minister, Release, June 22, 1989.

4. Statistics Canada, Imports by Country and Exports by Country, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1989). For more on the importance of Japan in the bilateral relationship, see Anthony Chapman, Canada and the Pacific Rim, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1992); and, Brian Job and Frank Langdon, "Canada and the Pacific," in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1993-94: Global Jeopardy, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1993), pp.266-94.

5. Gelatt et al., p.5 ; and Van Ness, Analysing the Impact of International Sanctions on China, p.8.

6. For more on the reactions of other states, see Gelatt et al.; Van Ness; George Hicks, Ed., The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen, (London: Longman, 1990); and, Kim Richard Nossal, The Beijing Massacre: Australian Responses, (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australia National University, 1993).

7. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, Book 1-January 20 to June 30, 1989, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1990), p.669; and, New York Times, June 4, 1989.

8. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p.100; and, James A.

Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992, (New York: Putnam, 1995), p.104.

9. New York Times, June 5, 1989; and, Washington Post, June 4, 1989.

10. New York Times, June 6, 1989. For more on the president's thinking during this period, see Bush and Scowcroft, pp.98-111.

11. The primary effect of this measure on government-to-government sales was the suspension of four agreements: a U.S.\$500 million Project Peace Pearl to upgrade the avionics for China's F-8 fighter/interceptor; a U.S.\$62.5 million AN/TPQ-37 artillery locating radar package; a U.S.\$28.5 million program to upgrade two 155mm ammunition production facilities; and, a U.S.\$8.5 million Mark-46 Mod-2 anti-submarine torpedo package. The effect on commercial exports were valued at between U.S.\$425 million and \$700 million. This included the sale of four Boeing 757 commercial jets, three American-made satellites, and six Boeing CH-47 Chinook cargo helicopters. Jing-Dong Yuan, "United States Technology Transfer Policy Toward China: Post-Cold War Objectives and Strategies," International Journal, 51, 2 (Spring 1996), pp.316-7.

12. Baker, p.104; Nayan Chanda, "Links Severed," Far Eastern Economic Review. June 15, 1989. p.10; Public Papers: George Bush, p.669; and, New York Times, June 6, 1989.

13. New York Times, June 7, 1989.

14. Public Papers: George Bush, p.679. Bush made similar remarks at his June 8 press conference. See, Public Papers: George Bush, p.699; and, New York Times, June 9, 1989.

15. Baker, p.106. On June 10, Han Xu was summoned to meet again with Baker. This meeting concerned the fate of Fang Lizhi and his wife, Li Shuxian. A source in the Chinese government had warned an American official that Deng was "extremely upset" about the U.S. allowing Fang and Li to enter and remain in the American embassy in Beijing and that China would resort to the "use of force" should the U.S. attempt "to spirit Fang out of the country". Baker, p.107.

16. Both the House and Senate passed resolutions condemning the Chinese crackdown, on June 6. The House resolution

which condemned China's "excessive and indiscriminate" use of force passed by a vote of 406-to-0. The Senate resolution called for a review of American loan guarantees and trade assistance program; it passed by a vote of 100-to-0. 1989 CO Almanac, p.519; New York Times, June 7, 1989; and, Washington Post, June 7, 1989.

After Bush announced the American response, dozens of amendments calling for additional measures were put forward by members of Congress. To help organize the various individual amendments into a coherent whole, House leaders created an omnibus package of sanctions and included it as a floor amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill. The floor amendment came to a vote in the House on June 29 where it was passed by a vote of 418-0. See, 1989 CO Almanac, p.521-4; Eric Hyer, "United States' Response to the Tiananmen Square Massacre: Congressional Values and Executive Interests," Conflict, 11, 3 (July-September 1991), p.174; and, Qingshan Tan, "Explaining US-China Policy in the 1990s: Who is in Control?" Asian Affairs: An American Review, 20, 3 (Fall 1993), p.148.

17. Taifa Yu, "The Conduct of Post-Tiananmen U.S. China Policy: Domestic Constraints, Systemic Change, and Value Incompatibility," Asian Affairs: An American Review, 19, 4 (Winter 1993), p.235. For more on Congress and its role in US China policy before Tiananmen, see Chapter Two, Note 115.

18. This alliance between "human rights liberals" and "anti communist conservatives" was headed by Representative Stephen Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs sub-committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, respectively. Baker, p.108; Hyer, pp.173-4; Tan, p.151; Washington Post, June 5, 1989; and, New York Times, June 7, 1989.

19. Hyer, p.174; Tan, p.151; New York Times, June 5, 1989; and, Washington Post, June 5, 1989 .

20. Hyer, p.174; and, Tan, p.147. Helms' bill called for a return to the COCOM list of banned of exports, the end of trade development programs, and the suspension of MFN trade status. Helms also suggested terminating China's observer status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as blocking loans and assistance from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

21. New York Times, June 5, 1989.
22. West Germany did not report on its treatment of Chinese nationals within its borders. There were significantly fewer Chinese nationals in West Germany than in Britain or France. For a more on the reactions of Britain, France, and West Germany, see Gelatt.
23. Gelatt, p.33 and p.18; and New York Times, June 6, 1989.
24. Gelatt, p.18; and Toronto Star, June 6 and 7, 1989.
25. Gelatt, p.23.
26. K.V. Kesavan, "Japan and the Tiananmen Square Incident: Aspects of the Bilateral Relationship," Asian Survey, 30, 7 (July 1990), p.671; and, Seiichiro Takagi, "Human Rights in Japanese Foreign Policy: Japan's Policy Towards China After Tiananmen," in James T.H. Tang, Ed., Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific, (London and New York: Pinter, 1995), p.100.
27. New York Times, June 7, 1989; Nayan Chanda, "Links Severed," Far Eastern Economic Review, 144, 24 (June 15, 1989), p.10; and, The Economist, 311, 7606 (June 10, 1989), p.22
28. Takagi, p.101.
29. Takagi, p.102; Hidenori Ijiri, "Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization," China Quarterly, 124 (December 1990), p.656; and, Asai Motofumi, "Japan's China Policy - A Pattern of Consistency," in George Hicks, Ed., The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen, (London: Longman, 1990), p.297. Uno's comments were reflected in the statement made the same day (June 6) by the new Chief Cabinet Secretary, Masajiro Shiokawa. He stated that Japan was carefully watching the situation in China and that no sanctions were under consideration due to Japan being "burdened by the heavy history of the past". Ijiri, p.656; and, Kesavan, p.671.
30. The comments of Taizo Watanabe, a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman, as cited in the Washington Post, June 7, 1989.
31. Motofumi, p.298.

32. Globe and Mail, June 8, 1989.
33. New York Times, June 7, 1989; and, Gelatt, p.26.
34. Motofumi opines that an exchange of views between the U.S. and Japan had been underway prior to the Japanese decisions being taken. Motofumi, p.299.
35. Confidential correspondence with the author.
36. Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, Eds., Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), pp.375-6.
37. Timothy Brook, Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement, (Toronto: Lester, 1992), p.14; and, Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.378. For a complete translation of Deng's speeches, see Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, pp.376-88.
38. Toronto Star, June 30, 1989.
39. For more examples, see Baker, pp.110-12; and, Chen Xitong, "Report on Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion," Beijing Review, 32, 29 (July 17-23, 1989), p.xx.
40. New York Times, June 21, 1989. In his June 16 speech, Deng stated that the Chinese leadership had to prevent the economy from declining and, in an effort to accomplish this, it had to continue to open up the economy. To this end, it was reported that the Chinese government promised to supply cheap prison labour to Volvo as an incentive to open a plant in China. Executives from Volvo initially took the Chinese offer to be a hoax. As well, a new ruling was announced in Shanghai in early July that allowed foreign investors to purchase raw materials at the same price as Chinese corporations. For Deng's speech, see Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert, p.385-6. For the Volvo case, see Marie Gottschalk, "The Failure of American Policy," World Policy Journal, 6, 4 (Fall 1989), p.680. Finally, for the new ruling, see Tokyo Business Today, August 1989, p.11.
41. Tokyo Business Today, August 1989, p.11.
42. Toronto Star, June 17, 1989; and Globe and Mail, June 29, 1989.
43. New York Times, June 21, 1989.

44. New York Times, June 22, 1989; and The Economist, 312, 7609 (July 1, 1989), p.27. On August 17, Japan lifted the travel advisory for business and planned to remove the suspension of aid projects announced in the aftermath of Tiananmen. New York Times, August 18, 1989.

45. Kesavan, p.672; and Tokyo Business Today, August 1989, p.11. Also see, Gelatt, p.27; Motofumi, p.299; and, Washington Post, June 16, 1989.

46. New York Times, July 3, 1989.

47. Washington Post, June 16, 1989; and, Gelatt, p.27.

48. Washington Post, June 16, 1989.

49. The telephone 'hot line' was announced on the evening news where viewers were told to call 512-4848 or 512-5666 to turn in protesters. Callers were assured of complete confidentiality for whatever information they provided. The Beijing Public Security Bureau reported that it had received approximately 16,000 calls by the end of July, resulting in 5,000 arrests being made. Of the 5,000 arrested, 4,000 turned out to be cases involving spouses or neighbours trying to settle disputes with one another and not the turning in of protesters. The 'hot line' was so successful in helping to 'settle scores' that Deng had to issue an order that arrests should be made only after two phone calls had been received.

The effectiveness of the telephone 'hot line' notwithstanding, Amnesty International reported that at least 6,000 people were officially arrested throughout China. Unofficial sources put the total at 8-10,000 in Beijing alone and at least twice as many throughout the rest of the country. Accurate numbers are hard to come by as provisions in Chinese law and illegal practices which have become the norm allow for arbitrary detention and imprisonment for weeks or months without charges being laid. As well, many political prisoners are held incommunicado.

On the creation of the 'hot line', see Brook, p.194. On the effectiveness of the telephone 'hot line', see Lucien Pye, "Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The Escalation of Confrontation from Moralizing to Revenge," Asian Survey, 30, 4 (April 1990), p.346. On the number of arrests, see Amnesty International: 1990 Report, (London: AI, 1990), p.66.

50. Ottawa Citizen, June 13, 1989.

51. Mark Findlay, "Show Trials in China: After Tiananmen Square," Journal of Law and Society, 16, 3 (Autumn 1989), p.354-55; Amnesty International: 1990 Report, p.67; and, Toronto Star, June 21, 1989.

52. Amnesty International: 1990 Report, p.67; Globe and Mail, June 22, 1989; New York Times, June 23, 1989; and, Ottawa Citizen, June 23, 1989. Official reports put the number executed at a few dozen, but unofficial sources put the number executed at several hundred. See, Amnesty International: 1990 Report, p.67.

On June 21, China's Supreme Court issued a ruling instructing lower courts to "severely punish counter-revolutionary elements who have been charged". Globe and Mail, June 21, 1989.

53. Baker, p.107; and, New York Times, June 21, 1989.

54. Public Papers: George Bush, p.764; Baker, p.107; Tan, p.146; and, New York Times, June 20, 1989. The suspension of formal exchanges meant that the visits to the PRC scheduled for July by the Secretary of Commerce, Bob Mosbacher, and by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia and the Pacific, Roger Severance, were canceled. The suspension of loans from international financial institutions was valued at U.S.\$1.3 billion with U.S.\$500 million from the ADB and U.S.\$780 million from the World Bank. For loan figures, see Gelatt, pp. 50 and 69.

On June 19, the Senate had passed a resolution which set the release of imprisoned protesters and the commencement of talks between the Chinese government and the student leaders as conditions for the resumption of normal Sino-American diplomatic and military relations. The resolution also called for the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council to condemn the massacre.

55. New York Times, June 22, 1989.

56. New York Times, June 22, 1989.

57. Motofumi, p.299; and, New York Times, June 22, 1989.

58. Takagi, p.102.

59. Kesavan, p.673; and, Motofumi, p.299.

60. Motofumi, p.299. Baker traveled to Tokyo and met with PM Uno prior to going to Brunei for the ASEAN meetings. At the meeting, Baker and Uno reiterated their common position

concerning no additional measures being taken to isolate China. See, New York Times, July 6, 1989.

61. For a copy of the letter sent by Bush to Deng, see Bush and Scowcroft, pp.100-102.

62. The need for utmost secrecy was demonstrated by Bush recalling the American Ambassador in Beijing, James Lilley, to inform him of the meeting personally. As well, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser, and Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State, left Washington at 5 a.m. under the cover of night and their plane was refueled in the air by an Air Force tanker.

This visit remained secret until December 1989 when Scowcroft and Eagleburger returned to China once again. They went to Beijing in an attempt to rebuild the Sino-American relationship. A Bush Administration official argued that neither visit violated the carefully worded June 20 ban on "formal exchanges". The White House did not rule out the possibility that additional secret visits to Beijing had been occurred. On the visit, see Bush and Scowcroft, pp.104-106; and, Baker, p.109. On the cover-up, see New York Times, December 19, 1989.

63. Baker, p.108.

64. Lawrence Eagleburger, "U.S. Actions Toward China," Current Policy, No. 1247, (Washington: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, February 1990), p.3. For Scowcroft's reflections on the visit, see Bush and Scowcroft, pp.105-111.

65. Baker, p.110.

66. New York Times, June 23, 1989. Also, see Tan, p.151; Hyer, p.174; and, 1989 CO Almanac, p.521. Similar remarks were made by President Bush in his June 27 news conference, see Public Papers: George Bush, p.814.

