Populist, Nationalist, and Authoritarian Discourse: A Critical Analysis of How Populist Radical Right Parties Frame Social Policy in Hungary

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Hungary was once the star performer of democratic transition among the post-communist countries that joined the European Union in 2004. In recent years, however, Hungary now presents the most extreme case of democratic decline in the region, exacerbated by the rise of the Populist Radical Right (PRR). The relationship between the PRR and democratic decline in Central Eastern Europe has received wide scholarly attention. The literature that has examined Hungary mainly focuses on defining and/or measuring populism and its impacts. These studies miss the important role of PRR party discourse. In response, this qualitative dissertation explores the populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames and framing strategies of the two PRR parties (Fidesz and Jobbik) in Hungary. I use two crucial, less likely social policy cases to empirically investigate PRR discourse. One case study looks at how PRR parties articulate welfare benefits in five policy areas. This is important because although the PRR is increasingly associated with welfare chauvinism, the literature mainly focuses on Western and Northern European cases. The other case study explores how PRR parties articulate education policy for Roma schoolchildren. The Roma are the largest and most oppressed minority in Hungary, so education is a pressing policy area. To study PRR discourse, I selected electoral manifestos and high-profile speeches such as annual commemorations and State of the Nation speeches from both parties between the 2010 to 2016 timeframe. I use two research methods to examine the documents in a coherent and systematic way. Interpretive grounded theory allowed me to organize and code the data and a critical frame analysis allowed me to unpack and categorize my findings. The main findings are six-fold: First, by analytically discerning between populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames as overlapping but distinct, I found that nationalism was the most

prominent element of PRR discourse. Second, while overlooked in the bulk of the PRR literature, gender is a key component in how nationalist and authoritarian frames are constructed. Third, while I anticipated that PRR parties would glance back to the Soviet era as legacy theory suggests, I did not anticipate the centrality of the "corrupt communist" theme in Fidesz discourse. Fourth, my research counters the idea that PRR parties tone down radicalism once in power. Fifth, beyond the dissertation's original goals, my findings disrupt the widely held assumption about Hungary's unexpected and sharp turn to the PRR, especially since 2014. Instead, I find evidence of strong populist, nationalist, and authoritarian discourse well in advance of 2014. Sixth, I find ample evidence to support ideas that Fidesz and Jobbik are ideologically converging, which blurs the lines between mainstream and extremist positions. This dissertation makes two major contributions for the discipline of political science more generally and the study of populism more specifically. First, this work addresses a gap in the PRR literature by paying close attention to discourse to help explain PRR party agency and strategy. Second, this research carefully distinguishes between populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism (the defining features of the PRR as a party family) for conceptual clarity on how these parties compete.

PREFACE

The concept operationalization in Chapter 3 and approximately half of Chapter 4 of this thesis has been published as Lugosi, N.V.T. (2018). Radical right framing of social policy in Hungary: between nationalism and populism. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, 34:3, 210-233.

In addition, most of Chapter 5 of this thesis has been published as Lugosi, N. V. T. (2015). Race and Populist Radical Right Discourses: Implications for Roma Education Policy in Hungary. *Alberta Journal of Educational Research*, *61*(4), 484–502.

Both publications are original and single-authored work. All of the research and writing for these articles was conducted during the PhD program.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the everyday citizens that face oppression and struggle for a better life in a free and fair democratic Hungary.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research has been generously funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada, the Province of Alberta, the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, the Department of Political Science, and the Wirth Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies at the University of Alberta.

This research process was made undoubtedly more enriching with the mentorship of my supervisory committee. I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Lori Thorlakson, for her endless support, constructive feedback, and encouragement over the years. Lori, I am so grateful for your guidance, personally and professionally. I would also like to thank my committee members Dr. Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Dr. Siobhan Byrne for their helpful feedback and support. My gratitude is also extended to Dr. Joseph Patrouch, the Director of the Wirth Insititute for Austrian and Central European Studies here at the University of Alberta and my external examiner, Dr. Achim Hurrellmann at Carleton University for graciously serving on my viva committee.

The Department of Political Science is in an amazing, collegial environment and I am thankful for all the Faculty members I have studied under and for the administrative team, especially Cindy Anderson and Caroline Kinyua, for all their patience and help over the years. I am also grateful to the dearest colleagues and friends in my cohort, Dr. Mariam Georgis and Hajar Amidian. Your friendship and support got me through our many long hours and late nights throughout all the milestones of this program.

Much gratitude to all of my colleagues and friends in the Faculty of Native Studies, most notably Dr. Chris Andersen, Dorothy Thunder, Chelsea Vowel, Robin Howse, and Jessica Kolopenuk for their ongoing support and encouragement. *Hiy hiy!* I am also grateful to Dr. Frank Tough, Deputy Provost Dr. Wendy Rodgers, and Transition Year Program Coordinator Suzanne Butler for launching my career in the Faculty of Native Studies.

I am also thankful the help and support from the Wirth Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies. The team, most especially Sylwia Adam-Ross, provided funding support, encouragement, and many opportunities throughout my academic career. Doctoral fellow Orsolya Kiss provided vital research assistant support. Reading and analyzing primary documents would not have been possible without Erzsébet (Erszinéni) Tóth-Borsai's passionate and thorough Hungarian language instruction. I am proud to continue my affiliation by serving as a member of the Wirth Academic Advisory Board (WAAB).

Outside of the University of Alberta, I would also like to thank Dr. Kirk Hawkins and Dr. Takis Pappas for organizing the 2016 European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions *Causes of Populism* panel. I received great inspiration and feedback from all the participants of this workshop, especially Dr. Bartek Pytlas and Dr. Attila Ágh. Dr. Markus Ketola and Dr. Johan Nordensvard invited me to publish with them in a special issue of the *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy,* which largely inspired my research approach. Thank you both. Thank you also to dear friends Bil MacAoud, Thomas Kearns, and Chehala Leonard for always believing in me.

Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the kindness, support, patience, help, and encouragement at home. I cannot express enough thanks to Christian Schimpf, my husband, colleague, and partner in populism. Thank you. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to express my eternal gratitude to my daughter, Brigid MacAoud. Thank for you all the presentation rehearsals, especially the Transylvania paper, and the ups and downs you have endured these last years. You never gave up on me and I will always be grateful.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview of the Problem

This qualitative dissertation explores the frames and framing strategies of Populist Radical Right[1] (PRR) parties in Hungary. Within the PRR literature, discourse is often overlooked, and my work addresses this gap. Further, this work is timely because there are active debates on democratic transition in the post-communist countries of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) that joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 to explain why countries transitioning to democracy are 'backsliding'[2]. A troubling trend for liberal democracy and social cohesion in CEE in recent years is the rise of populist far right parties. Mainstream political parties can be powerful agents of socialization and are worthy of study because how these parties strategize and mobilize their constituents has consequences for democratic change (Herman, 2016). Party agency does not occur in a vacuum, but rather within a wider political, social, and economic context.

The role of cleavages and party strategy are significant in post-communist democracies as the scars of the Soviet legacy and domination of the socialist left blur the lines between the center and the far right, offering greater room for maneuver than seen in Western Europe (Tavits, 2008; Tavits and Letki, 2009; and Hanley, 2004). However, it is also worth noting that turbulence in Hungary's political structure predates Soviet rule. The country's history is long and storied, but a pivotal moment for the modern nation-state was the nationalist uprising during the 1848 Revolution resisting the Hapsburg Empire. This led to a joint monarchy

[1] This term was coined by Cas Mudde (2007).
[2] For example, see: (2007). 'Special Issue: Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?' *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 18, No. 4.

between Austria and Hungary (Fabos et al., 2019). The Hapsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empires dissolved by a series of post-World War I peace treaties, namely the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which allocated two-thirds of Hungary's territory to neighbouring countries (Fabos et al., 2019). The 1848 Revolution and Trianon mark what neo-Gramcians, such as Laitin and Watkins refer to as a major crisis, or tipping point, that represents a complete reshaping of society (1998). In 1919, Béla Kun imposed short-lived communist rule in the newly independent Hungary and this was met with intense resistance, known as the "White Terror", led by Admiral Horthy (Waterbury, 2010, p. 174). Following Bolshevik defeat and still bitter about the imposed terms of Trianon, Hungarian leaders, most notably Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös, advocated for a reunified Hungary with the lost Transylvanian territory at the forefront this rhetoric[3]. During the German-Italian-Hungarian alliance period leading up to the Second World War, the first Vienna Award on November 2, 1938 re-extended Hungary's borders into Czechoslovakia and the second Vienna Award on August 30, 1940 re-extended the borders into the coveted Transylvanian region of Romania. Because of the alliance, Hungary also fully cooperated with the liquidation of Jews and Roma during the Holocaust, especially when Nazi sympathizer Ferenc Szálasi's far right Arrow Cross Party formed a government in 1944-1945 (Waterbury, 2010, pp. 36-37). In the aftermath of the war, the 1947 Treaty of Paris re-affirmed the 1920 borders and Hungary lost the territories regained during the war.

Another widely celebrated tipping point that symbolizes the country's strength and resilience against oppression is the 1956 Hungarian Revolution to push back against Soviet takeover. This movement was unsuccessful, and Hungary remained behind the Iron Curtain

[3] The Gömbös legacy is marked with irredentist sentiment that also dismissed claims for autonomy by ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, known as "Transylvanianism" (Waterbury, 2010, p. 36).

until 1989. Before Soviet takeover, women demanded emancipation and received limited voting rights in 1922[4]. Women were granted full voting rights in 1945, but the communist regime suppressed democratic freedoms (Várnagy, 2013, p. 4). Following Soviet collapse, Hungary began the slow and painful transition to a liberal democracy and a market economy. The country joined NATO in 1997 and along with nine other countries, joined the European Union (EU) in 2004[5].

Demographically, while ethnic Hungarians are the largest group in Hungary, the country is diverse. Within national borders, data from the 2013 Census counts the population of Hungary at 9 937 628. The largest ethnic minority groups are the Roma, 3.1 per cent[6] and Germans, 1.3 per cent, followed by Slovaks, 0.3 per cent and Croats, 0.2 per cent. There are also smaller minority communities consisting of (in order of size): Romanian, Ukrainian, Serbian, Slovenian, Polish, Greek, Bulgarian, Ruthenians, and Armenian. In 2011, the Minority Rights Group International (MRGI) estimated a population of 100 000 Jews in Budapest, who are categorized as a religious minority. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that in 2013, 4.7 per cent of the population were immigrants, mainly from other parts of Europe and China. In terms of social cohesion, some minorities have faced discrimination, especially the Roma[7] and Jewish communities in Hungary that were targeted in the Second World War. Under the oppressive Soviet occupation, minority politics were not publicly discussed but legal rights and safeguards were promoted in the years leading up to EU accession.

[4] For a detailed discussion on women's voting rights and constraints in Hungary, see Kovách, 1996.
[5] In 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia all joined the EU, known as the "Big Bang" of EU enlargement.
[6] The MRGI notes that other estimates suggest the Roma population is much higher, up to 5 – 10 per cent of the population.
[7] The Roma are an ethnically distinct and very diverse group. The Roma originate from Northern India but have settled across Europe for thousands of years (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2019).

In the region, Hungary was once the forerunner of democratic performance among post-communist peers. For instance, scholars like Vachudova (2005) pointed to Hungary as an exemplar of successful transition to liberal democracy and a market economy by EU standards and measures, with robust party competition and democratic institutions in place. However, as Herman points out, Hungary's post-communist story shifted after 2010 (2016). Since the 2010 and 2014 elections, Hungary has been run by a populist far right party (Fidesz), with a populist extreme right party (Jobbik) as the official opposition. Following Soviet collapse, Fidesz established itself as a conservative, anti-communist party on the center right, with Viktor Orbán as party leader. From 2002-2006, Fidesz was elected but lost the next election in 2006 by a small margin to Ferenc Gyurcsány's Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP (Election Guide, 2018). Over the years, parties in post-communist CEE strategized and adapted according to the processes of democratic transition and eventual EU membership. A striking example is the former liberal Fidesz' sudden shift to the populist right (Grzymała-Busse, 2006, p. 432). The party always showed nationalist sentiments but more recently adopted an economic populist position. Fidesz' shift occurred at a time when left-leaning ideologies lost legitimacy in response to then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány's confession about dishonestly representing the country's grave economic situation. The speech was leaked and broadcast over national radio, leading to political crisis and public protests (Kósa, 2016). The immediate and ongoing impact has been a complete discrediting of the socialist left. Fidesz won the 2010 election and secured a supermajority in the subsequent 2014 and 2018 elections (Election Guide, 2018).

That political climate helped open space for a party farther on the right end of the spectrum. Jobbik is a newer party, founded in 2003, and is Hungary's third largest party. The

rapidity of Jobbik's success is remarkable. The party broke through in the 2009 European Parliament election. This was a surprise as Hungary's party system was considered fully consolidated and locked in, leaving no room for new parties. Jobbik went from less than 1 per cent to 15 per cent in popularity in one year. This is unparalleled among European far right parties (Karácsony and Róna, 2011). Nationally, Jobbik has been enjoying ever-increasing success, securing second place in 18 of 19 counties in the 2014 local elections. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) describes the party as anti-Roma, anti-Semitic, homophobic and xenophobic (ECRI, 2015, p. 9). In fact, scholars such as Karácsony and Róna (2011) have empirically linked Jobbik's remarkable success with the salience and ownership of the "Gypsy crime" moniker the party campaigned on in 2010. Jobbik coined this term as a key part of their platform that articulates extreme rhetoric about how the Roma community is inextricably linked with crime and deviance. Worse yet, Jobbik's hostile rhetoric, regarding the Roma and in general, is influential and has impacted the Hungarian party system. Karácsony and Róna's argument falls in line with Meguid's compelling theory that explains how parties strategically compete over issue position, salience, and opportunity (2008). The use of inimical populist constructions of "us and them" (Laclau, 2005; Reinfeldt, 2000) can open space for political polarization and deference to a "personalist authority" as seen in Hungary (Enyedi, 2016a, 2016b; Pappas, 2014, pp. 3-4). As these PRR parties have moved into the mainstream, and therefore exert policy making and agenda-setting power, understanding the features of PRR ideology is an increasingly important task (Pirro, 2017).

1.2. Practical Relevance of the Study

The rise of the PRR in Hungary is not just an interesting research problem. There are also practical consequences for liberal democratic performance and social cohesion. Recently in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), there has been a well-documented erosion of democracy with the rise of the far-right, nationalism, and xenophobia (Rupnik, 2007; Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013). Hungary stands out as an extreme case and justifications for some of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's illiberal policies, at least rhetorically and at the elite level, have been underpinned by strong populist, nationalist, and authoritarian discourse typical of the PRR to mobilize support for the Fidesz government and its policy aims. Ever since the 2010 election of Orbán's Fidesz government, many instances of illiberal practices such as *inter alia* restrictive media laws, the erosion of minority rights, discriminatory laws against marginalized populations, and a re-drafting of the constitution that compromises safeguards of liberal constitutionalism have been observed and raised alarm bells within the European Commission. Tavits asserts that powerful parties, like Fidesz, deserve scrutiny because they help direct and anchor in a new party structure that paints a bleak picture for democracy (2013: 1-2). There is ample evidence to support her claim. For instance, Freedom House's annual reports on *Freedom in the World* since 2010 all rank Hungary as free but indicate a steady decline in the quality of democracy.[8]

Jobbik's electoral success increased PRR supply to voters, with negative impacts on the whole party system. Enyedi characterizes this severe democratic backsliding in Hungary as "populist polarization" (2016b). This came as a surprise to researchers, in part because

[8] At the time of writing, this troubling downward trend continues. Recent Freedom House data shows declining aggregate scores of 76, 72, and 70 out of 100 for 2017, 2018, and 2019 respectively. In 2019, Hungary was even downgraded to "partly free" and is the only EU country with that status (Freedom House, 2017; 2018; 2019).

one idea taken up in the populist literature is that once in office, radical positions would be tempered and lose traction (See Akkerman et al, 2016, pp. 3-4 for an overview of this debate). In Hungary, Fidesz' adoption of Jobbik's positions did not temper radical competition as predicted but instead led to a "mainstreaming of the extreme" (Feischmidt and Hervik, 2015). An unintended consequence of such party competition is that Fidesz' adoption of Jobbik's positions lends credibility to ideas of the populist radical right that were previously viewed as unrealistic (Pirro, 2017, pp. 355-356). The two parties are coming to resemble each other, with Fidesz adopting more extreme positions and Jobbik taking on a more nuanced approach (Pirro, 2017, p. 353). These observations support assertions that Fidesz and Jobbik are in many ways "twin parties" competing for many of the same voters. The biggest challenge for Fidesz is to discern the party from Jobbik while trying to monopolize the extreme vote (Ágh, 2014, p. 45). Because Fidesz and Jobbik take a common approach to many of the same issues, they focus on *electoral* rather *policy* accountability (Grzymała-Busse and Innes 2003, p. 66). In other words, these parties attack each other's credibility and capacity to govern and overlook policy successes and failures. The result is policy application and reform without the critical oversight necessary for a healthy democracy.

Pertinent to my study, the lack of democratic oversight and accountability has dramatically impacted minorities. The strength of minority rights and protection is a good indicator of the democratic progress of CEE countries as both post-communist democratizing states and as members of the EU because a vibrant, cohesive social fabric is a key component of a successful and healthy democracy where all citizens are represented and have the opportunity to fully participate in social and political life. For instance, Article 2 of

the Treaty on European Union lists the rights of persons belonging to minorities among the fundamental values of the Union. As mentioned above, these minorities, especially the Roma and Jews, have been targets of nationalist groups, both civil such as the neo-Nazis who marched through the town of Devecser during an anti-Roma demonstration, and elite actors, namely the political parties of Fidesz (current governing party) and Jobbik (second largest party in the Hungarian National Assembly), whose platform is based on anti-Semitic, fascist, neo-Nazi, homophobic views. This is particularly concerning because, as Tavits asserts, strong parties are better organized, so their influence is wider and their ability to mobilize groups is greater. She notes this is particularly true in newer democracies (2013, pp. 7-8), such as the countries of CEE. As both populism and nationalism rest on ideas of the "us versus them" dichotomy, a good place to look for in-groups and out-groups is ethnic minorities. This is important because, as stated, the treatment of minorities is a good indicator of democratic health with implications for social policy.

1.3. Theoretical Relevance of the Study

In addition to the practical concerns discussed above, my research also helps fill significant gaps in the scholarly literature. My analysis of party discourse and the convergence of different literatures within comparative politics and international relations make this study novel. The party literature on populism is vast, but there is less research on PRR discourse and how parties articulate their positions (Herman, 2016; Pytlas, 2016). While there is a great deal of work that defines and measures populism, there is less work that helps us to understand how these parties create and shape discourse. I contend that this omission is crucial because close attention to party discourse can help researchers identify warning signs

of democratic backsliding towards illiberalism. For instance, Hungary's dramatic shift to the far right resulting in poor democratic performance caught researchers by surprise. In assessing Hungary's successful transition based on democratic performance and institutional indicators, scholars missed the important role of discourse, which is central to party strategy (Herman, 2016). Further, Helms reminds us that democratic participation alone does not translate to democratic performance (2009, p. 52). I make a theoretical intervention into this research gap by exploring PRR party strategy on a discursive level.

Secondly, I also take care to refine the key concepts that characterize the PRR as a distinct party family. Defining features of the PRR include exclusive-nationalism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde, 2007), which I operationalize as frames. In addition to paying close attention to PRR discourse in Hungary, I clearly differentiate between nationalist and populist frames. This is important because recent studies suggest there is conceptual conflation between the two (De Cleen, 2017; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017) and that nationalism, not populism, offers a better explanatory frame for how these parties strategically compete (Rydgren, 2017; Lugosi, 2018). This means that nationalism, not populism, is a better explanatory frame for these parties. Taking these claims seriously allows for the opportunity to examine the discursive contours of PRR discourse with more precision.

A related, but separate contribution of my work is a close examination of authoritarian frames. This is important because research on authoritarianism mainly focuses on voter tendencies and attitudes. I contend that it is equally important to examine the less studied role that party agency plays in activating threats and making them relevant to electoral choice. Moreover, Béland (2019) notes that an area that remains underexplored is

the relationship between populism and the politics of insecurity, which refers to how perceived collective threats are framed and acted upon. Alongside populism and nationalism, I also analyze discourses of fear and threat, which are hallmarks of authoritarianism, to explore how political rhetoric might activate latent authoritarian attitudes.

Finally, my research makes a causal contribution to the party literature. Kitschelt (2003 [2001]) asserts that convincing causal explanations must consider deep institutional legacy and shallow social factors and triggers. I contend that articulations of nationalism that draw on historical legacies (deep) and articulations of authoritarianism rooted in security concerns in reaction to trigger events (shallow) help explain the success of populism in Hungary. Current political party positions are shaped by the past. Populist parties in East Europe place strong emphasis on historical legacies, conditioned by the particularities of the post-communist transition to democracy and eventual EU membership (Pirro, 2014; Pytlas 2013; 2016). The transition to democracy also occurred in the wider context of globalization and opening borders. Kriesi et al. trace the rise of populism to those challenging times (2010, p. 677). Grzymała-Busse and Innes (2003) point to the perceived failures of EU membership as a cause of increased populist support. These points exemplify my argument that causal mechanisms for PRR success rest in Kitschelt's deep and shallow causes, which legitimates the idea that the wider political opportunity structure conditions party competition space. While I do not use Kitschelt's arguments to test a causal model in this research, I do consider his points to enrich the discussion of my empirical findings with an indirect causal story.

1.4. Research Questions

The purpose of this research is to unpack the contours of Populist Radical Right rhetoric in Hungary, with the aim of building theory for research in this area. Further to that point, I aim to build theory by exposing the particularities of how this party family expresses populist, nationalist, and authoritarian discourses as frames. In light of how PRR party discourse can threaten social cohesion, I selected two social policy case studies to answer my central research question: *How do the radical right Fidesz and Jobbik parties in Hungary use populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames to articulate social policy issues?* Relatedly, I pose two secondary questions to push my discussion further. Specifically, I want to know:

1. *What rhetorical strategies might give traction to certain frames?*
2. *What are the possible consequences?*

1.5. Overview of Research Design

In this section, I provide a very brief sketch of my research design. I do not go into fine detail here because I elaborate on these components in the Conceptual Framework (Chapter 2) and the Method (Chapter 3) chapters.

1.6. Scope

My work is situated within comparative politics research on post-communist party systems, European politics in CEE, and populism. I also draw on international relations literature, namely securitization and IR feminism. This dissertation is a qualitative single case study focused on contemporary Hungary. Hungary, located in Central Eastern Europe, is one of the ten countries that joined the European Union (EU) in 2004. Hungary is the most extreme

case among CEE peers that have faced a populist backlash (ex. Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) that compromises liberal democracy. Moreover, Hungary is an interesting case given the country's unpredicted and rapid fall from democratic grace.

My research serves as a theoretical intervention in the expansive field of populist literature. The emphasis on discourse situates my work at the micro level of analysis. Scholars studying populism at the micro level often draw on constructivist and discursive approaches that examine specific actors at the individual country level, as my work does. Relevant to my approach, micro level researchers looking for causal explanations suggest that, among others, political framing and/or voter attitudes lead to populist success (Pytlas, 2016). This line of work is particularly concerned with identifying the specific mechanisms that populist parties use to generate support (Pappas, 2008; Hawkins, 2009). Because I study populism in Hungary at the micro level and explore PRR frames and framing strategies in close detail, I do not examine other parties. Thus, I restrict my analysis to Fidesz and Jobbik, the two PRR parties in power.

1.7. Empirical Case Selection

I selected two empirical cases to answer my research questions about PRR discourse and social policy. Social policy is a broad term for government policy aimed at improving wellbeing (Aravacik, 2018). This encompasses diverse policy areas such as: welfare benefits, the criminal justice system, healthcare, education, immigration, and workers' rights, to name only a few. I restricted my analysis to welfare benefits and Roma education for schoolchildren. These are interesting less likely cases to examine because on the surface, they are pressing policy issues but not intuitive places to look for PRR discourses. Finding

PRR frames even in less likely cases then shows how PRR discourse impacts even more policy areas than the populist research has shown, including day-to-day policies that affect most people. Following Gerring's (2007) work on case selection, we can think of these less likely cases as crucial. I return to this point in Chapter 3.

1.8. Methods

For this dissertation, I chose two qualitative methodological approaches to answer my research questions. Qualitative methodologies are appropriate because I am exploring questions about discourse. For this research, I used interpretive grounded theory and critical frame analysis. Grounded theory is an inductive method that allowed me to systematically code and categorize my data. I followed the work of Pidgeon and Henwood (2004) who neatly summarize the steps for applying grounded theory as: generating aims and questions, preparing the data, conducting an initial analysis then a core analysis, and discussing outcomes. I unpacked the data and made sense of the findings with a critical frame analysis. Critical frame analysis is one of several methods available for discourse analysis research. This method is suitable because I am asking questions about how political parties use populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism to frame particular issues. Drawing from social movement theory, Benford and Snow (2000) develop a discursive model for categorizing framing strategies as diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational. This is helpful for linking discourse to action and I use these insights to guide my analysis and discussion in light of my secondary research questions.

1.9. Data Selection

To analyze the rhetoric of the PRR in Hungary, I focus on electoral manifestos, annual commemoration, and State of the Nation speeches. This selection of texts offers a sense of wider party discourse about a host of different issues, including social policy. High profile speeches that are widely consumed by the public provide important insights into what non-specialists know about certain issues. I further restrict my analysis to the 2010-2016 timeframe.

1.10. Concept Operationalization

The PRR is a party family defined by the intersection of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007). All three concepts, and especially populism, are contested in the literature. What is more, some scholars (cf. De Cleen, 2017; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017) have pointed out that because populism and nationalism both draw on notions of "the people", the two concepts are often conflated. This conflation comes at the theoretical cost of sharply defined understandings of the PRR. In my work, I strive for conceptual clarity and carefully define each one. To that end, I adopted a reliable coding scheme from Caiani and Kröll (2017) because they provide clear indicators of populism and nationalism. Using their work as a blueprint, I expanded their coding frame to also conceptualize authoritarianism.

1.11. Main Findings

My research yields six main findings about PRR discourse in Hungary:

1). One of the most substantial contributions of this dissertation is the use of two interpretive research methods. This innovation allowed me to examine and identify PRR discourse with

fine precision. By carefully discerning between populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism (the defining elements of PRR parties), my key finding is that nationalism is the most prominent feature of these parties' discourse.

2). Relatedly, I also detected that gender is a key component in how nationalist and authoritarian frames are constructed used in different ways in different contexts. This is important because gender is largely absent in the PRR literature despite the intersection of nationalism and gender. For instance, feminist comparative and international relations literature from the 1990's illustrates how nation-building processes are deeply gendered (cf. Yuval-Davis, 1993; McClintock, 1994; Enloe, 1990, 2014). Additionally, there is a wide body of scholarship discussing the role of gender in the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996; O'Connor, 1996). My discourse research empirically shows the poverty of this omission.

3) Third, my analysis on the role of historical legacy in PRR discourse yielded another unexpected finding. The transitology literature discusses how the communist past shapes contemporary party systems in CEE, as distinct from Western European party systems (Allen, 2017; Elster et al., 1998). While I did anticipate PRR parties to draw on historical legacy discourse to support their claims, I did not anticipate how pervasive the "corrupt communist" theme is in party discourse and how Fidesz draws on this as a framing strategy even in unlikely places, such as discussions on old age pensions. This finding speaks to active debates in the legacy literature about how the past continues to shape party politics.

4). Fourth, a conventional idea within the populist literature tells us that once a populist party takes office, they must moderate their strategy and agenda to remain electorally relevant

(Akkerman et al., 2016, pp. 3-4). Yet in the Hungarian case, I observed the opposite. This suggests that PRR politics is perhaps more ubiquitous than previously thought.

5). My research also uncovered an important temporal finding. In 2014, Orbán's annual summer speech in the still contested territory of Transylvania captured international headlines and attention when he publicly declared Fidesz' vision of an "illiberal democracy" for Hungary. While Hungary's sudden downward trajectory from democratic success caught many transitology scholars by surprise (Herman, 2016), my work reveals strong populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames well in advance of the 2014 speech. These early warning signs of Hungary's populist shift support my argument that we need to pay closer attention to discourse.

6). Last but not least, I found ample evidence in my analyses to support the party convergence thesis from the literature on Hungary (Ágh, 2014, p. 45). Given Fidesz' spatial shift further right over the years, this is not completely unexpected. This extreme behaviour both shapes and is shaped by the party system. My finding helps demonstrate how party positions and strategies are malleable, further confirming the suitability of my discourse analysis.

1.12. Roadmap of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, I develop my theoretical framework of analysis in four main parts. Part one surveys how cleavages and politics on the left-right spectrum have shaped the post-communist party competition space in CEE. Part two untangles the characteristics of the PRR by refining the concepts of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism to provide clarity on this party family and how these parties compete.

Part three makes the case for a discursive approach to PRR party competition by stressing the importance of discourse and framing strategies. The last section concludes by pointing to legacy and threat as deep and shallow causes to explain why PRR discourses might resonate.

In Chapter 3, I explain my methodological choices in detail. I approached the data with a blend of grounded theory and critical frame analysis. I open the discussion by justifying why I use grounded theory and critical frame analysis to code and categorize frames and framing strategies in a rigourous manner. After recapping my research questions, I give a snapshot of each of these methods and explain why they are appropriate for this study and my rationale for using both in tandem. I also lay out my research strategy, including which texts I selected and why, concept operationalization, and my coding procedure.

The next two chapters are my empirical cases on how the PRR articulates their positions on social policy issues. My first case study in Chapter 4, examines how the PRR frames welfare benefits. In this chapter, I start by discussing the relationship between welfare chauvinism and the PRR in Western Europe. I follow up with an overview of social policy more generally in Hungary to provide some background context. Then I apply my research strategy (detailed in Chapter 3) to present the summary and discussion of my findings. Based on my findings about the centrality of racism regarding the Roma, in Chapter 5, I explore how the PRR articulates their positions on Roma education to determine how pervasive racism is with PRR discourse by using a less likely case study. Here, my analysis also highlights the discrepancies between official policy and actual progress on Roma education. To that end, I compare documents and statements to identify how the Hungarian government frames the issue with EU and Council of Europe documents to

determine the extent to which the assessment of Hungary's performance matches or contradicts Hungary's self-assessment. Following that, I analyze the same party speeches and documents as Chapter 4.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I reflect back on my research questions and what I have learned. After briefly summarizing the chapters, I discuss my key findings and their implications, with thought to my theoretical contributions and where appropriate, I point to avenues of future research. I conclude with final thoughts on Hungary.

