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A CRITIQUE OF O'SHAUGHNESSY'S THE WILL

BY

GRAHAM J. McALEER

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A Critique of O'Shaughnessy's The Will" submitted by Graham J. McAleer in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Supervisor

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ABSTRACT

O'Shaughnessy's The Will argues for an original view of the nature of bodily willing. Bodily willing is a primitive phenomenon exhibited by all animal kinds that is nevertheless voluntaristic in nature. Unlike the tradition, the volition is not of a piece with thought. For O'Shaughnessy, bodily willing is both a psychological and physical phenomenon; it is the sole dual aspect phenomenon. A priori, claims O'Shaughnessy, one knows that (and can argue that) the volition or bodily action (since O'Shaughnessy argues for such an identification) is a unique structure of a psychological "element" (a striving) which is non-distinct from, but also non-identical with, a physical "element" (an arm rise). Against this theory of the act of will, I argue that O'Shaughnessy may not be able to maintain the required ontological identification of bodily willing as psychological non-mental. This identification not being possible because the 'given' - which is said to be an awareness of the limb in a body-relative space as provided by bodily sensation - may be a thought-mediated phenomenon. That is, it might be the case that sensations are projected onto the body as are visual sensations onto the world. If this were so, then the bodily object of the will would fall in the higher ontological category of the properly mental and since O'Shaughnessy accepts that bodily willing requires a bodily object, it will follow that bodily willing must be itself a thought-mediated phenomenon and thus properly mental. Hence, I think I can plausibly argue that O'Shaughnessy cannot maintain his desired identification of the act of will with the act of body in the bodily act-situation: the act of will falls in one ontological

category, the act of body in another. Arguing within O'Shaughnessy's own framework, I take myself to have forced O'Shaughnessy - in the absence of further argument - back to the traditional conception of the bodily will. The thesis ends with some possible replies to the criticisms made against the 'intellectualist model' of bodily willing by such thinkers as Ryle and Searle.

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Introduction

Before beginning Chapter I, which is an account of O'Shaughnessy's conception of the bodily will, I would like to orientate the reader to the following chapter, and to O'Shaughnessy's thesis itself. The Will is a work in the philosophy of mind. It presents a theory of bodily willing. Thus, the following pages concern volition theory and thus action theory but also, and just because a theory is being presented, the mind-body problem, perception theory and ultimately, a metaphysic of man. I say this last, because the dual-aspect nature of bodily action that is O'Shaughnessy's thesis is designed to establish the embodiment of man. Man as animal, and of the earth, is the position in the philosophy of man that is being advocated. O'Shaughnessy sees the mind as the most elusive element of man's being in regard to this stance. Hence, to show that mind is the mind of an animal is this work's pre-occupation. O'Shaughnessy believes that it is bodily action with its dual-aspectism which encases this insight. The high-profile of the body then, in all that follows, is hereby explained. Such a metaphysic has its intellectual heritage in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud; all these thinkers are very present in the pages of The Will.

In the broadest outline possible then, Chapter I should be seen as forwarding that movement which is the naturalization of man. The challenge to Descartes in this, is obvious. Not quite so obvious in the case of Locke, since he saw no contradiction in "thinking matter." Still, Locke, following Descartes, subscribed to a volitionism that O'Shaughnessy thinks mistaken in virtue of its intellectuality, i.e., its ontological parity with thought. O'Shaughnessy believes that so

regarding the volition, with its role of being the ultimate mental cause of bodily action, makes mind-body causal interaction - as it is relevant to bodily action - a mystery. For how can something like a thought cause controlled movement in a physical entity that is a body-part? O'Shaughnessy argues that any single aspect version of the volition (or bodily action itself) will always fail to capture how it is that mind and body "mesh" together in bodily action. To account for the causal interaction exhibited in the bodily act-situation some form of dual-aspectism must be endorsed, thinks O'Shaughnessy. However, to understand O'Shaughnessy's dual-aspectism, its difference from traditional dual-aspect theories must be understood.

Cartesian dualism, with its ontological division of mind and body, raises the question of how it is that a non-spatial, non-physical system, the mind, could causally interact with a spatial, physical system, the body. For the Cartesian, the problem appears intractable. In response to this difficulty, the Materialists argue that the mind is a physical entity and thus there is no difficulty in understanding how mind (a physical entity) interacts with body (another physical entity). However, it is commonly thought that the solution to the problem leaves no room for one of our most powerful intuitions - namely, mind is not reducible to the physical. Then dual aspect theories of mind take this intuition seriously but hope also to overcome the interaction difficulty. In its ontological form, dual aspectism argues in two ways. The mental and the physical are two aspects of some further ontological category - persons, animals or nature. Alternatively, dual aspectism argues that the animal has bodily states and bodily states

that are mental states, the causal mental properties of which are physical properties of these bodily states. In this scenario what is not physical is the phenomenal inner aspect of these mental/bodily states that can only be known in the first person. These versions of dual aspectism really need not concern us, since O'Shaughnessy does not subscribe to an ontological but only, an epistemological dual aspectism. O'Shaughnessy insists that his version of the volition and how it copes with causal interaction is a correct account of the bodily act-situation irrespective of the truth value of physicalism. But any dual aspectism makes a tacit ontological commitment - namely, psychological entities must be deemed a reality. Some versions of physicalism aim to eradicate psychological entities altogether and thus also, the causal interaction problem. Thus, O'Shaughnessy is really saying that at the level of ontology, any physicalism that is likely to be true must not dispose of, through notions like identity, the psychological. This much of an ontological commitment is made, even given an epistemological dual aspectism. Clearly then, O'Shaughnessy seeks to synthesise the Cartesian insights into the mind with the movement of naturalism. This is most evident in O'Shaughnessy's method. Following Schopenhauer's distinction of the enquirer standing on the 'inside' to some things but only on the 'outside' to others, O'Shaughnessy claims that certain features of mind and bodily action are open to a priori investigation; standing on the 'inside' makes this a possibility. This is to make common cause with the deliverances of introspection - just as Descartes did - but it is not to claim that the mind is transparent to the "inward gazer." It does not follow, so far

as I can see, that if one subscribes to the usefulness of introspection and thus a priori deliverances into the nature of mind, that one immediately and categorically cuts empirical science out of the picture. O'Shaughnessy in discussing the nature of the concept of physical action as a priori allows that science must determine this concept's precise extension, and this because the body and its mechanics do not allow for (much?) a priori investigation. Still, O'Shaughnessy claims, a priori one can determine that science must have a place in determining our knowledge of this concept. By this method, O'Shaughnessy establishes the dual-aspectism of bodily action. It seems to me that Dennett does the same as regards reasoning. His 'antique-example' goes from introspecting on the nature of reasoning to claiming that something is missing! This is just what Freud did with the unconscious. Dennett a priori discovers that information processing, or at its weakest, "some very fast non-conscious logical process must occur if reasoning is to be made sense of," is a necessary component in the reasoning process. Now, Dennett and O'Shaughnessy might be wrong in their a priori claims as to what is going on when people reason or what is the concept of bodily action, but this is not to say that their method is wrong. Dennett a priori argues for the need of cognitive psychology, O'Shaughnessy a priori argues for the need of physiology, or again, at its weakest, some form of "mechanistic explanation of body movement" and all because introspection reveals that both are required. To subscribe to Descartes' method is not to be saddled with his results .... Locke, Spinoza and Leibniz taught us this much.

O'Shaughnessy's dual aspectism concerning the bodily act arises out of this method since bodily action is the only psychological phenomenon that splits - a priori - into both a psychological "component" (a striving) and a physical bodily "component" (the surface event of arm rise). O'Shaughnessy argues that we know this is the case just through knowing what a bodily action is. This is not true of any other psychological phenomenon. While it is very likely to be true that a thought is the result of some physical occurrence in the brain, we do not know that this is so simply through knowing about our thoughts. For this reason, thoughts are said to be single aspect phenomena while bodily actions are said to be dual aspect phenomena. This fact, claims O'Shaughnessy, is indicative of the special place in animal life occupied by bodily action; it is the mediator of the mind onto the world. Causal interaction is thus openly on display in bodily action. In fact, in Chapter 1 of my thesis, the epistemology which bares this fact out, will be seen to give way to a detailed ontology of bodily action that equally well illustrates this fact. Then it is obvious that O'Shaughnessy's dual-aspectism is no grand general ontological claim. It is limited to epistemology in the first instance and secondly, to ontology. The account given of the ontological status of bodily action solves the causal interaction problem but obviously only for bodily action - and more, it leaves on one side the further ontological question of what in fact the inner aspect of bodily action - the striving - amounts to. As noted earlier, the striving is something psychological for O'Shaughnessy and so some measure of ontological commitment is here present, but clearly not enough to

establish a full-blown dual aspectism. I think the dual aspect claims of O'Shaughnessy, should be seen as asserting no more than a non-reductionist principle; this of course ensuring that O'Shaughnessy has a problem to solve. Thus, when I claim that O'Shaughnessy's epistemological dual aspectism gives way to an ontological dual aspectism, this claim should be understood in light of the above proviso.

Firstly then, in Chapter I, I show the radical break O'Shaughnessy makes with traditional volitionism. Chapter I then goes on to show the "gist" of O'Shaughnessy's dual aspectism - though this is highlighted throughout the chapter - and then to specifying the a priori features of the bodily act-situation as O'Shaughnessy sees them. From here, a philosophical analysis of that concept exploits the initial pre-philosophic "intuitions" concerning that concept. At this part of Chapter I action theory proper takes over, O'Shaughnessy attempting to establish that the try-event is omnipresent in the bodily act-event and that tryings are volitions of a very special kind. This inquiry leads to the positing of the structure of the bodily action and hence, to a discussion of the ontological status of bodily action. This last issues in an important - and highly unusual! - resolution to the seeming paradoxes contained in O'Shaughnessy's version of the volition. I complete Chapter I by noting some of O'Shaughnessy's most fascinating thoughts on the naturalized mind, and the solution to the mind body problem that such a naturalization carries with it. Chapter I then, closes with the mind of man being shown to be an animal mind.