67. Peter Van Ness, "Sanctions on China," Far Eastern Economic Review. September 21, 1989. p.25; Hyer, p.174; Tan, p.148; and 1989 CO Almanac, p.521. Interestingly, Bush had enacted these four measures by executive order, they simply had been put into effect without a formal announcement.

68. 1989 CO Almanac, p.521; and, Tan, p.148. Following the lead of the House, the Senate adopted similar measures on July 14. The Senate, however, went one step further calling

on Bush to reconsider all bilateral economic ties. Added to the list were, inter alia, revoking China's most-favoured nation status and restricting new Export-Import Bank loans. See, 1989 CO Almanac, p.524; and, Tan, p.148.

69. The Senate bill allowed Bush more flexibility, in that, he only had to claim that lifting the sanctions was in the 'national interest'.

70. Gelatt, p.38; Far Eastern Economic Review, 145, 29 (July 20, 1989), p.14; New York Times, July 8, 1989; and, 1989 CO Almanac, p.525. In October, Bush allowed Chinese military officers and technicians to return to the U.S. to continue work on the U.S.\$502 million project to upgrade the electronics in Chinese F-8 fighter planes. In December, the President lifted the Export-Import ban on loans and other guarantees for U.S. exports to China. As well, Bush determined that it was in the 'national interest' to issue export licences for three American communications satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets. Export licenses for the satellites were issued, in part, due to pressure from the Australians who were to use the satellites once they were in orbit. Gelatt, p.10; and, Peter Van Ness, Analysing the Impact of International Sanctions on China, working paper 1989/4 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australia National University, 1989), p.9.

71. Gelatt, pp.54-5; and, Financial Times, June 28, 1989.

72. New York Times, June 23, 1989; and, Ottawa Citizen, June 23, 1989.

73. Ottawa Citizen, June 23, 1989; and, Beijing Review, 32, 27 (July 3-9, 1989), p.9.

74. Beijing Review, 32, 27 (July 3-9, 1989), p.9.

75. Lowell Dittmer, "China in 1989," Asian Survey, 30, 1 (January 1990), p.37.

76. Globe and Mail, June 2, 1990. While reported in the aforementioned edition of the Globe and Mail, the quotation was from a year earlier.

77. Tan, p.150.

78. Bush and Scowcroft, pp.158-9; 1989 CO Almanac, p.524; and, New York Times, September 3, 1989.

79. For a discussion of Congress and human rights, see David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered, (Gainesville: U of Florida P, 1988).

80. New York Times, August 21, 1989.

81. For example, three days after the G7 summit, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official was dispatched to the Chinese embassy in Tokyo to defend the Japanese actions at the Paris Summit. In particular, the official tried to explain why Japan had condemned China and joined with the other G7 members in issuing the Political Declaration. The acting Chinese Ambassador responded to the Foreign Ministry official's explanations by stating that the G7's actions were a "reckless interference" in China's internal affairs, but that China would not alter its relations with Japan. Kesavan, p.674.

82. Charles Smith, "Coming Off the Fence," Far Eastern Economic Review, 144, 25 (June, 22 1989), p.22.

83. Washington Post, June 1, 1989; New York Times, June 29, 1989 and July 2, 1989; Takeshige Kunimasa, "Uno Sosuke and the Windfall of Crisis," Japan Quarterly, 36, 3 (July-September 1989), pp.252-55; Charles Smith, "Status Quo Leadership," Far Eastern Economic Review, 144, 24 (June 15, 1989), p.24; and Charles Smith, "A Mandate Squandered," Far Eastern Economic Review, 145, 31 (August 3, 1989), p.10. In the July 23 elections, the LDP lost control of the upper-house of Japan's parliament for the first time since the LDP was formed in 1955. Upon defeat, Uno resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Toshiki Kaifu.

84. Ottawa Citizen, June 14, 1989; and, New York Times, June 29, 1989.

85. See, Richard Stubbs and Michael Donnelly, "Japan," A paper presented to the Conference on the Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia in the 'New World Order', University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, October 29-November 1, 1992. Also, see Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," World Politics, 60, 4 (July 1988), pp.517-41; Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan, the World and the Twenty-First Century," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, Eds., The Political Economy of Japan: The Changing International Context, vol.2, (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988), pp.446-86; and, Masaru Tamamoto, "Japan's Search for a World Role,"

World Policy Journal, 7, 3 (Summer 1990), pp.493-520.

For a more in-depth discussion of Japanese foreign policy, see Reinharte Drifte, Japan's Foreign Policy, (New York: RIIA, 1990).

86. Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994), p.185.

87. Gelatt, p.26.

CHAPTER FIVE

DOMESTIC-LEVEL AFTER TIANANMEN

The events of June 4, 1989 resulted in the human rights situation in the PRC becoming a "problem" in Canada-China relations thereby fundamentally altering the bilateral relationship.¹ This chapter examines the domestic-level environment after that date. The chapter opens with an examination of the preferences of both societal and state actors. The response of societal actors such as the Canadian general public, the media, the Chinese-Canadian community, and the business and farming communities will be examined, as well as those of state actors such as Parliament, the provinces, the bureaucracy, and the executive. It will be demonstrated that societal actors resembled more a chorus of discordant voices than a common voice pressing the government to respond in a particular manner. Within the state there were differences among the participants. These differences, however, were attenuated by other factors such as, *inter alia*, control over information, time, and centralization of decision-making.

Following the examination of the preferences of state and societal actors, the decision-making process is looked

for themselves.

As a result of the instantaneous projection of the aforementioned images across the world, public opinion was quick to react and to call for government action. On a mass scale, public opinion was expressed in numerous ways, such as through letters to government officials and to newspaper editors and through mass protests.³

Canadians vented their anger in the letters they wrote to both government officials and newspaper editors. Protests by Canadians reached unprecedented proportions as evidenced by the volume of letters received by External Affairs (2,074). Most often the writers simply stated their support for the demonstrators and did not outline any policy directives (1,059). However, when policy was considered (839), the overwhelming majority called for a stern response by the Canadian government including the imposition of economic sanctions (822).⁴

Letters were mailed to the government and the media from every region and from every demographic category. As an indication of the level of public opprobrium, the June 12, 1989 issue of the Ottawa Citizen included an entire page of letters from concerned Canadians. In their letters, they wrote of the "wanton brutality," the "brutal repression," and the "barbarian tactics" of the Chinese

government's measures.⁵ In a letter to the Toronto Star, Pearl Miller, a resident of Downsview, Ontario, wrote that "Canadian foreign policy is nothing short of hypocrisy. They go all out to condemn China's inhuman behaviour, but fall short of taking action for fear of losing the billion-dollar trade we have with them".⁶ Several hundred residents of Red Deer, Alberta, in a telegram to Joe Clark, commented that they could not "stand in silence" and observe the "massacre of innocent people" because to remain quiet would be an acceptance of the "oppressive acts of violence".⁷ Finally, a Grade 5 class in Markham, Ontario undertook a letter-writing campaign to the Chinese Ambassador asking him to explain the actions of the Chinese government in using force to end the demonstrations.⁸

The indignation evident in the letters written by Canadians was not reflected to the same degree in the editorial columns of Canada's newspapers. Editorial opinion was relatively mute on the issue, with most papers usually only registering their repulsion in one editorial between June 5 and 12.⁹

The most vociferous in its denunciation of the Chinese leaders and in calling for the imposition of sanctions was the Ottawa Citizen. In a June 6 editorial, it called on Canada to recall its Ambassador, to embargo all flights

between China and Canada, to terminate all technology transfers, to allow Chinese students to remain in Canada as long as necessary to ensure their safety, and to link deliveries of foreign aid to human rights performance. Later, on both June 14 and June 23, the paper repeated its demand to cease aid transfers. Joining the Ottawa Citizen in pressing for the imposition of sanctions was the Financial Post, which urged the government, in a June 6 editorial, to withdraw the Ambassador, to grant students refugee status, to review all Export Development Corporation credits extended to China, to examine all possible multilateral channels that could force acquiescence and to recommend that China's application to re-enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade be halted.

Opposing the Ottawa Citizen and the Financial Post and supporting a measured response were the Toronto Star and the Vancouver Sun. Editorials in the Toronto Star credited the Canadian government with proceeding "cautiously" and the Vancouver Sun was supportive of the government's initiatives, arguing that the government "responded with suitable rhetoric and a compassionate concern for Chinese citizens".¹⁰

A second means through which Canadians vented their

displeasure was mass protest. In May and early June, protests had been held in support of the demonstrators in China. After June 4, the focus of the protests shifted to pressure Canada to adopt strict measures against the Chinese regime. Large-scale rallies were held in all cities with a significant Chinese ethnic or student population, and these demonstrations assisted in galvanizing and focusing public opinion at large. For example, more than 30,000 people gathered in Grange Park near City Hall in Toronto to protest, listen to speeches and to march to the Chinese diplomatic offices in an effort to register their indignation. However, not all demonstrators were Chinese citizens or of Chinese ethnicity. Canadians joined in the rallies to force their government to announce strict measures in reaction to the atrocities committed in China.

By the middle of June, reports began circulating in Canada, and elsewhere, of Chinese students studying abroad being harassed by Chinese diplomatic personnel. It also became known that those who had appeared on television in China in support of the demonstrators were being arrested and this made some outside of China fearful of being videotaped by Chinese diplomatic personnel. Canada's Ambassador to the PRC warned Chinese students in Canada

that the Chinese government was keeping track of their activities and that they should maintain a "low profile" and not be photographed.¹¹ In responding to claims that Chinese officials were conducting these activities in Canada, Joe Clark twice called in the Chinese Ambassador to warn him about officials of his country harassing Chinese students in Canada.¹² The fear of reprisals on return to China for their activities in Canada led many Chinese students to stop participating in activities in which they could be photographed or videotaped. The result of this was a decrease in the number and size of demonstrations held after June 15 to protest the actions of the Chinese leadership.

Prior to June 4, the Chinese community in Canada was divided into many different factions and rarely, if ever, was unified in opinion. Leaders of the Chinese-Canadian community condemned the brutality of the measures employed by the Chinese leadership to stop the demonstrations in Beijing. They also agreed that Canada should not sever completely its ties with China stressing the importance of maintaining people-to-people links and that Canada should provide safety and assistance for those Chinese who were in Canada at that time. Outside of these measures, the Chinese community leaders disagreed on the extent that

Canada should go to demonstrate Canadian disapproval to the happenings in the PRC. There were those groups such as the Canada-China National Council that had worked hard over the years to forge academic and cultural ties between Canada and China and they argued that the disruption, or termination, of these types of person-to-person linkages would serve only to isolate further those in China who were attempting to promote change.¹³

There were also those groups that had formed to lend support to the demonstrators before the 'crackdown'. One of the more notable of these groups was the Toronto Committee for Concerned Citizens Supporting the Movement for Democracy in China formed by Joseph Wong, a Toronto physician. This group included among its supporters John Polanyi, a Nobel Prize recipient and Professor at the University of Toronto; the members of Toronto City Council; the Ontario Federation of Labour; Oxfam Canada; the Canadian Federation of Students; and, numerous other groups and prominent individuals.¹⁴ In Vancouver, the Canadian-Chinese Committee for Democratic Movement in China was formed and counted among its leaders Raymond Chan, the current Secretary of State for Asia Pacific.¹⁵ For the most part, these groups pressed the government to adopt more stringent measures including economic sanctions,

withdrawing Canada's ambassador from Beijing, and raising the issue with the United Nations Security Council.¹⁶

Joining with these latter groups in pressing for a Canadian response that criticized the Chinese leadership were the pro-Kuomintang (KMT) groups such as the Chinese Community Centre. These groups looked for opportunities such as what transpired in June 1989 to lobby for closer relations between Canada and Taiwan at the expense of Canada's relationship with the PRC.

For their part, Canadian development and human rights non-governmental organizations wanted their work to continue with as little disturbance as possible. They did not want Tiananmen used as a rationalization to reduce government funding for their programs in China as a means to ease Canada's domestic budgetary condition.¹⁷ These groups were in the PRC to help those who had suffered not those who had meted out the punishment. To decrease funding would be to punish doubly those in China needing help the most.

The Canadian business community did not want the happenings in Beijing to interfere with Canada's trade relationship with China. Setting up operations in the PRC, for most companies, was a long drawn out process that spanned many years and Canadian businesses were fearful

that their market share could be lost to others who hurried back, or who never left. Those Canadian companies with operations in China experienced a temporary disruption in activity but, by June 20, most had resumed their operations in the PRC.¹⁸ Canadian businesses, along with those from other Western states including Japan, were subjected to a "high pressure campaign" to maintain their investments in China commenced in the aftermath of Tiananmen.¹⁹ Supporting those businesses with operations in the People's Republic in pressing the Mulroney Government to not adopt measures detrimental to their financial well-being was the Canada-China Trade Council which was led by Mulroney's close personal friend, Paul Desmarais, and which counted 120 corporate-members.