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical and conceptual groundwork for my dissertation. My work makes four contributions: First, I apply a discourse analysis method to address the gap on party discourse in PRR research. Second, I respond to recent work (cf. DeCleen, 2017; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Rydgren, 2017) that advises researchers to carefully distinguish between the defining features of PRR parties. To avoid conflating concepts of nationalism and populism in the PRR, I study these as separate frames. Third, I expand on the authoritarian literature by shifting the focus from explaining electoral outcomes to asking how political rhetoric might activate latent attitudes. Finally, I advance causal arguments by asserting that articulations of nationalism that draw on historical legacies (deep) and articulations of authoritarianism rooted in security concerns in reaction to trigger events (shallow) help explain the success of the PRR in Hungary.

The chapter is organized as follows: Part one surveys how cleavages and politics on the left-right spectrum have shaped the post-communist party competition space in CEE. Part two untangles the characteristics of the PRR by refining the concepts of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism to provide clarity on this party family and how these parties compete. Part three makes the case for a discursive approach to PRR party competition by stressing the importance of discourse and framing strategies. The last section concludes by pointing to legacy and threat as deep and shallow causes to explain why PRR discourses might resonate.

2.2. Party competition space: Surveying the terrain

Mainstream political parties can be powerful agents of socialization and are worthy of study because how these parties strategize and mobilize their constituents has consequences for democratic change (Herman, 2016). Party agency does not occur in a vacuum, but rather within a wider political, social, and economic context. The role of cleavages and party strategy are significant in post-communist democracies as the scars of the Soviet legacy and domination of the socialist left blur the lines between the center and the far right, offering greater room for maneuver than seen in Western Europe (Tavits, 2008; Tavits and Letki, 2009; and Hanley, 2004).

Cleavages are malleable and can be shaped and transformed to produce party system change. Research on political cleavages took hold in the 1960's, most notably since Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal work, which examined how voter alignment and divisive cleavages shape party systems in Western industrialized countries. Early research in this area conceptualized cleavages as frozen or stable, but contemporary scholars disagree. Bartolini and Mair posit that, "Social cleavages are political differences grounded in the social structure of a society" that do change over time (1990). Further, Bartolini insists that cleavages must combine social, normative, and organizational elements (2005). The key implication of understanding cleavages this way is that, "Social divisions and their ideological expressions are not translated into politics as a matter of course, but are decisively shaped by their political articulation" (Kriesi, 2010, p. 674), which points to the importance of a discursive approach that stresses context. Franklin (1992) found that the transformation of party systems could be explained in part by changes in the social structure and most especially, the rise of issue voting, which was replacing traditional cleavage

politics like class and religion. Where cleavages are contingent on group loyalty that is often formulated early on and reified later in life, issue voting is a new concern that often occurs along the left-right spectrum (1992, p. 403).

However, party systems, including those in CEE, have complex dimensionality. That translates to limitations when studying political phenomena and party behaviour only along a linear left-right spectrum (Albright, 2010; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Kitschelt, 2003 [2001]; Hellman, 1998, Marks et al, 2006). The left-right spectrum is best suited to explain economic voter-party linkages but there is more to consider. From the 1970s onward, successful party competition occurs with elites introducing and contending with far more issues than the left-right spectrum suggests. Inglehart's (1977, 1990, 1997) pioneering work on identifying and measuring a libertarian-authoritarian dimension reframed the debate by suggesting that conflicting values offers a better explanation than traditional cleavages based on religion, class, or nationalism. In democracies, basic needs for shelter and security were satisfied, leaving citizens room to desire postmaterial liberal values such as autonomy and freedom of expression (Inglehart 1977). Further, as traditional cleavage lines weaken, party competition along multiple lines can make a clear left-right party position difficult to pinpoint (Albright, 2010, pp. 700-702). For example, authoritarian positions can appear in the welfare state on the economic left with chauvinist policies, or on the far right with government policy that dictates a smaller role for the state.

Political and social cleavages change over time and vary across different contexts in terms of what is deemed important and to what extent, so there are commonalities and differences in Western and Eastern Europe. Across European democracies, Kitschelt points to three main cleavages: First, there is a cleavage along the lines of universalism versus

ethnic/cultural divides to determine citizenship and who belongs. A second cleavage oscillates around political and social liberalism in terms of participation and personal autonomy versus strictly regulated authoritarianism. Third, there are economic contestations about distribution and property, put simply, who should get what (1995, p. 458). The left-right political spectrum is often applied in Western European cases, but post-communist transition shaped CEE party systems and opened space for political mobilization around new cleavages in ways not available in Western European democracies (Allen, 2017, p. 274; Herman, 2016, p. 19). By consequence, party competition in post-communist Europe is influenced by a noneconomic, cultural dimension, which features just as prominently as the economic left-right. In Hungary, this second dimension is even stronger (Marks et al., 2006, p. 157). That means parties raise issues of morality, the family, and religion in divisive ways (Kitschelt, 1995, p. 462). The emphasis on the private sphere opens space for governments to interfere into peoples' personal lives in attempt to regulate and promote a particular social order, such as the nuclear, Christian, heteronormative family.

While the post-communist countries demonstrate a tendency toward authoritarianism, different historical legacies shape crucial differences between party system dimensionality in the East and West. For example, a study of Estonian party politics finds that the main cleavage line there is ethnicity (as expected by Kitschelt's observations) combined with a communist-anti-communist cleavage (Saarts, 2015). In addition to the communist legacy, another study shows that historic tensions between the Czech Republic and Slovakia largely inform nationalist narratives in those countries that cut across parties and ideologies (Seleny, 2007, p. 157). Körösényi identifies the state-church[9], post-communist-anti-communist, and

[9] Körösényi is referring here to the Christian Catholic church.

urban-rural as the most influential cleavages in the Hungarian party system with a strong emphasis on culture to a degree not seen in the rest of Europe (1999, p. 60). As Casal Bértoa puts it, “Since the very beginning of the transition, and most clearly after 1994, party politics in Hungary has revolved around cultural rather than economic conflicts” (2014, p. 24). A consequence of focusing on culture is a party system built on nationalist sentiment. This is not surprising since nationalism (in tandem with populism) has always been a feature of Hungary's post-communist government (Ágh, 1998, p. 67).

Within this complex competition space, party positions and ideologies are not locked in so it is crucial to think about agency. Grzymała-Busse points out that during the processes of democratic transition and eventual EU membership, communist successor parties strategized and adapted accordingly. To exemplify, she notes the former liberal Fidesz’ sudden shift to the populist right (2006, p. 432). Fidesz’ shift occurred at a time when left-leaning ideologies lost legitimacy in response to then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s confession about being dishonest about the country's grave economic situation. The speech was leaked and broadcasted over national radio, leading to political crisis and public protests (Kósa, 2016). The immediate and ongoing impact has been a complete discrediting of the left. Put simply, there is no legitimate left in Hungary. Innes explains,

> If this retention of leftist economic space becomes impossible, however, if social democratic parties in government lose all serious traction on social justice issues in economic terms, then this logically forces the collapse of their normative project and the credibility of the party as such. It diminishes the space for economic representation and opens up the risk of anti-system players increasing their vote

> among lower-income voters. This scenario is exactly played out in the Polish, but also, notably, in the Hungarian case (2014, p. 95).

By consequence, space for radical right party competition opened and resulted in a total party system disruption. The rise of the PRR means that social cleavages are amplified and articulated in new ways, namely through the intersections of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism.

2.3. Populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism: Interlocking but not interchangeable concepts

Populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are hallmarks of the populist radical right. How these different elements manifest in day-to-day politics can have a big impact on indicators of liberal democratic health. Before discussing the particularities of this party family, it is necessary to define these concepts. I begin this section with a brief outline of how populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are conceptualized in the literature, before shifting to a larger discussion of how these components intersect within the PRR in CEE generally and in Hungary more specifically.

2.3.1. Populism: We the people! But who are the people?

Within political science, the precise definition of populism continues to be hotly contested. Although all definitions stress a politics for "the people", there is disagreement on how to classify it. The bulk of the research can be divided into three main schools of thought. Scholars such as Weyland (2001) imagine populism as a political strategy of personalistic

leaders that is disengaged from ideology (see also Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Others (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Stanley, 2008) disagree and conceptualize populism as an ideology, chiefly as a "thin-centered ideology" attached to "host ideologies", such as nationalism or communism (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013a). Among the extensive populist literature, Mudde's ideational definition is seminal and the most widely accepted. He writes, "I define populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (2004, p. 543). Others still, abandon the structural ideology thesis and instead conceive of populism as a discursive enterprise centered around a set of ideas (Hawkins, 2009) that manifest as a discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), a discursive frame (Aslanidis, 2016), or as an ongoing process of reframing "us and them" (Mayer, Ajanovic, & Sauer, 2014). For these thinkers, populism is not attached any particular ideology or regime (Taguieff, 1995). Further, shifting the focus to discourse allows for greater conceptual clarity than the murky and unneeded focus on ideology (Aslanidis, 2016). In my view, there is not one master definition of populism as different research objectives demand different operationalization (cf. Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

Driven by the discursive questions posed in this dissertation, I subscribe to the Hawkins definition of populism as a set of ideas manifesting as discourse grounded in particular cultural contexts (2009, p. 1043). Hawkins' definition is best suited for my research because it contains the core ideas of populism shared by a variety of scholars, while also focusing on party discourse as my work does. The core ideas include: Populist appeals to the "common person", the "politics for the people" versus the "corrupt elite" (Mudde,

2004), are expressed by a particular discourse strategy and line of argumentative reasoning that can occur anywhere along the left-right political spectrum (Blokker, 2005, p. 386; Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2009; Hawkins, 2009). Responding to cultural backlash against post-material values, parties can sit on the left, right, or centre of the economic spectrum, especially for populists and authoritarians (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). In addition to contestations over defining populism, there are also active debates on how populism impacts democracy. Drawing on Latin American examples, Laclau (2005) argues that populist politics on the left is an essential component of democracy by bringing issues that matter to "the people" to the forefront (2005). On its own, populism in not inherently negative, but it can be dangerous, especially for unconsolidated democracies by compromising liberal institutions and encouraging authoritarian party competition (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Müller points out that the constant constructions of "us versus them" are essentially anti-pluralist (2017). For example, because mainstream parties in Hungary are constrained by EU membership it is unacceptable to directly express hostility towards democracy. However, Herman points out that, "Populism is a likely candidate, precisely because it carries an ambivalent democratic message. The populist speaker claims to act in the name of the 'People', and yet denies the legitimacy of alternative claims to citizen representation" (Herman, 2016, p. 20). This shows how populism can appear compatible with democracy. In addition, the moral demarcations between us and them (Laclau, 2005) opens space for political polarization and deference to a "personalist authority" (Pappas, 2014, pp. 3-4).

Even worse, Europe has seen a rise of the populist radical right (PRR), which refers to a very specific party family with common elements such as authoritarian leanings that further compromise democratic liberalism and a style of populism that excludes certain

minority groups from the "the common people" (Pirro 2014; Mudde 2007). Like populism, a right leaning position on the political spectrum is not inherently damaging to democracy but radical parties on the far right share, to varying extents, common features that often can lead to negative consequences for democracy. The far or extreme right can be understood as, "A political ideology revolving around the myth of a homogenous nation – a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism hostile to liberal, pluralistic democracy, with its underlying principles of individualism and universalism" (Minkenberg, 2013, p. 11). For these parties, the intersection of populism and nationalism is prominent. Some scholars, such as Derks (2006) even label these parties as "national-populists" that construct the populist *us versus them* logic of "the people" along nationalist lines of who belongs. Along with the "corrupt elite", immigrants and marginalized minorities, such as the Roma, can also comprise the "outgroup" by draining financial resources and threatening national culture (Derks, 2006, p. 181). Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser similarly argue that for "European populist radical right parties", nationalism does play a role in defining "the people". Yet, it is not as important with regards to who "the elite" are, even though they may be portrayed as putting the interest of the alien foreigners over those of the "native" people. The distinction between the people and the elite, they argue, is moral, not ethnic (2013b, p. 508). On the far right, both populism and ultra-nationalism are characterized by in/out-groups and us/them binaries, which can cause conflation between the two concepts. The discussion now turns to nationalism to show how this is conceptually distinct from populism despite commonalities.

2.3.2. Nationalism: An elite construction of who belongs

Scholars across disciplines have been interested in questions of nationalism and how to understand it ever since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that organized the world into nation-states. Ideas of the relationship between nationalism and democracy can be traced back to the Enlightenment period, most notably Jean Jacques Rousseau's (1712-1778) writings on the "general will of natural men" within the social contract. Later scholars such as Geertz (1973) and Shils (1957) approach nationalism from a primordial perspective that, similar to the early thinkers, suggests culture is natural and rooted in family, kinship, and blood. The primordial approach links nationalism and history by emphasizing the naturalness of culture based on blood ties and ancestry. By contrast, the modernist school of thought stresses the importance of social and cultural factors overlooked by primordialists. For instance, Nairn (1981 [1977]) and Hechter (1972) contextualized nationalism within structures of colonialism and uneven development.

Post-modern thinkers reject earlier ideas that nationalism is inherent and argue instead that nationalism is a social construct. Anderson defines nationalism as an "imagined political community" (1991 [1983]). Similarly, Gellner (1994) and Carr (1945) contend that nationalism is an invented tradition resulting from the development of the modern nation-state system and is not natural. A strength of Gellner's argument is the correlation drawn between political legitimacy and nationalism (Harris, 2009, p. 53). Mudde understands nationalism more broadly as "nativism". Nativism is an ideology that only members of the core group belong to the nation and outsiders pose a threat. In contrast to ethnic nationalism that is inherently exclusive, nativism allows for inclusive forms of nationalism that do not compromise the tenets of liberal democracy (Mudde, 2007, pp. 17-19).

Other scholars situate nationalism within power relations in the state. Breuilly (1993), Brass (1991), and Waterbury (2006, 2010), perceive nationalism to be an elite tool of power where politicians draw on "banal nationalist" (Billig, 1995) constructions of "us versus them" to reify and reproduce narratives of the national interest, especially vis-á-vis the outside international context, as a powerful rhetorical device. In a similar vein, Brubaker (1996; 2013 [2011]) coins the term "nationalizing" to capture the idea of nationalism as a process of ongoing discourse. Nationalizing discourse is successful in part because "The collectivist, black and white, populist and enemy identifying rhetoric came easily to post-communists; politicians were well trained in this style, and populations were responsive after decades of having heard little else" (Harris, 2009, p. 113)[10]. Further to that point, any single definition of nation, nationalism, and nationality will always be contested as one group, especially a majority, will always be favoured in terms of identity, policy, etc. (Calhoun, 1997, p. 98). That creates problems for minorities who may not fit into the dominant group, especially under oppressive conditions where status and rights may be compromised. In addition, newer approaches within the nation-building literature consider how the nation and its institutions are gendered (Yuval-Davis, 1997; McClintock, 1994) in ways that intersect with race and ethnicity (Black women in the U.S., Crenshaw, 1990; Roma women in Greece, Macris, 2015).

Elite expressions of nationalism then, are always potentially controversial, especially exclusive forms based on concepts of ethnicity as seen in CEE by "national-populists [that] tend to be anti-Europe and create myths such as 'true Hungarianness or Polishness' into an 'us vs. them' philosophy" (Ágh, 1998 pp. 65-66). With this understanding, groups perceived

[10] It is worth mentioning that while nationalizing discourse has wide appeal in CEE, Zahra points out that for some, an alternative response is indifference (2010, pp. 118-119).

as outsiders of the imagined nation, such as, for instance, immigrants, the Roma, and sexual minorities, are prime targets for discrimination and resentment (Ágh, 1998, p. 106). Ruzza and Schmidtke refer to widespread hostility toward out groups as a 'culture of enemy-thinking' (1996, pp. 192-193). For Tismaneanu, post-communist nationalism is in fact the expression of an historical cleavage that is hostile to globalization while bringing long repressed attitudes about "the nation" to the forefront (1998, p. 106). The theory of nationalism as an ongoing process also sheds light on the role of history. If we accept Tismaneanu's claim that expressions of post-communist nationalism expose an historical cleavage in CEE (2009), then the link between nationalism and history demonstrates why historical narratives are salient for strategic elites seeking to capitalize on social divisions.

Brubaker's ideas provide a roadmap to find nationalizing discourse. First, there is the idea that a 'core nation' exists in ethnic and cultural terms. Second, there is the idea that the nation-state belongs to and is for the core group. Third, such discourse will reveal some sort of threat to the nation, and the core group by implication. Fourth, the state must intervene to save the nation's language, culture, economy, or political hegemony. Finally, any actions taken are necessary for redress and remediation of past injustices (2011, p. 1786). To uncover nationalist rhetoric, researchers need to pay attention to some of the principal watchwords such as: *inter alia* religion (i.e. Christian), common history, common struggle, the natural homeland, our values, the collective we, and a natural community. The discursive construction of the nation used by elites indicates a performative element (Geisler, 2005, p. xiv-xv). Articulations of nationalism are legitimized by language used to signify symbols and metaphors of the nation (Smith, 1991; Geisler, 2005). Both concrete and abstract symbols such as flags, national anthems, shared culture, etc. become evidence of a common

identity. In addition to territorial boundaries, common culture and values, nationalist rhetoric draws on common myths, or stories about the nation and its history (Smith, 1991, p. 14; Pytlas, 2013, 2016). These socially constructed myths or "invented traditions" are told as an historical narrative, which roots these stories in the past (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 1). Historically situated stories of who belongs in the nation can even inform policy. For example, King István (of *Magyar*[11] descent) is a central figure in Hungarian history known for advancing Roman Catholicism. Since 1301, royalty and noblemen all claimed Catholic and *Magyar* ancestry thereby defining the 'model Hungarian' as both Magyar and Christian (Fabos et al., 2019). This ideal was formally coded in the *Golden Bull of 1222,* which is an historical legal document similar to a constitution that spelled out Hungarian work and tax policies that clearly privileged noblemen (Magyar and Christian) to the disadvantage of others (Vörös, 2015). This example dates back to the Middle Ages but contemporary political actors on the far right continue defining "proper Hungarians" by the same standards and often draw on primordial logics of natural communities bonded by blood. Preserving the nation and national identity is a core aim of these parties. The need for protection is often uttered through authoritarian language of threat and insecurity, elaborated in the next section.

2.3.3. The authoritarian worldview: The need for order in the face of fear

Any discussion of authoritarian literature and the language of threat and insecurity begins with Nazi Germany and the research puzzle of explaining support for the Nazi party. Pioneering work in this area focused on how to measure authoritarianism in individuals, most notably the F-scale (F=fascist) developed by Adorno et al. (1950). Later work

[11] The Magyars are an early ethnic group from the Ural Mountains that settled in the Carpathian Basin in the area now known as Hungary (cf. Róna-Tas, 1999).

explained authoritarianism from a behavioural perspective. More nuanced than the F-scale, Altemeyer created the Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) test and scale based on assumptions that authoritarianism is a social attitude characterized by submission, conventionalism, and aggression (1981, 1988, 1996). Newer scholarship insists that both models are flawed and tautological as this early work was premised on the assumption that conservatism and authoritarianism were inextricably linked. Some scholars contest this and maintain that authoritarianism (like populism) can occur anywhere on the political spectrum (Dunn, 2015; Hetherington & Weiler 2009) and even among different economic classes, education levels and race/ethnicity (MacWilliams, 2016; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005).

Scholars do agree that authoritarians are motivated by order, deference to authority, and a simplistic "black and white" worldview (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Lavine et al., 2005; Stenner, 2005). The desire for an ordered society means that authoritarians subscribe to ideas of homogeneity, interpreting diversity as a threat to social order (Stenner, 2005). Similar to expressions of nationalism that state who belongs (or not) to the core nation, utterances of authoritarianism can also exclude ethnic and sexual minorities. Authoritarians, however, exclude based on the need to "crack down on crime" or "protect" social order and institutions from those perceived as deviant (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 31). Where the non-authoritarian supports libertarian freedoms, authoritarians do not and are not receptive to change (Feldman, 2003). Political rhetoric by strong leaders that provide simple solutions for problems, and draw on tradition and norms resonate as legitimate and appropriate (Hetherington, 2009, p. 34). The appeal of black and white, easy solutions offers insight to why a populist strongman[12] leader is

[12] The male pronoun is used here in the context Vona and Orbán as the populist leaders under examination in this study and does not reflect insensitivity to gendered language.

preferred, even if the rules of liberal democracy are bent.

To avoid earlier methodological traps of conflating authoritarianism with the political far right, newer tests have been developed in the 1990s to uncover authoritarian leanings through attitudes about parenting (two seminal works include Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). The focus on child-rearing questions provides a reliable measure of authoritarian attitudes, with the propensity for order, through a politically neutral approach that has revealed some surprising results. For example, doctoral candidate Matthew MacWilliams' research explains that American support for GOP (Republican Party) candidate Donald Trump lays in "latent authoritarian attitudes in voters" that Trump's political discourse speaks directly to. MacWilliams polled Americans using four questions based on parenting: "Whether it is more important for the voter to have a child who is respectful or independent; obedient or self-reliant; well-behaved or considerate; and well-mannered or curious. Respondents who pick the first option in each of these questions are strongly authoritarian" (2016, §8). There is also a wide swath of recent work from political psychology that puts forth cognitive and coping theories about authoritarian personalities (See for example: Stenner, 2005; Oesterreich, 2005; Lavine et al., 2005). Rather than rehash these extensive debates here, I simply take away a key finding relevant to this study. In Dunn's words, "The bottom line is that when authoritarians are threatened with the perception of a fragmenting society, their inherent response is to rally behind a strong in-group leader that similarly rejects anything perceived to be foreign" (2015, p. 368).

There are numerous studies that show authoritarians are sensitive to normative threat and threatening messages (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016). One hypothesis is that threat activates latent attitudes among authoritarians and that impacts the way they vote and what

policies they support (Lavine et al. 2005, p. 221). A recent interview with Hetherington reveals that authoritarians in America are particularly wary of threats from outside the borders, namely terrorist groups like ISIS or rogue states like Russia and Iran. Further, some non-authoritarians are also very fearful of terrorism and other international threats and the salience of these issues explains the increased support for Trump (Taub 2016, Section IV). This finding illustrates how powerful fear tactics are as a rhetorical strategy. The same article also featured an interview with Feldman, where he notes, "What stands out from the results is that authoritarians are most willing to want to use force, to crack down on immigration, and limit civil liberties" (Taub 2016, Section VIII). For authoritarians, threatening discourse is matched with support for hard action to solve problems and the need for security as the most paramount concern, justifies illiberal policies.

The authoritarian literature yields intriguing findings about how voter attitudes shape party preferences. While the bulk of the research focuses on what motivates certain vote choices, I am interested in the role of party agency. Conceptualizing authoritarianism this way adds another link to the causal chain by asking *how* political actors activate threat among the authoritarian constituency. Additionally, emphasising the discursive construction of threat is compatible with my discourse-based approach to populism and nationalism.

2.4. The rise of the populist radical right in CEE

2.4.1 Conceptual clarity on the PRR

In turning attention to the populist radical right (PRR), it is imperative to delineate populism from nationalism. Scholars continue to argue, however, that separating the two is not straightforward. In earlier work, some went as far as calling populism "a kind of

nationalism" (Stewart, 1969, p. 183). Akkerman (2003, p. 151), in an analysis of the populist radical right, writes that the meaning of "the people" refers to ethnos rather than demos. For example, "the people" can be defined along ethnic and nationalist terms and outgroups often include immigrants as a cultural and economic threat (Derks, 2006, p. 181). Yet, in some instances, articulations of the "the people" may refer to both (Jansen, 2011). In the same vein, Vincent (2013, p. 454) talks about the populist notion of nationalism, which is often the source for populist mobilization in the first place (see also Pankowski, 2010). Therefore, nationalism may be understood as "the notion of popular self-government, the idea that government is carried out either by the people or for the people, in accordance with their 'national interest'" (Heywood, 2012, p. 179). In other words, nationalist mobilization gains a populist character if nationalist actors argue that they seek to represent "the people", i.e. the nation, against the privileged elites (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 20). Not surprisingly, many parties (from the left and the right) that are often described as populist, equally share nationalist features (cf. Halikiopoulou, Nanou, & Vasilopoulou, 2012). The analytical costs of conflating these concepts is that researchers might miss important insights into how these parties strategize and compete. Rhetoric is central to understanding how party discourse works and rich analyses rooted in context demand sharp concepts. The question that arises then is, if and how these two concepts can be separated. Given the often-occurring conflation between populism and nationalism, it is especially important for this research to make the theoretical distinction to avoid empirically conflating the framing of social policy issues in Hungary as populist when really, they are nationalist (and vice-versa). For example, overlooking the prominence of nationalist discourse comes at the analytical risk of missing what strategies parties used to persuade, such as references to the glorious past or homeland

connections to the diaspora. In recent years, the term “populism” has become fashionable and oftentimes used as a “catch all” phrase that carries little meaning. Labelling and measuring parties as populist when in fact they are nationalist can lead to weak explanations. Gerring (1999) reminds us that little social scientific progress is made if all our work does is assign new labels to old concepts.

Since the 1970s, the rise of the “new right” has changed the political landscape by politicizing issues normally relegated to the private sphere, such as the construction of the family, national identity, and so on (Kirkham, 1998, p. 245). New rightists challenged the liberal order by advocating a return to so-called traditional norms and values. In the European context, a particular strand of right-wing populism that excludes immigrants and minorities has been on the rise since the 1980s (Ignazi, 2003; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005). Rightist populism has captured widespread academic attention, with many simply referring to these parties as “populist”. This simplification comes at a theoretical cost as 'populism' neither defines these parties in a meaningful way nor is their main feature (De Cleen, 2017; De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017; Rydgren, 2017).

The PRR is a specific party family across Europe with common elements such as authoritarian leanings and a style of populism that excludes certain minority groups from “the common people” (Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2014). This party family is first and foremost derived from a far or extreme right tradition with exclusionary nativism at the core (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2005). The far or extreme right is conceptualized as, “A political ideology revolving around the myth of a homogenous nation – a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism hostile to liberal, pluralistic democracy, with its underlying principles of individualism and universalism” (Minkenberg, 2013, p. 11). Rydgren stresses that the most

important feature of PRR discourse is in fact exclusionary ethnic nationalism, which influences the populist features (2017). Similarly, De Cleen (2017) and De Cleen & Stavrakakis (2017) advocate for a discourse approach to better understand PRR climates as characterized by the nationalist rhetoric used to frame populist arguments. They point out that for both populist and nationalist politics, the nation-state is the main level of policy and so references to "the nation" are inherent to both (2017). The strongest point of conflation occurs when trying to define "the people", a notion central to both populism and nationalism. De Cleen & Stavrakakis contend the nationalist construction of the people is defined by citizens versus non-members (can include other nations), with the populist construction of the people as an underdog to the establishment/some sort of elite (2017). By contrast, Brubaker (2019) cautions against "purifying" populism as completely and analytically independent from nationalism as Stavrakakis et al. (2017) do. For the purpose of my empirical analyses, I maintain this differentiation but also heed Brubaker's caution by understanding the concepts as interlocking and at times, overlapping.

2.4.2 The PRR in Hungary

As a party family, there are many commonalities within the PRR, but there are also important differences between Western and Eastern Europe (Allen, 2017). This is partly because Communist Europe did not experience the many social changes, including immigration, in the 1980s that shaped the development of the Western European far right (Bornschier, 2010). The experiences of communism and the painful transition to a market economy and democracy dramatically shaped party competition in Eastern Europe (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009). During the transition, parties grappled with the same valence

issues such as the market, EU accession, public spending, and budgets. Along with technocracy, parties adopted strategies of nationalism and populism to successfully compete (Grzymalała-Busse & Innes, 2003, pp. 66-67). Populist parties in East Europe also present themselves as leaders of a social movement (Gunther & Diamond, 2003), with a strong emphasis on historical legacies, conditioned by the particularities of the post-communist transition to democracy and eventual EU membership (Pirro, 2014). The transition to democracy also occurred in the wider context of globalization and opening borders. Kriesi et al. trace the rise of populism to those challenging times (2010, p. 677). Grzymała-Busse and Innes point to the perceived failures of EU membership as a cause of increased populist support. In their words, "In short, the demands of enlargement have both constrained responsive and accountable party competition and, as the character of enlargement became apparent, encouraged populists and demagogues" (2003, p. 66). These points exemplify my argument that causal mechanisms for PRR success rest in Kitschelt's deep and shallow causes, which legitimates the idea that the wider political opportunity structure conditions party competition space.

In Western Europe, populism tends to occur on the fringes of the party system, whereas in CEE, populism is a more mainstream occurrence (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002). Hungary is not an exception. Populism and nationalism have always been a feature of Hungary's post-communist government, in part because of late regime change compared to other countries that transitioned earlier in the democratization wave of the 1960s and 1970s (Ágh, 1998, p. 67). As with other CEE countries, strong narratives of the past, or historical legacies, often underpin these rhetorical strategies and discourses (Pirro, 2014). For example, one of the most contentious policy areas concerns the Hungarian diaspora living as

minorities in neighbouring countries. The nationalist - cosmopolitan liberal divide was as prominent as the communist legacy and this polarized political climate opened space for parties to adopt populist strategies (Enyedi, 2016b, pp. 204-206). Hungary also stands out among CEE countries as the cultural versus economic divide has been a defining feature since transition (Casal Bértoa, 2014; Enyedi, 2006, Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Tóka, 1999; Körösényi, 1999). For instance, ever since transition, parties in Hungary have echoed nationalist sentiments. To exemplify, Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall publicly declared that he wanted to be the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians, "emotionally as well as spiritually" (Culic, 2006, p. 185). Antall's sentiment is significant because he was encouraging stronger ties between the 5 million Hungarian diaspora and the 10 million Hungarian citizens in the homeland. Antall implicitly referred to the injustice of Trianon, which forcibly separated the Hungarian community. By acknowledging and expressing sympathy for the 5 million Hungarian diaspora, governing all Hungarians would move to correct injustices of the past. Another feature of the PRR in the East is the prominent role of Christianity in political rhetoric (Froese, 2004).

Hungary also presents an extreme case among CEE peers, which Enyedi (2016b) characterizes as "populist polarization" in which the entire party system is dominated by PRR politics. Fidesz is the governing party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in power since 2010. Jobbik, led by Gábor Vona, is the official opposition party and has been characterized as an extreme populist radical right party. Pirro (2017) notes that populist actors on the far right increasingly engage socio-economic issues into their platforms and these are often manifested through (exclusionary) nativist discourses. In Western Europe, the key targets are immigrants with PRR parties like Denmark's Danish Peoples Party or

Britian's UKIP expressing hostile anti-immigration rhetoric. Earlier research found that because immigration was not a salient issue in CEE, exclusionary attitudes were directed at national minorities such as Roma, Jews, Turks, etc. (Allen, 2017; Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009; Mudde, 2007). However, since the migration crisis that peaked in 2015, this is no longer the case. Now, PRR parties frame both national out-groups and immigrants as threats (Feischmidt and Hervik, 2015; Lugosi, 2015). This is another example of how external shocks (or shallow causes to use Kitschelt's term) structure competition space.

