UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

EMPOWERMENT, POWER AND EDUCATION

BY

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

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis the idea of empowerment is explored for its application to education. Empowerment has as its focus the development of human maturity. The relationship between modern power and empowerment is picked out to show how modern power operates to hinder the development of human maturity, particularly in those who historically have been disempowered in social relations on the basis of sex, race and wealth. Yet it is also true that, in the context of modern power, human maturity is distorted in both the powerful and the powerless. This is because modern power is grounded in an asymmetry that begets passivity in the disprivileged and a preoccupation with the desire to dominate in the privileged. The outcome for the powerless is that they become individuals who are useful for the purposes of others rather than articulating life plans for themselves.

As I examine modern power, I identify what I refer to as *personal power*. This expression refers to the feeling/belief that I am someone who can say and do those things that are congruent with my self-conception, and has passivity as its opposite. *Personal power* is an antidote to the hindering effects that modern power has had within us. Since the goal of empowerment is the unleashing of the creative individual, to realize its goal, empowerment is directed towards removing those social and cultural obstacles that obstruct the development of maturity. In particular, features of empowerment are set against social practices that perpetuate inequalities between people on the basis of sex, race and wealth. I propose that in empowering schools women and men will emerge who are capable of conceiving a good life for themselves, one which is directed towards being responsive and responsible members of the human community.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The central and unifying theme of empowerment is that of becoming mature. Human maturity is not a static state of being complete or perfect; it has more to do with our readiness to deliberate over problems and opportunities in a way which corresponds with the conception we have of ourselves. That is, mature people generally can be counted on to live from the inside, as it were, on the basis of highly prized and carefully considered values. It is in this sense that we think of mature people as having integrity. In this dissertation, I argue that the relationship between empowerment and power can be understood in the following way, namely, that power relations bear heavily on maturity in that they either foster or frustrate its development. In particular, power relations invade or "invest" us (like a parasite invests a body) and fundamentally shape what is within. If we claim that those who are mature should live from the inside, we must first examine how power relations operate on what is within us. I argue that modern power relations[1] must be picked out and understood if we seriously assert that people should be empowered. We cannot proceed with a project of developing what I call our *personal power*, which is the outcome of empowerment, without first coming to see how modern relations of power have had hindering effects within us.

Throughout the dissertation, I use the expression *personal power* to pick out a pertinent aspect of maturity. By *personal power* I refer to a feeling/belief that we are people who can say and do those things that are congruent with our self-conceptions. That is, *personal power* has passivity as its opposite. In addition, *personal power* assumes the importance of considering how people arrive at their self-conceptions because *personal power* is not meant to imply license to do whatever one wants. If it did, we would have to concede that murderers are mature because they are active and not passive in carrying out their personal plans. The maturity inherent in empowerment implies limits on our personal plans that I pick out in the following chapters.

The question of human maturity is hardly new. At the outset of the modern era, Immanuel Kant wrote an article (1784) in answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?[2] To him, the motto of the Enlightenment was: "Have courage to use your *own* understanding." He claims here that the Enlightenment is "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity" and he defines immaturity as the "inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another." He asserts that "men" remain immature because they are lazy or cowards and because it is "so convenient to be immature!" He identifies books, spiritual advisors and doctors as "guardians" who "kindly" take upon themselves the work of supervision to see to it "that by far the largest part of mankind (including the entire fair sex) should consider the step forward to maturity not only as difficult but also as highly dangerous." If we follow Kant, modernity should have as one of its projects an inquiry after what it means to become adult or mature. Empowerment is an aspect of this inquiry.

Michel Foucault analyzes Kant's article and connects it to the three Critiques by noting that, according to Kant, maturity is made possible through the use of reason, as Kant depicts it.[3] Foucault suggests that, to Kant, Enlightenment is a "way out:" it is a "process that releases us from the state of immaturity"[4] by "linking will, authority, and the use of reason."[5] Further, it is a phenomenon and an ongoing process; it is a task and an obligation--an obligation because "man himself is responsible for his immature status." In other words, Enlightenment is understood as defining "humanity's passage to adult status" and at the same time shows that "each individual is responsible in a certain way for that overall process."[6] Foucault thinks that Kant's essay is the first time in history someone applied philosophical discourse to the question of "today as difference." That is, in raising the question of human maturity, Kant asks the question of what makes today different from any earlier time. In referring to himself as doing the "history of the present," Foucault takes up this examination of "today as difference" as well as taking up the

question of what it means to become adult. Rather than following Kant in positing that maturity is achieved through rationality, Foucault articulates the various ways that power relations prevent us from becoming adult because we are made subject to the authority of others, an idea congruent with immaturity as Kant identified it. But Foucault also adds that the modern exercise of power makes us subjects to ourselves[7] and that this constraint constitutes another way of remaining immature. The implication that I take from this is that, during the modern era, there was a relationship between the exercise of power and our capacity to become adult that is not accounted for in Kant's assertions about becoming mature through our use of reason alone. That is, Foucault's analysis raises serious questions about whether it is accurate to say that we are to be blamed for our immaturity, as Kant would have us believe that we are to be. While Kant wanted us to use our reason to become mature, Foucault wants us to engage in a particular kind of critique which he calls the "critical ontology of ourselves." He says:

> I do not know whether we will ever reach mature adulthood. Many things in our experience convince us that the historical event of the Enlightenment did not make us mature adults, and we have not reached that stage yet. However, it seems to me that a meaning can be attributed to that critical interrogation on the present and ourselves which Kant formulated by reflecting on the Enlightenment....The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not...as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.[8]

The underlying investigation in this dissertation is an examination of how we might help educate people to become mature adults. I consider the role of empowerment, power relations and education in the process of becoming mature. In analyzing empowerment and power, in relation to education, I pick out dimensions of empowerment and explain the effects that empowerment must have in order to foster the project of becoming adult. At bottom, there are really only two ways to structure relations of power between people; either we work in partnership with others or we express domination over them. Domination, power *over* or *through* others, frustrates their ability to think for themselves thereby creating the social conditions of vulnerability, which render people unable to achieve adult status. By the term "thinking for ourselves" I refer to a general notion of thinking that includes feelings and beliefs as well as the socializing processes that initiate us into this thinking. The partnership paradigm for power relations assumes that power is *in, with* and *for* others; it encourages practices and strategies that promote maturity because it enhances *personal power*.

I use the term *personal power* rather than autonomy or maturity, for example, for two reasons. The themes of empowerment, equality, and justice that I explore in order to pick out power's effects on us, convince me that we must re-evaluate the ways we conceive these latter two terms. In particular, women's and men's experience has been divided into public and domestic spheres of life with the result that we have arrived at different ways of conceiving autonomy.[9] We tend to think of adult responsibility, and therefore, maturity or autonomy in different ways because our work has drawn differently on our human resources. The division between the work that men and women typically engage in came about in large part because of an emphasis that is easily detected in what Kant is quoted to say at the outset. He says that few men but *no women* "(the entire fair sex)" think for themselves. Underlying this assertion was a belief that the supposedly natural capacities of women were differently constituted from those of men.[10] Domestic life supposedly suited women, and public life did not, because of their particularistic emotional nature. Beliefs about women's so called natural capacities enabled the negative effects of power (domination) to be wielded over women up to the twentieth century. As a result, the way that men and women typically conceive autonomy, for example, has been strongly influenced

by the exercise of domination over women. While autonomy remains an important term, I re-examine the ways power has been able to constitute us as subjects who think about autonomy or maturity in the way that we do. The effects of domination on our idea of autonomy and maturity constitute my second reason for analyzing the term *personal power* as opposed to these others, though I use all three in general discussion.

My interest in articulating a meaning and context for *personal power* is motivated by a belief that when we teach, we not only teach people some content, through being in our presence we also convey to them something of what it is to be human. To educate someone in something is also to be engrossed in a project that informs us all about what it means to be an adult human being. In this project, *personal power* is central: if we are seen as powerless, by ourselves or by others, we are fundamentally disturbed in our self-expression. Practices of domination are always aimed at silencing and inhibiting others (or oneself) and have passivity (or docility) as their desired aim. A partnership paradigm for power relations focuses on constituting, releasing, or enhancing the "objective capacities" of individuals along the lines of *personal power*. In analyzing power relations we look at what it is possible to say and do, by whom, and under what conditions, at a given time in a society; this is to focus on relational and political dynamics of power. But *personal power* is also a heuristic device in that I may apply it to myself in attempting to understand my own situation with respect to power relations, in addition to applying it to the situation of others. In my view, schools should encourage the development of *personal power*.

It is almost too obvious to say that schooling shapes the life chances of children. What is less obvious is the role that power relations play in educational institutions and in setting the tone for the way that things are done. Power relations refer to one aspect of the way that things are done which shapes students' "end-product" abilities. Power relations in the school setting, are interrelated both with communication and our capacities to constitute "blocks" in which there is a systematic adjustment of capacities towards end-product abilities on the basis of what Foucault calls "considered formulae" (an arrangement of elements that constitutes his understanding of "the disciplines"). In the blend of communication, capacities and power, power relations can be picked out and analyzed for the contribution they make to the way things are done and the way students turn out during and after the schooling process.[11] In particular, power relations strongly influence people's willingness and ability to think for themselves.

I argue in this dissertation that power relations have a direct bearing on the development of those capacities which influence the project of becoming adult in a modern and democratic society. While children are unavoidably dependent on parents and teachers for a time, power relations engaged in by parents and teachers are central to constructing and paving the road to maturity if they find a way to transfer over to students the pedagogic role of guidance so that students come to think for themselves. Domination forestalls the development of maturity. In society as a whole, the power to dominate others and to take away power rather than to give it, limits the life chances of many people on the basis of sex, race, wealth and position.

In chapter two, I examine how domination frustrates maturity by using Foucault's analysis of *sovereign, pastoral and disciplinary power*. In addition, I consider two ideas that undergird Foucault's analysis of power relations that I rely on throughout the dissertation. I argue that modern relations of power, in the person of the king and pastor and in the presence of the all-seeing eye, forestall the development of human maturity. Chapter three has empowerment as its focus. Four aspects of empowerment are included, namely: organizational empowerment, feminine empowerment, ameliorative empowerment, and preventive empowerment. I trace the idea of empowerment throughout these dimensions and present and relate core aspects of its conceptualization. In chapter four I pick out relations between empowerment, equality and justice to argue that a commitment to equality has not served to empower all of us. Chapter five is an analysis of the ideas of power that have been outlined in chapters two and three to argue that only empowerment is properly educative. In chapter six, I ask what schools must do for girls and young women in order that they may come to express *personal power* as defined above and to ease the burden of exclusion that easily stymies participation in the project of becoming adult and

which has been anything but "convenient" for women up to now. I argue that this exclusion has made it enormously difficult for women even to conceive life plans for themselves which is a necessary step in being full of *personal power*. Throughout the dissertation, my aim is to show that unless we understand the power relations we perpetuate and engage in, we cannot develop the potential students have to be full and critical participants in a democracy that needs everyone's adult involvement.

End Notes

1.By the expression "modern power relations" I refer to those relations of power that characterize the period of modernity which some theorists suggest began at the end of the 1700s and came to an end in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See, for example, David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989). Foucault's exploration of what I refer to as *disciplinary power* in chapter two, is an articulation of modern power. This does not imply that *disciplinary power* is the only description for modern power relations; *sovereign and pastoral power* continue to be demonstrated in the world up to the present time. The expression "modern power relations" then has this ambiguous character of referring both to *disciplinary power* specifically (especially in chapter three) and to all those relations of power that have come down to us historically including the power of the king and the pastor. In this specific instance the expression takes on the latter meaning.

2.Immanuel Kant, "An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?" in *Kant: Political Writings* ed. Hans Reiss, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54-60.

3.Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32-50.

4."What is Enlightenment," 33.

5."What is Enlightenment," 35.

6."What is Enlightenment," 38.

7.For example, see Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 208.

8."What is Enlightenment," 50.

9.See for example, Will Kymlicka's discussion of the ethic of care versus the ethic of justice in *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 283ff.

10.See for example, Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender and the Family* (The United States: Basic Books, 1989). On pages 10 through 13, she argues against what she calls "false gender neutrality." She asserts that: "Kant even wrote of 'all rational beings as such' in making arguments that he did not mean to apply to women." A more comprehensive analysis of Kant's intentional exclusion of women from his moral theorizing is found in Susan Moller Okin, "Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11, No. 1 (1982): 78-82; and in Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Sacramento: Stanford University Press, 1988), 168-73.

11.Foucault describes the relationship between communication games, power relations and objective capacities in "The Subject and Power," 217ff.

CHAPTER TWO

EXERCISING POWER AS A HINDRANCE TO MATURITY

Introduction

Power is a social concept and discussing it generally involves the normative activity of selecting and emphasizing certain aspects of our social environment over others. For example, analytic philosophy engages us in a discussion of power through the making of arguments which fix power in certain categories that put power in line with larger theoretical positions, justifying power in terms of, say, criteria of usefulness which depend on making other political and ethical judgements. Foucault's investigation of power relations does not follow this formula.[1] The difference in his thought is particularly felt in the absence of any arguments about its nature, instead, he asks the question of how power operates. He does take an ethical and political stance but this is not easy to read in the descriptions that follow. The apparent "facelessness" of Foucault will be addressed in this chapter, but in making clear his descriptions of how power operates, and in presenting my own applications, two things matter to me. My first concern arises from a belief that power relations can be seen to operate in ways Foucault suggests they do. Certainly the grandiose scale of *sovereign power* is absent but its activity can be detected in many places, including the school room. As well, I continually witness incidents of *pastoral power* and I know first-hand of the effects of *disciplinary power*. The second concern is to identify the atrocities that people suffer in their person as a result of what is essentially a negative dimension of power, i.e., domination, and recognize its free play so that we might be moved to reconceive power and our practices of it. The first part of this chapter, then, is not so much an argument about power, as it is the setting of a stage on which to see how power operates and to settle in our minds what we think of these demonstrations and their continuance. This is my political agenda, as it were.[2] The second part of the chapter, "Engaging Foucault," is an analysis of two of his ideas that relate directly to the idea of power or ground the discussion in following chapters.

What unifies the idea of power in this chapter is a reliance on two models for power, the one proposed by law, a juridical model, and the other taken from the military, a model of war or struggle.[3] Foucault says that the former model predominates throughout the classical and modern eras. He picks up the latter model but expands the power relation between those who make war on each other to include the possibility that each party in the struggle is equally capable of directing the actions of the other. In this way, Foucault does two things; he challenges the legitimacy of relations of domination as expressions of power, and he goes beyond the conceptualization of struggle previously put forward, by Marxists for example, who fail to take seriously the full range of possibilities for both parties in the agonism of a power struggle. In analyzing power relations in this dissertation, I argue that, while theorists such as Foucault challenge the legitimacy of domination's role in power relations, their analysis of power relations remains within a dominator paradigm for power relations because of the models for power that underlie their views. *Sovereign, pastoral and disciplinary power* constitute three expressions of power relations that typify the pre-modern and modern eras. The first expression of power relations that Foucault describes is *sovereign power*.

The Power of the King

Prior to the emergence of the modern era, *sovereign power* was exercised between the king and his subjects. The fundamental tie, the source of the sovereign's legitimacy, was his connection to the realm.[4] Power over subjects was expressed in a discontinuous manner by means of levies or obligations, and was demonstrated in spectacles of severe punishment, for example, at public executions. The discontinuous aspect of *sovereign power* enabled many of the king's subjects to escape from his obligations or hide from his presence. Power, conceived as *in* the physical existence of the sovereign and expressed *over* the subject's material property, i.e., over the land

and its products, and even over the criminal's body itself, was essentially the king's right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself. It culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it.[5] The king incarnated power and this right of seizure was appropriated by those who operated on the king's behalf.

Following Rusche and Kirchheimer, Foucault asserts that the king had a double measure of power because he had a "double body." This duplication was, on the one hand, represented in the transitory body which is born and dies, and on the other, by one that remains unchanged by time and is maintained in the physical yet intangible support of the kingdom. Around this *second* body are organized an iconography, a political theory of monarchy and the legal mechanisms that distinguish between, as well as link, the person of the king to the demands of the Crown.[6] The king's "double body" was the source of his surplus power--an excess that he deployed to control his subjects. This is why Foucault asserts that the king's body is not a metaphor but a political necessity.[7]

The king's exercise of power was legitimated by a theory of [Divine] right (in the sense of a justifiable claim based on the indivisibility of sovereignty itself") which came to be practised throughout the kingdom as domination. In response to the demands of royal power a legal edifice was erected to protect this theory of right. Foucault maintains that the essential function of the discourse and techniques of right has been to efface the domination intrinsic to power in order to present the latter at the level of appearance under different aspects: the legitimate rights of the sovereign and the people's legal obligation to obey him. Yet it is always possible for this legal structure to slip out of the sovereign's grip. At the end of the Classical era Foucault notes that it is from lawyers that reform emerges to challenge the king's right to dominate the people. Foucault uncovers this practice of domination as it was expressed within the social body. He looks not to the king and his edifice of sovereignty, but to the subjects in their mutual relations and to their multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and a function in the social organism[9] to find evidence for how *sovereign power* operates. He probes the extremities of the social body as a whole to understand how power's effects turn us into subjects.[10] Power is not housed in the king's body alone. Between every point of the social body, between men and women, masters and pupils, between everyone who knows and everyone who does not, there exist relations of power which are not purely and simply a projection of the sovereign's great power over the individual; they are concrete, changing situations in which the sovereign's power is grounded: they are conditions which make it possible for his power to function. Foucault maintains that in order for the State to operate now the way it does, there must be, between male and female, or adult and child, quite specific relations of domination which have their own configuration and relative autonomy.[11] It is not that these local power relations are a mere echo of *sovereign power*, yet they are connected to the particularity of its expression. Without the kind of preparation provided by these local relations it is difficult for domination to so easily have its way.

Since the central role of the theory of right was to fix the legitimacy of power, Foucault wants us to sever the relation between sovereignty and its legitimacy so as to reveal the brutality that divine right permitted. He acknowledged that his intention is to expose the cruel domination that is characteristic of *sovereign power*. As far as he is concerned, right "should be viewed...in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates...[since the] system of right, the domain of law, are permanent agents of these relations of domination, these polymorphous techniques of subjugation."[12] All forms of domination are subject to the criticisms levelled against *sovereign power*, and subjects of such power are constituted in identifiable ways. I pick out these effects of power in order to keep us from failing to notice them as we observe the social relations around us, including our own.

The body of the king's subject

Foucault takes as a starting point the particular effects that *sovereign power* had on the body of the criminal in a 'ceremony' which constitutes a physical *confrontation* between the sovereign and the condemned person.[13] The public execution

> brings into play the asymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength. Public execution is not a spectacle of measure but an imbalance and excess; in this liturgy of punishment, there must be an emphatic affirmation of power and of intrinsic superiority to make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign. The public execution did not re-establish justice, it reactivated power. It was a policy of terror.[14]

In the enactment of *sovereign power*, as a *confrontation* between the king and his subject, the king's surplus power allows him to make a spectacle out of his exercise of power. Crime is his personal score to settle. The execution is an act of personal vengeance aimed at demonstrating the surplus power that inheres in the king's offended body. The horror of the crime is redone on the criminal's body so as to annul its effects and to show just how different the king is from his subjects. While the king has a double measure of power, the condemned body records a "lack of power."[15] In other words, the criminal has no power at all and is therefore empty of value because the condemned person is one to whom things are said and done: he or she is not one who says and does things. The king has a license to say and do whatever he wills, thereby expressing the extreme form that asymmetry between the sovereign and subject has taken.[16] Foucault notes that the existence of public torture and execution were seen as the effect of a system of production in which labour power, and therefore the human body, has neither the utility nor the commercial value that are conferred on them in an economy of an industrial type.[17] In the later industrial age, the bodies of subjects were valuable because they produced labour.

The chief characteristic of demonstrations of *sovereign power* is made manifest in the king's power over the subject's body. The valuelessness of the subject's body means that the king can make the criminal do anything he wishes: Stand up! Sit down! Stay where you are! Be dismembered! Be dead! The body of the criminal can be 'manhandled': it is a mere shell--a surface which reflects the king's glory for others to see. In this power relation asymmetry is so extreme, it seems to me that when a confession breaks forth from the mouth of its victim, this utterance only repeats the king's power and the supposed legitimacy of the king's act: a confession is the hollow echo of the king's voice in the criminal's body--a body which has no value but does have some use. Yet it would be incorrect to see the criminal's body as instrumentally useful except in the thinnest possible sense: it is not useful as some particular person's body, rather it is useful as any person's body might be, as if it were a picture screen on which is projected the power and glory of the king. In this way, the criminal serves to reflect how much power the king has over any one individual, and therefore over everyone. Those present at the execution witness the king's power and consider the possibility of being in the criminal's place. In this way the execution is supposed to keep people good by scaring them. The king's power is a policy of terror intended to convince each one in his presence that his power can be brought down on any one in the group. The body of the condemned person is the place where *sovereign power* was applied; it was the anchoring point for a manifestation of power and an opportunity for affirming this asymmetry of forces.[18] The criminal's body was also the site of identification for the people who were to be controlled by this spectacle of terror. But it was this very identification, meant to secure the effects of the ritual, that eventually limited the king's power.

This limiting of *sovereign power* occurred because the king can be capricious: at all costs, subjects must not upset him; and it has two outcomes. The first is that subjects come to understand the king so well that they are able to anticipate and avoid his outbursts so that escape from him is possible; the second is that the kingdom must echo power relations which support the worthlessness of the less powerful. In schools, homes, and shops the one who has less power must learn how to stoop before the king so as to avoid abuse. If it so happened that someone refused to stoop, he or she would make a bad subject and a bad example: the king has so much more

trouble having his own way with subjects like these. And once aroused, the desire for significance is not easily extinguished.

Therefore, as Foucault notes, the king's extravagant spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the very people to whom it was addressed. The political danger was tied to the fact that the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty, than in those rituals intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of power. Never did the people feel more threatened, just as criminals did, by a legal violence exercised without moderation or restraint. In the end, the execution no longer frightened the people; it made them angry. They came to identify with criminals and to glorify them as emblems of the "tiny struggles that passed unperceived in everyday life;" they came to identify with the innocent ones who paid a great price for resisting or for getting caught in the excesses of this power. Once it was clearly seen that the demonstration of *sovereign power* is an act of vengeance on the weaker by the stronger, tyranny was recognized and tyranny arouses rebellion; in fact, Foucault asserts that each calls for the other.[19]

The limits of sovereign power

The connection that people felt with the criminal was the core of their solidarity--a solidarity that gave them strength to voice their fury at the abuses of an absolute and untamed power. Torture on "one of us" could no longer be justified; the humanity at the core of this solidarity became the limit for *sovereign power*. The humanity of the criminal became the measure for penal practices.

> The 'man' that the reformers set up against the despotism of the scaffold has also become a 'man-measure': not of things, but of power. The eighteenth century opened up a crisis...[and] in order to solve it, proposed the fundamental law that punishment must have 'humanity' as its 'measure' without any definite meaning being given to this principle, which nevertheless is regarded as insuperable.[20]

The Kantian view of self, as a rationally autonomous subject, supplied the measure for "humanity" modern reformers required. John Rawls (1971) summarizes this view of self by saying that "the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it." Will Kymlicka (1990) explains Kant's view by saying that it proposes that "we can always step back from any particular project and question whether we want to continue pursuing it, since no end is exempt from possible revision of the self." Kant is "one of the strongest defenders of this view that the self is prior to its socially given roles and relationships, and is free only if it is capable of holding these features of its social relation at a distance and judging them according to the dictates of reason." This view of self is questioned by communitarians and feminists who say that "the self is 'embedded' or 'situated' in existing social practices, and we cannot always stand back and opt out of them."[21] Foucault's analysis of power challenges the efficacy of Kant's view of self and the supposed capacity to "stand back" from roles and relationships, particularly in his description of *disciplinary power*. At this point in our history, however, Kant's view of self was employed as a measuring stick defined by the 'man of reason' who committed no crime himself. The primacy of this view shaped our conceptualization of equality, as I will argue in chapter four. The measurement of humanity produced a strain on *sovereign power* that broke it and brought in the power relations that characterize modern power relations. But it must also be noted that the "humanism" which produces the "man-measure" to limit *sovereign power* is ineffective in limiting the new form of modern power that I describe later as *disciplinary power*. Modern power, "normalizing-disciplinary power" which comes to characterize the bureaucratic welfare state, has little to do with the despotic regimes that humanism curtailed: against modern power "humanism is defenceless."[22]

Foucault maintains further that modern reformers placed limits on *sovereign power* because of its inefficiency not its injustice.[23] The crime that concerned the feudal structure was illegality with respect to rights; with the coming of modern capitalism the concern shifted from rights to

a protection of wealth and property. The bourgeoisie became emphatic in its insistence to close up open spaces for any illegalities perpetrated against material goods: power needed to be more efficient. Foucault asserts that the reformers may have used the rhetoric of equality to describe their aims but what they really did was suppress illegalities against wealth and property and permit illegalities with respect to bourgeois rights.[24] The outcome of this double standard with respect to rights and goods was the continuance of asymmetrical relations in power and privilege over the last 200 years.

It may be objected at this point that Foucault is simply being cynical when he accuses the reformers of wanting efficiency more than fairness. But this charge misleads us in an important way: without his analysis, which may or may not appear cynical in tone, how are we to explain the asymmetry of power relations that is currently the cause of so much hostility from, for example, women and minorities. If the justice called for by these groups is to be effective then our analyses must delineate the actual rifts in the social order so that justice can stand in the right gap. In this respect Foucault leads us in the appropriate direction because asymmetry in power relations is an under-analyzed problem.

If one sees the point of his analysis, it is clearer why rights have re-emerged since the 1960s as the main focus of public 'rebellion'. Changes in the constitution of material wealth, in credit, and in the value of tangible products make money more significant than things; the nature of crimes against material goods has changed, e.g., if robbed, people have insurance. Rights issues surface as more individuals and groups achieve political voice and recognize that a redistribution of rights is necessary to address the basic asymmetry of power relations that have remained intact throughout the modern era despite the rhetoric of equality. Yet, there is another form of power that Foucault uncovers that deepened the asymmetrical relations that were possible to maintain before the 1960s, which he calls *pastoral power*.

The Power of the Pastor[25]

Foucault asserts that Christianity introduced a form of new power throughout the ancient world because it was the only religion to organize itself into a church in which certain individuals served others as pastors.[26] This is a form of power

1. whose ultimate aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world;

2. that commands but also must be prepared to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of the flock; it differs in this way from royal power which demands sacrifice from its subjects to save its throne;

3. that looks after the whole community as well as each individual for his or her whole life;

4. that cannot be exercised without knowing the insides of people's minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.[27]

What must be noted in 2 and 3 is the combination of individual and corporate concerns: the pastor directs attention to each and to all. When Foucault uses the expression, "totalizing and individualizing" to describe *disciplinary power* he is referring to this tendency simultaneously to lump together and to single out people. As an example, university students may be singled out on the basis of an identification number but that number in no way signifies their individuality. This opportunity to lump together and single out is a fundamental characteristic of bureaucratic organizations. Foucault asserts that the state swallowed up the functions of the church spewing out a form of *pastoral power*, the objectives of which were different from religious ones but maintained control over each and all. As a result:

> Instead of a pastoral power and a political power, more or less linked to each other, more or less rival, there was an individualizing 'tactic' which characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education and employers.[28]

Pastoral power, as assimilated by the state, focused on salvation here and now in terms of health, well-being (sufficient wealth and standard of living), security, and protection against accidents. The officials of *pastoral power* increased: the police, private institutions and the family took on formerly pastoral functions. The multiplication of the aims and agents of *pastoral power* focused the development of knowledge about humankind around two poles: one which was globalizing and quantitative, concerning the entire population, and another which was analytical (in the sense of separating out) and concerned with the individual.[29]

Foucault is not alone in his assessment of the relationship between the Church, the State and this new form of power. Max Weber notes that the Reformation did not eliminate the Church's control over everyday life, rather it was the substitution of a new form for a previous one. This new form was a repudiation of a control which was very lax and scarcely perceptible in practice and hardly more than formal, in favour of a regulation of the whole conduct of people and which penetrated to all depths of public and private life. It was "infinitely burdensome and earnestly enforced."[30] Weber also notes that it was difficult for people even in his time to realize the former extent of pastoral influence over the lives of ordinary people; it was control from religious sources, he asserts, that was the "decisive influence in the formation of a national character."[31]

A description of state power modeled on *pastoral power* explains how forms of power can be both individualizing and totalizing at the same time. Foucault identifies three kinds of struggle against this type of power: 1. struggles against forms of domination (ethnic, social, religious); 2. against forms of exploitation which separate people from what they produce; and, 3. against forms of subjection, subjectivity and submission. One could argue that 3 is really the terminal of 1 and 2 but Foucault asserts that it is a form of its own which interacts with the other two. He seems most interested in focusing attention on the third type, an example of which he finds in the Reformation. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a new subjectivity, characterized by a need to take part in spiritual life, in the work of salvation, asserted itself in revolt against the forms of spirituality previously possible during the Middle Ages. Foucault asserts that the state is the power against which we now struggle.[32] There is a basic connection between *pastoral power* and the *disciplinary power* that follows it; the former is not so much a separate epoch as it is a technique of power assimilated by the latter.

The Pastor's Flock

Pastoral power is exercised between the priest/preacher and the people in the pew. Foucault asserts that the

> christian in confession doesn't know something, what he doesn't know is not whether X is a sin or not, or what kind of sin it is, *he doesn't know what takes place within him*. The christian says: "Listen, the trouble is that I can't pray at present, I have a feeling of spiritual dryness which has made me lose touch with God." The director says to him, "Well, there is something happening in you which you don't know about. We will work together to find it out."[33] (emphasis mine).

The assumption behind *pastoral power* is that ordinary people do not know what is within them as well as the pastor does. The first thing to notice is that those who do not know are placed in a position of diminished power with respect to the one who helps or claims to know. It must be noted that even in ordinary situations we do have difficulty in assessing the claim that others either do or do not know what is in them. In general, the subjectivity of another person is opaque to us and distant from us; we can be mistaken in any judgement we make about someone else.

Yet we persist in making judgements. As a simple but fundamental example, parents will require young children to eat dinner even when children say or indicate that they are not hungry. In this way parents express a form of *pastoral power* over their children which dismisses confirmations from their offspring. This is because, in examples of *pastoral power*, the subject's account of a situation is not heard or given the currency that is given to the pastor's account. As a result, the child comes to wonder: Am I hungry? In a context of *pastoral power*, children do not practice the art of listening to themselves or speaking for themselves. Yet there must be some relationship between listening to one's self, speaking for one's self and eventually thinking for one's self.

The overwhelming effect of years of this asymmetrical practice leaves the less powerful believing that they do not know what is within and need someone else to help them to find out. That is, the powerless are numb to their own experience and confused about what they feel. This confusion is fundamental in the perpetuation of immaturity. We have all been influenced by asymmetrical relations of the pastoral type to some degree. So we face a double bind. The very practice of continually inauthenticating what we know about ourselves sets up a need for someone to tell us what is within. It is hard to see a way out. But until the powerless find a way out, it will not be possible for them to trust themselves, e.g., even to trust the sensation, I am hungry now or I am not hungry now, and it will be difficult for them to sense their own plans and intentions in order to act upon them. What develops between pastor and people is a dependent relationship in which people forever search the horizon for someone to tell them who they are and what they can do. It is not just that this relationship produces and perpetuates asymmetrical relations, though it does do that; in addition, it grounds these asymmetrical relations in an overwhelming condition of not knowing and not trusting ourselves, a condition which is hard to shake off. The deep-going nature of this handicap can last a life-time: if I do not know myself, what is within, what I am truly good at as a specific human being, then I cannot take advantage of new opportunities to participate meaningfully in social life. Not knowing what is within is an obstacle in the path to full adult participation in the social world.

An objection that could be raised at this point is that in the parent/child, teacher/student relationship one person in the pair does know more than the other about a great many things. In fact, if parents and teachers do not know more, they should not be in that position, particularly because we hold them more responsible in the relationship than we hold either the child or student. The mere fact of knowing/not-knowing is not the problem to Foucault; rather it is the practices attached to this relationship that create the conditions of perpetual immaturity, and which distort the subjectivity of individuals directing them towards enslavement to the authority of the other. Foucault "dramatizes this point by claiming that power is in our bodies not in our heads." To put in another way, "he means that practices are more fundamental than belief systems when it comes to understanding the hold power has on us."[34] This is perhaps a central contribution to the way we should think about power relations in education. At bottom, these practices silence those who do not know. Foucault would say that the practices of confining mad people, making people confess, and I would add, making children eat when they are not hungry, maintain domination of one person over another by creating conditions of passivity or docility in the one who knows less. The only valid objective for helping by knowing more, is to liberate people from dependencies that prevent them from becoming fully adult. This is very complex since dependency is multi-faceted and is perceived differently depending on one's perspective on it, a problem I pick up when I discuss empowerment in chapter three.

In light of the asymmetry of power relations, early in his discussion of power relations,[35] Foucault appears to want us to skim along the surface with respect to understanding ourselves. This seems to me the wrong move. If we have not been enabled to be self-discerning, turning away from introspection would not provide us with a fuller understanding of what is inside us, nor would it free anyone to understand and tolerate others more perceptively. I argue that skill in understanding others is not only desirable, it is grounded in a well-developed exegesis of the self conducted in a context that is characterized neither by *sovereign* nor *pastoral power*. We should take seriously the effects of power relations imbedded in the historicity of our experience, and yet not

abandon self-understanding; rather, we should engage in on-going self-critique with others who are not, and are not believed to be, more powerful than we are. This requires reassessing the link between power and knowledge: the belief that one who knows more is more powerful than I am. Knowing more must be extricated from the practices aimed at producing passivity and which convey to the subject that she or he is incapable of knowing accurately what is within. We need to develop power relations which help us to excavate self-understanding. Towards the end of his life, Foucault did come to emphasize what he called the practices of freedom which linked up with a knowledge of and care for the self and, by implication, care for others.[36]

Disciplinary Power

The development of human maturity is distorted under each regime of power relations. The problem that *sovereign power* has for us is that the king turns people into things. Through *pastoral power* we are convinced that we do not know ourselves and so come not to trust ourselves; a condition we might call an agnosticism of the self[37] which is deeply confusing. Now it is sometimes argued that identity confusion among moderns arises because of the different world views that vie for our attention in pluralistic societies. I no longer believe that the mere presence of difference is the problem; rather it is our immaturity and our conceptualization of the significance of difference and the way we treat people because of it. I pick up the problem of difference when I discuss Foucault's idea of subjectivity, but understanding the following form of power helps us to see why we react to the differences in others the way we do. The problem we have in this third form of power is that we are held prisoner by practices that render us docile or passive yet useful for the purposes of others. Foucault calls this power *bio-power*; it used *pastoral power* as its model and was deployed by the emerging state. The strength of *bio-power* was situated in what Foucault refers to as disciplinary techniques that were directed towards domesticating a burgeoning population, techniques that were made efficient during the modern era. I refer to *bio-power* united with disciplinary techniques as *disciplinary power*. *Bio-power* designates "what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of the transformation of human life." *Bio-power* focused attention on the norm; as a power that took charge of life, it requires "continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms....Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize," rather than display itself in "the murderous splendour" of the sovereign's power over his subjects. In effecting distributions around a norm, Foucault asserts that *bio-power* renders ours a normalizing society. As a result, "life more than law" has become the issue of political struggles: the "right" to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, even to the "right" to discover what one is and all that one can be--a right that would have been incomprehensible in the classical juridical system.[38]

As a companion process to that of normalization, by which Foucault meant the "establishment of measurements, hierarchy, and regulations" around a statistical norm, there was an accumulation of derived judgements about what is normal and what is abnormal. Establishing what was abnormal on the basis of "dividing practices," (i.e., the separating out of some people from others on the basis of a division of some kind, e.g., madness versus sanity), contributed to the view that those confined possessed "a nature no longer continuous with those outside" so that they "acquired" a nature specific to them, e.g., as a delinquent, for example. As Jerrold Seigel notes, the "old sense that shared sin made all men potential lawbreakers gives way to a vision that presents each separate person as delivered wholly over to him or herself by the social practices that make individuality the foundation of normalcy"[39] so that, to Foucault, moderns simultaneously undergo and exercise power, a situation which he does not see as contradictory, but as a fundamental description of the subjectivity constituted in the modern condition.

The effects of *bio-power* on individual subjectivity were also felt in schools. The practices of *bio-power* ranked students around a norm so that students are "compiled and constructed" both in a passive sense in the process of objectification (they become an object in the ranking process), and in an active self-forming subjectivation of themselves in which they take on the identity that

these ranking practices give them. For example, this is how young girls come to see themselves as incapable of being competent at mathematics and science; they come to believe that only boys are good at these subjects since only boys get good marks. These latter processes involve "processes of self-understanding mediated by an external authority figure, e.g., the teacher." That is, the student is not encouraged to assess his or her own giftedness, but to inculcate his or her place in the rank. But while education linked with *disciplinary power* turns some students into incompetent subjects, it constituted others as "powerful subjects;" for example, those who became the intellectuals and knowledge experts after 1800.[40] In this way *disciplinary power* produces "abnormal" and therefore vulnerable students and also makes others "normal," knowledgeable, and strong.

As noted earlier, *pastoral power* was both individualizing and totalizing. *Bio-power* also coalesces around two distinct poles at the beginning of the classical age. The first pole was the human species, in that for the first time in history, the species, the population and issues like fertility become "the object of systematic, sustained political attention and intervention." The second pole was the human body itself: the body was not approached directly in its biological dimension, but "as an object to be manipulated and controlled." Disciplinary technology refers to the joining of knowledge and power around a technology of the body which has as its aim the production of a docile individual. This 'technology' intensifies through the classical and modern eras. The relationship between the management of the accumulation of people and the possibility of accumulating wealth is clear to Foucault. Although disciplinary technologies are not seen as causal to the rise of capitalism, "they were prerequisites to its success."[41] That is, the capacity for *disciplinary power* to simultaneously organize multiplicities in a totalizing and individualizing way and to focus this activity on the management of the species and the individual body at the same time is a primary organizing principle for understanding modernity.

Disciplinary power, emerging along with modernity, is a general assault on the body; it is a concerted and multifarious effort to produce a docile body, i.e., "a body that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved."[42] Despite the fact that it is the antithesis to *sovereign power*, the two coexist in the modern era, each legitimating the other. While *sovereign power* was exercised on the basis of a legitimacy established through the king's headship of the realm, and was exercised primarily to protect the land and its products, *disciplinary power*, is exercised over all bodies and all their operations; human beings and all their relations are the focus of this new form of power. Instead of the intermittent and shocking spectacles of the king's power, this power presupposes a tightly knit grid of material coercions (disciplinary techniques). While the king's presence could be terrible, at least one could escape him. This new power, incorporated into the State, allows for continuous surveillance and for a "calculation of power in terms of the minimum expenditure for the maximum return." The way that *disciplinary power* is described in *Discipline and Punish*, there seems no way of escape because it is enfolded into the order of things; it abides in all the means and mechanisms of power relations, permitting time and labour, rather than wealth and commodities, to be extracted from bodies. Just as in *sovereign power* domination is concealed, in *disciplinary power* there are the hidden practices of surveillance.[43] In each case a theory of right provides support for the domination which comprises those strategies that enable someone to oppress or repress people; in the first case it is a *Divine Right* and in the second it is a theory of right that acts as an organizing principle for legal codes.

Another description of *disciplinary power* is captured in Foucault's term, "governmentality," which is described in an article by the same name, published in 1979, the same year he published *Discipline and Punish*.[44] In this article he compares what he calls the "art of government" with the relationship that grounds *sovereign power* which he identifies by explaining the nature of the link between the Prince and his principality, a notion grounded in Machiavelli's work. He also describes the major historical shifts which intensified the "totalizing" procedures of the state in terms of this new type of political reflection: the art of government. Under this term, political reflection was broadened to include almost all forms of human activity "from the smallest stirrings of the soul to the largest military manoeuvres of the army:" each "activity in its own way

demanded reflection on how it could best be accomplished," best meaning most economically.[45] While the king's aim was to control a territory, which also implied controlling people and resources, the "art of government" gave new priority to three kinds of relations. These relations linked people and territory to the potential to generate wealth and provide subsistence; it linked people to their customs, habits and ways of doing and thinking things; and thirdly, it linked people to their relation to things like accidents, misfortunes, famines, epidemics and death. The rise of this centralized state apparatus was later christened statistics in the seventeenth century. "The art of government and empirical knowledge of the state's resources and conditions--its statistics--together formed the major components of a new political rationality" which, according to Foucault we have not emerged from yet.[46]

Foucault unites the ideas of power and governance by asserting that "[b]asically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government."[47] This term 'government' designates "the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities" *et cetera*. This is a sixteenth century sense of the term and it not only covered the "legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, it included strategies, more or less considered and calculated, which were destined "to act upon the possibilities of actions of other people." To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of actions of others.[48]

Foucault also uses the term 'governmentality' in his last published conversation before his death in 1984.[49] The term expresses most clearly what Foucault means by modern power, although he is aware that other forms of power persist as well i.e., *sovereign and pastoral*. In the 1984 conversation, 'governmentality' is power he thinks is "always present." Simply put, it "refers to relationships in which one wishes to direct the behaviour of another;"[50] it is always present in the sense that governing others is a tendency in all our relationships. Except, that is, for relations of domination since, in his view, governing permits a mutual exercise of power while domination does not. In his analysis of power relations, Foucault makes it much clearer in 1984 that domination is something other than power and that power only exists under the general condition of freedom in the sense that government always permits escape. For this reason power relations are not evil: power is a strategic game. Foucault uses the word 'game' in the sense of an "ensemble of rules for the production of truth....not in the sense of imitating or entertaining."[51] Domination may be evil, but power is not. In the earlier discussion of governmentality (1979), and more particularly in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault focuses on the practices of disciplinary technology in the production of a *subjectivity* that, on the face of it, seem to preclude freedom.[52] In 1984, he says that when he began to talk about power, and to focus so intensely on the practices of power, he may not have spoken "very clearly about it or used the words needed." For example, he says, in the pedagogic institution, "I don't see where evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given game of truth, knowing more than the other, tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits knowledge to him, communicates skills to him." Foucault identifies the problem "in knowing how you are to avoid in these practices...the effects of domination which will make the child subject to arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher." Further, Foucault has little confidence in our ability to do what Habermas seems to think is possible when we communicate with one another. He considers Habermas to have a utopian view in his ideal case of communication. Foucault says that the problem is not trying to dissolve power relations in the utopia of a "perfectly transparent communication," as Habermas seems to want us to do, "but to give one's self the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics, the *ethos*, the practices of self, which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination."[53] In short, in the latter account of governmentality, Foucault does not accept the idea that we can somehow achieve a social situation in which it is impossible for domination to be exercised. As teachers, we are always to be on our guard against our own use of domination as well as its use by others. Domination is always deserving of censure and resistance. Yet it seems to me that simply to identify an asymmetrical relation between two parties or groups is not necessarily problematic to the development of *personal power*. Rather, we must examine closely

the practices of the more powerful person and the responses of the less powerful, in each particular situation, and pick out the range of, or limitations on, the possibilities for saying and doing that develop in the less powerful.