In opposition to O'Shaughnessy's conception of the bodily will I argue that the bodily will is not epistemologically related to its bodily object in the primitive manner which O'Shaughnessy believes to be the case. This primitiveness is centered upon the 'given' which is crucial for the bodily object of the will being epistemologically 'there' for the bodily will. The 'given' is composed of bodily sensation which is said to have as a logically necessary component certain spatial data about the body. This spatial information about the body or body part is said to be a logically necessary condition for an act of will utilizing that body or body part - something with which I do not disagree. However, I disagree with O'Shaughnessy that this spatial information need be given primitively via bodily awareness; an awareness that provides knowledge about the body without the intercession of thought processes - one might say that it is cognitively 'simple.' That O'Shaughnessy can maintain that the bodily object of the will is 'there' for the bodily will in the said manner is absolutely crucial since it is an essential component in establishing that bodily willing is of ontological status psychological non-mental. If this is not so, then O'Shaughnessy's identification of an act of will being an act of body will be ruined; this is just the conclusion drawn at the end of my Chapter III. This conclusion can be drawn, for in Chapter II I argue that the 'given,' as characterized in Chapter I, is not a necessary component of the bodily act-situation. That is, bodily sensation, I show, can lack spatial data altogether or can be possessed of some spatial data which need not include a body part in body-relative physical space. O'Shaughnessy denies either scenario is

a possibility; he also denies that the following is a possibility. Bodily sensation, or feeling, is not required if one is to possess the requisite spatial information about the body that is necessary for bodily willing. I argue for this last with my example of the 'mathematical sense.' Out of these examples, comes a view of the bodily will that is similar to Descartes' - whose view I use to set the agenda for Chapter II - in stressing the need for the bodily object of the will to be 'there' for the will via thought-processed sensory data. In this, I see a similarity between Descartes and the cognitive psychologists.

Importantly, the results of Chapter II establish the possibility of regarding bodily sensations to be just like visual sensations in being, first and foremost, set in psychological two-dimensional space, thus composing a bodily sense-field, and secondarily, with the application of concepts and beliefs, being projected onto the body in a 1/1 correlative manner. This is an important result for it can be said to be internal to O'Shaughnessy's conception of the bodily will. Then what I show is that 'immediate presence' may not be a part of the bodily situation and if this is so, then it follows that the bodily will does not secure its bodily object epistemologically without the assistance of thought-mediated cognitions and thus, that bodily willing must be thought-mediated and hence, not possibly the primitive phenomenon O'Shaughnessy takes it to be. In light of this, I claim in my conclusion to Chapter III that, in O'Shaughnessy's language, bodily willing, since the bodily object is thought-mediated and thus the 'given' an attentional consciousness, must be a conceptual

consciousness - this being Descartes' position. In terms of ontological status, bodily willing then proves not to be psychological non-mental but properly mental.

Before reaching this conclusion, however, I must dispose of that crucial class of action, so far as O'Shaughnessy's thesis is concerned, the sub-intentional act. This I also do in Chapter III by establishing the possibility of the unconscious thought process which allows me to put a different "face" upon the 'unawares act.' These thought processes are of two kinds: the Freudian "free floating" thoughts, as I like to call them, which are no different, bar their conscious status, from introspectible thought processes, and the rule-guided thought processes of the cognitive psychologists. It is these last, which I believe are required if two features of bodily action are to be accounted for. In criticism of O'Shaughnessy, in Chapter III, who I read as something of a Cartesian at this point, I suggest that these rule governed information processing <u>thoughts</u> are necessary if the <u>complexity</u> of action, i.e., all the judgements etc. that go into organising the simplest of actions without any "swamping" of consciousness, and its <u>naturalness</u>, are to be explained. This completes what the reader can expect in the following pages.

It should be noted that the claims made in Chapter II are couched in a "possibility language"; though this is less true of Chapter III. What I mean by this is the following. My critique of O'Shaughnessy tries to show that he has not provided sufficient arguments to support that which he says <u>must</u> be the case. Thus, I try to show that sensations <u>might</u> appear without a location on/in the body: that

thought might be involved in the projection of bodily sensations onto the body, etc. It seems to me that the logical status O'Shaughnessy attaches to some of his claims is not as warranted as he thinks. I argue not that things are the way I say they might be, but simply, that things may be the way I say they might be, and that O'Shaughnessy has not done enough to convince us that this is not so. The usefulness of this, is that it allows me to diminish the universal standing O'Shaughnessy ascribes to his claims about bodily willing and thus, to claim that the nature of bodily willing has not been revealed to us in O'Shaughnessy's writings. At most, I believe, O'Shaughnessy can show the nature of bodily willing in one of its contingent forms. Though I do regard myself as offering a few reasons why even this much might not be true either.

I should note that Chapter I is a detailed description of much of O'Shaughnessy's thought but that I select for discussion a rather small piece of that overall picture. This needs explanation. There can be no doubt that O'Shaughnessy's view of the bodily will is both brilliant and bizarre. As Nagel puts it, O'Shaughnessy, "has worked by himself largely outside of contemporary philosophical society, and these wild and wonderful volumes reveal for the first time with what intensity and on what a scale he has worked ..." Then I set myself the task of trying to understand this theory of the will ... how I have managed is to be judged from Chapter I. Also, it seems to me that this theory of the will is not to be "butchered"; its principal parts need to hang together otherwise one is likely to have rather silly reactions. For example, I describe at length the claim that trying is universal in the

act situation. It seems to me that O'Shaughnessy makes an extremely strong case for this thesis but most people's reaction to the claim would be predictable. This discussion of trying is also a good example of what I mean when I say that the different parts need to be kept together (as one might expect of any theory!), for it is integral to showing the identification of the act of will with the act of body. In some such manner would I justify the length of Chapter I. I justify my selection of a particularly small part of this theory - the 'given,' 'location of sensation' and 'body image' concepts - because of their importance, and the fact that, in criticising O'Shaughnessy's understanding of them, one can develop a line of criticism against the entire O'Shaughnessian conception of the bodily will. It is one way to undermine the edifice. This is the rationale behind my selection. To end this introduction I will stress that though I sympathize with Descartes' conception of the will, O'Shaughnessy's work is a constant critique of Descartes and I attempt in no way to refute that critique. Nor do I offer any solution to escaping the mind-body-interaction difficulty that plagues any "mentalistic" view of the will.

CHAPTER I

Volitionism: a radical departure

Brian O'Shaughnessy is a volitionist; he believes there exist 'acts of will.' However, it will become plain through the course of Chapter I that O'Shaughnessy is a very different kind of volition theorist from Descartes and Locke. Basically, their view is this: whenever a voluntary bodily action occurs that event is to be explained by reference to an interior psychological event, a volition or act of will, which is the cause of that exterior bodily event, the movement of the body, that is strictly speaking the effect of the action - the volition. The action then, being on an ontological par with thought. O'Shaughnessy regards The Will as a refutation of this traditional view of the volition, and what voluntary acts amount to. Before showing why O'Shaughnessy takes himself to have refuted the traditional thesis, I wish to present a synthesis of volitionism reconstructed a la O'Shaughnessy.

Although O'Shaughnessy rejects the view that an act of will is ontologically on a par with thought, believing instead that thought is of the ontological status, mental, and volitions of the ontological status, merely psychological, he does maintain that all voluntary acts are to be explained by reference to a volition. He avoids the schism engendered by Locke and Descartes between the act and its surface event - the body movement - by arguing that the bodily act itself has two aspects to its nature. The bodily act has this dual aspect because of its unique place in animal life. It, and it alone, is responsible for a concrete mediation between mind and environment. There is the

volition - the striving non-autonomous psychological part event of the psychological event that is the bodily action. But this striving event also has for a part autonomous non-psychological whole events - these being neural events at the very least, but also, more often than not, muscle contractions and limb movements. Thus the volition is in its very inner nature possessed of two aspects: one psychological and one physical. And the volition is, if it is successful and hence if it completes itself, the bodily action of walking, swimming, etc. It follows, because of the two aspects of its nature, always present in success or failure, that any bodily manifestation of the volition is not a distinct entity from the volition. Contra the Lockean model, the volition is the surface event of body movement as much as it is any interior psychological episode (which it never is completely). The volition then, cannot be construed as the cause of the body movement, at best it can only be thought of as the cause of later parts of itself! Thus the surface event of arm rise is not the effect of the volition but is the volition and hence, very plausibly, the physical action also. This is all to leave traditional volitionism a long way behind.

I now turn to a consideration of the reasons and arguments that O'Shaughnessy puts forward for his dual aspect theory of the volition and bodily action, in near contradistinction to the traditional thesis.

Dual-aspectism and the possibility of a priori investigation.

For O'Shaughnessy, dual-aspectism is based upon the possibility of a priori investigation. The concept of bodily action is amenable to

this manner of analysis. O'Shaughnessy believes that there are features of action which are 'givens'; these givens needing philosophical eludication and not as such open to scientific investigation. This is to say that the concept of physical action is a priori, O'Shaughnessy holding, that only this concept's application conditions reside in the domain of science. A most important feature amongst the a priori determinable features of this concept is that the body is a limit upon the possible objects of the bodily will. That is to say, that the body a priori is an integral part of the concept of physical action; a concept whose other features are all psychological. This is the root of dual-aspectism: in a single concept, body and mind integrate without the reduction of either one to the other. O'Shaughnessy believes that bodily action is the sole dual-aspect phenomenon. Of the referents of all other concepts, "we are not a priori - given, simply through knowing what x is, that some determinately given physical non-psychological item is part of it" (236 II)[1].

To show the possibility of a priori investigation, O'Shaughnessy makes a sharp revision in Putnam's sense and reference theory. Putnam's major claim is that when a natural kind term is acquired one does not also acquire a concept that determines the extension of possible referents of the term. The extension of a natural kind concept is determined by items satisfying certain 'epistemological markers' that are traditionally taken to be characteristic of the kind. This "traditionally" is important: an item's being gold today and for a good many centuries past, is based upon that item's satisfying the

'markers' that science today takes to be indicative of gold. However, those 'markers' can change with mutating scientific knowledge of the nature of gold. 'Epistemological markers,' in the case of natural kinds, are always only provisional. O'Shaughnessy believes that this is a striking difference between gold and other natural kinds and bodily action. The advent of depth physical investigation may force the present-day 'markers' of gold to be abandoned, but it will not force the 'markers' of bodily action to be abandoned. The reason for this is that some of the 'markers' of bodily action are instances of an a priori-given. They are so because, as Schopenhauer pointed out, with action we (self-conscious consciousnesses) are 'on the inner' but with gold we are 'on the outer.' Thus some of the 'markers' are given mentalistically and criterialessly, and this means, that it is - in part- possible to determine the extension of the concept of physical action once the term is acquired. Unlike gold, where the 'markers' are picked out socially or scientifically, physical action has an 'internal' and thus pre-scientific set of 'markers.' Examples of such 'markers' are: desire and intention as progenitors of action, certain beliefs concerning the environment, certain seemings concerning bodily movement (these given to consciousness through sensation), etc.