On a final note, a commonly held assumption is that populism is temporary. Once in government, parties will temper their positions to an acceptable norm (Huber and Schimpf, 2016; Schmitter, 2007). The Hungarian case demonstrates the opposite since the PRR has been rising ever since Jobbik burst into the party system in 2009. In Hungary, populist strategy that draws on discourse and ideology is particularly prominent (Enyedi, 2016a, p. 9). Enyedi's observation makes a compelling case for adopting a discourse approach to the PRR. What is more, this discourse also shapes and justifies policy, which I explore in my empirical cases.

2.5. The discursive dimension of PRR strategies

The breath of research on defining and measuring populism is expansive but there is less attention to discourse. Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009) assert that studying the discursive aspects of party strategies would benefit comparative work. Discourses are rooted in context and can change over time. This is worthy of scholarly attention because it helps explain why particular strategies are successful (Herman, 2016). Further, Pytlas (2013; 2016) demonstrates how parties "politicize narratives" by telling and retelling stories of the

nation and the glorious past. These points support my causal argument that external conditions (shallow) and constructions of legacy (deep) provide rich context and insight to why certain discursive strategies resonate. The next section elaborates on my interpretive approach.

2.5.1 Articulations through discourse

Discourse analysis is useful for researchers interested in questions of power, hegemony, ideology, interests, institutions, and so on (van Dijk 2008, p. 87). Discourse encompasses the universe or framework of ideas, with particular terms, concepts, language, narratives, and practices used for making sense of events and the world (Detlefsen et al., 1998). The study of discourse is important because how an issue is conceptualized directly determines policies and actions taken. In this way, discourses are inherently political[13]. Taking a CEE example, Will Kymlicka posits that how Hungarian minorities in diaspora countries that share territorial borders with Hungary are perceived by the state determines if minority demands are considered legitimate. For instance, demands for stronger autonomy can be perceived by the state as either a legitimate claim of redress or as a potential security threat. Policy action is then taken accordingly to either work toward justice or to defuse irredentist sentiment (2004, pp. 144-145).

Within the constructivist school, a critical discourse approach stands in sharp contrast to some the key tenets of positivism, which include striving to emulate the scientific method, particularly the natural sciences, the idea that reality exists "out there" to be studied by an

[13] This definition of discourse is adapted from earlier published work, originally appearing in Lugosi, N. (2011) "Truth-telling and Legal Discourse: A Critical Analysis of the Neil Stonechild Inquiry" *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. 44 (2): 299-315.

external observer, and the need for value neutrality (Delanty, 1998, p. 12). Instead, the hallmarks of a critical discourse analysis are:

1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. Power relations are discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. The link between text and society is mediated.
7. Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory.
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

(Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; pp. 271-280; also qtd. in van Dijk, 2008).

In other words, discourse is not observed as a hard fact, rather discourses are socially constructed. As such, discourse is not static and is rooted in particular social, cultural, and political contexts over time. Further, discourses are not just about talk and speech. Discourses shape how we think, act, and solve problems. Butler refers to this discursive work as "performativity" (cf. Butler, 1990).

Attention to discourse involves reading texts closely with the aim of identifying particular themes, words, and references to pinpoint what is said and in what way. Narratives refer to the stories and modes of story-telling within a discourse and as such, are a smaller unit of analysis. A separate and equally powerful device of story-telling are metaphors, which can be thought of as mini-narratives (Mottier, 2008, pp.191-192). Use of metaphor, especially by elites is a strategic move to symbolize and evoke certain images and emotions. Walter and Helmig put it this way, "Metaphors are thus not simply plain talk, but rather represent one aspect of experience in terms of another. The use of metaphor already makes selective distinctions" (2008, p. 125). Metaphors are not simply stand-ins for other words but tell a mini-story in itself.

Another rhetorical strategy common within elite discourse, especially in racial frames, are lexicons (van Dijk 2008, pp. 104-105). A lexicon or ideological position happens when certain groups are stereotyped with particular behaviour to the point where the stereotype becomes a metaphor for the group (Gilbert, 2013). An example of a lexicon is Jobbik's moniker "Gypsy crime" where Roma becomes synonymous with criminality. When examining discourse, it is equally important to consider what is missing and not said or confronted directly. For instance, racial framing does not always manifest as stressing negative attributes and behaviours rooted in stereotypes. At times, elite discourse is peppered with denial of racism. At times, denial of a problem takes the form of completely ignoring the issue in favour of silence, as my later case study in Chapter 5 will show. At other times, political actors might respond in a hostile manner and adamantly insist the attack is unwarranted, ludicrous, or even a form of reverse racism (van Dijk, 2008, pp. 123-24). When racist behaviour is acknowledged, it is often nested in the "few bad apples" logic, which posits events as individual and out of the ordinary rather than face deeply rooted, structural problems (Tator & Henry, 2006). Political discourse is often implicated in denying and/or downplaying racism partially because of a lack of minority representation in government, policy-making, and other state institutions (van Dijk, 2008, p. 74). The consequence of low (if any) representation is that minorities are often talked for and about, rather than speaking for themselves. Political actors and policy makers are often highly educated and in positions of power and as such, are regarded as experts. Complaints from marginalized communities are easily dismissed as nonsense. Jiwani (2006) calls this process a "hierarchy of voices". Research on discourse must not only examine *what* is said and *how*, but also note *who* is speaking.

Situating discourse in particular contexts also involves recognizing that some discourses are privileged over others. Pytlas refers to these as "master frames" or "master narratives" (2016), which can be difficult to refute. Raymond Williams' work on dominant, emergent, and residual discourse helps unpack why. For Williams, the dominant is the "common sense", or master narrative, about social and political realities. The master narrative about "the way things are" is unique to every society. To understand the dominant culture, we must understand how it operates in the everyday (2005, p. 43). Embedded in the "dominant" are particular stories and understandings of a given culture's past. Alternative meanings and interpretations of history are concealed. "The facts of alternative and oppositional forms of social life and culture, in relation to the effective and dominant culture, then have to be recognized as subject to historical variation, and as having sources which are very significant as a fact about the dominant culture itself" (Williams, p. 45).

The dominant narrative influences, and is influenced by, what Williams calls the "residual" and the "emergent". Categorizing certain narratives as residual, dominant, or emergent is a tool for researchers asking questions of why particular interpretations resonate over others. Meanings, interpretations, and values of the past, or traditional, comprise the residual. The residual can contradict, yet still be adopted into the dominant, particularly in cases of a strong legacy, retold in ways that fit the current common sense (2005, pp. 45-46). Residual forces are kept alive in current debates and policy making circles and can also account for change in the process of the emergent (2005, p. 46). A society may reform yet still operate in the dominant paradigm. Emergent discourses are ones that drastically alter society by changing the ways people live and think. While all dominant cultures were once emergent, it is not a given that emergent discourses will become dominant. The emergent

and the dominant can be constrained to varying degrees by residual meanings and behaviours resulting from earlier social constructions. A society may constantly look back and glorify the past, because ideas and values still resonate with current experiences. To understand the dominant and emergent forces of a particular society, the "process of persistence of residual practices" must be revealed (Williams, 2005, p. 47). In my view, Williams' discourse categories merge well with Kitschelt's ideas about deep and causal factors. The dominant provides an overview of the discourse terrain that is legitimated by residual discourse that draws on historical legacy (deep) and conditioned by emergent discourse in reaction to trigger events (shallow).

2.5.2 Legacy: Digging for a deep cause

Legacy features prominently in CEE party politics because historical events condition competition space and impact party discourse. As I see it, the performativity of enduring legacies exemplifies a deep causal explanation and strengthens Williams' idea that residual discourses provide traction to the dominant story of the nation. Drawing on the work of Janos (2001) and Pop-Eleches (2005, 2007), Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig loosely define legacy as "the inherited aspects of the past relevant to the present". They further note strong links between religious practices and interwar development and political conditions with conditions but insist that, "…exactly which aspects of the past might hold explanatory value and how exactly they might be causally connected to outcomes have been subject to vigorous contestation" among legacy scholars (2010, p. 426). I contend that it is difficult for legacy scholars to pinpoint which particular version of the past holds the greatest explanatory value partly because different strategic political elites emphasize myths or omit

certain events to tell a particular (even if somewhat inaccurate) version of history, depending on their goals (cf. Varga, 2016; Pytlas, 2013).

Meyer-Sahling notes that within European politics debates, "legacy" of new member states is nearly always synonymous with the communist era and this is problematic (2009, p. 511). I agree and also depart from this bounded definition. Although the particularity of communist impacts on the region, vis-à-vis other regions (i.e. Latin America), justifies the "post-communist" moniker, there is enough variation across countries to ascertain that legacy effects are not uniform (Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 428). Further to that point, Linz and Stepan (1996) stress that understanding pre and post-Soviet conditions are crucial for explaining current contexts. For example, Pirro posits that PRR parties draw from a variety of major events that occurred before, during, and after the communist regime, such as hostile ultranationalism demonstrated by Hungary's far right Arrow Cross Party during the Second World War (2015, p. 39). In agreement that legacy effects produce uneven outcomes and history must be studied beyond the communist years, I would add that a deeper understanding of the particularities and context of each new member state are useful for in-depth single-case studies such as mine.

While legacies can enrichen post-communist research, some cautions are in order. The widely cited work of Herbert Kitschelt (2003 [2001]) is illustrative. Legacy theory does possess compelling explanations of policy change during the communist era, but it does not fully capture why such policy was implemented in the first place or explain post-communist policy change (Kitschelt, 2003 [2001], p. 12). Convincing causal explanations must consider both deeply rooted institutional legacy factors, along with shallower social factors and triggers (Kitschelt, 2003 [2001], p. 39). Research focused only on legacy risks producing

overly path dependent accounts that suggest communist-era policy is "locked in" and offers little room for maneuver. Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig (2010) take these potential shortcomings into account and offer different strategies for employing legacy, namely: legacies as deep conditions to provide context and causal depth, as enduring conditions to consider how legacies change and matter to varying extents at different junctures, or as encompassing and interacting conditions, in line with Kitschelt. Following Braudel, Ekiert and Ziblatt (2013) move away from compartmentalizing interwar, communist, and post-communist eras to instead assert it is more fruitful to examine how these different periods are continuous and reinforce each other. They contend that a better understanding of key moments in history helps contextualize the political opportunity structures open to parties following the communist era (2013, p. 95). Mindful of these observations, I conceptualize legacy as a framing strategy that PRR actors use to frame and legitimize their positions.

2.5.3. Shallow causes: External shocks and the construction of threat

Turning now to shallow causes, or event triggers, in explaining the success of certain populist messages it is important to consider the wider political context they are received. Literature on social movement theory describes particular contexts as the political opportunity structure. Trigger events can impact political discourse and policy making by making some issues and positions more relevant, and validating some claims over others (Meyer, 2004). Strategic political actors can take advantage of the political opportunity structure and advance illiberal agendas to solve urgent problems (Berezin, 2009). Creating a climate of fear can shape public attitudes as shown in the Hungarian case. Since the 2008 financial crisis, Europe has faced continued economic problems and conditions of

hardship thrust people into insecurity. The conflict in Ukraine activates not-so-distant memories of Russian aggression, not to mention armed violence along the Eastern borders. In recent years, there has been an increase in terrorist activity including direct attacks on Europe that activates anxiety even among non-authoritarians. Then there is the migration crisis resulting chiefly from refugees fleeing Iraq and Syria, but also from large swaths of economic migrants. This influx has presented Europe with volumes of migration waves previously unseen that show no sign of abating. 2015 Eurobarometer data for Hungary provides evidence for the issue salience of migration and terrorism. For example, within six months the number of citizens that believed terrorism and migration should be Europe's top concern rose from 38 to 58 per cent among EU countries and in Hungary, the number of citizens that agreed migration should be one of the two top concerns rose from 43 to 68 per cent (European Commission, 2015b, p. 6).

The examples above do not to suggest that the financial crisis, the war in Ukraine, terrorism, or migration (alone or all together) directly cause a spike in populist support. My point, rather, is to suggest that these trigger events create a sense of insecurity and that ascribes more legitimacy to populist messages that draw on the need for protection in the face of danger and threat to either political or social order to the national community. Research on the PRR finds that nationalists and authoritarians are both triggered by threat, to the core-nation or social order respectively, but this insecurity comes from different places. "Nationalists are likely to respond most favourably to those who will affirm a concrete and stable identity" whereas authoritarians are drawn to utterances of preventing and protecting the homogeneous group from outside threats (Dunn, 2015, pp. 369-370). From international

relations, theories of securitization explain the process of manufacturing threat for political gain.

Inspired by constructivist ontologies and taking a postmodern turn, scholars interested in ideas and security, most notably Ole Wæver, developed the concept of "securitization" to denote the discursive process of securitizing, known as the Copenhagen School approach. In identifying security as a process, Copenhagen focuses on: the speech act, the securitizing actor, and the audience (Wæver et al. 1993, 1996). This approach is not without criticism. Michael Williams claims the Copenhagen School ends up reifying and objectifying both "'society and identity' in ways that are analytically untenable and politically dangerous" (2003, p. 519). The concepts society and identity are taken for granted and a close analysis and deconstruction is needed to avoid essentialist research. Scholars should also consider *what* gets securitized. For instance, economic well-being is not a security problem on its own, until framed as such and taken up by successful speech-acts as an existential threat (Williams 2003, p. 520). "Danger is not an objective condition. It is not a thing that exists independently to those whom it may become a threat" and "a threat is only as dangerous as it is perceived to be" (Campbell 1998, p. 1). To move toward Copenhagen's aim as a discursive approach, emphasis must be placed on the *processes* of security, with close attention to the force of a (perceived) threat, how that threat might interact with other discourses, and the positional power of the actors speaking the threats (Stritzel, 2007, p. 377). Similarly, Balzacq emphasizes that security is a performative discourse strategy that draws on an assortment of rhetorical devices such as: narratives, emotions, and metaphors. Moreover, what gets securitized and why is deeply conditioned by the political opportunity structure (2005, pp. 172-173). I align with Balzacq's contention that security discourse can

inform action, which points to causality by showing a chain of action. That said, there is conceptual difficultly in demonstrating definitive causal links from discourse to action, so this process is best understood as an *indirect* cause. On a final note, we can think about securitizing actions as "emergent" discourse that may or may not impact the dominant discourse (to take Williams' terms).

CHAPTER 3: METHOD

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I describe the research strategy used in this qualitative, single-country study to explore Populist Radical Right (PRR) discourse in Hungary, using two social policy case studies. Methodologically, I approached the data with a blend of grounded theory and critical frame analysis. This two-pronged approach allowed to me to code and categorize frames and framing strategies in a rigourous manner. After recapping my research questions, I give a snapshot of each of these methods and explain why they are appropriate for this study and my rationale for using both in tandem. Next, I present my research strategy including which texts were selected and why, concept operationalization, and the coding procedure before concluding with a brief summary.

3.2. Research questions

In light of my aim to build theory by exposing the particularities of PRR discourse, my central research question is:

How do the radical right Fidesz and Jobbik parties in Hungary use populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames to articulate social policy issues?

Relatedly, I pose two secondary questions to push my discussion further. Specifically, I want to know:

1. *What rhetorical strategies might give traction to certain frames?*
2. *What are the possible consequences?*

3.3. Methodology

For this dissertation, I use two qualitative methodological approaches to answer my research questions. Qualitative methodologies are appropriate because I am exploring discourse, which is inherently interpretive. I elaborate on my methodological choices below.

3.3.1. Grounded Theory

Grounded theory is an inductive methodology that is useful for positivist or interpretive theories, depending on the questions asked and the research design chosen. Grounded theory is inductive because theory is generated from the data rather than approaching the data and testing an already developed theory. Although grounded theory focuses on identifying core themes, the method differs from a thematic analysis that generates themes and codes from the research and the literature before handling the data (Urquhart, 2013). Put another way, the researcher lets the data speak to generate ideas and assumptions. Walsham (1995) points out that good interpretive grounded theory research is often used to develop concepts, generate theory, identify implications, and provide in-depth explanations. In my work, I achieve these goals by refining core concepts and offering detailed discussions about the processes and consequences of PRR discourses, with attention to why some frames might resonate.

Within the literature on interpretive grounded theory, scholars tend to agree on the inductive principle and analytical outcomes of the methodology. However, there are active debates on precisely how to conduct such research. The most prominent debate is spearheaded by scholars either favouring the complex, detailed method put forth by Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1997) or choosing Charmaz' (2008) more flexible method. In an attempt

to refine classical grounded theory, Strauss and Corbin's work developed a sophisticated method with multiple steps for each stage of coding (1990). In a nutshell, their method includes open coding, which involves a close reading of the texts to determine relevant categories. During the axial coding phase, relationships between the codes are explored to explain conditions, contexts, strategies, and action/inaction. The next stage is selective coding where the researcher examines the data to identify the main narrative. To code selectively, the researcher must make choices about what codes are relevant and what should be dismissed. Once all three stages of coding are complete, the researcher can analyze the data all together to build a coherent theory. For each stage of coding, Strauss and Corbin outline several steps at each coding phase but in my view, the strength of their procedure is the focus on advancing causal arguments during axial coding. Here, they propose a six-step model for analyzing the data to reveal: the central idea, the strategies involved, the context, intervening conditions, actions, and consequences (1990). In their words, these steps are critical because, "A grounded theory is generalizable insofar as it specifies conditions that are linked though action/interaction with definite consequences" (1990, p. 15). All of the steps suggested for the axial coding phase are also compatible with my research aims on characterizing discourses of the PRR and understanding how it functions and why it might be appealing.

However, Strauss and Corbin's rigid approach has been critiqued as overly focused on the method and scholars like Charmaz have advocated for more methodological flexibility (2008). For Charmaz, a constructivist grounded theory method involves three stages. Similar to Strauss and Corbin, the research begins with open coding where key ideas are extracted from the data. In contrast, Charmaz asserts that instead of identifying themes,

the researcher must pay attention to actions and language usage to make sense of sentence fragments and reveal relationships between codes (Charmaz, 2008, p. 164). During the next phase, the researcher refocuses the coding to select the core, recurring themes and apply grounded theory tools to interpret the data.

The most crucial tool for the final theory-building phase is memo writing. Memos are short notes written as the researcher moves through the data to serve as reminders for the later writing phase. Writing and rewriting memos allows the researcher to present ideas, shows connections between codes, reveal missing data, and think about actions and implications (Charmaz, 2008, p. 166). Then the researcher can systemically sort and analyze the memos to help construct a coherent theory. Barney Glaser (2002) disagrees with Charmaz' flexible interpretation of grounded theory. One of his biggest contentions is while her method leans towards rich descriptions of the data, it comes at the cost of less attention to theory building. That is a strong critique because theory building is a hallmark and a great strength of grounded theory.

My research adopts elements from both Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1997) and from Charmaz (2008). I align with Strauss and Corbin (1990)'s emphasis on looking for the central idea, the strategies involved, the context, intervening conditions, actions, and consequences in the axial coding phase because their application emphasizes the relationship between discourse and action, which is central to my goals and especially to my secondary research questions. That said, I do agree that their method of uncompromising multiple steps for each coding phase is too rigid. I find Charmaz' point on language and language usage compelling because I am interested in political rhetoric. In addition, memo writing is critical for grounded theory, but Charmaz really stresses the importance of this process for

constructivist work (2008). I use the procedure outlined by Pidgeon and Henwood (2004) in the *Sage Handbook of Data Analysis* as a guideline for my work because it allows me to adopt the strengths of Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1997) and Charmaz's (2008) approaches while maintaining rigour. Pidgeon and Henwood point out that throughout the debates on how to conduct grounded theory research, there are commonalities across the approaches:

> 1. Developing open-coding schemes to capture the detail, variation and complexity of observations and other material obtained;
> 2. Sampling data and cases on theoretical grounds, and as analysis progresses, to extend the emergent theory ("theoretical sampling");
> 3. Constantly comparing data instances, cases and categories for conceptual similarities and differences (the method of "constant comparison");
> 4. Writing theoretical memoranda to explore emerging concepts and links to existing theory;
> 5. Continuing to make comparisons and use of theoretical sampling until no new or further relevant insights are being reached ("saturation");
> 6. Engaging in more focused coding of selected core categories;
> 7. Tactics to force analysis from descriptive to more theoretical levels (such as writing definitions of core categories and building conceptual models).
> (2004, p. 629).

Pidgeon and Henwood neatly summarize the steps for applying grounded theory as: generating aims and questions, preparing the data, conducting an initial analysis then a core analysis, and discussing outcomes (2004, p. 631). I follow these steps to systematically code and analyze the data in ways that align with my research goals. Pidgeon and Henwood point out that new and exciting research can emerge from work that combines elements of grounded theory with other social science research (2004, p. 643 note 1). I strengthen my analysis further by blending these steps with a critical frame analysis.

3.3.2. Critical Frame Analysis

My research is centered on questions about political discourse and rhetorical strategies. I use interpretive grounded theory to extract relevant material from the texts. Grounded theory allowed me to code and organize the data in a systematic and coherent way. Within social science research, discourse analysis is an overarching term that encompasses multiple tools and methods. Potter asserts that, "Discourse is situated in terms of rhetoric" and this is the key difference from conversation analysis (2004, p. 610). In light of my research questions, I turned to a critical frame analysis to rigourously analyze and make sense of the data to interpret the discourses of Fidesz and Jobbik. This method is appropriate because it narrows the huge field of discourse analysis into a manageable research design focused on unpacking political persuasion.

Following van Hulst and Yanow (2016) and Ritchie (2013), I make an analytical distinction between *frames* (as a noun) and *framing* (as an action verb). Frames tell us what an issue is about (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143) and offer stories and narratives to help interpret and legitimate issues, policies, and events (Gamson, 1988, p. 219). As Pytlas (2016) reminds us, when studying frames, it is important to distinguish between the frame and the issue being framed. My analysis of PRR discourse involves identifying and categorizing the populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames that Fidesz and Jobbik use.

A framing analysis deconstructs the method of story-telling to highlight what parts are emphasized and what parts are neglected, or even outright ignored (Ritchie, 2013, p. 107). The concept of framing indicates the ongoing process of discourse techniques to create frames (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). Fairhurst and Sarr (1996) note that framing techniques include *inter alia* the use of metaphors, stories (including myths) and narratives, contrasting,

and spinning concepts in a fashion that overtly or covertly inspire normative value judgments. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) point to identifying root causes, focusing on consequences and impacts, and making moral claims as the three main reasoning devices (1989). I argue that the normative element of framing becomes especially apparent when examining the devices political elites use to persuade and reason.

In my work, I stress the importance of metaphor among the different framing devices available to political elites. Metaphors are central for political discourse and framing because they evoke images and emotions that can tell a powerful mini-narrative (Mottier, 2008, pp.191-192). Although political metaphor usage varies across different contexts, there are some commonalities. To take a few important examples from Ritchie, political actors often draw on metaphors of kinship, which construct frames about the nation; the need for unity, which can be expressed as "building bridges"; notions of progress such as a journey of moving forward or backward; images of winners and losers, which falls into the domain of "us versus them" rhetoric; and references to disorder and morality (2013, pp. 161-185). Metaphors also perform framing actions such as generating catch-phrases or lexicons (Schön, 1993, p. 118). A relevant example is the "Gypsy crime" moniker coined by Jobbik. Finally, metaphors can even be used to evoke a particular frame that may or may not be mentioned outright (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017, p. 1756). This goes back to Ritchie's earlier point about paying attention to strategies of what is said and what is omitted. I accomplished this in my research by closely reading the texts and also analyzing the subtext.

A critical frame analysis is also useful for linking discourse to action. "Informal rules shape how democratic institutions work. They reinforce, shape, subvert, and sometimes even supersede formal rules, procedures, and organizations" (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p. 2).

From social movement theory, framing is understood to help set the policy agenda, thereby having a performative function. In addition to framing devices, the framing process involves identifying the problem, proposing solutions, and assigning blame and/or responsibly (Rein & Schön, 1977). Similar to Rein and Schön (1977), Snow and Benford (1988), refine the concept and identify the three core tasks of framing as: *diagnostic framing* (pinpointing a problem and assigning blame), *prognostic framing* (presenting solutions), and *motivational framing* (directly linked to justifying action). Context and culture matter because the political opportunity structure shapes and constrains which framing strategies political actors can draw on to meet their goals (Benford & Snow, 2000, pp. 629-631). Throughout my analysis, I draw on the work of Benford and Snow to demonstrate the discursive work that frames perform as a rhetorical strategy. This is particularly useful for my secondary research question on framing strategies. The multiple functions of a frame analysis allow me to push the discussion beyond how political actors talk into the world of the actions and policies that they influence. This is important because my empirical analyses demonstrate what is said in what ways, and then comments on the possible consequences of PRR discourse.

There are many advantages to using a critical frame analysis, but some scholars criticize the flexibility of the method. Within discourse and framing research, the links between language and power are clear but framing is not a coherent theory (Ritchie, 2013, pp. 114-115). I take this caution seriously by utilizing a frame analysis to explore the question of *how* PRR discourses are constructed through populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames, then I supplement the analysis of my findings with relevant literature to support my arguments of *what* the potential implications are and *why* certain framing strategies are successful. Methodologically, I addressed this potential shortcoming by using

the coding steps in grounded theory to systematically work with the data. I contend that the two methods complement each other and strengthen my research by mitigating limitations.

3.4. Research strategy

In this section, I discuss my research strategy for data collection, concept operationalization, case selection, and the procedures followed to code and analyze the data. Where appropriate, I also justify my theoretical choices and explain how I addressed shortcoming and obstacles.

3.4.1. Text selection

Time frame

To analyze the rhetoric of the populist radical right in Hungary, I focus on key party documents and speeches. I restrict my analysis to the 2010-2016 timeframe. The 2010 election was a pivotal shift to the far right for Hungarian politics because Fidesz came to power with a supermajority and Jobbik broke through as a new party and by 2014, presented the biggest opposition to Fidesz. 2014 is also the year that Viktor Orbán very publicly announced his plans to fashion Hungary into an "illiberal democracy", a move that caught international criticism. The six-year time frame gives me the opportunity to examine documents across both of those elections and two years after to gain further insight into how this shift played out in terms of discourse and policy.

Documents

The main documents I analyze are the party manifestos of Fidesz and Jobbik from the 2010 and 2014 elections. One disadvantage of using manifestos is that they are generally produced prior to election campaigns. That means they cannot capture all the issues and dynamics

during an election campaign. However, various studies show that parties generally tend to follow their manifestos when transforming pledges into actual policy outcomes (Naurin, 2014; Royed, 1996; Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014; Thomson, 2001). Thus, manifestos are key documents because of their implications for policy making (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018, p. 301). Interestingly, Fidesz did not release a manifesto in the 2014 election year. To supplement and overcome the shortages of manifestos, I also include Annual State of the Nation speeches for 2015 and 2016. State of the Nation speeches offer party leaders a chance to share their vision and recap what they deem is important for the upcoming policy year. In this way, State of the Nation speeches serve as an informal annual check in with voters between election years. High profile political speeches, such as the State of the Nation, which is printed, televised, and cited within media, are useful for seeing what the electorate is exposed to. Thus, they are a logical place to look for elite discourse as they provide a key outlet for political elites to communicate with the public they serve. Many people outside of law, politics, or academia may not have an expert understanding of the some of the issues, as they are complex. Speeches and campaigns are highly visible, widely covered sources of information and for many, the only source of information about certain issues. While the focus of this dissertation is the Post-Financial Crisis era from 2008 onwards, I also included both parties' Founding Charters, from 2007 for Fidesz and 2003 for Jobbik, to offer a snapshot of how these parties have engaged policy issues right from the start.

I also include two annual anniversary speeches in my text corpus. I selected the speeches that commemorate the 1848 (March 15) and the 1956 (October 23) revolutions. Both of these anniversaries represent significant national moments that are publicly

commemorated in Hungary by Fidesz and Jobbik. The 1848 Revolution led to Hungary's independence from the Hapsburg Empire and marks an important and widely celebrated holiday known locally in the country as “Freedom Day”. This event marks a significant moment in Hungarian history that continues to resonate. In Brubaker and Feischmidt’s words, “The revolution of 1848 has been central to the story of Hungary’s identity as a nation state and the memory of this critical juncture has long been utilized by politicians in different ways” (2002, p. 702). For example, two competing narratives frame the revolution as either the moment where Hungary joined Western Europe on a path towards progress and modernization or as a key moment for the nation to assert autonomy and revolt against oppression (Brubaker & Feischmidt, 2002, pp. 738-39). The 1956 Hungarian revolution is another widely celebrated holiday central to the story of the nation. The anniversary commemorates Hungary’s resistance against communism in the struggle for democracy. In Sonnevend’s words, “The 1956 Hungarian revolution was one of the seminal moments of the postwar era and its memory has endured in both East and West” (2013, p. 338). Like the 1848 Revolution, there are competing narratives of what happened that tell different stories about the West (Sonnevend, 2013, p. 336). For me, these speeches carry extra analytical weight because Orbán did not exert a strong-man style of populist politics with more statesman-like speeches, such as the State of the Nation, as seen in other countries until 2014. Until then, the anniversary speeches served to offer the public a glimpse of where parties believed the nation was at. While I expect that these speeches are highly charged with nationalist tones given the context, they nonetheless provide insight into national goals with nods to the (desired) policy direction in lieu of State of the Nation speeches.

I also included Orbán's annual Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp speeches delivered in Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad), Romania. Tusnádfürdő is in the Transylvanian region of Romania that belonged to Hungary before the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and again during the Second World War when Hungary allied with Germany (Waterbury, 2010, p. 37). Not only is Transylvania resource rich, it is also home to the largest ethnic Hungarian diaspora community. Since Ottoman rule, Transylvania symbolizes Hungarian resilience and autonomy and is the site of many important issues and events such as: the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region, consequences of the Hungarian 1956 revolution in Romania, and the 1995-1996 bilateral treaty promoting cross border cooperation to name a few. Orbán's decision to hold his speeches there is highly symbolic and conjures up prominent memories and metaphors of the Hungarian nation. Like the other anniversary speeches, this speech is widely publicized and receives a good deal of media and international attention. I also included these speeches because Orbán was Prime Minister during all six years under examination, so this offers another annual reflection of his vision for the country. This helps fill a gap in Fidesz' discourse especially since the party did not release an electoral manifesto in 2014.