When Foucault focuses entirely on disciplinary practices on the body, as he does in *Discipline and Punish* (1979), domination by others, and domination of the self by the self, almost seems inescapable. In 1984, when he speaks of "practices of freedom," domination is not inevitable, though it remains hard to avoid, and mutual benefit between the self and the other opens up as a possibility. That is, power relations take on a wide application for Foucault. From this perspective on power, all social relations have power embedded in them: governmentality is "always present" so that the development of human maturity is caught up, of necessity, in the practices of power. But because Foucault has no model for power relations other than those of war and struggle, he has no way of showing us how we might engage in relations of power that would bring into being the sort of person who is capable of the "practices of freedom" that he approves. I think such a person must have nourished his or her *personal power* in empowering relationships. While I agree with Foucault that the possibility to dominate lurks within every social relation, it is entirely conceivable that we could govern others in such a way that they become empowered as an outcome. Governmentality in this case would be grounded in nurturance and in a partnership paradigm for power relations, not on the models of war and struggle that conform to the dominator paradigm, an assertion I will pick up in the following chapter.

The disciplined body: docile and useful

The economic changes of the eighteenth century appeared to make it necessary to govern individuals so as to make them efficient workers; power needed to gain access to individuals, to their bodies, their gestures and all their daily actions.[54] In the development of good workers, opinion, observation, and the discourses of others were thought capable of keeping individuals from committing harmful acts,[55] thereby limiting illegality. That is, it was hoped that people would be good because other people were watching them and saying things about them. Foucault's analysis of expert discourse helps us see how power operates during modernity to secure this end. The term 'discourse' refers to "what can be said and thought and also about who can speak, when, and with what authority." That is, "discourses embody meaning and social relationships," constraining the possibility of thought by both including and excluding what can be said. As a result, one 'discourse' may stand in an antagonistic relationship to another in that some are privileged and others are disprivileged, e.g., the 'discourse' of midwives versus the 'discourse' of an emerging group of male medical doctors at a point in our history. 'Discourse' is "structured by assumptions within which any speaker must operate in order to be heard as meaningful."[56] Privileged 'discourse' establishes and produces meaning and sets cultural limits on what it is meaningful to say and do.

Foucault analyzes the discourse of modern theorists and picks out one central symbol of *disciplinary power*, Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, which was an architectural arrangement for making it possible to keep people under a continuous surveillance and he analyzed Bentham's discourse about the social objectives for the Panopticon. The Panopticon consists of a large courtyard, with a tower in the centre, surrounded by a series of buildings divided into levels and cells. Each cell had two windows. One window let in light from outside and the other faced the tower in the middle. An observer could see through large observatory windows any activity in individual cells, and could be seen from the cell (unless venetian blinds were used) but the person in the cell could not see anyone other than the person in the tower. (Foucault makes a comparison between the experience of being in a cell and the experience of standing in a washroom stall.)[57] While the Panopticon influenced architectural designs for hospitals, prisons and schools, it was not actually built. To Foucault it is not important whether it was built, what mattered was that it was conceived and thought both possible and desirable.[58] Bentham assumed that observation itself would have interiorizing effects. He wrote that it is necessary for the

inmate to be ceaselessly under the eyes of an inspector in order that one might lose the power and even almost the idea of wrong-doing.[59] The reign of opinion coupled with surveillance represents a mode of operation through which power was exercised by virtue of the mere fact of things being known because people were seen by an immediate, collective, anonymous gaze.[60] Under this eye, individuals would come to interiorize the opinion of others to the point that they would become their own overseers, each exercising surveillance over, and against, themselves:[61] this is power by transparency--subjection by 'illumination'. In the end, this use of opinion was conceived as a spontaneous re-enactment of the social contract.[62] Hence, surveillance eventually makes us subjects to ourselves. What makes the power relations inherent in these technologies more insidious than ones from the classical era is that they do not appear openly as power but mask themselves as its opposite--as the human sciences, or as self-knowledge.[63]

To summarize, oppression characterizes *sovereign power* because the king had the right to say no; repression characterizes *disciplinary power* because surveillance and opinion are eventually interiorized and individuals say no to themselves: they come to police themselves. While force is excessive and brutal in the first case, no show of force is necessary in the second because those observed play two roles: they become king to themselves as subject, a process that becomes a perpetual victory that avoids any physical confrontation and is always decided in advance.[64] It is in this way that domination is exercised both through oppression and repression. Surveillance is an apparatus of total and circulating mistrust because there is no absolute point,[65] and people come to feel mistrust for themselves. Power relations take on a pyramidical form but even the summit is not the source or principle from which all power derives, and people are not the source of their power, either. The summit and lower elements stand in a relationship of mutual support and conditioning, i.e., a mutual hold which equates power with mutual and indefinite blackmail.[66] And power is always exercised at a cost: if it is too violent, the risk is revolt; if it is too discontinuous, the risk is to allow resistance and disobedience to slip through the fingers of power's reach.

Disciplinary power gained access to the bodies of individuals, to their acts, attitudes and modes of everyday behaviours and began to be exercised through social production and social service;[67] this occurred in response to a need for a more efficient control of multiplicities of people and of capital, as well as with the demands that industrialization made on the bodies of manual workers. It is a form of power that took the opportunity to insert itself into the general functioning of things during the outbreak of the plague in Europe, for example.[68] It is not so much that these mechanisms of discipline all originate at this point but rather that techniques and models already operating acquire a new magnitude; the body becomes an object of control that requires uninterrupted coercion.[69] *Disciplinary power* is a "capillary form of power," composed of mechanisms that "reach into the very grain of individuals," touching their bodies, and inserting "itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, their learning processes, their everyday lives." According to Foucault, power is exercised within the social body rather than from above it, as the sovereign exercised power.[70] To Foucault, the political investment of this power in the body is bound up in accordance with complex reciprocal relations and with the body's economic use; as the body is bent towards the production of labour, the exercise of *disciplinary power* becomes part of the body's relation to the activity of production. Additionally, this relationship between the exercise of power and the production of labourers is possible only if workers are caught up in a system of subjection in which *need* is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated, and used. The body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body--a subjection not only obtained by instruments of violence, but also through a knowledge of the body, which is a practical technology of the body.[71] The issue here is that modern power took on a characteristic set of techniques that directed what it was possible for a *body* to do and to say thereby limiting the actual freedom of individuals. But the loss of freedom appeared to be compensated for through the emergence of a new subjectivity in which particular needs made necessary the worker/production relationship.

We can examine more closely the case of schooling in order to illustrate the worker/production relationship constituted through *disciplinary power*. Discipline, in *disciplinary power*, meant the correct means of training; this training turns students, for example, into individuals who are both objects and instruments of its exercise. In schools, the success of discipline derives from the use of simple instruments: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and the examination which is a union of the first two.[72] The object of *disciplinary power* is to produce one who is subjected to habits, rules, orders, on the basis of an authority that is exercised continuously around and upon the individuals who must allow this power to function automatically in them.[73] As disciplinary control comes into schools it does not consist simply in teaching or imposing a series of particular gestures; it dictates the best relationship between a gesture and the overall position of the body, which allows the students' bodies to express efficiency and speed in performing a given task. When the body is used correctly, there is also a correct use of time, nothing must remain idle or useless--a disciplined body is the prerequisite of an efficient gesture.[74] An example of this body/task relationship is uncovered in the practices which surrounded handwriting.

> Good handwriting...presupposes a gymnastics--a whole routine whose rigorous code invests the body in its entirety, from the points of the feet to the tip of the index finger. The pupils must always 'hold their bodies erect, somewhat turned and free on the left side, slightly inclined, so that, with the elbow placed on the table, the chin can be rested upon the hand, unless this were to interfere with the view; the left leg must be somewhat more forward under the table than the right. A distance of two fingers must be left between the body and the table; for not only does one write with more alertness, but nothing is more harmful to the health than to acquire the habit of pressing one's stomach against the table; the part of the left arm from the elbow to the hand must be placed on the table, on which it must rest slightly. The teacher will place the pupils in the posture that they should maintain when writing, and will correct it either by a sign or otherwise, when they change this position'.[75]

What was being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body--a calculated manipulation of its elements, gestures, and behaviour. The human body was entering "a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down, rearranges it." This was "a political anatomy" or mechanics of power defined by how one may take hold of other bodies, not only so they operate as one wishes, but also with the precision, speed, and efficiency that one desires. Discipline produces subjected, practised, and docile bodies; it does so by enhancing economic utility and diminishing political vigour at the same time, making the body more vulnerable to increased domination.[76]

In the school room, *disciplinary power* engages in a meticulous observation of detail. It distributes pupils in space thereby making it possible to establish absences and presences; marking each person's place not only in the room but also with reference to each other and to the increasingly complex and difficult tasks that are set. Individuals are partitioned off from one another but treated as an aggregate at the same time. Further, in discipline, the elements (pupils) are interchangeable, since each is defined by the place it occupies in a series, and also by the gap that separates it from others. Discipline establishes and confirms *rank*; it is an art of rank. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations.[77] There are two models for the body as it becomes subject over time to discipline: "the mechanical body" in which gestures are constrained according to the generalized directions written in a manual which set out what counts as an appropriate act, e.g., how to hold and fire a rifle; and "the natural body," based on "the intention of nature" as well as a closer analysis of the construction of the human body.[78] Rousseau's *Emile* would provide a good example of education for the natural body.

The exercise is at the centre of discipline. The term refers to a technique by which one imposes on the body tasks that are both repetitive and different, but always graduated. By bending behaviour towards some end point, the exercise makes it possible to describe an individual either in relation to the exercise itself, in relation to other individuals, or in relation to a project. That is, the individual is invested with some attribute in relation to the exercise. This assures that continuity and constraint continually draw students toward a standard of authoritarian perfection established by the teacher.[79] At bottom, the exercise constrains time and imposes disciplinary time on pedagogic practice.[80] Foucault also describes the examination as a disciplinary practice. The examination plays a critical role, determining on the one hand, that a person is governable, and "likely to lead a docile, useful and practical life," but it also identifies to the individual his or her so-called true self by which students are classified as an object in various ways for others. In this way, the student is tied to this true self as a subjected or politically dominated being since the true self is attached to the authority of someone else, e.g., a teacher. If we take Foucault's description of *disciplinary power*, with its practices that make us subject to the authority of others and to the policing of ourselves, we may well ask how it is possible to exercise freedom.

Foucault describes practices of *disciplinary power* as capable of investing us with power which is not a "fixed quantity of physical force, but rather...a stream of energy" flowing through every human society which is harnessed in "various patterns of behaviour, habits of introspection, and systems of knowledge."[81] This energy is transmitted by us and through us; it exerts pressure on us, just as we, in our struggle against it, resist the grip it has on us through its use. Power relations, then, go right down into the depths of society; they are not localized in relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes but form a complex of mechanisms. To Foucault, because of the intimate penetration of *disciplinary power*, it is not possible to rid ourselves entirely of its effects in us. This is why Foucault is so sceptical about our attempts to use new ideas or techniques to free ourselves completely from current ones.[82] This point is central to him. He does not want us to conceive *disciplinary power* as a garment we can throw off in order to put on a new one. Further, because *disciplinary power* is conceived in terms of strategies, it creates and perpetuates asymmetry as it invests us. And while his analysis of *disciplinary power* is grounded in an examination of the power to punish, he notes that the power to punish is not essentially different from that of curing or educating.[83] Its most compelling effects are to disengage individuals from themselves and to make it possible to sustain asymmetry in our power relations.

Asymmetry in power relations

The continuing presence of the king in modern life is made possible because power relations form asymmetrical systems: in religious, juridical, and military models, an imbalance in power relations is fundamental and power is conceived as a commodity. In assessing the functionalist nature of juridical and liberal (and also Marxist) conceptions of political power,[84] Foucault picks out a connection which he calls an "economism" of the concept. He is not arguing that functionalist and Marxist conceptions are the same, rather he postulates that they have a similar focus, i.e., the economic functionality of power as primary. Power, in the classical, juridical system, is taken to be a right that one is able to possess as though it were a commodity, and which can be transferred or alienated, either wholly or partially, through a legal act, through cession or through making a contract. In this view, power is that concrete substance which every individual holds, and whose partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty to be established. Hence, we have the genesis of the social contract: a belief that at some imaginary point in time, people gave up their right to power so that they could enjoy the peace a sovereign would secure for them. This idea is based on the notion that the constitution of political power obeys the model of legal transactions involving contractual types of exchange, therefore making the clear analogy between power and commodities and power and wealth.[85] While Foucault is not denying power and money are profoundly enmeshed, he asks whether power is always in a subordinate position

relative to the economy? He believes it is not. To him, power only exists in action and is, above all, a relation of force.[86]

While jurists and philosophers were seeking in the social contract a model for the reconstruction of society, the technician of discipline had a military dream of society constituted on the basis of individuals as the "meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine: the technicians related not to a primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility."[87] It is Foucault's belief that the idea of a social body constituted by a universality of wills is a great fantasy because the "phenomenon of the social body is the effect not of a consensus but of the materiality of power operating on the very bodies of individuals."[88]

In explicating how power constitutes this materiality, Foucault points out that two answers may be given, namely: power is that which represses (from Hegel, Freud and Reich), or power is struggle, conflict, war (from Nietzsche). Two major systems of approach are connected with this analysis of power, and to Foucault's two models for power. In the first place, there is the old system (as found in the *philosophes* of the eighteenth century) in which power is conceived as an original right given up to establish sovereignty, with the social contract as its companion. Power, so constituted:

> risks becoming oppression whenever it over-extends itself, whenever...it goes beyond the terms of the contract. Thus we have contract-power, with oppression as its limit, or...as the transgression of that limit.[89]

The other system analyzes power in accordance with the model of war, and repression replaces the oppression inherent in the sovereign-subject relationship. Domination is accomplished both through oppression and repression,[90] in that individuals within the social body continue to be subjects in each instance. As a result we have two schemes for an analysis of power:

> The contract-oppression schema, which is the juridical one...and the war-repression schema for which the pertinent opposition is not between the legitimate and illegitimate, as it is in the first schema, but between struggle and submission.[91]

If citizens are presumed to have accepted once and for all the laws of society by which they can be controlled and disciplined, on the basis of a social contract, then when some break the pact they become the enemy of society as a whole and they must participate in the punishment that is practised upon them. Crime is no longer conceived as against the king but as against the social body; illegality is no longer an issue between the king and his enemies but between the social body and the enemies within so that society in its entirely, has the right to oppose and punish them. This is an unequal struggle: on one side are all the forces, all the power, all the rights. In this way the right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of the society. It again becomes a penalty without bounds and a terrible 'super power'. What was needed historically was a principle of moderation to mediate the overwhelming aspect of this asymmetry. As mentioned earlier, the limit for the vengeance in the social body became the sensibility of the reasonable man who makes the law and does not himself commit crime.

Therefore, the confrontation formerly acted out between the sovereign and the subject now takes place within the same social body. Asymmetry not only describes the difference in power between the kings and the subjects, it also marks out a division necessary to maintaining the separation between those for and those against the social body (the abnormal versus the normal, for example).[92] Foucault points out that the realization of this latter division has two possibilities for its expression: either we live in the "punitive city" where discipline operates in such a meticulous and extensive manner that criminal behaviour cannot occur, or, we establish the "coercive institution" where we send offenders to physically exclude them from us. The option

chosen historically was the coercive institution, i.e., the prison, and schools were deeply influenced by this choice.

Foucault is insistent that it is not recourse to *sovereign power* that will limit the effects of *disciplinary power* because both are mechanisms which are absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanisms of power today.[93] It is their union that has anchored the asymmetry of power relations that underlies all our encounters, both public and private; each has embedded in it a theory of right (in the sense of a justifiable claim but whose justification Foucault wants us to question) deployed by state functionaries such as teachers, police and judges. On the political level, this theory of right supports the relationship between the State and the social body, "conceals its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and guarantees to everyone...the exercise of proper sovereign rights." This justification of the rights of the body politic as a collective to exercise power over its citizens enabled

> sovereignty to be democratized through the constitution of a public right articulated upon collective sovereignty while at the same time this democratization of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.[94]

This means that the public has the right to exercise power over its sovereign subjects; that is, those who live under the illusion that they are the source of their own actions, opinions, *et cetera*, in the Kantian sense. What this obscures, according to Foucault, is the way in which these so-called sovereign subjects are constituted through the particular nature of the mechanisms of *disciplinary power*, are held in asymmetrical relationships and are dominate themselves through these techniques whose function it is to maintain cohesion within the social body and to push back to the margins anything that cannot assimilate, anything that is different. This process of maintaining cohesion is accomplished through 'normalization', a term referred to earlier, and 'discipline' or 'the disciplines' are Foucault's general terms for the institutional organization of mechanisms which bring about normalization.[95] We only have to think of the steadily increasing number of children accommodated in schools over the last century to realize the conditions that seemed to call for such techniques. In organizing cells, places and ranks, 'the disciplines' create complex spaces, at once architectural, functional and hierarchical, that provide fixed positions and permit calculations, that mark places and indicate values, and that guarantee the obedience of individuals and a better economy of time and gesture.[96]

In summary, the social body has taken the place of the condemned body and the king is replaced by us all. In Foucault's view, power is exercised generally in, through, and on all of us to ensure normalcy and cohesion and particularly on any who might deviate from prescribed norms. He says that disciplinary normalizations are coming into ever greater conflict with the theory of right inherent in legal systems because of the way power invests the body and makes it strong. I address this tension in chapter three, but the incompatibility between normalization and juridical systems of sovereignty is supposedly intensifying. In this way Foucault seems to be saying that since the late 1960s, *sovereign power* and *disciplinary power* which formerly worked together are at some points threatening to split apart. This fissure allows individuals and groups to ask the question of why this doctor or that judge should have the *right* to exercise the particular form of power he or she does over those who are neither doctors nor judges; this is not so much a rejection of their knowledge as it is a rejection of the excess power that undergirds their statements. In this way empowerment directly confronts this excess power and presupposes that human maturity cannot flourish in its presence.

This excess power, which is exercised by people on the basis of their strategic position, goes well beyond what is needed to get a job done. This excess power is expressed in a *right* to be treated extraordinarily by other people. On the personal level, in our attempts to work with those in positions of power over us we may still be told by lawyers, for example, that while we are in *court* we had best not "upset the judge" if we expect things to come out alright for us.[97] If we are observant, we witness the commanding presence of the king or pastor in our classrooms,

homes and workplaces creating asymmetry in power relations. In all cases, some sort of theory of right undergirds these demonstrations of excess power. For police or the judge, justification is situated in a legal code. But I wonder whether it is not possible to consider another kind of theory of right. Take for example the individual we speak of when we say something like the following: "I know he is very hard on people, he doesn't listen, he violates the decisions he has agreed to earlier when he was with other people, but really he is very fragile, (or busy, etc.) and I think it would upset him if I *say* anything about his behaviour. Saying something to him might even make him worse." Or further, "I know she is very hard on her secretaries but you know she is the only woman in her position and she feels defensive. If I *say* something to her it might threaten her or make her even more difficult." The implication in both cases is that X cannot be spoken to or held accountable for these actions due to a special condition which serves as an excuse for behaviour we otherwise would not tolerate. The effects on us are that we hold ourselves back from saying or doing anything to make X accountable; we are silent and passive because we believe speaking and acting will increase the hardships that we, or others, may face in the future.

I am not arguing that we should stop trying to understand others but that we should be more cognizant of what such compensations permit in terms of demonstrations of excess power. It seems to me that we must learn how to restructure our relationships by working with those in privileged positions. In the specific case of the behaviour of those over us, what is at issue is knowing whether it is possible to establish a relationship between rulers and ruled that is not one of obedience or silence, but one in which working with each other would play an important role. Foucault says that we must escape the dilemma in which we are either for or against the other. After all, he asserts, "one can stand face-to-face" and "working with a government does not imply either subjection or total acceptance. One can simultaneously work and stubbornly resist. I even think these two things go together."[28] It is claims such as these that seem to have earned Foucault the label of neo-conservative. Yet I think such labelling precludes hearing how the nature of working with would constitute something really new in political terms. I do not see how we can work with kings or pastors and let them keep their excess power, or how in working with we would not come to notice the influence on us of disciplining techniques. Working with implies restructuring power relations towards a minimization of domination.

To conclude, if we consider the effects of these epochs of power upon us, we need to gather up some threads of thought and weave them together. We must realize that *sovereign, pastoral and disciplinary power* constitute relations of power which are both internal and external to us. This is because modern relations of power have as their complement two other aspects, namely, the enfolding of discipline right into the functioning of mechanisms already in existence, and the interiorizing effects of the surveillance and opinion that we now use to police ourselves. That is, power from without unites with order from within and results in a disciplined subjectivity. We cannot simply apply the principles of rationality, as Kant articulates them, and become mature, i.e., be our own source of authority, because power relations get in our way. The rational man alone may be useful against *sovereign power* but is less effective against modern power; or more particularly, the rational man ideal does not work equally well for all of us in the face of modern power.

In order to make my point clearer, let me stipulate a distinction between two terms, namely: individual and person. By individual, I mean the sort of human being that is *produced* by the combined effects of *sovereign, pastoral, and disciplinary power*: an individual is someone who is controlled from without and ordered from within. A person, on the other hand, would refer to an ideal type in whom one would see the originality of a very particular human being and in whom one would observe the developed ability to speak and to act from within in concert with others who also speak and act from within themselves. Such a person would have to become conscious of strategies of domination and would wrestle with the historicity of his or her experience and the givenness of culture and community; but even under these conditions, such a person would live in more symmetrical power relations with others, or at least consciously works

toward this end. Persons would envision themselves as those who are able to say and do those things which are moved by an authentic self-conception. In his final public interview, "the ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom," Foucault appears to approach this view though he does not address the problems we might have in reconciling care for the self and care for the other.[99]

It is obvious, then, that an individual is not his or her own person; being a person, in this sense, is central to becoming mature. What is at issue in this distinction is the reasonable limits that inhere in being a person in community with other persons and the unreasonable limitations that these epochs of power have been able to exact in order to make us individuals instead. When Foucault says that *disciplinary power* makes us individuals I would add that it does so because it will not let us be persons. And further, when some people act like kings or pastors and express domination through demonstrations of excess power, they are not acting or speaking as persons. They are expressing what is involved in being strategically well-situated individuals. The point as far as Foucault is concerned--given the nature of power relations as he sees them--is to disturb and unsettle, even for the moment, strategically well-situated individuals. Yet, given the interiorizing and subjugating effects of *disciplinary power*, as Foucault describes them in *Discipline and Punish*, it is difficult to see how one could ever be free to be a person in the way I describe.

Engaging Foucault

I now want to address two ideas that are central to Foucault's analysis of power that I make use of in the dissertation and in doing so, to point out some of the problems that Foucault has with how we might become mature. The first is the relationship between power and the subject and the second is an analysis of what he calls the historicity of experience. The particular way I unravel the relationship between power and the subject is relevant to my discussion of equality in chapter four. In terms of the second idea, Foucault's analysis of the historicity of experience is central to understanding the significance to power relations of socially-constituted vulnerability, which I also describe in chapter four.

Power and the subject

Foucault gets at a conceptualization of power by asking the question of how people have been made subjects throughout the epochs of power described earlier. He analyzes the historic shift from the Classical era to the Modern era as have Durkheim, Weber and Marx. While Marx described this shift in terms of feudal to capitalist society, Durkheim in terms of mechanical to organic solidarity, and Weber in terms of traditional to rational or bureaucratic society, Foucault describes this shift in terms of *sovereign* to *disciplinary power*, as described above, and identifies the consequences these forms of power have on the constitution of subjectivities. Foucault concludes that to maintain the proposition of a sovereign Kantian subject misleads us with respect to the constitution of human being. Kant's view of the sovereign subject fails to account for the ways in which we are both products and agents of knowledge and power. That is, Kant's assumption that we are responsible for our own immaturity is misleading[100] because it fails to take seriously the limitations placed on people through the socially constituted vulnerability that power's negative effects create in them. Foucault alerts us to the "conditioned and conditioning" relationship that human subjects have with power. While Foucault realizes his treatment of the subject is problematic, he cautions us to consider how much of our humanity we fail to account for by not taking seriously our historically constituted experience.

Foucault asserts that people are made subjects initially by being made objects of their own inquiry, or the inquiry of others. That is, human beings are studied as *other*, for example, as mad by the sane, or as criminal by those who are not.[101] This *otherness* is assigned through three modes of objectification that transform human beings into subjects.[102] The first of these three includes those modes of inquiry that try to give themselves the status of sciences by a) objectivizing the speaking subject (in *grammaire generale*, philology, and linguistics); objectivizing the productive subject (the subject who labours) in the analysis of wealth or economics; and c) objectivizing the

sheer fact of being alive in history or biology. His analysis of these three is found in the historical development of what he calls Language, Labour and Life.[103] The second mode involves objectivizing the subject in "dividing practices" so that subjects are either divided in themselves or divided from others: the mad-the sane, the sick-the healthy, good children-bad children. The third mode of inquiry is composed of the ways that human beings turn themselves into subjects,[104] so that it is not just the world outside me that objectifies me and makes me a subject, I also do this to myself. As an example of this, Foucault would say that we objectivize ourselves with respect to our own sexuality.

In general, human subjects are placed in relations of production, signification and power. The instruments for analyzing production are found in economic history and theory; the instruments for analyzing signification are found in linguistics and semiotics, but to Foucault there were no adequate instruments for the analysis of power relations. He takes power relations as his focus of interest in order to demonstrate the objectivizing and subjectivizing influences of these relations. In considering his analysis of power as activity, what is central to observe is how he focuses attention on those engaged in power relations so that each one involved continues to be able to act on the actions of others. Prior conceptualizations situate power in only one of the players, as I discuss in chapter five. In this way, prior conceptualizations of power are grounded in a view of power relations as *zero-sum games* in which power is scarce and a redistribution takes place so that one person ends up with more power and the other with less than each had at the outset. *Sovereign and disciplinary power* are essential ingredients in any relationship that turns people into subjects who are pre-disposed to accept the idea of power as a *zero-sum game* and either to acquiesce or to dominate according to an already understood asymmetry which presets their position in the social order.

As Jerrold Seigel[105] observes, it is now fairly common to recognize Foucault's idea of subjectivity as a consideration of the "modes of self-identity which internalize the contexts of domination out of which they emerge." But less clearly seen is the special quality subjectivity "acquires from its relationship to two intersecting axes of possibility: one between sameness and difference, the other between selfhood and otherness." Seigel explains Foucault's interest in sameness and difference by pointing out a relationship between sameness, difference and conceptions of the self. He says that if "selves are [conceived as] separate beings, but composed of elements shared with other forms of existence, then selfhood may be viewed as composite and heterogeneous;" that is, the self "contains difference in itself." On the other hand, "if the self is conceived in terms of pure identity, given its substance by elements that belong solely to it, then its self-sameness will push all difference outside." Seigel points out that Foucault's histories all recount the emergence of a subjective self-identity which is constituted through dividing itself off from some content defined as other and locating itself outside of this *otherness*.[106] For example, the man of reason is defined in modernity by what Foucault considers to be an absolute separation from unreason or madness. In the pre-classical era, there was a fluid movement between madness and reason symbolized by the presence of the insane within the city.[107] From the classical period to modernity, the separation of madness from reason was intensified until modern reformers made it an absolute separation by pushing difference outside of the man of reason; as a result, those confined are seen as possessing a nature specific to them--a nature no longer continuous with the people outside.[108] Another example of this separation of identity occurs at the outset of modernity between men and women, as I will elaborate in chapter four where I point out how this activity of separation shapes our conceptualization of equality. The effects of such separations are profound in terms of constituting the identifies of those who are separated off as well as those who do the separating. The result is that "an earlier bridge of sameness between the self and the things [now] external to it is ruptured, leaving only difference as the principle of relations between the self and the other."[109]

The movement from sameness to difference, as the characteristic principle of the relation between the self and the other, can be seen in Foucault's histories: *Madness and Civilization, The Order of Things, Discipline and Punish*. In summary, the classical era and modernity dissolved the

pre-classical conception of the human world as characterized by continuity or sameness. Some elements of sameness remained in the classical era, making possible the identification of the masses with the criminal's execution, as mentioned earlier, but according to Foucault, modernity has driven us to separate out what is different in an extreme fashion which is an essential characteristic of our individuality. To Foucault, while we may have become free of the external domination typical in pre-classical times, modern separations "fix the identity of human beings inside a space of subjective interiority" declaring us free of old forms of domination only to "become subject to new kinds of control." His conception of *disciplinary power* describes this new control in which we come to express a domination over ourselves that is a new imprisonment; Foucault thinks of this appropriation of domination over ourselves as having a source outside of ourselves, which is symbolized by Bentham's Panopticon.[110] Modernity's separation between identity and difference is completed in Kant's philosophy and in the new disciplines that Foucault speaks about in constructing the epoch of *disciplinary power*. In distancing himself from the rest of nature, man "becomes a subject by projecting objectivity onto the external world." That is, he breaks the old continuity and perceives the external world as an object to be examined and as a difference to be analyzed. But "his freedom as knower thus depends on having objectified and alienated from his being certain parts of his being that were located within it before." Foucault posits that the way we made ourselves free from old tyrannies of external power has not freed us in the end; when we conceive ourselves as difference we become the objects in our own inquiry in a way which paralyses our freedom. He describes the result of this process in terms of man as "a being of incoherence" a "transcendento-empirical doublet," an "enslaved sovereign," and an "observed spectator." To Seigel, the consequence of this treatment of difference is that: "All our deepest intellectual and moral dilemmas derive from these contradictions, our unsatisfied claims to understand the world we make and our unfulfilled aspirations to achieve the liberty we pretend to possess."[111] Despite the critique levelled against Foucault's excesses in describing *disciplinary power's* capacity to entirely constitute us, there is an enormous explanatory force to his assessment of our problems with difference and this is a theme I will return to in chapter four as I discuss equality.

Throughout Foucault's work, the term subject has two possible meanings: we may be subject to someone else by control and dependence, and we may be tied to our own identities by a conscience or by self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates us or makes us subject to; by this subjectivation (*assujetissement*) we are kept under the authority of someone else since Foucault had no doubt that the means of this domination lay outside the individual.[112] Not only are there literally two meanings for the term subject, Foucault has an ambiguous relationship with the term as well. On one hand it is the core of his effort: he tells us that it is the *subject* not *power* that has been the focus of his theoretical work as he creates "a history of the different modes by which...human beings are made subjects."[113] On the other hand, his work announces the death of the subject, i.e., the concept of man which has anchored the human sciences up to now. He attributes the demise of the subject, in the second sense, to the archaeological nature of his work. He explains that, in *The Order of Things* he does not do away with humankind per se, but with a particular concept of man which has only informed Western thought for the modern period and is unique to it. He does not "wish to deny the validity of intellectual biographies, or the possibility of a history of theories, concepts, or themes," rather, he focuses on what he refers to as the rules of discursive practices not on the "speaking subject."[114] His two uses of the term subject can be related in the following way: the first use is only uncovered by examining systems of regularities, i.e., the epochs of power referred to earlier, and the second use--the death of man--indicates the end of the applicability of a previously acceptable set of rules, i.e., modernity's rules. He develops the first sense (the subject as constituted through a particular exercise of power) and he constantly fends off attacks for positing the second, the death of man.[115] As Seigel analyzes this dualism about the subject, he relates its significance to two themes that are only picked out by assessing Foucault's earlier writings and by acknowledging

the role that Foucault's homosexuality played in his own attempts to understand how subjectivities are constituted.[116]

In a very helpful way, Seigel disputes the strong claim in Foucault and his followers that "neither a thinker's [i.e., Foucault's] mental stages nor his links to deeper personal needs tell us much that counts about the meaning of his ideas."[117] Seigel posits that the whole way of thinking about personal identity and subjectivation which Foucault first developed in *Madness and Civilization* was linked to what Seigel calls Foucault's "double and self-divided identity" connected with his struggles over his sexual identity.[118] Foucault attempts to secure freedom for himself, despite his articulation of a power that precludes such freedom, and provides a way of understanding how freedom in fact remains possible in spite of power's all-seeing gaze--a freedom that must be possible if we are to make sense of "a source for the resistance to those powers for which his whole project appealed."[119] In terms of the ideas of difference, sameness and the self, Seigel does not generalize from Foucault's experience; but the issue deserves some consideration in terms of its significance for issues that I raise in subsequent chapters. I think it is Foucault's difference in terms of his sexuality that allows him to see how power operates. Foucault's homosexuality is a criterion of difference that opens up to him how power is generated by a relentless sameness that marginalizes differences and forces an assimilation of whatever can be swallowed up.

The tendency throughout modernity to push difference to the periphery of importance silences any contribution to our thinking about human experience that might originate from this difference. Women are another example of those who have been constituted as different. Most of our philosophical tradition has been written from the perspective of those who have excluded the differences of women. This tradition has, as a result, been drawn from a pool of sameness that has driven women's experience to the edge of its discourse. It seems to me that this is the source of the trouble feminist theorists have in trying to speak to that tradition from what seems like a position barely inside its borders. This position on the periphery shapes feminist feeling about that tradition and particular examples of this problem are addressed in chapters three, four and five.

Critics of Foucault have pointed out that his own project of resistance "implies the existence of an agent which his vision of subjectivity as constituted by social and discursive practices leaves him no way to posit." If individuals are the products of power relations, and "subjectivity the space through which the web of micropower enters into our very lives, what is it that can--or would even desire to--resist the ubiquity of panoptical domination."[120] In response to this problematic aspect of Foucault's work, I agree with James Marshall who affirms, following Michael Waltzer (1986), that what Foucault says "on the philosophy of the subject and the form in which power has come to be exercised in modern states is...'right enough to be disturbing'."[121] To me it is not so much a question of affirming or disputing Foucault's argument about the relationship between power and the subject (since I point out at the outset that he does not make arguments about power relations) so much as it is a question of raising the usefulness of his perspective on power relations as we examine them in our everyday lives. Foucault is aware of the problem and is pressed with this question more than once. In response he acknowledges how problematic his view of subjectivity is, but he counters this criticism with the assertion that aspects of our experience can only be explicated if we take seriously the role of governance and normalization in our lives which is made possible through power relations.

Foucault certainly has an uneasy relationship with the idea of freedom that would make resistance possible. For example, at Sartre's funeral he commented that "as a young man...it was [Sartre], and all that he represented...that I wished to renounce." As Michel Tournier says of Foucault and himself, this reaction against Sartre, who stood so solidly for an idea of freedom best caught in the expression, "[m]an is condemned to be free," and believed that man is responsible for "everything that he does--everything--" should be taken for what it was: "a liquidation of the father by overgrown adolescents afflicted with the awareness that they owed him everything."[122] Few of us are so driven by a desire to separate ourselves from the influence of a Sartre.

In addition, according to Seigel, Foucault has a higher view of freedom at the beginning of his work than he does when writing work which is better known, for example, when he describes *disciplinary power* in terms of practices directed towards governing the body. Yet even in his well known work, e.g., *Power/Knowledge* he talks about "the plebs" as a source for freedom.[123] I am not suggesting that the positing of plebs lets Foucault entirely off the problem that his idea of *disciplinary power* brings with it in terms of conceiving the possibility of the human agency that it is necessary to consider if we are to imagine how anyone might resist or alter their social relations and confront the historicity of their own experience. Yet Seigel identifies in the early Foucault a vision which pictured life as the "the utopian fulfilment of a radical subjectivity,"[124] a radical subjectivity which would permit the possibility of freedom. Seigel thinks that this vision was buried in Foucault but not eradicated. Following Nancy Fraser, he notes that "everybody that can appear in Foucault's world is already invested with some historically specific form of power. The body then, like the plebs, was a way of letting back in, through the rear door, the subjectivity ejected at the start." Seigel asks what this "plebs" can be, if not a remnant of a point of origin for the activity of human freedom.[125] Foucault's emphasis on the historicity of experience, which grounds the idea of being invested with a specific attitude toward ourselves in relation to the exercise of power, is an important contribution to thinking about the development of maturity in the disempowered.

The Historicity of Experience

Foucault asserts that the two questions, What is legitimate power? and What is the state? do not give us the kind of tools we need to analyze power. He asserts that with power, as with other conceptualizations, it is hard to try to find (or make) instruments of analysis. The problem we have is two-pronged: on the one hand, a theory of power assumes a prior objectification of the concept; on the other, we cannot proceed without a theory. To address this difficulty a constant checking is necessary. As we proceed we must continually check two things. First we must check our conceptual needs and then we must check whose reality we are examining. The checking of conceptual needs refers to the insight that our conceptualization should not be founded on a theory of the object because the conceptualized object is not the single criterion of a good conceptualization. Rather we must see how to separate what we want to examine from the theory we use to look at how it occurs in our experience; in order to accomplish this separation we must know the historical conditions that motivate our concepts. That is, we need an historical awareness of our present circumstance.[126] Our present circumstance is the situation in which we now find ourselves using a particular construction for, say, power.[127] In order to check our conceptual needs we require a sense of the path that our conceptualization has taken over time as it became what it is now.

The anthropological expression, 'historicity of experience', refers to the idea that every culture is a precipitate of history. That is, over time there is an accumulation of selections and this accumulation gains influence in the future shaping of each culture. The historicity of our experience, expressed in our rituals, traditions and practices, directs the way things are done along the lines of the way things have always been done. In this way historicity has a great deal to do with what it is possible to do and say, by whom, in a given culture. To its credit, historicity makes life predictable and secure. Historicity is responsible for a particular culture's poise so that change typically has a drift in one direction.[128] To its discredit, our 'historicity of experience' can limit future possibilities and drag us back from selecting those social changes that our best ideas and beliefs beckon us to make. If injustice is inherent in our traditions, rituals and practices, then a change toward justice must contend with the full weight of the historicity of our experience. In chapter four I address the relationship between the 'historicity of experience' and socially-constituted vulnerability.

In light of the effects of historicity, we must check whose reality we are dealing with when we analyze power relations. That is, we must understand that power is experienced differently depending upon whether one is, for example, in a privileged or a disprivileged position. This is

because power relations appear differently depending upon whose reality we are deploying to examine them. The particular conceptualization of power we use influences how we interpret power relations. As an example, in the recent Los Angeles riots, there will be a multiple number of perspectives which result in different interpretations about what was actually happening. When we try to sort through all of these interpretations, we have to constantly check whose reality a particular fact or explanation is attached to in order to make sense of an interpretation. The willingness and ability to shift perspective (and to constantly check) is central to seeing how concepts are embedded in a whole way of experiencing a particular struggle; a capacity to shift perspectives is essential to figuring out what to include in a conceptualization of power and in evaluating what is included in other conceptualizations of power. I will say more of this in chapter four.

Conclusion

To summarize, power relations result in dividing practices that fix us in our differences, for example, dividing men and women from one another and constituting both as subjects, objectifying us in the process, and defining both groups by the separation.[129] These divisions establish the potential for struggle between the members of the divided pair. Foucault asserts that these struggles have taken place in an intensified way since the late 1960s and early 1970s. He asks what these struggles have in common as he witnesses them taking place. He picks out 6 commonalities, the last three being his more original points. In articulating these struggles, he picks out the features of what I refer to as the empowerment "movement" in chapter three. He notes that these struggles:

1. are "transversal" struggles: they are not limited to one country;

2. their aim is to confront power effects as such; for example, the medical profession is criticized not primarily because it is a profit-making concern, but because it exercises an uncontrolled power over people's bodies, their health, their lives and deaths;

3. are immediate struggles for two reasons: those engaged are not looking for the chief enemy and they do not expect a solution at some future date; ecology groups come under this description; as an example, a group that attacks a specific whaling ship to prevent the killing of whales does so because they do not expect the international community to solve the problem at some date in the future;

4. question the status of the individual: on the one hand, they assert the right to be different and they underline everything which makes individuals truly individual. On the other, they attack everything which separates individuals, breaks their links with others, splits up community life, forcing individuals back on themselves, and tying them to their own identity in a constraining way. These struggles are not exactly for or against the individual, but rather they are struggles against the "government of individualization;"

5. are an opposition to the effects of power which are linked with knowledge, competence and qualification: they are against the privileges of knowledge; but they are also an opposition to the secret, deforming, and mystifying representations imposed on people; there is nothing scientistic in this (i.e., the dogmatic belief in the value of scientific knowledge); but neither is it a sceptical or relativistic refusal of all verified truth; what is questioned is the way in which knowledge circulates and functions, i.e., its relationship to power;

6. revolve around the question: Who are we? They are a refusal of the abstractions of economic and ideological state violence which ignore who we are individually, and are also a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition which determines who one is.[130]

These struggles are an attack on modern power and characterize what I call the empowerment "movement." Modern power applies itself to immediate, everyday life and categorizes individuals, marking them by their own individuality, attaching them to their own identity, imposing a law of truth on them which they must recognize and which others must recognize in them[131], thereby fixing them in an identity--an identity which frustrates the development of a fully-flourishing maturity. Modern power, currently under attack, comprises *sovereign, pastoral and disciplinary power* and is unified by its reliance on the strategies of domination. In the following chapter I outline a view of empowerment that moves us by a very different desire than the desire to dominate: it is grounded in partnership not domination and it is the longing for maturity.