Importantly though, bodily action does not have purely mental criteria determining the referents of the term 'bodily action.' This is indicative of the dual aspect character of bodily action. Bodily action is a priori the only psychological phenomenon that is known to divide into a psychological and physical part. Thus it is the physical aspect that provides the similarity with gold in terms of its

'markers,' and allows science to enter the inquiry into the nature of physical action. The physical element in bodily action is limb movement and the operation of an act-mechanism. Limb movement is dependent upon a mechanism and the actual operation of this mechanism is a physical matter for science to discover. As a physical matter, it can never be mentatistically known if this condition of physical action is satisfied, and thus if indeed the item under investigation falls under the extension of the term 'physical action.' Quickly then, bodily action is like gold in that the term can only be applied to certain items with the aid of depth physical inquiry; some of its 'markers' will be on the 'same footing' as gold's 'markers.' Yet, while the 'markers' could shift from physiology to electronics in the case of the act mechanism and thus what might constitute a part of the body - paralleled with gold and celluloid gold - such change in some of the other 'markers' of bodily action is not a possibility - namely, with those 'markers' dubed 'internal.' It is these last which establish physical action as an a priori, and thus philosophical, field of inquiry.

The a priori concept of physical action: its principal constituents

The dual-aspect nature of bodily action, its inner and outer faces, and its uniqueness in this regard, has, to some extent, been explained. Through this explanation, some of the principal a priori features of bodily action "surfaced." Limb movement and the obtaining of an act-mechanism, along with the satisfaction of certain cognitive and originating conditions, are amongst those features. These features

are worth consideration for they constitute a pre-philosophical understanding of bodily action; they are the basis of the philosophical investigation into the concept.

O'Shaughnessy examines the 'internal' features of bodily action in some detail. Some of the 'markers' of bodily action then are: a matching of intention and desire with the desired effect that often obtains, an apparent causal immediacy between the progenitors of action and their bodily effects. Further, bodily actions have the feature of an absence of surprise at the occurrence of the desired effect (though the kind of absence of surprise must not be founded on systematic observation). There is a knowledge of the future that follows upon any firm decision to there and then execute an intention. This knowledge is of the just know variety, i.e., one just knows that one is going to put one's hand in the air. This knowledge is immediate because of its intention origin. And the character of the knowing as the 'just know' variety is a formal consequence of the intention origin. For if I firmly intend to do some action then I cannot help 'just believing' that that action will thus occur and the same is true of knowledge concerning the intention. This is the case even though this knowledge depends - in part - upon the empirically founded knowledge that my arm and body are in working order and that I can act. This last is important for it introduces mechanism with its air of regularity. One knows that the intended action will occur in a 'just know' way because a mechanism is known to obtain: if one doubted this, or the knowledge was statistical in nature, one could at most 'lay bets' that the action would occur. Thus mechanism makes its presence felt as an a priori

feature of the concept of bodily action.

Mechanism, for O'Shaughnessy, is a 'principal player' in the concept of bodily action but it is also problematic because volitionism and mechanism appear to clash over the responsibility for an action. The physiologist will say, "contraction of the muscles brought about the movement of his head," and contra this, the person will say, "I moved my head to look at something." Here, a psychological source has the field but for the physiologist it is the physical that is in the ascendant. If attention is paid to speech pragmatics, a way out of this difficulty can be found. If a person were to say, "my muscles did that," people would deduce that he/she did not do the moving of the arm. However, if this person were a physiologist no such conclusion would be drawn; the physiologist would still be credited with the moving of the arm. Thus, context is important, and one sees that, "while it is true that my arm rose because the muscle contracted, this does not make muscle contraction the source of the movement <u>in opposition</u> to me." (112 I) Person <u>and</u> muscles are jointly responsible for arm movement. Not that this is to say that the person and his, or her, muscles are causally jointly responsible; muscle contraction is a sufficient condition of arm rise, and needs no causal contribution from the agent. Rather, O'Shaughnessy insists, the agent effects <u>through</u> the mechanism's effecting. This is to say, the contraction of one's muscles <u>enables</u> one to move one's head but does not constitute one's <u>moving</u> one's head. The reason being that one would not say, "if those muscles had contracted it would have brought about my moving my head." In the act situation then, muscle contraction is seen as a necessary

though not sufficient condition of head movement. Thus room must be made for the efficacy of the agent - in some manner - and yet not in opposition to the physical elements involved in the action. O'Shaughnessy suggests that if the physical elements are thought of as 'mere cogs' that do not rob the agent of his/her choosing powers, and thus of the agent's deeds either, then the tension is resolved. For it follows in attributing the movement of an arm to someone that that person have power - exhibited in conditionals - to stop the movement of the arm, alter the direction and speed of the movement, etc. Thus a legitimate act-mechanism is one over which the agent exercises control. Again, this is revelatory of the dual aspectism of action. The 'outer face' of action - mechanism - must be in unison with the 'inner face' - the psychological determinants constitutive of choice.

Before drawing out the significance of all these different features of action I want to mention another very important feature of the concept of bodily action: feeling. O'Shaughnessy believes that one can only move a limb if one has a feeling-based immediate awareness[2] of both limb and its position. O'Shaughnessy believes it simply baffling that someone might write even though that person has no feeling in his/her arm. For O'Shaughnessy then, there is a direct connection between feeling and power, and thus between feeling and the will itself.

Here are the elements that must be included in any concept of physical action - the 'markers' of the concept. This is not yet to have stated the precise nature of a physical act, rather it is the surface phenomenon that we, at the pre-philosophic level, have access

to in our understanding of bodily action. What I have so far provided of O'Shaughnessy's view is enough to help establish an important limit upon the will's object, or in another terminology, the extension of the concept and the possible referents of the term 'bodily action.'

It appears that a table could not be the object of the will. Two vital features would be missing: mechanism and feeling. This is not to say that an electronic attachment to the body could not be the object of the will. Indeed, O'Shaughnessy notes that it could but insightfully, he further notes, that such an electronic attachment, instantiating a mechanistic link and simulated feeling, would be a mere body-part substitute. This showing that the body or some body-part substitute is a boundary of the will. This is no small conclusion: it is obvious that dual-aspectism needs this conclusion; after all, O'Shaughnessy's volitionism establishes the act of body as the reverse side of the act of will. Also, the ontological import of this conclusion shall be brought out later.

The philosophical elucidation of the concept of bodily action: the object of the bodily will via 'immediate presence.'

This section, throughout Chapters II and III of my thesis, I claim to be of utmost importance to O'Shaughnessy's thesis on the primitiveness of the bodily will. It is the thoughts of this section that I shall be arguing against, and later in this section I focus in on the prime premise which must be capable of being maintained by O'Shaughnessy if he is to have his thesis of the act of will being the act of body.

The will has two objects: there is the goal event, for example, the opening of a door and a primary object, the body or some body-part. The concept, 'the point of application of the will' demands that the object or 'point of application' be epistemologically available to the will. In terms of the primary object then, the body must be 'there' for the will. An examination of the epistemology of the body is of crucial importance in understanding the relation between the bodily will and its immediate or primary object. O'Shaughnessy argues that bodily willing logically necessitates the occurrence of a distinct psychological phenomenon putative limb awareness. Limb awareness then, makes possible the phenomenon of bodily willing.

The object of the bodily will must be 'immediately present' to the subject - this is a necessary though not sufficient condition of willing bodily phenomena. O'Shaughnessy believes this feature of 'immediate presence' to be primitive. By this, O'Shaughnessy means, that the phenomenon is not thought-mediated (i.e., the bodily object of the will is not a material object of an intentional consciousness). I will now provide some of the reasons O'Shaughnessy offers for the position that 'immediate presence' is not thought-mediated but rather, "a fallibly immediate seeming-to-be-there that is somehow or other at least partially based upon feeling in the limb." (151 I)

Feeling is a mode of awareness rather than a thought-mediated cognitive relation, i.e., awareness of one's body is not knowledge of one's body.[3] O'Shaughnessy offers the following thought experiment to show that awareness of one's body is a real experience and in so doing shows it to be different from knowledge of one's body. Thus one could

have all one's nervous system de-sensitized and yet continue to know that one's body still existed or at the very least, that certain essential elements of one's body still exited. With this knowledge pertaining, one's body could be re-sensitized and the declaration, "my body seems to be there!", would reveal an experience of one's body that was known to be distinct from a knowledge of one's body. O'Shaughnessy showing that there is a very real awareness of body that may fall outside of the domain of thought-mediated cognitive relations. This phenomenon O'Shaughnessy dubs 'immediate presence' and it is it which O'Shaughnessy believes provides the will with its bodily object. This last is supported by the following argument.

Indicated in the thought experiment is that via feeling one knows of the body's existence and possibly also, its spatial and temperature properties. Further, it is suggested that these things are known immediately through a relation of awareness of which is sensuous. That this is how the bodily object of the will is given to the will is shown by the following. The will must relate to its bodily object independently of the distribution and objects of the subject's attention. As an illustration of this O'Shaughnessy offers the example of a man tapping his foot to the sound track of a movie while engrossed in the martial events taking place on the screen before him. O'Shaughnessy argues that this man must know of the position of his foot if he performs such an act yet he must know of his foot's position without noticing the position of his foot, i.e., his foot's position does not enter consciousness at its higher levels wherein reside the concept and memory systems. The position of the foot escapes the

attention and thus the knowledge of the foot's position cannot be a thought-mediated cognition. Therefore, if the knowledge that obtains is not a thought-mediated cognition this leaves a primitive bodily awareness as the provider of the knowledge; the awareness being composed from feeling.