Data collection

I retrieved all the texts required for this study online (see Table 3.1 below for a full breakdown of the text corpus). Some of the documents were available in English and others were available in Hungarian. An obstacle I faced during the data collection process was that the textual transcripts for eight of Jobbik's anniversary speeches were not available online. I overcame this challenge by transcribing video files of the speeches that I retrieved online, using *Happy Scribe*, which is online software that transcribes audio (including audio from

video) to text. The software can handle several international languages including English and Hungarian. The software is reputable and used by media outlets such as Forbes and research outlets such as Harvard University.

While my corpus (see Table 3.1 below) contains more documents for Fidesz (21 in total) than Jobbik (14 in total), I do not believe this poses a problem for my analysis. Across the two election cycles covered in my research timeframe, Fidesz received about 30 per cent more votes than Jobbik[14]. If we consider vote share and seats in parliament, then my corpus serves as a good reflection of power. Given Fidesz' higher position, we can reasonably expect more speeches from that party.

Table 3.1 Textual Corpus (author created)

Document Type	**Fidesz**	**Jobbik**
Founding Charter	1	1
State of the Nation	2	2
Electoral Manifestos	1	2
March 15 Anniversary	6	4
October 23 Anniversary	4	5
Annual Summer Speeches	7	0
Total	21	14

3.4.2. Concept operationalization

It is important to clarify my concepts because I analyze the texts to tease out the particularities of populist radical right discourse. As discussed in my conceptual chapter, PRR parties are characterized by populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism. These concepts are contested and at times, conflated in the literature. The critical frame method I use places utmost concern on context. This approach is also particularly suited to distinguish

[14] According to Election Guide data, in 2010 Fidesz captured 52.73per cent of votes and Jobbik captured 16.67 per cent and for 2014, Fidesz received a 44.36 per cent vote share and Jobbik received 20.46 per cent. (http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2458/)

between populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames. I adopt a reliable coding scheme from Caiani and Kröll (2017, p. 339) to aid with this distinction, see Table 2. I have adapted their coding frame by expanding it to include signifiers of authoritarianism.

Table 3.2 Identifying populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames

Concept	Operationalization
Populism	1) "the people" (or similar concepts, like "common people", "ordinary men", etc.) whose interests are said to be represented by the populist party 2) the political elites against which "the people" are opposed 3) the leader (the radical right) and the relation between the people and the elites
Nationalism	4) (the construction of) the "nation" (e.g. constructed as a community of homogeneous members, defined through ethnic and even racist categories vs. legal citizenship 5) (the construction of) the other (e.g. either my nation vs. other nations or members of my nation vs. non-members) in terms of citizenship 6) (the construction of) sovereignty (e.g. in contrast to international institutions like the European Union
Authoritarianism	7) (the construction of) "(in)security" (or similar concepts, like threat) to the nation and citizens that the populist party can address 8) (the construction of) "order" (e.g. how to maintain lawful society, crack down on crime, etc.) 9) (the construction of) the deviant other (e.g. ethnic, gender, and sexual minorities as a threat to social order and institutions) in terms of safety and order

Note: The populist and nationalist indicators are adopted from Caiani & Kröll, 2017, p. 339.

3.4.3. Case Selection

I selected two empirical cases to answer my research questions about PRR discourse and social policy. Social policy is a broad term for government policy aimed at improving wellbeing (Aravacik, 2018). As such, many social justice issues fall under the purview of social policy such as: welfare benefits, the criminal justice system, healthcare, education, immigration, and workers' rights, to name only a few. To narrow my research, I examine welfare benefits and education. In the first case study (Chapter 4), I selected five policy areas of welfare benefits to restrict my analysis even further. In the second case study (Chapter 5), I narrowed my focus on education to policy geared at Roma school children. Welfare benefits and education are interesting cases because on the surface, these pressing policy issues are not intuitive places to look for PRR discourses. For example, we could expect to find strong authoritarian frames in a study on the criminal justice system or strong nationalist frames in research looking at diaspora policy. While border security and criminal justice policies provide obvious opportunities for nationalist and authoritarian frames, social policies such as welfare benefits and education provide less obvious opportunities. As such, these cases can operate as a type of *crucial*, or less likely, case for identifying populist, nationalism, or authoritarian discourses emblematic of PRR parties. In line with scholars like Eckstein (1975), Gerring and Seawright use crucial cases to confirm (least likely) or disconfirm (most likely) analytical predictions. A case is least likely if it unlikely to validate a model or prediction. If the case does produce the outcome, it confirms the theory. According to Gerring and Seawright, “The crucial case offers a most-difficult test for an argument, and hence provides what is perhaps the strongest sort of evidence possible in a nonexperimental, single-case setting” (2007, p. 115). I argue that my cases are crucial

because the policy areas I chose are less likely. I qualify my cases as *less* rather than *least* likely because, while understudied, scholars like Ketola and Nordensvard (2018)[15] have demonstrated linkages between welfare chauvinism and the PRR, at least in Western and Northern Europe, so the welfare benefits case is not entirely least likely but is less likely. Also, among the different social policy areas such as the criminal justice system or LGBTQ* rights, welfare benefits such as old age pensions or education of young school children are less likely policy areas to find all three frames typical of the PRR. While we can reasonably predict strong nationalist frames given that issues around welfare chauvinism and Roma schoolchildren are cross-cut by identity politics, we would not intuitively expect to find populist or authoritarian frames. As crucial cases, the evidence I found about how the PRR frames these issues gives more insight into how these parties work and how important PRR frames are for these parties. By finding these types of frames even in less likely cases shows how PRR discourse applies in even more policy areas than the populist research has shown, including day-to-day policies that affect most people.

3.4.4. Coding Procedure

My coding procedure followed Pidgeon and Henwood's (2004) five-step model on grounded theory research.

1. Aims and questions

In this early phase of the research, I narrowed my topic and drafted initial research questions about PRR parties and framing.

[15] (Cf. Ketola, Markus and Johan Nordensvard, Eds. Special Issue: 'Social Policy and Populism: welfare chauvinism and identity politics in post-Brexit Europe.' *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, Vol. 34, No. 3, October, 2018).

2. Data preparation

For this dissertation, I used Nvivo for Mac 12.5.0 (QSR International 2019) qualitative data analysis software for data management to store and examine texts. NVivo is suitable for organizing materials and moving through data quickly and does not compromise rigour as long as close attention is given to categories used (Hardy & Bryman, 2004, p. 12). After collecting my texts and saving them as PDF's, I labelled them all by party, document type, and year for easy reference. All of the texts were available online (in either written or video format) in Hungarian and most were also available in English. I am a native English speaker, but I am also competent in reading, writing, and speaking Hungarian so this did not pose a problem. I created two data sets in NVivo containing the original Hungarian and English translations of the documents. While I conducted the bulk of the work with the English documents during the initial analysis to quickly pick out the policy areas, I compared both sets of documents side by side during the core analysis to capture the context.

3. Initial analysis

I began the initial analysis by skimming over all the documents to familiarize myself with the data set. Then, I moved on to the open coding process. Open coding is useful for linking initial themes and categories (called nodes in NVivo) and seeing what the data reveals. I followed Strauss and Corbin's (1990) suggestion to start open coding with a word search/analysis. I did this by running a word query to search all the Fidesz, then all the Jobbik documents. I started by running a search on keywords for the welfare benefits case study. Because this case study is organized thematically by policy area, I used the following terms to code:

- Pensions
- Health care

- Employment/job/work
- Social assistance OR social benefit
- Family allowance OR family benefit

My second empirical case looks at education directed at Roma, so for this case I coded using the terms:

- Education OR school
- Pupil OR student
- Scholar (ship)

After gathering the data on education generally, I narrowed the selection by searching for the terms "Roma" and "Gypsy". I acknowledge that many consider the term "Gyspy" derogatory, but I included it in my search because that is the term Jobbik uses for this community. For all the search terms in both cases, I included stemmed words (i.e. adding plurals, "ing", "er", etc.). I coded policy areas by paragraph because word frequency does not account for word repetition in a single paragraph or filter irrelevant usage (i.e. term health used a metaphor, such as "health of the nation" as opposed to paragraphs discussing health policy). Coding by paragraph also helped me avoid selection bias by showing a fuller picture of how policies are framed. I saved all the coded data in NVivo as sets (folders) organized by political party and policy area. Following the principles of grounded theory, strongly stressed by Charmaz (2008), I wrote memos throughout this process to jot down notes, reminders, and ideas. This phase also involved examining the texts to see what frames and strategies popped up and allowed me to refine my research questions.

4. Core analysis

After completing the initial analysis, I conducted a closer examination of the data during the core analysis, or selective coding phase. I coded whole paragraphs for context to identify if, where, and how Fidesz and Jobbik used nationalist, populist, and authoritarian frames and

framing strategies (concepts summarized above in Table 2). I developed an informal codebook to help further discern between the three concepts based on my observations during initial coding. This codebook allowed me to quickly find the watchwords of nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism in a systematic way. I generated the list of signifying words in English and I hired a native Hungarian speaker to translate the list to ensure that any nuances or alternative terminology for my words were not missed.

Table 3.3 Codebook of concept watchwords

Frame category	***Signifier (English)***	***Signifier (Hungarian)***
Populism	the people	az ember, az emberek
	elite	elit
	European Union	Európai Unió, EU
	common man/Hungarian	közönséges ember
	average man/Hungarian	átlagos ember/ magyar
	everyday man/Hungarian	mindennapi ember, hétköznapi ember/magyar
	hard-working	keményen dolgozó
	ordinary man/Hungarian	Átlagember
Nationalism	nation	nemzet
	real Hungarian	igazi magyar, valódi magyar
	true Hungarian	igaz magyar
	citizen	állampolgár
	homeland	haza, otthon
	natural homeland	természetes haza
	our ways	a mi módunkon, a mi módszerünkkel
	our culture	a mi kultúránk
	our values	a mi értékeink
Authoritarianism	security	biztonság
	crime	bűnözés
	order	rend
	deviant	deviáns
	criminal	bűnöző
	law abiding/lawful	törvénytisztelő/törvényes
	threat(en)	fenyeget(és)
	problem	probléma, gond
	destroy	elpusztít, tönkretesz, lerombol
	disrespect	nem tisztel, tiszteletlen

During the core analysis, Charmaz (2008) suggests paying close attention to action words. Here, Strauss and Corbin's (1990) work on axial coding is useful. This process involved carefully examining the paragraphs to identify the central idea, the strategies involved, the context, intervening conditions, actions, and consequences. I accomplished a detailed, close reading by printing out the selected paragraphs to code manually and write theoretical memos.

5. Outcomes

In the final step of the coding process, I sorted and organized all the data and memos about how the PRR uses populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames. Then, I unpacked my findings using Benford and Snow's (2000) ideas about diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. This allowed me to use my theoretical memos to refine my observations about frames, framing strategies, and the possible consequences. The analysis is further supported with relevant scholarly literature in the two case studies. For clarity and consistency, I carefully discern between populist, nationalist, and authoritarian *frames* and the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational *framing* strategies throughout my analysis of PRR discourse.

3.5. Summary

This chapter outlines and justifies the grounded theory and critical frame analysis methods I chose to answer my research questions. I discussed my concepts, justified my cases, and detailed the coding procedure. The grounded theory method provided a systematic coding roadmap and helped me refine my concepts and signifiers. The critical frame analysis

allowed me to advance the discussion of my findings and make further theoretical connections. These methods are applied in Chapters 4 and 5, my empirical cases.

CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY I

Populist radical right discourses: Framing welfare benefits in Hungary

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I explore how contemporary Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties in Hungary frame social policy issues around welfare benefits. While the PRR is often associated with welfare chauvinism, an exclusionary program of distributing social benefits, there is little research on how these parties articulate their positions. Nordensvard and Ketola argue that the welfare nation state is an important component of populist discourse in Finland and Sweden, especially concerning outgroups like immigrants. This form of populist discourse is exclusionary and tightly linked with nationalism and perceived threats to sovereignty (2015, p. 357). There are good reasons to suspect that nationalist and populist reframing of welfare policy can also be observed in the Hungarian case. For example, writing on Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's social policies from 2010-2014, Szikra finds that Fidesz' welfare reforms since taking office are increasingly polarizing society along income and ethnic lines (2014). Further, because the PRR is defined as a triadic configuration of nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism, we can reasonably expect to find authoritarian style discourse. Finally, the overlooked role of gender framing is also important to consider for two reasons: First, as scholars like Yuval-Davis (1997) writing from the nationalist literature remind us, construction of the nation-state is a gendered project. Second, because welfare politics often oscillate around needs of the family, they are always gendered (Haney, 2002, p. 242).

What we do know about the PRR and welfare chauvinism comes mainly from Western and Northern European cases. My research contributes to the literature by

investigating PRR framing strategies with a CEE case study. This is important because populism in CEE differs from Western Europe. For instance, in Western Europe authoritarianism is linked to chauvinist welfare states whereas CEE has a long history with the authoritarian left (Marks et al, 2006). However, in CEE authoritarianism also appears on the far right.

Based on the concepts and methodology developed in Chapter 3, I use a critical frame analysis of party manifestos and key annual and anniversary speeches to reveal how welfare benefits in Hungary are constructed (i.e. deserving vs. undeserving poor) in five social policy areas: pensions, health care, unemployment, social assistance, and family allowances. The chapter is organized as follows: First, I discuss the relationship between welfare chauvinism and the PRR in Western Europe, followed by an overview of social policy in Hungary for background context. After a short recap of the research strategy discussed in Chapter 3, I present the summary and discussion of my findings. I structure the analysis thematically by examining five policy areas. I conclude with remarks on my findings that form the basis for my subsequent analysis on Roma education in Chapter 5.

4.2. Welfare Chauvinism and the PRR

4.2.1. From Western Europe with Love?

One feature of PRRs in Western Europe that has attracted the interest of scholars is their change into welfare chauvinist parties. Since the early/mid-1990s, parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Front National (FN) turned their focus on social policy issues to advocate pro-welfare positions (Lefkofridi & Mechel, 2014, p. 19). This contrasts most of the positions PRRs in Western Europe adopted early on, where they would

campaign on neo-liberal platforms (Rovny, 2013). Yet, as opposed to Social Democratic Parties, for instance, most PRRs adopted a pro-welfare position but would only grant benefits to those considered a "legitimate" member of the nation. This particular combination of egalitarian views with restrictive views on who is deserving is known as "welfare chauvinism" (see Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990; de Koster, Achterberg, & van der Waal, 2012; Derks, 2006; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2006; van der Waal, Achterberg, Houtman, de Koster, & Manevska, 2010)[16]. PRRs, by adopting these positions, were also found to influence the positions of mainstream parties. For instance, conservative parties, under pressure from PRRs, adopted more critical positions towards immigrants while, at the same time, changing their positions towards a more pro-welfare position (Schumacher & van Keersbergen, 2016). Today, these positions make up part of the PRR's "New Winning Formula" (de Lange, 2007, p. 411).

In some cases, the PRR's shift in positions on welfare benefits coincided with an increasing agreement among citizens to restrict welfare benefits to "our own" (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990). This view was particularly prominent in the 1990s when societies became more diverse as a consequence of a greater influx of immigrants (Crepaz & Damron, 2009). In contrast to many Western European countries, however, many Eastern European countries did not experience a larger influx of immigrants. In some cases, like Hungary, most immigrants came from neighbouring countries and were returning Hungarians (Juhász, 2003). Nevertheless, attitudes towards welfare benefits are often in line with the spirit of

[16] PRRs, however, do not focus on all issues related to welfare benefits. Rather, they restrict themselves to benefits that are based on the principles of equality (universal benefits) and need (means-based benefits). Ennser-Jedenastik (2018) argues that this is the case because in both cases, welfare benefits may mean a redistribution from "the deserving" to the "non-deserving", for instance, immigrants. In contrast, where benefits are based on the principle of equity (e.g. insurance), PRRs would not have reason to argue that immigrants would not profit because they would only receive benefits based on what they contributed, e.g. to their health insurance.

welfare chauvinism. Mewes & Mau for instance, find that welfare chauvinism, i.e. being in favour of restricting benefits to Hungarians only, is a commonly held view among Hungarian citizens (2012, p.136). Their research shows that approximately 10 per cent of Hungarian citizens are considered to hold welfare chauvinist attitudes. In another study, Mewes and Mau (2013, p. 236) find that Hungarian citizens also display the lowest willingness to grant immigrants unconditional access to welfare benefits, using European Social Survey Data from 2008/2009 and 26 European countries. In contrast, the share of Hungarians in favour of granting welfare benefits exclusively based on citizenship was the third highest among all countries included in the study at 51.2 per cent. Given these numbers, there is surprisingly little research on the exploitation and shaping of the demand for welfare chauvinism by political parties in Hungary, a most-likely case. Assuming parties to be rational actors, they should be very likely to explore the high demand for welfare chauvinist policies as in Hungary. Consequently, Hungary represents an interesting case to study the framing of these issues, also because it complements a field that has mainly focused on Western European cases (see for example, Norocel, 2016; Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015).

Examining a CEE case also engages unresolved debates about differences between Eastern and Western Europe welfare state regimes sparked by Esping-Andersen's influential typology work on liberal, corporatist, and social democratic welfare regimes (1990). In response to critique that the post-communist experience qualifies as a different case, Esping-Andersen (1996) and others, such as Deacon (1993), insist divergence from Western Europe is temporary, given that these nations are in transition. Others assert that in spite of transition, the strength of the communist legacy places these nations on a path-dependent

track (Fenger, 2007, p. 3). Testing this thesis, Fenger's findings support a distinct welfare state regime that can be further divided into three subgroups (2007, p. 22). Further, it is important to note that welfare chauvinism may not be directed only towards immigrants, but may also be used to define ethnic minorities that live in a country as less deserving of social benefits, as Rydgren points out (2007, p. 245), a question that has not been addressed extensively thus far. Finally, the rich data should allow an exploration of if and how we can distinguish between populist and nationalist frames.

4.2.2. Social Policy in Hungary

A commonly held assumption in contemporary welfare state literature is that (re)construction of social policy is shaped by the wider social, economic, and political context. [17] Haney's 2002 longitudinal study on Hungary from 1948-1996 reveals that who was considered in need and deserving of benefits changed over time and in response to regime type. Policy makers throughout this period particularly scrutinized women. For example, policy in the 1950s zeroed in on how to mete out benefits for mothers on a case-by-case basis instead of a blanket benefit for all mothers. A consequence of allocating benefits individually was that women seeking help did so alone rather than organize collectively for better living conditions (2002, pp. 86-89). The demographic decline in the 1960s was blamed on "Stalinist emancipation" that took women away from their "responsibilities" at home and into the workforce (2002, pp. 91-92). By linking the declining birth rate (a nationwide concern) to women's choice gave policy-makers justification for

[17] Cf. Emmenegger, Patrick, Jon Kvist, Paul Marx, and Klaus Petersen, eds. Special Issue: 25 Years of "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism." *Journal of European Social Policy* (February 2015).

state intervention into the private sphere. The state promoted the idea that women should work less and have more children through a generous benefit program mothers could access if they passed psychological tests and home inspections that determined if they ran an appropriate household and therefore deserved benefits (or not). Haney notes that the assessment criteria were very subjective as case workers inspected everything from the mother's appearance to cooking ability, and even home decorating. The subjectivity of the good/bad mother binary had a greater impact on Romani women, who faced tougher evaluation, especially those mothers in non-nuclear family arrangements (2002, Ch. 3). The good-bad mother discourse (with Romani women over-represented as unfit parents) became widely accepted by the 1980s (2002, p. 147). As Hungary began transitioning to a neo-liberal democracy, political rights expanded but social rights declined (2002, p. 235).

Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, Hungary's social policy laws changed dramatically, taking on a "neo-liberal, *étatist* and neo-conservative" shape (Szikra, 2014, p. 488). This process has been accelerated by the election of the conservative government coalition in the 2010 Hungarian elections, led by Victor Orbán's party Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP). For instance, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data shows that overall social spending in Hungary decreased from 23 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 20.6 per cent in 2016 (OECD, 2016). In addition to lowered spending, three changes stand out. First, pension schemes were reformed such that formerly private pillars were nationalized, and social insurance rights cut. Notable changes include increased retirement age, reduced payments, and of consequence for the disabled, limited access to invalidity pensions (Hermann, 2017, p. 59). Second, a new unemployment system was put in place to curb particularly the rights

of the unemployed and to replace activation policies with a compulsory public work program. Finally, new family policies that instated a flat tax of 16 per cent paired with tax credits resulted in reverse distribution from poor to rich families by benefitting middle to higher income families (Szikra, 2014, p. 488). These reforms are concerning for single parent families, as this group represents the highest risk of poverty and social exclusion in Europe (Eurostat, 2016). Further, these policy changes not only affect the poor in general, but especially the Roma living in Hungary leading to an increasingly "ethnic face" of welfare policy (Szikra, 2014, p. 496; Innes, 2015)[18].

Another notable observation in the post-Financial Crisis period is that Jobbik, as the main competition of Fidesz for voters, managed to dictate the government's economic direction at least to some extent (Pirro, 2017, p. 355). However, while the government coalition Fidesz-KDNP has mainly focused on neo-liberal policies with consequences for the Roma, Jobbik has emphasized a leftist national economic program according to which any foreign investments and business, i.e. "nonnative" business and market capitalism would not be able to fulfill "the interests and needs of Hungary and its native population" (Pirro, 2017, p. 355). In sum, both PRRs Fidesz and Jobbik have left their mark on Hungary's social policies over the last years. For these reasons, I focus on how both of these parties have articulated and framed social policies and social policy issues. This is important because, as Pirro (2017) points out, in spite of dramatic policy changes, political polarization, and a spike in PRR party politics, very little has been written about PRR parties and their economic programs and social policies in Hungary.

[18] Szikra (2014) notes that none of these reforms has led to large resistance among Hungarian people. She attributes the absence of protest to lack of checks-and-balances that can function as barriers to the executive power in Hungary.

4.3. Research strategy

In light of my central research question to identify populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames, I analyze electoral manifestos, 1848 and 1956 commemoration speeches, Orbán's annual speech in Transylvania, and State of the Nation speeches from 2010-2016. To further structure the analysis thematically, I follow Ennser-Jedenastick (2018) to focus on five social policy areas: pensions, health care, unemployment, social assistance, and family allowances. I pay careful attention to how the parties frame the issues and with what strategies and rhetorical devices. To recap from Chapter 3, and with respect my central research question, I place utmost concern on context to distinguish between populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames. To deepen the investigation, I also highlight how gender is implicated in these PRR frames because if we take Haney's (2002) assertions seriously, we can expect to find gender articulated throughout the discourse. To answer my secondary research questions of what rhetorical strategies give the PRR's frames traction, I draw on insights from social movement theory that identify the three main tasks of framing, namely: *diagnostic framing* (pinpointing a problem and assigning blame), *prognostic framing* (presenting solutions), and *motivational framing* (directly linked to justifying action). I use these categories of the work that framing does to guide my analysis of the findings.

4.4. Discourses of welfare benefits

In this section, I present and analyze Fidesz' then Jobbik' discourse about welfare benefits by policy area. In an earlier study, I showed how both parties place great emphasis on these different policy areas in their speeches more generally and especially in their electoral manifestos (Lugosi, 2018). In the subsequent analyses, I describe the party position on each

policy area, then I identify and unpack nationalist, populist, and authoritarian frames. My purpose is not to detail each policy and document examined exhaustively but rather, to highlight Fidesz and Jobbik's key frames and framing strategies.

4.4.1. Pensions

Fidesz

In the 2010 manifesto, Fidesz notes how cuts to police pensions have devastated the number of officers in the force. Some left due to retirement but nearly 8000 left due to poor salaries and pensions. The situation is dire and at least 3000 more officers are needed to perform basic duties (Fidesz, 2010, p. 55). Put this way, there is a sense of urgency for pension reform and without it, law and order will be difficult to maintain. The need for protection is emblematic of fear-invoking authoritarian frames. According to Fidesz, every society is responsible for the elderly, and the socialist-liberal government of the past eight years did a poor job of taking care of the retired (Fidesz, 2010, p. 77). This statement justifies change and in particular, rightist conservative policy change by pointing out failures of the previous government. Within the CEE context, a critique of the socialist left is unsurprising given the link to the communist history with post-communist parties struggling to move away from the past (Bozóki & Ishiyama, 2002, pp. 6-7).

Other annual speeches in 2010 echo the same grievances as the Manifesto but utilize stronger nationalist frames. Given the context of the anniversary speeches, this is expected. For example, in the 1956 anniversary speech Fidesz positions itself as heroes of the nation leading the charge for social change and justice based on calls for a total shift in everything from the constitution, law and order, morals, goals, and values among others. Again, the blame is placed squarely on the socialist government (Orbán, 2010c, para. 10). Frames that

construct Fidesz as leaders of a glorious nation are echoed in later speeches annual speeches and clear nationalist frames of promoting Hungarian "values", "morals", and "traditions" are consistent. Much of the same is reiterated again in 2013 in that year's 1956 speech where Orbán states affirms that no-one wants their pensions and salaries compromised in favour of state debt. This is couched in strong language such as not wanting to "ruin Hungary" again, the pressing need to "protect freedom", and the necessity of joining "fight" (Orbán, 2013b, para. 10-12). Once more, strong indicators of nationalist and authoritarian frames are evident in the how the idea of the nation is highly securitized in these speeches.

The 2011 and 2013 Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp speeches delivered in Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad), Romania are worth mention because they signpost the widely criticized illiberal turn Fidesz takes from 2014 onwards. In both speeches, Orbán offers a general assessment of Hungary's social, political, and economic situation with nods to where policy should go, especially regarding the struggling economy. The 2011 speech takes stock of accomplishments made thus far but with continual blame of the past socialist government that only served elite interests. Orbán insists that Hungary is going through a period of transformation and is not on the "Greek road" (Orbán, 2011b, para. 11). Further, the problem of the past is identified as elites subscribing to "old rules and old truths". The motivational framing proposed is to create a unique "Hungarian model" of politics that deviates from old (and failed) practices of looking westward for solutions to import (Orbán, 2011b, para. 12). The call for a Hungarian model can be read two ways: First, the statement may sound like an innocuous suggestion that a one-size-fits-all policy approach may not be appropriate for Hungary. Second, a more pessimistic interpretation might emphasize a latent

hostility towards Western ways of doing things, given the policy failures within Central East and South East Europe thus far.

Anti-West and by default, Eurosceptic, discourse is even more pronounced in Orbán's 2013 Summer Speech. Here, Orbán expresses grave disappointment with the EU market and calls for protectionist measures couched in economic nationalist arguments with populist appeals (Orbán, 2013a, para. 14). He notes that riches generated in Hungary are due to foreign companies, banks, and other forms of outsourcing. Orbán criticizes the EU by claiming that 2000 billion forints (over 6 million Euros) of capital was raised but not used in Hungary. He argues that lost revenue equates to two thirds of all pensions annually (Orbán, 2013a, para.14). Suspicion of the EU resonates with the public given the growing mood of dissatisfaction with EU membership in Hungary after the 2008 financial crisis. For instance, Eurobarometer Survey data from 2012 shows that 64 per cent of Hungarians indicated they were unhappy living in the EU (European Commission, 2014c, p. 38). The speech stresses this point by referencing the need to protect the small people (Orbán, 2013a, para. 25). The benefit of hindsight suggests that the points made in these speeches were, in fact, early warning signs of discontent that created conditions favourable for the rise of illiberal politics. What is more, the hostility toward to the EU as a corrupt elite taking advantage of everyday Hungarians is a clear example of a populist frame.

Later, following the 2014 re-election of Fidesz, we see much of the same rhetoric only amplified and not so covert. The 2016 State of the Nation Speech by Orbán is largely self-congratulatory, taking stock of successful reforms taken thus far, spinning Fidesz policies as saving and protecting the nation. For example, Orbán remarks,

> We have protected pensions and pensioners, and have gone the extra mile in supporting families. We have restored public order and the self-esteem of the police, and have also created a counter-terrorism and disaster management system. We have rescued our schools and hospitals (Orbán, 2016a, para. 9).

What is notable about Orbán's account above is the consistent usage of metaphors such as protecting, restoring, and rescuing. This type of framing suggests the country is insecure and in a state of crisis from which Fidesz can offer solutions. Fear based rhetoric creates a climate where day-to-day issues become highly securitized and is a hallmark of authoritarian frames.

Jobbik

Jobbik is a far right populist party with extreme views. We can expect discourse that draws heavily on exclusionary populist and nationalist frames. We can also expect to find authoritarian frames rooted in discourses of threat and protection to justify action. Right from the Founding Charter, Jobbik positions itself as the leader of a social movement to expel "...Successors of the Communist party and the extremist liberals, who are inextricably entwined with them, from the political power" to represent the entire nation (Jobbik, 2003, p. 2). Jobbik appeals to "the people" who are underrepresented and suffering from low wages and pensions (Jobbik, 2003, p. 2). This reference to 'the common people' is a classic example of a populist frame. The 2010 Manifesto adopts more nationalist frames. Jobbik outlines its vision for total reform as, "a genuine policy for the whole nation" that is, "In short, the return of national autonomy. In a word: A brighter future!" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 1; 2010b). The ambitious reforms of the pension system include age allowance, increased funds for seniors,

and review "disproportionately high pensions originating as rewards for service to the single-party state" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 4; 2010b). The latter point is a not-so-subtle reference to the communist era, suggesting the system is still corrupt. References to the communist era also lend support for Fenger's (2007) ideas about path-dependency shaping contemporary welfare politics. The Manifesto also acknowledges the role of child-bearing women (working or not) as making sacrifices and pledges early pension options for mothers (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 9; 2010b). In isolation, this statement illustrates the importance of family for Jobbik and so it is worthwhile to pay attention to how the family is constructed in other documents and policy areas to get a complete picture of the party's position on this issue.

Jobbik also clarifies that while Hungary is responsible for the Hungarian diaspora in neighbouring countries, those who obtain dual citizenship are not automatically entitled to benefits without residency (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 15; 2010b). Jobbik's campaigning has always relied heavily on revisionist nationalist frames that makes appeals to the "wider Hungarian nation", stirring up memories of the Treaty of Trianon that reshaped Hungary's borders in 1920[19] (Pytlas, 2013, p. 163). Jobbik's discourse in this regard is not unique. References to Trianon have been prolific in Hungarian politics since the treaty terms were imposed and even more so after 1989. As with nods to the 1848 Revolution, the prominence of Trianon underscores the need to examine how legacy shapes political discourse and rhetoric further back than the communist years.