In addition to the business community, the farming community wanted to continue as usual in exporting their produce to the PRC. By 1989, many farmers relied on the PRC market for their livelihood as indicated by one-in-three farmers' income being tied to sales to the People's Republic.²⁰ The importance of wheat sales to China to the livelihood of prairie farmers cannot be underestimated. As indicated in Chapter Three, the export of wheat from Alberta and Saskatchewan to China totaled Cdn\$1.7 billion and comprised 64 per cent of Canadian exports to China, in

1988 (see Table 3). Any threat of loss of the China market due to actions by the Canadian government would have been reacted to harshly by the farmers and by the co-operative grain companies, including the three Prairie Wheat Pools and the United Grain Growers. The former with a membership in excess of 140,000 persons and a geographical span of more than 30 federal constituencies is the "largest and traditionally the most influential co-operative grain-handling company" in Canada.²¹

The above analysis portrays the business and farming communities as being monolithic in form and action. This obviously masks the myriad of views of those who comprise the membership of these communities. There were differences among the members as to the extent to which Canada should go to demonstrate its displeasure of the actions taken by some in the Chinese leadership. However, the main thrust of the message heard in Ottawa by the representatives of these communities was that they did not want to have their operations disrupted by what they believed was essentially a political issue. In short, the Canadian business and farming communities pressed Canadian officials for a muted reaction.

In sum, there were those in the policy community who pressed the government to adopt stricter measures than

those announced on June 5 and there were those who opposed any additional measures being implemented. In the immediate aftermath, public opinion, as expressed through letters to External and Canadian newspapers and through participation in mass rallies, was pressing the decision-makers to adopt a stern response to the happenings in Tiananmen Square. Conversely, those in the business and farming communities pressed the government to adopt a softer response. The reaction of the Chinese-Canadian community was mixed with some groups pushing for a more muted response than others. The editorial opinion in Canada was also mixed with newspapers such as the Ottawa Citizen and the Financial Post pressing for a more stern response and the Toronto Star and Vancouver Sun pressing decision-makers to stay the course of a more muted response.

The State Responds

To signal Canadian disapproval of the Chinese government's initiative, the Chinese Ambassador in Ottawa, Zhang Wenpu, was summoned to the Department of External Affairs by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, on June 4. Upon his arrival, Zhang Wenpu was met by Raymond Chretien, Acting Under-secretary of State for External

Affairs, who then lodged Canada's protest and condemnation concerning the use of force in quelling the demonstrations.

The next day, June 5, in an emergency debate in Parliament on the crisis in China, Joe Clark outlined the initial Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. In the statement, he expressed the government's abhorrence and outrage at the Chinese use of force to end the demonstrations. The short-term Canadian approach was to build upon two premises: the need to safeguard Canadian lives and the need to pressure the Chinese Government. To safeguard the lives of Canadians in Beijing, of whom there were approximately three hundred, the Secretary of State for External Affairs advised them to evacuate the city. He called upon the government in China "to urgently and immediately take steps to stop the aggressive and senseless killing by its armed forces". He also indicated that Canada would make available humanitarian assistance or medical supplies as needed. Clark then proceeded to set out the following bilateral initiatives that Canada was taking or had already taken:

- (1) all events that were planned for the near future were canceled;

- (2) the signing of a series of memoranda of understanding regarding Canada's developmental assistance projects worth approximately \$60 million were postponed;

(3) nuclear co-operation consultations due to begin the next week were suspended;

(4) provinces and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with consultations planned for the near future were advised to suspend them;

(5) all high level visits were delayed until a "more appropriate time";

(6) the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations was instructed to consult with other members and the Secretary-General regarding effective means by which moral suasion could be brought to bear upon the Chinese leadership;

(7) with regards to Chinese students and immigrants in Canada, student visas were extended until "calm return[ed] to their homeland" and the Immigration Act pertaining to "removals to China" was suspended for a two month period; and

(8) the Canadian Armed Forces' modest program of defence relations with the People's Liberation Army was suspended as well as any export permits for military sales.²²

After announcing the immediate response to the incidents in the PRC, the most pressing policy concern to be dealt with was the evacuation of Canadians from China. The evacuation plans of the various western countries was a major topic of discussion among the national crisis management teams that had been formed after June 4. A direct telephone network connecting the national crisis management teams of the western states was established in the immediate aftermath, in an effort to co-ordinate evacuation plans. A toll-free telephone 'hot line' was set

up to provide information to friends and relatives of those Canadians who were in China at the time of the massacre.²³

While those Canadians who wished to leave China were evacuated within days of the incident, there was a myriad of additional policy concerns that needed to be addressed. Should the government proceed with the screening of *The First Emperor*, a film co-produced by the National Film Board and Chinese film-makers, at the grand opening of the National Museum of Civilization?²⁴ Should the government proceed with aid projects that had already been signed and were in the process of being implemented? What course of action was to be undertaken concerning those Chinese students residing in Canada who did not want to return to the PRC? These concerns and many others needed to be dealt with in the context of the chaos then present in the People's Republic. As well, the annual Group of Seven (G7) Summit was scheduled to begin on July 14 in Paris and it was felt that Canada needed to determine its policy response prior to the opening of that meeting. Therefore, within a week of the 'crackdown' in China, it became apparent that a "formal policy response" was necessary in order to deal with these concerns.²⁵

On the weekend of the incident, Clark considered recalling the Canadian Ambassador to the People's Republic

of China. However, Drake wanted to remain in Beijing until all Canadians who desired to leave had been airlifted to safety. Drake was subsequently recalled to Ottawa on June 13. The recall of the Canadian ambassador to China was taken as an "indication of disapproval" of the Chinese leaders' actions, according to Clark. The action also had a more pragmatic purpose in that the Canadian government had decided to conduct a complete review of Canada's relations with China and Drake's participation in that process was crucial.²⁶ It is important to note that Canada was alone in implementing this measure.

In addition to recalling the Canadian Ambassador, provincial consultation was needed if a 'national policy' for China was to be crafted. Federal officials need "at least [to] consul[t]" provincial officials on matters of importance to the provinces, if not bring them "directly into the process of policy-making".²⁷ In an effort to consult the provinces and to craft a 'national policy' for China, discussions between officials in Ottawa and the provincial capitals were ongoing throughout the period under study.

When news of the events in China reached Canada the leaders of those provinces with an interest in China issued statements expressing their disapproval of the Chinese

leaders' actions.²⁸ For example, David Peterson, then Liberal premier of Ontario, was "outrage[d]" at the "senseless violence and loss of life", and he called for an "end to [the] tragedy".²⁹ While expressing anger at the Chinese leadership, the provincial leaders knew that a unified Canadian response was necessary if it was to be effective. They recognized that any response from the provinces, harsh or soft, would have had little impact on China. Moreover, they recognized the economic importance of the PRC to their economies and, therefore, the need to not isolate China. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the bilateral trade relationship comprised mostly wheat exports from Alberta and Saskatchewan. Any measures announced by Canada in response to Tiananmen that affected the sale of wheat to the PRC would have been reacted to strongly by the provincial governments in Edmonton and Regina.³⁰ Provincial officials, like their federal counterparts, knew that a harsh response would not affect China and would only result in their losing their share of the PRC market. Therefore, the interests of the provinces and the federal government were similar and mutually reinforcing. In short, a "soft consensus" between provincial and federal officials was arrived at.³¹

After Clark's announcement of the imposition of a

range of sanctions, there was support from all parties in parliament for the government's action. Opposition leaders John Turner (Liberal) and Ed Broadbent (NDP) both seconded Clark's speech. Further, Andre Ouellet, Liberal External Affairs critic, remarked that it was one of the toughest statements he had ever heard from a Canadian government.³² The multiparty support given Clark's speech was evidenced by the Members of Parliament (MPs) giving it a standing ovation at its conclusion.

Later that night a special session of Parliament was held in order to provide MPs with the opportunity to express their concerns and give advice as to the proper course of action for Canada to follow in the post-Tiananmen period. Applications for the holding of an emergency debate were tendered by Howard McCurdy, Jesse Flis and David Kilgour under the provisions of Standing Order 52 which allowed for a special session of Parliament to be called to discuss important matters requiring urgent consideration.³³ Over the course of almost five hours, 37 Parliamentarians voiced their opinions on the matter with most pressing the government to use its seat on the UNSC to take action against the PRC, and to review Canada's extension of official development assistance and export credits to China.³⁴

After the emergency debate, some Parliamentarians kept pressing the Canadian government to adopt more stern measures. For example, Bill Blaikie, the NDP External Affairs critic, pressed for Canada to be "more aggressive at the United Nations" and to "force China to use its veto" in the Security Council.³⁵ Additionally, Howard McCurdy, the NDP human rights critic, questioned the resolve of the Mulroney Government by asking if Canada would "be bullied into apparent acquiescence to infamy" in reacting to the incidents in China.³⁶ Notwithstanding these efforts, Parliament played a diminishing role in the crafting of the Canadian response as June wore on.

In developing a formal Canadian response, a "broad consensus" on the "general line" that there could not be business as usual in the aftermath of the incidents of June 4 was reached within the public service.³⁷ Outside of External, those departments with an interest in Canada's China policy would include the members of the China Working Group (CWG).³⁸ Included in the various strands of the 'general line' was that the Mulroney Government had invested a significant amount of time and money in trying to develop Canada's commercial relationship with the PRC, past sanctions directed against the PRC had failed to fulfill their goals,³⁹ and restrictions could not be placed

on Canadian businesses in their dealings with the PRC.⁴⁰ Outside of these strands of the 'general line', differences of opinion emerged among officials as to what program should be delayed, halted, or terminated. In general, all realized that some response to the killings was necessary. Interdepartmental differences tended to be "parochial" with departments wanting to maintain as many of their programs as possible.⁴¹

The impact of the interdepartmental differences was limited, however. First, External is a central agency within the structure of the Canadian government and, thus, is in a position of authority over line or program departments such as Agriculture, or the Canadian International Development Agency.⁴² Second, as presented below, External was headed by a very capable and senior minister who had the prime minister's support. Third, the North Asia Relations Branch of External exercised effective control over information on what was happening in China.⁴³ Finally, time was an important consideration. An official Canadian response had to be in place prior to the G7 meeting that commenced on July 14 in Paris.

While there could not be business as usual in the aftermath of Tiananmen, the events of June 1989 were a short-term disruption in the Sino-Canadian relationship and

this was no reason to destroy the linkages that public servants had been striving for nearly 20 years to build. This suggests that the officials involved opposed any tough and extensive measures being adopted and that they favoured a more lenient approach. What was required was a "relationship adjustment" and not a severing of ties with China.⁴⁴ Further, it is important to note that upon his return to Ottawa after being recalled from the Canadian Embassy in Beijing on June 13, Earl Drake met with both Mulroney and Clark where it can be assumed that he offered similar advice to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs and that he may have even made his case for a restrained Canadian response in stronger terms in private.⁴⁵ In short, the overriding concern for bureaucratic actors was to respond to Tiananmen Square but not to disrupt the key aspects of the Canada-China relationship.

Those in the executive with an interest in Canada's response to the happenings in the PRC included the ministers of those departments that had membership in the China Working Group (CWG) including Harvie Andre (Regional Industrial Expansion), Perrin Beatty (Health and Welfare), Benoit Bouchard (Transport), Jake Epp (Energy), Monique Landry (External Affairs and International Development),

Doug Lewis (Justice), Marcel Masse (Communications), Don Mazankowski (Agriculture and Deputy Prime Minister), Barbara McDougall (Employment and Immigration), Bill McKnight (Defence), Tom Siddon (Fisheries), Michael Wilson (Finance), and William Winegard (Science and Technology), as well as Mulroney and Clark.

While all the members of the CWG may have had an interest in Canada's China policy, not all had equal influence on policy-making. The key ministers in this case were Joe Clark, John Crosbie, Donald Mazankowski, Barbara McDougall, Brian Mulroney, and Michael Wilson since all had an interest in China and all were members of the powerful Operations Committee.⁴⁶ The Operations Committee met every Monday morning to discuss controversial matters and to determine a course for the government to follow. Between the June 5 and 30 announcements, the Operations Committee would have met four times so there was ample opportunity to discuss the China issue. It is the forum in which the Canadian response to the events in China in June 1989 was discussed at the executive level.⁴⁷

The "dominant concern" for Prime Minister Mulroney in this instance, as in all policy matters, foreign or domestic, was for a "policy and process that succeeds", that is it is "popular with the Canadian public".⁴⁸ As

Andrew F. Cooper has noted, the "key question" for Mulroney was whether or not a policy decision had "political appeal".⁴⁹ This was in keeping with both Mulroney's philosophy of political leadership which stressed the "accommodation of interests" over the "interplay of ideas"⁵⁰ and his "modus operandi as a labour negotiator and political deal maker".⁵¹

Problems arose, however, in the case of China. The complexity of the Canada-China relationship was of little interest to Mulroney and, as John Kirton has noted, Mulroney "had no wish to immerse himself in the complex details of policy areas he only dimly understood... leav[ing] the detailed substance of policy to others".⁵² Therefore, apart from remarking that he was "outraged" and "appalled" by the use of force to end the demonstrations⁵³ and from penning a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations advising him of Canada's "readiness" to assist the United Nations in pursuing "constructive action...to the full extent offered by the Charter",⁵⁴ Mulroney maintained a low profile until the G7 meeting in Paris in July entrusting his Secretary of State for External Affairs with the task of crafting the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre.⁵⁵

Clark then assumed the lead role in formulating the

Canadian response. He had formal authority and responsibility for Canada's foreign relations, control over information concerning China, and direct access to expertise on China. Moreover, he had the confidence and support of Mulroney who often entrusted him with formulating Canada's policy on sensitive foreign issues.⁵⁶ Clark, in short, exercised effective control over the crafting of the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre.⁵⁷

In formulating the Canadian reaction to the incidents in China, Clark drew on what he had learned in pressuring the South African government to end apartheid.⁵⁸ In that case, Canada had attempted to lead both the Commonwealth and the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries (G7) in adopting a "hard line" on the fight to end apartheid. Canadian resources were expended in an effort to move the leaders of member states of these organizations to adopt "a more coercive policy towards South Africa".⁵⁹ For example, Mulroney used his position as chair of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver in 1987 and as host of the G7 Summit meeting in Toronto in 1988 to press these organizations to assume a more censorious position concerning apartheid. The Prime Minister, however, was "rebuffed" in his efforts. Fearful

of becoming a "lightweight" and losing all "capacity for exercising influence in other areas of interest to Canada", Canada retreated from its position on South Africa.⁶⁰ The interests of the other more senior members of the G7 and Britain's intransigence in the Commonwealth led ultimately to Canada moving away from its hard-line position. These same states also comprised the main cast of players in the China case. As demonstrated in Chapter Four, Canadian decision-makers knew that the others would not follow the Canadian lead in adopting strong measures against the PRC. Canada, then, was not about to extend itself too far beyond others in the international community. The lessons of South Africa were well remembered when the events in China began happening.