This characteristically pre-attentive feeling, O'Shaughnessy names, the 'given.' Its nature is next to be disclosed. At first, it might be thought that 'immediate presence' amounts to the presentation of some pure quale of feeling. But inspection reveals that bodily sensations always come as at some place. For has there ever been a pain as from nowhere, floating aimlessly through space? The 'given' then, is not just feeling but feeling-at-a-place. Spatial location is intrinsic to feeling. It is always possible, if possessed of a pain, to give some rough indication of where the pain is. Further, will not that place be a part of the body? Do sensations not appear as at a place, say, 'in the arm'? More still, if those feelings were to move would not the person whose feelings they were be able to say, "the pain to my right is moving over to my left"? However, "while I can be conscious of the movement of my hand from knee to face, and conscious of feelings in that hand as it moves, I am not also conscious of the movement of the pain in my thumb from knee to face." (160-161 I). The thought here being that the movement of feelings is to be explained by reference to the limb in which the sensations inhere, i.e., a change in the location of the sensations is due to a change in the part of the body that harbours the sensations. All parts of the body are located in a body-relative space; thus as a sensation moves from one part of

the body to another we come to be able to talk of sensations in a body-relative language. The intuition being that it is not plausible to account for the body-relative information possessed by our feelings in terms of those feelings themselves. What sense can be made of left-side sensations and right-side sensations? The account must be given in terms of the sensation inhering in a body part that is indeed in a body-relative physical space. Thus the limb or body part features as an inherent part of the bodily sensation.

Hence, the 'given' is said, by O'Shaughnessy, to be a rich amalgam: feeling-in-a-certain-limb-that-is-at-a-point-in-body-relative-physical-space. The 'given' is a unitary whole such that if there is feeling there are also these other experiential properties and if there are these experiential properties then there is feeling; the two are a bonded package. More importantly, the 'given' provides the presence and spatial properties of the limb and the location of the very sensations that ensure such a 'given.' Thus the will's object - the body - is "inextricably linked with the givenness of the location of just those sensations that help to make it thus 'given'" (167 I). Thus discovering how a sensation comes to have a bodily location will explain how, and in the needed primitive and immediate manner, the will obtains its bodily object. The next concept to be examined is the 'location of sensation.'

O'Shaughnessy, in order to locate exactly which part of the human body harbours sensations, makes use of the after-image phenomenon, thereby exposing the important concept - 'projection.' After-images, with eyes open, are located on walls and floors and yet, since the

after-image is a psychological phenomenon its actual physical location must surely be in the brain. However, as noted, after-images appear as on walls and floors. This same disparity is true of sensations. The concept, the 'location of sensation,' is not complete when it is noted that the sensation as a psychological phenomenon has its home in the brain. There is still yet the experiential fact to be accounted for - the sensation appearing as at some body part. O'Shaughnessy offers the phenomenon of projection as the explanation.

Projection allows for some "psychological item to be experienced as inhabiting something that lives without the mind of the experiencer." Projection is the key to limb awareness. It is responsible for a body part being brought to consciousness and at the same time is the reason why a sensation projectively 'lands' on the "projective sustainer" i.e., some body part. Projection explains both these features of the bodily sensation, for there is a causal story underwriting the psychological story.

To understand the role of physical causality in the phenomenon of projection it will be useful to consider one of O'Shaughnessy's examples concerning projective illusions: we shall use the example of 'cross-patchwork' or, referred pains: A pain has its physical cause in one part of the body but appears as at another di[illegible] of the body. The causal explanation runs: there is a pai[illegible] causes a further interior bodily event, p_3, where p_3 happe[illegible] be [illegible]eepest physical cause of movement in the brain that is respo[illegible]or causing the mental event, 'pain as at p_1.' Thus when p_3 is stimulated the cause of the pain is usually at p_1. However, on such occasions as

these, the pain is at p_2 and hence, the place of the sensation will be incorrectly identified, i.e., phenomenology diverges from causality. This raises the issue of whether the location of the sensation should be identified with its phenomenal appearance or its cause: why favour locating the place of the sensation at the point of its physical cause rather than where it appears as at? Until this is settled it is not really correct to say that the place of the sensation - in this case - has been incorrectly identified! In resolution of this tension, O'Shaughnessy writes, "projection rests upon the foundation of a regular neurologically founded connection between the deepest physical cause of the sensation and its projective site" (197 I). In other words, in looking to discover the location of a sensation it is towards the deepest physical cause that we must look, and it will always be found that the place where the sensation appears as at is nomically bound to the sensation's deepest physical cause. Therefore, the superficial cause may or may not be the site of where the projected sensation lands. Phenomenology then, is in unison with deep physical causes.

It is now time to give O'Shaughnessy's insistence that projection is a psychological concept and not merely causal. The "regular link" above is said to be dependent upon the character of one's experiences. O'Shaughnessy formalizes the above causal story in the following nomic schema. C(auses at) $(p_3) \leftrightarrow$ S(eems to be at) $(p_1) \leftrightarrow$ P(osition at) $(p_.)$. It is the middle element then, the seeming to be at some part of the owner's body, that is said to ensure that the concept of the

'location of sensation' must portray a 'trade-off' between causality and phenomenology.[4]

In examining what this seeming amounts to O'Shaughnessy wonders if the bodily sensation - with its characteristics of the 'given' - obtains those characteristics through standing, via psychological space, in psychological spatial relations that match 1/1 the spatial relations of the body. Psychological space then, would be the explanation of a sensation appearing as at some body part. One would have a sense perception of the body via bodily sensation analogous to a sense perception of the world via perception proper! This must not be the case for O'Shaughnessy. It would, in short, make his characterisation of the will largely untenable. Perception is a mediated relation with the world; the mediation comes through visual sensations. Thus the psychological phenomenon of perception is a composite of visual sensations and intentionalist seeings, where these latter are to be understood as the concept system (in the guise of the attention) taking notice of the data in the organism's visual field (a two-dimensional psychological space for O'Shaughnessy). That is to say, the instantiation of a thought-mediated relation between concepts and visual sensations. Explained earlier, however, was O'Shaughnessy's position that the bodily will must be capable of a relation to its object at a pre-attentional level, and that is to say for O'Shaughnessy, in a manner unrelated to thought. The body was epistemologically 'there' for the will in a non-thought-mediated cognitive manner. All this is just another way of saying that the will's bodily object must be given to the will immediately. For if it

is not, the remaining alternative is mediately, and that demands a composite relation along the lines exhibited by perception, i.e., a composite of sensation and thought. Thus it is absolutely imperative that O'Shaughnessy be capable of showing that bodily sensations do not, cannot, appear as at some body part due to bodily sensations inhering in a bodily sense-field, the spatially arranged contents of which, map, 1/1, onto the body with its spatial layout. If O'Shaughnessy cannot meet this task then his characterisation of the bodily will obtaining its object in a primitive manner via feeling is shattered. For he will have failed to show that the bodily will must relate immediately to its bodily object and hence, that the bodily will does not relate to the body in a thought-mediated cognitive relation.

Since Chapter II of my thesis is devoted to showing that O'Shaughnessy cannot meet this task I intend to leave the details of the above position till then. Before discussing the nature of bodily willing itself it will be useful to reiterate why O'Shaughnessy views feeling as the ideal medium for the bodily will's objects.

Having analyzed the 'given,' two logically necessary conditions for the exercise of intentional bodily action are seen to reside in feeling: awareness of the sheer presence of the bodily object of the will and the spatial properties of the bodily object of the will. But as noted above, it is not that bodily sensation can provide this information that is of crucial importance to O'Shaughnessy but rather, that the nature of bodily sensation is such that the "posture and dynamics of the limb" can be 'immediately present' to the bodily will and thus the agent also.

The philosophical elucidation of the concept of bodily action: the identification of physical strivings with physical actions.

O'Shaughnessy notes that a feature of bodily action is that it does not distance itself from its owner. As O'Shaughnessy puts it, doing is in my world, what is done is in the world. Since observation apprises us of the world it follows that we cannot observe our own acts. Yet, it is through action that we interact concretely with the world. It is in action that the world of meaning - my world - meets the sterile world. It is for this reason that action is Janus-faced; inner and outer conjoin in action. This is important for it reveals that action seems to parallel thought in its interiority but does so, not because of itself, but rather because of its intention origin. The intention, "integrates the act into that intelligible internally consistent network - even as the act manages ontologically to slip through the net" (XXII II). The action being of my world, and therefore not open to observation ... but not really of my world. What exactly the bodily act does amount to, what exactly is its ontological status and thus its true interiority, is to be discussed now.

O'Shaughnessy argues that a bodily action is a bodily striving and bodily strivings, for O'Shaughnessy, are acts of will. Thus, the discussion of the try-event should be understood to be a discussion about the nature of bodily willing. To begin the argument for this identification, O'Shaughnessy considers the following two questions: What is trying? Are all actions tryings? If one considers the speech-conditions governing the use of 'try' then tryings are a very small sub-class of the class of actions. This is what Wittgenstein thought.

O'Shaughnessy believes that the speech-conditions of 'try' are not this term's truth-conditions.

One can desire-to-try, decide-to-try, intend-to-try, choose-to-try, and one can, when ordered, stop trying. Moreover, tryings come as no surprise to us and we can give our reasons for trying. This is enough to establish that tryings have the status of action and event. Our speech conventions would permit us to say that someone was trying if the following three conditions were satisfied. The trying issued from a desire and intention. For the instrumental act a possibility condition would have to be satisfied, i.e., one would only attribute an intentional trying to someone if that person believed that there was a possibility of his/her doing x. 'Basic' acts cannot be restricted in the same way, for you might attribute a trying to raise his/her arm to a person who knew that his/her arm was paralyzed. Further, a doubt or failure condition would need to be satisfied. Thus if a person effortlessly and complacently did some act one would not say that this person tried; the agent must be doubtful concerning the outcome of the attempt.

Taking the example of the instrumental trying, O'Shaughnessy tests whether the speech-conditions are in fact the truth conditions of the try event. If they are not, one needs a context where the speech-conditions (listed above) do not obtain (or rather, any one of them) yet a trying is evidently taking place. An instrumental trying is done out of the belief that what is done is a possible way of engendering x. O'Shaughnessy claims that the agent's believing some particular act is a possible cause of x is consistent with the agent's being certain that

this particular act is a cause of x. He claims that a strong claim of certainty can be co-present with a weak claim of possibility. This passing from the stronger to the weaker claim is exhibited by such pairs as knowing and believing, seeing and seeming-to-see, and these are to be joined, claims O'Shaughnessy, by the pair action and trying. When an intentional instrumental act is performed in a confident frame of mind there is a transition from the strong knowledge - because of the said entailment - 'it is certain that what I do must cause x,' to the weaker belief, 'it is possible that what I do will cause x.' Thus the criteria of the intentional instrumental action is seen to entail the criteria of the intentional instrumental trying. At the very least then, acting and trying are co-present when an instrumental act is performed.