End Notes

1.See for example, Nicholas Burbules, "A theory of power in education," in *Educational Theory* Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 1986): 95-114. For a discussion of Foucault's idea of power from the perspective of straight analytic philosophy, see Nancy Fraser, *Unruly Practices* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989,1991); Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Hoy, (New York and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 69-102. The latter two authors reduce Foucault to particular positions which they then criticize as failing to live up to standards inherent in their own analytical practice. See Paul Bove's analysis of Taylor in the foreword of Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), especially viii-xix, where he points out that in doing this to Foucault, Taylor is practising the very sort of power/knowledge that Foucault analyzed. Nancy Fraser discusses the problematic relationship that there is in Foucault's thinking with respect to "normative frameworks" in *Unruly Practices*, 17-34. Fraser accuses Foucault of not presenting any reason for why modern power should be distressing to us; she asserts that it is only if we conceive of a Kantian self that we have grounds for seeing modern power as an offense against humanity. As Hubert Dreyfus notes: "In the last analysis Foucault is more radical than Heideggar in that, consistent with his opposition to all totalising [sic], he avoids any account of what human beings essentially are and are called to do....Although Foucault does attempt to be receptive to the problematizations in our current practices 'through which being offers itself as having to be thought', he does not claim that in so doing he is fulfilling his human essence. This, of course, denies him any account of why biopower should be felt as distressing and so be resisted, but it enables him to avoid adding one more universal norm, while still engaging in active resistance to current levelling or totalising practices." Hubert Dreyfus, "On the Ordering of Things," in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher* ed. Timothy Armstrong, (New York: Routledge, 1992), 80-95; 92-93. Since this debate raises the spectre of the incommeasurability of two philosophical discourses, I have chosen to take from Foucault's analysis of power relations what I call the analytic of *personal power*, which for me underlies everything he says about power but is not something that he specifically names or describes as such. The point here is not to find out whether Foucault is correct through posing counter arguments alone, but to find out whether his view is useful. In my view *personal power*, as I spell it out here, is useful.

2.I agree with Foucault, "philosophy's question...is the question as to what we ourselves are," a question that Socrates hailed citizens with as well, and this makes contemporary philosophy entirely political and historical. See "Power and Sex," in *Michel Foucault: Interviews and other writings, 1977-1984* ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 110-124.

3."Power and sex," 123.

4.Paul Rabinow, ed. *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 15.

5.Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 136.

6.Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison* Alan Sheridan, trans., (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 29.

7.Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 55.

8.See Jean Bodin, *On Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), especially ix-xxvi.

9.*Power/Knowledge*, 96.

10.*Power/Knowledge*, 97.

11.*Power/Knowledge*, 187-188.

12.*Power/Knowledge*, 96.

13.The following discussion is taken from *Discipline and Punish*, 27ff.

14.*Discipline and Punish*, 49

15.*Discipline and Punish*, 29.

16.The "absoluteness" of the king's authority is discussed by Jean Bodin (1529-1596), *On Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) as a characteristic of the necessary "indivisibility" of the crown, see page xxiii. His analysis "helped turn public law into a scientific discipline," page xii. Bodin seems to have believed that the divisibility of the crown's authority implied that the community was a higher authority than the king. While he seems to have seen how controversial this assertion is potentially, he nonetheless affirms the indivisibility of the crown as a necessary condition of sovereignty. In Britain, of course, this issue of the absoluteness of the king's authority is addressed by "The Article of Barons," sealed by King John at Runnymede in 1215 (June 15), and known as the *Magna Carta*, an article that is specifically directed against the arbitrary and unjust rule of a sovereign (British Museum).

17.*Discipline and Punish*, 54.

18.*Discipline and Punish*, 59.

19.See *Discipline and Punish*, 67, 80, 83; and *The History of Sexuality, vol 1*, 136.

20.*Discipline and Punish*, 74; see also, 92.

21.Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 207.

22.Nancy Fraser, *Unruly Practices: Power, discourse and gender in contemporary social theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 45.

23.*Discipline and Punish*, 79.

24.*Discipline and Punish*, 80, 83, 87ff.

25.Pastoral power refers to the forms of control that became available to the state once the assimilation process of the Church to the State began. That is, the term refers essentially to a new form of state power which was based on Christian expressions of religious community.

26.The following is a summary from Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* 2nd edition, (U.S.A: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 214ff.

27.Dreyfus/Rabinow, *Beyond Structuralism*, 214.

28.*Beyond Structuralism*, 215.

29.*Beyond Structuralism*, 215.

30.Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 36.

31.*The Protestant Ethic*, 155.

32.*Beyond Structuralism*, 212ff.

33.*Power/Knowledge*, 215.

34.*Unruly Practices*, 25.

35.Toward the end of his life, Foucault came to stress what he called a "hermeneutic of the self," and "practices of freedom." This direction is grounded, I think, in what he allows for in his earlier work but it is certainly a different emphasis. I wonder whether it is not his model for power, as war or struggle, that perpetuates the problem that he has in conceiving self- and other-relations that constitute genuine benefit for both. Certainly his ideas in "an ethic of care as a practice of freedom" are thought provoking of a new direction for power relations. See this article in *The Final Foucault*, eds. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988), 1-20.

36.This is like the position that Foucault seems to come to in his last two years in "the ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom."

37.I am thinking of the aspect of agnosticism which believes that materiality is all that there is.

38.*History of Sexuality, vol. I*, 143-145.

39.Jerrold Seigel, "Avoiding the Subject: A Foucaultian Itinery," *Journal of the History of Ideas* Vol. 51, No. 2, (April-June 1990): 273-299, 280.

40.Stephen Ball, ed. *Foucault and Education: Disciplines and Knowledge* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 4-5.

41.Paul Rabinow outlines the nature of *bio-power* and works out this connection between *disciplinary power* and capitalism in a helpful manner, in the introduction to *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 17ff.

42.*Discipline and Punish*, 135.

43.*Power/Knowledge*, 105.

44.Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," *Ideology and Consciousness* Vol. 6, 1979:1-21.

45.*The Foucault Reader*, 15.

46.*The Foucault Reader*, 15-17.

47.Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 221.

48."The Subject and Power," 221.

49.Michel Foucault, "the ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom," in *The Final Foucault* 1-20, especially 19.

50."the ethic of care," 11.

51."the ethic of care", 16.

52.Foucault certainly has an uneasy relationship with the idea of freedom, an idea I will discuss further at the end of the chapter. For a discussion of this discomfort, see James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 43-44.

53."the ethic of care", 18.

54.*Power/Knowledge*, 152.

55.*Power/Knowledge*, 152ff.

56.*Foucault and Education*, 3.

57.*Discipline and Punish*, 200.

58.*The Foucault Reader*, 20.

59.*Power/Knowledge*, 154.

60.*Power/Knowledge*, 153.

61.*Power/Knowledge*, 155.

62.*Power/Knowledge*, 161.

63.Kenneth Baynes, ed. *After Philosophy: End or transformation?* (London and Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1989), 96.

64.*Discipline and Punish*, 202.

65.*Power/Knowledge*, 158.

66.*Power/Knowledge*, 159.

67.*Power/Knowledge*, 124.

68.*Discipline and Punish*, 195ff.

69.*Discipline and Punish*, 135.

70.*Power/Knowledge*, 38-39.

71.*Discipline and Punish*, 25.

72.*Discipline and Punish*, 170.

73.*After Philosophy*, 128.

74.*Discipline and Punish*, 149-153.

75.*Discipline and Punish*, 152. What I found so fascinating in reading this analysis of school practice was to recall my grandmother's attitude toward handwriting. She was born (1878) and educated in England. Though I was very young I recall her telling me of such practices; in addition, I realized as I read Foucault that she also transmitted the belief that someone who could perform handwriting in the acceptable manner was also a good person.

76.*Discipline and Punish*, 138.

77.*Discipline and Punish*, 141ff.

78.*Discipline and Punish*, 155.

79.*Discipline and Punish*, 160.

80.*Discipline and Punish*, 159.

81.*Passion of Michel Foucault*, 15.

82.*Discipline and Punish*, 26-27.

83.*Discipline and Punish*, 303.

84.See *Unruly Practices*. She distinguishes Foucault's version of power from a liberal one which she asserts separates, for example, legitimate and illegitimate uses of power (p. 18). In addition she states that: "The liberal framework understands power as emanating from the sovereign and imposing itself upon the subjects. It tries to define a power-free zone of rights, the penetration of which is illegitimate" (p.26).

85.*Power/Knowledge*, 88ff.

86.*Power/Knowledge*, 88.

87.*Discipline and Punish*, 169.

88.*Power/Knowledge*, 55.

89.*Power/Knowledge*, 91.

90.Yet as Foucault notes, repression is not generally thought of as an abuse but as a "mere effect and continuation of a relation of domination." On this view, repression is the realization of a perpetual relation of force. *Power/Knowledge*, 92

91.*Power/Knowledge*, 92.

92.*Discipline and Punish*, 87-92.

93.*Power/Knowledge*, 108.

94.*Power/Knowledge*, 105.

95.Disciplinary institutions "organize physical space and time with activities that have been developed over time to change people's behaviour along a number of parameters." Institutions such as prisons, hospitals, asylums, the military, work places and schools fulfil this criterion in Foucault's view. *Foucault and Education*, 15.

96.*Discipline and Punish*, 148.

97.*Power/Knowledge*, 104. I refer here to a recent experience of mine. Due to a trusteeship for my father I appeared before a judge--something new for me. Since I felt strongly that the issue pivoted on a difference in values between the judge and me, particularly after I spent an afternoon listening to his judgments, and further, because what he required me to do meant breaking promises specifically made to my father. I protested and questioned his decision. He proceeded to sanction my past actions but prevented me from continuing to keep my promises to my father; he adhered to his standard and dismissed mine. What genuinely shocked me--because I do realize he may be caught within a legal system that he cannot yet change, though he gave the appearance of having power and being convinced in what he pronounced--was my lawyer's urging that I not "upset the judge" if I wanted things to go well for me. The implication was that, had I upset him, he might not have sanctioned past expenditures of my father's estate. What she meant was that because the judge has a repertoire of possibilities from which

to choose, if I "upset" him he is quite capable of making different selections than if I do not "upset" him. In this case "upsetting" him meant giving any indication that there might be a problem with or a different perspective on what he thinks should be done. What is deeply troubling is the unquestioned acceptance on the part of my lawyer that upsetting a judge was pivotal to my case. It seems to me it would be quite easy for an Native activist or a feminist activist--people committed to positions deeply different from a particular judge's--to "upset" him. Is justice still as capricious as my lawyer's comment implies?

98.Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault* trans. Betsy Wing, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 297.

99.*The Final Foucault*, 1-20.

100. See the discussion in the introduction of the dissertation.

101.In *The Birth of the Clinic* he demonstrates just how the possibility of a knowledge of the individual was instituted. For a discussion, see Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 153ff.

102.There are two meanings of the word subject: being subject to someone else by control and dependence, and being tied to one's own identity by a conscience and self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a power which subjugates and makes subject to. *Beyond Structuralism*, 212.

103.Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 250-302.

104.*Beyond Structuralism*, 208.

105.*Avoiding the Subject*, 273-299.

106.*Avoiding the Subject*, 277.

107.I know of a hamlet in Western Canada that has been able to retain a particular mad individual within its boundaries. The entire community is sensitized to newcomer-encounters with this individual and takes responsibility to help strangers to accept what would be unacceptable, foreign and dangerous in a larger centre. In the particular town, Hyas Saskatchewan, the town's mad person has a repertoire of stories of unusual human strength and willingness to help others attributed to him in town folklore. His difference is accommodated in ways that consolidate the feeling of kinship in the area. This way of dealing with difference would be much closer to a pre-classical approach to the insane.

108.*Avoiding the Subject*, 280.

109.*Avoiding the Subject*, 273-277.

110.Seigel identifies Foucault's homosexuality as an experience that informs this project of analyzing difference and sameness. Eribon also picks up the significance of Foucault's homosexuality in his biography of Foucault. It is James Miller's biography that perhaps explores this connection most fully.

111.*Avoiding the Subject*, 279.

112.For examples of the way this topic is addressed see the following: Seigel, p. 276; "The subject and power," *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 208ff; Paul Rabinow, (ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 7ff; Stephen Ball, (ed.), *Foucault and Education* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 3ff. When he wrote this article, Seigel's analysis was unique in its connection to the ideas of difference, sameness and the self and his reading most closely articulates what I consider to be the importance of Foucault's discussion of sameness and difference in these three histories. The term *assujetissement* is used in Seigel, see p. 276.

113."The Subject and Power," 212.

114.In *The Order of Things*, Foucault tried to explore scientific discourse "not from the point of view of the individuals who are speaking, nor from the point of view of formal structures of what they are saying, but from the point of view of the rules that come into play in the very existence of such discourse" see pages xiii-xiv.

115.With respect to the "death of man" which he heralds in *The Order of Things*, Foucault says: "This is the theme that allows me to bring to light the ways in which the concept of man has functioned in knowledge. It is not a matter of asserting that man is dead; it is a matter of seeing in what manner, according to what rule, the concept of man was formed and has functioned. I have done the same thing for the notion of the author. So let's hold the tears." (*Michel Foucault*, 210).

116.*Avoiding the Subject*, 275.

117.*Avoiding the Subject*, 273.

118.Seigel writes: "To have otherness within oneself is to possess a divided sexual identity, leading one to seek relations with others, equally composite, who are the same as oneself. Self-sameness, by contrast, means being all-male or all-female in a way that makes one look outside for others who are equally possessed of sameness but in a form different from one's own. To Foucault, the transition from the first form of existence to the second is what makes the modern world seem a field of free activity to others, but an uninhabitable trap for him." *Avoiding the Subject*, 292.

119.*Avoiding the Subject*, 274. Foucault talks about the plebs in *Power/Knowledge*, 137-138, as a source for this freedom.

120.*Avoiding the Subject*, 297.

121.James Marshall, "Foucault and Educational Research," in *Foucault and Education*, 14.

122.James Miller, *The Passions of Michel Foucault* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 43-44.

123.*Power/Knowledge*, 137-138.

124.*Avoiding the Subject*, 282.

125.*Avoiding the Subject*, 297.

126.*Beyond Structuralism*, 209.

127.I realize that I am using the term idea and conceptualization synonymously; I distinguish conceptualization more clearly in chapter four.

128.A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhorn, *Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions* (Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Vol. XVLIII, No. 1. Cambridge Massachusetts, U.S.A. Published by the Museum, 1952, 182.

129.*Michel Foucault*, 93ff.

130.*Beyond Structuralism*, 211ff.

131.*Beyond Structuralism*, 212.

CHAPTER THREE

REMODELLING POWER THROUGH EMPOWERMENT

Introduction

There are really only two paradigms for power relations, namely, a dominator system grounded in taking and losing based on war and violence or a partnership system based on giving and *receiving*[1] through nurturance and enablement. All models for power relations are situated within one of these two paradigms. Models that are congruent with a dominator paradigm are related to each other through strategies that permit a person or group to ascend to a position above another person or group and perpetuate that asymmetry. While not all instances of being above another are taken to the extreme of force (whether epistemological, psychological, physical), abuse, or violence, the opportunity to do so is always open to one who is strategically advantaged; the one below senses this. Models which conform to the partnership paradigm are similar to one another in terms of the presence of care and the absence of symbols and threats of violence, the presence of cooperation and the absence of techniques that promote and perpetuate strategically advantaged and disadvantaged positions. Nurturance, parenting, mothering in particular, *receptivity*, generativity and friendship all constitute models for a partnership approach. While dominance presupposes war, partnership intimates peace. In this and the following chapter I argue that a position of privilege above another violates the humanity of the one below since power is expressed over or through the one who is disadvantaged so that *personal power* does not flourish and additionally, vulnerability characterizes the one below. Specifically in this chapter I gather together elements of a conceptualization of empowerment that is capable of redeeming this loss of *personal power*. In the following chapter I explore the moral, social and political problem of vulnerability.

As I consider the role of asymmetry in power relations, Foucault interests me because throughout his analysis of the subject, and the derived implications for power, his models for power relations come from a dominator paradigm even though agency in the power relation is constructed on a kind of partnership--an agonism of reciprocal struggle. Despite this aspect of partnership in agency, he never arrives at models for power relations that are fully congruent with the partnership paradigm, so we must look to other sources. As an example, Raine Eisler (1988), analyses anthropological research largely uncovered since World War II, and argues that:

> The larger picture that emerges indicates that all the modern, post-Enlightenment movements for social justice, be they religious or secular, as well as the more recent feminist, peace, and ecology movements, are part of an underlying thrust for the transformation of a dominator system...[which is an] evolutionary thrust for survival.[2]

The role that violence or harm versus care plays is central to demarcating these two paradigms. In chapter five I develop the relationship between power, violence and harm more fully.

Attributes of Power

In order to show how empowerment might be broadly conceived, I distinguish five attributes of its root word 'power', in addition to the two paradigms mentioned, namely: power's models, effects, descriptions, practices and agents. These attributes influence each other but in separating them out, we are better able to speak about how power operates. In analyzing empowerment in this chapter, I will elaborate four types of empowerment, namely: organizational, feminine, ameliorative and preventive empowerment and then I relate these attributes of power to the types of empowerment described.

As already noted, on one view, power relations are grounded either in domination (taking/losing) or partnership (giving/receiving). Models for power relations conform to one

paradigm or the other on the basis of the presence or absence of violence/harm versus care. In terms of power's effects, these either are *negative* and subtract power from others, resulting in a diminution of humanity in the powerless, or are *positive* and add *personal power* to people, thereby promoting a flourishing of humanity in everyone concerned and opening up the possibility for cooperation between people. In terms of descriptions of power, two possibilities exist: either power is a substance, a commodity of some kind which stops and stays in one place or person and which can be passed around or withheld, or else the term 'power' refers to a kind of *energy* which moves between people at every social level which cannot be caught, held or contained. When power is conceived as a commodity, exchanges of power amount to a zero-sum game of redistribution in which one person *gets* power because another person *loses* it. This is due to the relationship between power as commodity and the threat or likelihood of scarcity. In describing power as energy, scarcity is not the same problem; empower is a verb in which its root 'power' is conceived as *renewable* or inexhaustible.

Power is also picked out in particular practices, for example, oppositional practices directed towards liberation of some kind, or cooperational practices, which are attempts to work with rather than oppose or dominate others, or one's self. Domination sets up the need for opposition since domination offends our humanity, i.e., domination has liberation as its only solution at the moment one struggles to regain a fully articulated humanity. Liberation requires that we resist oppression but resistance has a complex relationship within oppositional and cooperational practices. When Foucault identifies two senses to the word subject he establishes a basis on which to bring out this point. As noted in chapter two, being "subject" may refer to being under the authority of another person, or to an authority I exercise over my self in which *being over my self* implies the interiorizing of an external authority, e.g., another person's habits, belief system, or objectives. In both cases authority originates from outside us. To Foucault, it is not a question of the possibility of not being subject so much as resisting being a certain sort of subject constituted by external authority. The issue here is the immaturity implied in being under an external authority and this is the same sense in which Kant uses the term 'immaturity'. I suggest that in becoming mature, I must resist the subjectivation of an external authority, even over myself. But the particular nature of the power relations in which I find myself set the framework for my efforts to try become mature in that some power relations limit the possibilities for the development of maturity and others relations enhance these possibilities. As an example, I may resist wholesale practices of domination and thereby press for liberation through oppositional practices, although to the extent that I practice domination myself (robbing the other of humanity), I remain immature. I may also resist within the context of cooperational practices by resisting certain aspects, ideas or pressures, yet at the same time engage in the overall strategy of cooperation. In this last case I work with others and perhaps employ "practices of freedom," to use Foucault's expression. Such practices are not aimed at liberation but at living ethically, and therefore maturely, with myself and with others.

Lastly, there are agents of power and the relationship between agents is characterized either by asymmetry or symmetry in the balance of significance, ability or rank. If power is conceived (I would say misconceived) as a commodity, then people are agents in a strong sense if they own or have a lot of power and people are agents in a weak sense if one of three conditions applies to them: their role is merely to permit someone else to have the opportunity to express power over or through them, they think of themselves as relatively empty of power, or if others do. (In some of the empowerment literature, the model for power is confusingly conceived both as a commodity and as an activity, without any reference to the problem that this confusion implies.[3]) If we conceive power as an activity, i.e., power as energy, people are agents in a strong sense if they are thought to be capable of competency and skill in the power relation. There is no weak sense of power in this view since everyone is ideally capable of exercising power; what power as energy does pick out is the absence of power in the strategically disadvantaged. In addition to the relationship between agents, the relationship that agents have to themselves influences our assessment in that there is a connection between the maturity of agents and the

dynamics of power relations. Maturity is perhaps the most important quality in the relationship that the agent has with herself or himself. Maturity influences our willingness and ability to operate under a partnership versus a dominator model for power relations: I contend that human maturity and the desire to dominate others are mutually exclusive. Whether power is conceived as commodity or energy the reciprocity and reversibility of asymmetrical relations is influenced more by the maturity of at least one of the agents than by any other characteristic or condition of them.

Power relations that promote maturity are characterized by empowerment which is grounded in a partnership paradigm. In this chapter I argue for a view of empowerment that is rooted in nurturance and enablement and assumes a level ground on which individuals and groups may stand. Empowerment has as its fundamental characteristic the generosity that is ideally implied in nurturance and has becoming adult or mature as its central and unifying theme. In picking out the following four types of empowerment, in this and the following chapters I argue that empowerment must satisfy nine criteria in order to promote our *personal power*, the flourishing of which amounts to the realization of human maturity. Empowerment should support the assertions that:

1. individuals matter and matter equally;

2. equal concern for people must be demonstrated by ensuring that we can all claim our fair share of primary resources, as long as we do not derogate another's fair share;

3. *personal power* is a component of a fair share of primary resources, and is conceived as the feeling/belief that we are people who can say and do those things that are congruent with our self-conceptions, as opposed to being people to whom things are said and done, i.e., as opposed to being, or being seen as, passive and powerless;

4. our self-conceptions are to be constrained by moral self-interest which directs us toward working for our own good as well as the good of others simultaneously;

5. *personal power* is a building block for self-respect;

6. the social bases for self-respect are primary goods and these are brought to us through a relational not a material generosity;

7. our interests, conceived as the material necessities plus the various goods that we feel worth having in our lives, implies that *personal power* is included in the interests of all of us, as a means for securing self-respect;

8. the freedom to pursue our self conceptions is a fundamental freedom;

9. there is an interactive relationship between *personal power* and substantive freedom.

Sources for the Empowerment Movement

Empowerment is directed towards unleashing the *personal power* that allows people to be effective in what they do and say. The impetus to empower ourselves and others is moved by a belief that dependency and vulnerability, which arise through the asymmetrical relations of power's negative effects and practices constituted through taking/losing, is a human problem that requires redress. There are three relevant sources for the demand for empowerment all of which are responses to power's negative effects on people.[4] The first source is connected to the ongoing difficulties felt by those who live in slums to rise above conditions of poverty and the general problem minorities have in appropriating the advantages accruing to them as citizens in the

modern state. Both predicaments arise from the problem of being held outside the main flow of benefits which circulate between the state and the majority population,[5] a situation challenged during the 1960s when a number of books were written to awaken people to the conditions of those who were collectively disadvantaged.[6] In response to the social-structural nature of the problems faced by these groups, empowerment was proposed as the only solution to the unending cycle of their anger and despair.

Powerlessness is the central problem identified in the literature. The term can be defined as the inability to manage emotions, skills, knowledge, and/or material resources in such a way that effective performance of valued social roles (e.g., as a worker, a parent) will lead to personal gratification.[7] Powerlessness arises through social processes that withhold valued identities and roles on the one hand, and valuable resources on the other--all of which are prerequisite to the effective performance of social roles.[8] For this reason, powerlessness is related to self-esteem since self-esteem is influenced not only by forces inherent within the individual but also by external supports of reinforcement; our self-esteem is governed in large part by the judgements of others who themselves are afflicted with the human anxiety of self-doubt. Thus, for example, African-Americans and other minorities are dependent upon judgements from the rest of society for sanction and latitude to exercise control over major decisions which affect their lives.[9]

Because of this natural dependence on others for our self-esteem, minority status can be deeply disabling. There are some individuals or groups whose exposure to negative valuations has been so intense that they accept these valuations as correct or inevitable and make no effort to exert *personal power* at all. These individuals or groups may not recognize what the problem is that exists for them. The powerlessness they exhibit can be considered "power absence" rather than "power failure"[10] and empowerment is an appropriate social goal whenever there is the presence and pervasiveness of institutionalized discrimination on the basis of race, wealth, or sex, for example, that perpetuates an absence of *personal power*. Empowerment has as its aim to counteract the effects of powerlessness, by countering negative valuations. Specifically, empowerment is directed towards removing the obstacles which block some people's *personal power*. What needs to occur in empowering processes is a change in perception on the part of the powerless. The following example pertains directly to the African-American situation, but applies more generally:

> ...the overall goal is that of helping client systems that have been subjected to systematic and pervasive negative valuations to perceive themselves as causal forces capable of exerting influence in a world of other people and capable of bringing about some desired effect. It should be made clear that this does not deny the power and the significance of external forces in the creation of their problems...however, it does place an overarching emphasis on the limitations of 'giving up' and the latent potential in black individuals and black communities to deal more effectively and more creatively with oppression and oppressors. This emphasis on individuals as causal forces does not imply that they are the cause of their problems or that their problems can be solved by merely effecting change in self; on the contrary, it focuses away from the medical model of finding a cause, a germ, a disease entity to be cured and accepts the complexities of multiple contributing factors in any problem situation.[11]

It is important to note the relationship that is proposed between clients and the problems they face: they cannot be thought of as the singular cause of problems which have multiple contributing factors but what can be accomplished is the emergence of a new belief in their own capacity to effect change. This capacity is identified, owned, and developed into the ability to say and do the things that are congruent with people's self-conception, through the process of empowerment which creates *personal power* in the formerly disadvantaged. This suggests that power is not created *ex nihilo*; rather it is uncovered through the excavation of the energy to be powerful from layers and layers of history that hinders its expression. The assumption in

empowering relationships is that all human beings should have *personal power* as part of being human, and when some cannot or do not express it, it is because of circumstances that discourage them from doing so.

When, for example, privileged individuals express impatience or anger towards the disadvantaged and assert that such people should just get up and get doing the things they say they want to, they fail to take seriously the nature of oppression and its effects on opportunity. An opportunity is not just a singular, isolated event in someone's life. The door of opportunity is open wider for some than for others, and the passwords must be known in advance. The ability to recognize and respond to opportunity, as well as to secure access to resources that make taking advantage of an opportunity possible, takes time to develop; this process occurs gradually as part of the life circumstances of those who are expected to perform well from birth and are nurtured to that end. Further, new opportunities appear for those who have had them in the past: some people are in the right place at the right time largely because of a history of having opportunities, making connections, and enjoying privilege. Yet this aspect of their experience is taken-for-granted and invisible to them; it is perceived as stemming from their own industry. But opportunity has a cumulative effect. When Peter Drucker, for example, asserts that urban African-Americans cannot be expected to jump from "rural illiteracy to twelve years of schooling in one generation because this is more of a jump than any group can be expected to make, more of a jump than any other group has ever made in the United States or elsewhere,"[12] he is spelling out the cumulative effects of being in a strategically disadvantaged position. People who have enjoyed privilege for generations underestimate the significance that encouragement and entitlement have provided for them. They fail to take seriously the importance of these aspects of possibility when they judge others. In defence of themselves, the privileged often raise an example of someone they know of who came from a disadvantaged position and was successful. If we question these examples, the path to success was often paved by assimilation processes during which disprivileged people disown attributes of their minority identity in order to obey rules designed for them by people who have the strategic advantage of requiring them to comply. In this way a few squeeze through the door of acceptability but, from the perspective of a minority person, their admission extracts the price of devaluing the differences in their sexual, racial or cultural identity–a price if paid that is carried in their being.

The second source for the idea of empowerment can be traced through Antonio Gramsci to Paulo Freire and then, for example, to Henry Giroux and Michael Apple in the United States, and to David Livingstone in Canada.[13] I will not develop this aspect here, except to identify in Gramsci the concerns that connect him, and the others, to the empowerment movement. Gramsci picked out the bureaucratic control emerging in Marxism and identified it as a problem. As James Joll notes, Gramsci was instrumental in the Factory Council Movement, which was an attempt to find "a new form of revolutionary organization which would combine effective leadership with real participation by the rank and file."[14] And further, Gramsci "suggested the possibility of a more humane and more diversified form of Marxism than that used to justify the bureaucratic dictatorship and cruelty of the Soviet Regime."[15] Generally speaking, this literature focuses on the helplessness arising from relations of domination in which liberating power relations are directed towards oppositional rather than cooperative practices.[16]

The third source for the literature on empowerment comes from research done on motivation in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States primarily that adds another dimension to the idea of empowerment because of its assertion that all levels of society have been negatively affected by bureaucratic control, i.e., modern power. That is, we all experience degrees of helplessness and therefore immaturity because of the bureaucratic model of control that permeates Western society. Even individuals at the top are in the middle of bureaucratic power relations since they are caught between forces circulating beneath them on which they depend. This source of empowerment, fed by the human potential movement led by individuals such as Carl Rogers, developed an emphasis on the power of individual human beings as well as an emphasis on communal aspirations of disprivileged groups. The feminist movement strongly influences this

literature.[17] Empowerment, in this view, emphasizes both personal and communal aspirations, as opposed to focusing on achievement based on the efforts of the solitary individual,[18] thereby setting the groundwork for an emphasis on moral self-interest versus mere self-interest.

While this third source includes us all in the need for empowerment, it is connected to the first two in its clear assertion that some people as more disadvantaged than others. As an example, it is easier to bureaucratize, oppress, and degrade the poor than the wealthy. The wealthy and well-placed fight back and benefit from their position. In all its expressions, empowerment presupposes radical changes to social, economic and relational structures so as to alleviate powerlessness. Organizational empowerment has been influenced by all three sources and attempts to restructure organizations along the lines of new distributions of power through shared decision-making.

Organizational Empowerment

Since the 1960s, the empowerment movement has intensified the challenge to our reliance on a dominator paradigm. As noted in chapter two, *disciplinary (or modern) power* has an interactive relationship with the emergence of capitalism, and it also played a central role in the utilitarian and bureaucratic project of establishing the modern state. The particular *rationality* of Bentham's panoptic vision for society, which functioned as an organizing ideal for the theoretical and practical search for techniques to administer and manage people, was geared to efficiency and productivity and characterized by hierarchizing and ranking individuals under anonymous and ubiquitous forms of *normalizing* control. Domination is at the heart of all of these practices, even to the extent that we come to divide and dominate ourselves. It is the immaturity inherent in being dominated and in dominating ourselves that empowerment confronts. Because empowerment is based on a partnership rather than a dominator paradigm, the practices of empowerment focus on cooperation not opposition and on practices that link people together not practices that rank them. Empowerment confronts modern power as it is expressed through the hierarchical ranking practices of bureaucratic organizations.

Empowerment is realized through being in the presence of others who do not use us instrumentally and who acknowledge our worth. Ideally, the core of empowerment is the creative person. This person is the opposite 'product' of *disciplinary power* since the inevitable result of docile bodies and obedient souls is individuals that are "drained of creative energy."[19] In its most attractive form, empowerment prizes the self and human freedom as its starting points.[20] Further, it provides people with opportunities to affect themselves in positive ways. The assumption here is that the affected self increases organizational well-being so that individual and corporate interests are reciprocally satisfying. The empowered person also "has an open and healthy world view and a positive and accurate self-concept;" such people see themselves as having significance and influence. The empowered person thus recognizes the meaning of projects willingly taken on and has a sense of making progress in life. Further, accurate and beneficial self-evaluation is part of the empowered person's repertory of skills and approaches to life's challenges. Such a person is able to envision success, is capable of meaningful activity, concentrated effort, initiating action, and is flexible and personally resilient.[21] Most importantly, the best evidence that we are empowered is our willingness and ability to empower others. The attractiveness of this view of an empowered person is particularly compelling when one compares this picture to that of an individual caught in the trap of socially-constituted vulnerability, as described in the following chapter. In short, *personal power* is the chief characteristic of the empowered person.

Yet there is an underlying ethical dilemma in this description of empowered people, hinted at by some empowerment theorists but not many. The issue here is the assumption that "people who change will be better off at higher levels of self-actualization."[22] The problem is that the creative individual could turn out to be the compulsively improving individual,[23] a compulsion driven by an externally imposed requirement to produce more and more of something that benefits someone else. In this way workers could be pinned to an identity

grounded in the tyranny of constant improvement. This moral dilemma is not resolved in any of the literature; the empowerment movement generally assumes that encouraging workers to be all that they can be is individually and corporately beneficial. In it most unattractive form, empowerment could perpetuate the general productivity of modern power that Foucault describes in *Discipline and Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality*, volume one, where he no longer describes power relations as repressive but as compellingly productive; a productivity that seals one inside processes of normalization. From this vantage point, empowerment could be included as an extension of *disciplinary power*. This is a genuine tension in our conceptualization of empowerment.[24] For this reason, empowerment "must attend both to the personal dimension of the empowering activities affecting individuals" and at the same time continue a philosophical dialogue "about the ethics of change rooted in an assumption about the worth of each individual,"[25] and must consider what it might mean for us to choose not to be all that we could be. In general, however, the attractive aspects of empowerment appear as a necessary balance to *disciplinary power* though I acknowledge that empowerment is even now producing a subjectivity of its own (which is in some way picked out in the idea that we should be all that we can be) that we must critically reflect upon as we go along. Despite this inherent tension, the benefits of empowerment should not be underestimated as a balm to modern, bureaucratic power relations.

If becoming empowered occurs when people value us intrinsically, in bureaucratic organizations people use us instrumentally and our worth is derived from our rank alone. In analyzing the nature of bureaucratic versus empowering organizations we can assess the way power is exercised beyond particular or individual commands or acts and begin to see how in bureaucratic organizations "power ceases to be personalized in either its genesis or its effects" and how its most subtle effects are kept alive through the "presumption and maintenance of a status quo" of rank. Bureaucratic control constrains and facilitates activities and goals, and ranks the rightful claims and duties of one person relative to another, thereby shaping the possibilities and limits of personal endeavour.[26] Organizational empowerment, on the other hand, is understood as a partnership approach which assigns people value simply because they are members of the team. Individual members come to feel and behave as though they have *personal power* over significant aspects of their work lives. As an example, in Warren Bennis's "trust theory," he identifies people's primary needs (even in organizations) as acceptance and a sense of belonging. He believes that with the assurance of membership in a group comes a feeling of confidence that allows for a fuller participation in the work process of sharing the planning and decision-making.[27] In this view competence is not insignificant; rather, competence is thought to flourish in an atmosphere of trust. In bureaucratic organizations, there is a circulating mistrust and a pervasive sense that nothing that happens is actually the fault of any one individual: someone lower down or higher up can always be blamed. In empowerment, people take action on their own behalf to foster productivity, motivation, and behaviour which is in line with the projects they set for themselves in cooperation with others. The *personal power* of organizational members runs along a continuum from powerlessness to empowerment; work strategies are aimed at drawing people toward the empowerment end of the continuum. Powerlessness is seen as dysfunctional between the otherwise adult members of the organization and as a limiting factor in individual development in, and contributions to, the organization. Because of the damage powerlessness does, it is assumed that bureaucratic organizational structures must be replaced by empowering ones.

In order to focus our understanding of the role that organizational empowerment plays, we can compare bureaucratic versus "entrepreneurial"[28] organizations, and in doing so, reveal several attributes of bureaucracy that empowering processes must address. The bureaucratic organization is characterized by four attributes, namely: a patriarchal contract, myopic self-interest, manipulative tactics and dependency. Empowering organizations are typified by four competing attributes, namely: an entrepreneurial contract, enlightened self-interest, authentic tactics and autonomy. The patriarchal contract is a top-down, high-control arrangement, orientated towards relations of dominance. Myopic self-interest emerges as one thinks of

individual freedom of movement only in terms of "moving up the ladder." Since the patriarchal contract so heavily weights a centralized authority, even those who are not interested in climbing an organizational ladder either are forced to do so or are let fall. The possibility for securing meaning from one's work or from having a personal purpose for it is diminished by the short-sightedness of conceiving individual success in this way. Manipulative tactics are united by a desire to control people without letting them know one is doing so. As a result, these tactics focus on an individual's strategic advantage; they are cautious and indirect.[29] Therefore, the power that gets us to do things in the bureaucratic organization is hidden from us and we cannot directly confront, challenge or resist it. If we resist, we also must resist by indirection. We cannot even cooperate willingly under these circumstances since our wills are circumvented through manipulative tactics.[30] The patriarchal contract, myopic self-interest, and manipulative tactics reinforce each other to foster a dependent mentality in organizational members. At bottom, a dependent mentality expresses itself in the belief that our survival is in someone else's hands; it is typified by the habit of waiting for something above or below us to give us direction. In contrast, the development of *personal power* works in precisely the opposite direction. *Disciplinary power* played a central role in solidifying our acceptance of the dominance paradigm for power relations in mass schooling, thereby hindering *personal power* in all of us to some extent.[31] Schools habituate us to this attitude of waiting for directions to come from outside ourselves. For example, students are disciplined for speaking out of turn, getting out of their desks without permission, or changing an assignment because they are interested in something else.

The empowering organization is grounded in an entrepreneurial contract based on the belief that the most trustworthy source of authority comes from within the person. The primary task of supervision is to help people trust their own instincts and take responsibility for the success of the organization. The contract demands that people make a serious commitment to the organization but do so because they want to, rather than for fear of losing their jobs. Enlightened self-interest refers to helping the organization get ahead, rather than only helping ourselves get ahead and resembles moral self-interest. The assumption is that meaning is created and is personally satisfying when our efforts contribute to the overall good. Being able to work in a trustful environment enhances our potential to find meaning in cooperative work and is a direct and deep-going benefit to the organization. Authentic tactics refer to the practice of letting people know where they stand, sharing as much information and control as possible, and taking reasonable risks. These aspects of empowering organizations foster autonomy which refers to realizing that there is nothing to wait for: autonomy is expressed in the belief that it is better to proceed than to wait for direction, better to ask forgiveness than permission, and better to seem stubborn than incompetent.

By contrast, bureaucratic ways of life efficiently teach us that in order to get ahead we need to be very cautious in how we use and share information, in how we manipulate the truth, and in how we posture ourselves so that what we say and do always enhances (or at least avoids weakening) our position relative to organizational structures. In this way we are not free to pursue personal projects and we do not develop a sense of personal commitment to our tasks. This happens because at the core of the bureaucratic organization is the patriarchal contract, a *devil's bargain*, so to speak, in which we agree to be submissive to authority in return for security. However, this contract is responsible for our modern feeling of helplessness. If authority lies outside me, then whatever happens is not my fault and I cannot fix it. Circulating blame, which never rests anywhere, distorts relationships and precludes trust or cooperation. While there is lulling comfort in the feeling that blame cannot rest on us, we pay for its pacifying effects with our own loss of integrity. The bargain persuades us that it is necessary to be highly constrained in what we say and do and that we must treat other people *bureaucratically*. As noted earlier, a strong reaction against this bureaucratic mindset erupted in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Prior to this reaction, in the eighteenth century it was generally believed that "the investment of the body by power had to be heavy, ponderous, meticulous and constant," so much so that "those formidable disciplinary regimes in the schools," for example, were accepted as

necessary. Then in the 1960s, "it began to be realized that such a cumbersome form of power was no longer as indispensable as had been thought and that industrial societies could content themselves with a much looser form of power over the body."[32] In large part this shift in thinking comes about because of the emergence of a new kind of worker, the "knowledge worker."[33] The power that was held over the body of the manual labourer was believed to be necessary in order to extract from that body the work which kept the industrial machinery moving. Manual workers did not need to think for themselves in order to produce their labour; in fact, independent thinking interferes with the smooth running machinery of modernity. But knowledge workers must think for themselves in order to be productive. Therefore, a difference in the relations of power over these workers becomes necessary. The knowledge worker cannot be productive if he or she is encased in a docile and useful body; these workers need to be thinking, acting subjects.