Also influencing Clark's views on how Canada should respond to the incidents in China in June 1989 was the need to act consistently with the increased importance of human rights considerations in Canadian foreign policy since 1987, to satisfy the general Canadian public's demands for action, and to not adversely affect the Canada-China relationship.

First, human rights considerations had assumed a higher priority in Canadian foreign policy since 1987 and there was a need to act consistently, at least in a

rhetorical sense, with that new focus. Clark shared this commitment most prominently with McDougall and Mulroney.⁶¹ A few days prior to the clearing of Tiananmen Square by PLA forces, Clark, in his opening speech to Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting on the human dimension, reasserted Canada's commitment to the promotion of human rights globally.⁶² Based on the enhanced focus on human rights, it was clear that the Canadian government had to respond to the incidents in China or else open itself up to charges of inconsistency and hypocrisy. The image of Canada as a supporter of human rights internationally fostered by Clark and Mulroney needed to be maintained.

Second, the "moral leadership" provided by Mulroney and Clark in the fight against apartheid in South Africa helped to foster a "national ethic of outrage" in Canada against human rights violations that could not be disavowed in the case of China.⁶³ The visceral response of the Canadian public to the brutality of the measures employed by the Chinese leadership needed to be responded to by the Mulroney government. It moved various ministers, including Mulroney, Clark, and McDougall, to meet with the leaders of Chinese-Canadian groups throughout Canada.⁶⁴ It also moved Clark to schedule the National Round Table meeting of those knowledgeable in Canada-China relations to survey their

opinions on how Canada should respond to the events of June 4 and what course Canada should follow in the post-Tiananmen period.

Finally, while there was a need to be consistent with the enhanced importance of human rights in Canadian foreign policy and to be aware of the pressure from the general public to respond harshly, Clark was mindful that Canada had to be able to "accommodate the promotion of both exports and human rights simultaneously".⁶⁵ In other words, the Canadian reaction could not be too harsh so as to affect the Canada-China commercial relationship in an adverse fashion. That the Canadian response should not negatively affect the bilateral commercial relationship was a position supported by Crosbie, Mazankowski, and Wilson, as well as Drake and other civil servants.⁶⁶ Moreover, as Mulroney stated when he met with Grant Devine, then Premier of Saskatchewan, on June 8, the Canadian trade relationship with the PRC benefitted the Chinese people because it comprised primarily of wheat and potash exports and, as such, was "designed to alleviate hunger", to "help the people in China", and "not to fuel any military machine".⁶⁷

The positive effects of Canadian trade on China would have also been stressed by Mazankowski. He had positioned himself as a "dominant force both in cabinet...and in

virtually all matters pertaining to western Canada".⁶⁸ Mazankowski's experience as the head of the Canadian Wheat Board during the period of the grain embargo of the Soviet Union in 1979 caused him to be "very reluctant" to agree to the use of restrictions on grain shipments as a measure used by Canada to express its displeasure of another state's behaviour.⁶⁹ As a regional minister for the West and as Agriculture Minister, he would have resisted strongly any measures that interfered with the bilateral commercial relationship.

There was also a need to distinguish between those who had ordered the offensive action (i.e. the Chinese leadership) and the rest of the Chinese populace who had suffered as a result of that action. The Canadian response needed to target the former while maintaining ties with the latter. Cognizant of the fact that Canada alone could not have a noticeable impact on the People's Republic and that other states were ready and willing to step into the breach caused by a Canadian exodus from the PRC, Clark, in formulating the Canadian response, was mindful of the need to follow a "prudent" policy based on a realistic assessment of the affect Canada could have on the PRC, the need to satisfy the Canadian public's demand for action, and the need to act consistently with the increased

saliency of human rights in Canadian foreign policy.⁷⁰

In sum, there were differences of views among state actors as to the appropriate Canadian reaction to events in China in June 1989. The severity of the violation of human rights and the fact that the actions were televised live moved Parliamentarians to hold a special session in which they pressed for a stern response. This was, for the most part, the limit of Parliamentary involvement in formulating Canada's response. At the executive level, there was broad agreement that a response was necessary given the enhanced importance of human rights concerns in Canadian foreign policy and the level of domestic protest. However, it was important that Canadian reaction was not too harsh so as not to impact negatively the bilateral commercial relationship. This view was stressed by those in the civil service that had worked hard to advance the relationship, as well as those provinces that relied on exports to the China market for their economic well-being. The focus of the chapter now turns to examine the ways in which state and societal actors interacted with one another over the course of June 1989 in an attempt to determine Canada's course of action in the post-Tiananmen period.

The Decision-Making Process

After news of the events of June 4 reached Ottawa, the group of officials from the North Asia Relations Branch that had been 'loosely assembled' into a crisis management team became more formalized in the Crisis Decision-Making Unit (CDMU). They immediately began work on formulating a response to the massacre.⁷¹ That the actions of the Chinese military had been seen on televisions throughout the world added further pressure on the officials to develop a response quickly. Working at their desks nonstop, those in the CDMU formed the initial Canadian response to the massacre that was announced by Clark in the emergency debate in parliament, on June 5.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs and/or his representative maintained daily contact with the members of the CDMU and the leader of the CDMU had direct access to the Minister thereby bypassing the formal organizational line of authority within the department. After the CDMU had met, developed a response to events in Beijing, discussed it with Clark, and had it approved by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the CDMU then met with the larger Task Force and briefed the members as to the government's decision. Other departments, as B. Michael Frolic has noted, had "minimal impact" in the

decision-making process.⁷² The CDMU was the "policy development unit" whereby officials of the North Asia Relations Branch met informally and frequently and developed the government's response to the ongoing crisis and the larger interdepartmental Task Force was the "operational unit" which implemented the decisions of the CDMU after they had been approved by the Minister.⁷³ This was the process whereby decisions were made throughout the entire period under study. The key decision-making group was not to be found at the top of the organizational structure of External but rather within a division within one of the geographic branches.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs played the lead role in crafting the Canadian reaction. The decision-making process instituted by Prime Minister Mulroney after coming to power in 1984 augmented the "executive-centred"⁷⁴ character of the Westminster system by empowering key ministers to deal with pressing concerns without requiring their decisions to be "put through numerous hoops of collective decision-making".⁷⁵ The use "personal influence behind the scenes" to arrive at decisions replaced Cabinet as the nexus for decision-making.⁷⁶

The Minister's influence over the decision-making process was evident in his desire to hold a national

meeting of interested societal actors.⁷⁷ On June 22, over 40 persons drawn from the business community, the Canadian-Chinese community, the academic community, and the various government departments involved in the policy-making process were assembled in Ottawa for a National Round Table. Originally, Clark wanted to meet with the various group representatives separately but was convinced of the utility of meeting with the representatives at one time in one location. Officials within External felt that placing all the participants in a single venue would diminish the probability of radical proposals being voiced by one group due to the inter-group dynamics of the situation. Those invited to participate were asked to make their presentations succinct. No presentations were made by governmental participants, save a brief introduction by Jean McCloskey, Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia and Pacific Branch, Department of External Affairs.⁷⁸

In what has been labeled "the most important airing of Canadian views on China after June 4", the representatives from the above-mentioned groups convened to "tell the Minister, and subsequently the Prime Minister and Cabinet, what to do about China".⁷⁹ It is important to note that the views of those selected to participate in the Round Table were, for the most part, known prior to June 22.

Consultations between those in the Canadian business community with an interest in China and government officials had been occurring since 1972. Similarly, discussions had been occurring between External officers and academics on an intermittent basis since 1984. Furthermore, many of the academics invited to participate in the Round Table had been former cultural attaches in the Beijing embassy and so they had a prior relationship with the officials in External. Discussions between non-governmental organizations and External had been ongoing since 1979. Selecting representatives from the Chinese-Canadian community to participate in the Round Table meeting was the most difficult. Credible, articulate spokespersons from a community which had little previous experience or interest in Canada's China policy had to be found. Prior meetings with various ministers across Canada allowed some insight into the views of these participants. Therefore, the opinions expressed at the Round Table were, for the most part, familiar to the officials present.

During the Round Table meeting, the strongest voice in favour of not punishing China came from the business and farming representatives. It was reported by one participant in the Round Table meeting that the participants from Canadian businesses spoke "with one

voice" saying: "Let there be business with China as usual. Economically it is in our interest and in Canada's to maintain trade links and investment".⁸⁰ This sentiment was repeated outside the Round Table talks by Marcel Dufour, President of Lavalin Industries, when he stated that "it is business as usual as far as we are concerned".⁸¹ George Shaw Macmillan, a representative of the Canada-China Trade Council, "agreed" with the remarks of Dufour and noted that what Canadian business needed to do was to "assess [the] risk" of doing business in China in light of the events in the People's Republic.⁸² The most visible signal to Canadian and Chinese leaders that Canadian businesses would not ignore the world's largest domestic market rested in the fact that by the time the Round Table was convened most Canadian companies had resumed their operations in China.⁸³

Similarly, the representatives of the farming community voiced their concerns that a harsh Canadian reaction may jeopardize their profitable trade with China. The sale of Canadian wheat was to alleviate hunger and could not be regarded as helping the Chinese leadership suppress dissent. The Canadian response then should not "punish" Canadian farmers and "the common Chinese who... [eat] our grain".⁸⁴

For their part, NGOs wanted to maintain a "low

profile" so that their work could continue in China with little disruption. They counseled Canadian policy-makers to not cancel programs or disrupt their operations by taking a stand on human rights in this instance.⁸⁵

Academics and China-watchers were divided in their reaction to the events. A minority within this group, some of whom had witnessed the massacre, had close Chinese friends whose fate was uncertain, or had taken part in the evacuation of Canadians from China, called for much stronger action. However, the majority recommended a measured response, and proposed:

that the Canadian government not withdraw its Ambassador, or in any way diminish the level of Canadian representation in China; that the Canadians should not impose economic sanctions on the PRC; that basic linkages with the PRC be maintained, especially scholarly exchanges which serve to benefit precisely those who are certain to be repressed after Tiananmen; that high-level government delegations be suspended, along with government-to-government consultations at the senior level; that no new developmental assistance programs be initiated; that selected aid programs be evaluated and possibly suspended; that the Government should re-evaluate its current and pending loans; that the Government should deliver a strong note of protest to PRC authorities, in Ottawa and in Beijing.⁸⁶

Pressing Canadian policy-makers to adopt a stern course of action were various Chinese-Canadian community organizations in attendance. These groups had two primary concerns including pressing decision-makers to take "severe sanctions" against China and to provide safety and

assistance for the nearly 8,000 students and scholars who were in Canada at the time of the incident.⁸⁷

In examining the policy-making process, it has been demonstrated that decision-making was centralized in a small group of officials within External who possessed expertise on China. It was the 'politicals' within the Department and not the 'traders' who were tasked with developing Canada's response. As well, the Secretary of State for External Affairs took an active interest in crafting the Canadian reaction. While he tasked those in the CDMU to develop a response, all initiatives had to be agreed to by him before being implemented. He did not leave the task to those in the public service, but was actively involved in formulating the decision. Because the Minister assumed an active role in the decision-making process, the process was opened up to include a wider array of interested societal actors than had participated previously in the making of China policy.⁸⁸ The addition of Chinese-Canadian community groups and human rights NGOs to the mix of those consulted was a direct result of the Minister's active participation in the process. It was pressure from the minister that also resulted in the holding of the Round Table. Absent the involvement of the Minister, the process would not have been opened up to

include as wide a collection of societal actors.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis indicates that Canada's relationship with the PRC was fundamentally altered by the events of June 1989. As determined in Chapter Three, Canada's China policy prior to June 1989 was characterized by three primary aspects. First, Canada's China policy was crafted by those in the public service with sporadic and short-term interjections by political leaders. Second, those societal actors in the policy community, including business and farming groups, as well as academics, pushed for Canada to develop further its relationship with China. Finally, the preeminent concern for Canada in the bilateral relationship was fostering good commercial relations. The events of June 1989 change the domestic environment in which Canada's China policy was formulated.

First, new actors were introduced into the policy community. The most prominent of these new participants was the increased role played by the political leaders, in particular Joe Clark. The events of June 1989 moved Clark to become involved in an issue-area in which he had little interest or knowledge. Clark, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, had left this area of Canadian foreign policy to

others. The bilateral relationship was, as previously mentioned, primarily commercial and Clark had little interest in these matters. When the PLA troops began to forcefully clear the square, human rights became a "problem" in the relationship and, thus, moved the Secretary of State for External Affairs to become more actively involved.