O'Shaughnessy's thesis is that all actions are tryings or strivings, and that these tryings are not merely co-present in any action. Thus O'Shaughnessy has a long way to go yet given that 'basic' acts and 'sub-intentional' acts must be discussed and instrumental acting shown to be instrumental trying. To show all this, O'Shaughnessy tries to establish, as an integral part of his project, that we stand epistemologically to tryings as we do to sensations.

Before illustrating how O'Shaughnessy establishes this tenet, it is worth noting that this issue is not directly related to the discussion of 'immediate presence.' This tenet is important, however, to my thesis, particularly as it is presented in Chapter III. It is not so much this tenet that is important to my thesis as rather, the general discussion of epistemological types. Of especial interest to

me is the fact that O'Shaughnessy allows intentions and motives to reside in the unconscious, for this allows one to pressure him into accepting the unconscious thought process. Indeed, I try to show that O'Shaughnessy has little choice but to accept such thought processes, and that this has serious ramifications for his conception of bodily willing. Thus, what follows is important to my thesis as a building block of my critique of O'Shaughnessy.

Descartes thought that we stood in a single epistemological relation to the contents of our minds. This idea was shattered by Freud, and O'Shaughnessy believes there are no less than four distinct epistemological types obtaining within the mind. Nevertheless, he will defend a notion of privileged access, Conditional Cartesianism, that is an interaction of psychological type and psychological setting.

The first epistemological type is provided by forgetting processes which do not register in immediate awareness at any time; they are necessarily unconscious. The second, includes intentions and motives, and examples of this type can be conscious but they can also reside in the Freudian Unconscious. When ideal epistemological conditions obtain within the mind they can either be accessible to immediate awareness or inaccessible. Pains, and other sensations, instanstiate the third type. Though items of this type can be erred over, this is only possible "at the necessary cost of some form of schism in or unavailability of the attention." Thus when ideal epistemological conditions obtain one is necessarily immediately aware of one's sensations. Finally, mental images - as an example of the fourth type

- are "more or less" fated to enter consciousness. One is unconditionally necessarily immediately aware of one's mental images.

Conditional Cartesianism holds of the latter two mental types; that is, when certain conditions of mental setting are satisfied. Such conditions are sanity, wakefulness, attention not grossly overwhelmed, etc. In such conditions pains and mental images must cause knowledge of themselves, immediately and no-how and this knowledge must be strongly known to be knowledge. This is O'Shaughnessy's statement of a Cartesian privileged access.

Tryings, sometimes, satisfy the conditions of Conditional Cartesianism. O'Shaughnessy's example is a man with a paralyzed limb who is strenuously trying to move it - all his attentive powers focused on the attempt. This is a man who would clearly be aware of any intentional trying that might ensue. Thus tryings are not necessarily opaque to consciousness and therefore are unlike forgetting processes in their epistemological relations to their owner. Nor are they akin to mental images in this regard for they are not fated to register in consciousness. This leaves the possibilities of striving or trying being of the epistemological types - motives and intentions and/or sensations. It was shown above that there certainly are some instances of tryings being of the same epistemological type as sensations but, they can also be of the type, motives and intentions. For one could unconsciously try to drive someone mad over a period of ten years. Thus O'Shaughnessy holds that here and now bodily strivings are of the epistemological type: sensations. O'Shaughnessy calls this, Principle A.

This principle formally runs: if Conditional Cartesianism (C_1) prevails and it seems to a person that he/she is physically striving then he/she must strongly know he/she is engaging in a physical striving; for in C_1 conditions, any physical striving is necessarily given to awareness.

The following diagram makes vivid the epistemological distinctions drawn within the mind by O'Shaughnessy.

Figure 1 does not appear for lack of copyright permission. The figure is an illustration of O'Shaughnessy's that systematizes in a diagram the epistemological distinctions drawn within the mind by O'Shaughnessy. The discussion of these distinctions is to be found on my pages 27 through to 30. The original diagram is Figure 24 on page 81 of O'Shaughnessy's The Will, Volume II.

Fig. 1

Carrying on the discussion now of the co-presence of trying in the intentional instrumental act-situation O'Shaughnessy attempts to reveal that the pragmatic speech-conditions obscure the more fundamental truth-conditions of trying. It was shown earlier that the first two conditions (and very likely the third) governing the application of 'trying' to the act-situation are in fact entailed by the act-situation. This suggesting the co-presence of trying and acting. O'Shaughnessy tackles those who would insist that this is not so because the doubt or failure condition is not satisfied. O'Shaughnessy gives an example to show that even though this condition is not

satisfied still one has a try event. He does so by noting that usually the interest of speaker/listener in uttering/hearing 'he/she tried' is whether the act was performed confidently. Thus one alters the interest in uttering/hearing 'he/she tried' such that the doubt or failure condition is not relevant, and by so doing, one shows that the speech-conditions already listed are not universal, and thus not truth-conditions governing 'he/she tried.' O'Shaughnessy gives the example of some safe-breakers looking out of their jail house windows at the fateful safe when X comes along to 'have a go at,' 'have a shot at,' opening the safe. He claims - plausibly - that these safe breakers have no interest in whether X will perform the act confidently but merely whether X is the next to try.

Having shown that the everyday speech-conditions governing 'trying' are not its truth-conditions, O'Shaughnessy goes on - via Principle A - to show that trying is omnipresent in intentional instrumental action.

From Principle A we know: if Conditional Cartesianism obtains then if one intentionally tries to do X then one must be immediately aware of this trying. And, given those conditions, if it seems to some person[6] that he/she is trying to do x then he/she must be performing a trying act where this act at least falls under the description, 'trying to do a seeming x act.'

Utilising this latter fact and an evil demon scenario, one convinces a person that though he/she thought he/she acted - and in fact he/she did - this was not the case. In this act illusion the person would still have recourse to insisting, 'Still, I tried.'

Principle A guarantees that the person knows this. This shows that in the instrumental act-situation one does in fact try. For if this person - and granting Conditional Cartesianism - believes that he/she performed a trying then it must have been the case that a trying to do a seeming x occurred, and if so, and on the assumption that physical conditions were sympathetic to the attempt, then indeed a trying must have occurred only one now believes falsely - because of the demon - that the attempt failed. A similar scenario and a similar conclusion - one tries when one acts - is true of the 'basic' act-situation.

O'Shaughnessy has the conclusion that all intentional acts, whether basic or instrumental, we strive or try to perform. However, O'Shaughnessy also believes in the existence of the sub-intentional act. Simply, these are acts which are not intentional under any description. As an example of such an act O'Shaughnessy cites the coming to notice-that one is idly moving one's tongue. The reason the act is sub-intentional is that the act issues from no reason that is one's reason for moving one's tongue. O'Shaughnessy accepts Davidson's account that belief and desire together go to make for the causal reasons of any act. However, in the case of idle tongue moving, the desire to alter the posture of one's tongue, and the belief concerning the position of one's tongue, simply are not sufficient to be regarded as one's reason for moving one's tongue. O'Shaughnessy writes, "the bond linking act with belief when one acts out of one's reason, is at once rational and causal, whereas here it is merely causal" (61 II). Merely causal because, "idle tongue moving is neither rational through one's having rational aims, rational through being judged

unobjectionable, nor rational through one's employing means suitable for the fulfilment of those aims" (61 II). O'Shaughnessy says a good deal more about the sub-intentional act but this is enough at this stage to establish the nature of this class of act. In terms of O'Shaughnessy's overall thesis its import is obvious from what I said earlier about the nature of the bodily will and its capability to locate its object in total isolation from thought-mediated cognitive processes. The existence of this class of act will turn out to be crucial in determining the ontological status of action and thus the bodily will. Hence, this class of act will be discussed in great detail by me in Chapter III of this thesis.

To return to O'Shaughnessy's attempt to show that we try to perform all actions. The acts just described cannot support an intention for they are done for no reason that is a reason of their owners. It follows then that striving or trying cannot be <u>as such</u> "directed towards the unrealised future," but that this feature of striving, as we normally know it, is to be accounted for by the normal intentional status of action. O'Shaughnessy gives reasons for believing that striving is present in the sub-intentional act-situation. By the following example, O'Shaughnessy shows that we sometimes sub-intentionally strive.

Scientists are armed (suppose) with an 'inhibitor machine,' and as the neural firings and muscle tensionings of some person's idle tongue moving take place the machine robs that person of the very last event in that sub-intentional act-situation - namely, the event of tongue movement. All that can be said is that this person <u>strove</u> to move

his/her tongue for he/she did not move it and more than mere motor mechanism firing occurred. Secondly, since all actions are psychological events (we shall see why later) what here did occur must itself have been a psychological event; for no event can derive its psychologicality from mere tongue movement. Therefore, some psychological event must have occurred and if the 'inhibitor machine' had not been present a tongue moving act would have occurred, and thus the psychological event that did take place must have been active in nature for again, no event could obtain active status from mere tongue movement.

A further "strong proof" that we sometimes sub-intentionally strive is offered by O'Shaughnessy (97-99 II), but I shall move on - since the above considerations are good support for his contention - to the discussion of the "omnipresence of trying in sub-intentional action." The following argument is based upon Principle A and the conclusion reached just before: that we sometimes strive sub-intentionally. Take the example of a person sub-intentionally straightening his/her leg and suppose that this person is successful in so doing. However, engineered in this person is the "internal situation" of this person trying to straighten his/her leg but failing. Assume that this person comes to notice this sub-intentional event, and granting Conditional Cartesianism, the phenomenology this person will light upon is that of trying and failing. However, by Principal A, we know that if a trying to do a seeming straightening of the leg occurs then indeed a trying to do a straightening of the leg is occurring - assuming, of course, physical normality. With this argument,

O'Shaughnessy takes himself to have shown that whenever we sub-intentionally act we strive. For it is a theoretical possibility to repeat the above scenario with any sub-intentional act. Thus, an even grander conclusion follows: O'Shaughnessy has now shown of instrumental, 'basic' and sub-intentional acts, that whenever we perform anyone of these acts we also strive.