In fact, knowledge workers came first and knowledge work came second.[34] That is, something took place that constituted a new subjectivity and its emergence has shaped our entire economic future. So the *disciplinary power* in mass schooling has had two opposing effects: it produced knowledge workers but as yet prevents them from achieving their full potential. One way of understanding this opposition of forces is to consider the limits of *disciplinary power* itself. The effort exerted by modern power had as its aim to make the human body docile and useful so as to make it productive. But the very means used, the mastery over and awareness of one's own body, can be secured only through an investment of power in the body, e.g., if the body is to be strong physically it must be strengthened consciously. According to Foucault:

> this all belongs to the pathway leading to the desire of one's own body, by way of the insistent, persistent, meticulous work of power on the bodies of children or soldiers, the healthy bodies. But once power produces this effect, there inevitably emerge the responding claims and affirmations, those of one's own body against power, of health against the economic system, of pleasure against the moral norms of sexuality, marriage, decency. Suddenly what made power strong becomes used to attack it. Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to a counter-attack in that same body....The impression that power weakens and vacillates here is in fact mistaken; power can retreat here, reorganize its forces, invest itself elsewhere...and so the battle continues.[35]

That is, power "invested" in the body to make it productive (docile and useful) also resulted in a body that "desired itself" and that acquired abilities that make it impossible to continue disciplining this new body in the ways we had been using in our schools, e.g., we have stopped using corporal punishment. The discipline that made the body productive in one economic regime makes it unproductive in another. In schools we are now uncomfortable with coercive discipline (though we continue to use it) so we resort to *laissez-faire* discipline, foolishly letting children do whatever they like, or work on their own. We do this because we do not have a form of discipline that expresses power relations that will adequately prepare students for the next century. Coercive and *laissez-faire* disciplinary systems can be related by analyzing the power relations implied in each as they are embedded in a dominator paradigm. In coercive practices, the teacher has all the power and the student has none. In *laissez-faire* practices, the student has all the power and the teacher has none. That one person in the pair should be empty of power is intolerable. If coercive practices constitute an abuse of force, *laissez-faire* practices constitute an abuse of freedom. While the first form of discipline is seriously disabling, the second is fatal: there is no place for a child to go in comfort who has been given all the power. No one wants to have these children around.

Both approaches to the child are forms of neglect. Neglect amounts to not seeing to it that students are enabled to acquire important aspects of an education. If we describe school as an institution in which the development of skill is achieved through the interaction of

communication games and power relations which operate to develop students' capacities into "finalized activities" or abilities, this means that in schools there is an interpenetration of communication, power and capacities which results in the development in the student of abilities associated with doing and saying something. The "finalized activity" may be the ability to speak in public or write a good essay. The process by which a student learns to make a presentation or to write an essay, has embedded in it a set of power relations which, I would assert, make all the difference as to whether the outcome belongs to the student or remains essentially the teacher's work expressed through the student's body. This is not to suggest that teaching should exclude providing students with models which they then emulate, quite the contrary; but the issue here is, whose work has been done when the speech is uttered or the essay written? The relations of power between teacher and student directly affect the degree of ownership that the student takes on. There is a relationship between this sense of ownership and the feeling of being responsible for what one produces, and by extension, the eventual development of maturity in students. In *laissez-faire* practices, students are not specifically taught how to do or say things so they have no ownership over their work because they do not experience mastery over the component parts of a process which eventuates in a finished product. In coercive practices, the work is not connected to students' lives and even if component parts of the process are separately mastered the teacher's work is done in and by the student's body and students are constantly made aware, and they come to believe, that school work is not their work--it is not about their experience. As yet, we have only the intimations of what might constitute power relations that would enable students to be educated apart from either coercive or *laissez-faire* practices.

The problem in our homes and schools of moving unreflectively between coercive and *laissez-faire* practices is better understood if we examine the difficulties that are inherent in organizational empowerment. Empowerment aims at sharing power in terms of decision-making and planning. The bureaucratic organization is hierarchical and layered, like a sky-scraper building, and each layer is sealed off from the one below; in particular, the top-layer is hermetically sealed from everything below it. Information and responsibility are contained within each layer. Empowerment, on the other hand, slices the organization top to bottom. That is, decision-making and planning is shared top to bottom by everyone who is involved in bringing a decision or policy into being. From the chief executive officer to the junior engineer who turns on the switches, everyone shares in the conception, planning, designing and implementing of a project. The success of this approach has convinced many business people that empowerment is not just a fad but is here to stay and requires new commitments to democratic participation in the workplace.

But empowerment also demands an entirely new kind of leader, the need for effective leaders is considerably increased,[36] and supervision takes on new forms. Old ways of leading were characterized by a kind of supervision which knowledge workers find oppressive. The supervisory all-seeing eye of modern power frustrates any attempt to encourage the interdependently creative person that empowerment is supposed to foster. Also, leadership frequently has to circulate around the organization in response to the requirements of a given task. In order to be effective, leaders must encourage knowledge workers toward self-reflectiveness; in doing this supervisors do not entirely withhold their perspective from employees and yet they do not use this perspective as a threat or as a "premature ultimate" thereby terminating an authentically self-reflective process for the employees. Few leaders have these skills. And further, fewer employees easily accept the freedom they have to be both self-reflective and safe in their work situation. Empowerment is a power-sharing approach, safe-guarded by the assurance of the employee's worth to the organization. It is sometimes misconceived as a power replacement in which supervisors are ousted by workers or voluntarily abandon their power, thinking that by doing so they are empowering others. This is a fundamental mistake. The perspective of supervision remains a central contribution to the empowering process; it changes its nature, however, by enabling rather than investigating workers. A *laissez-faire* leader abrogates agency in the power relation. Power-sharing is not achieved if either party is empty of influence.

Because power-sharing requires specific skills, the abandonment of power by leaders is an alternative frequently chosen in the absence of knowing what else to do. A genuine disgust for coercive practices also propels unreflective leaders to take up *laissez-faire* practices. But *laissez-faire* practices are incapable of developing maturity in us because maturity arises from participating reciprocally in power relations not from having either all or none of the advantage.

For this reason organizational empowerment is grounded in partnership and relies on enablement as a model for work relationships. This view focuses on power's positive effects to encourage people toward the empowerment end of a continuum of *personal power*. Organizational empowerment precludes seeing power as a commodity and as constituting zero-sum games of redistribution. Cooperative rather than oppositional practices generate those situations in which a strong sense of personal agency in the power relation is fostered. In general, however, it is not easy to see how organizational empowerment can be carried over to the classroom where there are temporary but unavoidable relations of asymmetry between teachers and students although classroom practices may be conceived as preparation for participation in empowering organizations. If organizational empowerment is a genuinely worthy and humane way to structure work relations, the question becomes one of what preparatory classroom practices might look like. The least we can say is that, if we think students should be educated and trained towards full participation in empowering organizations, and be intolerant of bureaucratic ones, passivity must not be the outcome of educative practices. In terms of the specific educational problem of empowering those in unavoidable, though ideally temporary, asymmetrical relationships, feminine empowerment makes a central contribution. If the development of the capacities to participate meaningfully in organizations that are empowering is our educational end point, the remaining three types pick out features of empowerment that bridge the gap between our current practices and ones that are empowering; further, they direct our attention to social changes that are necessary to foster human maturity as empowerment seeks to do.

Feminine Empowerment

Suppose we live in a small town in whose central square stands a large portrait of a man and a woman. The man is tall and looks at us with a clear, bright expression. The woman looks at us too and we are held in her gaze momentarily, each time we pass. In painting this picture, the artists have drawn the woman somewhat shorter than the man so that she stands just beneath his right shoulder. We see the picture day after day, year following year. We are thoroughly accustomed to it. But one night, the artists slip back into the town and replace the painting with one that they have been laboriously and lovingly drawing, with care and fairness to detail, ever since the first painting was put in the square. They have brought a painting of the same man and woman. Here are the same eyes, the same expressions in face and body, except--and this is everything--the man and woman are now equal in height. As the townspeople crowd into the square in the morning, and squint at the portrait, there is an outburst. Everyone is shocked. Someone shouts, "Look at her face. She's sneering at us!" "She's a monstrosity!" another moans. "Look at him," clucks a third, "He's shrunken and pathetic." And some say in chorus: "What has she done to him?" But we are in the square with them. Standing quietly in the shade of the painting, we smile--liking what we see.

I would say that feminine empowerment is grounded in receptivity and responsiveness and refers to the project of re-presenting the portraiture of men and women, giving special attention to the mutuality of their proportions. I distinguish responsiveness and receptivity from passivity, in that the former two descriptors refer to creative, active, purposive, intentional responses carried out on the basis of a woman's well-considered and mature interpretation of the human situation. In spelling out feminine empowerment, Carol Gilligan (1982) is helpful because she introduces us to the ways that women and men have historically been constituted in their social, political and psychological development. She focuses on the emerging awareness of sexual differences, which social science research uncovered at the same time as attempts were being made to eradicate discrimination between the sexes on the basis of sexual difference. The conflict between

discrimination based on sex blindness versus fair judgements made on the grounds of authentic differences between men and women will be picked up in chapter four, but Gilligan's work points to the discovery that scientific research, formerly thought to be sexually neutral, reflected instead a consistent observational and evaluative bias.[37] As the point of our story shows us, it is our perception of the appropriateness of a given portrayal of men and women that is most troubling to us. Through custom and convention our perceptions of the rightness or wrongness of a particular depiction of the so-called nature of men and women are shaped and solidified. Deviations from the norm are either liberating or alarming so that a movement for feminine empowerment is felt either as friendly or adversarial depending on our perceptions and perspectives.

In describing the social/historical constitution of our idea of maleness and femaleness, Gilligan identifies two moral projects: an ethic of care, voiced most often by women, and an ethic of rights or justice, heard most often from men. Gilligan recognizes that the ethic of justice has shaped public moral discourse but she argues that prizing the differences in women's development enhances the attractiveness of the human picture. Following Nancy Chodorow, she roots male and female development in the way we are raised in infancy; boys and girls are typically raised by their mothers resulting in a developmental trajectory characterized for boys by separation--separation from what they are not--and by attachment for girls--attachment to what they are themselves. Identity, supposedly "firmly fixed at three," is grounded, thereby, either in a contiguous or disconnected sense of self and mother. This attachment and connection enhances a girl's capacity to experience another's needs or feelings as her own;[38] i.e., her capacity for receptivity to another's feelings.[39] Gilligan asserts that, since "masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by separation." As a result, males tend to have difficulty with relationships and women tend to have difficulty with individuation.[40] Gilligan charts the development of both sexes in terms of conformity towards separation on the part of males and towards conformity with attachment on the part of females. Her views are important to feminine empowerment because she argues convincingly, along with other feminist theorists, that the particularity of women's development, while essential to the very survival of the human family, is persistently and consistently devalued by the ways in which maturity has typically been drawn. This is because human development towards maturity has been designed on the basis of individuation. In response to this disparity of value, feminist theorists want us to rethink the way we genderize men and women. Genderization refers to socially and politically constituted descriptions of our sexual nature, and the derived assignment of benefits and burdens in adulthood, based on conditions of birth, child-rearing practices, and family life. Gilligan notes that when "the focus on individuation and individual achievement extends into adulthood and maturity is equated with personal autonomy [grounded in separation], concern with relationships appears as a weakness of women rather than as a human strength."[41]

In her overall presentation of the different ethics that men and women construct in response to their divergent experiences, Gilligan suggests these projects ideally could be complementary, but each by itself distorts the other. Women appear to men to bring disorder to the public world;[42] the very traits that traditionally have defined the goodness of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that make them appear deficient in moral development. When women compare themselves to the predominating model, they assess their own perceptions as deficient and feel confused about what they thought they knew; a feeling which silences them. Due to the strong association of maturity with individuation, women and girls, throughout their lives, are in a state of perpetual failure with respect to a conceptualization of what it means to be adult since a structuring of women's sense of self reveals that it is "organized around being able to make and then maintain affiliations and relationships."[43] In particular, girls fail when compared to an adolescent model which values separation because they appear to turn inward rather than turning outwards towards the clarity and singularity of pursuing personal ambition and achievement.[44] Failure continues to dog their experience throughout later life

where men's values and interests shape the public world, as well as the possibilities for the domestic world.

The trajectory of male development is best pictured in the formation of hierarchies in which separation is fully realized by achieving a position "alone at the top." The picture of women's development, which originates in and maintains connection, is caught in the metaphor of a web or network of relations. The similarity between male development in its hierarchizing and ranking of persons and the patterns identified by Foucault in the emergence of modernity, is obvious. That is, hierarchy has defined both the interiorized and the externally significant landscape of human relationships. In light of this predominance of hierarchy in the social world, women's values and interests have not been able to compete. The metaphor of web is unattractive to any who feel most comfortable with separation and hierarchy. Gilligan says:

> As the top of the hierarchy becomes the edge of the web and as the centre of a network of connection becomes the middle of a hierarchical progression, each marks as dangerous the place which the other defines as safe. Thus the images of hierarchy and web inform different modes of assertion and response: the wish to be alone at the top and the consequent fear that others will get too close; the wish to be at the centre of connection and the consequent fear of being too far out on the edge. These disparate fears of being stranded and being caught give rise to different portrayals of achievement and affiliation, leading to different modes of action and different ways for assessing the consequences of choice.[45]

Men and women find danger in very different places when they describe their progress towards achievement. Men describe the dangers of entrapment, betrayal, being caught in a smothering relationship or being humiliated through rejection or deceit. Women, on the other hand, see danger in isolation, in a fear of standing out or being set apart by success, which amounts to a fear of being left alone. Thus, "it appears that men and women may experience attachment and separation in different ways and that each sex perceives a danger which the other does not see--men in connection, women in separation." For women, the aggression necessary for achievement which causes one to stand apart fractures human connection. The activities of an ethic of care make the world a safe place. Men, on the other hand, are comfortable with "rule-bound competitive situations, which for women threaten the web of connection." When men establish connection, they do so by setting clear boundaries and limits for aggression; when women try to change the rules in order to preserve relationships, men, in abiding by these rules, depict relationships as easy to replace.[46]

The ideal of care is an activity of maintaining relationships, of seeing and responding to need and taking care of the world by sustaining the web of connection so that no one is left out.[47] An ethic of justice, focuses on rights, principles and autonomy; this position is spelled out, for example, by John Rawls (1971). The potential for complementarity between these ethics appears to Gilligan to rest on the capacity for both men and women to overcome the particular set of problems that integrity and care present to them because of their genderized experience. The central moral problem for women "poses a dilemma whose resolution requires a reconciliation between femininity and adulthood."[48] Since the reality of connection is experienced by women as "given rather than as freely contracted," they arrive at an understanding of life that reflects the limits of autonomy and control. If care is conceived as an absolute value, since it is defined initially as "not hurting others," attempts to live accordingly become complicated through the encounters of women as they recognize their need for personal integrity. To Gilligan, the recognition that integrity reshapes caring "gives rise to the claim for equality embodied in the concept of rights, which changes the understanding of relationships and transforms the definition of care."[49] Inclusion of the self in one's intention to care, delineates a path to maturity realized through interdependence and taking care; that is, the self is also one to whom we owe the responsibility to care. For men in Gilligan's research, the absolutes of truth

and fairness, defined by the concepts of equality (treating everyone the same) and reciprocity, are called into question by experiences that demonstrate the presence of differences between self and other. Gilligan proposes, on the basis of her research, that as the men involved who held to the absolutes of truth and fairness begin to acknowledge the existence of multiple truths, e.g., of different perspectives, this recognition leads to a "relativizing of equality"[50] in the direction of equity (i.e., recognizing difference and applying principles appropriately rather than treating people the same) and gives rise to an ethic of generosity and care. For both sexes, according to Gilligan, starting from very different points, "from different ideologies of justice and care," in becoming adult, each recognizes the "dual contexts of justice and care" and participants in the study, came to "realize that judgement depends on the way in which the problem is framed."[51] If we recall Foucault's description of the way modernity excluded difference, it is easy to see how modernity has not moved men towards maturity and why women's experience was excluded from the formation of important modern concepts such as human maturity. I develop aspects of this exclusion more fully in chapter four in discussing the formation of our conceptualization of equality but it is important to note here that the concept of maturity itself, and its evaluation, depends on the context in which it is framed. Women construct the adult domain as a situation in which relationships are the focus of attention and concern. Since women are more concerned than men with both sides of an interdependent relationship they are quicker to recognize their own interdependence. This tendency to see both sides is directly related to women's experiences in power relations which enable them to understand power as an activity that is capable of empowering others since they equate being powerful with giving and caring. While men "represent powerful activity as assertion and aggression," women portray power as activity in terms of nurturance and they see nurturance comprising "acts of strength." Following Jean Baker Miller, Gilligan distinguishes "temporary" and "permanent" relations of inequality in relations of power that are characterized by dominance and submission. In a temporary relationship of inequality, the power that is acted out is ideally used "to foster the development that removes the initial disparity." That is, temporary relations (parent/child, teacher/student) dissolve inequality though acts which empower the one who is below in the relation, if circumstances are favourable, thereby bringing their power over the other to an end. In permanent relations of inequality "power cements domination and submission and oppression is rationalized by theories that *explain* its need for continuance." Miller is making a distinction that other theorists make between relations of dominance (or a state of domination) and relations of power which imply freedom and the possibility of escape. But she adds that women are in the dominant position in temporary relationships of nurturance and in the subservient position in relations of permanently unequal social status and power; therefore, women are both empowering and dominated. They are caught in this duality merely because they are women, a situation from which there is no escape but which is "ideally suited to observe the potential in the human condition for care and for oppression."[52]

In this context, Gilligan notes that women express what sounds like confusion when they describe their moral dilemmas. It is possible to think that this duality in their experience, this seeing both sides, is in part responsible for their quandary. In addition, the absence of validation from their social world for things that women do contribute to moral discourse may also add to the uncertainty they express over moral issues. While women have traditionally taken care of men, "men have in their theories of development, as in their economic arrangements, tended to devalue that care."[53] As she notes, "the difficulty that women experience in finding or speaking publicly in their own voice emerges repeatedly in the form of qualification and self-doubt, but also in the form of intimations of a divided judgement, of a public and a private assessment that are at odds."[54] Understanding the confusion that women convey is related, in Gilligan's view, to the fact that women tend to express "contextual judgement, bound to the particulars of time and place," contingent on this mother and this unborn infant, for example, thus resisting categorical formulations of moral dilemmas such as abortion. Gilligan observes that inarticulateness about a moral dilemma may stem from a lack of validation for a stance that is neither pro-life nor pro-

choice but is "based on a recognition of the continuing connection between the life of a mother and a child." This view appears confused in light of a pattern of thinking that is a clear, crisp delineation of settled positions. If women are concerned with problems of relationships rather than contests between rights and focus on the question of responsibility, contextual moral thinking may simply be a different way of thinking rather than a confused way. But contextual moral thinking is one aspect of an ethic of care that causes many theorists serious problems and these concerns will be picked out in the following chapter.

In general, feminine empowerment amounts to enabling women to find their voice in an adult world that genderizes girls and women and simultaneously disprivileges that genderized contribution. At the personal level, it includes the recognition of self as a person of concern who is also deserving of care. At the collective level, empowerment involves voicing the value of women's insights into the workings of the human family. Feminine empowerment is grounded in a belief that people matter and matter equally and that each of us is entitled to a fair share of resources that enable us to participate meaningfully in public and private life. Empowerment is concerned to include women's experience in important social concepts and to eliminate the subjugation of women from social processes. The ideal of mutuality in feminine empowerment is grounded on a partnership model for power relations which, through cooperative practices, brings about a generous reciprocity of good will, attentiveness and care. In this view, all agents in power relations are made strong and competent in the achievement of relational maturity so that both people in the human portrait are equal in height.

Ameliorative Empowerment

Ameliorative empowerment operates in the light of this ideal case and refers to social action and reflection that tries to remove the obstacles that currently exist for some people, obstacles that perpetuate their vulnerability. Empowerment, as a social responsibility, has two complementary aspects. It acknowledges that the condition of passivity characterizes large segments of the population because of socially constituted vulnerability, and it acts as a cure to this distortion of human potential. We cannot be adult and be perpetually taken care of at the same time. While ameliorative empowerment is conceived in terms of a helping relationship, helping is acknowledged to be problematic. The *pastoral power* embedded in all attempts to help someone requires the assumption of a surplus of resources; that is, the helper is thought of as being in a strategically better situated and better endowed position. To help we must have more of what the other needs, whether it is knowledge, money, influence or insight. So helping implies being in a position above someone who is dependent upon us--a dependency which works to perpetuate the differentiation of rank between the one above and one below. Being above and being below are mutually supportive: each makes the other possible. As long as this condition of dependency remains it conserves the position of the one above and it is unending for the one below: it is felt as a chronic condition of helplessness and powerlessness. It is the combination of the taken-for-grantedness of someone's claim to their position above as well as the dependency of the one who is helped, that sustains the asymmetry of power between them. This dependency is ideally addressed by empowering practices.

In a reaction against the *pastoral power* which is incorporated and expanded into disciplinary power, and that facilitates bureaucracy, the dependent and therefore immature status of those who remain throughout their lives in a position below is understood to be problem for us all. In short, asymmetry in power relations is a general societal problem because it leaves so many people feeling powerless, dependent and passive, a condition which constitutes a failure of care. In such people the capacities latent within them will not flourish even when resources are available. So we might say that it is the humanity of the disprivileged that sets a limit on the helping relationship. Those helped must be seen as people who can say and do things, but also as people whose power is frustrated: a frustration that can be located in their response to bureaucratic ways of being treated and whose self-conceptions may be unclear to them.

The problem of overdetermining the dependency of the disprivileged is fully explored by Frantz Fanon (1963, 1967), Paulo Freire (1988) and Pierre Vallieres (1971), for example. The solution to oppression for all three theorists is the replacement of the oppressor by the formerly oppressed: freedom is "acquired by conquest, not by gift."[55] Frantz Fanon articulated in anger an objection that still applies directly to proposals to empower the disadvantaged: he asserted that the only way to achieve equality with one's oppressors is to remove them from their place of domination. Vallieres also views violence as central to the way out for the oppressed. Following Fanon, Freire conceives liberation in terms of an "act of love" which alone is capable of liberating both the oppressor and the oppressed. While the tone of Freire's writing is vastly different from that of Fanon's and Vallieres's, there is still an important sense in which liberation is tied to the act of domination and remains within a conception of a world divided into two groups, the oppressed and those who oppress them. That is, liberation limits our ability to work within a partnership paradigm on the basis of cooperation.

The complexity of an act of liberation is made clearer by a distinction posed by Foucault. He separates acts of liberation from what he calls, but does not explicate fully, "practices of freedom." Acts of liberation are a response to a state of domination in which relations of force are "firmly set and congealed" in a way which prevents individuals or groups from engaging in power relations which involve the reciprocity and reversibility of governmentality, as described in chapter two. Foucault points out that an act of liberation is "not sufficient to establish the practices of liberty that later on will be necessary" for liberated people to develop in order to live well with their freedom. In fact, practices of liberty compel us to ask different questions and to focus on different relations of power than an act of liberation from a state of domination requires of us.[56] That is, this model for liberation is conceived by Fanon and others in the context of the "colonial relation." The assumption is that the colonizer's status in the colonized country is fundamentally illegitimate and maintained through violence; the only solution is to replace the oppressor and violence is seen as legitimate to accomplish this replacement. This model does not apply to a situation in which the oppressed have no desire to rid themselves of the oppressors, and have no intention to be violent, e.g., to the case of many feminists who want to work with non-feminists not replace them.

This perspective on the limits of liberation from theorists who speak along with those who come from a position below in relations of domination constrains what may be done in the name of empowerment. The question is, since helping typically implies that one is coming from a position above how does one help without perpetuating the impoverished self-image of the oppressed in which some are seen as people who cannot say and do things very well. It is at this point that the mature character of the one in the helping position is pivotal in the act of empowerment if it is to be distinguished from acts which perpetuate domination. There is no quick fix for character. The helper must ask: What is it like to be in my presence? Helpers require maturity: their sense of identity, individuality, separateness and worth must be grounded in an appreciation of the continuity between the humanity of the oppressed and their own. In this way, empowerment is grounded in moral self-interest. Moral self-interest assumes that "in the just and well-ordered society, everyone's acting to uphold just institutions is for the good of each." When we all strive "to comply with these principles and each succeeds, then individually and collectively" our nature as moral persons is most fully realized."[57] In working towards our own good as well as the good of others, our individual and collective good is achieved simultaneously. The assumption underlying moral self-interest is that our important individual and collective interests are not in fundamental conflict.

Ameliorative empowerment is grounded on a partnership model for power relations and geared towards moral self-interest in the sense that empowering others is understood also to benefit those who empower. Power's positive effects enable agency in its strong sense. This agency is of primary concern so that, in asymmetrical power relations, power as activity expressed through cooperative practices and is directed towards making relations symmetrical *from the start*, particularly when dealing with adults. Ameliorative empowerment is directed towards

strengthening the strategies and values that already inhere in the situation as it has developed thus far and in discerning between the need for liberation versus the need for "practices for freedom." Confidence in the possibility that people can help themselves under favourable circumstances is central to ameliorative empowerment. But the quality of ameliorative empowerment that continues to make asymmetrical power relations problematic throughout, requiring extreme caution and sensitivity on the part of the helper, is made less necessary under the conditions picked out by the idea of preventive empowerment.

Preventive Empowerment

Preventive empowerment is rooted in the idea of plenty as opposed to scarcity. For this reason, it is aimed at informing those parenting and teaching practices capable of creating conditions in which vulnerability and long term dependency are less likely to occur; it has generosity as its fundamental characteristic. But this is a generosity with respect to those needs in infancy and childhood that are most likely to give a child a strong sense of agency balanced by the developed capacity to be receptive to, and generous with, others. I am not referring at all to material generosity, but to a generosity of care and attentiveness. The needs little children have for material luxuries are slight and children should never be given everything that they want. If they are, they have no understanding of the difference between their needs and their wants and it is unlikely they will be able sense the needs of others, feel compassion for these needs, and be moved to respond to them. The capacity to be generous and receptive is realized through parental encounters in which the child's body *never* experiences any violence at the hands of its parents and has its bodily needs met with kindness and perceptive responsiveness. Nourishing infants is the initial and primary relation that conveys to the newcomer whether the world is sympathetic or harsh. For this reason, nursing a child should be approached with all the sensitivity and creativity that any transmission of cultural content to the young deserves. Nursing is neither a natural nor a facile process. It sets up a relationship between mother and child which builds the groundwork for all others. No one ever warns you in advance how painful it is to nurse a baby. Under many conditions, getting food into a squawking infant demands an act of supererogation that has few parallels in ordinary life. And if, at the same time, a mother wants to convey generosity and kindness, the task can feel overwhelming. While there are other ways to feed an infant, there is a special opportunity in breast-feeding to spark communication between the pair that is not only physically but also relationally healthy, if it is understood to require skill, forethought and attentiveness to every particular child's unique needs and responses.

Modern educators, on the whole, have not addressed the significance of infancy. But earlier educators, Plato, Rousseau and Kant did. If we consider what Kant says about what he calls "physical education" we can identify some trends which help to direct preventive empowerment. I make no attempt to outline the praxis of parenting fully; I only want to pick out features of the relationship which will soften the bureaucratic blow to our sensibilities. Kant talks about babies and how they are to be fed, believing that their "physical education" should be of interest to tutors who, as the "only well-educated person in the house," should expect to be advisors to parents.[36] Kant is aware of the importance of infancy to later educational practice, but he does not pick out its significance as a relationally bountiful or impoverishing time for child and parent.

The child's capacity to care for and to treat others fairly develops through parental encounters, i.e., through what it means to be in its mother's or father's presence, as well as through the child's bodily experiences, e.g., feeling a tender or abusive touch. Kant has no emphasis on "feeling with" the infant, as has Noddings (1984), for example. Further, he fails to ground morality itself in feeling, an omission that I address in chapter four. I would say, however, that it is quite easy to pick out those infants, even at two months old, who have a strong sense of being in the presence of a communicative parent. In addition to not courting the importance of feeling, Kant gives authority to the tutor that diminishes the parent-child relation. The parent is not an authority on parenting according to Kant. This seems peculiar in light of Kant's

complaint about those who like the "convenience" of immaturity and rely on books and experts *et cetera*, instead of "reasoning for themselves."[39] He should be equally concerned that adults parent for themselves.

If maturity is our aim, then being adult and a strong sense of *personal power* should characterize parenting above all other relations, for two reasons. The first is that, in this way, we demonstrate to the child that we take responsibility ourselves for what we say and do; and secondly, and as a result, the child comes to sense that it is good and right to take responsibility for what one says and does. As an example, if a child is to sit down so as not to fall from a chair, we might say: "Johnny, I want you to sit down" (possibly adding a reason but never a threat). If the child does not sit, then we say this again, first getting the child's attention by asking him to look at us and waiting until he does. The third time we walk over and gently but firmly conform his body to our request. The child must sense that we are unequivocal but it is not necessary to hurt a child for any reason in order to do this or to express any anger whatsoever; what is necessary is that parents encourage in the child's body the responsiveness to the request that was made.

Too often we hear parents become exasperated, and then abusive and rude, with children when all they had to do was to bring the request home in the child's body by making it clear that obedience was the only acceptable response in this instance. Obedience to well-chosen and kindly administered rules is essential to provide the child's body with the kinds of experiences that will serve as a groundwork for the development of other skills later on. But the aim here is not to produce the docile body, useful for the purposes of others; one is not laying the groundwork for the child to be a slave. This raises the question of the relationship between obedience and empowerment yet I do not think we can expect a wily and disobedient body to become an empowered and an empowering one, even eventually. At any rate, reckless disobedience signals an overabundance of power in the child's body and if the child overbalances a parent's exercise of power, the relationship is hindered just as it is by an overbearing attitude from the parent. Obedience is seen as a means to develop that capacity in children which will eventually allow them to obey, but not be slaves to, themselves. Therefore, parents should restrict those behaviours in a young child which express disregard for others, e.g., loudness in a restaurant, wildly running in public places, hitting someone, or touching precious things in a store (because they belong to someone who values them).

Due to the disempowering effects of manipulative tactics, described above in the section on organizational empowerment, the infant, child/parent relation should be directive: children should know clearly what is required of them. Thoughtfully chosen and reflectively administered parental values should undergird what the child is expected to do. This raises the question of whether it is possible for a strongly value-prizing environment to be empowering to the child. This is difficult. There must be a balancing act between, on the one hand, conveying a world-view capable of making the child come to see the world whole, as it were, and on the other, recognizing and valuing the differences that are present in the new and unique being that the child is. Parental strategies for empowering their children should be aimed at ways of conveying already settled values, although this should be reflectively done, but parents must direct their skill in being *receptive* to important differences in the child concerning values the child holds. As an example, the point in Plato's gold, silver and bronze myth, in *The Republic* is that those who guide the very young should watch carefully to see what is in each child and everything which follows in the child's education should rest on the basis of the child's authentic qualities. Following Plato, a child's uniqueness will emerge if we allow differences to surface early and receive validation.

Preventive empowerment grounds trust and respect for others in generosity through an approach towards the child's own person which is never violent, rude or insulting. If the child is treated with gentleness and respect we have every reason to believe these values will be extended to others eventually, though often we force children to express these values long before they can possibly attach any genuine feeling to their responses. As John Rawls asserts, "the active sentiments of love and friendship, and even our sense of justice, arise from the manifest intention

of other persons to act for our good. Because we recognize that they wish us well, we care for their well-being in return."[60] Empowerment is first to be felt in the child's body in the way the child is trusted to carry out adventuresome but not dangerous activities. If the *attentive* parent presides over such activities without interfering unnecessarily, the child comes to sense what he or she can do and say. Most children treated in this way display very good sense. I am, of course, speaking of children who are not specifically handicapped in some way. But some may object to this aspect of preventive empowerment by raising the case of the so-called strong-willed child. I tend to think of such children as both passionate and intense, rather than strong-willed. We must find ways to discipline such children which operate effectively to withhold privileges on the basis of what these children care about. For example, a passionate and intense child may be required to go to his or her room and be removed from an activity that is interesting and important to the child. Violence on the bodies of these children is useless and unacceptable, yet such children must be made to conform bodily to important rules set by their parents.

Through preventive empowerment, a parent allows children to trust to their own instincts, as well as their own bodily capacities, and to take responsibility in small ways for what occurs. Most importantly, parents convey to their children that they are worthy of trust. There is perhaps no greater gift that children receive than to be trusted by their parents. It is a gift children long to live up to. In terms of the child's capacity to engage in power relations eventually, agency in the strong sense is the eventual aim of preventive empowerment. Power here is an activity directed towards engaging children in practices that develop a capacity for mutuality and moral self-interest, and which eventuate in symmetrical and friendly relationships between adult children and their parents. But while preventive empowerment grounds the empowered and empowering person, larger family patterns must also reflect an empowerment model in order to secure children in the self and other trust and respect that is at the core of empowerment. Inequality and injustice in family practices negate our attempts to empower our children toward human maturity, an argument I pursue more fully in chapter six.

In summary, empowerment in the educational setting must be undergirded by practices that enable a child to sense what is within and develop self and other trust and respect on reasonable grounds. In addition, the basis for personal responsibility and strength of purpose emerges out of an empowering relationship that is informed by and modelled on both male and female interpretations of the human world. In the following chapter, I make connections between empowerment, equality, and justice so as to further spell out the nature and implications of empowerment.

End Notes

1.Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (London, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 30-31.

2.Raine Eisler, *The Chalice and the Blade* (New York: Harper San Francisco, 1988), xx.

3.Jennifer M. Gore, "What Can We Do For You! What Can "We" Do For "You?" Struggling over empowerment in critical and feminist pedagogy," in *Educational Foundations* Vol.4, No.3, (Summer) 1990:5-26.

4.From 1966 to 1981, ERIC records 17 uses of the term 'empowerment'. In the period from 1982 to 1991 (November), ERIC records an explosion of interest in the term--721 citations. In all, I read 1130 abstracts detailing particular aspects of empowerment. References appear in the bibliography only if they were central to my task, but the majority were not. What I gleaned from reading the abstracts was general insight into the language, focus and direction of what I am calling the 'empowerment movement'.

5.See Geoff Dench, *Minorities in the Open Society: Prisoners of Ambivalence* (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).

6.I am not suggesting that the 1960s represents that first or the only protest of this sort. But as examples of this protest, see Franz Fanon *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963) and *Black Skin White Masks* (London and Sydney: Pluto Press, 1967); Solomon, B.B. *Black Empowerment: Social Work in oppressed communities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs. *Black Rage* (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1968); Pierre Vallieres. *White Niggers of America* Joan Pinkham trans., (U.S.A: Monthly Review Press, 1971); John Howard Griffin. *Black Like Me* (Canada: A Signet Book, 1960); Paulo Freire. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman (New York: Continuum, 1988).

7.*Black Empowerment*, 16.

8.*Black Empowerment*, 12.

9.*Black Empowerment*, 16.

10.*Black Empowerment*, 21.

11.*Black Empowerment*, 26.

12.Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to our changing society* (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), p. 330.

13.David W. Livingstone, *Critical Pedagogy and Cultural Power*. Introduction by Henry A. Giroux and Paulo Freire, (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987).

14.James Joll, *Gramsci*. (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977), 10.

15.*Gramsci*, 11.

16.See for example, Henry Giroux's very helpful article, "Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociology of Education: A Critical Analysis," in *Harvard Educational Review* Vol. 53, No.3, (August 1983): 257-293.

17.The best example is Judith F. Vogt and Kenneth L. Murrell, *Empowerment in Organizations: How to spark exceptional performance* (San Diego, California: University Associates, Inc., 1990).

18.David Nyberg, *Power over Power* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1981).

19.James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York, London: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p.15.

20.This assessment of the essential nature of empowerment comes from *Empowerment in Organizations*, p. 68. This book on organizational empowerment expresses the broadest concern for human development and maturity (in terms of moral self-interest) of all the material I read.

21.*Empowerment in Organizations*, 68.

22.*Empowerment in Organizations*, 68.

23.As an example, see William Byham, *Zapp! The Lightening of Empowerment* (New York: Harmony Books, 1988). At the outset he identifies "constant improvement" as the underlying motivation for empowerment. Empowerment is a means to this end. In Lorne C. Plunkett and Robert Fournier, *Participative Management: Implementing Empowerment* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991), the authors very clearly identify empowerment as "a business decision" not as a means to employee fulfilment. They consider other empowerment texts that do not make the same move to be "missionary" in approach. Vogt and Murrell's *Empowerment in Organizations* stands alone among these three in envisioning empowerment both as means and end to social, personal, political and economic fulfilment. The empowerment literature is so divided on this subject that it would be misleading to think that much of it could be applied to schooling in any way which would benefit students, although I think that Peter Drucker's ideas and Vogt and Murrell's ideas could be. See Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to our changing society* (New York & Evanston: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968).

24.In one way the attractiveness or unattractiveness of empowerment is related to our beliefs about the general trends in the development of our conceptualizations historically. Kant, Hegel and Marx picture history as working towards harmonious resolution on issues of human freedom and dignity. Heidegger and his followers, on the other hand, think of the development of history as a calamity. The particular way that the empowerment movement develops its emphasis on productivity will come about as a result of a multiplicity of forces. One's assessment and prediction of this emphasis has something to do with whether one finds Kant's or Heidegger's view of historical trends persuasive. For a fuller discussion, see James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, 46ff.

25.*Empowerment in Organizations*, 68.

26.Nicholas Burbules, "A theory of Power in Education," in *Educational Theory* Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1986): 107-108.

27.*Empowerment in Organizations*, 58.

28.Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity*; Peter Block, *The Empowered Manager: Positive political skills at work* (San Francisco, Oxford: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991).

29.*Empowered Manager*, 23.

30.In *Emile*, Rousseau applauds this form of power which is hidden from us and gets us to do things as though we were doing them ourselves. To him, power should be hidden.

31.See for example, Barry Allen, "Government in Foucault," in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 21, No. 4, (December) 1991, 421-440.

32.*Power/Knowledge*, 58.

33.Drucker analyzes the emergence of knowledge workers and concludes that "knowledge has become productive." Further, he asserts that we are shifting rapidly from a Cartesian view of the universe, in which the accent has been on parts and elements, to a configuration view, with the emphasis on wholes and patterns. This shift challenges every single dividing line between areas of study and knowledge and shifts teaching and learning away from the disciplines as their centre. This was bound to happen, according to Drucker, as application became central to knowledge. Until the nineteenth century, knowledge and action had almost no contact with each other. This trend to link knowledge and action shifts the meaning of knowledge from an end in itself to a resource, that is, to a means to some result. What used to be knowledge is becoming information. What used to be technology is becoming knowledge. Knowledge as the central energy of a modern society exists altogether in application and when it is put to work. The end results are interdisciplinary. We do need a discipline as a tool, as a resource and a specialty. Specialists in a given discipline, i.e., today's scholars, may be the tool makers of tomorrow who serve the tool users where traditionally they have been their masters. The greatest need, according to Drucker, is for people who can develop and teach the application to end results of knowledge and information drawn from diverse disciplines. Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity*, 1968: 350-355.

34.*Discontinuity*, 285.

35.*Power/Knowledge*, 56-58.

36.*Empowerment in Organizations*, 23.

37.Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological theory and women's development*. (London: Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 6.

38.*Different Voice*, 8.

39.See Nel Noddings' usage in *Caring*, 30-31.

40.*Different Voice*, 8.

41.*Different Voice*, 17.

42.See for example, Carole Pateman's discussion of this problem in "The Disorder of Women": Women, love and the sense of justice," in *Ethics* 91 (October) 1980: 20-34. She describes the particular problem that women's nature posed for the modern era's emphasis on individual rational beings born free and equal and their relationship to civil life. Women have ascribed to them an ambiguous nature which precluded their participation in the public world of men.

43.*Different Voice*, 48.

44.*Different Voice*, 39.

45.*Different Voice*, 62.

46.*Different Voice*, 43.

47.*Different Voice*, 62.

48.*Different Voice*, 70-71.

49.*Different Voice*, 165.

50."Relativizing" equality refers to a psychological process of realizing the validity and presence of different ways of thinking of moral problems, i.e., as opposed to the use of absolute values and a belief in simple black and white solutions. The fact that moral development toward maturity has been typically defined along a male model tends to dilute the possibility of this recognition of difference. See this analysis in *Different Voice*, 151-174.

51.*Different Voice*, 167.

52.*Different Voice*, 167-168.

53.*Different Voice*, 17.

54.*Different Voice*, 15.

55.*Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 31.

56.Michel Foucault, "the ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom," in *The Final Foucault* eds. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988), 2-4.

57.Susan Moller Okin, "Reason and Feeling," in *Ethics* Vol. 99, 1988-89:229-249, 246.

58.Immanuel Kant, *Education* (Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1960), 33.

59.See the introduction for these statements.

60.Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family*, (U.S.A: Basic Books, 1989), 99.

CHAPTER FOUR

EMPOWERMENT, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE

Introduction

It is due to the dominator paradigm for power relations that equality has been so ineffective in addressing the problems created by the asymmetries of power between people throughout the modern era. Apart from partnership relations of power, equality can be meaningless. In this chapter, I argue that empowerment works to alleviate the injustices associated with asymmetry only to the extent that the "movement" understands and articulates a view of equality that takes account of the problematic nature of our current way of conceiving the term: to misconceive equality is to misdirect empowerment. Equality needs to be grounded in a conception of justice that is driven by the belief that asymmetrical power relations picked out on the basis of differences in sex, race and wealth require social change now. In order to spell out this position, I also argue that our conceptualization of equality is flawed in its formulation, in its central model, and is misapplied to our human circumstances. It is particularly hard to realize the hope of generosity on which empowerment is based under the current conditions in which inequalities misshape our lives.