At the societal level, the most prominent addition to the constellation of actors in the policy community was the Chinese-Canadian community. Tiananmen marked a coalescing of the community into a political force that could not be overlooked by decision-makers. B. Michael Frolic has noted that "the events of June 1989 marked a major step in the political maturation of Canada's Chinese community".⁸⁹ After Tiananmen, the Chinese community emerged as a factor to be considered in the making of China policy within Canada.

In addition to Chinese-Canadians, human rights NGOs were also added to the policy community. Because of the experience of June 1989, human rights considerations assumed a more prominent position in the Canada-China relationship and, as such, human rights NGOs assumed a more prominent role in pressing the government on these issues with respect to China.

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Second, along with new actors becoming involved in the making of Canada's China policy, political rationality superceded bureaucratic rationality. In other words, domestic political considerations became an important component of the decision-making calculus. Decision-makers had to concern themselves with how Canada's China policy would 'play' domestically, something that, prior to June 1989, was a marginal consideration, at most. For Clark and Mulroney, this meant ensuring their reputations as propagators of human rights internationally was maintained.

A final change in the relationship as a result of the happenings of June 1989 concern the heightened importance of human rights considerations in the decision-making calculus. No longer could the bilateral relationship be based predominately on commercial ties. This is, in part, due to the concerns of the new societal actors in the policy community who emerged as a result of Tiananmen. In short, the experience of Tiananmen meant that Canada's China policy was crafted in much more politicized environment with various domestic actors calling on the Ottawa to respond in a number of ways.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, (Ann Arbor: Harper Collins, 1984), p.115.

2. This is not particular to China, numerous examples could be cited where a lack of media coverage resulted in human rights violations not being responded to. A very short list of events happening in Asia close to Tiananmen would include Burma/Myanmar in August and September 1988 and East Timor prior to November 1991.

3. In order to assess public opinion, five newspapers were examined between mid-May and mid-July, 1989. The papers included the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, the Ottawa Citizen, the Financial Post, and the Vancouver Sun.

4. Confidential information supplied to the author.

5. Ottawa Citizen, June 12, 1989. For additional letters written by Canadians, see Toronto Star, June 14, 1989; and Hansard, June 5, 1989, p.2630; June 14, 1989, p.3011; June 22, 1989, p.3520; and, June 27, 1989, p.3702.

6. Toronto Star, June 14, 1989.

7. Hansard, June 14, 1989, p.3011.

8. Hansard, June 22, 1989, p.3520

9. Surprisingly, the Globe and Mail was silent on Canada's policy vis-a-vis China. The editorials were primarily descriptive in nature and offered no position regarding sanctions. It was not until July 22 that the Globe and Mail expressed a position on sanctions and, then, it supported the range of sanctions compiled by the G7 states at the summit meeting in Paris in July 1989.

10. See, Toronto Star, June 15, 1989; and, Vancouver Sun, June 8, 1989, respectively.

11. Ottawa Citizen, June 21, 1989.

12. Globe and Mail, June 17, 1989; Ottawa Citizen, June 16 and 21, 1989; Toronto Star, June 17, 1989; Winnipeg Free Press, June 14 and 16, 1989; and, Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994), p.164.

Later, these claims were given substance when it was

discovered that the Chinese government had developed a classification scheme for students studying abroad ranging from category one or "patriotic students" to category five or those "not allowed to return to China before they abandon[ed] their anti-government positions and commit[ted] concrete acts of repentance". See, Calgary Herald, June 3, 1990; and Harper's Magazine, September 1990, pp.28-31.

13. See Haitao Wen, "Organizations in the Chinese Community and Sino-Canadian Relations: A Case Study of Seven Organizations in Toronto," (unpublished paper for the degree of Master of Arts, York University, 1992); Maire O'Brien, "Canada China Policy in the Aftermath of Tiananmen: A Bureaucratic Politics Perspective," A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, P.E.I., May 31-June 2, 1992, pp.19-20; Globe and Mail, June 22, 1989; and Toronto Star, June 22, 1989.

14. Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.165.

15. In 1991, Raymond Chan traveled to China to confront the Chinese leaders on their human rights practices. The next year he returned to the PRC as an advisor to a group of three MPs who had journeyed to China on a fact-finding mission to investigate human rights violations perpetrated by the state. The group, along with Chan, was forcibly expelled from China after attempting to place a wreath in Tiananmen Square to commemorate those killed in 1989. After winning a seat in the House of Commons in the 1993 general election, Chan was appointed the Secretary of State for Asia Pacific. Chan was back in the PRC the next year but this time he was a minister in the Canadian government and was there to help advance economic relations between the two countries. As B. Michael Frolic has noted, Chan underwent a "metamorphosis" from his time as a human rights activist to his period as a minister.

For more on this, see B. Michael Frolic, "Six Observations About Canada-PRC Relations Since Tiananmen," A paper presented to the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies' Conference on China Ten Years After Tiananmen, 1989-1999, Toronto, Ontario, June 4-6, 1999; ---, "Re-engaging China: Striking a Balance Between Trade and Human Rights," in Fen Osler Hampson, Maureen Appel Molot and Martin Rudner, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1997: Asia-Pacific Face-Off, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1997), pp.323-48; and, Jeremy T. Paltiel, "Negotiating Human Rights with China," in Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1995), pp.165-86.

is the current Secretary of State for Asia Pacific

16. Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.165; Globe and Mail, June 24, 1989; and, Toronto Star June 22, 1989. For a listing of the groups, see Globe and Mail June 9, 1989; Nossal, Rain Dancing, pp.164-65; and, Wen, pp.22-24.
17. See Robert E. Clarke, "Overseas Development Assistance: The Neo-Conservative Challenge," in Maureen Appel Molot and F. O. Hampson, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1989: The Challenge of Change, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1989), pp.193-206; and Cranford Pratt, Ed., Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1994).
18. Ottawa Citizen, June 22, 1989. For further comments from business leaders, see Montreal Gazette, June 14, 1989; and Toronto Star, June 21, 1989.
19. See, Globe and Mail, June 29, 1989; and Winnipeg Free Press, July 10, 1989.
20. B. Michael Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre: A Canadian Perspective," A paper presented at the Conference on Political Order in Changing Societies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 27-September 1, 1989, p.4.
21. Barry K. Wilson, Farming the System: How Politicians and Producers Shape Canadian Agricultural Policy, (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990), p.130. Also, see Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, The Domestic Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: CIIA, 1985), pp.21-4.
22. Department of External Affairs, Statement, 89/28, June 5, 1989.
23. For more on the evacuation, see Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.173; Ottawa Citizen, June 6 and 9, 1989.
24. On June 15, it was decided that the screening was not to occur as scheduled. Ottawa Citizen, June 15, 1989; and Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.174.
25. Confidential correspondence with the author.
26. Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.174; and, Globe and Mail, June 13, 1989.

27. Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1997), pp.295 and 309 respectively. For more on the role of the provinces in Canadian foreign policy, see Nossal, Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, pp.292-331; Ronald G. Atkey, "The Role of the Provinces in International Affairs," International Journal, 26, 1 (Winter 1970-71), pp.249-73; and, Tom Keating and Don Munton, Eds., The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: CIIA, 1985).

28. Those provinces with an interest in China included Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan. All of these provinces maintained a provincial office in Hong Kong, and all had an expanding trade relationship with China. For an overview of these provinces relationships with China, see George MacLean and Kim Richard Nossal, "Triangular Dynamics: Australian States, Canadian Provinces and Relations With China" in Brian Hocking, Ed., Foreign Relations and Federal States, (London and New York: Leicester UP, 1993), pp.170-89; and Globe and Mail, March 17, 1986.

29. Globe and Mail, June 6, 1989. Also, see Legislative Assembly of Alberta, Hansard, June 5, 1989, p.39; Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Hansard, June 5, 1989, pp.7199-200; and Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Hansard, June 6, 1989, p.953.

30. On the role of provinces in agricultural policy-making, see Wilson, Farming the System; and, Andrew Fenton Cooper, "Subnational Activity and Foreign Economic Policy Making in Canada and the United States: Perspectives on Agriculture," International Journal, 31, 3 (Summer 1986), pp.655-73.

31. Confidential correspondence with the author.

32. Toronto Star, June 5, 1989.

33. Hansard, June 5, 1989, pp.2523-4.

34. Hansard, June 5, 1989, pp.2591-2636.

35. Toronto Star, June 18, 1989. Canada had a seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1989.

36. Toronto Star, June 22, 1989.

37. Confidential correspondence with the author.

38. The CWG comprised officials from the following departments: Agriculture; Communications; Defence; Employment and Immigration; Energy; Finance; Fisheries; Health and Welfare; Justice; Regional Industrial Expansion; Science and Technology; and Transport. Also included in CWG were officials from the following: the Canadian Commercial Corporation; the Export Development Corporation; Investment Canada; the Prime Minister's Office; and the Privy Council Office. With the imposition of martial law on May 20, the CWG began to meet weekly in order to keep informed of the happenings in the PRC, to discuss Canadian responses to those happenings, and to coordinate activities among the departments. See, O'Brien, "Canada China Policy," p.13.

39. See the testimonies of Earl Drake (then Canada's Ambassador to China), Jean McCloskey (then Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia and Pacific Branch, DEA), Yves Fortier (then Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations), to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 8, June 20, 1989, and, 9, June 22, 1989. Also, see Earl Drake, "Human Rights and Trade Relations: A Personal Commentary," bout de papier, 11, 3 (Fall 1994), pp.18-20.

40. See, Paul M. Evans and Daphne Taras, "Looking (Far) East: Parliament and Canada-China Relations, 1949-1982," in David Taras, Ed., Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: CIIA, 1985), p.89; Kim Richard Nossal, "Cabin'd, Cribb'd, Confin'd?: Canada's Interest in Human Rights," in Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, Eds., Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1988), p.52; and, F.Q. Quo and Akira Ichikawa, "Sino-Canadian Relations: A New Chapter," Asian Survey, 12, 5 (May 1992), p.389.

41. Confidential interview by the author.

42. On central agencies in the Canadian bureaucracy, see Colin Campbell and George J. Szablowski, The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979); and Paul B. Thomas, "Central Agencies: Making a Mesh of Things," in James P. Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon, Eds., Canadian Politics, (Peterborough: Broadview P, 1994), pp.288-306.

43. Soon after the demonstrations began in Beijing, officials in the CDMU began to circulate a document to those ministers whose departments had an interest in China.

The "China Daily" provided information on the events occurring in that country, as well as the significance of those events for Canada's China policy. For most of the period, the "China Daily" was published, as its name implies, once a day. At the height of the crisis, however, the document was being published three times per day.

44. Confidential correspondence with the author.

45. For Drake's views, see Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, June 20, 1989, 8:11. and, Earl Drake, "Human Rights and Trade Relations: A Personal Commentary," bout de papier, 11, 3 (Fall 1994), pp.18-20.

46. Ottawa Citizen, February 4, 1989; and, Office of the Prime Minister, Release, January 30, 1989. For an interesting discussion of differences in importance in the Mulroney cabinet, see Herman Bakvis, Regional Ministers: Power and Influence in the Canadian Cabinet, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1991), pp.258-82.

47. In addition to Clark, Crosbie, McDougall, Mazankowski, and Wilson, OPs members included Bouchard, de Cotret, and Murray. See, Office of the Prime Minister, News Release, January 30, 1989; Bakvis, Regional Ministers, p.264; and, Ottawa Citizen, February 4, 1989.

48. John Kirton, "Managing Global Conflict: Canada and International Summitry," in Maureen Appel Molot and Brian W. Tomlin, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1987: A World of Conflict, (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1988), p.23. Mulroney's fixation on media commentary is indicative of this need to find 'successful' solutions to policy problems. See, Charlotte Gray, "Know Your Pundits," Saturday Night, 104, 2 (February 1989), pp.13-17; and John Kirton, "The Foreign Policy Decision Process," in Maureen Appel Molot and Brian W. Tomlin, Eds., Canada Among Nations, 1985: The Conservative Agenda, (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1986), p.27.

49. Andrew F. Cooper, In Between Countries: Australia, Canada, and the Search for Order in Agricultural Trade, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1997), p.188.

50. Peter Aucoin, "Organizational Change in the Machinery of Canadian Government: From Rational Management to Brokerage Politics," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 19, 1 (March 1986), p.17.

51. Cooper, In Between Countries, p.188.
52. Kirton, "The Foreign Policy Decision Process," p.33.
53. Toronto Star, June 6, 1989.
54. Office of the Prime Minister, "Letter from the Prime Minister of Canada, Brian Mulroney, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, His Excellency Javier Perez de Cuellar", June 7, 1989.
55. Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.172.
56. See, Joe Clark, "The PM and SSEA: Comment 2," International Journal, 50, 1 (Winter 1994-95), pp.213-15; Kirton, "Foreign Policy Decision-Making," pp.21-38; ---, "The Foreign Policy Decision Process," pp.25-45; ---, "Managing Canadian Foreign Policy," pp.14-28; and Kim Richard Nossal, "The PM and SSEA in Canada's Foreign policy: Dividing the Territory: 1968-1994," International Journal, 50, 1 (Winter 1994-95), pp.189-208.
57. For a similar assessment with respect to Clark's role in formulating Canada's policy towards South Africa, see Gray, "New Faces in Old Places,"; and, Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, "The Background to Canada's Activist Policy Against Apartheid: Theoretical and Political Implications," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 30, 3 (November 1992), pp.293-315.
58. For an excellent overview of the literature on learning and foreign policy, see Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization, 48, 2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312. Also see George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, Eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, (Boulder: Westview P, 1991), especially chapters by Breslauer and Tetlock, Tetlock, Haas, and Breslauer; Ernest B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, 1990), pp.17-50; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1976), pp.217-87; and, Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-intuitive Historians: Applied History and Its Shortcomings," International Studies Quarterly, 30, 2 (June 1986), pp.223-47.
59. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, (Vancouver: UBC P, 1993), p.157. For a

thoughtful discussion of this case, see Linda Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1997).

60. Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994), pp.248 and 250, respectively.

61. For example, it was Mulroney and Clark who had consistently pressed officials in External Affairs towards a more sanctionist policy in the fight against apartheid in South Africa. See Nossal, Rain Dancing, pp.91-125; Adam and Moodley; and, Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion.

During her tenure as SSEA (April 1991-June 1993), McDougall never visited the People's Republic and when she visited other countries in the region in February 1993, ten months after Wilson led a trade mission to China that signalled a return to normal relations, she criticised China harshly for its human rights record. See, DEAITC, "Canada and the Pacific Century," Statement, 93/12, February 19, 1993. For more on McDougall's views on human rights in Canada's foreign policy, see Barbara McDougall, "Towards the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights," in Irwin Cotler and F. Pearl Eliadis, Eds., International Human Rights Law: Theory and Practice, (Montreal: Canadian Human Rights Foundation, 1992), pp.23-40; and ---, "Canada and the New Internationalism," Canadian Foreign Policy, 1, 1 (Winter 1992-93), pp.1-6. Also see Tom Keating, "In Whose Image? Canada and the Promotion of Good Governance," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. John's, Newfoundland, June 8, 1997.

62. See Statement, 89/26, May 30, 1989. Also see Clark's comments at the Summit conference on La Francophonie in Dakar, see Globe and Mail, May 25, 1989.

63. Adam and Moodley, pp.307 and 310. Also, see Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p.193; and, David Black, "Echoes of Apartheid? Canada, Nigeria, and the Politics of Norms," Paper presented to the Workshop on 'Human Rights, Ethics, and Canada's International Security Policy', Toronto, Ontario, York University, November 21-22, 1997.

64. To become better informed of the views of Chinese-Canadians, Cabinet Ministers met with many of the leaders of the community. On June 9, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney met with Chinese-Canadian community leaders in Vancouver to discuss the Canadian response to Tiananmen. On the same

day, in Toronto, Minister of External Affairs and International Development, Monique Landry, met with industry representatives and non-governmental organizations members to discuss the Canadian aid programme in the PRC. In Scarborough, on June 21, Secretary of State, Gerry Weiner, organised a dinner with Chinese community representatives including Gary Yee, President of the Canadian Chinese National Council. As well, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, met with various leaders of the Chinese community in both Vancouver and Ottawa. See, O'Brien, "Canada China Policy," p.19; Nossal, Rain Dancing, p.166; Globe and Mail, June 8, 9 and 22, 1989; Toronto Star, June 9 and 22, 1989; and Winnipeg Free Press, June 9, 1989.

65. Joe Clark, "The Business of Human Profits," Behind the Headlines, 54, 1 (Autumn 1996), p.14.

66. Crosbie recognised that sanctions would not work against the PRC. Also, it was Crosbie who announced the resumption of commercial contracts to the PRC after Tiananmen Square. Furthermore, Crosbie did not mention the continuing problems in China when he led a nine-member trade mission to Hong Kong in September 1989, a mere three months after Tiananmen. For Crosbie, see Winnipeg Free Press, June 23, September 14, and September 19 1989; and, Minister for International Trade, Statement, 89/43, September 18, 1989.

For Wilson, he was the Minister of International Trade who led Canada back into China when he led a trade mission there in April 1992. During his trip, Wilson did broach the subject of human rights with his Chinese counterparts but he did so in a perfunctory manner making it quite clear from the outset that the purpose of the visit was to increase Canadian exports to the PRC and to downplay any criticism of the Chinese on their human rights record. For Wilson, see Minister of Industry, Science, and Technology and Minister of International Trade, News Release, 69, April 10, 1992; Globe and Mail, April 21, 1992; Financial Post, April 18-20, 1992; and, Winnipeg Free Press, April 21, 1992.

67. Associated Press, June 8, 1989.

68. Bakvis, p.258.

69. Wilson, Farming the System, p.253.

70. For a discussion of 'prudence' in this context, see Joe Clark, "Modelling a Canadian Foreign Policy in the Field of Human Rights," in Irwin Cotler and F. Pearl Eliadis, Eds., International Human Rights Law: Theory and Practice, (Montreal: Canadian Human Rights Foundation, 1992), pp.9-21.

71. Being a Saturday in Canada, these officials left home and family to go to the Pearson Building to begin work on crafting the government's initial reaction. Although the Chinese military began clearing Tiananmen on Sunday June 4, news of the happening reached Canada on Saturday June 3 because of the international date line.

72. B. Michael Frolic, "Canada and China After Twenty-Five Years," Fairbank Centre, Harvard University, May 1994, p.31.

73. O'Brien, "Canada China Policy," p.12.

74. C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada, (Toronto: U. of Toronto P., 1987), p.21.

75. Aucoin, p.20. For more on the changes instituted by Mulroney, see Herman Bakvis and David MacDonald, "The Canadian Cabinet: Organization, Decision-Rules, and Policy Impact," in Michael M. Atkinson, Ed., Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1993), pp.47-80; Colin Campbell, Executive Political Leadership in Canada, (Washington: ACSUS, 1989); Ian D. Clark, "Recent Changes in Cabinet Decision-Making in Ottawa," Canadian Public Administration, 28, 2 (Summer 1985), pp.185-201; ---, Recent Changes in the Cabinet Decision-Making System: Update, Autumn 1986, (Ottawa: PCO, December 6, 1986); and, Office of the Prime Minister, Release, January 30, 1989.

For an examination of the changes in foreign policy-making process, see the articles by John Kirton and Harald Von Riekhoff in Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot, Eds., Canada Among Nations, (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1984-1989).

76. Bakvis and MacDonald, p.62.

77. It should be noted that this was not a novel development. Clark had used round table meetings to become better informed about South Africa. See, Adam and Moodley, p.302.

78. O'Brien, "Canada China Policy," p.19. Over the course of the Round Table, Clark came and went from the meeting. He was not in attendance for the entire session. Confidential interview with the author.
79. Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre," p.4.
80. Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre," p.4.
81. Vancouver Sun, June 23, 1989; and Winnipeg Free Press, June 23, 1989. For additional comments by business participants at the Round Table, see O'Brien, p.20; Toronto Star, June 23, 1989; and "The National," Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, June 22, 1989.
82. "The National", Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, June 22, 1989.
83. Ottawa Citizen, June 22, 1989. Also, see Globe and Mail, June 29, 1989; Montreal Gazette, June 14, 1989; Toronto Star, June 21, 1989; Vancouver Sun, June 26, 1989; and Winnipeg Free Press, July 10, 1989.
84. Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre," p.4.
85. O'Brien, "Canada China Policy," p.21.
86. Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre," p.5. Also, see Paul M. Evans' letter in Globe and Mail, June 13, 1989.
87. Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre," p.5; Paltiel, p. 54; and Ottawa Citizen, June 11, 1989.
88. For a discussion of Clark's desire to consult the policy community, see Don Page, "Populism in Canadian Foreign Policy: The 1986 Review Revisited," Canadian Public Administration, 37, 4 (Winter 1994), pp.573-97; and, ---, "The Foreign Service and the Canadian Public," in Donald C. Story, Ed., The Canadian Foreign Service in Transition, (Toronto: Canadian Scholars P, 1993), pp.83-107.
89. Frolic, "The Beijing Massacre," p.5.

CHAPTER SIX

EXPLAINING THE CANADIAN RESPONSE

On June 30, Joe Clark set out Canada's 'formal policy response' to the events in China earlier that month in a broad-ranging statement, "China and Canada: The Months Ahead".¹ Reflecting the "virtual consensus" established at the National Round Table convened on June 22, the statement outlined a framework for the bilateral relationship, as well as new measures to be implemented. The June 30 statement was more precise and detailed than that of June 5 with respect to Canadian policies towards China in the aftermath of Tiananmen.

The June 30 statement set out "four basic parameters" which framed the accompanying policy initiatives. First, the nature of the relationship between China and Canada had been altered and Canada could not accept the "business as usual" stance of the Chinese Government. However, and this was the second point, Canada still valued its friendship with China and had not become and was not becoming "anti-China". Third, measures which tended towards isolating China were to be avoided. Fourth, Canada, in an attempt to maximize the effect of any measures employed, would strive to adopt a "coordinated approach of like-minded countries".

In accordance with these "basic parameters", Canadian policy was to follow three broad criteria in order to "reflect the new reality in China". First, the links developed over the past decade were to be retained "to the extent possible". Second, "people-to-people exchanges" were to be the focus of any new initiatives. Lastly, "programs which benefitted or lent prestige to the current hardline policies of the Chinese government, most particularly the military or state propaganda apparatus," were to be "avoided".

With respect to the "basic parameters" and the "broad criteria", a series of further measures were adopted to clarify Canada's position vis-a-vis China. At the "Overall political relationship" level, the June 30 statement retained the ban on high-level contacts with the Chinese government announced on June 5. In addition, it was indicated that Canada would continue to pursue human rights activities related to China in United Nations agencies, especially the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights.

With respect to new initiatives, measures were imposed on the development assistance front. Aid to three specific projects was withdrawn because they failed the test of the new criteria.² As well, four of the five aid projects,

worth \$60 million, suspended on June 5, were to remain suspended. Only a project linking community colleges was allowed to proceed. Canadian financing for the \$13.2 billion Three Gorges hydroelectric project was also suspended indefinitely.

Commercial actions were also included in the June 30 statement. Funding for a television transmission tower was canceled because it was "clearly supportive of China's state propaganda apparatus" thus, in violation of the new criteria for Canada-China relations. In addition to this measure, Canada's trade representation in Beijing was to be "downgraded", trade show funding was terminated for the balance of the year, and an examination into the slowing and possible stopping of the liberalization of the Coordinating Committee on Multinational Export Controls (COCOM) sanctions against China was undertaken.

Measures to assist the Chinese people in the face of the new repression were also announced. Canadian immigration capacity was to be improved through an increase in processing capabilities in both Beijing and Shanghai. "Priority" was to be given to students and people with family in Canada. Further, the visas of the Chinese students already in Canada were extended up to one year. In the cultural and communications field, Ottawa announced

the advancement by ten months of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporations' plan for its Radio Canada International operations to commence Mandarin broadcasts into China. As well, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was "call[ed] on" to suspend its joint production agreement for television and radio programming with China's state radio.³

In sum, the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre announced on June 30 included more substantial measures than the reactions of the US, Japan, and the European Economic Community (see Chapter Four). No other state issued as complete an array of sanctions as did Canada, or recalled its ambassador. Even though the Canadian response went beyond those of those other western states, it included few measures that could be regarded as potentially significant sanctions. Several of the measures, moreover, were merely window-dressing including enhancing the Beijing embassy's human rights monitoring capacity, increasing the processing capabilities of the embassy in Beijing and the consulate in Shanghai, suspending defence relations, nuclear co-operation consultations, and aid to the Three-Gorges dam project, and opposing the easing of COCOM restrictions.⁴ The question to ask then is why did Canada respond to the Tiananmen Square massacre in this manner?

Alternative Explanations

Up to this point, the material has been presented mostly in an historic fashion, that is, little attempt has been made to analyze it with reference to a specific framework or "conceptual lens". As demonstrated by Graham T. Allison, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, and Denis Stairs, there are many explanations of 'what happened' depending on the "conceptual lens" employed.⁵ In this section of the chapter, explanations for the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre will be developed according to the dominant class, statist, middle power, and interactive approaches. The explanations rendered will then be assessed with respect to the three criteria of 'explanatory richness' outlined in Chapter One. The analysis will demonstrate that the interactive approach furnishes a richer explanation of the Canadian response than the other three approaches.

The Dominant Class Approach

In the dominant class approach, commercial interests have played a central role in diluting the salience of human rights concerns in Canada's foreign policy due to the 'consensus' operative between the commercial class and the foreign policy bureaucracy in which economic concerns are

accorded primacy in Canada's foreign policy. Violations in those states that Canada has a profitable commercial relationship with tend to be overlooked whereas violations in states that Canada's commercial relationship is scanty tend to be reacted to sternly.⁶

With respect to the Canada-China relationship before June 1989, Canada actively cultivated the bilateral commercial relationship with the PRC. The Mulroney government had invested a significant amount of time and money in trying to develop commercial relations with the People's Republic. As discussed in Chapter Three, in 1987, Mulroney announced the "Canadian Strategy for China" which built upon the then recent initiatives of the Canadian government: China was targeted as a "priority market" in the National trade Strategy; a consulate was opened in Shanghai; CIDA's China program was expanded; and a \$350 million concessional financing line was established within the Export Development Corporation's (EDC) \$2 billion line-of-credit for China. These measures were further enhanced in April 1989 with the announcement of the Canadian trade strategy for the next century, entitled Going Global. This new Canadian trade strategy included a plan for the Pacific (including China) that was to complement the 1988 Free Trade Agreement that Canada had signed with the US.⁷ The

Canadian trade strategy outlined in Going Global was five-year \$94 million package of initiatives aimed increasing Canada's international trade to the "three pillars" of North America, the Pacific, and Europe.⁸ With China thus enjoying an important place in Canada's trade policy, Ottawa was not prepared to apply stern sanctions against the People's Republic for its violation of human rights.