It can now be shown that not only do we strive when we perform physical actions but that all physical actions are some physical striving or other. This is established once Principle B is established. This principle runs: if one tries to do x and succeeds in doing x, then the act of trying to do x and the act of doing x are identical. The problem in establishing this thesis revolves around the fact that it is natural to view tryings as interior events, after all, we relate to them as we do to sensations! However, physical actions include things like arm movement, and arm movement certainly is not of the 'inner life.' Therefore, a bodily action cannot be identical with some trying. Principle B must be false. We shall see that O'Shaughnessy insists that the two phenomenon are identical and accepts that this must mean that tryings cannot be interior events and that this admission is integral to O'Shaughnessy being a dual aspect theorist concerning the volition!

To show that the striving to do an instrumental act is the instrumental act that succeeds, O'Shaughnessy argues as follows. A man tries to open a door by pushing. The act this man tries to do is the pushing. The trying to open the door is the pushing act. Assume that the man is successful and the door opens. How does one identify the

successful act, i.e., the act of door opening? O'Shaughnessy accepts the thesis of Anscombe and Davidson that the instrumental act is the act of making the bodily movements. Therefore, the act of opening the door is the 'basic' bodily act of giving a push, and this is the act that was done in trying to open the door. Therefore, the instrumental act and the trying that succeeded are identical. Physical strivings then are the acts of opening doors and shoving pianos. Therefore, in no way is a trying an interior event as are thoughts. Tryings, or strivings, are acts of will for O'Shaughnessy therefore, a Lockean model of the will as ontologically on a par with thought is an error, and strongly objectionable, so far as O'Shaughnessy is concerned.

The above identification depends upon a trying being the successful 'basic' act of pushing. In O'Shaughnessy's example it is hard to see what else the trying to open the door might amount to, but a proof that the physical striving to perform a 'basic' act is the 'basic' act that succeeds is given. We know what whenever a 'basic' act occurs so also does a trying. If the trying and the act that succeeds are not identical then in the normal 'basic' act-situation there must be two acts performed; a physical striving that is non-identical with the successful 'basic' act. However, it is surely unlikely that two acts are performed! Indeed, the two acts share the same act progenitors, the same effects and the same predicates. Thus if the attempt is rash and wicked so too is the act. It is clear then, that the trying act that succeeds is the act that we manage to do. So again, a trying cannot be an interior event as is the thought event for the trying will encompass such things as the movement of arms, and such

movements are not of the interior! The same holds for the sub-intentional act which is just like the 'basic' act excepting the intentional status. O'Shaughnessy takes himself to have now shown that all physical acts are some physical striving or other.

Earlier we saw that the doubt or failure condition was not one of the truth-conditions of the try event. Now we have seen that a sub-intentional act is a striving. Therefore, part of the first condition that was to govern the try event - that the trying issue from an intention and desire - must also be dropped from the truth-conditions. That is, that the trying be intentional. Further, the sub-intentional act that is some striving or other, tells us that belief as the ground of the possibility condition is not necessary either and thus, only desire remains of the original conditions said to be the truth-conditions of trying. That trying must be the expression of some desire is the only remaining speech-condition that can possibly rank as a truth-condition of trying. Indeed, a logically necessary and sufficient condition of trying, claims O'Shaughnessy, is that a desire to do x should cause some act such that that act counts as the expression of that desire. Thus trying is nothing more than the immediate event effect of a desire to act. "It is will moving in a certain direction. That, and no more" (115 II). Therefore, "all bodily strivings are at once identical with basic act strivings and the expression of act-desire" (116 II).

O'Shaughnessy goes on to say exactly what is the 'expression of act-desire.' The expression of a desire must be separated from its satisfaction. The expression of a desire "is the immediate causing by

the desire of the act that it is in absolutely any act-mechanism condition necessarily tending to cause" (117 II). The satisfaction of a desire is, "the immediate causing by the desire of an act of the type of its object" (117 II). Thus, "the basic act-desire must find both expression and satisfaction when the basic act occurs as a result of that desire; but will find expression alone when the desire causes no more than a striving to do that basic act" (117 II). These quotations give the "flavour" of physical striving, and the following lengthy quotation captures its nature.

> The phenomenon of striving is a phenomenon much akin to the embryo or the bud. For it is such that, in the conditions standardly appointed by nature, it naturally develops into the entity that is the object or goal of the origin entity. In short, we here single out the desire's expression through a law-like developmental property linking it with the desire's satisfaction. (117-118 II)

However, instrumental desire has no natural tendency to generate the type of item that is its object, and this is just because its object is beyond the closed system of the animal. "This ensures that the instrumental act-desire has a merely anomalous relation to its own active satisfaction" (118 II). But this type of act-desire must have a natural tendency to causes something. The clue is given by the purpose of the instrumental act, an act which relates animal to environment. Belief must be operative such that the body relates causally to the instrumental object. The 'something' then is, "a basic act endowed with a certain special property, viz. that of so relating to the belief system as to ensure that it itself appears in consciousness as at least a possible cause of Q' [the instrumental act]" (119 II). The instrumental act-desire then is joined by a 'basic' act-desire such

that the basic act issuing from the basic act-desire, and thus its expression, will also be the expression of the instrumental act-desire. This would be consistent with the definition of trying which was given above, but a problem seems to be that it is really only the basic act-desire that finds expression for the instrumental act-desire does not have an immediate active expression and therefore, there would be no physical striving which was the physical striving that is the immediate active expression of an instrumental act-desire, and this is to contradict the above claim that instrumental acts are a physical striving. This last then, does not look to be possible because the instrumental act-desire has no expression that is consistent with the definition of trying. In solution, O'Shaughnessy makes some subtle scholastic manoeuvers (120-126 II), and maintains that the expression of the basic act-desire is the expression of the instrumental act-desire. The reason being that the two desires are non-distinct, and since O'Shaughnessy rejects the thesis that there are only causal relations between distinct entities, he can maintain that because the desires are non-distinct whatever is immediately caused by the basic act-desire is also immediately caused by the instrumental act-desire. It is in this way that he ensures that the instrumental act-desire has an immediate active expression and thus that the instrumental act is no counter-example to the thesis that all bodily acts are some striving or other.

As was noted, maintaining this thesis commits one to an odd set of bedfellows. There is the striving to which we stand as we do to a sensation and this striving is a physical act that encompasses arm

movement and piano shoving! The seeds of dual-aspectism are here present. It is now time to describe the relation between the psychological striving and the non-psychological surface goal event, the physical arm rise. The precise relation can only be described once a discussion of the ontological status of bodily action is given. For now, O'Shaughnessy provides a reductio to show that the two cannot be distinct. Thus, assume an arm raising is a distinct event from arm rise.

If this is so, then it will follow that arm-raising is the cause of arm rise. Thus acts of walking will cause movement of legs. This means that actions like walkings, swimmings, and pushings will all occur in the brain and thus the act of pushing the piano will never immediately cause movement in the piano object but only mediately so through the bodily effects of the actions that occur in the brain. And it follows from this, that strictly speaking, basic acts will be instrumental acts since the cerebral event of kicking causes movement in the leg. All these entailments of the assumed distinctness of act from surface effect are absurd. Therefore, it must be assumed that, in some sense, an arm raising includes or encompasses an arm rise. All the above absurdities are avoided and additional reasons for the correctness of this identification can be advanced. The origin of the surface effect nomically 'projects' the co-presence of trying-to-do, the surface effect, and the successful act. That is, basic-act-desire and basic-act-intention are "like seeds essentially and regularly directed towards a basic Q act of q-making and hence also towards q" (129 II).

This nomic bond is a powerful reason for believing that O'Shaughnessy's identification is correct. Moreover, there are nomic links between the basic-act-try-q-make, q (the surface effect, e.g., arm rise) and the successful arm raising (Q) such that a physically healthy body in a state of physical liberty instantiates an act-mechanism that is a series of linked events only completed by the occurrence of the surface effect (q). Thus, "try Q, q, Q are nomically linked together in themselves; as well as being nomically linked to their origin[illegible]ce. As bough, trunk, tree are linked together in themselves, [illegible]l as to their originating seed - so it is with action" (129-130 II).

This is O'Shaughnessy's case for the assumption that in some manner arm raising encompasses arm rise. The exact relation can only be discovered once the ontological status of action is addressed. There is firstly, the intuition that trying to cut down a tree is grossly ontologically dissimilar from trying to remember a name yet both are actions. Secondly, we relate to physical strivings epistemologically as we do to our sensations yet, physical strivings are physical actions and physical actions are non-distinct from their surface effects which are plainly non-psychological. Whatever O'Shaughnessy says about the ontological status of bodily action must confront and placate these two issues.

The ontological status of bodily action.

This is an important section for my thesis for a number of reasons. O'Shaughnessy sets out to show that bodily sensations are of

ontological status, merely psychological. Since tryings are of the same epistemological type as sensations, it follows that bodily strivings are of ontological status, merely psychological. My conclusion in Chapter III will argue that this is not so and just because in Chapter II I show how bodily sensation can be viewed as an attentive consciousness at all times, and this irrespective of the state of the attention. However, if the bodily object of the bodily will is an attentive consciousness and thus has as a part of its genesis, thought, bodily willing must be a conceptual consciousness and as O'Shaughnessy's arguments show, if some item is a conceptual consciousness then it has an ontological status, properly mental. If it proves to be the case that body willing is of mental status then O'Shaughnessy's identification of the act of will and act of body cannot be maintained - the body will be in one ontological category, the will in another.

In grand metaphysical style O'Shaughnessy claims there is an ontological divide within the mind itself. The divide is "between the merely psychological and the properly mental sub-sector of the psychological" (138 II). To begin the elucidation of this division O'Shaughnessy lists the characteristics of the paradigm of the mental, the thought event. These characteristics (138-9 II) are notable for two reasons. The first is the place of honour accorded to the feature of intentionality. The second is the statement that the thought event is a content of the stream of consciousness and mentalistically immediately cognisable.[6] O'Shaughnessy says that these last two conditions are not necessary to the category of the mental but that

almost always they are a feature of any mental item. As a counter-example he picks out the forgetting process. This indicating that O'Shaughnessy believes these two conditions of self-conscious consciousness to be always pertaining to the thought event.