The idea of equality: principle versus conceptualization

In a recent and very useful book, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Will Kymlicka analyzes political philosophy, and its current major schools of thought, on the basis of the principle of equality. He argues that, while right and left political positions have been divided from each other by their focus on freedom versus equality, respectively--leaving "wishy-washy liberals" wading somewhere in the middle--it is important now to pick out one deeper value to act as arbiter, so to speak, between the plethora of existing theories of justice. He chooses the principle of equality as that deeper value. He justifies his choice by suggesting that, without one deeper value "there could only be *ad hoc* and localized resolution of conflict," and, "[w]e would have to accept the inevitable compromises that are required between theories, rather than hope for any one theory to provide comprehensive guidance."[1] Kymlicka does not tell us why "inevitable compromises" cannot provide "comprehensive guidance." Three questions should make us hesitant about accepting comprehensive guidance from one theory by itself. To begin with, what evidence do we have just now that one theory respects the full range of what we prize in human experience? As an example, Kymlicka criticizes Okin for not defining her liberalism more clearly.[2] I suggest that Okin is precluded from following one theory precisely because her project is to include women's experience in the discussion of justice. She could only follow one theory (and here we must say one tradition), and use it for comprehensive guidance, if liberalism had taken seriously women's experience; it has not. Secondly, is there nothing to be gained by engaging in *ad hoc* and local resolutions of conflict at a time when there is so much disagreement regarding our intuitions about important issues such as the status and role of women in public life? In addition, the degree of mistrust that characterizes bureaucratic democracies is so intense that wholesale solutions seem perpetually to escape us; we only have to think of the recent referendum debate as an example. The third question has to do with the sort of power over other theories that having one theory would give us. Quite simply, why do we want one theory to have this advantage?

I now want to consider carefully Kymlicka's project of picking out one deeper value, i.e., equality, to act as arbiter between existing theories of justice. Should we be so ready to let equality guide us? As it stands, I do not think we should until we separate out the principle from what I call its conceptualization. There are three aspects to our conceptualization of equality that are troubling. In the first place, our conceptualization has come into the modern era through real historical processes. Feminists argue convincingly that the exclusion of women from these processes distorts our understanding of equality. Secondly, equality implies an equation based on

a particular standard or model that frustrates and precludes the inclusion of those who are different. And thirdly, as Kymlicka himself asserts, applications of equality are deeply flawed. Taking these ideas together, I argue that our conceptualization of equality is flawed in its central model, in its formulation, and in its application. Given this assessment, we may well ask what use equality is to us.

I suggest that the idea of equality exists in our thinking both as the principle that operates as a moral ideal and as the conceptualization that informs our actual practice. It may be that equality as a moral ideal refers to a situation most of us deeply value. This aspect is picked out in expressions such as the "egalitarian plateau" or the "moral equality of persons." We mean something very important here. We want equality to guide us in making right judgments and political decisions based on the mutual respect for and equal consideration of all people; and further, we think people should get this respect and consideration simply because they are human beings. Equality as a moral principle helps us see what is wrong with what we are doing at a particular time because we think of equality in this sense as being above the vagaries of time and circumstance.

Our conceptualization of equality, on the other hand, is tied to real historical contingencies and current practices, all of which make it messy: it is 'a thing of earth not heaven'. For this reason, as the term equality is used in practice it is vague, ambiguous and problematic. It is the second sense of equality--equality as historical conceptualization--that I explore in this chapter. So I must now ask: Should our *conceptualization* of equality serve us as a comprehensive guide? The answer to this question must be no because the flaws, named above, apply to our current conceptualization. We must not let our conceptualization masquerade as a principle or moral ideal. Our current conceptualization of equality needs to be remade before it will help us to be just.

Since our conceptualization is flawed in its formulation, model and application, in shaping modern life it has excluded masses of people from its promise of mutual respect and equal consideration. Even though the disadvantaged can see this clearly, the advantaged are persistently troubled by reforms that redistribute power because it feels to them as though things have suddenly gone out of balance. Such people say things like: "That reform now makes some people 'more equal' than others" as they examine new benefits given to women or minorities. That is, they feel the principle of equality has somehow been offended. (Really it is just that they have been offended.) But their comment renders visible just how incapable they are to see their previously advantageous position: prior to the reform they were the "more equal" but they took this to be the most plausible arrangement. Since most reform fails to upset unjust structures and tends to make small plays on the boundaries of systematic injustice by tinkering with the consequences of injustice, it is unlikely that their relative position of power has shifted very much. In order to make transparent this failure of receptivity[3] on the part of the more powerful, the question is not, What is equality? --a question which directs attention towards the principle--but rather it is, How is equality currently operating? and, What effects is it having on people? The latter two questions focus our attention on our conceptualization of equality which we could change if we reflect upon our practices, engage in new practices and interrupt the smooth running of current practices.

Equality: Flaws in its formulation, model, and application

The most basic problem we have with equality is in making sense of people who are different. In the ordinary experience of Canadian society, for example, there seem to be two very strongly felt, and I would argue, conflicting sentiments about equality. First, we seem to believe we should all be treated equally; and second, we believe that any special treatment for one individual, group or region is unfair and takes away something from other individuals, groups and regions. Why do I say these sentiments conflict? If we consider the way we look at equality as it is configured by these two sentiments, we realize that the second only creates tension for the first if we think of equality as sameness. That is, what makes treatment special rather than

appropriate, is that it deviates from treating people the same. In our everyday life, we cannot seem to shake ourselves loose from the sameness that coils round the heart of our conceptualization of equality.

Educational philosophers have considered the problem of sameness and equality and have drawn out some of the consequences of equating them. At bottom, sameness presents us with a moral problem because it could only be achieved at the expense of social engineering if it were held up as an educational ideal.[4] That is, sameness implies uniformity; uniformity is abhorrent to us because it necessarily strips away everything that is personal in us. Yet, even though most of us would agree that uniformity is unattractive, the very process of becoming a human being (enculturation) makes it difficult for us to accept the value of differences that other people bring along with them. Ask any two people who begin to share the same living space; differences that violate what has previously been taken-for-granted by each as the right way to do things become a source of contention. If we ask why it is so difficult to accept difference, we must admit that our lack of acceptance has culturally, sexually, racially, and materially constituted bases and is grounded in the historicity of our experience. We learn to be human by being in the presence of those that we come to be like and then we set out on our own path. Flaws in our conceptualization of equality are intensified by enculturation processes (primary ethnic socialization) that exclude difference, and are supported by a public world which has trouble comprehending difference. We must make some significant advances in our thinking and our feelings if we want to overcome the problems that we have between equality and sameness. In this chapter I focus on the problems associated with our conceptualization of equality but I do not want to lose sight of the emotional dimension of our enculturated difficulties with other people's differences.

In order to examine our conceptualization of equality, I want to identify two very broad stages in the formulation of our current usage of the term. The first stage is the period of modernity that stretches from the end of the seventeenth, or beginning of the eighteenth century, to the mid-twentieth century. During this time equality gained strength against the tyrannical reign of *sovereign power*. As I pointed out in chapter two, equality was promoted on the basis of an idea of humanity which came to be measured by the "man of reason." In particular, the slogan "man as the measure of all things" motivated claims by many to a share in society's rights and resources. But inequalities were allowed to persist between the people even in the face of reform. Foucault says that this was because the object of reform was to eliminate only those illegalities that applied to property and material goods. In this way, the perpetuation of forms of domination through inequalities with respect to rights continued to benefit those who had property. In addition, Carole Pateman[5] argues that the exclusion of women as citizens with full rights began, at the outset of modernity, as a political strategy to maintain sexual relations as they were. It was argued that women by nature were different and incapable of participating in public life. Catherine Mackinnon also says that, "[t]he claim that men exercise jurisdiction over women by virtue of their natural capacities, as a consequence of the natural difference between the sexes, was advanced by contract theorists [Foucault's reformers] in order to head off the revolutionary implications for sexual relations otherwise implied by the doctrine of natural freedom and equality."[6] The consequences of the exclusion of women are far-reaching since exclusion at this point meant that women's experience is held outside of the very idea of what it means to be equal.

The second stage, occurring in the late 1960s or early 1970s, was propelled by an angry reaction against the exclusion of people that the reformers of modernity had allowed. The standard inherent in equality during the first stage operated historically to produce what was perceived as a consensus about equality; this consensus has come to an end and we currently live and try to make meaning for ourselves on its aftermath. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), fits very well into the mood of this second stage because of its particular emphasis on persons. He asserts that "[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override."[7] This is a position which not only opposes itself to utilitarianism, which Rawls makes explicit, it also opposes itself to the former consensus of

modernity in which asymmetries of power were justified and maintained. Some have argued that even Rawls did not anticipate the radical depth that his view of justice makes possible.[8] The clamour for rights that erupted during the late 1960s and early 1970s was an expression on the part of those for too long excluded from a full range of rights and participation in public life on the basis of a notion of equality that had never been extended to them in any way that mattered substantively.

While the reformers heralded "man as the measure of all things" as the core sentiment and standard for the modern notion of equality, second stage theorists react against that standard by asserting that man is not a generic term, rather it specifically applies to whiteness thereby excluding people of colour, to maleness thereby excluding femaleness, and to Anglo-Europeans thereby depreciating other cultures. In a further way, homosexuals could argue that the standard refers to heterosexuality, thus excluding homosexuality. Modernity's standard has made possible the domination of anyone who cannot measure up to it due to conditions of birth. I will focus on two conditions of birth, sex and race--emphasizing sex differences, in order to make the argument that exclusion is directly related to dominance and therefore to the perpetuation of asymmetrical relations of power and this exclusion affects the usefulness of our conceptualization of equality.

The so-called former consensus that emerged through modernity has shaped our consciousness and directed our intuitions so that when Kymlicka, following Rawls, suggests we should judge theories of justice on the basis of the way they match our "considered" or "shared" intuitions he disturbs anyone who wants to challenge the legitimacy of this former consensus. I would say rather, that intuitions come to us through the cultural reproduction of this former consensus--which of course was not consensual except between men who were given voice. That is, many intuitions are not so much "shared" or "considered" as they are brought forward and perpetuated in the social world as unreflected upon bits of cultural content, broadly transmitted. Now Kymlicka does acknowledge that intuitions may mislead us, but "does not believe that there is any other plausible way of proceeding."[9] I agree with Kymlicka that intuitions guide us in our judgement-making, but I do not agree that all of them should. In particular, our intuitions about the role of women and minorities in public life need to be re-educated along the lines of a re-conceptualization of equality. If we ask what intuitions are, and realize that they are alterable because they are cultural transmissions, then we must acknowledge that our social world shapes our intuitions and therefore can reshape them. If it is the case that our intuitions are shaped through experience, and if our experiences differ vastly, then we are not likely to have the same intuitions about important aspects of life. If human intuitions have not been informed by women's experience, because women were left out of historical processes and public conversations, then "consideration" falls far short of seriously taking account of women's lives. Intuitions attached to those in strategically advantaged positions carry the weight of privilege not of consensus. Intuitions shaped by power and privilege differ in important ways to those shaped by poverty and exclusion.[10]

At the present time, some reforms have come into being that treat women as though they are equals. This equal treatment was made possible through the "difference approach" which views as discriminatory unequal treatment that cannot be justified by reference to some sexual difference. The difference approach, as it was applied to women, was based on an approach that was taken towards people of colour, particularly, African-Americans in the United States. The idea behind the difference approach is that treatment should be "colour-blind" in the one case, and "sex-blind" in the other. But this notion of equality through blindness to difference fails in both instances because it dismisses the significance of differences constituted by sexual and racial diversity that have been given cultural weight through historic processes of discrimination. The real human problem that we have with important differences is not only that we cannot be "blind" to them, but depending on the difference, we should not be blind to them; we should try instead to understand the importance of, and the reasons for, these differences. The application of 'blindness' to legal situations was intended to prevent injustices arising from these differences, but this application has failed.

As Catherine Mackinnon points out, the difference approach requires a standard or yardstick "against which equality can be measured; so that those who are equal (the same) can be treated in the same fashion." This view focuses attention on classification, discrimination and comparison. People are measured against the standard and treatment is meted out accordingly. Mackinnon observes that the standard is made in a male image and the rules and laws derived from it direct public life. The result is that women are excluded by virtue of their differences from engaging equally and freely in a public world that best suits the men who are the architects of equality. As an example, the workplace assumes that workers are people with wives at home. Mackinnon, in *Feminism Unmodified*, argues that feminism is a powerful explanatory political theory which proposes and takes seriously the political problem of men's domination over women; a view which she calls the dominance approach. She asserts that men express their power over women largely in sexual terms, hence we have pornography as one of domination's latest expressions; but this power also extends to all aspects of public life. In legal discussions of equality and equal treatment, since we use a difference approach[11] rather than the dominance approach, "sex equality law has been utterly ineffective in getting women what we need and are socially prevented from having on the basis of a condition of birth: a chance at productive lives of reasonable physical security, self-expression, individuation, and minimal respect and dignity."[12] As Kymlicka notes, since the problem is domination, the solution is not only the absence of discrimination, but the presence of power. What people need is equal opportunity plus equal power, though he does not make clear what he means by power.

It is possible to argue that the position of women with respect to power is better defined as the "politics of autonomy" rather than the "politics of equality." This position may imply however that women's possibilities are really as open as are men's and this seems to me to be, as yet, inaccurate. In order to distinguish the difference to the question of power that autonomy versus equality makes we can separate out attributes of each in the following way:

Autonomy	**Equality**
1. implies the right to see one's self in whatever terms one chooses, which may imply an integration or alliance with other groups or individuals, or it may not;	1. implies a measurement according to a given standard
2. implies the right to accept or reject such norms or standards according to their appropriateness to one's self-definition or self-concept;	2. equality is the equivalence of two or more terms, one of which takes on the role of norm or model in unquestionable ways;
3. struggles for autonomy imply the right to reject such standards and to create new ones.	3. struggles for equality imply an acceptance of given standards and a conformity to their expectations and requirements.[13]

If the conceptualization of equality requires "that one be the same as those who set the standard--those which one is already defined as different from, this simply means that sex equality is conceptually designed never to be achieved."[14] The issue is between treating people the same and treating people appropriately in light of the authentic and important differences imbedded in our experience and values. If equality is modelled on sameness, we have no way right now to measure or compare the significance of these differences or assess how treatment should be directed by our conceptualization of equality. When we try to decide what treatment is appropriate in a given circumstance, we are not capable of addressing problems which arise from a model for equality itself stacked against those who are different. If we accept both Foucault's and Gilligan's analysis, we recognize that there are two problems here: immaturity and

asymmetry. Our perspective must be informed by examining the power and privilege that modern equality has made possible through the exclusion of difference. In the case both of many feminists and critical theorists deviation from the dominant standard is understood to exist because there are real and significant differences which are of value because of the knowledgeable experience of women and minorities. Application of equality to these values perpetuates an asymmetry in their evaluation. It is not simply that people are different because they are excluded; they are excluded because of genuine and valuable differences. What is the significance of these differences?

Mackinnon argues that to see the problem of sexual equality as one of equality and difference is a fundamental mistake. The problem is not equality but inequality: the power that men exercise over women. Neither, she argues, are sexual differences the problem. She asserts that "there is no natural difference between men and women that lies repressed beneath existing social relations or that requires reevaluation. There is only power." The social constitution of our ideas of what it means to be female or male, have been brought into being as a result of male domination.[15] That is, power as domination is at the bottom of all social relations between men and women. She simply denies that the terms equality or difference have any relevance to the problems women have in securing access to rights and dignity as persons. Carole Pateman disagrees with Mackinnon on this point and says that equality and difference are not necessarily opposed, but historically, this is how the categories have developed. Men's equality depends upon the political significance accorded to sexual (women's) differences. It was supposed, at the outset of modernity, that women's bodies lack the attributes of equals who can participate in public life; women's political incorporation was determined by their physical body. The question is not whether sexual difference is politically relevant, but rather, how that difference is to be given political significance. An argument that singles out acts of power as the focus for the way women are subordinated "lacks historical depth and an appreciation for the paradoxes and contradictions of women's experience."[16]

I agree with Mackinnon that inequality is the pressing social problem but I think that the conceptual problem of whether we are able to conceive of different people equally remains, and it influences the outcomes of our social and political goals. Further, I would argue that the solution is to redefine power relations in the direction of including empowerment and empowering practices, an argument I make in the following chapter. In response to Mackinnon, I think it is misleading to characterize all those who have historically occupied a position of privilege in the way that she does. Our experience tells us that 1. it is possible for particular men to choose not to dominate women and it is possible for some women to dominate some men; 2. it is conceivable that people in privileged positions could choose not to dominate others and could choose not to accept privileges that accrue to being in the advantaged position; 3. it fails to take seriously how hard 2 is to actually carry out whether one is a male or female; and 4. it under estimates the influence that women have had in social relations, though this influence has been shaped by social processes of genderization. I would assert that all social relations are characterized by the exercise of power. Power, as a kind of social energy, fills us or leaves us empty through historical and current conditions that have shaped our experience, blinding us to the potential for *personal power* that inheres in all of us, so that we fail to activate it, as it were. These conditions apply to sex, race, and poverty and therefore are broader than sex alone can account for. The social inequality of women and minorities must receive our immediate attention and schools must assist in the ameliorating effects of such a project; but in the long run we must address the conceptual problems of difference and sameness in order to establish the social aims and goals based on a reciprocity of good will that could alleviate the burden of our differences. Finally, we must not forget the problem that immature moral development presents for us as we try to work towards this aim.

Vulnerability

In chapter two I discussed Foucault's idea of the historicity of experience and suggested that his idea is central to understanding those who are persistently disadvantaged in power relations. If we apply the notion to minority experience then we must have two kinds of information, namely: an historical awareness of a group's present circumstance, and a clear view of whose reality we are deploying when we assess how power operates.[17] In responding to both of these directives to our inquiry, I suggest that the idea of socially-constituted vulnerability is capable of separating out those whose vulnerability is a result of a failure of our conceptualization of equality so that our moral responsibility to such individuals can be more clearly seen.

If our conceptualization of equality were to be effective in bringing about justice in the midst of our human condition then we would not expect vulnerability to disappear--since to be human is to be vulnerable in some sense; rather, we would expect vulnerability to be either natural or mutual. It would be natural in those circumstances where dependence upon others is unavoidable, as in the case of children, the sick, and the aged. The situations of childhood, illness and aging make us more vulnerable than we otherwise are. What makes vulnerability natural in these instances is that everyone is similarly afflicted: we are all children, we all get sick and we all die. If we think of vulnerability in our relationships, moral equality should make us mutually vulnerable. As examples, married couples or intimate friends should be mutually vulnerable for emotional support: each person in the pair should be mutually and reciprocally dependent upon the particular satisfactions that friendship or marriage affords. There is also a third possibility. Some people might become vulnerable because of choices they make. As an example, a man might spend all his money at the race track and have nothing left to live on; having nothing left to live on makes him vulnerable to the exigences of life. In such an instance, we make certain assumptions that lead us to the conclusion that his vulnerability was self-imposed. We assume that he is a competent adult who is morally responsible for his own actions and therefore, no one can be expected to protect or compensate him for his loss and his resulting vulnerability.

Now there is no doubt that some people may make choices in the way our gambler did. But as Okin points out, some theories fail to take seriously the limitations placed on the choices that many of us make. Large and predictable segments of our society suffer from a vulnerability that is neither natural, mutual nor self-imposed. Rather, this vulnerability is a social condition which results from asymmetrical power relations perpetuated historically and practised against certain identifiable groups and which distorts personality. Whereas natural dependency has the possibility of throwing off vulnerability through empowering parental and educational practices, and mutual vulnerability presupposes a symmetry in our social relationships, asymmetrical vulnerability and dependency "create social obligations which may fail to be filled" and open up the opportunity for exploitation. For these reasons, asymmetrical vulnerability is "morally unacceptable."[18] I refer to a variety of experiences of being vulnerable due to social conditions, in addition to focusing on feminist critiques of socially constructed vulnerability, in order to show that vulnerability is a pervasive condition attached to asymmetrical relations of power and not just a problem for women. I am inclusive for two reasons: to maintain a focus on abuses of power as our central problem and to take account of the possibility that women as well as men may subjugate others from strategically well-situated positions. That is, the issue is not that we are vulnerable because we are female, i.e., from something in our nature; rather, because we are women, we are made vulnerable through identifiable, and alterable, social processes. I argue that vulnerability as a social condition, is a moral problem which hinders justice and the just distribution of goods and resources all of which frustrates the development of human maturity. If it is the case that the standard at the core of our conceptualization of equality is exclusive of difference, then we could expect those who fall outside the criteria of male, white, Anglo-European to experience their difference as a perpetual and self-depreciating inferiority, and this is what we do see.

In the previous chapter, I made reference to Fanon, Freire and Vallieres and the problem for empowerment their critique raises. Fanon spelled out what he termed the "colonial relation:"

a relation which originates in the violence that foreigners carry out against natives of a particular country in order to subjugate these indigenous people so as to secure whatever interests the newcomers have in the land. The violence which makes colonialism possible can be compared to *sovereign power*. The oppressors are enabled, through their technological advantage, to gain a position of ascendency over the less technically developed native population. In the colonial relation, the colonizers act as king and the native takes the criminal's place, with the important difference that no evidence must be got together to demonstrate the native's guilt. Violence comes down upon their heads merely because they are native. The native's very being--his blackness, his backwardness--is reason enough to offend the king. That is, the very physical presence of the native, his nearness, and in particular, his bodily difference is sufficient justification for any and all the harm he suffers at the hands of his oppressors. In the same way that the criminal's body becomes a thing--a screen on which is projected the power and glory of the king--the native also becomes a thing. The "very nature of humanity becomes estranged in the colonial condition."[19] And further, "the colonial subject is always 'overdetermined' from without." This overdetermination is made possible by the constant comparison between the colonized and the colonizer. The colonized are keenly aware of the dehumanization that is made possible by "a form of power that is exercised at the very limit of identity and authority,"[20] so that the exercise of this power over the powerless adversely affects the personality of the oppressed.[21] The effects of this inferiority constantly drive the native "to seek white approval,"[22] and eventuates in a condition Fanon describes as a "neurotic orientation" in which "the man of colour" is in "constant effort to run away from his own individuality, to annihilate his own presence....The Negro, having been made inferior, proceeds from humiliating insecurity through strongly-voiced self-accusation to despair."[23] The sense of inferiority that comes along with being powerless in the presence of an absolute and limitless aggression "makes people ashamed of their own existence," and encourages "passivity...in just those situations in which what is most needed is to hold oneself, like a sliver to the heart of the world, to upset, if necessary, the chain of command, but in any case, and most assuredly, to stand up to the world."[24]

Fanon believes that, because this power takes the form that it does, passivity in the oppressed must be replaced by anger and violence. The humanity of the oppressed must become outraged. But *sovereign power* in the colonial relation, which is also forever outside any reasonable justification, creates an ambivalence in the colonialized that is expressed in what appears to be a "dependency complex:" the white man is to the black man both enemy and ideal. It is, as Freire observes, the dual role that the oppressor plays inside the oppressed that creates and sustains dependence. Freire's analysis of the effects inside the oppressed compare with the effects of *disciplinary power* in that docility (passivity) characterizes both. Freire also affirms effects like those of *sovereign power* in that the "oppressed have been destroyed precisely because their situation has reduced them to things."[25] Whether this distortion of personality is the result of the economic dependence of women on their husbands, or the symbolic objectification of women in pornography, or the technological dependence of one cultural group on another, domination's effects inside the disprivileged are similar.[26] It is because he made this connection between vulnerability and personality that Gramsci asserts that: "The formation of a new feminine personality is the most important question of an ethical and civil order connected to the sexual question." He continues: "Until women can attain not only a genuine independence in relation to men but also a new way of conceiving themselves and their role in sexual relations, the sexual relation will remain full of unhealthy characteristics."[27]

The issue is that people can be kept vulnerable to the extent that they are internally conflicted in their self-conceptions. Inside the vulnerable person is a civil war which precludes making plans and having intentions. As long as the war lasts, people will remain unable to exercise their *personal power* in positive and self-empowering ways. The vulnerable, whether they are women or minorities, are held back inside this ambiguity and the confusion of identity that results from it. One aspect of the debilitating ambiguity in women's experience arises out of the liberal tradition's acceptance of two competing claims about women. The first is that women, like

men, should be viewed as "free and equal beings," capable of self-determination and a sense of justice, and hence free to enter the public realm of economy and government. The second assertion is that:

> Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman marries, it may in general be understood that she makes the choice of management of a household, and the bringing up of a family, as the first call upon her exertions, during as many years of her life as may be required for the purpose; and that she renounces, not all other objects and requirements, but all which are not consistent with the requirements of this.[28]

That is, married women are pulled in two directions, they are drawn towards involvement in a public life which has been constructed around highly prized male values and interests, hindering their involvement there, and they are drawn towards a domestic life consisting of work that has little cultural value. Neither world conceives women positively. Surely this is very odd.

This domestic world is comprised of two responsibilities: household management and parenting children. How is it possible that these two responsibilities lay equal claim to women's lives on the basis of their nature? What is true of women who become mothers is that they conceive, carry, bear and nourish their young offspring. Since this is a particularly female function it is reasonable to make it women's work. For each child a women has she could reasonably be expected to spend a year per child engaged in such activities. Since women in the 1990s apparently can expect to bear 2 children, this would amount to two years out of a life-span of approximately seventy years. But what else follows from women's natural role in the lives of infants? Domestic service to adult men certainly does not. Neither does the sole responsibility for the parenting of small children. Most men have been socialized to think they are not responsible for domestic labour and parenting; because they have the power to enforce their wills and silence women's opposition to them, women's assignment of unpaid labour has continued unchecked.[29] Further, it may be that influential notions of autonomy in the liberal tradition discourages men from participating in work which limits and shapes the pursuit of their personal projects. If privilege has been traditionally defined in terms of "getting one's own way" men may feel diminished in their *personal power* if they pursued goals directed towards empowering their offspring and carried out at some expense to themselves. That is, privilege has allowed men to free themselves from the ambiguity of ambition versus family, and in doing so, has put the entire burden on women. The workplace perpetuates asymmetry in power relations that supports the imposition of these dual roles on women: this ambiguity is experienced as being drawn forcefully in two opposing directions which amounts to a feeling of being pulled apart. According to Kymlicka, the liberal tradition suggests that mature adults should operate from the inside, but because of the way the world is structured, women's internal worlds are ambiguous at best. And as long as married men with families continue to pursue singularity of purpose to the exclusion of generously caring for their own children, adult maturity, in its fullest sense of generativity, eludes them.

Susan Moller Okin claims that the institution of marriage as it is currently conceived makes women vulnerable. She asserts that "women are rendered vulnerable by marriage and especially by motherhood," which means that "there is greater scope for unchecked injustice to flourish" in the family.[30] The vulnerability she speaks of is neither natural to all human beings nor mutual between human beings and is not self-imposed. Rather, it is collectively-imposed: it is imposed on women merely because they are women. That is, this vulnerability is socially-constituted and results in emotional, relational, political, educational and economic disadvantages that disastrously affect the choices that women typically make. The reason that marriage and motherhood make women vulnerable is that young girls anticipate and also become the primary parent of young children and carry the responsibility for the unpaid domestic labour of the household. As a result, career aspirations in young women are neither encouraged in their social world nor seen by them as in their own best interests. Since domestic service to men and

parenting children take much of their time and energy, having a career conflicts with this consuming role. In addition, women are aware that the assumption in the workplace generally is that workers are individuals with wives at home who look after the reproductive aspects of their lives, at no compensatory cost to these workers.

As a result, the educational aspirations of young girls and women are shaped by this cultural expectation, which is reinforced by what they see in their own families. The social conditions which promote this division of domestic labour directly affect the substantive liberty of women. Included in the self-conception of women, a competition is set up between parenting and domestic responsibilities, on the one hand, and any career options that they might wish to develop, on the other. That is, women must choose between marriage and career while men make no such choice but can have both. The argument for leaving the responsibility for reproductive as opposed to productive work with women is made on the basis of their very nature. The same tradition that has come to see that substantive liberty is more fundamental than formal liberty has fathered this connection between women's work and their essential nature. But why are women so susceptible to being made vulnerable?

Okin also claims that marriage makes women vulnerable "to dependency, exploitation, and abuse" because it is harder for women than men to leave a marriage. Further, the ease or impossibility of withdrawing or exiting from a relationship is related to the development of the "art of voice" while one is in the relationship. There is, according to Albert O. Hirschman, a complex relation between voice and exit. That is, the "differing relative potentials for satisfactory withdrawal from the relationship [without severe cost] is one of the major elements making marriage a morally unacceptable relationship of vulnerability.[31] The role that withdrawal plays in vulnerability is made visible by recognizing that some of our most "important dependencies and vulnerabilities are almost wholly social in character," and that "insofar as they are alterable, they are morally unacceptable and should be minimized."[32] In terms of his analysis of exit and voice, Hirschman's first point is that if the exit option is readily available, "this will tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice." For example, if two stores sell the same product but in one the salespeople are rude, you merely go to the other store without voicing a complaint about the rudeness of sales clerks. His second point is that the non-existence or low feasibility of the exit option can impede the effectiveness of voice, since the *threat* of exit, whether explicit or implicit, is an important means of making one's voice influential. That is, if there are a lot of stores selling the same product and all are competing for customers, the threat that customers might leave affects how each store does business. To Hirschman, the most satisfying equation is that there should be "the possibility of exit, but exit should not be too easy or too attractive." In this way, the art of voice is developed most effectively.

If these insights are applied to marriage, Okin argues that the freedom to exit is different for women and men when there are children and especially if the wife has not developed skills to support both herself and her children. Further, the marriage relationship is an institution that is not only weakened by the exit of one person, it is dissolved by it, whether or not the other party wanted this dissolution. Because of this, "the relative potential of the exit option for the two parties is crucial for the relationship's power structure." The one who is more dependent must conform his or her behaviour more strictly towards accommodations that are imposed by the other. Okin proposes that "gender-structured marriage involves women in a cycle of socially caused and distinctly asymmetrical vulnerability" through an unequal division of unpaid household labour and through the cumulative effects of the privilege accorded to men through the unhindered pursuit of personal ambition.[33]

Equality and ambition

Kymlicka begins his argument for equality as a deeper value by making an important connection between moral philosophy and political philosophy. He asserts, using Robert Nozick's view, that "moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of, political philosophy." That is, what people "may and may not do to one another limits what they may do through the

apparatus of the state, or do to establish such an apparatus." In this context, Kymlicka says that we have moral obligations towards each other, some of which are matters of public responsibility enforced through public institutions, others of which are matters of personal responsibility involving rules of conduct. Political philosophy "focuses on those obligations which justify the use of public institutions and which are determined by deeper moral principles," such as "equality" which to him implies mutual respect and equal consideration. He asserts that any account of our public responsibilities must fit into a broader moral framework that makes room for, and makes sense of, our private responsibilities. Public responsibilities "must not crowd out (in theory or in practice) our sense of personal responsibility for helping friends, keeping promises, pursuing projects." However, personal obligations must also make room for the values applying to political institutions, values such as tolerance and equality.[34]

In trying to balance public and private considerations the way he does, Kymlicka sets the stage for analyzing equality between the sexes in terms of several distinctions that are made in the liberal tradition under the heading of private versus public worlds. In particular, he discusses the relationship between the ethics of care and justice which I identified in chapter three. I analyze his argument later on, but when Kymlicka grounds his analysis this way he makes it much easier to build bridges between the worlds of men and women. I think his emphasis is not only acceptable, it is compelling to him throughout his investigation of major political theories, particularly as he tries to make sense of the argument between the ethics of care and justice. By relating moral and political philosophy as he does, Kymlicka establishes parameters for political philosophy that must fall within the boundaries circumscribed by "moral self-interest." What remains to be considered is how he depicts this moral world. When he suggests we use equality as our one deeper value we must ask ourselves whether equality enables us to responsibly *measure* differences between the worlds of women and men. I argue that, because Kymlicka has not interrogated our conceptualization of equality, the end of his chapter on feminism seems unfinished.[35] He does not include, for example, a section on the politics of feminism, which would allow him to make an argument for the de-genderizing of social processes, for example, a conclusion to the chapter we expect considering the pattern of the others.

But prior to discussing the ethics of justice and care, we must acknowledge that even though Kymlicka is encouragingly sensitive to feminist issues, he hangs on to an important distinction that fails to take women's experience seriously. His omission is hard to understand particularly when he places so much importance on substantive over formal freedom. The distinction I refer to is his "ambition-sensitive" criterion regarding just distributions of resources. In discussing liberal equality, Kymlicka analyzes Rawls's position which is captured in the "difference principle," which, generally conceived, states that all social primary goods, such as liberty, opportunity, income and wealth and the bases of self-respect are to be distributed equally; an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is justified if it benefits the least advantaged.[36] That is, inequalities are allowed if they improve the initial "fair share" of social primary goods that people should have merely because they are human beings but distributions are not allowed to continue to the point that fair shares are invaded.[37]

That is, undergirding Rawls's position is a claim for universal entitlement to a fair share of social primary goods. In fact, Kymlicka observes that Rawls considers the right to a certain share of society's resources to be his most important right.[38] Further, in Rawls's "second priority rule...fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle," the principle that allows for distributions to be carried out on the behalf of the least advantaged. That is, fair shares apply to everyone. Extra benefits enjoyed by some can be curtailed through a redistribution of goods that benefits those who cannot achieve extra benefits for themselves due to some condition that characterizes them and is a result of "brute luck." Rawls clarifies his position by distinguishing between *social primary goods*: those that are directly distributed by social institutions, like income and wealth, opportunities and powers, rights and liberties; and *natural primary goods*: goods like health, intelligence, vigour, imagination, and natural talents, which are affected by social institutions but are not directly distributed by them.[39] What motivates Rawls's assertions is the

view that equality of opportunity, for example, should not be constrained by brute luck; that is, no one deserves poverty due to conditions of birth.

Further, Rawls believes that equality of opportunity seems fair to us because it ensures that people's fate is determined by their choices not their circumstances.[40] The moral significance of the distinction between choice and circumstance is one of Rawls's most important contributions, according to Kymlicka. This is because the distinction between choice and circumstance grounds our idea of morally justifiable distributions of goods since people's moral claim to a fair share of resources should depend on individual ambition, on this view. Meritocracies rely on such justifications. Rawls compensates for the disadvantages that some people suffer due to circumstance, by allowing that natural talent, an endowment, can be "saved" from moral failure if natural talent works for the good of the least fortunate;[41] that is, Rawls considers it to be a moral failure to use endowment to selfish advantage. To Kymlicka, what seems to motivate Rawls's theory of justice is that distributions of social primary goods should be endowment-insensitive and ambition-sensitive; endowment-insensitive to compensate for "brute luck" and ambition-sensitive to accommodate reasonable differences in the distributions of goods that follow from individual choices. Rawls himself makes this point clear just prior to articulating fully his two principles of justice.[42] He states that:

> For as I have defined it, the second principle [the difference principle] only requires equal life prospects in all sectors of society for those similarly endowed and *motivated*. If there are variations among families in the same sector in how they shape the child's aspirations, then while fair equality of opportunity may obtain between sectors, equal chances between individuals will not.[43] (emphasis mine)

When we ask if the child in this statement is female we see that the effects of insisting that our ambitions distinguish our rewards becomes clear as a form of discrimination against all women since during genderizing practices the ambitions of women are constrained by the brute luck of birth, an assertion that I will pursue shortly. But suffice it to say here that women's exclusion from positions of power fixes the development of their ambitions in ways which disprivilege them in comparison to men and the state has been free to use its power to keep women in subordinate positions with respect to decision-making over issues, such as abortion or divorce, that stem from their socially-constituted role as primary parents and unpaid domestic labourers.

In fact, if we take Foucault's analysis seriously, the liberal tradition has relied on a naive view of state power and power generally. According to Kymlicka, if a liberal asks the question: How is it that people born free and equal come to be governed?" a satisfying answer is found in the belief that: "Having some people with the power to govern others is compatible with respecting moral equality because the rulers only hold this power in trust, to protect and promote the interests of the governed."[44] This perspective does not account for the effects of sovereign, pastoral and disciplinary power, i.e., for the general consequences of domination. Rawls, on the other hand, opens the liberal tradition up to a more realistic view of power and sets a better groundwork for reconceiving equality. His original position prevents X from having an advantage due to a strategically better position from which X bargains for the satisfaction of personal interests and this provision must be extended to "genderized" interests, an argument I will pick up later.

Kymlicka says that if we wish to criticize Rawls we must do so by showing how his view fails to embody an adequate account of equality.[45] He attempts to do this himself by asserting that Rawls leaves "too much room for the influence of natural inequalities, too little room for the influence of our choices." He argues that in the difference principle, Rawls defines the worst off position in terms of social goods alone, e.g., wealth, and he needs also to define it in terms of natural goods, such as health. Kymlicka then suggests that if we make this second move, we must compensate for inequalities that arise from people's circumstances and we begin a *slippery slope* argument: while the difference principle is the best principle for ensuring that natural assets do

not have an unfair influence, if, for example, handicapped people need more to compensate them, then we should compensate both for natural and social inequalities. Kymlicka asks: Where is the end to this requirement to compensate? and, How can one be compensated for having to live life in a wheelchair while others walk about able-bodied? He then interjects the problem of scarcity of resources into the discussion. According to him, we have this untenable position in which the disadvantaged can drain away resources from the talented because they are disprivileged and deserve compensation. Kymlicka wants to strengthen ambition-sensitive criteria for this reason.

In my view, it is Rawls not Kymlicka that helps us understand what is currently wrong with our conceptualization of equality. Kymlicka's critique of Rawls does not take account of those numerous situations of inequality which arise from conditions which are socially-constituted and therefore alterable but are connected in our minds to "brute luck." It is certainly a matter of luck that we are born either male or female. But while genderization may be brutish, it is hardly an outcome of luck; it refers to a set of processes that are the result of the social power that men have had and continue to have over women. Genderization undergirds a sustained and socially advantageous position of privilege which benefits men while disprivileging women, and supports a liberal notion of autonomy as the relatively predictable pursuit of one's own projects--a view of autonomy which precludes women, as we will shortly see.

It seems to me that the most obvious outcome of Rawls's proposal is that we should eliminate those genderizing social conditions of unfair advantage that result in making some people vulnerable. As an example, we should make families more just by redistributing the domestic work between the adult partners; we should make education more just by no longer genderizing the life chances of boys and especially girls. This point becomes clearer if we examine the idea of choice as Kymlicka presents it and if we ask: What do we mean when we say distributions should be ambition-sensitive? I argue that what we actually mean is that some of us want to maintain status-quo distributions. Unless we analyze the idea of ambition and its relation to power and empowerment, we will not feel compelled to alter basic social structures and will continue to use scarcity as a reason to leave things as they are.

Kymlicka criticizes Rawls's view as too loose an interpretation of choice by working out a thought experiment about a tennis player and a gardener. He asks the question: How should we be sensitive to people's choices? In his experiment he attempts to demonstrate the injustice of not taking choice seriously: the male tennis player only wants to play tennis and therefore only works hard enough to pay for his involvement in the sport; the female gardener works hard, gains resources and according to the difference principle should give the tennis player some of her hard-earned resources when he runs dangerously low. Unfair! says Kymlicka. But he warns, if we use Rawls's difference principle, the gardener is bound to support the lazy tennis-player. He says that we should take ambition seriously and make distributions ambition-sensitive. Kymlicka concludes by saying that: "When inequalities in income are the result of choices, not circumstances, the difference principle creates, rather than removes unfairness." Therefore, distributions should be endowment-insensitive and ambition-sensitive. He supports his assertion by saying further, that Rawls would not wish the gardener to subsidize the tennis-player because it is inequalities in life-chances not in life-choices that concern Rawls. What this view fails to recognize is that women's choices result from their endowment as women. They are heirs of a collective-conception of what it means to be women which does not fit into the traditional liberal framework. That is, women's choices result from their genderized circumstances and we cannot make the separation stick to them of endowment-insensitivity versus ambition-sensitivity, except unjustly, unless we also rid ourselves of the social processes that genderize all of us.

There are two problems with Kymlicka's thought experiment. The first is that our choices are the outcome of our social experience: of what we think is both necessary and possible for us. Kymlicka is not talking about the real lives of women when he makes his point about ambition--even if he makes the gardener a female. He excludes the real problems women face at the outset by saying "[i]magine that we have succeeded in equalizing people's social and natural circumstances" and therefore his view is not a solution for women's experience. To take the

simplest case, he asserts, "imagine two people of equal natural talent who share the same social background."[46] But comparing social backgrounds is not the same as taking the historicity of women's experience seriously since our so-called natural talent is socially constituted. But suppose he does intend social backgrounds to include these effects, a second problem applies which is related to the first. His example fails to reveal how domination over women has led to the ways in which ambition is expressed in them. If he is correct to argue that choice is deeply significant given this scenario, his example fails to account for women's experience for two reasons: this woman either is genderized or she is not. If she is, then she is made vulnerable by this process as any genderized woman would be and is therefore drawn in two directions with respect to her ambitions (towards those of her potential family and towards her own). In this way she is not equal to the tennis player whether or not she is married and has children since it is the expectation that she might be in one or both of these situations that influences her while she is developing a sense of ambition during adolescence. If, on the other hand, she is not genderized, then she may be equal to the tennis player but she is not like most woman we know and the case for ambition-sensitive criteria only applies to women who are not genderized. In this case, Okin's argument for the de-genderization of society seems necessary. Kymlicka does address the problem of women's experience very carefully later on but he does not bring out these implications for ambition-sensitive criteria. He seems very reluctant to let go his hold on the expression. I am not arguing that Kymlicka's thought experiment fails as an examination of choice, rather I am saying that, as it stands, it is an instance of false gender neutrality.[47]

In general, theories of justice have been and continue to be formulated on models and examples that fit well the real life experiences of men but do not fit at all the experiences of women, and therefore they are incapable conceptually of including women's experience in their purview. Ambition-sensitive criteria only secure a position for those who make free and unhindered choices which conform to a notion of autonomy as the relatively predictable pursuit of personal projects. Either we must challenge the applicability of ambition-sensitive criteria to women or we should include in it a *genuine* sensitivity to different meanings for, and expressions of, ambition. That is, Kymlicka's stress on ambition-sensitive criteria does not help us pick out ways in which the ambitions of women (and minorities) are thwarted in their development or never get off the ground. Additionally, the term certainly does nothing to spell out the experience of women who have personal projects they want to pursue while at the same time wanting to empower the lives of others, a dual desire which drains time, money and energy from single-minded personal ambition.