The Canadian response then should be limited in nature so as not to adversely affect commercial relations. Measures were applied to aspects of the relationship to the extent that Canada's commercial relationship with China was not impacted negatively. For example, the one measure announced that could affect the bilateral relationship the greatest, pertained to the application of the policy framework outlined on June 30 to any new projects considered under the EDC's line-of-credit for China. The policy framework that was to guide Canada's relations with the PRC in the post-Tiananmen period was, when considered as a whole, "fraught with difficulty".⁹ There was the potential for behaviour to be encouraged under one point to affect adversely a second. For example, the approval of a project considered for EDC funding, while perhaps justified on the grounds of preserving traditional links, could be considered as inconsistent with business as usual not being

possible and with avoiding programs that lend prestige to the hard line policies of the Chinese government. What the policy framework allowed for was EDC financing to be extended to the PRC unhindered by the events of June 1989. Any EDC funding extended could be argued as falling within the June 1989 policy framework.¹⁰

In examining the other measures announced on June 30, it is clear that Canadian decision-makers wanted to keep intact as much of the bilateral relationship as possible. That the measures announced by Canada on June 30 had only a minimal affect on the bilateral trade relationship was evidenced by the continued increase in both exports to and imports from the PRC in the years following Tiananmen.¹¹ As Earl Drake, then Canada's Ambassador to China, expressed it, Canada, in responding to the events in China, simply "wanted to make a statement" rather than alter substantively the bilateral relationship.¹² By not responding too harshly to the Tiananmen Square massacre, officials were advancing Canada's economic interests, as well as those of the Canadian corporate community.

With respect to the quality of the explanation, the dominant class approach fails to provide a 'rich' explanation of the Canadian response. First, state behaviour is explained largely by one variable: the

relationship between state actors and those in the commercial class. Because it relies on one variable to explain foreign policy behaviour, the dominant class approach cannot provide answers to questions such as why did the Canadian reaction go beyond that of the other western states, or what compelled Canadian decision-makers to react in a manner more harsh than the others? The dominant class approach outlines a direction for foreign policy, not an explanation.

Second, the dominant class approach does not provide an examination of the state preferences. They are given exogenously. State preferences are assumed to be driven predominantly by concerns for the health of the Canadian economy.

The final criteria to be examined concerns the decision-making process. Proponents of the dominant class approach would explain the holding of the Round Table meeting as an example of state actors attempting to give "an appearance of consultation" rather than allowing "significant input into policy formation". What Pratt has referred to as "diluted consultation".¹³ The actors invited to the Round Table meeting were carefully selected by those in External because they had participated previously in consultations and their views, for the most

part, were known to not diverge greatly from those held by External. Only the Chinese-Canadian groups were an unknown entity and the meetings held by the various ministers before the Round Table allowed some insight into the views of these groups. Of all the voices heard at the Round Table meeting, state actors were particularly attuned to those of the Canadian business elite and the prairie farmers. The other voices, while audible, were a din in the background.

According to the dominant class approach, the Canadian response to Tiananmen can be explained by the ongoing close relationship between state officials and the Canadian corporate community in which economic concerns predominate. The widening of the decision-making process to include other participants was an effort to demonstrate support for a response that did not handicap the prosperous bilateral trade relationship between Canada and China.

The Statist Approach

In this analytical framework state actors formulate foreign policy with little interference from societal actors. Decisions are the result of compromises and trade-offs made by various state actors each of whom is attempting to fulfil their own parochial interests. The

process through which state actors resolve their differences and arrive at decisions is the focus of enquiry.

As demonstrated in Chapter Five, the Secretary of State for External Affairs assumed the lead role within the executive in crafting the Canadian response to the happenings in the PRC, and the officials in the North Asia Relations Branch of External Affairs who comprised the Crisis Decision-Making Unit (CDMU) developed the Canadian response with minimal interference from departments both inside and outside of External. The 'interchanges' of interest in the China case then were those that occurred between levels, i.e. between Clark and those in the CDMU.

A comparison of the objectives of Clark and officials within the CDMU reveals that both were concerned with maintaining the bilateral commercial relationship. Beyond this however there were differences between the two. Clark, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, was ultimately responsible for the decision taken both to the government and to the people of Canada. His primary consideration was how the Canadian response would 'play' domestically. That is, coming up with a response that satisfied the Canadian audience. If the reaction was thought to be too lenient or harsh, he would be the focal

point of any criticism and/or pressure to alter Canada's course of action, especially from the Chinese-Canadian community. Clark was also cognizant of the need for the Canadian reaction to be consistent with the increased importance that human rights considerations had assumed in Canada's foreign policy under his leadership. There was the question of Canada's image as a defender of human rights at stake. Clark, not being knowledgeable in the complexities of Chinese politics and the nuances in the Canada-China relationship, sought the input from those in External most experienced in these matters. He set the tone for the overall response but left the details of the reaction up to those in the CDMU to formulate.

While it was left to those officials in the CDMU to craft a Canadian response that obtained Clark's approval, they were guided by a different set of objectives. They were motivated primarily by a sense of what was "doable", by a sense of how Canada could demonstrate its displeasure without hurting the bilateral relationship.¹⁴ For the public servants, Canada should do the "minimum" needed to "maintain [its] standing in the international community" thereby following a pattern discerned by Kim Richard Nossal which he labeled the "minimax calculus of contending interests".¹⁵ The officials in the CDMU stressed to their

political master the need to temper Canada's reaction to what they believed was a short-term disruption in the bilateral relationship. As well, they opposed opening up the decision-making process to new actors, such as Chinese-Canadian groups. They wanted to get past this unfortunate event with as little change in the bilateral relationship as possible.

Therefore, within the context of needing to satisfy the domestic considerations of their political master and to do the 'minimum' required, there was a degree of tension between public servants and the Minister. As one official put it, we had to "sell it to the leadership".¹⁶ To gain Clark's acceptance, it seems that officials within the CDMU included in the Canadian response as many measures as possible to give the appearance that more was being done than was necessarily the case. Prior to June 4, a volume containing the memoranda of understandings signed by Canada and China had been compiled, and this proved valuable in assessing what measures were included in the response to be approved by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.¹⁷ This, in part, explains why so many measures were included in the Canadian reaction that were in areas in which either the bilateral relationship was limited, or it matter little what Canada did.¹⁸

In the context of the three criteria of 'explanatory richness', the statist approach also does not furnish a 'rich' explanation for the Canadian reaction. An explanation gleaned from an application of the statist approach would stress one variable - the interplay between the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, and the officials in the CDMU. The Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square incident can be explained as a 'give and take' between the minister and a small group of officials in the public service.

The preferences of these actors stem primarily from parochial concerns. Officials are guided by what they believe is the best course of action for their country, their department, and themselves.

The statist approach does include a process element. However, the range of actors participating in decision-making is overly narrow. Societal actors are regarded as having a "limited" ability to influence foreign policy decisions, and "where there is clash between state preferences and those of society, the state has both the willingness and capability to ensure that state preferences prevail over those of society".¹⁹ As stated above, decisions are the result of interchanges between state officials. In short, Canada's reaction to the Tiananmen

Square is explained by one variable, examines state preferences, and explores a limited range of actors involved in the decision-making process.

The Middle Power Approach

The Canadian reaction to the happenings in the PRC can be explained by an examination of the international context within which Canada operated, human rights as a factor in Canada's foreign policy, and the willingness of Canada to use its resources to pursue milieu goals.

The Canadian response was affected by what other states in the international system were doing. It is important to note that the state committing the human rights violations--the PRC--was, and is, a power of some importance both regionally and globally. Access to the lucrative China market and to those Chinese officials whose approval was necessary to enter into commercial relations was threatened for those states that reacted sternly to the violation of human rights. The point being made is that China could impose some real economic costs on those states that endeavored to punish it.

That Chinese officials could inflict some economic costs on those who attempted to punish China was evident, in part, by the soft responses of the US and Japan--China's

two most important partners in terms of both commercial and security relations. The fact that the US reacted to the happenings in the PRC and that the American President announced the American measures were indications of importance of the issue to American decision-makers. The Bush Administration, as James Baker noted, believed it "imperative" for the US to "lead world reaction".²⁰ As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the reaction that the Americans wanted to lead the world in taking was a chary one. The Americans set the bar for world response at a very low level. As was also demonstrated in Chapter Four, the Japanese were reluctant to announce any measures that could be construed as responding to human rights violations in China.

In this context, there was little to be gained for Canada to respond to the events in China in more than a perfunctory manner. Canada, if it was to have any impact on China, would have to be part of a larger contingent applying pressure on the Chinese leadership, and a larger contingent applying pressure was absent from the start. In acting alone Canada could have little impact on China but it could lose access to the expanding Chinese market to those who did not respond harshly. What was required in this case then was for Canada to maintain a "sense of

proportion" about what it could accomplish.²¹

A second determinant of the Canadian response concerns the issue area. One issue-area in which Canada attempted to assume a greater responsibility was human rights. Human rights considerations, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, were accorded higher priority in Canada's foreign policy after the Mulroney government came to power in 1984. The issue of human rights in general and the practice of apartheid in South Africa in particular were targeted as areas in which Canada could make a difference and, thus, were areas in which Canada attempted to provide "leadership" in the international system.²²

From the above, it would seem that Canada would respond to the human rights violations in China in a stern manner. Concerns for human rights were an integral component of Canada's foreign policy. As well, Canada, under the leadership of Mulroney and Clark, had attempted to 'lead' the world in reacting to apartheid and, in so doing, cultivated an image of Canada as a defender of human rights internationally. To fail to demonstrate Canada's disapprobation to the opprobrious actions of the Chinese leadership in deciding to use lethal force to end the demonstrations would be counter to this image.

The willingness of Canadian decision-makers to use

Canadian capabilities to pursue milieu goals is the final determinant that needs to be examined. The Mulroney government's willingness to expend Canadian capabilities to pursue milieu goals, by 1989, had declined in the face of increasing fiscal restraints. In its review of foreign policy undertaken shortly after taking office, the Mulroney government informed Canadians that Canada did "not have the resources to do all [it] would like to do in international affairs" and that "further retrenchment" in international activities was required.²³ This retrenchment of Canada's international activities characterizes what Mark Neufeld has called the "limitationist conception of middle power" whereby Canadian decision-makers stressed more the international constraints they faced than the opportunities for creative statecraft.²⁴

Further reducing the Canadian government's willingness to expend its political resources in pursuit of milieu goals was Canada's inability to 'lead' the Commonwealth and the G7 to adopt more stringent measures against South Africa. Knowing that these same states also comprised the main cast of players in the China case and that they would not follow the Canadian lead, Canada was not about to expend resources to no avail. The lessons of South Africa were well remembered when the events in China began

happening.

In examining the explanation derived from an application of the middle power approach, a tension emerged concerning how Canada should respond to the Tiananmen Square massacre. Canada was pulled in opposing directions. First, the fact that it was China that committed the offense and that the US and Japan responded softly acted as a constraint on Canada. Second, Canada had cultivated an image as a propagator of human rights both domestically and internationally. To respond in a muted fashion would be in opposition to the image fostered. Finally, Canada was unwilling to spend its capabilities in trying to 'lead' others in the international system to adopt a harsher line against China. What Canadian-decision makers did, therefore, was to adopt as course of action that was in front of the other states in the international system but not so far out in front as to disrupt severely the Canada-China relationship.

The explanation obtained from the middle power approach evaluated in reference to the criteria of 'explanatory richness' while of higher quality than the statist and dominant class approaches, is still found to be wanting. Foreign policy outcomes, in the middle power approach, are the result of multiple variables including a

state's position in the international structure, the issue-area in question, and a state's commitment to internationalism, defined as a willingness to pursue milieu goals. State preferences are conceptualized as being changeable, they vary according to the key variables outlined above. While foreign policy outcomes are explained by numerous key variables, and while state preferences are determined, not assumed, the process through which decisions are arrived at is not examined. The middle power approach lacks any discussion of the decision-making process, it is a static approach. To better explain foreign policy outcomes, the middle power approach needs to be able to explain the inner workings of the 'black box'.

The Interactive Approach

To explain the Canadian reaction to the incidents in China, one needs to examine how other states in the international system were reacting to the events, as well as domestic factors such as the institutional structure of the state, societal preferences and coalitions, and decision-makers' preferences.

At the international level, the reactions of the US and Japan narrowed the range of feasible policy responses

for Canadian decision-makers and so played an important role in determining the Canadian reaction. That the US and Japan had responded to the incidents in China in a chary manner did impact decision-makers. The Canadian decision could not be too far out in front of these two states. A vociferous Canadian response not only would have been costly in terms of economic opportunities lost, but, more importantly, it would have had little impact on China.