In contrast to the thought event, sensations are not intensionalist nor mentalistically immediately cognisable, claims O'Shaughnessy. The cognized sensation event has two parts. There is the seeming-to-have which is psychological and intensionalist and there is also the material object of this phenomenon, the sensation itself, which is psychological and extensionalist. The fact that the cognized sensation event splits into two parts shows that a sensation is not mentalistically immediately cognizable. That is, the cognized sensation event is a sensation coming to one's awareness such that the sensation is noticed and attended-to. It will be seen that it is a mark of the merely psychological that an item of this nature is a possible immediate material object of the attention and thus not an item that is mentalistically immediately cognizable. Thoughts, and the properly mental, being just the opposite, for O'Shaughnessy asks, "is it not certain that I cannot notice and hence cannot attend to my thoughts or my mental images?" (158 II)

O'Shaughnessy proceeds to try to define both categories. The psychological is declared "primitive and indefinable." O'Shaughnessy believes that we know what falls inside and outside this category - anxiety inside, digestion outside - and this is about all. It follows that all properly mental items fall within the category - psychological. This lack of definition will be put to use in making a

clever twist later on in O'Shaughnessy's thesis. Our concern, then, is with, as is O'Shaughnessy's, the definition of the mental.

O'Shaughnessy thinks it clear that psychologicality and intentionality are constitutive conditions of the mental. Though the satisfaction of these two conditions is necessary if an item is to be of the ontological status, mental, it is not sufficient. O'Shaughnessy considers a possible third condition - an item's being a 'consciousness-of' i.e., a slice out of 'the stream of consciousness.'

A consideration of the attention will take us some way to understanding what it is for an item to be a 'consciousness-of.' The phenomenon of perception is a classic example of the attention and its workings. O'Shaughnessy holds to a representationalist theory of perception, thus he believes that the immediate objects of perception are visual sensations. Then the attention is first and foremost such sensations coming to stand in the relation of being noticed - and this is the phenomenon seeing. Being noticed is the type of event which occurs when concepts are applied to visual sensations through the thinking process such that a thought issues with an intentional object and thus as ... the seeing of an orange, say. Thus the visual sensation is senseless: "It is neither 'made out of' concepts, nor 'made by' concepts. It is one might therefore say a mere meaningless 'it' ..." (170 I). By contrast, seeing is, "constitutively dependent upon the concepts resident in the mind of its owner, is always of the form, see as ..." (170-171 I). That is, the attention, in its many varied forms, is an intentionalist phenomenon. O'Shaughnessy writes:

> items like sensations of contact must when noticed by given as of a body part that need not exist, and under a preferred description, they do not themselves as such fall under a preferred description, unlike a visual impression; and this is because their owner's concept-system plays no part in their genesis. In short, it is the noticing of them, not they themselves, that exhibits intentionality. (142 II)

Being noticed, is the event which brings concepts and sensations into a cognitive relation. But a complexity should be noted. O'Shaughnessy holds that the visual sensation can be noticed simpliciter. Indeed, I would suggest that O'Shaughnessy holds the noticing event to always amount to at least this much. But it can amount to more. For one can be thinking about what one notices also, and this is noticing-that. To explicate this difference think of staring. O'Shaughnessy must hold that when one is staring at a wall there is the intentionalist phenomenon, 'seemingly-of-a-wall.' For staring is a perceptual visual event and therefore is as ... and therefore instantiates the relation remarked above. What the noticing - that event amounts to must be this much, and a bit more. One is jolted from one's gazing by the question, "What are you staring at?" A split second later, immediately following thinking about what is in one's visual field, the reply follows, "a wall." This sophistication is not just the thinking process functioning - for this is true of the noticing-simpliciter - but the thinking process made complex by the subject making explicit connections and rejecting others. This might be called, 'active thinking' and it is surely this phenomenon we pick out by the term, 'self-consciousness.' Note: this is my account of what O'Shaughnessy is saying concerning the attention.

What is it for an item to be a 'consciousness-of' then? The

phenomenon of the attention gives to consciousness an intentional object. Some mental items are intrinsically the giving to consciousness of an intentional object. Thoughts, desires, mental images are all examples of such items, and for this reason they must necessarily not be possible objects of the attention. With such items the attention would be running its head up against a brick wall! Here is an important clue to ontological disparity. Sensations, because they can function as the immediate material objects of the attention, are not examples of items that exhibit the property of 'consciousness-of.' O'Shaughnessy offers a sophisticated test for discovering exactly which items do exhibit this property but this property is ultimately rejected as a third constitutive condition of the properly mental.

I now give an explication of O'Shaughnessy's 'The Dream Test.' O'Shaughnessy lists two general categories of waking experience: thoughts, desires, emotions are all examples of what O'Shaughnessy calls 'conceptual consciousnesses': "those in which the experience-of is directed towards its object solely through the use of concepts" (160 II). This type of waking experience has its nature illustrated in O'Shaughnessy's Fig. 30.

Figure 2 does not appear for lack of copyright permission. The figure is an illustration of O'Shaughnessy's that depicts the relation holding between a type of mental content and an object-in-the-world that is the subject-matter of that mental item. The original illustration of the 'conceptual consciousness' is Figure 30 to be found on page 161 of O'Shaughnessy's The Will, Volume II.

Fig. 2

There are also 'those experiences-of where in the attention takes an intuitional object" (160 II). These are O'Shaughnessy's 'attentive consciousnesses,' and sensations are the paradigm of this type. To avoid a possible confusion in what follows it should be remembered that earlier their thought- and concept-dependent nature was clearly delineated. 'Attentive consciosunesses' have for a part of their nature intentionalist seemings; this is important. O'Shaughnessy illustrates their nature in Fig. 29.

Figure 3 does not appear for lack of copyright permission. The figure is an illustration of O'Shaughnessy's that depicts the relation holding between a type of mental content and an object-in-the-world that is the subject-matter of that mental item. The original illustration of the 'attentive consciousness' is Figure 29 to be found on page 160 of O'Shaughnessy's The Will, Volume II.

Fig. 3

The dream state begins as the attention 'shuts down' and thus the dream is not composed of attentive consciousness: "Therefore the dream must be constituted out of nothing but conceptual consciousnesses: one half of which are so to say 'originals,' the other half consisting of mutations in this tropic atmosphere of attentive into conceptual consciousness" (162 II). This is entirely consistent with the composite nature of the 'attentive consciousness' that I described earlier: in the dream one is only left with the seeming ... a thought-mediated intentionalist phenomenon; these seemings are the conceptual

consciousnesses O'Shaughnessy here talks of.

This fact is utilised in 'The Dream Test.' It runs:" Those psychological items that can without-mutation or else without ceasing to be seemings of some kind appear in dreams must be consciousness-of." This is the test that must be passed, what are its mechanics? O'Shaughnessy's thought is that thoughts, desires and emotings "can survive intact both in the dream hot house and the world at large" (162 II). That is, if in a dream one had the thought '7+2=9' or felt sexual desire then indeed, one did have that thought and did feel sexual desire. This feature of thought, desire and emoting, that one desires and thinks in dreams just as one desires and thinks in waking life, is quite general. For the formalized dream test runs thus:

(In his/her dream he/she experienced a T phenomenon

a T-phenomenon occurred in him/her as he/she slept)

T is a mental type (163 II)

Those items then that are such that if they are present in a dream they must in fact have occurred are items that exhibit the property of being a 'consciousness-of.' The contrast with pains and other sensations makes the force of this argument felt. So far, those items that can appear in dreams without mutation have been considered. The other possibility for an item to be shown to be a 'consciousness-of' by this test is if that item can appear in the dream as a seeming of some kind. This is to deal with 'attentive consciosunesses.' It will be remembered that they are a composite of an intentionalist seeming and a sensation. Then what O'Shaughnessy claims is this: that the formalization of the dream test reveals that though I may dream that I

am in pain it need not be the case that in fact I really did have a pain - and this is, of course, as we have just seen, in contradistinction to what is in fact the case if I dream of sexual desire. This seems plain enough: certainly we have all dreamt of being in horrific pain at some time or another and yet awoken fresh for another day in the morning! Thus, while I can dream of being in pain, it does not actually follow that I am in pain. Pains then, are unlike thoughts and other 'conceptual consciosunesses' in this regard, and thus are not examples of items that exhibit the property of being 'consciousness-of.' Hence, we see now that pains are merely psychological and thoughts are properly mental. However, this still leaves seemings unaccounted for. When I dream I am in pain the experience is 'a seeming to be attentively seeming to be in pain.' We have just seen that with such an experience it does not follow that I actually be in pain. However, it does follow, a la Descartes, that if it seems to me that I am in pain then there is an experience I am certainly having - namely, the seeming to be in pain. Thus, in dream experience attentive seemings mutate into seemings. This is exactly what one would suspect from the composite structure of the attentive experience. Simply, when the attention 'shuts down' access to the visual sensation ceases and one is left with the intentionalist seeming, and its nature is that of the other 'conceptual consciosunesses' only that in most waking experience it comes to us as a hybrid of concept and sensation. Thus, as O'Shaughnessy rightly acknowledges, a Cartesian ploy will reveal to us those items which are examples of 'consciousness-of,' and those that are not. As the

formalization of the dream test indicates those items that do possess the property of being a 'consciousness-of' are of ontological status, properly mental.

However, it is not a necessary condition that an item, if it is to be of ontological status, mental, must pass the dream test and thus be a 'consciousness-of.' For, the forgetting process is properly mental but because it is not, necessarily, an experienciable item it cannot even surface to take the test. At best then, being a 'consciousness-of' can be a third necessary condition of mentalism only if the item in question is experienceable. The conditional nature of this condition makes it unsuitable, thinks O'Shaughnessy, for making a distinction of ontological import. Thus he offers the condition of being immanence-less as the third and final condition needing to be satisfied by an item with pretensions to being of ontological status, mental. This last argument is complex and needs both embellishment and comment.

O'Shaughnessy sets out to show that mental items, unlike merely psychological items, lack 'psychic matter' or, what O'Shaughnessy calls, an analogue of matter. To show this, O'Shaughnessy must illustrate that there exists no 'x' that is psychological such that that 'x' plays a role in mental items that is analogous to the role played by matter in material objects. Roughly, if there exists some object (x) which is dependent upon some z for some of its properties and relations then z is an analogue of matter for (x).

O'Shaughnessy's claim is that there is no analogue of matter for mental items but there is for psychological items. Psychological items are immanent in 'sensuous matter,' mental items are not - so the claim

goes. Mental items are said to be purely intentionalist.