Kymlicka is aware of these problems however. In discussing Dworkin's insurance scheme, he says that the idea of Dworkin's auction only works if natural resources are the same. He asks: Why not compensate for disadvantages before the auction begins and divide up the resources later? But because, in this case, he moves to the example of the handicapped and away from the tennis player and gardener, he responds to his own question by suggesting that nothing can really compensate for being handicapped and that full equality of circumstance is not possible; we are left with only *ad hoc* acts of compassion or mercy.[48] But something could be done to enhance the life chances of women; we could alter social processes that genderize women as well as men. Women do not want compassion or mercy as *a substitute for* commitment to social change.

The second problem is related to the first. If the woman is not genderized, we have no need for a just redistribution in this example, because we start with an imaginary one. That is, we have to believe in advance certain things about the nature of choice in order to be convinced by this example. Since Kymlicka eliminates in one imaginary move all the real problems women have with choice, his point is quite useless to us. Neither is Dworkin's ambition sensitive auction any use to us in ameliorating the conditions suffered by those who are vulnerable in our society. The experience of women is excluded by Dworkin at the outset: All society's resources are up for auction: everyone has the same amount of resources; people make choices to best suit their plan of life. If the auction works, Kymlicka claims that the three main aims of Rawls's theory would be fulfilled: the moral equality of people would be respected, mitigating the effects of morally

arbitrary advantages; we would accept responsibility for our own choices; and therefore, just distributions would result because distributions would be directly linked to choice.[49] But the auction merely assumes conditions that Rawls's theory was set up to alleviate. The set up of the auction precludes any other relationship except the one between choice and distribution. While this thought experiment helps to clarify this relationship, it does not take account of the predictable problems that women face.

Vulnerability produces predictable effects on the choices and ambitions of women. Sexual inequality renders women incapable of making decisions that men make when they conceive life plans. In fact, inequality shapes the self-conceptions of women before they can even begin to plan a life for themselves. If Kymlicka is seriously asking how we might be sensitive to people's choices, it is difficult to understand why he hangs on so tightly to ambition-sensitive criteria without de-genderizing it. Surely substantive liberty and moral equality are offended more because women are precluded from making choices on the basis of sex than by inequalities arising from people's choices.

In terms of substantive liberty,[50] the basic claim is that "no one is the possession of any other." Thus formal liberty prevents people from being legally owned by any one else and is important as a contrast to slavery. Substantive liberty, on the other hand, promotes our ability to act on our conception of ourselves. It is an expression of self-determination and requires resources as well as rights over one's physical being. Sovereign, pastoral and disciplinary power distort substantive freedom by making the disadvantaged vulnerable to the advantaged. If we accept Kymlicka's argument that substantive liberty is more fundamental than formal liberty and if we accept that Rawls is correct to say that the social bases of self respect are perhaps the primary goods, we must realize that vulnerability jeopardizes self-respect and self-respect is fundamental to the development of ambition.

In making his argument about ambition, Kymlicka worries about the slippery slope that Rawls begins when he distinguishes between social and natural goods and so he, following Dworkin, proposes to solve the problem by making the division on the basis of our choices and circumstances.[51] While I think this move is appropriate, I would argue that in the actual genderized world in which we live, ambition does not fit on the choice side. While Kymlicka says we need a clear and acceptable line between choices and circumstances, and we do not have one--thereby allowing libertarians to suggest that we can avoid having to draw one,[52] I suggest that ambition must be reconceived.

As noted earlier, in terms of ambition, women grow up expecting to provide domestic service for men and to parent small children, so they assess life chances in terms of a competition between family and career: women must choose one or the other. If both are chosen, they are mutually constraining so it is not surprising that women perceive "a conflict between their own work interests and the interests of any children that they might have."[53] Men, on the other hand, choose both family and career without any sense of rivalry between the two life plans. Because structures of power, based on socially prized public resources, constituted outside the family bear directly on power relations within the family, women become and remain dependent. This dependency, which makes women vulnerable to power, increases over time in marriage as men gather together the life experiences that enhance their relative power when compared with their wives. As a result, men can exercise greater control in the marriage. So we have conditions in which power in the family operates to benefit men and power outside the family supports and extends male power. As a result, "men as a group exercise control over women's general life chances" through making political decisions about issues such as abortion, job requirements, and the like. Within the privacy of the family setting, "individual men exercise control over economically vulnerable women."[54]

Kymlicka argues that this cycle of power maintenance is gender neutral; by that he means that it is all accomplished without any overt discrimination against women because they are women; that is, it all happens under the guise of the "difference approach." But he points out that it all contributes to sexual inequality. Using Mackinnon's conception of the "dominance

approach," we can see that if women are dominated they do not need to be discriminated against. The more gendered the society, the less capable the difference approach is of detecting an inequality. Okin clearly identifies structures that make it easier for men as a group to control the life chances of women, e.g., the role of primary parent and the imbalanced division of unpaid domestic labour. If we examine the difference approach, the way we think of equality now makes it easy for those in positions of power to believe that women are being treated "equally" as long as no overt discrimination is exercised against them. This view assumes that women are really the same as men but perhaps a little behind in their development: they need a little boost and will catch up--some more quickly than others, so that, at bottom, women are *less than* or *not yet* men. It seems to me that Kymlicka's use of ambition-sensitive criteria lends some support to the idea that women can be measured against a male standard for ambition. What he fails to recognize is that historical differences between women and men have real effects in the way women conceive ambition.

As noted earlier, whether or not women marry, the expectation that they will still shapes their ambition because it is hard for women "to imagine successfully combining motherhood and a career."[55] Rawls includes imagination in his natural primary goods, but we see here that a failure of imagination characterizes women's adolescent life. This is not only because as young women we have few dreams for ourselves; no one else has dreams for us either. One of the most debilitating aspects of growing up female is that no one expects you to do anything other than parent and housekeep and in fact discourages you from imagining something else by setting the problem of your attractiveness and acceptability to men before you in a way which terrifies ambition.[56] Since the pursuit of a career implies that life plans will proceed in a single, relatively uninterrupted forward-looking direction during the so-called prime of one's life, healthy ambition is a pivot point. What young women see is that the prime of most adult women's lives is spent caring for children. Even in conceiving the idea of a life-plan, women are disadvantaged by the unpredictability that responsibility for the young carries. Only low-paying or temporary jobs fit in easily with family responsibilities. All ambitions are projected from the idea that we have of ourselves: from what we dare to dream is possible for us. Ambition requires a steadiness of purpose, personal courage and a social environment that provides high expectations and high support for adolescent dreams. Young women's lives are ill-designed to provide them with this foundation.

It is for these reasons that the substantive liberty of women must be said to be highly constrained by the obstacles that our social structures place in their way. These obstacles may come in the form of expectations about marriage or from the actual bargain that marriage extracts: in the unequal and unjustified distribution of domestic labour; in abuse or violence such as that portrayed in pornography or meted out in families against women, simply because they are women; or in indifference to the conditions which frustrate women at home and in the workplace. Whatever form that these obstacles take, they all contribute to making women vulnerable.

Equality in terms of justice and care: two moral projects

Social reform is necessary so that women can pursue personal goals. But what does this freedom mean to women who carry the responsibility for the reproductive aspect of human labour? Because of the historic separation of men's and women's lives, ideas about how we are different not only limit the ambition of women, this separation shapes our ideas about what is both possible and necessary to include in our moral work. Kymlicka and Okin interrogate the relationship between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice, and as Kymlicka notes, the separation of public and domestic spheres along the lines of gender has left us with what seem to be "two moral projects."[57] Behind the meaning of both projects is what I call a *moral posture*: behind justice, there is the "impartial benevolent observer" and behind care there is the "relational benevolent participant." While the word 'benevolent' appears in both, the other two terms in the expression influence the meaning of common term. In particular, I would say that the emotional

tone of the justice posture is one of 'distance' and the emotional tone of the care posture is one of 'nearness'. This distinction allows us to analyze the relationship between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice and reveals the primacy of an ethic of care in the empowerment of people.

Kymlicka and Okin address the relationship between the ethics of justice and care differently. Okin does so by inserting care into the heart of Rawls's theory of justice, his "original position," which I will presently describe. What is the effect of this insertion of care into justice? One result, is that she has "impartiality" left over after the union is complete and this is not insignificant.[58] Kymlicka, on the other hand, compares central aspects of the two ethics by examining what is common to them, but stops short of saying that they can be worked together into one view. What keeps them apart, in his view, is the realization that justice may actually only apply to a moral world constituted by competent (usually male) adults; that is, justice may not guide us well in dealing with those who are dependent and vulnerable. In comparing "objective unfairness" which it is our responsibility to address in an ethic of justice, with the "subjective hurt" that care focuses our attention upon, Kymlicka is unable to resolve the different implications which follow from each. He does not bring closure to his discussion of feminism; rather, he suggests more work needs to be done to articulate aspects of care.

I argue that the ethics of justice and care are as yet incompatible in important aspects which are picked out by considering the different *moral postures* that each represents. These two *moral postures* are differently constituted, and differently shape our picture of what people are really like and what it is necessary for us to do so that we can live well together. I argue further, that because the moral world is made up of the strong and the weak, those who take from others leaving them vulnerable, as well as those who give in order to strengthen others, the ethic of care must shape our social practices just now if empowerment and partnership are to be made possible in the context of vulnerability. Care is necessary preparation for the development of justice and must follow in its wake. I say this not because I think an ethic of justice is inferior to care but because an ethic of justice can more easily assimilate to a model of power as domination and has more difficulty deciphering the significance of differences between people. Because we have been living for so long with the prevalence of a power that takes away, we have filled our world with woes that only care can mend. In examining the arguments of Okin and Kymlicka I will use the analytic of *moral postures* to support this urgency to care. This debate is central to resolving problems we have with our notion of sexual equality that our current conceptualization of equality propagates because it so far precludes the development of *personal power* in the weak and disadvantaged.

In the context of developing a feminist approach to social justice based on a reinterpretation of John Rawls's central concept, the original position,[59] Okin proposes that recent distinctions made between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice may be "overdrawn, if not false."[60] In her view, the bifurcation of care and justice, led by theorists such as Carole Gilligan and Nel Noddings, "obfuscates rather than aids" our attempts to achieve a moral and political theory that we can accept given that genderization is increasingly unacceptable to us. An implication of Okin's criticism raises a very troubling problem: if we focus on care as the identifying feature of the contribution women make to conversations about political theory, and, at the same time reject genderization, how do we know what unjust consequences of genderization have gone into to making us care in the way that women supposedly do? Yet, if we follow Gilligan's assessment, problems with caring may arise from the failure of women to count themselves into the caring encounter.

In contrast to Gilligan, Okin's project is to eradicate genderization rather than build up two competing theories based on "different voices." Unlike Kymlicka who looks for the right principle to direct his inquiry, she is moved by the question of what sort of people we need to be in order to be moral and just. To Okin, genderization thwarts our attempts to address this question effectively. Okin and Kymlicka both believe that genderization limits the life chances of women. While Okin addresses genderization specifically, Kymlicka identifies the basis for the

disadvantages women suffer in the separation of public and domestic worlds--a separation which has encouraged us to associate men and women with "different modes of thought and feeling."[61]

Okin argues that "the original position," if we add the condition that the contractors do not know their sex, can be reinterpreted to reveal at its core an ethic of care, concern and empathy; and therefore, she argues that an ethic of justice does the same moral work as an ethic of care. In order to establish her case, Okin extricates Kant's influence from Rawls's view. This is necessary to her argument since Kant's heritage is responsible for the way Rawls casts his theory in the language of "rational choice" rather than empathy. Kant stresses autonomy and rationality as defining features of a moral subject; further, he rigidly separates reason from feeling and refuses to allow feeling any part in the formulation of moral principles so that rational choice refers to the idea that moral philosophy becomes the study of the conception and outcome of a suitably defined rational decision. Rawls asserts that his theory is an outworking of principles formulated under conditions that characterize men as free and equal beings. Okin asserts that reliance on Kant makes inclusion of empathy or benevolence in principles of justice very difficult because Kant assigns no place for feelings in the foundation of morality.[62]

Okin suggests that he has no place for love and for feeling in morality because Kant does not consider parental love, which

> is usually made up of elements of affective love and of benevolence, but it involves far more. The benevolence in it does not spring from the recognition of duty, and the affection in it is usually far from being 'mere inclination', with the fickleness suggested by those terms. It is a kind of love that develops over time and that has its origins in attachment so close that, for the young infant, it constitutes complete psychological identification. It is fed by attachment, continued intimacy, and interdependence. It is disastrous if it does not recognize differences between the child and the parent; it is fundamental to human life and relationship since it is the first kind of love we experience (if our circumstances are fortunate) regardless of our sex, and (providing and receiving) it has...constituted throughout history a much larger part of women's than of men's experience.[63]

Okin believes that Kant is unable to perceive the relevance of this kind of love to moral development because he defined (and lived in) a moral world that excluded women. Women in his view, were not sufficiently rational and autonomous to be included. Oddly, he does not ask himself how it is possible that women are neither. As Mary Wollstonecraft posited, if women have a particularistic emotional nature it is "simply the result of the fact that women were denied the opportunity to develop their rational capacities fully. If women thought only of the needs of the people around them, ignoring the needs of the general public, it was because they were forcibly prevented from accepting public responsibilities."[64] In short, women are different because of their experiences; in spite of this, Kant measured the virtues of women against the virtues of men and ranked women lower, holding their differences against them. Okin sees in Rawls a very different conception of the role feeling plays in morality.

Rawls assumes that the family is just and posits that it is necessary for moral development. Okin argues that if we challenge Rawls's assumption that families are just, by, for example, considering the prevalence of abuse within the family and the detrimental division of domestic labour; if we discard the heads of families assumption in his original position, and if we further assume that we do not know the sex of the contractors, when we apply the principles of justice to the gender structure and family arrangements, "considerable changes are called for."[65] These changes in family structures, such as a redistribution of domestic labour, are required by Rawls's theory because in his view the family plays an important role in moral development and, Okin asks: If families are not just, how will they move children toward justice?[66] Rawls assumes that the love of parents for the child plays the central role in the child's development of self since children aspire to be like their loving parents; love plays a role in the development of empathy

which is crucial to developing a sense of fairness. In this way Rawls, unlike Kant, makes manifest in his theory, the fundamental importance of loving parents for the development of moral thinking and a sense of justice.[67]

Okin identifies tensions in Rawls's theory between his assumption that the family is just versus his own theory and between the development of a sense of justice grounded in attachment versus the rational choice language he uses. She addresses these tensions and argues that "one is not forced to choose between an ethic of justice and an ethic of care; nor between one that emphasizes universality and one that takes account of differences."[68] Okin shows that, because Rawls reduces the original position to not being able to use probabilistic reasoning and to contractors that cannot be assumed to take risks, he must rely on empathy, benevolence and equal concern for others as for the self, in order for the parties in the original position to come up with the principles of justice he wants them to arrive at, especially the difference principle.[69] This move takes him far from rational choice theory which requires that people know a great deal more than Rawls allows contractors in his original position to know.[70] That is, not knowing who we are and what are interests might be requires us to consider all other selves equally and also requires a well developed capacity for the perspective-taking that is at the heart of empathy/receptivity.

If we ask the question of how the people behind the veil of ignorance operate in Rawls's original position, Okin concludes that they do not deliberate "from a position of nobody,...they must think from the position of everybody, in the sense of each in turn." Okin then argues that "the original position is not an abstraction from all contingencies of human life," it is "much closer to an appreciation and concern for social and other differences." She thinks it is plausible to require us both to distance ourselves from our own attachments in order to arrive at principles of justice and at the same time acknowledge that we may identify with them as we go about our daily lives. If we would be just she says that "we must develop considerable capacities for empathy and powers of communicating with others about what different human lives are like." In short, knowledge alone is not sufficient to make us just. In addition, we need a "great commitment to benevolence; to caring about each and every other as much as about ourselves."[71] In terms of the "impartiality" that Okin believes is necessary, while she does not use this language, she implies that both distance from and nearness to our attachments is possible. That is, deliberating "from the position of every body. in the sense of each in turn," requires that our moral posture be mobile and not stationary, to use the idea of *moral postures*. Is this tantamount to equating 'impartial benevolent observers' with 'relational benevolent participants'?

In order to answer this question we first must examine the underlying relationship between "moral self-interest" and "contextual caring thinking." Rawls says that justice requires us to be moved by moral self-interest rather than by mere self-interest; this is an important basis for anything we might say about care as well.[72] Okin resolves the conflict between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice by placing care at the heart of Rawls's ethic of justice but she asserts that this move "does not suggest that such principles can be replaced by contextual caring thinking." She goes on to say that if principles of justice are founded on empathy and care for others, including their differences from ourselves, instead of mutual disinterest and detachment "they will not likely lead to destructive rules that have tragic consequences when applied to those we love." She raises the problem of the relationally destructive aspect of 'distance' and intimates that mutual disinterest and detachment constitute a static posture of 'distance' which precludes coming near to those we love. But there is something problematic to Okin about the idea of "contextual caring thinking." If we recall the discussion in chapter three, Gilligan also picks out "contextual caring thinking" as a problem in moral discourse. I agree that we must resolve the confusion that seems to attend it, if Gilligan's analysis is correct, but we must first decipher whether this confusion is a socially constituted outcome of disprivileging the typical ways women work out moral problems. That is, we must see whether this confusion stems from limiting our educational approaches in a genderized society to male models of development. (By 'typical' I mean a way which arises from everyday experience instead of arising from formal training in the solution of moral problems

which at this point is most often congruent with a male model for human experience.) In short, we must identify the roots of this confusion and distinguish it from the genuine contribution women make to discussions of the needs and possibilities of human maturity in moral discourse. In terms of Okin's argument, "contextual caring thinking" may represent to her an inflexibly near posture, in which we remain too close to those to whom we are attached thereby compromising moral self-interest which is then no advantage over the inflexibly distant posture characterized by an ethic of justice. She makes her view plainer when she discusses the idea of impartiality that is left over after her interjection of care into Rawls's original position. Okin regards impartiality in Rawls's original position, as long as it is taken together with the other aspects of the position, to be designed to eliminate biases that might result from particular attachments to others, as well as from particular facts about the self. She asserts that: "[s]urely impartiality in this sense is a reasonable requirement to make of a theory of justice."[73] That is, impartiality, to Okin, may address the problem of a fixed position of nearness but she does not want to replace one fixed moral posture with another, i.e., one of distance. I would assert that a flexible *moral posture* is a feature of empowerment since empowerment includes concern for *personal power* as well as for moral self-interest.

Kymlicka also addresses the differences between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice so as to make sense of the problems we have with sexual equality. He compares three aspects of each project, namely: moral capacities, moral reasoning and moral concepts. In terms of capacities, he says, just as Okin does, that an ethic of justice grows out of an ethic of care and also agrees with Okin that families must become just to successfully develop a sense of justice in children. In terms of moral reasoning, the conflict between these ethics is more difficult to resolve, in part because it is affected by the way we conceive the ethic of care; Kymlicka also asserts that "contextual caring thinking" is inadequate if it is held to be an important feature of an ethic of care. He makes this claim because he believes that "particularity will not give us the broader social perspective,"[74] an assertion that would not convince hermeneuticists or phenomenologists, for example. In short, an ethic of justice is concerned with the application of principles while an ethic of care attends to the features of a particular person. Would Okin agree with other care theorists, following Gilligan, who intimate that appealing to principles to adjudicate conflicts may pre-empt the more valuable tendency to work out solutions to those conflicts? In stressing empathy and removing Kant from an ethic of justice she certainly moves in that direction but her discomfort with "contextual caring thinking" may pull her in an opposite one. As for Kymlicka, he says he would have more support for an approach which he calls "principled caring," since to him principles are moral guidelines that function as instructions for what we should look for in a particular case; he thinks they do not prevent us from taking particulars seriously, rather they direct our inquiry.

In one way, Kymlicka is attempting to insert justice into caring just as Okin injects caring into justice; but he has more left over at the end. Kymlicka thinks that if caring implies attending to all the particulars of an individual's case then it becomes too cumbersome a process because we cannot meet all demands: some resources are scarce and, further, we should not meet all demands because some of them may be selfish, or sexist or racist. He seems to be thinking here of "contextual caring thinking." He does not claim that caring necessarily implies an attempt to meet all demands, but he does say that caring needs to better spell out what demands it does require us to meet. Kymlicka asserts that we need principles in both ethics but because of their differences care is concerned with principles that attend to "responsibilities and relationships" while justice focuses on "rights and fairness." This distinction in their moral concepts can be broken down into a tension between 1. universality versus concern for particular relationships; 2. respect for common humanity versus respect for distinct individuality; and 3. claiming rights versus accepting responsibilities. A picture of these distinctions can be laid out in the following way.[75]

Justice	Caring
1. aims at universality or impartiality;	1. aims at preserving the web of ongoing relationships;
2. is depicted by a lone figure against the background of social relationships;	2. is depicted by allowing the relationship to become the figure in the foreground;
3. this lone figure stands back or apart to judge;	3. the pair respond and the care giver discerns;
4. conveys impartiality or disconnection which is necessary in order to make a fair judgement.	4. signifies connectedness that precedes and follows the act of discernment.

In terms of the first criterion of universality, and here I want to separate universality from impartiality for my own purposes because it is not yet clear to me that universality requires impartiality, Kymlicka asserts that even with care we still need a universalistic principle of moral worth. For example, Gilligan posits that "what joins people in this giant web of relationships is not necessarily any direct interaction, but rather a shared humanity." Kymlicka observes that once care theorists connect people on the basis of their common humanity, then "it seems that they too are committed to a principle of universality." Under these conditions care amounts to "an approach that seeks to resolve moral dilemmas through sympathetic identification with all the affected parties." To him, this sort of universality "is at least closely related " to that of the "impartial and benevolent observer in Kantian and utilitarian theories."[76] In fact, Kymlicka links the ethic of care with utilitarianism since both are concerned with overall happiness although care theorists would reject the maximization principle.[77]

Kymlicka's caution in the expression "is at least closely related to" that of "the impartial and benevolent observer," interests me. We must recall that Okin found it necessary to rid Rawls's position of its connection to Kant. She notes that Rawls himself now finds the rational choice language to have been "a very misleading error."[78] Okin was compelled to peel away Kant's influence from Rawls's theory of justice because she insists that Kant and Rawls "present contrasting accounts of how one becomes a moral person:" at the centre of Rawls's view is the voice of responsibility, care and concern for others.[79] Almost as an afterthought, she mentions impartiality which does the work of eliminating biases. She makes the latter comment in the context of saying that since we know who we are and what our particular interests are, real life situations call from us a great commitment to benevolence, caring and empathetic/receptive perspective-taking.

What role does impartiality need to play in either justice or care? I would argue that in real situations since we know who we are and what our interests are, we cannot achieve impartiality but we must care enough to overcome partiality while taking our commitments seriously. In Rawls's original position we do not actually need impartiality because we do not know our own particularity: taken together with everything else, impartiality merely affirms that we **really** do not know who we are or what our interests are. We use Rawls's original position to think as if we did not know who we were. Yet it is hard to know how to transfer to the situation of knowing who we are principles that are derived under the conditions of not knowing who we are except by the means that Okin provides when she injects caring into justice. In this way, caring is more central to living well in real life than is justice if the latter insists on hanging on to the criteria of an 'impartial and benevolent observer'. I disagree with Kymlicka, caring, even principled caring, is not very close to the posture of the 'impartial and benevolent observer' for two reasons: it is not possible to be impartial if this implies that we are detachable from ourselves and others; and, it is neither desirable nor necessary to imagine ourselves to be so detached if caring can do all the work. In caring, one is capable of being flexible in one's moral posture on the basis of reflection upon the authentic differences and needs of the other. In justice, we must

believe it is possible to sever the connection both to self and to others. That is, empowered caring engages us in reflective moral posturing. We begin by being rooted in our experience of being connected to others; commonalities and differences are recognizable. This is a posture that is mutually exclusive of power over or power through the other. While Okin does not use this language it seems to me that reflective moral posturing underlies her reinterpretation of Rawls's original position. Her particular accommodation to impartiality functions logically to motivate the one who cares to sense differences in the other but because of the association that impartiality has with a posture of distance, I think it is an unnecessary and misleading accommodation for her to make.

If justice were to be our predominant ethic, justice theorists must show us why we should have, and how we develop, the capacity to be flexible in our *moral postures*--how to come close and why--and how to exclude the model of power as domination. An ethic of justice currently conveys the possibility of a fixed posture of distance; it is easy to see how power over and power through others is made easier by this static posture. In addition, I suggest that the deepest difference between the ethics of care and justice is their unique descriptions of the world and the way it operates and this is also related to reflective moral posturing. Kymlicka intimates this very point as he analyzes the relationship between attending to "responsibilities and relationships" versus "rights and fairness." Kymlicka argues convincingly that "both ethics are universal and both respect commonality."[80] In making a distinction between responsibilities and rights, he argues that it is only libertarian theories that pose a problem between these two commitments since Rawls in particular assumes a close relationship must exist between responsibilities and rights. But while the other dimensions of these ethics do not provide "genuine contrasts" in his view, the kind of responsibility that each imposes on us is different. Justice imposes a responsibility for "objective unfairness" while care imposes a responsibility for "subjective hurt."[81] He proposes that "the emphasis on objective unfairness, while initially plausible, is only legitimate in certain contexts--namely, interactions between competent adults and this emphasis may only be legitimate "when our interactions with competent adults are sharply separated from our interactions with dependents."[82] I would add that responsibility is conceived in an ethic of care in terms of *response-ability* as well as being responsible f someone else. This first sense of the term is missing from an ethic of justice to the extent that it is typified by a developed capacity for distance and detachment.

The world as characterized by justice is full of competent adults who have unambiguous self-conceptions formed through socially unhindered assessments of personal interest. In this view, adulthood enables one to pursue largely predictable personal projects. This self-determination may be said to conform to moral self-interest only in a world of competent adults because competence requires the absence of socially-constituted vulnerability. If this description is inaccurate, how does an ethic of justice help us with everyday problems? Kymlicka himself wonders whether "the whole picture of autonomy as the free pursuit of projects formed in the light of abstract of standards presupposes that care for dependent others can be relegated to someone else or to the state."[83]

The world as portrayed by an ethic of care includes children and adults connected to each other on the basis of a common humanity that is expressed outwardly in vastly different ways. Care takes account of the possibility that our deepest values may differ but postulates that we may remain connected to one another, none-the-less. The struggle for substantive liberty in each of us must be understood to be constrained by this complex relationship between our interests, as I argue in the following chapter. Whereas in the world of justice, competing interests exist between competent adults, in the world of care, interests do not necessarily compete and if they do, provisions must be made for those who are dependent. In this latter world, a "certain sort of freedom is an ideal, namely freedom of thought and expression, but 'to live one's own life in one's own way' is not likely to be among the aims of persons," and preserving relationships takes precedence over the pursuit of new ambitions. In the care perspective:

> the commitment to autonomy is not a commitment to staking out ground for the pursuit of personal projects, free from the shifting needs of particular others, but is rather a commitment to meeting those needs in a courageous and imaginative way, rather than a servile or deferential way. Any more expansive notion of autonomy can only come at the price of abandoning our responsibilities."[84]

These two worlds differ greatly in their assessment of the moral responsibility that follows from each. If we compare care and justice theories, the former claim that an "emphasis on objective unfairness sanctions an abdication of moral responsibility, because it limits our responsibility for others to claims of unfairness, and thereby allows people to ignore avoidable suffering." The latter claim that the "emphasis on subjective hurts sanctions an abdication of moral responsibility, because it denies that the imprudent should pay for the costs of their choices and thereby rewards those who are irresponsible, while penalizing those who act responsibly."[85] While the first position has the problem of moving too far in the direction of irresponsible, selfish and insupportable demands, the second position stays too remote from the vulnerable, underanalyzing choice as well as dependence in its attempt to make people fully responsible for their actions. How are we to choose between the two?

Given the problematic history of our conceptualization of equality, if it is true that the most compelling argument morally is grounded in imagining and rectifying what it is to be vulnerable then care must lead us just now. If it is true that men and women, because of their experience rather than their sexual differences, live in two distinct worlds, the ethic that will best bridge this gap must be an ethic that connects us. Just how separate are the worlds of men and women? The modern idea of equality came into being in a highly genderized world, so that it is difficult to theorize about sexual differences and to predict how a better approximation to the moral ideal of equality might respond fairly to these differences. At this point, however, men and women do not stand together on an egalitarian plateau: men and women do not share equally the burdens and benefits of adult life. We do not have a clear picture of how our relations might work out if we were to stand together. We must repaint the human portrait but realize that power relations perpetuate current inequalities. In the following chapter, I analyze theories of power as they apply to education. As I propose in chapter six, if the portrait of equality is to be redrawn, the family picture must also be redrawn in schools.

End Notes

1.Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 3-4.

2.Will Kymlicka, "Rethinking the Family," in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* Vol. 20, No. 1, (Winter 1991): 77-97, 92-93.

3.Nodding distinguishes the difference between empathy and receptivity by pointing out that empathy is defined as "the power of projecting one's personality into (and so fully comprehending) [an] object of contemplation." (O.E.D.) To her the term 'receptivity' refers to the opposite approach: it is allowing the personal feeling of the other to be received within oneself. In the exercise of power relations, I would say empathy could come across as a form of emotional imperialism while receptivity is grounded in emotional partnership and reciprocity. See Nel Noddings, *Caring* (Berkeley, California and London: University of California Press, 1984), 30.

4.For an example of this analysis, see Mary Warnock, *Schools of Thought* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 9-56.

5.Carole Pateman, "The Disorder of Women": Women, Love and the Sense of Justice," in *Ethics* 91 (October) 1980:20-34.

6.Carole Pateman, "Sex and Power," in *Ethics* Vol. 100 (January) 1990:398-407, 399.

7.John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 3.

8.Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender and the Family* (U.S.A: Basic Books, 1989), 101.

9.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 7.

10.Kymlicka distinguishes between those people who think that moral values are just a matter of personal preference and those who think that justice, for example, is merely a matter of cultural interpretation. He goes on to assert that neither position is defensible (*Contemporary Political Philosophy*, 8). In terms of the categories he sets out, I agree. The point I am making about intuitions is not that moral values are simply a matter of personal preference or cultural interpretation, but that the moral values that dominate and define our public and domestic worlds, and which are reproduced culturally, are derived from an identifiable source--from the privileged position of male preferences and perspectives. The result is that women's experience is not adequately incorporated into our intuitions. Therefore, the solution is social change in the direction of the full participation of women in public life so that the cultural conversation about important values and intuitions will include the perspective of women.

11.Kymlicka uses the term difference approach and Mackinnon makes the same point, see, "Sex and power," 400.

12.Will Kymlicka quotes Catherine Mackinnon in, "Rethinking the Family," in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Winter) 1990, Vol. 20, No. 1, 77.

13.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 246.

14.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 244.

15."Sex and power," 400.

16."Sex and power," 401.

17.The books, *Black Rage, The Wretched of the Earth, and Black Skin, White Masks*, are all good examples of an analysis that keeps both of these questions sharply in focus in discussing black experience.

18.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 136.

19.Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (London and Sydney: Pluto Press, 1967), xi.

20.*Black Skin*, xxiii.

21.*Black Skin*, 30.

22.*Black Skin*, 51.

23.*Black Skin*, 60.

24.*Black Skin*, 77.

25.Freire goes on to say that: "In order to regain their humanity they must cease to be things and fight as men. This is a radical requirement. They cannot enter the struggle as objects in order *later* to become men." Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1988), 55.

26.I am not arguing that the effects on all these groups are the same because they are similar. As Nietzsche says: "Seeing things as similar and making things the same is the sign of weak eyes. Frederick Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* trans. Walter Kaufman, (New York: Vintage, 1974), 228. Also quoted in Barry Allen, "Governmentality in Foucault," 423.

27.Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 296.

28.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 248.

29.See for example, Arlie Hochschild, *The Second Shift* (New York: Avon Books, 1990).

30.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 126.

31.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 136, 137.

32.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 136.

33.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 136-138; 138ff..

34.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 6.

35.Kymlicka makes it very clear (*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 44) that the idea of moral equality is "too abstract to serve as a premise for a theory of justice." Rather theories of justice can be evaluated in terms of how they "aspire to" an ideal of equality. It seems to me however that the problem is that in everyday life, in families, courts and schools, our conceptualization of equality does motivate our actions. This conceptualization is so flawed that the ideal does us little practical good in our efforts to be appropriately just and egalitarian.

36.*A Theory of Justice*, 303.

37.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 52.

38.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 105.

39.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 64.

40.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 56.

41.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 57.

42.*A Theory of Justice*, p. 303.

43.*A Theory of Justice*, 301.

44.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 60.

45.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 63.

46.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 73.

47.See Okin's analysis of this expression in *Justice, Gender, Family*, 10-13.

48.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 78.

49.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 76-77.

50.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 102-103.

51.I am indebted to Allen Pearson for making this point clear to me.

52.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 155.

53.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 143.

54.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 243.

55.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 143.

56.Of course, there are exceptions to this case. Some young girls have been encouraged to define a conception of themselves and pursue it, but they are rare. As an example, we can imagine that an only daughter could carry all the weight of parental expectation and therefore have developed ambition in the way that many men do. See Doris Anderson, *The Unfinished Revolution: The status of women in twelve countries* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1991) and Naomi Wolf, *The Beauty Myth* (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1990), for an insight into how rare such women are still.

57.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 263.

58.The issue of partiality and impartiality has become a hot topic in ethics. Some have noted the partiality that was formerly directed towards the privileged and taken-for-granted as a legitimate *accoutrement* to power. Others have noted the partiality that seems central to an ethic of care. See, for example, Barbara Herman, "Agency, Attachment, and Difference," in *Ethics* 101 (July) 1991: 775-797; and, Marilyn Friedman, "The Practice of Partiality," in *Ethics* 101 (July) 1991: 818-835.

59.*A Theory of Justice*, 3-20.

60.Susan Moller Okin, "Reason and Feeling," in *Ethics*, Vol. 99, 1988-89: 229-249, 229.

61.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 262.

62."Reason and Feeling," 231.

63."Reason and Feeling," 232.

64.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 263.

65."Reason and Feeling," 235.

66.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 135.

67."Reason and Feeling," 236-37. In particular, see *A Theory of Justice* for Rawls's three psychological laws of moral development, 490-91.

68."Reason and Feeling," 238.

69."Reason and Feeling," 243.

70.See especially Okin's note in "Reason and Feeling," 241.

71."Reason and Feeling," 245.

72."Reason and Feeling," 245.

73."Reason and Feeling," 248.

74.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 268.

75.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 271.

76.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 271.

77.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 282.

78."Reason and Feeling," 240.

79."Reason and Feeling," 230ff.

80.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 275.

81.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 276.

82.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 277.

83.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 285.

84.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 285.

85.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 278.

CHAPTER FIVE

EDUCATING POWER[1]

Introduction

As stated before, there are two paradigms for power relations: domination and partnership. Domination subtracts from some people the *personal power* that should rightly inhere in being human, leaving them passive, useful for the purposes of others, and therefore, vulnerable. As I say in chapter four, vulnerability is a moral, as well as a social and political problem. Domination allows some people a *right* of access to others on the basis of a double measure of *personal power* (and therefore a distortion of it) which is unmoved by the vulnerability that its activity produces in those others. Partnership in power relations focuses our activity on uncovering or unleashing power in ourselves and others; it is a perspective which pictures each person as having a 'right' to one full measure of *personal power*, so to speak. Partnership enables or enhances *personal power*; but since domination has held sway for so long it has eclipsed partnership historically and has disfigured our idea of what is feasible in power relations.

I argue in this chapter that the views on power that I examine, proposed by Benn, Nyberg and Burbules, all conceive being powerful as having the developed capacity to get one's own way. To this extent, they have a closer association with domination than with partnership and therefore do not account for all the possibilities that there are in power relations. Further, I contend that domination cannot ground educative power relations. To educate people is to enable them to see themselves, others, and the world in a way which enlarges their "productive capacities," to use Foucault's term. Domination, as a paradigm for power relations, enhances the productivity of some children at the expense of others This is because acts of domination require someone who can be dominated--someone who is *prepared* to be passive in the face of the dominator. School practices that are not grounded in a partnership paradigm must echo this *preparation* in some students, whether they are poor, people of colour, or female, so that they accept vulnerability as inevitable for them. On the partnership model, if we discover people who are empty of *personal power* we know something has gone terribly wrong. A failure of *personal power* in others calls forth a morally-sensitive response from us. Domination, on the other hand, is a zero-sum game which produces one group of people who are incapable of achieving moral self-interest because they focus on mere self-interest, and another group of people who are vulnerable, and because of this, are unable to identify their personal interests. Power, conceived as getting one's own way, fails to criticize the vulnerability that results. Under this condition, large segments of the population must conceive power as something other than getting *their* own way because of the burdens left to them through unhindered acts of domination. Empowerment addresses vulnerability by including a full range of possibilities for both parties in a power relation.

Power and Education

Empowerment is not *carte blanche* permission to do whatever we like. If to be an empowered person is also to be an empowering person, then what we want in terms of our interests, takes into account our connection with others. In this way, empowerment embraces communal aspirations and includes discerning our own interests as well as the interests of others. That is, empowerment contributes to a world characterized by "moral self-interest," as noted in chapter three, an idea based on Rawls's assertion that in the well-ordered society, "everyone's acting to uphold just institutions is for the good of each....When we all strive to comply with these principles and each succeeds, then individually and collectively [our] nature as moral persons is most fully realized, and with it [our] individual and collective good.[2] In examining the ideas of Benn, Nyberg and Burbules, we come to see that beliefs about the nature of our interests provides a fundamental difference between domination and partnership paradigms for power.

Prior to discussing these three views, two further aspects of moral self-interest are significant to our thinking about power relations. First, moral self-interest directs our attention to a way of responding to other people, and to ourselves, that is both collectively and individually beneficial. That is, moral self-interest involves us in a reciprocal exchange of good things. Further, the success of moral self-interest depends on everyone being able to say and to do those things that are congruent with their self-conceptions, as opposed to being people to whom things are said and done or who are shaped by the conceptions that others have for them. But it also implies that there are legitimate limitations to expressions of power that are single-mindedly self-interested. That is, depending on how we interpret 'autonomy' moral self-interest may collide with 'autonomous' interests. The second aspect of moral self-interest's relationship to power relations requires that we consider seriously what we think the people are like who inhabit this moral world in which we are to be both individually and collectively interested. How do they get to be the way they are? I explored these aspects in chapter four when I discussed vulnerability as a moral problem and compared an ethic of care with an ethic of justice and I will again in chapter six when I describe different futures for the family. Our ideas of what people are like and how they get to be the way they are are central questions in our interpretation of the actual possibilities represented in an expression like moral self-interest.

In general, domination only accounts for self-interested acts and behaviour and tends to affirm relations of power that do not question the price that others must pay for someone's free play of self-interest. I want to distinguish between power that is self-interested and power that is morally self-interested in order to show that the former is incapable of teaching us how to live well together. In addition to arguing for a view of power that is morally self-interested, domination distorts our idea of what people are like. Benn, Nyberg and Burbules provide us with three patterns of power and I examine these to show that domination is incapable of directing educative practices.

In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Stanley Benn analyses power using the following paradigm. Power includes:

1. an intention manifest in the exercise of power;
2. the successful achievement of this intention;
3. a relationship between at least two people;
4. the intentional initiation by one of actions by the other;
5. a conflict of interest or wishes engendering a resistance that the initiator overcomes.[3]

While it is not expected that every feature of the paradigm will be included in every instance, in this view, power is conceived on a continuum from domination, on the one hand, to influence, on the other. Instances of authority fall somewhere in the middle. The limiting case at influence's end of the continuum is constituted by rational persuasion: A persuades B by giving B good reasons for doing X. At the domination end, the limiting case would be an instance of abuse: A makes B suffer deliberately regardless of whether or not B refuses an initiation.

One of the problems that motivates this analysis is the need to make a distinction between power and influence. Benn concludes that one possible difference between the two terms is that power generally implies a difference of standing between two parties: one stimulates and the other reacts. Also, he connects the exercise of power with the ability to do someone harm; he asserts that, while doing people some good is not in itself power over them, the threat of withholding a good that they need or count on may be to exert power over them. That is, what distinguishes power from influence is B's status with respect to A, as well as the powerful person's capacity to take something of value away from someone else.[4]

Benn asserts that power is relational in a logical sense in that it requires more than one term for a complete statement. Hence if both terms refer to people, and if the relationship presupposes institutions, rules, and so forth, then power will be a social relation. He notes that a writer who stresses power as relation usually means that it is an initiative-response relationship;

that is, power-seekers look for people who value sufficiently the things they control so that they can expect others to obey their orders in return. In short, power relations are one category of social relations, according to Benn. In the case of consent, power which depends on threats or physical coercion counts on the acquiescence of subjects which amounts to their continuing to value whatever is being used as a lever against them. If something really matters to us, it is hard to refrain from acquiescing. But Benn points out that political power cannot be entirely coercive. The few rule the many for two reasons: the many believe the few have a right to do so, or the many believe that harm will come to them if they disobey. But, as he observes, coercion will not work unless most subjects obey without it.

Benn summarizes that to be powerful is to have a "generalized potentiality" for a) "getting one's own way" or for b) "bringing about changes (at least some of which are intended) in other people's actions or conditions."[5] If we ask what sort of changes characterize power in reference to b), power refers to someone's ability or opportunity to threaten or actualize **a loss of some kind** for others of something that is valued since, as noted earlier, Benn asserts that the ability to benefit someone is not included in this idea of power, although withholding a good from someone may be.[6] In this view, then, power refers either to the activity of making threats (or causing harm) as well as to withholding a good from someone. He does not tell us why benefitting someone is not power, but in making this claim he clearly separates his view of power from the partnership paradigm.[7] Partnership models are precisely those that exemplify the idea that power can benefit others.