Similar to Fidesz, later speeches by Jobbik express dissatisfaction with the status quo and the need for change. For example, in the 2011 speech commemorating the 1956 anniversary, Vona points out that Hungary is worse off today than four years ago and that

[19] Pre-Trianon territories prominent in Jobbik's discourse include parts of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and of particular interest, the Transylvanian region of Romania.

pensions remain the same (Dvifort, 2011). This implies that Fidesz is not doing enough to transform the country away from the mess left by the Gyurcsány years. In the speech, Vona gives an indirect nod of approval to Gyuláné Horvath, the mayor of Győrszemere (Dvifort, 2011). Referring to the mayor is interesting because while he is an Independent and not linked with Jobbik, he did support more Jobbik-led assistance with policing and surveillance in his community to curb burglary and other crimes through use of the civil guard (Magyar Gárda), among others. The spike in crime and ensuing insecure environment demanded an immediate response and while Roma in general were not blamed, Horvath did point out that it was a few making all the rest look bad (Szeghalmi, 2010). This statement denies a racist approach to law enforcement while at the same time, essentializing the Roma as a monolithic group. Citing Horvath in a prominent speech gives us insights into Jobbik′s position on the Roma issue. Perhaps more enlightening is how an important issue like pensions for elderly Hungarians are mentioned alongside the mayor's name and by implication, a local debate that further entrenches Jobbik's infamous moniker of needing to combat "Gypsy crime" and gives us clues about Jobbik's wider agenda and priorities. For those who understand the subtext and references in the speech, the rhetoric, though nuanced, is highly securitized with hints of covert racism, which justifies Jobbik's proposals for more policing of the Roma community in a perceived state of emergency. With a lens on everyday people on the ground with everyday struggles like making ends meet, this speech is emblematic of the nexus between populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames.

In later documents, Jobbik more explicitly stresses the importance of pensions. In the 2014 election manifesto, a parent allowance system is even proposed whereby working adults could opt to contribute a portion of their income tax to their parents' old age fund

(Jobbik, 2014a, p. 18; 2014b). Gábor Vona aspires to a country with good opportunities for the young to stay and pensioners can retire with hard-earned "spiritual and physical security" (Nemzeti TV1, 2016). While nuanced, latent resentment toward Western Europe can be detected. As with Fidesz, this reflects a mood of overall disappointment with accession promises. Discourse like this is best described as nationalist through the construction of Hungary as the other within the EU member-states. Concern about broken EU promises are even more pronounced in the 2016 State of the Nation Speech by Vona where the importance of pensions is briefly mentioned alongside the need for livable wages, which are elaborated further in section 5.3, unemployment (Vona, 2016, para. 24).

4.4.2. Health care

Fidesz

From the Founding Charter (2007), Fidesz asserts that health care policy is a priority, and this is reflected in later speeches and documents. Leading up to the 2010 national parliamentary elections, Fidesz' annual 1848 commemoration speech, which, as mentioned earlier, employs strong nationalist frames, discusses the dreary state of health care as part of a wider problem demanding a solution. To exemplify, Orbán evokes strong language by positioning policy goals, including healthcare, alongside ideas that "public security" is under threat, that the "future of our civilization is insecure", and warns of the possibility of "another crisis" (Orbán, 2010c, para. 4-5). The 2010 manifesto links policy to national values in stating, "Thus you can find the policy back to everyday life and the people, the values connecting us all: work, home, family, health and order is placed in the center" (Fidesz, 2010, p. 21).

A key goal for the standards of health care in Hungary is to "catch up" with Western European countries to create and maintain social welfare (Fidesz, 2010, p. 45). Mention of the welfare state and "catching up" with the rest of Europe is significant for two reasons: First, it implicitly fosters a pro-EU discourse by lauding Western European standards. Second, returning to Europe denotes leaving the corrupt communist past behind. By subtly assigning blame and presenting a solution, this framing is diagnostic and prognostic at the same time. Later in the document, blaming the communist past is articulated more overtly. The Manifesto goes on to outline how the socialist-liberal government of the last eight years is responsible for seriously mismanaging funds leading to the current disarray of the bankrupt and near-bankrupt hospitals, poor patient care, and overall degradation of all health care infrastructure (Fidesz, 2010, p. 63). Use of "corrupt communist" discourse is in line with CEE party discourse dealing with legacies of the past, as observed earlier in Fidesz' rhetoric on pensions. The previous socialist government is also blamed for the "brain drain" of Hungarian doctors and nurses migrating in search of better employment opportunities (Fidesz, 2010, p. 69). In this way, Fidesz uses the "corrupt communist" discourse as a diagnostic framing strategy to assign blame.

Fidesz further points to the state of the Roma, noting that the drastically dismal education and employment conditions impact health in a negative way and that the only appropriate policy response is to stop "scapegoating" (Fidesz, 2010, p. 83). This message is a covert shot at Jobbik whose surprising electoral success as a PRR party has been linked to their extreme anti-Roma stances (Karácsony & Róna, 2011). Although the focus here is on solving policy problems, Fidesz is (albeit in a subtle manner) using this campaign forum as an opportunity to ideologically distance the party from Jobbik. In 2012, two years after the

election, we observe a shift in strategy in that year's 1848 anniversary speech where Orbán links policy needs to the importance of "telling the truth" about the state of affairs and "not lying" about the situation (Orbán, 2012a, para. 9). Following Fidesz' second electoral victory, populist frames are more pronounced. For example, the 2016 State of the Nation praises the responsible reallocation of funds to improve the health care system with a nod to the hard work of teachers and health care workers (Orbán, 2016a, para. 9). Amidst the pitch for a new hospital in Budapest, Orbán addresses criticism of Fidesz by discrediting ideas of a class struggle in Hungary. He argues that these ideas come from "*The Communist Manifesto,* Marx's *Capital*, or some trendy leftwing university" and are "narrowminded and pointless" as this dialogue unproductively pits people and institutions against each other (Orbán, 2016a, para. 6). In Orbán's words, the solution is,

> In place of infantile daydreaming, the romance of class struggle, and the fuelling of discord between employers and employees, small businesses and corporate giants, we need alignment of interests, reconciliation and cooperation. To this end, we need a large, strong and stable people's party, and a government which serves the best interests of the people (Orbán, 2016a, para. 6).

Here, we observe articulations of "the people" as signifiers of populist frames used to address criticism and propose solutions. This helps to support contentions of policy progress (reported earlier in the speech) and also constructs a coherent narrative that Fidesz is doing a good job in office and they are the logical party choice to lead the country.

Jobbik

Jobbik calls for action in the *Founding Charter* when they note, "We cannot accept the

tragic demographic situation, the mental and health condition or self-destruction of the Hungarian society! Political parties remain idle and silent even though the existing unresolved issues demand action!" (Jobbik, 2003, p. 1). As Gunther & Diamond (2003) point out, Eastern PPR parties are more likely to present their appeals as leaders of a social movement and the above quote lends credence to this thesis. Jobbik also uses the populist frames of tragedy and self-destruction to blame the other parties for the disappointing status quo. Moreover, health is mentioned more as a metaphor for the overall health of the nation, in line with nationalist frames. The whole document reads this way and also employs strong securitizing language and metaphors such as: the "need to fight", the desire to build a "just" society, the need to protect Hungary from a union that fatally "mutilates national sovereignty", among other examples (Jobbik, 2003, para. 3). Constructing issues not as common policies problems but as a threat to national sovereignty and order are typical authoritarian frames.

Similarly, the *2010 Manifesto* calls for all-encompassing social reform to promote, "A genuine policy for the whole nation; and a youth programme designed to promote national wellbeing" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 4; 2010b). They call for an end to widespread and deeply entrenched corruption and criminality in politics, a typical populist frame of the "corrupt elite". Jobbik partly blames the poor state of health and lowering population as compared with other European nations on a "growth of unhealthy lifestyles" and insists that, "This population crisis has been exacerbated by the destructive behaviour of the political establishment" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 9; 2010b). For Jobbik, the solution is through a traditional family policy that does not support an "alternative living arrangement or deviant lifestyle" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 9; 2010b). This framing blames liberal values as responsible for health

and population problems. While not saying it directly, this position attacks gender and sexual orientations that do not fit within conservative hetero-normative constructions of the family, positioning single mothers/fathers and the LGBTQ* communities as "others" outside the national norm. In a study on the relationship between gender roles and populism in Austria, Mayer et al. (2014) reached similar conclusions. In the face of high abortion rates in Hungary, Jobbik's policies on regulating the family go further when they express interest on abortion policy that is acceptable for the medical and Christian communities (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 12; 2010b). By situating individual choices as part of a wider health problem, an indeed a crisis, the party is further justifying the need for government to intervene in family and gender politics and enter the private sphere. Evoking implicit warnings of deviance and disorder is yet another example of authoritarian discourse aimed at protecting the national interest, illustrating how authoritarian and nationalist frames can overlap.

The *2014 Manifesto* again articulates health issues through diagnostic nationalist and authoritarian frames that insist Hungary has "been made sick" and only Jobbik can solve the problem (Jobbik, 2014a p. 23; 2014b). As said by Jobbik, "The health problems of the Hungarian nation are mostly rooted in mental-spiritual reasons. A nation that does not feel good, that has been mutilated, invaded, oppressed, whose wish for freedom is suppressed, and which is misled will sooner or later show physical deterioration as well" (Jobbik, 2014a, pp. 23-24; 2014b). Consistent with earlier party discourse, strong word choices that create a sense of emergency and crisis are used. Although Jobbik is not outwardly blaming Fidesz for the current state of "disastrous policy", it is certainly implied given that Fidesz had been in power for four years at the time this electoral manifesto was published. Fidesz' policies are more pointedly criticized later in the *1956 Anniversary Speech* in 2016 where Vona laments

political indifference to lackluster state of healthcare (Nemzeti TV1, 2016). Vona was spearheading a policy debate that was gaining public attention at the time and eventually culminated in a 2018 article calling out Orbán's lack of attention to healthcare in the prestigious and widely read magazine *The Lancet*, which the Health Minister hotly contested (cf. Ónodi-Szűcs, 2018).

4.4.3. Unemployment

Fidesz

In the *Founding Charter*, Fidesz proposes the New Széchenyi Plan aimed at cutting taxes for employers, creating programs that encourage new job creation, and supporting "atypical" part-time employment. As with other policy discourse, Fidesz blames the level of poverty and obstacles to working on "the painful legacy of our past" (Fidesz, 2007, p. 33). What is more, restrictions on employment highlight the disparity between "old and new member states" (Fidesz, 2007, p. 40). Rhetoric like this illustrates another example of diagnostic framing that assigns responsibility for social woes on the communist past and promotes the idea of "returning to Europe", a popular metaphor used by the transitioning new member states at that time. Regarding solutions, Fidesz believes that, "With the encouragement of part-time employment, we intend to provide employment primarily to women, young mothers, people with disabilities, and students in higher education" (Fidesz, 2007, pp. 33-34). Szikra points out that such programs benefit the wealthy more than those most in need (2014, p. 488). In this scheme, it is the employers getting the bigger tax break and access to a new pool of part-time workers, who are not as entitled to the pay raises, vacation pay, and benefits allotted to permanent full-time employees. The *Charter* also expresses concern for

better integrating the Roma into the national economy through training, skills development, and encouragement of non-traditional work such seasonal farming (Fidesz, 2007, p. 34). Fidesz insists that the party stands behind the principle of a working nation rather than extracting unemployment benefits (Fidesz, 2007, p. 34). While promoting work is a sensible goal, unemployment cannot realistically be addressed unless racial and gender barriers to working are outwardly confronted. In the absence of this important task, the need for welfare is discredited and stereotypes about certain groups as lazy and deviant are easily reinforced. Fidesz' discourse on employment consistently draws on nationalist frames in the *2010 Electoral Manifesto* where work is stressed as a key national value to achieve freedom, a healthy nation, security, and trust (Fidesz, 2010, p. 12). The discourse suggests that unemployment and poverty create tension and need be addressed with a focus on work. The level of poverty is blamed on the ineffective strategies over a 45-year span and the most recent eight years have been particularly harmful (Fidesz, 2010, p. 26). This remark lumps the Gyurcsány government with communism, essentially labeling democratic socialist parties as a repackaged extension of the communist legacy. Rhetoric like this is particularly effective at corroding the legitimacy of parties on the left. What Hungary wants and needs, according to Fidesz, is employment opportunities, "but work in the absence of welfare benefits and social-repatriation" (Fidesz, 2010, p. 40). Insisting that the people do not want welfare or for families to send money back home from other countries performs a significant discursive task. The "work not welfare" turn of phrase covertly assigns blame to past social benefit schemes as responsible for the cycle of dependency and poverty, which gives voters a negative association with the welfare state and support for Fidesz' solutions. There is even a reference to the national constitution that highlights how equal opportunity and the social

market economy are among common values connecting the nation (Fidesz, 2010, p. 73). To illustrate this point further, the *Manifesto* draws on rhetoric such as policy for everyday people, connecting values, and asserts that, "work, home, family, health and order is placed in the center" (Fidesz, 2010, pp. 12 & 21). Not only does this employ signifiers of nationalist (common values) and populist (everyday people) frames, it also turns attention to family politics again. The party elaborates on the conservative agenda further with policies aimed at reforming the labour market toward more family-friendly employment (Fidesz, 2010, pp. 74-75). The purpose behind such reforms is to promote the hetero-normative family having more children to raise the population. Fidesz justifies the proposed reforms by insisting that imagining the family and having children as a private matter is narrow-minded (Fidesz, 2010, p. 75).

Regarding the Roma, Hungary's most disadvantaged and persecuted minority, the *2010 Manifesto* nods to the desperate situation and that work options should be in place (Fidesz, 2010, p. 82). The high unemployment rate for the Roma is described with securitized language such as "catastrophic and bad for health" (Fidesz, 2010, p. 82). As discussed in the earlier health section, Fidesz asserts that Roma policy cannot fall back on "scapegoating", a popular narrative among Jobbik and the party's supporters. Rather than rely on racialized discourse that accuses the deeply marginalized Romani peoples as responsible for their own predicament due to cultural inferiority, Fidesz presents the problem as a consequence of "the past eight years" that were marked with "insecurity, unpredictable steps", and "criminalizing" (Fidesz, 2010, p. 82). The "corrupt communist" discourse fits with Fidesz' rhetoric on other the policy areas examined. What is more, this framing strategy functions to first, distinguish Fidesz from Jobbik, which is an important task given that both

parties are situated on the right. Second, contending that criminalization of the Roma began with the Socialists discredits the innovation of Jobbik's "Gypsy crime" narrative and implicitly links that party with the corrupt past.

An examination of Fidesz' discourse in the speeches commemorating the *1848 and 1956 Anniversary*, and annual *Summer Speeches* reveals rhetoric that is not as tempered as observed in the higher profile, more visible speeches that are scrutinized under the watchful eye of the European Commission. These speeches are peppered with pronounced populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames around policy issues and signal the illiberal turn Fidesz will take. For instance, Fidesz uses prognostic authoritarian frames of confronting "the causes of our troubles" and the need to "face the wickedness" to deliver "more jobs, order, security, and knowledge" (Orbán, 2010a, para. 12). Similar to the *2010 Manifesto*, Fidesz emphasizes work as a key national value that promotes order, but it is stated more forcefully here. In the 2010 speech commemorating the *1956 Anniversary*, Orbán draws on strong nationalist frames that outline Fidesz' vision of the ideal Hungary. In this speech, Orbán posits that the country's policies need a complete overhaul including the constitution, laws, public morals, values, etc. According to Orbán, the nation must reject anything "unnatural and immoral" that resulted from the "ruins of the last eight years" (Orbán, 2010c, para. 10). Orbán's usage of strong language like "unnatural and immoral" delegitimizes previous policies and even the constitution. This motivational framing helps Fidesz justify sweeping changes for the good of the nation. The nationalist frames in this speech also intersects with populist frames when Orbán describes the unemployed as "losers of the previous era" and that no-one will be left behind (Orbán, 2010c, para. 10). This is yet another example of the blaming the communist past by presenting the current conditions in an "us (we the people)

versus them (immoral socialists)" style of logic. What we can also observe are subtle indicators of authoritarian frames indicated by ideas of morality and maintaining order.

Other speeches continue to produce a coherent discourse about the nation articulated in populist and authoritarian frames, which hints as disappointment with liberal democracy and the need for dramatic change. Orbán posits that Western capitalism has not been working for the last decade (Orbán, 2010b, para. 3). While subtle, this critique can be read as an early indication of Euroscepticism and disappointment with EU membership. For Orbán, the transition years are better described as a time when "ordinary, honest people were constantly losing". The rest of the speech is littered with indicators of populist frames that intertwine with authoritarian frames of achieving order and justice, using word choices such as "everyday people", building a nation for law-abiding, honest citizens that want to "work, keep a family, comply with the laws, and work honestly" (Orbán, 2010b, para. 10). Consistent with arguments presented in the *Manifesto*, this new order must be rooted in a work-based social system and not the welfare state (Orbán, 2011b, para. 9). The 2012 annual speeches construct the nation as one marked by "freedom", "united strength", and "personal courage", which positions Fidesz as the leaders of the people in a common struggle (Orbán, 2012a, para. 11). At the *2012 Summer Speech*, Orbán again utters disappointment with the West, this time not so subtlety when he declares that the West needs to undergo a "moral revolution" (Doku Blog, 2016, para. 10). By demonizing the West as immoral, the discursive implication is a "moral and good" Hungary in a struggle against the immoral and bad West. Construction of the "pure people" is a hallmark of populist frames. Orbán's idea of a "Hungarian approach" as superior is supported by comments that point out that despite the soaring unemployment rate in Europe, Hungarians were supplied with 200,000 jobs (Orbán,

2012b, para. 10). The most widely cited example of Fidesz' illiberal turn and rejection of the West is the notorious *Summer Speech* Orbán delivered in 2014. Here, Orbán recounts Hungary's path through the nation state, the liberal state, and the welfare state and reiterates that the next phase of a "work-based society that, as I have just mentioned, undertakes the odium of stating that it is not liberal in character" (Orbán, 2014b, para. 9-10). Although it is not until 2014 where Orbán explicitly uses the term "illiberal democracy", there were indicators that went undetected throughout his annual speeches as early as 2010 when he called for a rejection of anything unnatural or immoral.

Following the *2014 Summer Speech*, Orbán very openly defended his declaration that an illiberal order was the best course for Hungary. In response to the migration crisis, these arguments are deeply securitized with racialized rhetoric. The *2015 Summer Speech* still mentions the importance of work and jobs, but in the context of employment for Hungarians being under threat. The overall tone of this speech is a sense of danger and emergency that must be stopped. Orbán explains that Hungarian hostility to immigration is a matter of common sense and morality (Orbán, 2015c, para. 18). He cites the recent questionnaire response data as evidence by pointing out that an overwhelming majority of Hungarian people believe that the EU has failed to properly tackle the problem of immigration and terrorism and support a stricter approach since Hungary does not share the values held by the European left (Orbán, 2015c, para. 19). For Hungary, stability and a "united nation" are at stake (Orbán, 2015c, para. 19).

In the *State of the Nation* address the same year, Orbán again pointed to the "common sense" and "politically incorrect" nature of Hungarians, going on to say that people want jobs and a decent living rather than theories (Orbán, 2015a, para. 10). Job

security, and security in general, is implicitly linked to the migration crisis when Orbán declares that Hungarians "do not want to see their country thronging with people from different cultures, with different customs, who are unable to integrate; people who would pose a threat to public order, their jobs and livelihoods" (Orbán, 2015a, para. 10). These authoritarian frames imply that all Muslims are a potential threat. This covert form of xenophobia can become an unquestioned part of the "way things are" as observed in Orbán's comments about common sense, and feed the narrative that certain people, by virtue of their religion or culture, automatically pose a threat to the nation. This fuels an overall climate of fear and insecurity, which provides ideal conditions for the legitimacy and support for strong authoritarian frames that offer (even extreme and normally unacceptable) solutions in a seemingly exceptional and dangerous time. Authoritarian frames gain further appeal when combined with nationalist frames that dictate that "the nation and national values" are threatened.

By 2016, the urgency of the migration issue tapered off somewhat as Fidesz' discourse shifted back to the illiberal agenda and how to shape and maintain order. For example, in the *State of the Nation* speech Orbán opens by listing Hungary's achievements in the road toward progress, notably the improved economy and work force (Orbán, 2016a, para. 5). The content of the speech quickly turns to dismissing Fidesz' critics. Orbán's refers to comments about class struggle in Hungary as absurd and insists these infantile imaginings spearheaded in part by a "fancy leftwing university" must be confronted with common sense and kept away from policy making. Further, what Hungarians need is a government that looks out for "the interests of the people" (Orbán, 2016a, para. 6). The backlash against education and the call for order are signals of authoritarian frames that intersect with populist

frames that construct Fidesz as a strong party for "the people". Finally, while Orbán's rant aimed at discrediting the notion of class cleavages in Hungary seem par for the course, we now know this was part of a growing disdain for the left and indeed, a forewarning about the turbulence about to hit the Central European University in 2017 and the ban on gender studies in 2018.

Jobbik

Similar to Fidesz, Jobbik emphasizes work and job creation as a key policy goal within a larger vision for the nation and order therein, but in a much more blatant fashion. In this regard, the party's frames on this position are best described as overtly nationalist and authoritarian with the child-rearing family at the centre. For instance, the crux of the *2010 Electoral Manifesto* focuses on how to remedy the problems facing Hungary such as halting political corruption, job creation, and promoting family agriculture while keeping the country safe by reforming policing and the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda). The Manifesto also declares that Jobbik strives for, "a media, cultural and educational policy serving national interests and values", "a genuine policy for the whole nation; and a youth programme designed to promote national wellbeing" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 1; 2010b). For Jobbik, the criteria to assess what is considered in the national interest and wellbeing becomes apparent throughout their crackdown on crime rhetoric, revisionist statements on reunification of all ethnic Hungarians throughout the Carpathian Basin, tight control over the Roma, and the dominance of Christian values. The combination of these goals leaves little to no room for diversity or pluralism, which are viewed as a threat to the nation by disrupting order. For Jobbik, the family plays a central role in maintaining the nation especially in a time of declining population and birth rates. The foundation of a healthy nation and strong

workforce rests on hard working, honest, multi-children families that adhere to morals and decency (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 2; 2010b). As with the national interest, morals and decency are defined narrowly. Like Fidesz, Jobbik promotes strong employment conditions for mothers to break down barriers between working and child rearing (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 9; 2010b). A problem with this approach is that it privileges mothers that do not face employment barriers and can therefore further reify stereotypes and tropes that some women (rural, Roma, non-Christian, LGBTQ, etc.) are simply lazy and unwilling to work.

Again, similar to Fidesz, in the 2010 Manifesto, Jobbik espouses protectionist economic nationalist frames against European Union employment directives, which demand close inspection (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 11; 2010b). This discourse remains consistent throughout other party speeches as well. To take the *1848 Anniversary Speech* in 2010 as an example, Vona asserts policy must focus on strengthening industry and manufacturing in home markets instead of outsourcing to multinationals (Cagecity, 2010). On the surface, calling for building the home advantage does not sound noteworthy until considering the wider discourse by this party. Two years later, Vona's *1848 Anniversary Speech* in 2012 is littered with extreme hostility to the West where he describes Hungary as a colony of Europe, indeed a "European United States", in which the wealthy old member states exploit new member states through neoliberal style economics based on bank loans that drive up unemployment. In this "Western Europe as exploitative" narrative, Viktor Orbán is singled out for supporting the so-called "freedom fighters" that seek to model Europe after the American economy (Barossg, 2012a). Thus, disappointment with EU membership not yielding prosperous results as imagined in the years leading up to accession is blamed on the Prime Minister's faulty economic vision and policy. This strategy differentiates Jobbik from

Fidesz (both rightist parties) while maintaining strong ideological distance from the communist past. Later still in the 2014 Manifesto, Jobbik continues to advocate for job creation, less outsourcing, etc. to create a more self-sustaining national economy to break the cycle of dependency that the party provokingly calls “Hungary's bondage to the EU” (Jobbik, 2014a, p. 5; 2014b). Here, the word choice 'bondage' evokes a strong metaphor of Hungary as a submissive victim of a controlling master, EU suggesting an unjust power imbalance that must be remedied. Framing national policy reform in an “us against them” and “struggle for the underdog” narrative is typical of PRR strategies in general (Gunther and Diamond, 2003), and Jobbik in particular, right from the party's *2003 Founding Charter*.

Throughout Jobbik’s discourse on work, their position on unemployment benefits is clear: work should be offered in place of cheques to cull the system of users and abusers. As said in the *Manifesto*,

> Those capable of labour, should only be entitled to receive state support, through the completion of some form of work. With the nationwide introduction of a “Social Card” scheme: we shall provide those individuals and families living under difficult circumstances, who both genuinely wish to improve their prospects and possess the willingness to accept employment when it is offered to them, with every possible opportunity for improving their living conditions; in addition to this such a Social Card scheme would bring to an end the epidemic of criminal usury [loan-sharking] that exists amongst those on welfare in Hungary (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 10; 2010b).

At a glance, such criminalization of the poor seems to be a blanket policy for all Hungarians drawing welfare benefits. However, by all social indicators, the Roma represent the most

disadvantaged group in Hungary with an embarrassingly low employment rate of about 20 per cent for Roma men and only 10 per cent for Roma women totalling an unemployment rate of about 70 per cent (ECRI, 2015, p. 26). This bleak situation is exacerbated by racism. The Council of Europe reports that, "Concerning employment, direct and indirect discrimination prevents a great portion of the Roma population from breaking the vicious circle of poverty in which they are caught" (16 Dec. 2014, p. 27). While Jobbik's remarks about the Social Card do not single out the Roma explicitly, it is clear they are the targets of this policy as they over-represent the unemployed. There are other sections of Jobbik's employment stance regarding the Roma that are overtly hostile in both the *2010 and the 2014 Manifestos*. For example, the *2010 Manifesto* states that one of Hungary's biggest problems is lack of "Gypsy integration" and the issues this causes. Regarding work, Jobbik recounts the mass unemployment among Roma following Soviet collapse in 1989. As they put it, the community was not able to adapt and, in many cases, refused to adapt. By consequence, extreme levels of unemployment and low education levels created an intergenerational cycle of crushing poverty that presents a security threat evidenced by word choices such as describing the situation as "deplorable", "a potential time-bomb", that left unaddressed could result in "virtual civil war" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 11; 2010b). Jobbik's threat activation falls squarely into the paradigm of motivational authoritarian frames that advocate for a tough stance to solve problems and crack down on crime. The harsh action required is justified by blaming the Roma for their predicament. Jobbik posits that, "At the present time a segment of the Gypsy community strive for neither integration, nor employment, nor education; and wish only that society maintain them through the unconditional provision of state benefits" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 11; 2010b). In this narrative, the Roma refuse to integrate.

The implication is that the Roma are deviant and their defiance against the state is an active choice. In other words, the Roma choose poverty, unemployment, lack of education, isolation, and so on. The solution to such "poaching off the system", according to Jobbik, is to introduce workfare style benefits where anyone able to work must accept offered employment to receive public welfare benefits (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 12; 2010b). The *2014 Manifesto* carries on the workfare theme insisting that following job creation schemes, no-one unemployed could use excuses such as, "I would work but there are no jobs" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 20; 2010b). While in principle, the workfare scheme sounds fair, it ignores race and ethnicity-based obstacles people face. Where social and economic problems of race are discussed, the Roma are blamed for their situation. This rhetoric can be explained as denying a problem (a form of coded racism according to Delgado and Stefancic, 2017) and in trademark populist fashion, again presents the party as leaders of a moral and social movement in the face of insecurity and instability.

4.4.4. Social Assistance

Fidesz

In the *Founding Charter*, Fidesz states that the party's overall vision is a state with increased welfare benefits, strong employment rates, and Hungary as an economic leader within CEE (Fidesz, 2007, p. 26). The party document states that in tandem with welfare, security is also a main concern (Fidesz, 2007, p. 25). As we know from the welfare chauvinism literature, intertwining welfare with security can lead to very targeted social policy that benefits some to the disadvantage of others. Further, Fidesz also emphasizes Christian morals and values of the church as a foundation for order (Fidesz, 2007, p. 21). Reinforcing the strength of

Christianity in Hungarian society leaves room for rejecting non-Christians, as witnessed later in 2015 with Fidesz' extreme hostility toward Muslim migrants and refugees.

Later in the 2010 Manifesto, Fidesz blames the social assistance program for the ongoing poverty in the country. Low motivation has been culturally ingrained, keeping people out of the workforce and this legacy comes from the previous socialist government of the past eight years (Fidesz, 2010, p. 26). This neoliberal approach to justify cutting benefits is typical of rightist parties (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). Against the painful backdrop of the communist past, Fidesz, from the conservative right, is also distancing itself from socialism while discrediting the left at the same time. The party draws on the securitizing strategy of linking unemployment with crime, which at once heightens the urgency of the problem while indirectly painting the socialist left as dangerous. Another example of such distancing is Fidesz' promotion of a return to strong working families, which represents a common national cause, and disruptions over the past eight years (the previous socialist government) must be amended to secure the future for everyone (Fidesz, 2010, p. 72). Altogether, this discourse is articulated through hallmark authoritarian (fear, insecurity) and nationalist (common national cause) frames.

Fidesz goes on to insist that criminal behaviour is an unacceptable response to poverty and will not be tolerated. Membership within Hungarian society is only for law-abiding citizens who earn an honest living through legitimate employment (Fidesz, 2010, p. 52). Although Fidesz does not single out the Roma directly, the link between poverty and criminality evokes assumptions about the Roma within widespread public discourse. For instance, the ECRI (2015) points out a court case where the presiding judge drew on stereotypes of "Gypsy crime" (most widely used by Jobbik) and the "Roma lifestyle", which

stands in opposition to national norms and is characterized by avoiding work (ECRI, 2015, p. 16). These covert racialized remarks by Fidesz about the unemployed and the criminal represent exclusive-nationalist frames of in and out groups, the Roma falling into the latter category. This can be read as contradictory discourse given the party's earlier stated commitments to not reinforce stereotypes and ensuing hostility. Fidesz addresses this tension directly when they claim that singling out the Roma is not hypocritical given that this group comprises the overwhelming majority of the poor. In line with explaining other dangerous policy failures, Fidesz blames the previous government for increasing Roma poverty, which opened space for extremist views (Fidesz, 2010, p. 81). Albeit implicitly, this argument again discredits Jobbik by packaging that party's views as the consequence of the Socialist Left. Fidesz later cites equal opportunity as a common national value to tackle Roma poverty (Fidesz, 2010, p. 73). The colour-blind approach to policy can be problematic. Kirkham (1998) points out that rightist discourse is often articulated through discourses of equality and rights. The trouble with such a colour-blind approach to equal opportunities is that the roots and very real barriers of racism remain unaddressed (Delgado & Stefancic, 2017).