That Canada would not stray too far from the reactions of the US and Japan was indicated by the last of the four parameters that was to frame Canada's China policy in the post-Tiananmen period, i.e. Canada would strive to "adopt a coordinated approach of like-minded countries" in an attempt to "maximize the impact" of its measures.²⁵ This provided an out for Canadian decision-makers, in that, they could argue that Canada was only following the other Western states in applying limited pressure on the PRC. The American and Japanese reactions set the international parameters of the Canadian 'win set'.

At the domestic level, three sets of factors were of particular significance. First, domestic political institutions enabled Clark to control both the process of decision-making and the substance of decisions taken. The 'brokerage politics' system adopted by Mulroney when he

came to power in 1984 empowered Clark with considerable decision-making autonomy in crafting Canada's response to Tiananmen. The subordinate role of parliament in foreign policy matters further heightened the degree of autonomy possessed by the secretary of state for external affairs. In contrast to the US where Congress played an active role in the decision-making process by pressing President Bush to adopt more stern measures, parliament's role was limited to legitimizing decisions taken at the executive level. Similarly, the provinces played a minor role in the decision-making process. The locus of decision-making was to be found within the executive level in general and with the Secretary of State for External Affairs in particular. In George Tsebelis' terms, Clark was a "veto player".²⁶

Second, the level of domestic commentary on the proper course for Canada to follow moved Clark to include the significant members of the policy community in the policy-making process. More than compelling the government to act by pushing the issue of Tiananmen to the forefront of the concerns of government, societal actors assisted in establishing the parameters of viable options for decision-makers. In other words, societal opinion helped set the boundaries of the Canadian 'win set'.

The heterogeneous character of the societal reaction meant that decision-makers had wide leeway in formulating the formal response, however. As presented in Chapter Five, there were those who wanted Canada to react strongly to the violation of human rights and, conversely, there were those who did want the events of June 1989 to affect the bilateral relationship. With respect to this latter group, the 'softness' of the American and Japanese responses was important because they could be used as proof that a stern reaction was not necessary and, indeed, would be inconsistent with Canada's economic interests. The American and Japanese reactions affected domestic groups within Canada, their responses 'reverberated'.

Finally, Clark was able to have the preferences of his "acceptability-set" met.²⁷ He was able to construct a domestic consensus in support of a Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre that was more substantial than those of the western states while not having a negative affect on Canada-China commercial relations. That the policy community was consulted at all was due to the preferences of Clark. The structures and processes of Canadian foreign policy-making insulate decision-makers from domestic pressures. No domestic ratification was required. Clark possessed the capacity to organize the

decision-making process, as well as determining the content of policy. What was needed however was a process and a policy that garnered domestic support. The Round Table accomplished that objective.

With respect to process, the Round Table fulfilled three goals. First, the forum was held to give the impression that more was being done than actually was the case. Busyness should not be mistaken for action. Second, by convening the Round Table and 'consulting' the policy community, central decision-makers attempted to simplify the consultation process either by placing groups in conflict with one another rather than with decision-makers, or by providing societal groups with a better sense of the complex nature of the Canada-China relationship. The meeting was for societal actors to gain a better appreciation of the many factors, and actors, that needed to be addressed in formulating the Canadian response. Societal actors were forced to see beyond their narrow parochial preferences. Third, it reduced domestic pressure by according relevant actors privileged access to the decision-making process thereby making them part of the solution.²⁸

In terms of policy, the Round Table provided what Lisa L. Martin and Kathryn Sikkink refer to as "approval", i.e.

ex post ratification, of the course of action already decided upon.²⁹ The Round Table was not an exercise in policy formulation. No discussion occurred in the meeting. Participants were allotted three minutes to present their views and when they finished, or their time expired, the next participant began. The importance of the forum was that it was held. As Maire O'Brien has noted, it was a "consolidation of the government's proposed position".³⁰ The Round Table was a means to ensure that the Canadian reaction fell partially within the 'win-sets' of the relevant domestic actors, it allowed central decision-makers to construct a consensus in support of the Canadian response announced on June 30.

This is not to say that all were satisfied with the June 30 announcement. There was "domestic opposition both from those who [thought] it went too far and from those who [thought] it [did] not go far enough" (emphasis in the original).³¹ The June 30 announcement, however, contained something for everyone. All could claim that they had met some of their objectives in part, at least.

In the interactive approach, the Canadian response is explained by a combination of international factors including the reactions of the US and Japan, and domestic factors including the institutional structure of the state,

societal preferences and coalitions, and decision-makers' preferences. The interactive approach seeks to determine state preferences, not assume them. State preferences are a subject of enquiry to be analyzed, not an assumption to be made. The interactive approach also examines the interaction of societal and state actors. That is, it looks at the process through which decisions are formulated. In so doing, it is not a static approach that compares preferences of actors to decisions taken to determine what, if any, impact actors had on decisions. Instead, it is a dynamic approach that captures the decision-making process.

Conclusion

In comparing the explanations rendered by the four approaches, the interactive approach provides a 'richer' explanation of the Canadian response to the Tiananmen Square massacre than the others. First, the interactive approach incorporates more relevant variables into its explanation. The interactive approach goes beyond the single variable explanations furnished by the dominant class and statist approaches in which the the Canadian reaction is explained by the close relationship between state officials and the Canadian

corporate community, in the former, and the interchanges between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the public servants in the North Asia Relations Branch of External Affairs, for the latter. While the middle power approach does provide an explanation that includes many relevant variables, it fails to incorporate any discussion of domestic level determinants. Because domestic level determinants such as the institutional structure of the state and the preferences of state and societal actors were important in setting the Canadian reaction, and are not included in the middle power explanation, the middle power approach fails to provide as complete an explanation as the interactive one.

A second reason why the interactive approach provides a more complete and nuanced explanation of the Canadian response is because it determines the preferences of state actors. Preferences are conceptualized as varying according to the various actors - international, state and societal - involved in the decision-making process, as well as the domestic political institutions of the state. The middle power approach also conceptualizes state preferences as varying according to a number of variables including the position of the state in the international structure, the issue-area of concern, and the commitment of the state to

internationalism. Again, the middle power approach fails to include any direct discussion that demonstrates the significant role played by domestic level determinants in crafting the decision. Unlike the above two approaches that attempt to determine state preferences, these are assumed in both the dominant class and statist approaches. In the former, state preferences are assumed to be guided by maintaining the health of the Canadian economy, whereas, in the latter, they are assumed to be driven by parochial concerns.

A third, and final reason, why the interactive approach renders a 'richer' explanation of the Canadian response to the events in China in June 1989 pertains to accounting for the process by which decisions are formulated, as well as the substance of those decisions. While the dominant class and statist approaches do examine the policy-making process, they do so in an incomplete manner. In the dominant class approach only a narrow range of societal actors, the Canadian corporate community, are regarded as having an effect on decision-making. Similarly, only a narrow band of state actors are conceptualized as having an impact on decision-making in the statist approach. Both the dominant class and statist approaches view societal actors not as important

determinants but as nuisances to be managed. The middle power approach, unlike the others, does not provide any discussion of the decision-making process. By not addressing domestic-level determinants, the explanation rendered by the middle power approach is decidedly weakened in comparison to the explanation provided by the interactive approach.

This chapter has attempted a comparative examination of the explanations furnished by the application of four analytical approaches to the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre. The concept of explanatory richness was adopted in an effort to provide a set of criteria by which to appraise the quality of explanations provided. The chapter moved to demonstrate that the interactive approach provides a more complete and nuanced explanation of the Canadian reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre in China in June 1989 than the dominant class, statist, and middle power approaches, according to the three criteria of 'explanatory richness'.

The interactive approach furnishes a 'richer' explanation of the Canadian reaction because it incorporates more relevant variables into its explanation, it determines the preferences of state actors, and it accounts for the process through which decisions are

TABLE 5

A COMPARISON OF THE FOUR APPROACHES

APPROACH	KEY VARIABLE	STATE PREFERENCES	DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Dominant Class	commercial concerns	economic	narrow range of societal actors
Statist	state actors' preferences	parochial concerns	narrow range of state actors
Middle Power	(a) position in the international structure (b) issue-area (c) commitment to internationalism	varying	black box
Interactive	(a) international environment (b) domestic political institutions (c) societal preferences and coalitions (d) decision-makers' preferences	varying	wide range of actors

crafted, as well as the substance of those decisions. A comparison of the four approaches with respect to the criteria of explanatory richness is displayed graphically in TABLE 5 above.

Moving beyond the Canadian response to Tiananmen, the interactive approach would seem to provide a good representative model for explaining Canada's foreign policy behaviour in other situations including recent human rights crises in Indonesia, Kosovo, Nigeria, and Rwanda. These additional studies will further test the explanatory power of the interactive approach in the Canadian context. This study has demonstrated that the interactive approach furnishes a "promising theoretical beginning" for the

future study of Canadian foreign policy.³²

CHAPTER SIX

1. "China and Canada: The Months Ahead," Statement, 89/32, June 30, 1989.
2. The three projects, worth \$11 million, included support for state auditor training, a lube oil centre in the city of Lanzhou, and a training program for urban traffic management. Globe and Mail, June 2, 1989.
3. Ironically, a Canadian transmitter in Sackville, New Brunswick was used by Chinese authorities through their Radio Beijing operations to spread Chinese propaganda in North America. An agreement had been signed by RCI and Radio Beijing in April 1989 allowing Radio Beijing two hours of access daily to the transmitter for broadcasts to Latin and North America. RCI was given equal access to Chinese facilities in Xian. Editorial freedom was guaranteed in the agreement. Globe and Mail, July 1, 1989.
4. For more on this, see Paul Gecelovsky and T.A. Keenleyside, "Canada's International Human Rights Policy in Practice: Tiananmen Square," International Journal, 50, 3 (Summer 1995), pp.947-74.
5. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada and the International Seabed: Domestic Determinants and External Constraints, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1989); ---, "Winners and Losers: Formulating Canada's Policies on International Technology Transfers," International Journal, 47, 1 (Winter 1991-92), pp.159-83; and Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1974).
6. See, T.A. Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Human Dignity," in Cranford Pratt, Ed., Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1994), pp.254-8.
7. For more on the Pacific 2000 strategy and China , see Ronald C. Keith, "China and Canada's 'Pacific 200 Strategy'," Pacific Affairs, 65, 3 (Fall 1992), pp.319-33.
8. See, Department of External Affairs, Statement, 89/10, 89/11, and 89/14, April 10 and 19, and May 16, 1989. Also

see, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Going Global, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1989).

9. Ralph Huenemann, "Chinese-Canadian Trade Relations," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, series 1, vol.1, 1990, p.237.

10. That the policy framework had little impact on the bilateral relationship is evidenced by the EDC extending loans totaling \$569.3 million to China between July 1989 and July 1992, an increase of 20.5 per cent over the three year period preceding Tiananmen when loans totaled \$472.6 million. The figure for the loans extended after Tiananmen were calculated using External Affairs and International Trade press releases from July 1989 to July 1992 whereas the figure for the loans extended prior to Tiananmen were obtained from Hansard, September 28, 1989, p.4014.

11. See, Statistics Canada, Exports by Country and Imports by Country, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, published annually).

12. Globe and Mail, October 7, 1989.

13. Cranford Pratt, "Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: Basis for an Explanation," in Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, Eds., International Conflict and Conflict Management, 2nd ed., (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1989), pp.267-68.

14. Confidential interview with the author.

15. Kim Richard Nossal, "Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada's Interest in Development Assistance," in Matthews, Rubinoff, and Stein, Eds., International Conflict and Conflict Management, pp.257-58.

16. Confidential interview with the author.

17. Confidential interview with the author.

18. An example of a measure that mattered little what Canada did was immigration. In the immediate aftermath, the Chinese government altered the emigration process so that anyone wanting to leave China first had to report to the nearest police station in order to secure the proper documents. Thus, the Canadian measure of assigning additional immigration officers to China was of little affect. See, Globe and Mail, June 23, 1989.

19. Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed., (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1997), pp.124 and 12, respectively.

20. James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992, (New York: Putnam, 1995), p.105.

21. John Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," International Journal, 39, 2 (Spring 1984), p.385.

22. See, Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, (Vancouver: UBC P, 1994), pp.156-59. For more on Canada's human rights policy in practice , see Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights".

23. See, Joe Clark, "Forward," Competitiveness and Security: Directions or Canada's International Relations, (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1985), n.p.

24. Mark Neufeld, "Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as a Middle Power," Studies in Political Economy, 48 (Autumn 1995), p.22. Arthur Andrew also noted a change in Canadian foreign policy from one that sought creative solutions to international events to one that relied on American "wisdom and foresight on the great international issues of the day". See, Arthur Andrew, The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney, (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993).

25. Statement, 89/32, June 30, 1989.

26. See George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism , Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25, 3 (July 1995), pp. 289-325.

27. Andrew Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, 1993), p.30.

28. For more on the use of this tactic, see Tom Keating, "Domestic groups, Bureaucrats, and Bilateral Fisheries Relations," International Journal, 39, 1 (Winter 1983-84), pp.146-170; and Denis Stairs, "Publics and Policy-Makers:

The Domestic Environment of Canada's Foreign Policy Community," International Journal, 26, 1 (Winter 1970-71), pp.221-48.

29. See, Lisa L. Martin and Kathryn Sikkink, "U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1972-1980," in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy, p.352.

30. Maire O'Brien, "Canada China Policy in the Aftermath of Tiananmen: A Bureaucratic Politics Perspective," A paper presented at the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, May 31-June 2, 1992, p.21.

31. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy, p.444.

32. David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 26, 4 (December 1993), p.746.

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