Benn's idea of a "generalized potentiality" implies that the powerful can expect to count on this potentiality in most spheres of their lives. Benn is not saying that the powerful inevitably use their position against the powerless but what is true is that the powerless are compelled to wait to find out whether or not power will be used against them. And this waiting signifies the absence of their own *personal power*. This absence of *personal power* is a fundamental characteristic of the dominator/dominated relationship. In this way, the generalized potentiality for getting one's own way makes necessary the development and perpetuation of a generalized potentiality in others to not get theirs. In applying this model for power relations to an educational setting either we content ourselves with producing Bs--those who expect to be dominated--or we teach B to fight like A. I contend that in making this latter move we encourage the development of a social world grounded in harm, threat and domination in which we would teach B to be a full participant in what I call *the reciprocity of harm*.

To explicate this point, suppose we choose to teach B to be like A in order to treat A and B equally which would mean that this generalized ability to actualize or threaten a loss or withhold a good of some kind would apply to everyone regardless of gender, race, politics or economics. Some might argue that egalitarian aims could thus be realized and social relations would at least be symmetrical. I would suggest that power relations generalized on this model would be 'nasty, brutish and short' since equality would amount to balancing out harm, threats of harm, and the withholding of valuable things. That is, we would measure our power by our ability to effectively threaten others with the loss of something they value or actually to bring about this loss. When power means getting one's own way, only two options exist for us: either we live in a social world where we all get our own way (implying we all have equal strength, resources, will and ability), or else one person's generalized potentiality for getting his or her way requires that others must develop a generalized potentiality for seldom or never getting theirs. The first option, as a hypothetical project, does not account for the actual asymmetry in resources and strength that we experience in our lives, yet it is an option that some might be willing to propose because it seems to equalize the relations between those who are currently powerful and powerless. But even if it were possible to bring about, it is unattractive because it builds social relations on the basis of perpetual war. Such a model fails to take seriously the plight of even the "naturally" vulnerable"--the children, the sick and the aged. What keeps life relatively peaceful in the second option is that many people permit a few to have their way, i.e., to let them have what they want. Under these conditions, people who are in the weaker position develop a generalized vulnerability to those who

are stronger and, in order to get along with each other, they must abandon self-interest and give in to the self-interestedness of others. Such a realization prompts Burbules, for example, to refer to power as a kind of "social pathology" and his assertion makes sense only if we think of his reference to power here as the power to threaten, take away or withhold.

How does this power to threaten operate? What are its effects upon the moral world when it is allowed its free play? Domination over someone is best understood as (a claim to) a right of access: the king has unhindered access to the body of the criminal; the pastor has better access to knowledge of what is inside us than we do; and, in *disciplinary power* there is access to our interior beings so that what is within is shaped in its image. When we examine this relationship, the more powerful one has right of access and the less powerful have two choices: either they comply with or consent to the plans made for them and do not challenge domination, or else they resist this intrusion. Under the condition of domination, we might want to say that resistance is preferable to consent or compliance. The resistance of the less powerful is characterized by the ability to disrupt, disturb, withhold or frustrate this right of access. This is the nature of all forms of resistance that are set up in opposition to domination. It is a response made necessary by acts of domination and it is the flip-side of consent: when one resists, one withholds or postpones consent. It may, in one way, seem like a strong addressment of domination. It is certainly better than submitting to an illegitimate right of access. But it is only effective in frustrating someone else's plans for us; it is ineffective in helping us make our own good plans for the future--plans in which we do not picture ourselves as dominated because we no longer are.[10] In fact, focusing on opposition distracts us from making our own concrete life plans because the energy of resistance is directed against the success of those who would dominate us and it requires different allegiances and strategies from us than are required if we wish to empower ourselves and others.

If there is any reciprocity in this second response to domination it is a reciprocity of harm: I will harm (withhold from) you what you would take (withhold) from me. It may be voiced in a determination to threaten or harm first, or in like manner, those who would threaten or harm us. As such, it is the first response, understandably, from people who have suffered "subjective hurt" due to a failure of care or "objective unfairness"[11] because of a failure of justice. But while this response is understandable, it is not empowering. The trouble with engaging in a reciprocity of harm as a strategy for confronting the powerful is that those in the structurally weaker position still lose. Being weaker means precisely that one is incapable of making an equally serious threat. The reciprocity of harm tactic can disturb, annoy or embarrass, but it cannot effectively unseat oppressors whose moral sensibilities have been dulled by the activity of oppressing others--which is what happens to them. If a reciprocity of harm is to be effective in unseating the oppressor, it must be carried to the extreme of violence, in which case we find ourselves committing acts that we have abhorred in others. A reciprocity of harm falls far short of empowerment which is a reciprocity of good will characterized by the desire to give rather than take; it is the desire to fill others up with good things that they would choose for themselves. As I pointed out in chapter three, empowerment is not without its problems and inequities which are directly related to this idea of giving and receiving good things from others, but it is to be clearly distinguished from a reciprocity of harm which perpetuates hurt and injury, and from opposition to domination which does little to bring anything beneficial into being.

It may at this point be objected that a reciprocity of harm is a more realistic view of power relations because it better describes the way the world works. I would say rather that a reciprocity of harm may be common in situations where domination is recalcitrant, but that is not a good reason for failing to confront the fundamental illegitimacy of domination. Domination, which ranks people in terms of their value and thereby creates superiority and inferiority, is not the only way to structure social relationships; the alternative is to be in partnership with others.[12] Foucault, for example, certainly talks about resistance, but he eventually proposes that we should work with those in positions of power as a better way of responding to them. What must be included in a cooperative model is a clear distinction between acts of power and acts of domination. Because domination/opposition sets up and maintains an adversarial relationship

between the more and the less powerful, it also intensifies the mistrust that is already a characteristic of bureaucratic democracies. Under these conditions, mistrust can develop an irrational life of its own that clouds our discernment making it impossible for us to work with those in positions of power. Currently in Canadian political life, for example, mistrust is ubiquitous, and it could become more: a political cancer that leaves people ungovernable. Mistrust is like a ravenous growth with a finicking appetite. It cannot be satisfied; it does not want to feel pleased with anything or anyone--at least not for very long.[13] Mistrust has come to characterize those in structurally weak positions and until we throw off the despair of this ill-got and excessive mistrust, we will not make any political advances in our attempts to work with those who are presently in positions of power.

A further elaboration of the limitations inherent in a reciprocity of harm can be uncovered in Pateman's analysis of the "dominance approach." In "Sex and power," Pateman critiques Catherine MacKinnon's, *Feminism Unmodified*, a book which addresses "the political problem of men's power over women."[14] The dominance approach picks out men's domination over women as the salient feature of sexual inequality, as pointed out in chapter four. As Pateman notes: "The cornerstone of men's claim to jurisdiction over women," which effectively kept women out of public life for much of the modern period, "is that they have a right of sexual access to women's bodies." This "sexual contract," has a similar nature to the idea of a social contract which refers to "the right of jurisdiction by the state over individual citizens."[15] The sexual contract implies that women gave up control over their own bodies at some point in time, perhaps in order to secure harmony in the family. Pateman points out that this right of sexual access, and men's claim to it, is secured by contract theorists on the basis of an argument about the "natural capacities" of women and their "natural differences" from men. Women were excluded from the rights which were celebrated during the French Revolution, for example, "in order to head off the revolutionary implications for sexual relations" that the "doctrine of natural freedom and equality" would secure if it applied to women. Mary Wollstonecraft, writing at the same time as the French Revolution, called for these rights to be extended to women and countered the argument that these rights should not apply on the basis of women's nature.[16] Given Wollstonecraft's argument, it seems highly unlikely that women simply gave up their right to control their own bodies; rather, their weaker social position made it impossible for the views of early feminists to effect change. The right of access to women's bodies has no legitimacy either in itself or as a justification for the domination of women by men. The right is maintained on the basis of threat: for example, the threat of physical harm, or abandonment. Women have historically been vulnerable to abandonment because of their economic dependence on men: to be abandoned is to be engulfed by poverty, a fear which in turn leaves women open to any abuse they suffer because they feel trapped in the relationship. At the outset of modernity feminists identified the injustice of male domination but they had nothing to bargain with for rights that should have accrued to women.

Pateman argues that the feminist concern for sexual equality is driven by a desire for what I would call a new bargain. She presents as a social goal a structure for power relations in which "women can freely and autonomously enter into consensual sexual activity." She adds to this first aim, the "wish to see a society in which women can withhold as well as give consent and in which enforced submission is seen as a crime not as 'sex'."[17] While I agree with her first aim, it seems to me that withholding and giving consent fall far short of an empowering aim for women. This emphasis on withholding a right of access makes sense in the context of Mackinnon's book which is largely about the injustice of pornography, but is it congruent with moral self-interest? I agree that pornography is an act of domination of the most unacceptable kind and it should not be protected under freedom of speech legislation. Pornography is an act of *sovereign power* exercised on the bodies of women, merely because they are women. What ended the murderous excess of *sovereign power* historically was the mass's identification with the criminal's body-and the consequent outrage of rebellion. What makes pornography such a desperate abuse is that those who typically watch it do not feel any connection to the inhumanly passive body--the pornographic

female body; it appears that it is easy to persuade the viewer that this body has no objection to what is being done to it. But, in terms of the project that Pateman advances, I think that the two ideas, "autonomous and consensual relations" on the one hand, and "withholding and giving consent" on the other, compete; Pateman seems to set them up as equivalents.

What we say about the structure of "the most fundamental of all human relationships (without which our species could not go on) has a profound effect on every one of our institutions, on our values," and on our future.[18] And it seems to me that the second aim, withholding and consenting, describes power relations that would not confront the fundamental structure of domination of men over women since it continues to portray men as the makers and sayers of sexual plans and intentions. This would not alleviate the burden of passivity that women carry because of historic domination, a passivity which is expressed in them through their vulnerability to all other forms of domination. And it also fails to meet the aims of empowerment if it conforms to the reciprocity of harm model, i.e., withholding something of value from others in order to threaten them. I say this for two reasons. The first, is that women are socially still so much less powerful than men that it is a hard threat to carry home except with men whose moral sensibilities are responsive. And these are not the men that women would need to threaten. The second reason is that a reciprocity of harm perpetuates the generalized mistrust of all men, which constitutes a failure of discernment and precludes establishing power relations on the basis of partnership.

Pateman criticizes Mackinnon for collapsing the distinction between sexual difference and genderization. While she agrees to the importance of the dominance view, she argues that, as Mackinnon deploys the term, the dominance approach obscures sexual differences which are historically constituted by focusing on sexual dominance as the instrument that created the genderization of women. I agree with Pateman and agree that the project of ridding the world of genderization would not foreclose on women's needs to explore the complexity of the historical and social conditions which make us what we are. In short, the genderization of men and women is an outcome of domination; since men have typically been in the strategically advantaged position, this has been the domination of women by men based upon sexual differences that have been given particular cultural weight and characterizations. This process of genderization has allowed men to subordinate women as an act of "male supremacy, under which gender differences are made relevant to the distribution of benefits and to the systematic disadvantage of women."[19] Yet sexual differences remain an important inquiry in human experience. Whatever results from such an investigation, women must be makers and sayers of culturally important processes in the public as well as the domestic world--processes that include values that they identify as important. As I argued in chapter four, the demands for equality that have been voiced by women over the last two decades have not secured self-determination for them, an issue I discuss in the following chapter.

As noted in earlier chapters, Raine Eisler (1987) proposes that there "are really only two basic ways of structuring the relations between the female and male halves of humanity:" either on the basis of dominator systems which focus on violence and force and the power to take life and rank order people to establish inferiority and superiority, or, on partnership systems which link people together and do not rate their differences in terms of inferiority and superiority. In terms of her analysis of dominance, Eisler believes that the problem is not "men as a sex," but a social system in which what she calls the "the power of the Blade" is idealized so that men and women "are taught to equate true masculinity with violence and dominance and to see men who do not conform to this ideal as "too soft" or "effeminate."[20] Eisler intimates an approach to sexual differences that is more compatible with partnership models for power relations, as opposed to the adversarial stance that is implied in Mackinnon. However, in making this point, I do not want to dilute the importance of Mackinnon's project to confront the harm inherent in pornography which still seems to me to be a prerequisite to taking authentic sexual partnership seriously.

In general, a feminist wish for a better society must educate women to make their own life-span plans and have their own intentions; that is, we must educate women in how to live well with substantive liberty. "Withholding and consenting," as a minimum resolve, would limit abusive relationships but would not put practices of freedom in the place of passivity. "Autonomous and consensual sexual activity" would set a better stage for a new womanly personality, depending on how we understand the terms 'autonomy' and 'consensual', if at the same time, women were able to express self-determination in all aspects of their lives. I am not assuming that only women prize such values; rather I am suggesting that the future is uncertain given the project of de-genderizing our social processes, particularly our families and schools. At present, self-determination for women who are also mothers, daughters and wives carries an ambiguity that does not constrain the idea when it is applied to men, as I argue in the following chapter. In summary, a reciprocity of harm as a characteristic of power relations does not constitute an admirable educative aim in any sense, but it would be the best that we could come up with if we take Benn's view as our only model for egalitarian power relations.

Nyberg and Burbules both differ from Benn in that each reduces power relations to one characteristic feature: David Nyberg grounds power relations in consent and Nicholas Burbules grounds power relations in conflicts of interests. Benn on the other hand, does not reduce power relations to any one attribute and asserts rather that power and its relative terms, e.g., influence, constitute a family of concepts that resemble one another.[21] Yet, there are two features of power that are implied by all three theorists. The first is that power relations are one category of social relations and the second is that power is essentially subtractive--the power to take away. That is, Benn, Nyberg, and Burbules think of power relations as 'zero-sum' games.

If we compare zero-sum notions of power, in which power is getting one's own way, with partnership models for power relations, the former implies that power is essentially the redistribution of a scarce resource. Two assumptions underlie this view. The first assumption is that there is finite amount of power: something happened to this quantity of power for one of two reasons, both of which presuppose that each person ideally should have *one unit* of power but acknowledges that now they do not which is, again, a kind of social contract notion of power. As in the example of women's sexual power given earlier, the first reason that some people have little or no power, is that, supposedly, they willingly gave it up. At some imaginary point in time, they gave up their power in order to secure particular benefits, e.g., family harmony. The second reason that some people have little or no power is grounded in our belief in meritocracy which legitimates some people acquiring more power than others because they have 'earned' their extra power by doing or having something, e.g., getting an education, having a good business sense. But even if meritocracy is a legitimate ideal, it should not imply that people who have power in one sphere of life which is earned also should have extra power in all the other spheres of their lives; yet this is what actually happens.[22] As an example, men who earn the family income have more power than their wives over decision-making despite the contribution to the family that women make. Earning potential in the public world seems to be the salient feature that structures power in the family: when women's earning potential increases so does their power in the family. Since most women have little earning power they also have little power in the family in terms of decision-making.

The second assumption is that if power is a commodity, like a *unit* of some kind, then power relations are the *means* used to redistribute this finite amount. That is, power relations are modelled on mathematical calculations which make possible the inequalities among people. Viewing power as a commodity in this way obfuscates the moral problem of vulnerability that such calculations cause ordinary people who should have a right to their fair share of *personal power*.[23] In addition, it conceals the fact that these calculations work in predictable ways, i.e., through domination, that privilege some at the expense of others. At bottom, conceptualizations of power which are grounded in domination share the view that power is a zero-sum game and little else.

As an example, in Nyberg's view, power relations consist of a minimum model of 2 individuals and one plan or set of intentions.[24] A and B are individuals; A has a plan which A

wants B to adopt, or consent to. He says that A has power over B when B consents to A's plan. On this view, power is measured on the basis of the outcome that A is able to win B over to A's plan. That is, we describe A as powerful if and when A is successful in securing B's consent. But what is going on with respect to B? B's activity seems to consist in giving consent; consent generally implies willingness, approval or agreement. Conceiving power relations in terms of giving consent intimates that A somehow requires *permission* from B in order to go ahead with a plan; i.e., that the carrying out of A's plan depends in some way on B. Nyberg posits that consent in a relation of power may range along a continuum from acquiescence under threat of sanction, to compliance based on partial or slanted information, to indifference due to habit or apathy, to conformity to custom, to commitment through informed judgement.[25] He asserts that commitment through informed judgement is an educational ideal, and in considering this type of consent, he believes that we see the link between education, power and freedom. Given Nyberg's continuum of consent, what sense can we make out of the "permission" that B gives to A? And what is the relationship between the points on Nyberg's continuum of power? The two questions are related since the relationship between the first four, namely: acquiescing, complying, being indifferent, conforming, and, the final one, committing/judgement-making (which he values as an educational ideal) have implications for the way B's "permission" is to be understood. In power relations defined by the first four terms, it is simply incorrect to suggest that B is giving permission or is approving in any important sense of the term since acquiescing, complying, being indifferent, and conforming all exemplify asymmetrical relations. In addition, as Nyberg describes it, this exchange between B and A tells us nothing about B's own plans or intentions at any point along the continuum. According to this view, power relations constitute a redistribution that leaves B with less than A at every point along the continuum except the last one. The question is, if consent links these five terms, what distinguishes the first four from the last one, the one he heralds as an educative ideal? In other words, how does one become committed and informed in the context of relations that are consensual and asymmetrical in the sense Nyberg uses the term?

While it may be argued that my criticism can be dismissed if one simply considers the case where 2 people have a plan each, or the case where A and B take turns, this objection would miss the point. In the first case, empowerment would not reduce the minimum case to 2 people and 1 plan or set of intentions since empowerment considers implies it is dehumanizing to conceive human beings who have no plans and intentions or who have plans and intentions that count for little or nothing? In the second case, empowerment recognizes the way that losing sticks to B and becomes an inescapable condition that permits and perpetuates socially constituted vulnerability to characterize B's life experience. And further, in Nyberg's view, even though consent is raised to the level of informed commitment, it is still commitment to someone else's plans. To be empowered is not simply to practice giving permission to other people's plans. Empowerment would not allow the relation to go below 2 persons and 2 plans and it is predisposed to value cooperative intentions and plans.[26]

I suggest that power relations have to be reconceived all the way across the continuum if we are to understand how people can become committed good judges of their own plans and intentions. This is particularly true in considering power as an educational ideal. To refer to power as an educational ideal requires that we spell out power relations that are capable of empowering commitment and judgement. Because traditional views allow the inclusion of domination in the way they conceive power, they are compelled to develop a strong view of freedom. But ideas about freedom will not suffice here because coercive and intrusive forms of power shape us long before we are mature enough to practice freedom in any meaningful way. And in the case of socially constituted vulnerability, which is made possible by systemic forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism, freedom is not effectively appropriated precisely because some people remain vulnerable throughout their lives. Foucault and empowerment theorists focus our attention on the possibilities that B might have in a power relation by asking how B might become powerful? Their answer is to extricate power from all forms of domination which necessarily exploit people and hinder the development of their human potential. This does not

mean that they think they can rid us of domination, only of its legitimacy. The importance of this move is obvious when we apply ideas of power to the family, for example. As Okin points out, theorists prior to her analysis were able to assume "that a moderate amount of dominance is the desirable norm within families."[27] She then points out examples of the abuse that women suffer when any concession to domination's legitimacy is made.

There is another way in which, given Nyberg's view, B is not taken seriously in the power relation. If power is realized only when A has a plan that B consents to, giving A all the obvious power, it would be difficult to recognize when B was cooperating with A for some reason. That is, if B cooperates with A, either because B freely chooses to or is afraid not to, what one would observe in the activity between A and B would be A's winning B over to A's side. B's intention to cooperate would only be a valued part of the relation if B were able to sense and articulate this intention and if A prized it in return. It is entirely conceivable that A could not recognize B's intention to cooperate as a separate and valued contribution, or even see this cooperation as an expression of B's 'autonomy'. A could therefore presume B's inferiority and conclude that B is someone who does not have separate plans and intentions: A could presume that "B is not like me." It is also possible that A could underestimate, or undervalue the cost to B of not cooperating and thereby interpret B's response inappropriately as freely-chosen consent, i.e., as giving permission.

In general, it would be easy for both A and B to not separate out B's plan to cooperate so as to value it separately as B's 'autonomous' contribution to the maintenance of the relationship. If B's 'cooperation' is not genuine however, if B is held in the relationship out of fear or dependence upon A, then there is no sense in which the relationship is consensual, since consent implies approval or permission-giving. A may be an abusive spouse, or A may simply have better developed life plans which are given more currency in the relationship. In either case, the possibilities for B are constrained by what it has been possible for A to do in the past. Even the expression "commitment through informed judgement" would not make B's consent equivalent to giving A permission to carry out A's plans if B could not sense the injustice of the inequality between them. Relations of consent form patterns over time which contribute to the accumulation of privilege in the hands of some and to the systematic vulnerability of others. Vulnerable or powerless people have no real permission to give, although, as long as domination has some legitimacy, so-called 'permission' may still be extracted from them, even in violent crimes, such as rape. In summary, since Nyberg allows domination to remain inside his conception of power he does not allow us to picture the full range of possibilities that exist for B.

In a third example of the traditional conception of power, Nicholas Burbules[28] identifies power as a social concept which is necessarily embedded in particular purposes, values and interests. His theory is tied to other values that affect its meaning, in particular, he cites democratic and egalitarian values. He says the way we think about power makes the pursuit of these values either possible or difficult. While I agree to the importance of the values he upholds, I argue that grounding power in conflicts of interests, as he does, prevents us from picking out all the possibilities that B and A have to consider in their relations with one another. In particular, Burbules only examines implications for power which stem from considering interests that conflict. Burbules's view is not educative for two reasons, namely, it is impractical in an educational setting because of its reliance on an analytic of a "conflict of interests" which is too confusing to apply in any meaningful way, and, by remaining within a dominator paradigm, it leaves us with no way to improve B's capacity to engage in power relations. The pedagogic relation is necessarily asymmetrical and we therefore require a view of power relations that include what can be done to enhance B as well as A.

In making his argument, Burbules asks two questions: Are all social relations also power relations? and, What is the quality of a power relation?[29] To the first question he answers no: to be a power relation, a social relation must be grounded in conflicts of interests. That is, following Steven Lukes, he asserts that in all power relations "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests" so that in all power relations "B is influenced

against his or her interests."[30] In other words, power relations are social relations in which something goes wrong. What goes wrong may result from historic or current inequalities in the distribution of resources among people. Since it is a general criterion, in his view, that power relations always operate against B's interests, power relations could not effect beneficial outcomes in terms of the promotion of democracy or egalitarianism because they cannot work to benefit B. Just as Nyberg reduces all power relations to consensual relations, Burbules reduces power relations to conflicts of interests. He acknowledges repeatedly that judgements of this nature are hard to make and that agreement about what constitutes people's interests is difficult to secure.[31] Two consequences follow from Burbules's assertions about power's connection to conflicting interests: 1. we can never be sure that the encounter between A and B is a power relation because disagreement is possible, and, 2. power is only the power to take away. He refers to power "as a kind of social pathology" capable of enticing and addicting us to its effects.[32] The answer to his second question, about the quality of power relations, is driven by his answer to the first.

In assessing the quality of power relations, Burbules rejects Nyberg's use of the term consent as a characteristic of power relations and substitutes compliance because he believes the latter term does not imply the approving attitude that the former does. He also appears to disqualify domination as a legitimate characteristic of power relations.[33] If people genuinely consent, Burbules thinks they are not involved in a power relation. But he carries over from Nyberg a similar theme in terms of what B is doing, and in my view it is a theme congruent with a dominator paradigm for power relations. He asserts that in power relations, because they are fundamentally about conflicts of interests, there is usually a tension between compliance and resistance; although this tension can dissipate leaving only relations of domination on the one hand, and relations of consent on the other. That is, both Nyberg and Burbules discuss domination and consent but Burbules asserts that when social relations are characterized by domination and consent they are not relations of power. Power relations for Burbules are characterized by conflicts of interests which engage us in relations of compliance and resistance. Domination refers to a case of overwhelming physical or psychic force so that compliance does not come up; consent is a "pure form" which is not a power relation because there is no conflict of interests.[34] To Burbules, the tension between resistance and compliance is accurately portrayed if we say that A has power over B and that B empowers A. That is, B's role in a power relation is in some way to assist A in getting what A wants.[35] While I would support Burbules if he stripped away the legitimacy of domination, the relation picked out above is not qualitatively different from Nyberg's idea of B giving A permission through consent (in Nyberg's terms) thereby making it possible for A to carry out his or her plans. More importantly, this is a misleading use of the term "empower" given that Burbules conceives power relations only in terms of harm to B's interests.

What might we mean when we say that interests conflict? Burbules does not tell us either what he means by "interests" or "conflict" and we are genuinely disadvantaged by these omissions since the terms carry so much weight in his argument. He persistently says that conflicts of interests are hard to get agreement on but scarcity seems to be at the bottom of Burbules's conception of conflict since he states that "[N]ot all conflict is a conflict of interests;" a conflict of interests exists where there is a 'zero-sum game'.[36] If we use the term "interests" to stand for "material necessities plus the various goods that people feel worth having in their lives"[37] it is easy to see how interests could be in conflict due to scarce material necessities. It is less clear how scarcity could produce conflicts between the goods people value unless these also are tied to something material like time, space or property. Burbules implies a connection of this very kind when he says that students are disadvantaged in schools due to unequal access to the teacher's limited resource of time.[38] Rawls grounds our understanding of the injustice that asymmetries between our interests produces when he says that we are all entitled to an initial fair share of society's resources by virtue of being human and includes "the social bases for self-respect" as "perhaps the primary goods."[39]

What would we mean by suggesting that the bases of self-respect can be threatened by scarcity? Tied to this question is a question that Burbules asks twice but does not answer. In reference to Lukes's view that power always operates against B's interests, Burbules poses the problem of how power might benefit B.[40] I think he drops the question because his singular focus on the power to take away precludes his having an answer. Power which is focused on taking away and making threats provides us with no model for structuring power relations that could benefit B. One of the features that can be assumed to inhere in B's experience is a failure of self-respect because B's condition is characterized by perpetual loss. B is predisposed to be in the losing position in a power relation.[41] Why must B become accustomed to being in a losing position? In talking of power, Burbules says that: "Power is a matter of fascination to us: getting it, using it, lusting for it, admiring it, etc....we do not know how to live without it."[42] Whose feelings is he declaring? Surely we must sense that this is the dominator's voice we are hearing. This is the power that wrecks havoc with B. If we consider the idea of generativity, articulated by Erik Erikson, the contrast is shocking. Generativity, primarily the concern to establish and guide the next generation, is an "essential stage on the psychosexual as well as the psychosocial schedule." Generativity is expressed in "Care for" and "charity" (love) towards the next generation but also may be expressed toward the world in general, (a sentiment that would motivate ecological concerns, for example). Erikson asserts that only with the development of generativity do the final stages of human maturity "ripen" in an individual person. In this way we see that a tenacious grip on the power to do harm to others precludes our own maturation processes.[43] It is a scarcity to care for and love those who are dependent and vulnerable that results in poverty of self-respect for B. In contrast to a power to take away, empowerment is enabling and plentiful and is directed towards benefitting B and A; therefore self-respect would not be something material scarcity could threaten for those who are in the presence of an empowering person since empowerment is grounded in generosity. Of course, empowering people may be scarce. And this scarcity is all the more likely if we take relentless pessimism as our only model for power relations.[44]

I mention pessimism because of the centrality Burbules gives to conflicts of interests. At the core of his argument is the following statement and its corollary: "Against this background of conflicting interests, all social relations take on power significance because power relations suppress, disguise, preserve or deny conflicts of interests." In short, the typical problem power has is obtaining compliance despite such conflicts. Its corollary states that: "Where we do not judge there to be a conflict of interest, we do not label a social relation a power relation."[45] In any view of power a great deal hangs on interpretations of our moral world: interpretations of the nature of and extent to which our interests conflict shape possibilities for benefitting B as well as A in a power relation. If we take Burbules's view in isolation, it follows that in order for democracy and egalitarianism to be realizable we must get rid of our tendency to engage in power relations. The implication is that we cannot be good and powerful at the same time, a sentiment that is rooted in the belief that power is a scarce resource and those who have it have disempowered others in order to privilege themselves.

The implication that power is only negative keeps Burbules's theory within the parameters of power as domination. He summarizes that, in general, "traditional theories of power have assumed that power is a property of individual persons, wielded instrumentally as a means to particular intended outcomes," i.e., power is individual, instrumental and intentional.[46] When he grounds power relations in conflicts of interests, as he does, his theory falls easily within the criteria of individuality, instrumentality and intentionality: the individual A exercises power over B by using B against B's interests in order to secure A's own interests. I would suggest that a positive conception of power would account for and ameliorate the diminished position of B in the relationship and would propose some way for B to secure intrinsic rather than purely instrumental worth. Empowerment is not an individual possession, it is relationally constituted, although it has positive personal effects in us. It is grounded in the feeling/belief that we are those who can do and say things which are consistent with the conception that we have of

ourselves and has passivity as its opposite. Empowerment comes most easily to us if we are in the presence of an empowering person who has not used us instrumentally but has assigned intrinsic worth to us which is expressed in outcomes that are mutually and reciprocally beneficial. When empowering relationships occur between competent adults and dependent or vulnerable people (e.g., children) full mutuality and reciprocity are achieved only eventually. Under these conditions, the empowering person is willing to make some sacrifices for the dependent person, but the relationship is conceived as mutually rewarding overall. Where the dependent people are adults, their intrinsic worth in the relationship must be acknowledged from the very outset; personal worth is not something they must earn in order to have it attributed to them.

In order to show how non-traditional ideas about power open up this positive possibility we need to look more closely at what Burbules tells us about conflicts of interests? He asserts that: "a conflict of interests exists where there is a zero-sum game in which gaining or maintaining an advantage for one person or group necessarily entails disadvantaging others."[47] Earlier he identified his belief that conflicts are inevitable given the hierarchical nature of our social system. I am not arguing that Burbules is incorrect to describe current social systems this way, I am arguing that his view does not include all that can be said about power relations. Yet, to say that all power relations are grounded in inevitable zero-sum games implies that our *personal power* is only negative and this fails to point to a pedagogically satisfying way out of the web of relations that forms our social life. He has trapped us in a muddle: if we would be educative with B, we must first be able to identify whether or not A interacting with B constitutes a conflict of interests *before* we can decide whether they are in a power relation. Burbules makes it abundantly clear that it is extremely difficult to come to agreement about what is a conflict of interests: "What you call 'power', I may call benign."[48] Given that B is "predisposed" to lose and that conflicts are hard to identify, requiring a high level of sophistication, and further, that power is malignant and we can predict who the B's are in advance,[49] how are we to educate B to win a power game with equal strength and conviction? That is, using a theory of power as an evaluation of conflicts of interests, how in practical terms are we to educate B to be a full participant in power relations? Any equality and mutuality that we add to Burbules's theory of power turns it into a reciprocity of harm: I will hurt (threaten) you in the same way that you hurt (threaten) me. Further, he believes that "degeneracy is inexorable;" in our attempts to use power, power uses us.[50] Negative effects of power constitute a loss for someone and may be expressed in making threats, causing harm, or simply by persistently giving preference to one set of personal life plans in a relationship. In this view, if we would be educative with a particular B we must aim at turning that B into an A; but, since a dominator paradigm makes no sense if there are no Bs, we must still produce some Bs somewhere.

Is it necessary to conclude with Burbules that power applies only to interests that conflict and power relations are only one category of social relations? His first assertion pictures people in a particular way; that is, Burbules's view posits what relations between people are like. If we take interests to include material necessities plus the various goods that people feel worth having in their lives, underlying the assertion that interests conflict is a liberal tradition which, as Will Kymlicka says, is informed by J.S. Mill's assertion that "each one has a unique personality and a unique good; experiences of others provide no ground for overriding my judgement." Mill asserted that our good "lies in something that we share with no one else." In contrast, Marx asserted that "each of our goods lie in a capacity we share with other human beings." I agree with Kymlicka that: "[b]oth extremes are not right; our good is neither universal not unique, but is tied in important ways to our cultural practices" and to our "shared community." Following Mill, the liberal tradition has constructed a public world characterized by competent (usually male) adults who believe their interests necessarily conflict. This is the only world where Burbules's view of power makes sense, though even here it perpetuates harm. This is why I do not think it is an educative view since the world in which we educate others is filled with those who are dependent and vulnerable. More centrally, this is not the only way to depict the moral world. Feminists scholars affirm power relations in which interests do not necessarily conflict, or if they do, the

conflict is only on the surface of the relationship and underneath, common ties and interests ground the possibility of agreement or compromise. That is, relationships may also be conceived in terms of negotiable partnerships.[51]

As opposed to Burbules, I would answer yes to the question: Are all social relations power relations? But I would add that power refers both to the capacity to take away and the capacity to give and while this duality may be represented respectively in the words power and empower, the idea of power that stands behind both terms must include the possibility of benefitting B. In our present social world, because of the primacy permitted to domination, Burbules is accurate to say that power (if we add that we are referring to the power to take away) constitutes a social relation that we would not choose but is unavoidable in the circumstances under which people come together. Further, these relations constitute a "template" or "pattern" for the way people think about themselves which tends to "predisposition" them. This is really the same point that Benn makes when he says that the powerful have a "generalized potentiality" for getting their own way. And I agree that there is usually a tension between compliance and resistance in such social relations. Given this analysis, it is hard to understand why Burbules would argue that some social relations are not power relations. If people carry these predispositions with them as excess baggage, then whenever there are two people there will be a power exchange of some sort *because power resides in people and not in the conflict between their interests*. People are *invested* with either relative powerlessness or powerfulness in relation to the *investment* of those they are with. Our relative power may shift depending upon who we are with, but these shifts occur up and down a hierarchical ranking of persons (due to the influence of power as domination) which is established on the basis of gender, race and wealth. But in response to these asymmetries and to the tendency to rank people in terms of superiority and inferiority, other kinds of social relations are possible. Power relations can be modelled on nurturance which presupposes interdependence and partnership.

Nyberg and Burbules fail to take the power possible in partnership relations seriously because they fall into a trap identified by Foucault. In trying to design a theory which identifies power in one fundamental characteristic, neither makes it possible to analyze power relations as they are fully lived out in daily experience. As an example, in Burbules's case, answering no to his first question (Are all social relations power relations?) precludes his ability to adequately answer the second (What are relations of power like?). The order of the questions needs to be reversed because only those relations which happen to coincide with conflicts of interests (or relations of consent for Nyberg) will show up as power relations. If power relations happen to be different, if conflicts of interests and relations of consent do not cover all there is to say, they both miss the full range of the quality of power relations.

To walk into a situation with a ready made concept, as Nyberg and Burbules would have us do, makes it difficult for us to identify what we are seeing and to sort out the specific *realities* that confront us. And depending upon the view we carry with us, it is hard for us to imagine that what we observe could be different. On the other hand, we cannot assess our experience unless we have a concept to focus our perspective. If we begin with *personal power* as the feeling/belief that I am someone who can say and do the things which are consistent with my self-conception, a positive assertion, then we can be taught to pick out instances in which we sense either freedom or restriction on what it is we can and want to say or do in a given situation. This project is educative in the sense of enhancing human capacities for 'self-understanding and 'self-determination, and allows us to sense what is happening to us. This approach also directs educational practice towards enhancing the substantive liberty of students. In addition, we must always ask whose *reality* we are assessing when we analyze power relations. The dominance view of power allows us to see how power operates from above, from the position of A so to speak, or accepts, as in Burbules's case, the norm of power as a "social pathology." A partnership model, on the other hand, allows us to see how power can enhance and change the opportunities that B has in the relation and includes activities that are enabling and have hope in them.

In order to illustrate this point, let us examine Burbules's assertion that a theory of power requires a way of identifying where personal interests reside. He states that where there is no conflict of interests, for example, in a parent's command that a child not run into the street in front of an oncoming car, the command does not constitute an exercise of power.[52] Yet the parent-child relationship is clearly asymmetrical. The parent could literally use force to stop the child, or could exert the force of a relationship that may be grounded in trust or the desire to please a beloved parent. As Rawls points out, our sense of justice is developed out of just these kinds of relationships of love and trust. Rawls says that the "love of parents for their children, coming to be reciprocated in turn by the child" is important to the development of "a sense of self worth."[53] This is precisely the act of empowerment that characterizes nurturance or parental love. It is because Burbules does not include parental love as a source for the positive power to give, to fill up others with good things, that he thinks of power's effects only as negative, and therefore makes the claim that this instance does not constitute a relation of power.

While it is true that some child/parent relationships could constitute relations of domination it is also true that not all of them do; the significance of sensing and valuing the differences between oneself and one's child cannot be overestimated for this reason. Burbules's view cannot account for the power of love which inheres in a trusting and loving relationship and which is capable of acting as a pedagogic model as well: it is a reciprocity of good will directed by a desire to give, to fill others up with good things. The fundamental quality of this power relation is not only that parents take their children's interests into account, and willingly sacrifice their own interests for the interests of the child--often at great personal cost--the relationship helps to shape a child's interests and certainly redirects the parent's own interests. The assumption that power relations are grounded in conflicts of interests cannot account for the full range of power relations expressed between parent and child. Parents have power over children and they do not assume that their interests conflict. Parent/child relationships are asymmetrical power relations because children are dependent upon their parents for a period of time, but they do not have to embody conflicts of interests. Because each child goes through this period of dependence, we must look much more holistically at their relationship in order to pick out the dimensions, either positive or negative, of this particular power relation.

Suppose we take the case of a parent preventing a child from running out in front of an oncoming car where the interests of the parent to preserve the life of the child so clearly outweigh the effects of the parent's exercise of power or control over the child. Autonomy, the child's interest that potentially conflicts with the parent's interest to keep the child safe, does not do a dead child much good. The clear harm to the child in the situation keeps the conflict of interests from being a serious consideration, as Burbules would agree, but it is not accurate to say that since a conflict between these interests does not occur this instance does not constitute a power relation.

Three other possibilities exist which would take power away from the child. In the first place, the command could be an expression of *sovereign power* in that the parent's purpose is merely to demonstrate through the child's body that he or she can make the child obey in an instant in the absence of any concern for the well-being or future good of the child. Children treated in this way come to feel that they have no value. Secondly, the command may be an expression of *pastoral power* in that the parent is moved to tell the child not to run out into the street because the parent 'knows' better than the child does what the child will do: the parent 'knows' that the child will not look at the oncoming car and even if the child does look, he or she will not respond appropriately. In this case the parent has no interest in developing independent thinking in the child, even eventually; the parent sees his or her command as always necessary to the child's safety, a belief which implies that children are never to be trusted when they stand at the curb of busy streets. The effect of this lack of trust is that children treated in this way come to not trust themselves. The third possibility is to see the command as part of an intention to keep the child docile and useful for the parent's purposes, as is the case in *disciplinary power*.[54] In this demonstration of power over the child, perpetual dependence is the aim of any and all

strategies that the parent uses. This command would be no exception. In order to accomplish the aim of engendering docility and utility in the child, parents would have to manipulate the truth about the actual dangers of being next to a busy street in order to have the effects on the child they desire. They would have to keep children frightened of an inherently unsafe and unpredictably malevolent world. In summary, identifying the conflicts of interests between the parent and the child would never reveal the full range of ways that the power to take away is exercised over children.

Just as significantly, the command does not automatically produce power's negative effects if the child also gets good reasons along with the command to not run out in front of oncoming cars. The parent's interjection into the child's rushing headlong into trouble is an act of power which has the potential to enhance the child's power eventually. The command to stop operates to create a pause in the child's activity. In that pause the child has a choice made for him or her. If choices are at some point gradually transferred over to the child, children may learn for themselves to pause before acting, giving them time to think. In this way, they learn to give themselves time to consider why they should do one thing rather than another: they have time to get and give themselves good reasons for the actions they take. The parent's command can operate to provide the child with a model for habits that are necessary to rationally autonomous people who must think before they act. In this way the parent's power expressed through a command can lead to the empowerment of the child. So it is not in looking at the isolated command and locating conflicts of interests that we are able to decide whether this is a power relation or not; rather we must say that the parent-child relationship has power embedded in it because of the child's unavoidable dependence. Only by observing the subjectivity constituted in the child can we decide whether the sum total of effects is enabling or disabling to the child.

Conclusion

What dependent people want to develop is the strength to sense and satisfy their own plans for themselves. It is the cumulative effect of being in the presence of particular parents, as well as the effects of a multiplicity of other encounters that children have, in addition to the *personal power* they use to respond to all these occasions, that results in children eventually becoming mature or continuing to be dependent. Rather than positioning the power of the parent and child as adversarial, if power is only negative, we must link their *personal powers* together to see how the development of *personal power* in the child emerges from the child-parent relation. Burbules's insistence to ground all power relations in conflicts of interests and Nyberg's reduction of all power relations to relations of consent both fail to account for the multiple ways in which power relations are exercised among adults and dependents.

In all power relations, B must learn to sense and respond to the possibilities inherent in being with A and to learn strategies that will secure for her or him the ability to engage A with vigour and skill. This is why B must view all social relations as power relations and why both A and B need to acknowledge the positive and potentially liberating and egalitarian elements that are also possible. B must learn to recognize and expand the negative boundaries around his or her *personal power* to make positive whatever can be. Egalitarian values cannot be supported from a base of power which is negative and *interested*; they can only receive support from a view of power relations which attributes equal value to the people engaged in the struggle; that is, B cannot be categorically disprivileged and engage in democratic relationships. In Burbules' view, B is always disadvantaged and always less than A. In his view, equality would only be realizable if we were all equally empty of the power to take away. On the contrary, as educators we want students to be full of *personal power*.