Fidesz' nationalist frames about the need for social benefits are articulated in a different way outside of the *Party Manifestos* that exude authoritarian frames that propose securitizing strategies. In the *2010, 2011, and 2012 Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp Speeches*, Fidesz attributes the current state of the Hungarian economy to a moral crisis of Western capitalism. These speeches contain several references to a capitalist system undergirded by strong values and morals. The *2010 Summer Speech* explicitly mentions belief in God (Christianity) as the key driver of successful capitalism (Orbán, 2010b, para. 4). According to Orbán, the move away from a faith-based system in recent

years has resulted in poor economic performance (Orbán, 2010b, para. 4). The theme of Western capitalism failing is repeatedly revisited in the *2011 Summer Speech* where Orbán bluntly contends that the Western way is not working and among other remedies, there is a need to move away from the welfare state and emphasize work (Orbán, 2011b, para. 9). Further, the role of the state must not come first as with botched socialist politics and ideology of the past, but rather the state apparatus must serve the nation and the national community (Orbán, 2011b, para. 9). By 2012, Orbán's *Summer Speech* openly criticized the West while emphasizing how Central Europe is different. Relevant to the discussion here, he suggests that Western approaches to addressing problems such increased welfare spending is a departure from reality (Doku Blog, 2016, para. 6). Orbán goes on to point out that Western Europeans were "pampered" by the lofty welfare state and by contrast, Central Europeans have 'better instincts' and are more realistic as socialist politics led to disaster, that Hungarians know how to put in order (Doku Blog, 2016, para. 28). This nationalist "us versus them" frame essentially ridicules the West as foolish and short-sighted while upholding Central Europe as superior. It also exacerbates difference in sharp opposition to pre-2004 EU accession enthusiasm for Hungary's "return to Europe".

By 2015, Orbán's rhetoric becomes increasingly hostile toward Western Europe, most strikingly observed in his response to the migration crisis (Orbán, 2015a). In the *2015 Summer Speech* and the *State of the Nation Speech*, Orbán again situates policy, Hungary's position on migration in this case, in the context of "protecting the nation" and "adhering to morals". The migration crisis is articulated as a security threat at the top of the government's agenda. In these speeches, the problem is imagined as a public safety and an economic concern. For example, during the *Summer Speech*, Orbán highlights findings from a recent

(government created) survey on Hungarian attitudes to immigration. He points out that four-fifths of Hungarians favour a strict response given that Brussels has failed to adequately address immigration and terrorism (Orbán, 2015c. para. 15). Relevant to the discussion on social assistance, Orbán also notes that 75 per cent felt that illegal migrants threaten Hungarian jobs and 80 per cent of respondents believe that illegal immigrations should be financially responsible for their own care while in Hungary Orbán stresses that 95 per cent favoured support for Hungarian families as a higher priority over helping immigrants, which is in direct opposition to attitudes of the Western European Left that emphasizes the protection of human rights at the expense of common sense and stability (Orbán, 2015c. para. 14).

Articulations of immigration, and especially migrants from predominantly Muslim countries, as synonymous with terrorism is not unique in the post-9/11 world. This problematic discourse draws on the idea that any and all Muslims present a threat as the culture is defined by a proclivity towards violence (Huntington, 1993). Drawing insights from the German case, Schmidtke points that hostile party rhetoric constructs immigrants as threats to cultural values and identity, with great emphasis on difference (2015, p. 386). Culturalist assumptions, in Razack's terms (2008), position migrants as dangerous, therefore justifying harsh policy in response. As observed earlier with rhetoric linking Roma poverty with criminality, we can now see a colour-line in Fidesz' authoritarian framing that is cross-cut with nationalist frames that feeds back into welfare chauvinist attitudes about who does or does not deserve state benefits.

Much of the same rhetoric is present in the *2015 State of the Nation* but with a stronger critique of liberalism as a threat to public order and Hungarian, indeed European,

livelihood. In this address, Orbán emphasizes that liberal social policy ignores "the common good" and "Christian values" as "the only natural foundation" for a civilized and secure Europe (Orbán, 2015a, para. 9). Here, the prognostic framing pinpoints Brussels and other European capitals (as metaphors for liberal multicultural values) as the most pressing threat to European ways of life. This is illustrated in usage of strong terms such as: "earlier harmony disintegrated", "intellectual chaos from which we had struggled to escape", and that those who "endanger the future of Europe" are found within Europe's borders (Orbán, 2016a, para. 21). All of this serves to position liberal values, including approaches to social policy, as oppressive ideology that Hungary fought to break away from. While not saying it outright, the implication here is that the European Union, and EU ideology, presents a threat to Hungary as the Soviet Union once did.

Jobbik

Jobbik has not been as vocal as Fidesz on issues of social assistance specifically, save for some chiefly nationalist frames in their *2010 Manifesto*. Jobbik's position on social assistance begins with blaming declining birth rates on the "destructive behaviour of the political establishment" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 9; 2010b). Making arguments supported by nationalist frames, the party maintains that in order for the nation to grow, Jobbik plans to enact a "coherent family and social policy", namely the hetero-normative family (discussed further below) (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 9; 2010b). Jobbik's position on social welfare stresses the importance of Christianity while also adopting elements of neoliberalism, such as assigning responsibility for well-being on the individual, the family, and all other resources before turning to the state for assistance. The social responsibility of the state is to support homebuilding, conditional benefits, and assistance for the disabled and the homeless (Jobbik,

2010a, p, 10; 2010b). The party clarifies that state responsibility is not all encompassing and unconditional, rather state responsibility is limited to supporting institutions such as "municipalities, established churches and nongovernmental organizations" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 10; 2010b). Jobbik's support of the church as an important institution responsible for social welfare further establishes the role of the church in national policy. The primacy of Christianity is typical of PRR discourse in CEE (Froese, 2004).

Not surprisingly, when the party does address social assistance policy more directly, it is in reference to the Roma community. Reiterating from the unemployment section but also relevant here, Jobbik explains in the *2010 Manifesto* that, "At the present time a segment of the Gypsy community strive for neither integration, nor employment, nor education; and wish only that society maintain them through the unconditional provision of state benefits" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 11; 2010b). This is a multi-layered statement that at once draws an image of the Roma as refusing to integrate and are therefore deviant but also lazy given the apparent desire to collect state benefits without condition. Such diagnostic framing paves the way for justifying welfare chauvinist attitudes and a call for extreme measures that would not normally be accepted in a European liberal democracy. Jobbik's proposed solutions on this issue again draw on the church, which is consistent with their discourse on the church assuming the majority of responsibility for charitable action. However, for Jobbik the church's role is not limited to donations and financial help. They call upon the church to play an integral part in helping the Roma with "assimilation into society at large" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 12; 2010b). While the party presents assimilation as a solution to Roma poverty and inequality that lead to perilous "Gypsy crime" moniker such discourses of helping can be dangerous. First, the desire to assimilate is not coming from the community but rather, is

being imposed on them by a radical right party. Second, punitive action taken against marginalized groups by religious organizations can lead to disastrous policy and practices, such as Canada's Residential School system aimed at assimilating Indigenous children to take an important example. Furthermore, insisting that a particular community needs to assimilate is a form of racism because it implies that a certain group is not as good and by virtue of their culture are lesser than the so-called national norm. Lastly, any benefits meted out by the state would fall under the purview of Jobbik's Social Card plan, mentioned earlier in the unemployment discussion. According to Jobbik this help take the form of, "A cash substitute through which benefit credit can be received but not spent on items such as alcohol and tobacco" (Jobbik, 2010a, footnote p. 10; 2010b). In line with discourse about the Roma as deviant, this provision perpetuates stereotypes of the poor by framing the Roma as irresponsible and incapable of managing their money without spending it on smokes and booze.

In reaction to the migration crisis, Jobbik responded in similar ways as Fidesz. Jobbik's discourse on this issue is also highly securitized in terms of Muslim migrants posing a threat to national sovereignty and values with similar tropes of the "Muslims as terrorists". In contrast to Fidesz, who very publicly announced the results of their survey gauging public attitudes on immigration, Jobbik has not linked the terrorist threat to social benefits. By 2015, the deeply racialized framing that was previously emblematic of the party's rhetoric seems to be waning. This observation supports arguments that after the 2014 election, Jobbik changed their strategy to converge further to the center right.

4.4.5. Family Allowances

Fidesz

Right from the *Founding Charter*, Fidesz states plans for family tax reform based on income and number of children (Fidesz, 2007, p. 36). Later in 2010, in the *1848 Anniversary Speech*, Orbán uses nationalist frames to promise to anchor the country's freedom in "common values", such as the family (Orbán, 2010a, para. 14). Much the *2010 Manifesto* emphasis on the family is also presented through nationalist frames. For example, as in the *Anniversary Speech*, work, home, the family, health, and order are all cited as the key "values of the nation" (Fidesz, 2010, p. 21). Policy priorities such as strengthening families and promoting childbearing are identified. According to Fidesz, the family is central to Hungary and Europe and must be protected to preserve Hungarian and European mental and spiritual health (Fidesz, 2010, p. 24). *The Manifesto* goes on to justify government attention by ascertaining that child rearing and family politics are not matters of the private sphere, since the whole nation depends on it (Fidesz, 2010, pp. 74-75). This finding falls in line with Haney's (2002) argument that welfare policy is inherently gendered. While this policy goal is couched in the language of helping and promoting the "strong nation" metaphor, there are implicit gender roles with women at home having babies for the national good, with men out working as the breadwinner.

In some places, Fidesz even draws on authoritarian frames and uses loaded security terms to describe Hungary's social and political landscape, such as: "disintegration of social security", threats of "unemployment and crime", "deterioration", and most dramatically, a "dangerously fragmented" child welfare system (Fidesz, 2010, p. 80). As witnessed in the other policy area examined thus far, Fidesz yet again insists that "good governance" is

needed and blames the previous Socialist government for their poor policy choices that have resulted in a fractured Hungarian society (Fidesz, 2010, p. 80).

Reforms are necessary to make the labour market more family friendly, including childcare options, and non-traditional work such as part-time employment for families with young children (Fidesz, 2010, p. 75). For Fidesz, working families contribute to national prosperity so policy should be directed there (Fidesz, 2010, p. 76). Family directed policy sounds noble, however Szikra argues that Fidesz' reforms that privilege better off families in tandem with cuts to unemployment assistance have actually increased social polarization and poverty levels (2014, p. 495). As noted in the above discussion on unemployment, the Roma represent the most impoverished group in Hungary with staggering unemployment numbers in the range of 70 per cent. Without confronting racial barriers that Roma face, employment-based benefits are not likely to foster meaningful change for this group. Szikra's (2014) observations on the increased poverty gap confirm this. While Fidesz does mention Roma social policy in the *Manifesto*, the undergirding issue of racism is not addressed directly except to say that former Socialist policy aimed at alleviating Roma marginalization focused too heavily on poverty which created a culture of hostility toward the Roma (Fidesz, 2010, sec. 4.6, p. 81).

A couple years into his leadership, Orbán's continues to articulate the family through the prism of nationalism during the anniversary speeches. In the *2012 Summer Speech*, he laments that in Europe, important institutions like the family and the natural community are viewed in negative ways in that they are traditional, out-dated, and even dangerous despite these being foundational (Doku Blog, 2016, para. 23). Without saying it outright, Orbán implies that alternative or non-traditional families are somehow less valuable since they do

not bond the nation together. In the following year during his *Anniversary Speech* of the 1956 Revolution, Orbán reiterates the primacy of helping families as a major policy concern within the wider context of freedom. Hungarian freedom, he insists, is grounded in "Christianity and Hungarian culture" and this value is enshrined in the constitution (Orbán, 2013b, para. 9). One implication of enshrining Christianity in the constitution is that it leaves little room for the protection, let alone the respect of minorities, such as Jews or Romani, that follow other religions. These speeches provide clues into what Orbán envisions as the ideal Hungarian.

Viktor Orbán's 2014 Speech directly attacks liberalism and takes on a strong populist tone. According to Orbán,

> It is always the stronger neighbour who decides where the driveway will be; it is always the stronger party, the bank, who decides the interest rate on mortgages, and who changes it mid-term if needed, and I could continue on with a long list of instances that individuals and families with weaker economic defences experienced regularly during the previous twenty years. It is in reply to this that we suggest, and are attempting to construct Hungarian state life around this idea, that this should not be the principle on which society is built (Orbán, 2014b, para.10).

In this narrative, it is always elites making decisions for Hungarians and not the people making decisions for themselves and this needs to stop. Orbán goes to say that liberalism has failed the people in many ways, including,

> The liberal Hungarian state was also incapable of protecting the country from falling into debt. And finally, it did not protect the country's families, and I mean the system of foreign currency loans in this instance. It also failed to prevent families from falling into debt slavery (Orbán, 2014b, para. 11).

This is yet another example of this party, or in this case the party leader, ascribing blame for poverty among Hungarian families elsewhere. Earlier at the beginning of Fidesz' rule, the culprit for the poor state health care and family impoverishment was the ghost of the communist past and now after four years in power, Fidesz blames liberal values, espoused mainly by the European Union and the United States, which he constructs as the "corrupt elite".

The anti-establishment sentiment only becomes more pronounced over time with strong signifiers of populist frames. To take an example, Orbán's *2015 State of the Nation* emphasizes the need to look out for what some call the "losers of communism" which he frames as "the everyday hardworking people and their families" (Orbán, 2015a, para. 21). It is Fidesz' responsibility to shield these folks from, among other things, "the cunning machinations in Brussels" (Orbán, 2015a, para. 21). Although such statements certainly fit within the populist frame, the importance of everyday Hungarian families also crosses over into nationalism in that families serves as the backbone of the nation.

Jobbik

Since the birth of the party, Jobbik has been very clear about their romantic nationalist vision for Hungary. They insist the future of the nation is grounded in a return to traditional communities including families and the church (Jobbik, 2003, para. 5). In the *2010 Manifesto*, much of Jobbik's positions on the family are also tied into other policy areas such

as employment and health care, as discussed earlier. Policy aimed at family allowances is focused on housing and regulating the Roma. The *2010 Manifesto* proposes an economic nationalist homebuilding program to protect the, "Tens of thousands of Hungarian families [that] have ended up the victims of both foreign banks, and foreign construction companies, due to financing drawn on currencies such as the Swiss Franc, the Euro, and the Yen" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 10; 2010b). What is needed is a national homebuilding program aimed at more family houses (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 10; 2010b). The home building program would be for all working Hungarian families, or those willing to take employment (Jobbik, 2014a, p. 11; 2014b). This represents an example of a citizenship argument that places primacy on the family.

Reading further into the 2010 document, Jobbik's position on what the ideal family looks like becomes apparent. As pointed out in the earlier discussion on health, one of the gravest problems facing Hungary is the declining demographic; in part because of what they call "unhealthy lifestyles" that Jobbik pledges to halt with strong social policies. As stated in the *Manifesto*, "To achieve this will first and foremost require the promotion and protection of the institution of the family, particularly from attacks by a liberalism whose objective is to put the family unit on an equal footing with every conceivable alternative living arrangement or deviant lifestyle" (Jobbik, 2010a, para. 9; 2010b). The need to reform the current child benefit system is also on the agenda with the party noting that mothers' allowances would be dependent on "a proven history of employment" (Jobbik, 2010a, para. 9; 2010b). Jobbik's approach to family policy is even more blatantly gendered and exclusionary than Fidesz', at least on the surface. For Jobbik, any alternative family arrangement outside of the "so-called" traditional institution of a man and woman married, heteronormative, and Christian

is frowned upon, stigmatized, and thereby undeserving of benefits as a result of nonconformity. While this framing certainly fits the bill of nationalism, it is also underpinned with heavy authoritarian frames of what constitutes a proper and ordered society. These strict attitudes are echoed in the 2014 electoral Manifesto with even more provisions such as the role for government to ensure “responsible family planning” and "fetal protection legislation that complies with medical and Christian ethics" (Jobbik, 2014a, p. 17; 2014b). Here, the party also draws on strong populist “us versus them” frames to propose solutions to Hungary’s declining population. As Jobbik puts it,

> To do so, we need to protect families from the liberal, anti-family attacks promoting deviant behaviour. Families need more financial support, protection and a conscious family planning programme instead of irresponsible childbirth; inter-generational responsibilities must be assumed and our youth need to be kept from emigrating abroad (Jobbik, 2014a, p. 22; 2014b).

Again, alternative constructions of the family are demonized, this time with the liberal establishment to blame. As in other policy areas, the party creates a sense of urgency around issues and uses appeals that sound more like calls to action to rally voter support.

In addition to advocating a very restrictive definition of family (than even encroaches on reproductive rights), there are implications for the many Roma who do not fit Jobbik’s family mold. As with the aforementioned Social Card scheme, family allowances for the Roma would be restricted as well. Jobbik states,

> In the interests of restricting the regrettable practise of the bearing of children for the

> purposes of economic subsistence through the state benefits receivable: child benefit will be reformed nationally, so as to only be receivable after the third child, in the form of tax relief; and it is vital that all child benefits be conditional on that child's attendance in education (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 12; 2010b).

This direct attack on the Roma plays on stereotypes of Roma families having many children to collect more welfare benefits. Paired with rhetoric about the Roma community refusing to integrate (mentioned in the discussion on social assistance), Jobbik's position is best understood as welfare chauvinist. The "Roma as undeserving" narrative is reiterated later in the document with a bullet point list that also calls for the need to "Cleanse Gypsy political life from confidence tricksters, criminals and other impostors who make a living off being a Gypsy" and that "Gypsy crime must be eliminated" (Jobbik, 2014a, p. 19; 2014b). The not-so-subtle implication of framing the Roma community as corrupt criminals negates legitimate claims for state benefits, as the community should be regarded with suspicion rather than sympathy. Jobbik's plans for the Social Card and what the ideal family looks like, and how the Roma are framed as criminal and deviant is also observed in other places, such as the 2011 speech commemorating the anniversary of 1848 (Barossg, 2011). Unlike Fidesz, Jobbik's discourse is consistent across political forums in that the party articulates very overt culturalist and racialized assumptions across highly visible texts (i.e. Manifestos) and lower profile events like the anniversary speeches that are not available in English or readily viewed outside of Hungary.

4.5. Summary

This chapter set out to investigate how PRRs in contemporary Hungary articulate social policy issues about welfare benefits. The main proposition advanced in this chapter was that these issues would be articulated with strong nationalist, populist, and authoritarian frames. The emphasis, however, was not only in identifying these frames and secondarily, these framing strategies, but also to make the distinction between nationalism and populism in line with recent attempts to establish clear theoretical differences between the two (de Cleen, 2017; de Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). I applied the same careful distinction with authoritarianism.

Table 4.1 Key framing by policy area and party

Policy Area	Key Framing by Fidesz	Key Framing by Jobbik
Pensions	• distancing from communist past • fear invoking, authoritarian • saving and protecting the nation	• populist us versus the corrupt elite • revisionist nationalist • sovereignty
Health Care	• national values • corrupt communist past • catching up with the rest of Europe	• national values versus deviant, unhealthy lifestyles • anti-liberal • populist us versus the corrupt elite
Unemployment	• supporting the heteronormative family • benefits for working families • nationalist, protectionist	• nationalist, protectionist • anti-Roma
Social Assistance	• corrupt communist past • covert racist anti-Roma rhetoric • exclusive nationalism, in and outgroups	• anti-establishment • neoliberal • strong role for the church

Family Allowances	• nationalist • key values of the nation • need to protect Hungarian and European families • anti-liberal • corrupt communist past	• economic nationalism • protectionist • anti-Roma discourse • Roma as criminal, cheating the system

Overall, this chapter reveals five main findings. First, in separating welfare benefits along five different dimensions, namely pensions, health care, unemployment, social assistance, and family allowances, I detected that Hungary's contemporary radical right employs mostly nationalist frames (see Table 4.1 above). Although populist and authoritarian frames were evident on some occasions, they were mostly informed by a either a nationalist perspective in the case of populism, or as a security problem for the nation, in the case of authoritarianism. This emphasis on nationalist frames lines up with Rydgren's (2017) recent argument that essentially, most PRRs are not so much a populist party family. Rather, they do employ populist discourse from time to time, but it is informed by their nationalist views. This is not to say that populism or authoritarianism does not play a role. However, we may be best served in using it, as Rydgren (2017, p. 9) puts it, as an "additional qualifier".

The second key finding I observed was the role of gender, an issue that so far has received far less attention from scholars working specifically on the radical right (but see Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge, & de Lange, 2015; and Félix, 2015 for notable exceptions). This expectation was based on the comparative and international relations literature on the state where scholars note that it no longer makes sense to view the nation-state as gender neutral

(see Connell, 1990; Pateman, 2000; Yuval-Davis, 1993; McClintock, 1994)[20], but as an active mediator that (re)produces, exacerbates, and regulates these differences. The performative role of the nation-state on gender is particularly salient within national borders, and within discursive and policy constructions of "the nation" (Abu-Laban, 2009). Both PRRs in Hungary, but especially Fidesz, clearly define the role of women in their vision for Hungary and the ideal Hungarian family. Fidesz has even enshrined "the family" as a marriage between a man and woman into the Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (the new constitution revamped under the Fidesz government) (Szikra, 2014, p. 494). Because these parties again and again emphasize how Hungary should become an "anti-liberal" state (Orbán, 2014b), women, as the backbone of Hungarian families, should stay at home to produce enough children to form a strong, Hungarian nation. Given the PRR's emphasis on nationalist frames, it is not surprising to find gender roles in their constructions of the ideal nation.

My third finding was that the way welfare benefit issues are framed by Hungary's Radical Right resembles typical back and forth party competition in CEE. Both Jobbik and Fidesz employ "corrupt communist" discourse when identifying what the issue is about and who is to blame (diagnostic framing). While Fidesz and Jobbik's discourse strategy of conjuring up images of the corrupt communist past is typical of populist rhetorical devices, what is more surprising in my findings was the extent to which Fidesz linked nearly every social problem to the past either directly naming communism or indirectly by implying the previous eight years of Socialists in power was an extension of the corrupt past. While these framing strategies can be interpreted as populist because it blames former elites, i.e. former

[20] For further reading, please see Peterson, 1999; Mosse, 1985 (for a discussion on sexuality) or Goldberg, 2002 (for a discussion on race).

socialist communist-successor parties, for the issues, it differs from the Radical Right in Western Europe precisely because of the post-communist context, where the blame-game takes place. The backward glances to the communist era also suggest enduring legacy impacts. This fits with Fenger's (2007) findings on a fourth welfare state regime that is distinct from Western Europe. But Haney cautions that the neat narrative of the "socialist past and capitalist present" used to explain the current state of welfare politics is oversimplified (2002, p. 238). Although this discourse may be common in CEE political rhetoric, researchers should unpack this discourse carefully to avoid an over-simplistic and over-determining explanation.

The fourth key finding was that the analysis confirmed that essentially, Fidesz and Jobbik employ similar framing strategies on social policy to compete for similar voters[21]. This lines up with Pytlas' conclusions of high congruence on policy positions between the two parties leading to increased party competition over ownership of salient issues (2016, p. 138). Among both parties, this paper found a strong emphasis on anti-Roma rhetoric. This does not come as a surprise, given Jobbik's ownership of the "Gypsy crime" moniker, in large part responsible for the party's rapid electoral success. There were, however, nuances that are worth pointing out and these go beyond Fidesz' neo-liberal approach as opposed to Jobbik's more socialist interpretation of social issues. While Jobbik appeared to present itself as leader of a social movement, Fidesz put a strong authoritarian focus on order along with continuously highlighting the importance of Christian values as the fundamental basis for an ordered Hungarian society similar to Jobbik. Finally, while Jobbik's discourse showed strong traces of overt racism, Fidesz was much more covert in that respect, yet just as

[21] For this reason, Ágh (2014) refers to Jobbik and Fidesz as "twin parties".

dangerous, an observation that others have made before (cf. Mudde, 2015) and that will play a central role in the following chapter on Roma education.

Last, a surprising finding was the extent to which Fidesz' discourse revealed early warning signs of the "illiberal democracy" Orbán was set on creating, long before the now infamous *Summer University Speech* delivered in 2014. The literature on democracy in Hungary generally hones in on 2014 as the point where Hungary began backsliding (cf. Enyedi, 2016b, p. 211). My findings disrupt this assumption held in the conventional literature. The main takeaway is that this finding underscores the need to pay attention to party discourse from a variety of sources as with the benefit of hindsight, Hungary's sudden fall from high democratic performance might have been predicted given the early warning signs.

4.6. Concluding Remarks

By way of conclusion, because this is one of the first studies to look at how the PRR constructs welfare benefits in a CEE context, it is also worth discussing some of the main differences between the radical right in CEE and in Western Europe in terms of their approaches to social policy. First, while the early observations made here do not settle the debate on welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996; Fenger, 2007), they do reveal that legacy plays a role in articulating welfare policy and is worthy of further investigation. Second, many scholars find that PRRs in Western Europe made a sharp transition from neo-liberal to pro-welfare parties, restricting benefits to those they see as belonging to the nation (see de Lange, 2007). In Hungary we see both. While Jobbik and Fidesz both approve some measures of welfare benefits, Jobbik's socialist view differs in many aspects from the neo-liberal focus of Fidesz (Pirro, 2017; Szikra, 2014). Nonetheless,

both manage to articulate the issues mainly in nationalist terms. Thus, the question arises whether a pro-welfare position is necessarily a feature of PRRs in all contexts. This chapter also examined the role of gender in the social policy discourse and, for that matter, in the literature on the PRR. As this chapter shows, both PRRs in Hungary emphasize the role of the women as the foundation for a strong nation. This may serve as the basis for future investigations into other contexts to find out how gender fits within the nationalist narratives of PRRs. The most surprising finding that was beyond the original intent of the chapter's goal was the extent to which Fidesz' discourse sign-posted to Orbán's "illiberal state" well in advance of 2014.

While the current political and policy climate in Hungary does suggest a decline of the welfare state, it is difficult to characterize Fidesz' approach to social policy as either welfare chauvinist (as research on the PRR and welfare chauvinism would suggest) or more neo-liberal as we see evidence of both. This observation lends purchase to Lendvai-Bainton's assertion that the economic policies of the radical right in Hungary are best understood as a hybrid "authoritarian neoliberalism" which rejects some elements of democracy and with sometimes contradictory social policy marked by generosity in some areas with cutbacks in others (2017). A striking example is family tax policy, marked by increased spending and benefits, but only for those who conform to Fidesz' narrow definition of the family to the detriment of others. In terms of party strategy, Fidesz has proved to be particularly adept at appealing to voters across the far and center right resulting in electoral success. In addition, the hybridity of welfare chauvinist and neoliberal approaches to policy in the name of protecting "the people" and "the nation" may appeal to voters across the right end of the spectrum. A grave consequence of Fidesz' ongoing

electoral success and both parties on the radical right sharing similar policy platforms is what scholars like Feischmidt and Hervik (2015) call a “mainstreaming of the extreme”, where nationalist and racialized frames normally of the extreme far right move center and become normalized in public and policy discourse. Given the prominence of such nationalist frames supported by racialized discourse, especially towards the Roma community that I found in this chapter, I dig into racism further in my next chapter.

CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY II

PRR framing of Roma education

5.1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the postwar order focused on equality and human rights. Yet, rights on paper, while well intended, can mask newer forms of racism that are more nuanced and commonplace (Delgado and Stefancic, 2017). As a result, racism often goes ignored except for extreme cases. To illustrate, Mudde (2005) notes that while public officials in CEE have spoken out against racism, it is reactionary to widely publicized incidents of violence. In his words, "Cases of 'everyday racism' have generally been ignored or even marginalized. In some instances, it seemed that the main audience was the international rather than the national community" (Mudde, 2005, p. 176). In the case of CEE, the most relevant "international community" is the European Union and its watchdog organizations that enforce equality and rights within the member states. EU funding and support is contingent upon compliance. Vachudova (2005) refers to this process as the "active leverage" the EU has, especially over newer member states.

Despite the EU's active leverage, extreme and everyday racism is common for the PRR (Minkenberg, 2013; Mudde, 2005). PRR actors often politicize issues of identity, race, and ethnicity that manifest through discourse. My previous case study showed strong racialized framing about the Roma that warrants further scrutiny. I argue that without careful attention to PRR discourse, especially nationalist frames, that emphasizes identity, race, and ethnicity, we would miss these important insights. To that end, I shift attention from general welfare benefits for all Hungarians to Roma education policy specifically. I suspect that PRR parties in Hungary articulate Roma education issues in even more hostile ways given the

populist polarized climate. As with other indicators of democratic decline, Freedom House data reports widespread discrimination of the Roma for each year under study (2010-2016), including ongoing school segregation and improper diagnoses of mental and learning disabilities. While there are several minority groups in Hungary, the largest minority group is the Roma. NGOs such as Minority Rights Group International (2011) estimate the Roma comprise 9 -10 per cent of Hungary's total population (9 877 364 in 2014 according to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2015). The Roma are also the most persecuted group in Hungary (and Central Eastern Europe) facing deeply rooted discrimination at the state and social level, which has drawn much criticism from the EU and international community (Mudde, 2005). This is troubling because the health of minority rights and protection is a key component of a successful and healthy democracy where all citizens are represented and have the opportunity to fully participate in social and political life (Article 2, Treaty of the European Union, 2012). In response, the countries of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) that are European Union (EU) members have ratified several international conventions regarding minorities, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Mudde, 2005). A notable internationally led effort is the 2005-2015 Decade of Roma Inclusion. NGOs and policy makers agree that the best route to eradicating the widespread discrimination and poverty among the Roma is to improve the quality of and access to education. A cursory glance at the Hungarian Government website suggests that policy makers are on top of the problem with good laws and initiatives in place. Yet

indicators from NGOs and academics point out that exclusionary practices such as the segregation of Roma school children persist (ECRI, 2015).

The problem of discrimination and educational outcomes for Roma children is a pressing social problem that without resolution, can perpetuate intergenerational poverty, low education levels, and even pose barriers for democratic participation. For example, Article XXIII, 6. of Hungary's new 2011 constitution redrafted and approved by Fidesz declares, "Those disenfranchised by a court for a criminal offence or limited mental capacity shall not have the right to vote and to be voted for". That means in theory, voting rights may be revoked for those with court ordered criminality or limited mental capacity labels. This clause is especially concerning given that many Roma are labelled with learning or behaviour disabilities early on in the school system. This is one example that points to the importance of investigating how PRR parties discuss education.