In the following chapter I present some aspects of empowerment that can apply to the full range of our experience. In addition, I argue for educational practices that contribute to the substantive liberty of women and which suit the conditions of a pluralistic society. That is, I argue for *personal power* that is capable of promoting the substantive liberty of all our students consistent with the aim of nurturing authentic self-conceptions and life-plans.

End Notes

1.A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication to *Philosophy of Education 1993: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society*.

2.Susan Moller Okin, "Reason and Feeling," *Ethics* 99 (1988-1989): 246.

3.S.I. Benn, "Power," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 6, 424-426: 424.

4.In this argument, Benn distinguishes power from influence by saying that power is not influence because power is negative. The implication here is that we can say that Jim is a bad influence on John but if we say Jim has power over John then we do not need to use the adjective bad because, in some way, bad is imbedded in the word power. If power has this attribute embedded in it however, either all people who have power over others must be bad or else only those people who were willing to be bad would agree to having power over others.

5."Power," 426.

6."Thus, we speak of power in situations in which a man could either successfully determine another's actions or do him harm. An ability to do him some good is not in itself power over him, although the threat of withholding a good that he has come to count on may well be" ("Power," 425).

7.In summary, Benn's use of the term power has four attributes: 1. it signifies an unequal relation, or different status (to distinguish it from influence); 2. power refers to getting one's own way which implies that power is an achievement word; 3. power is the capacity to bring about changes in someone else's actions or conditions and this is the attribute that is closest to Foucault's idea of governmentality, however, to Benn this also seems to imply achievement (as he says, at least most of the time) while to Foucault power refers to what both individuals in a power relation are trying to do to each other; and 4. power is the ability to threaten or actualize a loss for someone of something he or she values.

8.I am thinking here of the distinction I make between natural, mutual and self-imposed vulnerability in the previous chapter.

9.Nicholas Burbules, "A Theory of Power in Education," in *Educational Theory*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 1986): 95-114.

10.In many ways the theme of Simone de Beauvoir's *The Mandarins* is the ineffectiveness and bleakness of trying to move from resistance to positively constructing plans for the future. In Geoff Dench's *Minorities in the Open Society: Prisoners of ambivalence* the same point is made.

11.I am referring back to the discussion in the previous chapter on the ethics of care and justice.

12.Raine Eisler, *The Chalice and the Blade*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1987), the introduction.

13.What is even more disturbing is that this unreasoning mistrust is coupled with an unreflective and historically forgetful *trust* in people who are not yet in positions of power. We seem to mistrust politicians and simplistically trust those who make outrageous promises--the more outlandish the better; especially if they come from people who have never been in positions of power. This combination of mistrust/trust fails to take seriously the nature of political limitations and possibilities attached to the exercise of power.

14."Sex and Power," 399.

15."Sex and Power," 401.

16.Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 263.

17."Sex and Power," 407.

18.*Chalice and Blade*, xix.

19.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 245.

20.*Chalice and Blade*, xix-xx, xviii.

21."Power," 424.

22.See for example, Okin's analysis of Michael Walzer's work on the "separate spheres criterion" which "requires that different social goods be distributed in different ways and independently of each other." *Justice, Gender, Family*, 41-73, especially page 62.

23.I am thinking here of Rawls's view that our most important right is our right to a fair share of resources. I consider power in the sense of being able to make one's own plans and have one's own intentions to be an essential characteristic of our fair share of resources since Rawls also asserts that the "social bases for self respect are perhaps the primary goods." See *Contemporary Pol Phil*, 104, 153.

24.David Nyberg, *Power over Power* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981).

25.*Power over Power*, 46 - 49.

26.I am not arguing that cooperation is B's only intention, but rather that cooperation becomes part of both A's and B's intentions, such that A does not wish to exercise power so as to overwhelm the adversary; A does not lust for power's strategic position in this way. A must find out what B's plans are and find ways to take them seriously; each partner must do this.

27.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 156.

28.Nicholas Burbules, "Theory of Power in Education," in *Educational Theory* (Spring), Vol. 36, No. 2, 1986:95-114.

29."Theory of Power," 99.

30."Theory of Power," 96.

31."Theory of Power," 99.

32."Theory of Power," 105.

33."Theory of Power," 99.

34."Theory of Power," 99.

35."Theory of Power," 97.

36."Theory of Power," 97-98.

37.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 184.

38."Theory of Power," 110.

39.See *Contemporary Pol Phil*, 41 and 104, for example, as an analysis of Rawls's claims.

40."Theory of Power," 96,98.

41."Theory of Power," 97.

42."Theory of Power," 97.

43.Erik Erikson, "Eight Ages of Man," *Childhood and Sociology* (Frogmore, St Albans, Herts: Triad/Paladin, 1977), 240ff.

44.In particular see Burbules's comments about power on pages 97 and 109. Burbules believes in the inexorable atrophy of good will. It is very difficult to argue for one way of seeing the moral world over another because this perspective operates as a belief that precedes whatever we may do and observe in our interactions with people. We can ask however, what the likely outcomes of one way of perceiving social relations versus another would be.

45."Theory of Power," 98.

46."Theory of Power," 96.

47."Theory of Power," 97-98.

48."Theory of Power," 99.

49.Burbules points out that social inequalities are clearly reflected in our schools. See pages 109ff.

50."Theory of Power," 109.

51.*The Chalice and the Blade*.

52."Theory of Power," 96,98.

53."Reason and Feeling," 236.

54.Michel Foucault develops the nature of these three expressions of power in *Discipline and Punish* trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

CHAPTER SIX

WHAT SHOULD EMPOWERING SCHOOLS DO FOR GIRLS AND YOUNG WOMEN?

Introduction

The problem that prevalent theories of power present to an educational setting is their exclusion of the partnership paradigm for power relations which could promote the flourishing of all students. How would schools be affected by the introduction of power relations within a partnership paradigm? Ranking and hierarchical practices would disappear and resistance grounded in opposition to externally-imposed authority would not be necessary. Student effort would be directed towards uncovering and developing personal talents instead of conforming to a standard of perfection that has nothing to do with people's unique abilities. Teaching and assessment would be directed on the basis of locating the differences between students and adapting aims and ideals of education to these differences. But, perhaps more than anything else, the development of the capacity to be a responsive and responsible member of a partnership arrangement at home and work would take precedence over what we do in schools. This aim requires not only an education for empowerment, but also the abolition of a gender structure that limits the ambitions of women in ways that makes getting an education a sham for them. I argue for a partnership paradigm for power relations in our schools on the grounds of our fundamental freedoms. I propose that, in addition, what empowering schools can do for girls and young women is to envision a future for the family that allows women to emerge from home and school knowing what their talents are and what they want to do with them over the entire span of their lives. This revisioning implies a belief that bearing and rearing children is a possibility for women but is not any more central to being female than it is to being male, and that generativity is essential to the commitments of anyone who claims to be an adult member of the human family.

Feminist Projects, the Public and the Problem with Schools

It has become a commonplace to assume that the free play of a plurality of perspectives is best suited to enabling societies that have developed since World War II, through the mass migrations of people from deeply different cultures, to get along with one another in public encounters. Exclusive positions are seen to be detrimental to cooperation, mutual respect, and citizenship. The debilitating effects of this conglomerate approach have resulted in two attitudes to cultural, sexual, religious, racial, political and economic differences which are reactions against the sameness approach that typified the modern era, as discussed in chapter two. They are also attempts to approximate the laudable idea that we should be tolerant, although both misconceive tolerance.[1] In short, we have become either afraid to say what we actually think about our deeply-held beliefs, making these an entirely private matter, or else, we try to be open to, and are therefore confused by, a whole range of conflicting positions, and allow these positions to conflict internally, so that we fail to build personal beliefs systems that are coherent and capable of addressing the complexity of human affairs from a congruent point of view. In both cases silence or inarticulateness shrouds our personal beliefs. Nothing very beneficial happens to our beliefs when we keep silent about them, and the failure to pursue highly-prized values and organize them into a coherent world view is crippling to mature adulthood.

It is impossible for the feminist project to eradicate genderization to fit into either of these two attitudes. The *silent, private approach* is unacceptable because the constitution of private life affects women's lives in fundamental ways: it is no longer right or bearable to keep private what happens to women at home and at work. When feminists say that the "personal is political," in part this is what they mean. Okin argues convincingly that the "personal is political" shapes our possibilities for establishing a just society, and I outline her view later. The second *smorgasbord* approach is equally unacceptable, since feminism is a coherent and committed (though not a

monolithic) perspective and since it is only by concerted effort that women's lives will attain the substantive liberty that should accrue to them as the legitimate other half of the human race. At bottom, there is a tension in feminism: it has as its concern all women's lives by extension because collective interests transcend cultural, sexual, religious, political, and economic differences. But not all women are feminists and there is no consensus among us as to how we should live our lives. For this reason, feminine empowerment must support a public posture which takes all women's lives seriously, without pretending to speak for all women, while at the same time valuing the committed, different positions that women may hold, including men's if we are care about partnership. As a result, the most acceptable pattern for feminine empowerment in the public domain is one which clearly articulates highly-prized positions but which is responsive to hearing others out; in this way we discover agreements and outline disagreements but we also lobby for things that matter to us. It is impossible to construct such a public world without realizing that many of our views are perfectionist and that some positions will receive the support of public resources at the expense of others. In a very useful way Kymlicka distinguishes between two types of perfectionist and concludes that it is possible to be a perfectionist and also believe that distributive principles should be designed so as to promote a particular way of life, giving equal consideration to each person's interest in that good. And further, that equal consideration requires that people adjust their pursuit of the good in the light of the equal claims of others.[2] I argue that the feminist demand for the de-genderizing of social practices conforms to perfectionism in this sense. For while it may be possible to be generous and giving in terms of our attentiveness, concern and support for the things that enable people to have self-respect and other primary goods, it is not possible to continue to prop up what is insupportable on feminist grounds: the subjugation of women and the exclusion of women's presence and experience from fully representative participation in public life.

In this chapter, I argue that education represents a special application of Okin's project which is inclusive both of the abolition of the gender structure from the family and the workplace. The committed, public approach, outlined above, assumes that our interactions would constitute an open debate among competent and adult women and men who are informed about their own positions and have the requisite skills to dialogue in the way that is implied. In acknowledging the perfectionism in Okin's position, since she maintains that all women's lives would be better without the genderized structures that dictate to women how they will live their lives on the basis of a condition of birth, we must still ask whether we can appropriate both aspects of her view in our schools because public schooling addresses the needs and interests of a multiplicity of interest groups. The core values of these groups range widely on the issue of women's rights and roles in society. In addition, schooling has the capacity not merely to affirm values but to create and sustain them. If the liberal position, that perfectionism is detrimental to a modern pluralistic society is held seriously, in what ways, or for what reasons is it possible to argue that Okin's view is supportable in an educative context that is empowering to little girls and young women? We must have a complex response to the issue of perfectionism since it impossible to encourage people to become empowered adults, and expect that they will not come to carefully reasoned and highly prized positions, which other equally reflective people will disagree with for a variety of good reasons. Feminist issues certainly fall into this category. However, in a pluralist society we are not compelled to support strongly-held positions merely because someone wants to hold them. That is, pluralist societies must consciously formulate themselves. While respecting and listening to a diversity of perspectives is essential to treating different peoples fairly, we are not compelled by justice to sustain or promote views that in and of themselves violate fundamental principles of liberty. I argue that while the abolition of the gender structure can be brought under the fundamental criterion of substantive liberty, the linkage between work and family that Okin's project promotes must be separated out from the abolition of gender and examined on its own because of what is implies.

Framing the Family as a Household Unit

Suppose we take a traditional model for the family and reinterpret it on the basis of empowerment. This would require that the household unit conform to a symmetrical distribution of *personal power*. In this view the family, two parents and their children, compose a system in which the contribution that each one makes strengthens the whole. Whatever is done contributes to the good of the household; this unit is grounded in the mutual self-interest of its members. Individuals within the family mutually submit to this corporate benefit and, in one sense, are all individually less important that the household's overall good. The family is like a small business or industry in which the whole is greater than its parts. In applying empowerment, the work each party would take on would have to be freely chosen on the basis of personally recognized and valued skills. There could be no special privileges assigned to either adult member, or to adult children eventually, that would negate the value of any other family member. Mutual respect and mutual support would characterize all family interactions. Work, both pleasant and unpleasant, would be shared and communication would be open and flow freely. It is inconceivable that power could exercised by one person so as to harm any other. This system is grounded on trust, mutuality and a reciprocity of good will. It is hard to conceive this arrangement working without a strongly-felt commitment by each member to the enduring good of the household. That is, the household must remain a unit so that individual contributions made to it would accumulate in value over time and over generations. This is the case because individuals have pooled their resources and it is only as the family succeeds that individual contributions have any meaning.

This raises the question of the nature of household work. That is, what does a household do that requires the work of all of its members? There are two aspects to include: productive work to secure personal fulfilment and financial maintenance and reproductive work to provide those needs that allow the family to come into being and continue day by day.[3] We would not be able to predict in advance which adult would take on productive versus reproductive roles if they are freely chosen. But we would be able to predict that both adult members would share actively in the emotional and practical responsibility for each aspect. In all cases, the time required out of adult life spans to rear children would not take up the entire productive capacity of either adult member, given the smaller size of our families and the increase in human longevity during this century. That is, the self-conception of each adult member would include child-rearing as only one part, but a central part, of an adult role. Children would not constitute the focus of either parent's personal work: children are part of the household's relational arrangements rather than what the household produces. It is possible in this system that a woman could freely agree to do the reproductive work and a man the productive work so long as a sense of responsibility drew each of them equally to the household unit and to their commitment to it, but no norm would be attached to this agreement and it could shift and reverse over time. That is, as long as both parents were emotionally and practically responsive to and responsible for all aspects of the family interaction, there is nothing to prevent the division of labour from running along traditional sex-based lines, but there would be an equal and mutual distribution of unpleasant work. That is, men and women could decide to follow a traditional gender pattern and still conform to empowerment ideals as long as each adult member was living consistently with his or her freely-chosen life-span goals and as long as responsibility for parenting and household work was equally shared or equally compensated. If educations were required to satisfy the adult partners' life-span goals, each would take turns supporting the other's educational projects so that financial support and reproductive work could be sustained. If individuals in the household took on work in the public sector, which took them away from the family unit, then work within the household would have to constitute an equally valued contribution to the unit and be measured and rewarded in the same ways that public work was measured and rewarded. That is, it is not possible to value a person, devalue the contribution that they make, and support this idea of a household unit.

It is conceivable then that such a family system would pass through periods of activity that would have a central focus: the completion of educational goals, an intensified period of

reproductive work which involved both parents in child-rearing, a period of productivity that included a decreasing focus on reproductive work once children were either able to participate meaningfully or were less dependent on their parents. Other aspects of reproductive work would be carried on by both adults throughout the span of their lives. A single act of domination, a single breach of trust would violate this household cycle and the resulting conflicts would have to be addressed and resolved. In terms of such a relational failure, one of the most insufferable elements in *Emile* is Rousseau's insistence that we must never make mistakes, not even once, in our parenting role or all is lost. This tends to set up the expectation that conflict is somehow fundamentally destructive and irreversibly damaging. I would say rather that conflict between intimates is inescapable; it stems from a lack of insight or information about the other and is resolvable. What is crucial to resolving conflict is that neither adult member devalue the other. In addition, while it is possible to exit from this household unit, and each adult member has the mutually valuable asset of a significant contribution to withdraw, exit would be neither easy nor attractive. This is a trust relationship that cannot bear any threat without leaving all parties palpably vulnerable and the family in disarray since the household constitutes a fully interdependent system and since no party has concentrated on building up personal resources at the expense of others. In terms of a breach of trust between the adult members, there is the conscious awareness that children are emotionally attached to each parent and are inseparable from either. This implies a communication and interaction pattern in which adult members have personal and household needs and desires met simultaneously, or in turn, all the way through the relationship; the viability of a partnership depends on this from the outset. One element that is central to this household model is that all work done by adult members is constrained by the requirement that it benefit the household as a whole and that it be subservient to the cycles of family life. This requirement limits both adults and means that vocations are constrained by the responsibilities inherent in the household unit. If this applies equally to each adult member that has freely chosen to found the household, the substantive liberty of either partner is not fundamentally frustrated.

The household unit would have a strong basis for participation in the public world because receptivity, the successful resolution of conflict, perspective-taking, the recognition and valuing of differences, mutual respect, democracy, equality and tolerance would have to shape the internal arrangements of the unit in order for it to hold together. The development of these attributes based in a partnership paradigm for power relations between the adult members, and on the behalf of the vulnerable members, would ground effective participation of the adult members in a public world conceived in terms of essential public interests that do not necessarily conflict; and where they are found to compete, empowering family practices would help to provide models for the resolution of public conflict. That is, while the household unit is a closed system for meeting the needs of a family unit, it is open to meaningful participation in the public domain.

On one hand, for many it may be hard to think that such a family system is achievable given the vagaries of many people's lives just now; it is a separate question as to whether it is attractive. Yet this image is as compelling to us as is the strength of our belief that mutuality, reciprocity of good will, commitment, and interdependence can satisfy our deepest human longings. This household unit could apply to other family arrangements which are neither heterosexual nor inclusive of children; generativity could still be directed toward general ecological care-taking, or to the needs of the next generation, even though this would not include one's own children. The pattern in adult interaction would remain the same, except for child care, which constitutes a huge responsibility in the household frame presented above. On the other hand, it is due to the constraints placed on us by the generativity that the model requires when children are involved in the household unit that we may raise questions about the vocational plans of adult members. Is it possible for a household unit to do everything assigned to it in the example above if we think of all the directions that personal work and fulfilment draw us? Can this model fit into a modern social order and remain intact, and should it? Should this model, or some other, direct pedagogic practice towards empowering girls and young women?

Okin's Project

Okin asserts at the outset of her argument that feminists do not "believe people should be constrained by innate differences from being able to achieve desired positions of influence or to improve their well-being" in terms of equality of opportunity. She identifies the central problem for women in securing equal opportunity in marriage and family arrangements in which the division of domestic labour is drawn up on the basis of gender. There are two presumptions that drive genderizing processes: women are, supposedly because of their nature, primarily responsible for the rearing of children and the workforce does not have primary or even shared responsibility for the rearing of children.[4] That is, there are two strands to Okin's project: the first is the abolition of the gender structured family, and the second is the accommodation of the workplace to workers as parents of infants and small children. While I agree that the first strand is central to what empowering schools must do for girls and young women, I argue that the workplace requirement constitutes an aim which is more perfectionist than a pluralist primary education system can support.

Okin says that the idea of the family as a household, which is central to Rawls's theory of justice and is to be distinguished from the household unit just described, prevented the family from being included as an institution to which the principles of justice would apply but that equality for women and for children of both sexes rests on this inclusion. The family must be just if it is the linchpin to teaching that is basic to moral development.[5] She further argues that the structure and practices of families must afford women the same opportunities as men have to develop their capacities, to participate in political decision-making, to influence social choices, and be economically as well as physically secure. She notes that we grow up in such different families that any claim to equality of opportunity is unfounded. Since the family is an essential foundation for developing a sense of justice and since the value of the family is assumed but not explored in Rawls's theory, she asserts that the parental model must be justice and reciprocity rather than domination and manipulation. Further, unless children are treated with concern and respect they are likely to be hindered in becoming people who are guided by principles of justice. The sharing of roles by men and women, rather than the division of roles between them, would have a further positive impact because the experience of *being* a physical and psychological nurturer (of other adults, e.g., aging parents, or of children) would increase the capacity to identify and fully comprehend the viewpoints of others that is important to developing a sense of justice. She concludes that in a society that minimized gender this would be more likely to be the experience of all of us. In general, the feminist perspective is one that treats women, as well as men, as full human beings to whom a theory of social justice must apply. Feminists are sure that "women are human beings in no way inferior to men, who warrant equal consideration with men in any political or moral theory." Further, "any tradition that cannot address feminine equality because of its fundamental assumptions about the 'human good' can no longer be regarded as just or rational."[6] Okin asserts that underlying all the inequalities that women face, and the injustice of gender, is the unequal distribution of the unpaid labour of the family.[7]

Okin argues that Rawls's theory of justice is singular in its capacity to confront domination since his original position forces us to think: "What is the good for each and every one of the human beings whose society will be governed by these principles?"[8] As an example of a theory that cannot confront domination, Nozick's libertarianism is "zealous to leave the strong free from obligation to the vulnerable;" and even though women's work in birthing children is necessary to Nozick's theory, his theory cannot embrace women's work. Okin's summarizes theoretical perspectives like Nozick's as theories which are "founded in part on an individual variant of Aristotelianism, in which each person's rational aim is to promote his own flourishing." In this view, "society is best and most morally arranged when it leaves each to produce what he can by the use of his own talents, and to enjoy the produce of such labour and luck combined." This view assumes that people are fundamentally self-interested and cannot take seriously work which is "devoted to the reproduction of human beings themselves" rather than "devoted to the production of things that then belong to their producers."[9] She concludes that it is Rawls's original position

that avoids domination and the partiality that libertarian theories give to those who are talented or fortunate.[10] But his omission of the family as an institution that is in need of an application of the principles of justice colours Rawls's theory since justice as fairness characterizes institutions whose members could hypothetically have agreed to their structure and rules from a position in which they did not know which place they would assume in the arrangements they occupy. In the household model that Rawls assumes (as distinguished from the household unit) and though he would exclude these possibilities in a well-ordered society, children can be and are abused and women are deprived of choice through systematically reinforced vulnerability at work and at home. The problem is that Rawls assumes that people in the original position are all part of the paid labour market.[11] By excluding the family from principles of justice, Rawls jeopardizes his account of how one develops a sense of justice. A just, well-ordered society will be stable only if its members continue to develop a sense of justice which is the "strong and normally effective *desire* to act as principles of justice require."[12] The family plays a foundational role for Rawls, since he asserts that "the active sentiments of love and friendship and even our sense of justice, arise from the manifest intention of other persons to act for our good. Because we recognize that they wish us well, we care for their well-being in return."[13] For this reason, family justice is of central importance for social justice. To Okin, the critical impact of a feminist application of Rawls's theory comes chiefly from his second principle which requires that inequalities be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all: "This means that if any roles or positions analogous to our current sex roles--including those of husband and wife, mother and father--were to survive the demands of the first requirement, the second requirement would prohibit any linkage between these roles and sex." For this reason, gender, with its ascriptive designations of positions and expectations of behaviour in accordance with the inborn characteristics of sex, could no longer form a legitimate part of the social structure whether inside or outside the family.

According to Rawls, after the basic political liberties, one of the most essential liberties is the important liberty of free choice of occupation. This is not currently applicable to women who expect to be the primary parent and to serve the domestic interests of men. Although Rawls posits that in a well-ordered society "no one need be servilely dependent on others and made to choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are deadening to human thought and sensibility" and that work will be "meaningful to all" he does not apply this to women. He also posits that rational moral people would place a great deal of emphasis on the securing of self-respect, which would "emphasize the importance of boys and girls growing up with an equal sense of respect for themselves and equal expectation of self-development and definition." In Okin's view this would include regulation "of pornography, that did not seriously compromise freedom of speech," and an intolerance for basic social institutions that asymmetrically either forced or gave strong incentives to members of one sex to serve as sex objects for the other.[14]

Okin argues that "our current gender structure is incompatible with the attainment of social justice, but also that the disappearance of gender is a pre-requisite for the *complete* development of a non-sexist, fully human theory of justice." As for Rawls, he posits the possibility of people in original position being capable of adopting a viewpoint of "representative" human beings. He knows that this would be difficult, and realizes "ethical differences are bound to remain" but "thinks that complete agreement will be reached on all basic principles or 'essential understandings'."[15] He asserts this on the basis that "weak stipulations" apply so that our basic motivations and psychologies are similar. But Okin asks: What if our basic motivations and psychologies are different between men and women?--a claim which feminist theory asserts very strongly, as presented in chapter three. What is clear in feminist theory is that "in a gender-structured society there is such a thing as the distinct standpoint of women, and that this standpoint cannot be adequately taken into account by male philosophers doing theoretical work on issues of justice."[16] While Okin suggests that the standpoint of women is not without its own problems, it suggests that a fully human moral or political theory can be developed only through the full participation of both sexes: equal participation and comparable positions, something which

cannot take place in a gender-structured society. If people in the original position are in essentials to be "identical," Okin asserts that "only children who are equally mothered and fathered [can] develop fully the psychological and moral capacities that currently seem to be unevenly distributed between the sexes." So the idea that men can completely represent human psychology, rationality, moral development *et cetera* is now seen to be "part of the male-dominated ideology of our gendered society."[17] Justice becomes possible in the transformed family "where reason and emotion are equally called for, where all people care for others on a day-to-day basis and, through doing so, can learn to reconcile their own ambitions and desires with those of others and to see things from the point of view of others who may differ from themselves in important respects."[18] At present, we seldom experience transformed families.

In chapter three I say that the developmental trajectories of men and women tend to be reinforced by the primacy in public structures of values that affirm men and silence women. In liberal democratic politics, as well as in most workplace situations, "speech and argument are often recognized as crucial components of full participation." Being able to speak and be heard are related in a democracy to the allocation of power. Okin notes that, according to Michel Walzer, in a democracy "[w]hat counts is argument among the citizens. Democracy puts a premium on speech, persuasion, rhetorical skill. Ideally, the citizen who makes the most persuasive argument...gets his way." Feminists like Gilligan and Okin are aware that "authority is currently conceptualized so that female voices are excluded from it." Okin says that sometimes we are not heard; sometimes we are only heard if we make ourselves sound like men; sometimes we are silenced through sexual harassment; and sometimes, by having projected onto us the personae of particularly important women (especially mothers) in intrapsychic lives of men.[19]

I agree with Okin that we have good reason to suspect that many of our beliefs about sexual difference and appropriate sex roles are heavily influenced by very fact that we grew up in a gender-structured society. In her view, all of us have been affected, in our very psychological structures, by the fact of gender in our personal pasts, just as our society has been deeply affected by its strong influence in our collective past. Because of the lack of shared meanings about it, gender constitutes a particularly hard case for those who care deeply both about personal freedom and social equality. How we divide work has such deep-going repercussions that it belongs both to the sphere of the good and to that of the right. Further, any just and fair solution to the problem of women's and children's vulnerability must encourage and facilitate the equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and reproductive labour. The perfectionism is clear in the de-genderizing aspect of Okin's project, she says: "We must work toward a future in which all will be likely to choose this mode of life. A just future would be one without gender."[20] In my view, the eradication of genderization is justifiable and empowering practices in schools would encourage the view that a gender-structured family simply makes no sense. But it is not equally clear that the second aspect of Okin's project is one which must be appropriated by empowering schools.

This second aspect is an argument for a transformation in the workplace that parallels the one required in the family. She argues that the division of labour between men and women limits the life-chances of women because genderized values and practices extend into the workplace. The workplace assumes that workers are people who are not primary parents of infants and small children. The feminist claim is that the unequal distribution of rights, benefits, responsibilities and powers within the family is closely related to inequalities in many other spheres of social and political life. Okin identifies a "cyclical process at work, reinforcing the dominance of men over women, from home to work to what is conventionally referred to as the 'political' arena, and thence back home again." "Women are burdened more by burdens, benefitted less by benefits than men." I agree with her that this division of labour between the sexes is a "peculiarly pre-liberal anomaly in modern society--the gender structure, based as it is on an accident of birth, is far closer to feudalism or to a caste system than to most institutions fostered by or tolerated within liberal societies.[21] The interconnections between the domestic and the non-domestic aspects of our lives are deep and pervasive but I would argue that empowerment in the workplace would

foster the aims that Okin wants to achieve without privileging one model for the family over another during one's education years.

Framing the Family as an Open Unit

If we take Okin's project and apply it to the family, we can make several important comparisons between what I will call an open unit family, which would conform to her project, and the household unit described earlier. Both exist within a partnership paradigm for power relations so that both are rooted in a mutual and enabling reciprocity of good will between the adult members--thereby benefitting all members. The patterns for interaction between the family members would be similar in both. But there are assumptions in the household unit, though it is clearly different from the one that Rawls assumes in his theory of justice, that Okin would find problematic. In particular, the household unit constrains the vocational choices that parents may make because it is a relatively closed social arrangement; it assumes full responsibility for child-care and does not require public institutions for support prior to schooling or during the early school years. Both models assume that parenting is a mutually-felt and shared responsibility between the adult members, but the first model allows for (though it does not assume that) a primary commitment in terms of time spent on parenting could constitute the work of one adult member through a specific period in that person's overall life-span plan. In this case, adult members may also take turns parenting but both approaches have consequences for the kinds of work that adult members can include in their plans for themselves. For example, someone who is an artisan may include primary parenting within his or her career plan, but since caring for children is a consuming task, it is not easy to accommodate some careers with care for infants, pre-school children or children in their early school years because children's needs are inherently unpredictable during this time.

The adult members in the second model, the open unit, take on work which does not permit this primary parenting accommodation. Teachers, lawyers, doctors, professors, dock workers or executives, for example, do not generally operate from a home base. The significance of this difference is felt in the family's relation to and expectations from the public world and the workplace. The open unit family requires public child-care support and a serious-minded commitment in work arrangements to make parenting possible. In addition, there would be differences in children's experiences in the two models for family. These experiences are constituted by the fundamental question of who it is that parents them in their daily lives, practices such as breast-feeding an infant, the amount of time children stay in their own homes on a daily basis, and the general nature of the social world that is possible for them. For example, in terms of the last issue, the social community of a local neighbourhood is a possibility for the household unit, while the environment of day-care becomes the 'neighbourhood' for the open unit family. Some of these differences generate the reasons that parents may choose one family model over another.

In order for Okin's project to be successful, there must be a concerted and united front from parents to press society and the workplace to accommodate child-care as a public response to the needs of adult family members as well as to the needs of children. Child-care for pre-school, after-school, or for sick children is required either at the work site or close to it so that a father's or mother's interaction with children is not made impossible. In the organizational empowerment literature, for example in Vogt and Murrell (1990), this accommodation is seen to benefit both the worker and the organization. This feminist front is strengthened by the needs of single-parent families but gets little support from members of household units, i.e., the first family model. There is a fundamental tension between the household unit and open unit arrangements in terms of the public resources that families require. In the political struggle for public resources, contests between members of these two family units would pull society in very different directions. The question is, should one family model stand behind what we do to empower girls and young women in our schools? If we follow out Okin's project, then one model for the family would inform education.

Applications to schooling

It is not my concern here to argue for one view of the family over the other, particularly since I do not think one view is categorically better than the other. But most importantly, that move would of itself short circuit anything else that might be said about the educational responsibility that we have to empower girls and young women to reflect on their own entire life-span during their school years, in light of their inherent talents, in a way which would prepare them to live a full life from the inside in an unconflicted manner. Also, the political machinations of these two models are not my central concern except to recall that schools have a commitment to a variety of publics with competing positions like these. And finally, we can see that each model can be constructed in a way that is a viable interpretation of *empowering* arrangements for family life. In both views of the family, emphasis is placed on adult's having a self-conception worked out into a fully developed life-plan, acquired through education, and extending over an entire span of life. This is an essential feature of empowerment. Education helps shape the life-chances of students by assisting the young in making personal life-plans based on what they learn they are able to and want to do with their entire future. In contrast, that women have been steered into stereotypic work options throughout history is almost too obvious to state. That is, the projects of domestic service to men and primary parenting leave little room to consider a future that is shaped by authentic talents and inclinations. As a result, women conceive their future in entirely different ways than men do. In particular, young women leave school without making any life-plans that take their talents seriously and that address the full range of possibilities proffered by the forty-five to fifty productive years ahead of them, assuming retirement at age sixty-five. This trend, that schools perpetuate but may now be questioning, limits the self-determination of women in ways that affect their basic liberty, and this is a serious issue since "substantive self-determination is the more fundamental value" even to formal liberty.[22] But the project of bearing children that women consider involving themselves in, and which they must apply their liberty to, are not like the projects that are typically considered when liberal theorists raise the question of substantive self-determination versus perfectionism.

In one such example, Rawls argues for a neutral liberal state "which does not justify its actions on the basis of the intrinsic superiority or inferiority of conceptions of the good life, and which does not deliberately attempt to influence people's judgements of the value of these different conceptions."[23] If we think of schooling as an arm of the state, we must ask, not whether schools should *begin* to influence women in terms of their life-plans, because we know that schools already do that, otherwise there would not be the career tracking along gender lines that there is. Rather, we must ask on what grounds schools can legitimately re-direct the lives of girls and young women towards an idea of a future that would compete with primary parenting and household management. Is the de-genderization of schooling a perfectionist aim that is insupportable in a modern pluralist educational system in which we have strongly divergent views of the family and of women's political and social roles or is it an essential move to make towards securing the fundamental liberty of women in our society? If the de-genderization of schools can be argued for on the basis of fundamental freedoms then it seems to me that it conforms to Rawls's "thin conception of the good" that must hold our public life together.

Liberal justice has been criticized because it endorses formal equality, "in the form of equal opportunity or equal civil and political rights, while ignoring material inequalities, in the form of unequal access to resources,"[24] making it practically impossible for people to benefit from their formal liberty in any way that matters. I argued that women are unable to pursue their substantive liberty in chapter four. When we take the specific case of education the issue becomes more complex because children are vulnerable and dependent, and for a long time are incapable of deliberating about their lives in the way that is implied in the idea of self-determination. The idea of self-determination presupposes that, although people may make mistakes about their conception of the good for their lives, they are at least capable of considering fully all the ramifications of selecting one life-plan over another. Now liberals want to protect self-determination for a very good reason. Kymlicka, for example, argues that without self-

determination, people cannot live their lives from the inside. No life "goes better by being led from the outside according to values the person does not endorse."[25] He says that perfectionist projects are "self-defeating" because they do not allow people the right to live life from the inside and thereby may guide people into a good which the person does not actually value "from the inside." He says that two preconditions follow for the fulfilment of our essential interest in leading a life that is good. The first is that we lead our life from the inside, according to personally held values; and the second is that "we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in the light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide."[26] Since the distribution of resources is tied to perfectionist aims, and this certainly applies to schooling, perfectionism limits the full range of personal possibilities that would otherwise apply if the state were to remain neutral on the subject of specific goods.

But as I already have argued, women's lives are characterized by a vulnerability which leaves women internally conflicted over the issue of self-determination. The freedom to bear children and the responsibility to rear them is given in ways that are not comparable to deciding whether to continue our membership in a political party or religious organization. Further, self-determination applies to positions, practices or beliefs that one can stand apart from and change one's mind about. Once you become a parent, you cannot change your mind about being one and neither can you stand apart from this project if you are left with the responsibility of being the primary parent. While the liberal tradition may help women to "acquire different views of the good life, and to acquire an ability to examine these views intelligently," the issue of parenthood in a genderized society does not conform to this model for self-determination, yet it is a decision that dramatically limits every other good that women might choose to pursue. In addition, the devaluing of women's roles in the home that has already been referred to, further restrains women's substantive freedom if a woman does take up parenting willingly. Since liberals value lives being lived from the inside, they cannot devalue parenting and be consistent since "someone's essential interest in leading a life that is good is not advanced when society penalizes, discriminates against the projects that, she on reflection, feels are most valuable for her,"[27] yet this happens to women constantly.

That is, what threatens women's self-determination is not that they are the ones who must bear children so much as it is that boys and men are not educated to take on full and mutual responsibility for caring for the children they cooperate in bringing into being. This failure of responsibility arises through genderizing social processes that convince girls that because their bodies carry the child their sense of responsibility is more closely linked to the child's existence. Men can walk away physically and they do. In one way the idea of self-determination, as grounded in choosing between projects that one can stand apart from, lends support to this abnegation of responsibility. Unless parenting, and one's responsibility to care for the succeeding generation, is specifically taught to boys and girls it will remain the case that those who can walk away will include parenting and generativity under the conditions of choice that currently they extend to bearing and rearing children. We must work toward the idea that our formal liberty is less fundamental than our substantive liberty in the case of parenting and that this applies mutually to both parents, thereby constraining the substantive freedom of each. While self-determination should apply to the decision of whether or not to have children, people should not think of themselves as free to walk away from the project once a child is born. That is, because of the infant's unavoidable vulnerability, the child has a claim on the life-plans of its father and its mother that limits what those parents may do in terms of their other projects. In addition, because women's lives are more adversely affected by genderized family structures, women have a legitimate claim on the life-plans of their husbands in terms of the responsibility that fathers demonstrate in caring for their children.

Conclusion

In both models for family arrangements presented in this chapter there is a partnership paradigm for power relations between family members so that power is exercised to limit and

govern the possibilities of each adult in terms of this responsibility for offspring. Relations of trust, the reciprocity of good will, the distribution of roles--not on the basis of sex but on the basis of talent and interest--and the conception of parenting as only one part of an adult life-span responsibility all work to promote the realization of the claims that children and women could make on their husbands'/fathers' life-plans. That is, both support the substantive freedom of women and ameliorate the conditions which promote vulnerability; both require the development of care and a sense of justice that apply to families, and both enable men and women to enjoy the public and private benefits of generativity. But the relationship to the public world differs in that the household unit does not require the same degree of public support. There is no reason to support one view of family over the other if empowering principles and practices characterize each one. For this reason no one model for the family unit can inform the project of empowering little girls and young women in our schools. But we can justify the de-genderization of society in our schools which should have the effect of restructuring those work environments that the open unit family and the single-parent family requires to support child-care as long as we recognize that this constitutes a battle for public resources that will be waged on the grounds already outlined. What should be affirmed in this political struggle is the inherent value of each model as different but equally prized by its adherents. The primacy of the vulnerability created by single-parent families should move us to seriously consider our social responsibility to the members of such families. But empowerment practices should begin to influence the school site so as to redirect girls and young women towards establishing life-span plans that would preclude the current burdens of the single-parent unit. In addition, public opposition should be directed towards models of family which do not conform to empowering practices. Models for the family that inform schooling then, must support empowerment but do not need to be based either on the household or the open unit family, and schooling must attend to the attractiveness of both.

End Notes

1.Joyce Bellous, *Toward a Philosophy of Multicultural Education.* Masters Thesis, The University of Calgary, 1988.

2.Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 21-43, especially page 39.

3.Jane Martin, *Reclaiming a Conversation* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985).

4.Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family,* (U.S. A: Basic Books, 1989), 5.

5.*Justice, Gender, Family,* 8.

6.*Justice, Gender, Family,* 58.

7.*Justice, Gender, Family,* 25.

8.*Justice, Gender, Family,* 71-72.

9.*Justice, Gender, Family,* 84.

10.*Justice, Gender, Family,* 101.

11.*Justice, Gender, Family,* 95.

12.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 98.

13.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 99.

14.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 104.

15.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 105.

16.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 106.

17.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 107.

18.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 119.

19.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 132.

20.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 171.

21.*Justice, Gender, Family*, 122.

22.Kymlicka makes this argument and considers that, in fact, "formal self-ownership (formal liberty) is a red herring," when compared with the significance of substantive liberty. Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 123-125.

23.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 205.

24.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 160.

25.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 200.

26.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 204.

27.*Contemporary Pol Phil*, 206.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Empowerment has becoming adult as its underlying and unifying theme. At the outset of modernity, Kant raises the importance of becoming mature (adult) and says that we are responsible for our own immaturity. Foucault affirms that becoming adult is essential but challenges the connection between our immaturity and our responsibility for it by showing, for example, how the ascription of responsibility for their madness pinned the insane in two places, once to their condition of insanity and once again to their guilt for it. Foucault extends his analysis of human maturity by tracing the line of modern relations of power that make us into the subjects that we are--subjects who are not entirely responsible for ourselves. His prescription for us is that we should resist the particular ways in which we have been made subject and engage in choosing another subjectivity which of course presupposes that we are able do this.

Empowerment further shows us how our immaturity is constituted on the basis either of bureaucratic forms of control or socially-constituted vulnerability, both of which throw up obstacles to our striving towards maturity. The obstacles are more overwhelming for some than for others. Empowerment attempts to cooperatively remove obstacles to maturity from within people and move them out of their path ahead. But this idea of whether we are responsible for our own immaturity remains unclear. Suppose you have a friend who appears to have gone quite mad. She was depressed, and now says she is "dead inside," a deadness she wants to make complete. Because you love her and remember a generous and warm friendship during better days, you mourn its loss and long to help in every way that you can. Without success. It is as though she has spun a cocoon of dependency (immaturity) around herself, walled so thick it is impenetrable from your side. And so you wait. You think: She must break out from her side. As you listen to her talk, and speak back to her, you sense in yourself how deeply embedded is Kant's view that we are responsible for our own immaturity. It is not that you think that she is responsible for getting sick, she had an abusive childhood and all of the attributes of socially-constituted vulnerability apply to her case, but you still think that she is responsible for the first move to get better. Is this a reasonable belief? Is she responsible to and for herself in the way you think she is? You cannot escape by simply saying she is mad, because even those who are professionally trained to respond to madness are waiting for her to make the first move with you. What you wake up one day to see is that, whether or not she is fully responsible--all you ask is that she *want* to get better not that she make herself better--you cannot exercise your *personal power* in a way to make her even want to get well. That is, the belief that she is responsible for her own immaturity is really a way of picking out her *personal power*. Sick as she is, she still has a grip on this power, although she uses it against herself. Both of you have the *personal power* to desire things, to do and say things, but each only has enough for herself: this reveals to you her *personal power* and the limits of your own. In order to help her you would have to have, not more resources than she has, but more power. This is what you do not have. And how would you use it if you did? And so the idea that we are each responsible for our own lives is really an affirmation that we each have *personal power* to do with as we are able and willing. We use our *personal power* to give life, to ourselves or to others, to be loving, generous, and enabling, or we use it to take away life from others, and even from ourselves. This is truly an awe-full human freedom...and its strength.

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