In my previous case study, I introduced literature on welfare chauvinism to illustrate how PRR parties talked about social benefits in exclusionary ways. I found that racism is a central part of PRR discourse, even in the less likely policy area of welfare benefits. In particular, racialized discourse about the Roma was pervasive. In this chapter, I want to know more about how racism works so I focus on the Roma in another less likely policy area. To that end, in this chapter I draw on literature from Critical Race Theory (CRT hereafter) to guide my analysis. CRT is appropriate because these scholars emphasize more nuanced forms of contemporary racism and insist that legal rights on paper are a good start but do not always translate to equality in practice (Delgado and Stefancic, 2017; Williams, 1991, 1995; Bell, 1980). The racism experienced by the Roma community is entrenched within public discourses, attitudes, and institutions and with the rise of the populist radical

right these problems seem to be increasing. Racialized discourses are inherently exclusionary, therefore never neutral, and can bring minority issues to the forefront, shape public attitudes, and influence and justify policies. Illuminating potential problems and barriers for success within education policy requires a consideration of the wider social context. If discourses about the Roma can be understood as racialized, meaning that categories and policies are created based on race (despite the diversity of the Roma as an ethnic group), then it makes sense to conclude that education policy aimed at the Roma community is also racialized. That means education cannot be detangled and examined separately from race without missing important insights about how the two intersect.

Given how PRR parties articulate issues in divisive and antagonistic ways that can draw on racialized narratives, it is reasonable to assume that populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames are also present in education policy discussions. This is an important investigation because how the PRR impacts education policy is an understudied area. Research on populism that does consider education (or lack thereof) often positions it as a predictive factor of voter support for a populist party. A noteworthy exception is Fenger's 2018 study that compares the agendas of PRR parties in four social policy areas, including education. Of interest here, Fenger finds that the Front National party promotes a nationalist agenda with a strong focus on French language, identity, and culture. Germany's AfD and Belgium's Vlaams Belang both express hostility to education reform and the Belgian party has been particularly vocal about their disapproval of what they call "multicultural indoctrination" (Fenger, 2018, p. 198). I expect to find similar frames in the Hungarian case.

The chapter is organized as follows: First, I sketch out how the tenets of CRT can inform the critical frame analysis method used in this study. After a short recap of the

research strategy, I analyze government documents and statements to identify how the Hungarian government frames the issue. Then for comparison, I examine EU and Council of Europe documents to determine the extent to which the assessment of Hungary's performance matches or contradicts Hungary's self-assessment. The comparison serves three purposes: First, it illustrates Mudde's (2015) point of Hungary taking measures to appease international partners, namely EU member states, most likely in attempt to avoid EU sanctions or court orders. For instance, European Commission funding for municipalities is conditional upon improving equality and desegregation for minorities (European Commission, 2014a). Second, the comparison shows the severe consequences of racialization of the Roma in practice, which highlights why this case study is important. Finally, the comparison provides the necessary contextual information for the ensuing discourse analysis of how the PRR in Hungary constructs Roma education policy issues, which is based on the concepts of nationalist, populist, and authoritarian framing detailed in Chapter 3.

5.2. Critical Race Theory

Critical race theorists are interested in the role of stories. Implicit in everyday stories are narratives about our lives and the "way things are", which shape our views on how to interpret the social and political world around us (Delgado, 2000). Torres points out that individual interpretations of stories can vary greatly according to who is telling the story, who is listening, and what facts are emphasized and/or omitted (2001-2002). Discourses work the same way. While stories and narratives are included, discourses entail entire frameworks of meaning and include specialized language, terminology, facts, knowledge,

and appropriate practices (Foucault, 1972). For Foucault, truth and knowledge are inseparable from power (Brass, 2000). The implication is that power is situated everywhere in the everyday. In this way, discourse is inherently political because power relations are embedded even in the things we claim to know, which in turn inform and shape law and policy. The more institutionalized and specialized discourses become, the more difficult they are to contest.

A hallmark of CRT is a critique of liberalism. For example, equality laws and legal rights on paper may look good but do not automatically translate to equality and fairness without critical oversight and enforcement. Further, laws and policies are understood as fair and unbiased in liberal democracies (Bourdieu, 1987). CRT scholars rebut that liberal laws centered on equality and minority rights and opportunities are not neutral or fair when not everyone is starting from an equal point. CRT scholars are suspicious of rights as they often fail to address historical and ongoing practices of racism and discrimination (Delgado and Stefancic, 2017). As mentioned earlier, despite the active leverage of the EU, ongoing practices of racism and discrimination against the Roma can be observed in Hungary. CRT is appropriate for this study because the approach interrogates how racism occurs in both obvious (extreme cases) and more nuanced (discursive) forms. Moreover, CRT is also useful as legal rights and reform are clearly linked with education policy. Ladson-Billings draws on the American example of the civil rights movement of the 1960s focused on legal measures to ensure desegregation in schools, equal access to education, and sameness and equal treatment for African American students (1998). Present day Hungary is grappling with these same issues for Roma pupils and CRT can provide fresh insight to these problems.

5.3. Research strategy

5.3.1. Part One

My first task is to reveal the mismatch between official policy and actual progress on Roma education. I accomplish this by examining how Hungary assesses the performance on Roma education policy in terms of what the aims are and what is being done. To evaluate Hungary's position on their performance I selected the 2014 National Reform Programme of Hungary, which is a self-assessment report all member states must present to the European Commission to indicate how the country is responding to recommendations in different policy areas set out to meet Europe 2020 Strategy goals. Europe 2020 is the EU's ten-year growth plan to address social, political, and economic goals for member states (European Commission 2015a). Along with the National Reform Programme, I also consulted Hungary's National Social Inclusion Strategy - Extreme Poverty, Child Poverty, The Roma (Government of Hungary, 2011). This document is prepared by the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice to address issues specific to the Roma in Hungary. I chose these two documents to reveal, at the official level, what legal measures and strategies are in place to improve the lives of the Roma, with attention to education. Next, I chose documents to compare how two normative watchdogs assess Hungary's performance. For the EU perspective on the two Hungarian initiatives, I consulted the Commission's Assessment of the Implementation of Hungary's National Strategy (2014a) and the European Commission's Council Recommendation of the National Reform Programme of Hungary (2014b). I also analyze the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance's (ECRI) 2015 Report on Hungary. The ECRI is an independent watchdog group that reports on human rights issues relating to racism and intolerance. I use these documents to lay the groundwork for my

frame analysis because they reveal initial evidence of racism in Hungary, particularly education.

5.3.2. Part Two

The second part of the chapter provides more context about racism and the PRR in Hungary. Then, similar to the welfare benefits case study, my analysis deepens by investigating populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames and framing strategies in election manifestos, State of the Nation, and commemoration speeches. In contrast to the earlier case study, I apply insights from CRT to pay close attention to how PRR frames might be racialized and to give thought to the potential impacts. Based on the findings from the welfare benefits chapter, I expect to find racialized discourse about the Roma articulated throughout discussions on education policy. I also expect to find articulations of gender in education discourse as I did in the welfare benefits study. I analyze the texts closely with attention to how the parties are framing the issues and with what strategies and rhetorical devices. As a method that places utmost concern on context, this approach is also particularly suited to pick out and distinguish between populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames.

5.4. Performance Evaluation: Data and discussion

This section is organized in three main parts. First, I assess how Hungary self-evaluates their performance in areas of Roma education policy. In the next two parts, I study EU and Council of Europe documents to demonstrate the differences between how these two watchdogs, independent of Hungary, assess Hungary's policy performance on Roma

education. To wrap up, I summarize the key findings and differences on what Hungary says it is doing compared with what is actually being done.

5.4.1. Hungarian self-evaluation

The National Reform Programme of Hungary (Government of Hungary, 2014a) reports on progress and goals in several policy areas but my analysis is narrowed to education and social inclusion. In Section III.6 "Education and social inclusion", Hungary insists that their national education strategies parallel the goals of Europe 2020, namely to offer high quality education to prepare students for the labour market, create inclusive education strategies for the Roma, and improve access to education at all levels (2014a). Significant reforms have taken place since 2010 with special focus on implementing programs to eradicate early school leaving. Policy making has focused on early childhood to allow any necessary interventions such as risk factors for learning disabilities, from the start. New legislation includes mandatory kindergarten attendance from age 3 (previously age 5) starting September 2015 as per the *Public Education Act*. There are many programs in place to support early school leaving interventions including government funding for teachers and resources. Scholarship programs such as the Arany János Talent Fostering Programme recognizing the economic and material disadvantage many Roma children and youth face. There is also a Public Education Development Strategy, which in addition to ensuring quality education for pupils, high level training and support for teachers is promoted (Section III.6). Promising programs, such as the ones listed above among others, all suggest progress.

Another important report, the *Situation of the Roma population of the National Social*

Inclusion Strategy (Government of Hungary, 2011), merges insights and recommendations from the *Making Things Better for our Children National Strategy* (Government of Hungary, 2007a) and the *Decade of Roma Integration Programme Strategic Plan* (Government of Hungary, 2007b). Section 7.2 "Education and Training" of the *Strategy* notes that policy reform is aimed at young children with measures to help include the parents to ensure better success. Further, the *Strategy* emphasizes and follows the "Making Things Better for our Children" (2007a) assertion that,

> In an educational system creating opportunities, **children**, regardless of whether they come from poor, under-educated families, live in segregated living conditions, are disabled, migrants or blessed with outstanding talent, **must receive education suited to their abilities and talents throughout their lifetime, without their education being influenced or affected by prejudices, stereotypes, biased expectations or discrimination** (Government of Hungary, 2011, p. 74, bolding in original).

This demonstrates that education equality laws are in place along with programs aimed at education for the Roma. However, problems are acknowledged in Section 3.2 of the *Strategy* (Government of Hungary, 2011) that highlight the challenges Roma children face in terms of barriers to education, and social inclusion more widely. One obstacle emphasized is the lack of coherent, reliable data and statistics, including follow-up data to measure policy program/intervention success. Another challenge to policy implementation is the segregation and ghettoization of Roma communities. Because the majority of Roma (over 60 per cent) live in (mainly impoverished) rural areas, segregated communities are even further isolated.

The Strategy also points out that social problems such high unemployment, lack of quality education, and high levels of personal debt are especially troublesome for the Roma and "Segregation and discrimination are simultaneously the cause and consequence of these processes" (Government of Hungary, 2011, p. 25). That illustrates how Hungary's Roma are caught in a vicious cycle where bleak social indicators are caused by isolation and discrimination and vice versa. The situation is even worse for Romani women and girls. For example, only 5.8 per cent of females have vocation skills compared to 17.5 per cent of males (Government of Hungary, 2011). Such figures indicate discrimination by ethnicity and gender. This intersection further illustrates my earlier point that gender is an important, yet often overlooked, component of PRR party politics. In September 2014, the Government of Hungary made updates to the *Strategy*. Suggested reforms are targeted towards gathering better statistics and data and noteworthy here, including a cultural component into mainstream curriculum to foster awareness and appreciation for the breadth of Roma culture among non-Roma pupils. What remains undressed in the 2014 updates is the issue of segregation, which has come under international criticism (Government of Hungary, 2014b, September; United Nations, n.d.).

5.4.2. EU evaluation of Hungary's performance

The European Union serves as an important watchdog to follow up and monitor the progress that member states are making in key policy areas. The European Commission is responsible for producing many of these reports, accessible to the public. Pertinent to this study, the Commission released their *Assessment of the Implementation of Hungary's National Strategy* (2014a). The *Assessment* points out key steps taken since Hungary's 2011 *National*

Strategy while briefly highlighting measures needed to ensure efficacy. Regarding education policy, the report notes that while measures have been taken to ensure equal access to quality education, more awareness must be raised to promote access (European Commission, 2014a). The report applauded efforts made to standardize and centralize curriculum to ensure that all Hungarian pupils receive the same level of education. While the policies on paper suggest a move in the right direction, the Commission asserts that impact assessments are needed to determine success (European Commission, 2014a). Another important policy initiative is the changes to mandatory school attendance. Children must begin pre-schooling at age 3 and pupils must stay in school until age 16. The necessary changes are aimed at ensuring the best possible start for children at an early stage and to target early school leaving by regulating attendance into the later teens. However, desegregation efforts are necessary in schools and this remains unaddressed (European Commission, 2014a).

The problem of segregation is not restricted to education; spatial segregation also occurs within neighbourhoods. In response, the report also points out that desegregation efforts are also needed in housing policy (European Commission, 2014a). Segregation in schooling and neighbourhoods occurs in the larger context of discrimination against the Roma. The Commission recognizes the need to tackle discrimination and calls for: strong laws in place, active efforts to eradicate anti-Roma rhetoric and hate speech and raising awareness for Roma and non-Roma (European Commission, 2014a). This is the basic criteria countries must meet to secure EU funds.

5.4.3. Council of Europe evaluation of Hungary's performance

An important watchdog group supported by the Council of Europe that keeps tabs on issues of human rights problems is the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). The ECRI takes stock of progress and draws attention to areas of concern. Like the *Assessment of the Implementation of Hungary's National Strategy*, the 2015 *ECRI Report on Hungary* expresses concern in areas of education and discrimination, but in far more detail. Echoing the other reports examined, the ECRI also affirms that while there has been some progress made, serious problems remain, notably the uneven application of the law and ongoing anti-Roma discourse. According to the report, "The application of criminal law provisions on incitement to hatred remains extremely limited. A radical right-wing populist party [Jobbik] openly engages in anti-Roma, antisemitic, homophobic and xenophobic hate speech" (ECRI, 2015, p. 9). Worse yet, the ECRI warns, "...hate speech is not restricted to extremist parties and groups but occurs across the political spectrum. State officials and members of mainstream parties have been implicated" (ECRI, 2015, p. 16).

The ECRI critiques the *National Social Inclusion Strategy* as ineffective based on the failure to confront the problem of segregation of school children. While there are laws against segregation, in practice appalling numbers of Roma children are placed in special schools and classes with less challenging curriculum. Drawing data from the Roma Education Fund, the ECRI reports that between 20-90 per cent of pupils in special education schools or classes are Roma. More troubling, many have been misdiagnosed based on little or no testing, and in some cases without the child present during the assessment (ECRI, 2015). The ECRI insists the practice of inappropriately identifying Roma children as "learning disabled" must cease in order to meet goals of social inclusion, quality education

for all children, and opportunities to escape poverty (2015). The 2013 European Court of Human Rights judgment on *Horvath v. Kiss* offers hope. “Two [Hungarian] Roma argued that because of ethnicity, they were wrongly placed in a school for the mentally disabled, and that their rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR (right to education) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) had been breached” (ECRI, 2015, pp. 30-31). The Court ruled in their favour and ordered changes. Hungarian authorities have responded with new evaluation tests, teacher training programmes aimed at inclusive education, and new laws with strict benchmarks for diagnosing mental handicap in children (ECRI, 2015).

5.4.4. In Sum

In this section, I compare the Hungarian self-assessment on progress in Roma education policy to the EU and the Council of Europe’s evaluation of actual progress. From the Hungarian view, the picture of progress looks good. National education strategies line up with Europe 2020 goals of high-quality education with inclusive education strategies for the Roma and improved access to education at all levels. There are significant reforms and many new programmes in place. However, segregation and discrimination are recognized as ongoing challenges. From the EU perspective, the situation is more complex, and the problems of segregation and discrimination are serious and require immediate addressing beyond merely acknowledging the problem. According to the European Commission, there are initiatives in place, but continual monitoring and data collection are needed. In another report, the Commission also summarized the European Council’s recommendation that progress and efficacy of the new laws needs to be monitored (Section 15, 2014b).

The Council of Europe’s ECRI report is particularly damning. The report

acknowledges the hopeful reforms made to date and cites a landmark court case but the ECRI also insists that much more work must be done in order for meaningful change to occur. The report exposes how the hostile racist environment for Hungarian Roma at all levels of society informs and directs policy that results in dismal social indicators of progress.

These reports speak to the CRT claim that anti-discrimination and anti-racist policies are not enough to ensure equality for minorities. While legally enshrined rights are important and a sign of progress, there is evidence that racism continues in Hungary. In the next section, I explore this problem further with my frame analysis to show how these parties articulate racialized rhetoric regarding Roma education. Attention to discourse is paramount for this endeavour because a checklist of laws and policies as a measure of equality and protection for minorities does not accurately reflect the wider political and social landscape.

5.5. Populist radical right (PRR) discourse: Framing race

As noted in the previous section, the Hungarian Roma live with widespread discrimination leading to many social problems including low education levels, segregation, and intergenerational cycles of poverty. This situation persists even with laws, policies, and programmes aimed at eradicating exclusion. An examination of how the Roma are negatively framed in populist radical right discourse helps explain why the problem persists. Discourses are never neutral, and they are inherently political because how certain issues are framed (i.e. what the problem is, the extent, etc.) informs what policy action is taken. Political parties (like Jobbik and Fidesz studied here) are powerful agents of social influence. Jobbik and Fidesz are not the only groups espousing racism toward the Roma in Hungary,

but they are significant because parties in power make decisions and direct policy. For instance, Nagy et al. (2013) note that part of Jobbik's success is explained by, to borrow Meguid's (2008) terms, the salience and issue ownership of the "Gypsy crime" moniker that resonates with the public. In this way, racist rhetoric fuels anti-Roma attitudes and justifies questionable policies. Furthermore, PRR parties not only influence the general public, but also other parties. In the case of Hungary, this is especially concerning because Jobbik - on the extreme far right - influences Fidesz - the party in power. As Nagy et al. put it, "Overall, then, we can see that the ideology advocated by *Jobbik* is being implemented by the *Fidesz* government (with its two-thirds majority in parliament) in a slightly watered down version, but without any major changes in its tenets" (2013, p. 248). My analysis unfolds by examining how Jobbik, then Fidesz, articulate Roma policy with attention to what is said, in what manner, using which rhetorical strategies, and where appropriate, what is left unsaid. First, I reveal the frames and framing strategies of Jobbik and Fidesz. Then I locate race in these discourses to set up how I critique the findings. My analysis concludes with thoughts on possible implications.

5.5.1. Discourses of Jobbik

My analysis begins with Jobbik because this party represents the most extreme case of populist radicalism in Hungary that has been adopted by the ruling Fidesz party. Jobbik's racist position has been widely critiqued by groups like the ECRI who also describe the party as racist, fascist, homophobic, and hyper-nationalist (2015). Jobbik's strong positions against the Roma are influential and resonate with the public (ECRI, 2015). Consider the images conjured up by following excerpt:

> One Sunday morning in December 2007, some three hundred extreme nationalists dressed in black uniforms marched in military formation through a Hungarian village, protesting against what they called 'Roma [Gypsy] delinquency.' They then gathered at a rally, where speakers demanded that Roma be segregated from mainstream society (LeBor, 2008, p. 34).

The extreme nationalists LeBor writes of were members of the Magyar Gárda (MG), a paramilitary group founded by Gábor Vona (Jobbik's leader) to protect Hungary's values and culture. While the MG has been outlawed since 2009, Jobbik's extreme stance against the Roma persists and these tropes inform their policy proposals in all areas, including education.

In the *Founding Charter*, Jobbik positions itself as the defenders of the nation with a "get tough on crime" approach, which is a common catch-phrase typical of populist and authoritarian frames. They pledge to address "the situation of the Gypsy community" and later assert that, "We [Jobbik] cannot accept laws that guarantee more and more legal security for criminals and provide less and less protection for honest citizens!" (Jobbik, 2003, n.p.). In the *Charter*, Jobbik does not elaborate on what they mean by "situation of the Gypsy community" other than the obvious implication that the status quo is unacceptable. Later statements made by Jobbik clarify their intentions to solve the problem, namely by linking excess crime to the Roma community, even creating the moniker "Gypsy crime". To take an important example from the 2010 *Electoral Manifesto*, Jobbik declares that, "The coexistence and cohesion of Magyar [ethnic Hungarians] and Gypsy [Roma] is one of the

severest problems facing Hungarian society" and there is an urgent need to stop "Gypsy crime" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 11; 2010b). Scholars like Vidra and Fox (2014) point out that the term "Gypsy crime" is dangerous because it becomes taken for granted and accepted by the general public. Use of such a moniker is an example of using lexicons or ideological positioning as a rhetorical framing strategy. A lexicon or ideological position happens when certain groups are stereotyped with particular behaviour to the point where the stereotype becomes a metaphor for the group (Gilbert, 2013). In this case, Roma becomes synonymous with crime and vice versa in both political discourse and in the public imagination. What is more, this strategy is also highly securitized given that the Roma are framed as a threat. In this instance, not only is this discourse constructing nationalist frames of in and out groups but is also drawing on authoritarian frames by activating metaphors of the Roma (an out group) as dangerous and a threat to public order. Usage of the term "Gypsy crime" casts a different light on Jobbik's earlier mentioned *Charter*, which differentiates criminals from "honest citizens".

A discursive implication of labelling the Roma as criminal is blaming the group for deviant behaviour and creating further distance from mainstream society (Jiwani, 2009). Evidence for this can be found in the 2010 *Electoral Manifesto* when Jobbik claims that during regime change, the unemployment rate for the Roma sky-rocketed, made worse by low education levels and a refusal to adapt and integrate (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 11; 2010b). This diagnostic framing strategy assigns responsibility on the Roma community for the poverty and struggles they face by suggesting it is an active choice not to integrate and adapt. The result is propensity to criminal activity that requires government intervention. Jobbik articulates this situation in the Manifesto as a security threat drawing on metaphors such as

"a ticking time-bomb" and threat of a "virtual civil war" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 11; 2010b). Relevant here, remedial action to solve "Gypsy crime" includes a law enforcement approach along with policy directed at education right from nursery school onwards. The party is very clear that the main goal of Roma education is assimilation and that the Christian church has a key role to play in this process (Jobbik, 2010a, pp. 11-12; 2010b). However, the Roma are curiously omitted from Jobbik's dialogue on ideas to reform youth, employment, and cultural programmes. Instead, Jobbik explains their plans to "create a National Institute of Gypsy Methodology, whose purpose will be to develop and realize educational methods designed to alleviate the unique educational situation of Hungary's Roma" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 14; 2010b). The party does not go on to explain how they understand the "unique educational situation" or to clarify any details of the "educational methods" they call for. Further, this statement is at odds with Europe 2020 inclusive education goals because it not-so-subtlety hints at continued segregation and discrimination. Looking at these policy prescriptions in tandem with the party's wider discourse about the Roma casts doubt that Jobbik's motives fall in line with educational equality efforts.

Jobbik also draws on strong exclusive-nationalist frames and framing strategies for curriculum reform. They advocate for education focused on Hungarian values along with the need for instilling respect for Hungarian traditions rooted in Christian morals and mandatory religious teaching (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 13; 2010b). The primacy of Christian values leaves little room for diversity of faiths and practices within the education system. Further, the party takes an indirect shot at Western values by declaring that education reform is necessary to resolve the "veritable pandemonium" caused by neoliberalism (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 13; 2010b). The 2014 *Electoral Manifesto* shows that Jobbik's hostile discourse toward the

Roma remains consistent. In line with typical populist rhetoric, the party positions themselves as heroes fighting for the good of the country. For instance, they point out that discussing tensions between Hungarian and Roma communities has been taboo. As a result, resentments boiled under the surface but Jobbik was not afraid to confront these difficult issues and propose solutions (Jobbik, 2014a, p. 19; 2014b). In another statement on education reform, Jobbik states that, "We will set up a boarding school system for children coming from disadvantaged families" (Jobbik, 2015b). Although the Roma are not mentioned specifically, all indicators of unemployment and poverty show that Roma children, and especially females, are the most disadvantaged group in Hungary in terms of poverty, education, housing, and health. By implication then, the Roma are the key target group for such a boarding school system. The 2014 *Electoral Manifesto* is more direct. For example, in a ten-point plan to address Roma issues, they pledge to, "Establish a state-operated boarding school system for Gypsy children with special education needs and adaptability problems" (Jobbik, 2014a, pp. 19-20; 2014b). This proposal is very concerning given the unresolved problem of Roma children being mislabelled with learning disabilities and behavioural challenges, as pointed out by the ECRI. Furthermore, state legislated removal of children from their home communities into a boarding school system is chillingly reminiscent of the Indian Residential School system enacted by the Canadian Government in assimilation efforts to "destroy the Indian in the child" (Funk-Unrau and Snyder, 2007). It is troubling that Jobbik's official position for solving inequality in education is further segregation, a policy that directly conflicts with the Europe 2020 goals and the current national strategies and laws in Hungary.

Finally, Jobbik has hotly contested any accusations that the party is racist. For example, Jobbik rebuts that the term is not evidence of racism; rather it is a policy problem the party is prepared to fix. According to the party website,

> Jobbik has suggested an approach to tackling gypsy crime that deals with both its cause and its effects. The combination of a dedicated rural police service, or Gendarmerie, on the one hand; and social security and educational reforms on the other. All such changes would be totally colour-blind and would apply to all (Jobbik, 2015c, n.p.).

Despite the claim otherwise, the term "Gypsy crime" remains problematic as a lexicon and even the solutions offered paint a "they need to be more like us" type of picture that shows disregard and lack of respect for cultural difference. Embedded in a term like "Gypsy crime" is what critical race scholars like Sherene Razack call a culturalist explanation for behaviour (1998, 2008). A culturalist explanation conflates certain behaviours as inherent to the culture, thereby blaming entire ethnic groups as culturally flawed. Other examples include construing all Muslims as backwards with a propensity for violence or all Native Americans as prone to alcoholism and criminality. This is a coded form of racism that implies certain ethnic groups have tendencies toward deviance. Additionally, CRT is deeply critical of attempts to "whitewash" laws and policies as seen in Jobbik's statement that "All changes would be totally colour-blind". Applying a one size fits all model to policy can only expose and remedy the most extreme forms of racism and inequality and cannot address systematic, everyday racism (Delgado and Stefancic, 2017). Another way Jobbik has deflected

accusations of racism is by diverting attention to Fidesz' practice of corruption. During the 2016 *State of the Nation* speech, Vona again pointed to Jobbik's courage to address Roma problems while Fidesz plotted to keep the community impoverished so their votes could be easily bought (Vona, 2016, para. 28). CRT scholars point out that denial of a problem is another way that racism manifests (Jiwani, 2006).

One implication of widespread racist attitudes among policy makers and agenda setters is structural racism. Put another way, coming to the table with racialized assumptions is a recipe for bad policy, such as the call for special boarding schools discussed above. To remind, I also observed racialized policy in Jobbik's ideas about the how welfare benefits for unemployment should be allocated, namely in the 2010 *Electoral Manifesto* where Jobbik proposes plans for a Social Card. The purpose of the Social Card is to help families willing to work while simultaneously eradicating the problem of criminals abusing the system (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 10; 2010b). Given the poverty levels of the Roma, this policy is clearly directed at them. In theory, a Social Card benefit system for those actively seeking and willing to accept work sounds reasonable. The problem is that Jobbik's proposal for benefit reform does not recognize, let alone address, the many barriers Roma face. Further, given that many Roma settlements are isolated from larger cities it is unclear how successful job searching would be measured. For a family without basic needs like running water, maintaining an updated typewritten resume, and attending job interviews in an outside community is not realistic.

The entire community is stigmatized as always trying to cheat the system even when raising children. For instance, part of Jobbik's plan includes restructuring child benefits so that the government would offer a tax break only for the third child onward and conditional

upon the child attending school (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 12; 2010b). According to Jobbik, this is "In the interests of restricting the regrettable practise [sic] of the bearing of children for the purposes of economic subsistence through the state benefits receivable" (Jobbik, 2010a, p. 12; 2010b). As with the unemployment conditions, the wider context of why the Roma remain in a cycle of poverty and low education levels is ignored in favour of the "Gypsy crime" moniker, nuanced somewhat by suggesting Roma are cheaters and having kids just to get a bigger family allowance. Later in the 2014 *Electoral Manifesto*, Jobbik continues to advocate for social benefit reform and outlines a ten-point plan to tackle Roma issues. Of significance here are suggestions to "eradicate affirmative action programs", "end Gypsy crime", and even make voting contingent on completing primary education (Jobbik, 2014a, p. 20; 2014b). These proposals are all very problematic. Affirmative action programs are in place to help level the playing field. A consequence of not having such measures in place is continued segregation because marginalized students cannot otherwise access education programs due to racial, gender, financial, or other obstacles (Solórzano & Yosso, 2002). The strategy of reiterating "Gypsy crime" exemplifies the process of diagnostic framing that accuses the Roma for poor choices to engage in criminality over work and schooling. Articulating the "Gypsy crime" moniker not only creates a sense of insecurity by constructing Roma poverty as dangerous it also functions as motivational framing that justifies taking tough action to solve a tough problem under the guise of protection. Last, attaching education conditions to voting rights can be read as a form of creating a tiered citizenship where those considered to be part of an out-group are stripped of basic rights. In a nutshell, Jobbik's racialized discourse draws somewhat on populism in that they position themselves as leaders of a social movement, but the most evident frames are exclusive

nationalist, by constructing the Roma as an out group. Further, the party draws on strong authoritarian frames of crime and deviance to justify the need for drastic action, even against schoolchildren.

5.5.2. Discourses of Fidesz

A striking example of Fidesz' shift to the far right is the new constitution that includes reforms that weaken equality rights for minorities and include a complex amending formula that gives Fidesz a great deal of power. As previously mentioned, Fidesz was not always classified as a *PRR party*, but the party still employed many *PRR discourse strategies* that I draw attention to. The politics of Fidesz, such as the many anti-Roma statements made by the party and its affiliates, fit the definition of PRR strategy (Pirro, 2014, p. 261). On the surface, Fidesz appears much more moderate than extreme right Jobbik and the times when Fidesz has come under fire are often dismissed as atypical and excused as a vote-winning strategy. This is dubious since, "A party can't really take radical positions that are 'just strategic' for most of its existence" (Mudde, 2015, n.p.). Because Fidesz' discourses are far more nuanced than Jobbik's, CRT is especially useful for uncovering racialized discourse.

The Fidesz *Founding Charter* outlines the party's priority areas. They envision a peaceful, secure, and prosperous country governed by morals and rule of law (Fidesz, 2007, p. 4). These sentiments appear throughout the document by drawing on words like "security" and a "fear-free life". These word choices fall in the parameters of authoritarian frames. What is telling about Fidesz' goal for national order is the primary role of the Christian church in education, welfare, and other social institutions (Fidesz, 2007). By integrating church and state, Fidesz is proposing a very particular kind of non-secular order

that can set the scene for exclusionary politics and practices within a liberal democracy. Other policy areas such as health, employment, and education are also mentioned. Where the Roma are discussed, it is mainly in the context of education as a vehicle for integration. The party states that, "The integration and advancement of Roma citizens is a common cause for all" (Fidesz, 2007, p. 23). To achieve these goals, the party claims that education is the top policy priority, especially for children aged 7-8 years (Fidesz, 2007). In the *Charter* there is no mention of discrimination or racism in Hungary and where equality is discussed, it is only in terms of equality among new and old member states of the European Union. This is problematic for two reasons: First, not confronting the issue of racism against the Roma allows the problem to fester. Second, this demonstrates that Fidesz' conception of national inclusion and equality is for the ethnic Hungarian diaspora across Hungary's borders rather than acceptance and promotion of an ethnically plural Hungary (Fox et al., 2010). That means for Orbán, the connection to the diaspora community takes political and policy priority over the Roma. While likely unintended, the consequence is a tiered citizenship with preferential treatment for ethnic Hungarians across the border that fit into the mainstream national norm and are, in the view of Hungarian policy makers, "more like us". Rhetoric articulating ideas of who belongs in the nation indicates strong nationalist frames. This fits into a nationalist framing strategy of constructing what is considered the ideal Hungarian citizen, and is also a latent yet still racist position seen in other cases, such as Canadian immigration attitudes towards temporary foreign workers from Mexico (Gilbert, 2013). There are other examples of concerning attitudes and statements from Fidesz members and far right rhetoric is becoming more and more commonplace for the party (Verseck, 2013).

Some examples are more nuanced, and some are more obvious, which is what CRT draws attention to.

The 2010 *Electoral Manifesto* adopts a similar tone but with more references to the need for security and morals. According to Fidesz, all of Hungary's problems stem from the previous Socialist government, which they construct as an extension of the communist era. The rhetorical strategy of discrediting the Left by conflating parties on that side of the political spectrum with the past creates a "corrupt communist" narrative. The "corrupt communist" narrative points fingers at others while giving traction to Fidesz' proposed solutions since that party is on the right side of the political spectrum. These framing strategies can be categorized as emblematic of both populist (with the right against the corrupt left position) and authoritarian frames (given the stress on insecurity). The diagnostic framing strategy of identifying the problem even applies to Roma struggles. Fidesz ascertains that increasing Roma poverty fuels hostility and extreme views. This is the result of poor policy choices. The *Manifesto* declares that because the Socialists incorrectly viewed all Roma issues through the prism of poverty rather than as a national policy, their efforts only made the situation worse. The gap between employment, education, and even health care widened, thereby creating dangerous social divisions among people. Although implicit, describing the problem this way also links the Socialist past with current extremist views on the far right. As mentioned earlier in the welfare benefits chapter, this also serves to link Jobbik's anti-Roma position with the corrupt communism past. Fidesz emphasizes that Roma poverty must be approached differently, and that "scapegoating" must not continue (Fidesz, 2010, p. 82). Instead, policy must be directed at employment and education opportunities over welfare benefits that lock families into cycles of poverty (Fidesz, 2010,

pp. 82-83). Some of the solutions Fidesz mentions are creating job opportunities, training programs, and early childhood intervention aimed at schooling, but it is unclear how these directives would help without strong affirmative action policies also in place to level out the playing field.

A recent Supreme Court ruling decided that an all-Roma primary school in Nyíregyháza, in Northeast Hungary, did not constitute a legitimate case of segregation as parents could have sent their children via bus to another school. The school was closed in 2007 after the Chance for Children Foundation (an international NGO that advocates for at risk youth) lobbied against the school based on concerns of racial segregation. Local authorities allowed the Greek Catholic church to take charge and the school opened again in 2011, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court (Hungary Matters, 2015). The ruling caused upset and Fidesz member and Minister of Human Capacities Zoltán Balog backed the court decision insisted that, "Only a badly intentioned reading of the public education law passed at the end of last year could discern any legitimisation of school segregation" and that extra teaching resources would ensure the students received a quality education (MTI, 26 January, 2015, n.p.). Opposition co-leader Timea Szabo disagreed noting that Balog's support set a dangerous precedent for creating a segregation loophole in certain cases (MTI, 2014). The director of Chance for Children and Romani activist Erzsebet Mohacsi agreed with Szabo, noting that veiled forms of segregation are common in Hungary. "This is done all over the country. You can't find religious schools with mixed kids. They're either elite schools for the majority or Gypsy schools" (Simon, 2014). Minister Balog's failure to respond directly to these important critiques and simply stand behind the court ruling shows an example of a public official of accepting the word of the law as the most commonsense and legitimate

form of truth finding. What remains unquestioned and unaddressed in a meaningful way is the ongoing problem of segregation both in schools and in neighbourhoods.

In a more blatant example of racist attitudes toward the Roma, Fidesz co-founder and personal friend of Orbán, Zsolt Bayer was quoted in Magyar Hírlap, a daily national newspaper, saying, "A considerable proportion of the gypsies is not fit to live among people. They are animals. These animals should certainly not exist. The problem must be solved - immediately and no matter how" (Verseck, 2013, n.p.). The article stirred a great deal of controversy in Hungary and Europe but Fidesz responded meekly by trying to distance the party from Bayer saying he was "stating his own view" (Verseck, 2013, n.p.). The ECRI notes another similar incident when in 2014, theatre director Imre Kerényi, Orbán's personal representative on cultural matters was quoted saying, "The theatre world should be liberated from the 'lobby of the fags'" (2015, p. 16). Fidesz' reaction, or lack thereof, to incidents like Bayer and Kerényi demonstrate the "few bad apples" style of logic. This strategy suggests these are isolated incidents and not representative of the group. By allocating blame on a few individuals that may need reprimanding ignores and even denies that racism is a problem in the wider culture and in institutions (Tator and Henry, 2006). What remains unquestioned are the norms, beliefs, and values that underpin how such incidents can occur in the first place (van Dijk, 2008).

It is difficult to argue that such incidents of racism are not representative of Fidesz when they keep happening in different contexts, even from leader Orbán himself. In a public statement responding to criticism that Hungary was not pulling its weight regarding the Syrian refugee crisis, Orbán said, "It is a historical feature of Hungary that it is home to hundreds of thousands of Roma citizens. This is a fact that no one can object to or call into

question in any way. At the same time, however, we cannot require others (…) to follow suit and demand that they should also live with a substantial Roma minority" (Government of Hungary, September 7, 2015). By comparing the Roma to Syrian refugees, Orbán is implying the Roma are not "regular" Hungarians that are a welcome part of the social fabric but are rather, outsiders that Hungary was historically burdened with. Orbán's comment yet again demonstrates how pervasive nationalist frames are for Fidesz by explicitly declaring who belongs to the nation and alluding to who counts as a "real Hungarian". The Roma community reacted to this statement and Acs mayor Béla Lakatos (Hungary's only Roma mayor) resigned from the party as a result (Escritt, 2015). Some scholars note that racism has become increasingly acceptable in Hungary (Vidra and Fox, 2014). Blatant and coded incidents of racism discussed above suggest they are right.

5.5.3. Summary

Racialized discourses by the Jobbik and Fidesz parties have far reaching consequences for Roma education in Hungary. Using racist and culturalist explanations, PRR discourses draw chiefly on nationalist and authoritarian frames by characterizing the Roma as outsiders and troublemakers (see Table 5.5 below). This can translate into less attention and public pressure for politicians to remedy inequities in education and instead shifts focus on the need for protection against Roma criminals and deviants.

Table 5.1 Key framing of Roma education by party

Key Framing by Fidesz	Key Framing by Jobbik
• distancing from Jobbik • denial of a problem • primary role of the church • supporting the heteronormative family • covert racist anti-Roma discourse • exclusive nationalism, in and outgroups • nationalist, key values of the nation • need to protect Hungarian and European families • corrupt communist past	• fear invoking, authoritarian • "Gypsy crime" moniker • anti-liberal • economic nationalism, Roma as a financial burden • anti-Roma discourse • Roma as criminal, cheating the system • strong role for the church • assimilationist • national values versus deviant, unhealthy lifestyles

Overall, this chapter reveals three main findings. First, in line with CRT, racism manifests in overt and covert ways. In the case of Jobbik, strong anti-Roma discourses are prevalent and obvious. Assumptions about the Roma are highly racialized and culturalist, as exemplified by the "Gypsy crime" moniker, which can be read as both nationalist and authoritarian. By constructing the Roma as inherently prone to criminal deviance, they are seen as a problem and as outsiders posing a threat to peaceful (non-Roma) Hungarian society. Racist attitudes can often inform policy and when that happens, discriminatory policies are unquestioned and become the logical, appropriate way to govern society (Razack, 2008). Patterns of racialized policy can become cyclical when ethnicity or race is used as an indicator of crime, which leads to over-policing certain neighbourhoods, resulting in more arrests that suggest further evidence of criminality (Quigley, 1994). This can further entrench Roma "issue ownership"

and foster a "only Jobbik cares and can protect us" logic among voters. Increased popularity of Jobbik is a troubling prospect for minorities in Hungary.

Jobbik is the not the only concern for social inclusion in Hungary. Fidesz has also engaged racialized dialogue, at times in more nuanced ways than Jobbik, at other times just as overtly. This is not surprising because the CRT literature stresses how racism may not be outwardly apparent when focusing only on laws and policies. In this regard, attention to discourse is crucial for uncovering the subtext of what these parties are saying. My analysis shows that Fidesz draws heavily on rhetoric about in and out groups and the corrupt communist past (see Table 5.5. above), which are archetypical of both nationalist and populist frames, respectively.

My second finding is the absence of gender in this case study. On the surface, this finding seems surprising because studies show that Romani women and girls experiencing much lower rates of education (Macris, 2015). Further, because gender, specifically the role of women and the family, was so prominent in the welfare benefits case one could expect to find similar usage of gender regarding Roma education. However, this finding speaks to CRT legal scholar Kimberly Crenshaw's (1993) work on race and intersectionality, where she argues that racialized communities are often viewed as a monolithic group defined primarily by ethnicity at the cost of overlooking gender.

The third main finding in this chapter demonstrates how Jobbik and Fidesz draw on a combination of populist, authoritarian, and nationalist frames when discussing the Roma, and Roma education more specifically. Just as I argued in the previous welfare benefits chapter, however, an interesting qualification is necessary here. Whereas my discourse analysis informed by CRT shows that Hungary's contemporary PRR parties employ a

combination of all three frames, both Fidesz and Jobbik overwhelmingly rely on nationalist and authoritarian frames, as evident from Table 5.5. This speaks to active debates about how much populism plays a role for these parties, with respect to their party strategy but also, their success (e.g. Roodujin, 2018). Along with Rydgren (2017), in earlier work (Lugosi, 2018), I stress that PRR parties first and foremost are nationalist parties. Hence, while populism is a fashionable term, catching wide attention from the media, the public, and scholars, if we want to understand the PRR's "winning formula" (de Lange, 2007) and its success, we must shift attention to nationalism and authoritarianism to make sense of how these parties compete. In this regard, the findings from both of my case studies provide further empirical evidence for Rydgren's (2017) central argument.

5.6. Concluding remarks

What my analysis clearly shows is that the PRR articulate Roma education issues in racialized ways using populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames to varying degrees with nationalist and authoritarian frames most prominent. Jobbik draws heavily on culturalist explanations to construct the Roma as deviant and responsible for their struggles. By comparison, Fidesz often ignores the issue of race in official, high profile speeches and documents with party members making egregious comments in other forums, such as in news media. Beyond the implications for debates in the PRR literature, namely the need to focus more on the nationalist and authoritarian components of these parties, my findings also have practical implications.

With either Jobbik or Fidesz in power, both espouse PRR discourse and inform policy in racialized ways. The result for the Roma is a hostile political climate intolerant of

difference or diversity. Racism in society spells trouble for education policy and opportunity (Robbins, 2010). For instance, Ram asks how segregation of school children can be effectively tackled when mainstream society supports it (2015). The problem is further complicated when officials support court rulings like the one in Nyíregyháza that create exceptions for segregation. There are some promising educational reforms but without studies and data to demonstrate their effectiveness it is unclear how these policies will play out in practice. With weak enforcement mechanisms, it is likely that the decade of reform and improvement will only yield partial results (Varga, 2013). More importantly, unless racism and discrimination are confronted, educational strategies and reform efforts will only perpetuate the status quo. Ladson-Billings explains that first, curriculum will remain problematic. Embedded in what knowledge children must have are stereotypes, historical omissions, and a one-sided view of history and the now (1998). Classroom instruction and teacher training can pose problems too. Education policy is consistently aimed at finding the correct approach to teaching certain groups deemed as difficult to teach or a special case. Oftentimes, such approaches are evaluated in a success-fail binary. "This race-neutral perspective purports to see deficiency as an individual phenomenon. Thus, instruction is conceived as a generic set of teaching skills that should work for all students. When these strategies or skills fail to achieve desired results, the students, not the techniques, are found to be lacking" (Ladson-Billings, 1998, p. 19). Regarding how students are assessed, there is often a gap between what is being measured compared to what the pupil actually knows (Ladson-Billings, 1998). Hopefully, the new evaluation tests that Hungary has adopted will be more sensitive. Educators around the globe have long critiqued standardized tests. While Ladson-Billings drew insights from African American students in the United States, the

findings are relevant for Hungary. On the surface, the two countries are an unlikely comparison given that Hungary is a transitioning democracy with a post-communist legacy, while the US is an established democracy with a post-colonial legacy. Throughout American history, race has always been highly visible and politically divisive. Although more nuanced, in Hungary the politics of race appear just as pervasive but unique to the PRR, race operates through populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames.

On a final note, while Fidesz' racism may be covert, there are negative implications for democracy. Cas Mudde puts it this way,

> Mainstream parties such as Fidesz may be more harmful for liberal democracy than radical right parties such as Jobbik because they often have the experience, power and skills to implement illiberal policies. What's more, mainstream parties tend to have supporters in important political positions both within their own countries, such as within the bureaucracy and judiciary, and beyond (2015, n.p.).

We have already seen Fidesz' policies and exertion of power in practice, namely with the widely criticized constitutional reforms. Employing distancing strategies such as "a few bad apples" in the party and the generic nods to equality and social inclusion seen in the *Party Manifesto*, Fidesz effectively silences racism that is ongoing yet not confronted or questioned.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

> Out of the hands of poets and admirers of local customs, however, and in the hands of political leaders, nationalism becomes a much-used strategy for the attainment and preservation of political legitimacy. The strategy employed depends on the combination of cultural and political conditions (Harris 2009, p. 5).

6.1. Introduction

In this final chapter, I reflect back on my research questions and what I have learned. The purpose of my single case study was to unpack the contours of Populist Radical Right (PRR) rhetoric in Hungary. Further to that point, I aimed to build theory by exposing the particularities of how this party family expresses populist, nationalist, and authoritarian discourses. The main research question guiding this dissertation was: *How do the radical right Fidesz and Jobbik parties in Hungary use populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames to articulate social policy issues?* Relatedly, I pose two secondary questions to push my discussion further. Specifically, I wanted to know:

1. *What rhetorical strategies might give traction to certain frames?*
2. *What are the possible consequences?*

Before answering my research questions, I briefly remind the reader about the purpose and organization of the four main chapters in the next section.

6.2. Chapter Summaries

In Chapter 2, I developed my theoretical framework of analysis in four main parts. I opened the discussion by assessing how cleavages and politics on the left-right spectrum have shaped the post-communist party competition space in CEE. This was important to help understand the wider context of party politics in CEE. Part two untangled the characteristics

of the PRR by clearly differentiating between the concepts of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism. It was imperative for me to provide clarity on this party family and how these parties compete since these concepts are often conflated in the literature. Next, I made the case for an interpretive approach to PRR party competition by stressing the importance of discourse, frames, and framing strategies. I wrapped up the chapter by pointing to legacy and threat as deep and shallow causes to explain why PRR discourses might resonate.

In Chapter 3, I outlined my methodological choices and my research strategy in detail. I approached the data with a blend of grounded theory and critical frame analysis. First, I justified my choice to use grounded theory and critical frame analysis methods. As an interpretive inductive method, grounded theory provided me with the tools to systematically organize, code, and categorize the data. I then explained why I used a critical frame analysis to make sense of the frames and framing strategies. Critical frame analysis is rooted in social movement theory, so this method allowed me to push the discussion of my findings further by linking frames to action. In addition to laying out my research strategy, I explained why I selected certain annual speeches and electoral manifestos for analysis. From the insights I gained in my conceptual chapter, I showed how I operationalized populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism.

The next two chapters were my empirical cases on social policy. My first empirical case was presented in Chapter 4, where I examined PRR framing of welfare benefits. The Populist Radical Right (PRR) is increasingly associated with welfare chauvinism, but the literature mainly focuses on the links between PRR and welfare chauvinism in Western and Northern European cases. I focused my attention on the Central Eastern European case of Hungary to investigate how PRR parties in Hungary frame welfare benefits. I organized my

discussion thematically by exploring five policy areas: pensions, health care, unemployment, social assistance, and family assistance. I coded the data and applied the critical frame analysis to high profile party speeches and documents by the Fidesz and Jobbik parties.

In my second empirical case, Chapter 5, I explored how the PRR in Hungary constructs Roma education issues. My first case study revealed strong racialized framing of Roma and I wanted to know if this was also present in discussions of Roma school children. Additionally, education is an important social policy area that impacts most Hungarians. In this chapter, my analysis also focused on the mismatch between official policy and actual progress on Roma education. To that end, I compared documents and statements to identify how the Hungarian government articulated the issue with EU and Council of Europe documents to determine the extent to which the assessment of Hungary's performance matched or contradicted Hungary's self-assessment. Following that discussion, I analyzed the same party speeches and documents as Chapter 4 to identify the frames and framing strategies.

6.3. Main Findings

From the two empirical cases, my research yielded six interesting findings about PRR discourse in Hungary regarding frames and framing strategies, ubiquity, and temporality. In this section, I elaborate on my findings, discuss their implications, and, where applicable, point to areas for further research.

6.3.1. Particularities of PRR Framing

Turning to my research questions of how the PRR articulates social policy and what the possible impacts are, I selected my empirical cases carefully. Many social justice issues fall under the purview of social policy such as: welfare benefits, the criminal justice system, healthcare, education, immigration, and workers' rights, to name only a few. I narrowed my analysis to welfare benefits in five policy areas and Roma education. Welfare benefits and education are interesting less likely cases because on the surface, these pressing policy issues are not intuitive places to look for PRR discourses. A great deal of work on the PRR defines and measures populism, but there is less work that helps us to understand how these parties create and shape discourse. My research helps fill that gap.

Nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism

In Chapter 4, I set out to investigate how PRRs in contemporary Hungary discuss welfare benefits. My main proposition was that Fidesz and Jobbik would articulate their positions on these issues in chauvinist ways, drawing heavily on nationalist, populist, and authoritarian frames. To remind, an overarching goal of the dissertation was to build theory by carefully defining my concepts given the conflation between populism and nationalism, as I discussed in Chapter 2. My examination of authoritarianism also contributes to the literature on the radical right by focusing on the less studied process of how party discourse can activate threats. In separating welfare benefits along five different dimensions, namely pensions, health care, unemployment, social assistance, and family allowances, I detected that Hungary's contemporary radical right employs mostly nationalist frames. Although populist frames were evident on some occasions, it was mostly informed by wider nationalist assertions. I also operationalized authoritarianism as a distinct frame category emblematic of

the PRR. I found that authoritarian frames were also present but most often either overlapped with nationalism or were used to provide nationalist frames traction. This insight helps illustrate how PRR discourse works. Further, my research also shows how nationalism pairs with different ideologies. For instance, while Jobbik and Fidesz both approve some measures of welfare benefits, Jobbik's socialist view differs in many aspects from the neo-liberal focus of Fidesz (Pirro, 2017; Szikra, 2014).

In Chapter 5, I shifted attention to Roma education based on my findings in Chapter 4. My goal in this case study was to examine the role of race and PRR discourse about Roma education. First, I compared how Hungary self-evaluates their performance in educational reform to how the EU and the Council of Europe assessed Hungary's performance. This revealed a disjuncture between official policy and actual progress on the ground. Then, similar to Chapter 4, I examined my text corpus of speeches and election manifestos to examine PRR discourse in more detail. As expected, populist, nationalist, and authoritarian frames were detected in Jobbik and Fidesz' rhetoric to varying degrees of subtlety. Similar to my findings in the welfare benefits case, I also found that nationalism was the strongest and most obvious frame in discussions of Roma education. What my analysis clearly showed is that the PRR articulate Roma education issues by strategically drawing on racialized rhetoric and assumptions to give traction to mainly nationalist, but also authoritarian, frames. Jobbik draws heavily on culturalist explanations to construct the Roma as deviant and responsible for their struggles. By comparison, Fidesz often ignores the issue of race in official, high profile speeches and documents with party members making egregious comments in other forums, such as in news media. This finding is interesting because it demonstrates how party strategies are dynamic and tailored to specific audiences. Tailored discourse serves as a

lesson for interpretive researchers to pay close attention not only to the speech actor, but also the intended audience. Bringing in this other point of comparison further enriches and contextualizes interpretive work.

The biggest takeaway across the two case studies is that PRR discourse in Hungary draws primarily on nationalist frames. This finding lines up with Rydgren's (2017) recent argument that essentially, most PRRs are not so much a populist party family. Rather, they do employ populist discourse from time to time, but it is informed by their nationalist views. This is not to say that populism does not play a role. However, we may be best served in using it, as Rydgren (2017, p. 9) puts it, as an "additional qualifier". The emphasis on nationalism also lends purchase to Harris' point (see quote above) that, "...in the hands of political leaders, nationalism is a much-used strategy" (2005, p. 9). In fact, for Hungarian politicians, it is the *main* strategy. Future research investigating the differences and intersections between nationalism, authoritarianism, and populism will tell just how much the latter can help us advance our understanding of radical right parties.

Gender

My findings on gender framing address a glaring gap in the populist literature. With notable exceptions, gender is virtually absent within the literature on the PRR (cf. Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge, & de Lange, 2015; Félix, 2015; Lugosi, 2018). At a glance, this omission is curious because nationalism is a key component of PRR discourse. Feminist comparative and international relations literature from the 1990's illustrates how nation-building processes are deeply gendered (cf. Yuval-Davis, 1993; McClintock, 1994; Enloe, 1990, 2014). Additionally, there is a wide body of scholarship discussing the role of gender in the

welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996; O'Connor, 1996). However, studies on the PRR have ignored gender despite the relevance.

In an earlier study, I unexpectedly found that gender framing was central to PRR discourse on social policy issues (Lugosi, 2018). These important insights led me to anticipate strong gender framing in my two empirical chapters in this dissertation. On the one hand, I found prominent gender framing in my analysis on welfare benefits, as anticipated. On the other hand, I was surprised to find gender virtually unaddressed in Roma education discourse. These findings illustrate how discourse is not always coherent and can vary (at times in contradictory ways) in different contexts. As a method rooted in language usage and context, a discursive approach provides researchers with stronger theoretical tools to assess party positions on issues.

I surmise that gender is overlooked in the literature in part because of the conflation between nationalism and populism. Using the concepts interchangeably without carefully delineating the two comes at the cost of missing crucial elements of nationalism, namely gender. Scholarship on the PRR aimed at theory building must pay more attention to gender given the central role of nationalism.

Legacy

My analysis on the role of historical legacy in PRR frames yielded another unexpected finding. My findings speak to the observation that party systems in CEE are shaped by the communist legacy, as argued by scholars such as Allen (2017), Elster et al. (1998), and Vachudova (2005). While I did anticipate PRR parties to draw on historical legacy discourse to support their claims, I did not anticipate how pervasive the "corrupt communist" narrative is in party discourse, especially for Fidesz. In this context, Fidesz draws on the 'corrupt

communist' narrative as a strategy to distance the party from the deeply resented socialist past, often to justify tough policy actions to clean up the mess of the previous government. This discourse is used to villainize any party or policy that shows linkages to the corrupt past. In some cases, I showed how Fidesz even implicitly links Jobbik with the socialist past, presumably in reaction to Jobbik's increasing electoral fortune. Because I detected this framing strategy throughout my analyses, I conclude that legacy plays a strong role in how the PRR articulates social policy issues and is therefore worthy of further investigation.

6.3.2. Ubiquity of the PRR

My work challenges a conventional idea within the populist literature, which suggests that once a populist party is in power, they must tone down their radical ideology and agenda or they risk losing office (Akkerman et al., 2016, pp. 3-4). In the Hungarian case, I observed the opposite. Not only has Fidesz been in power since 2010, Jobbik continues to enjoy increasing electoral success. In fact, after the 2018 elections the party is now the second largest in the Hungarian National Assembly (Election Guide, 2018).

I selected two less likely cases because finding evidence of PRR framing in these cases gives more insight into how these parties work and how important PRR frames are for these parties. My research detected PRR frames in all sorts of unlikely places such as policy discussions about old age pensions and education for schoolchildren. These findings illustrate how PRR discourse applies in even more policy areas than the populist research has shown, including day-to-day policies that affect most people. The take-home point here is that populist politics is perhaps more ubiquitous than previously thought.

6.3.3. Temporal dynamics

One of the most surprising and unexpected findings was the extent to which Fidesz' discourse sign-posted to Orbán's "illiberal state" well in advance of 2014, which disrupts a commonly held assumption about the rise of the PRR in Hungary. Many news reports and scholarly journals mention Orbán's now infamous 2014 speech at the summer university in Transylvania when he publicly declared that he envisioned an "illiberal democracy" for Hungary. This captured international headlines and attention. However, some scholars were already warning about Hungary's illiberal turn (cf. Rupnik, 2012). Hungary's sudden downward trajectory from democratic success caught scholars by surprise (Herman, 2016). My work revealed strong populist, nationalist, and authoritarian framing well in advance of the 2014 speech.

What is more, my findings provide ample evidence to support Ágh's party convergence thesis, which contends that Fidesz and Jobbik are "twin parties" (2014, p. 45). In 2010, Fidesz was a center right party and Jobbik was a radical right party. Leading up to the 2014 election, both parties shifted their strategies to effectively compete. Fidesz began adopting some of Jobbik's extreme rhetoric, albeit in a nuanced manner, while Jobbik toned done some of the party's most extreme rhetoric to effectively rebrand the party (Ágy, 2014; Pytlas, 2016; Pirro, 2016). My finding further demonstrates how party positions and strategies are malleable. In addition, it shows how spatial shifts and extreme behaviour both shapes and is shaped by the party system, leading to what Enyedi astutely argues is a party system dominated by "populist polarization" in Hungary (2016b). These early warning signs of Hungary's populist shift are worthy of further investigation and strongly support my argument that PRR research must to pay closer attention to discourse.

6.3.4. Searching for a Cause

In light of my second research question, my discussion now shifts towards drawing indirect causal inferences of why certain frames might resonate with the public who may not otherwise support a populist party using Kitschelt's notion of deep and shallow causes (2003 [2001]) discussed in Chapter 2. Regarding deep causes: I suspected that voters might be activated by threat, which translates to support for a strongman leader, such as Orbán or Vona, who can provide easy answers to protect the nation from disorder and chaos, especially in turbulent times. Authoritarian frames were most apparent in Jobbik's highly securitized rhetoric of the Roma. In this way, PRR messages that draw on nationalism and the nation as the collective "we" in need of protection from outside threat are appealing. Similarly, nationalist rhetoric that secures a common identity may be solidified by historical legacies. Strong legacy framing was detected in Fidesz' nationalist rhetoric. References to history, even a cherry-picked version, can provide evidence and legitimacy to help elites construct a coherent narrative about time-honoured traditions and territorial claims to ancestral homelands. Fidesz and Jobbik's continued electoral success suggest their framing strategies are effective.

Regarding shallow causes of PRR success, it is important to consider the wider political context of my 2010-2016 timeframe as many events occurred during these six years. Europe was thrust into economic hardship following the 2008 financial crisis. Hungary was hit particularly hard, leading to widespread job loss and insecurity. The conflict in Ukraine both triggered memories of Russian aggression, not to mention concern for the ethnic Hungarian minorities living in Ukraine. The increase of terrorist activity, including direct attacks on Europe activated anxiety even among non-authoritarians. Finally,

Europe faced a migration crisis with large numbers of refugees fleeing Iraq and Syria. In Hungary, Fidesz and Jobbik articulated the migrants as a terrorist risk that threatened national values and order. These trigger events breed a sense of insecurity that ascribes more legitimacy to PRR messages using authoritarian frames that draw on the need for protection in the face of danger and threat in the name of either political and social order or the national community. Lastly, nationalist frames rooted in rhetoric about the glorious past may carry more currency in times of insecurity and perceived threats to sovereignty and well-being.

Based on my findings, I contend that articulations of nationalism that draw on historical legacies (deep) and articulations of authoritarianism rooted in security concerns in reaction to trigger events (shallow) help explain the success of the PRR in Hungary. Considering that conventional literature on populism considered the phenomena a temporary political force, it is even more important to understand why the PRR is successful.

In sum

The cannon of populist literature is extensive but there is ample room for new work. The three major contributions this dissertation stresses for the PRR literature are: the need to pay closer attention to discourse, the importance of distinguishing between populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism to highlight the paramount role of nationalism, and the need to examine gender, given that it cannot be delinked from nationalism. Attention to discourse can provide rich insights that might be missed by other empirical measures. To exemplify, the bulk of transitology and democratic scholarship did not predict Hungary's democratic decline despite early discursive clues. Interpretive approaches must also pay close attention to history and context to offer rich explanations. Further, interpretive work

must consider how discourses are not always coherent and can change according to different context and audiences as I have shown in this dissertation.

Altogether, my findings can travel to other case studies inside and outside of Central Europe. Applying my findings to other Central European cases could contribute to a better understanding of PRR politics in the region. The findings could also be applied to other non-Central European cases for more comparative work on the differences between PRR discourse in West and Eastern Europe. My contentions can travel even further to other regions outside of Europe. This is crucial because the rise of populism and authoritarianism is a global phenomenon, which threatens liberal democracy. The stakes are high and require careful research in this area.

6.4. Concluding Remarks

On a final note, Attila Ágh insists that there are four main steps in the path toward successful transition. First, the tenets of democracy and a market economy are secured. Second and third, human and political rights are clearly explicated and respected without hate or xenophobia. Finally, a successfully transitioned nation-state maintains healthy trans-national relations (1998, pp. 77-78). While Hungary once appeared well on the way to democratic success, the shift to the populist radical right has complicated the transition picture. In terms of party strategy to secure vote share away from Jobbik, Fidesz has proved to be particularly adept at appealing to voters across the far and center right resulting in electoral success. A grave consequence of Fidesz' ongoing electoral success and both parties on the radical right sharing similar policy platforms is what scholars like Feischmidt and Hervik (2015) call a "mainstreaming of the extreme", where nationalist and racialized frames normally of the far

right move center and become normalized in public and policy discourse. The trend of normalizing, or mainstreaming, divisive politics paints a bleak picture for social inclusion and poverty reduction in Hungary, especially for ethnic minorities. For now, local civil organizations along with external international actors such as the European Commission and the United Nations continue to raise awareness about problematic policies and call for improved conditions. Given the ongoing political polarization in Hungary, there is ample room for skepticism but only time will tell if these efforts are successful or not. Either way, future work on how the PRR impacts democratic conditions in Hungary and elsewhere must consider discourse and clearly differentiate the interlocking but not interchangeable concepts of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism that make up this party family.

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