To see how one might determine an analogue of matter consider the following example: a gold statuette is flattened with a hammer, and a new object is created from the gold. Later, this new object is flattened and the gold returned to its former shape as the gold statuette. That this is possible indicates that there is some z which persists through the different structural changes and thus these two objects are said to be possessed of some analogue of matter, z. It is the persisting, through structural changes, etc., of some properties possessed by some one object and capable of being cultivated by another, that is the key to O'Shaughnessy's argument. Roughly then, one takes some object (x), list its properties and if those properties are capable of being split into two such that some properties pertain to (x) alone while other properties of (x) can continue to exist and be instanstiated in some other object (y), then it follows that some of the properties that pertain to both (x) and (y) are possessed by something further, z, and (x) and (y) are immanent in z because dependent upon z for some of their properties. Hence, (x) and (y) have a matter analogue.

O'Shaughnessy goes on to show - I think successfully - that visual sensations have a matter analogue. A psychic tattoo artist places thousands of little dots - using some chemical - on the retina of an eye. These dots go to form visual sensations in the shape of Lincoln; a visual sense portrait. The analogue of matter can be shown as follows. The colours of this portrait can be separated from the shapes. It would be possible for the psychic tattoo artist to elongate

the shape of Lincoln while keeping the colour the same or change the colour while the shape stays constant. Thus the categories of colour and brightness can be separated from those of shape and structure. Transformations such as these being possible while the image remains of Lincoln or the constituent sensations are re-modelled into another image altogether. The parallel with the gold example is clear: there is here some z capable of being re-modelled into numerous representations indicating that the sense portrait has features that are constitutive of a matter analogue, and thus the Lincoln visual image is immanent in some 'sensuous matter,' the sensations.

The subtlety of this argument ought not to be missed. It is akin to a micro/macro division, but it is such a division within the phenomenological! The importance of this will be shown later. First, let me illustrate the subtlety involved here. At first blush, one wants to say the following: "An analogue of matter does exist for visual sensations but this is because of their inherent spatiality and hence similarity to material objects themselves. Moreover, this is true of bodily sensations since they come to consciousness <u>necessarily as at</u> some body part. Thus their spatiality is inherent also, and this allows for changes in the spatial location of the pain while the texture of the pain, its "dullness," remains constant and vice versa. This being equivalent to a change in the structure of the pain (the shape of Lincoln altering) and the "face" of the pain remaining the same (the image remaining the image of Lincoln). All this is granted: but where is the analogue of matter for items such as the auditory or olfactory sensation? Can some set of properties be distinguished in

these kinds of sensations to allow the argument to go through? Since auditory sensations do not come as at some spatial location their intensity or texture is not going to be able to be distinguished from anything else. And if this option is not open then nothing seemingly is. For certainly the sound cannot be separated from its pitch since the pitch of a sound defines that sound. Just the same is true of an olfactory sensation: there is no inherent spatiality and the pungency of a smell is inseparable from the smell itself. Nor is the following thought a counter-example to this lack of separable properties with these two types of sensations. While the pitch or pungency cannot be separated off from a sound or an odour, the loudness or strength can. Is there not a parallel in that these last two properties - always a feature of some sound or odour - are capable of acting as the "structure" of a sound or an odour in just the same way as the shape of Lincoln contributes to the image of Lincoln. After all, the volume of the newscaster on television can be increased just as Lincoln can be elongated. But the parallel is not the same. Question: when the volume is turned up on the television do you have more of the same sound or more sounds of the same kind? Now, I know nothing about physics, but I doubt the sound in some way "expands," but rather that the rate of emission of the sound of the voice increases. Thus what you have is an increase in the number of sounds of the same kind. To see this, consider the example of a dead body. It is an unpleasant fact that a dead body begins to smell as it decomposes - and this smell increases as time goes on. The reason it increases, is that more of the body decomposes, more smells are emitted. This fact puts paid to

the suggested analogy. Therefore, visual and bodily sensations but not auditory and olfactory sensations do possess a matter analogue. Therefore, some sensations, but not all, are immanence-less. O'Shaughnessy's putative ontological divide does not exist."

However, and here is the subtle move O'Shaughnessy makes, the issue is not individual sensations but rather complexes built from individual sensations. By an appeal to the intentionality involved in a visual image, O'Shaughnessy wants to be able to show that the sensations themselves are 'sensuous matter.' The parallel for an auditory sensation would be a psychic tattoo artist "composing" a symphony on one's eardrum with chemicals and then re-arranging those same chemicals into a different symphony. This revealing that the macro structure is not just intentionality but a psychological phenomenon with a micro structure built out of different sensations, this micro structure being capable of numerous configurations, each configuration issuing in a different macro structure. This is what I meant when I said that the distinction O'Shaughnessy is drawing is within the phenomenological. There are the visual sensations and their configuration, this configuration presenting to consciousness an image, a symphony or the smell of a sausage. This revealing that there is a macro-micro division within the psychological as psychological. The contrast can be made with Searle when he discusses the mind-body problem. Searle saying that we should understand the difference between the phenomenological nature of consciousness and its physical nature as neuron activity, as we do the table and its molecular structure. O'Shaughnessy is suggesting that this sort of image will help us sort

out what is actually happening when we hear the church bells ringing. This sort of de-composition of the mental has to first take place within the mental and then possibly be carried through a la Searle once the constituents are identified. But here now is O'Shaughnessy's point: this will not be possible of the properly mental. This is what the argument from immanence-less-ness is designed to show.

O'Shaughnessy's claim is that the properly mental knows no de-composition within the mental for it is not constituted out of 'sensuous matter'; it is altogether different from sensations. Take the example of a mental memory image of Lincoln: can differing sets of properties be discovered that constitute this mental image? As O'Shaughnessy points out, one's first inclination is just to repeat what one did for the visual image - the blue can be separated from the shape, the brightness from the structure, etc. O'Shaughnessy claims that this is to confuse the mental image of blue with blue itself. I think he can show this quite convincingly.

The visual image of Lincoln, if it is veridical, should possess the same colour value as the external object (in this case the chemicals on the retina) and thus the sensations themselves are some colour - blue, in this case. I do not find any difficulty with the idea that my visual sensations can themselves be coloured. This is the intuition O'Shaughnessy is gambling on. More, accepting this is just to admit that a sensation of blue is in fact en-mattered. But it seems unintelligible to suppose that a mental memory image of Lincoln is possessed of the same colour value as Lincoln himself, if the image were in the first instance provided naturally, or the same colour value

as the chemicals, if provided by the tattoo artist. For this would mean that the image recently selected from one's memory was itself blue!!! The same is true of shape, of course. The only difference being that not even the sensations come as square or circular! The sensations are spatially arranged within the two-dimensional sense-field. Shape, unlike colour, is a function of the relations between different sensations in the sense field.

O'Shaughnessy then would appear to have his point. A mental memory image is not at all like some macro structure composed form individual sensations. If this is true, then it is purely intentionalist, and the argument to show that the mental memory image is immanent in 'psychic matter' will not be able to go through. The de-composition of the image into its constitutive parts that are themselves possessed of colour and capable of standing in spatial relations to other sensations is not a possibility; and it is this that is crucial to the argument. Note further, that because the de-composition must be made <u>within</u> the mental or phenomenological, it is no good arguing a la Searle that the constitutive brain states of the mental memory image can themselves be re-constituted so as to provide another mental image: an elongated Lincoln, for instance. O'Shaughnessy does not doubt this, but it is at a level <u>too low</u> to be relevant. The issue is whether the <u>psychological constituents</u> of the image are en-mattered. There is no question that brain states <u>are</u> enmattered!!!, and one has, anyway, left the realm of the subjective.

O'Shaughnessy does seem to have picked out a genuine difference between the visual image and the mental memory image. More, I suggest

that if one reads O'Shaughnessy's argument in a certain way - the way I think it is intended - one is also in a position to see that it is true of visual, auditory and olfactory sensations alike. An ontological divide is all but established within the mental: sensations arrayed against mental images, desires, emotings and thoughts. However, a final objection might be proffered.

Bodily sensations initially seem to be a counter-example to this ontological divide. The naive interpretation of this argument accepts that bodily sensations "fit the bill" for having separable properties. But now that the argument is understood as offering a macro/micro distinction within the phenomenological, this does not appear to be so. For what analogous to the symphony is possible of bodily sensations? Before showing a plausible candidate, it might be noted that the quale I offer in Chapter II - stripped of all its spatiality - while being a counter-example to the naive conception of this argument, since in this case there would be no spatiality to be differentiated from the quale - is no counter-example to this "dual-level" understanding. For a plausible candidate for a phenomenological macro-micro distinction is a pure quale sensation of silk, say. It seems plausible that the phenomenology of silk could be de-constructed and its sensuous elements re-aligned to issue in the phenomenology of rayon, say. If something like this is possible then O'Shaughnessy has his point. All sensations do allow for a matter analogue: and if this is true, then O'Shaughnessy's ontological divide would be genuine.

Thus, O'Shaughnessy thinks he can show that a visual image is not intentionality pure and simple by the following considerations. The

sensations in the configuration that make up the visual image of Lincoln may have supported a different interpretation altogether if the artist had intended an image of Lincoln's double or no intentionality at all may have been exhibited by these sensations if the visual image had been engineered naturalistically upon Lincoln or Lincoln's double entering the visual field of the eye in question. The crucial point being that this configuration of sensations, remaining constant in its arrangement, can support a number of intentional interpretations, or none whatsoever. This tinkering with the intentionality of the visual image is possible because the 'sensuous matter' - the sensations - can be tinkered with. This is, for reasons already stated, not possible with properly mental items and thus O'Shaughnessy thinks that it follows that whatever a thought or mental image is about it is <u>essentially</u> and thus <u>intrinsically</u> about that thing; for there simply are no features, other than those which the thought possesses, that enter into the thought or mental image such that there are "left overs" once the thought departs.

This long argument provides the support for the claim that if an item is <u>immanence-less</u> then it is of ontological status properly mental. This completes the necessary and sufficient conditions for an item's being of this ontological status as opposed to the merely psychological. These conditions are: an item is properly mental if it is psychological, intentionalist and purely intentionalist, i.e., non-psychological immanent or "sheer intentionality phenomenalised" or intrinsically essentially intentionalist. These conditions are true of thoughts, forgettings, emotings and desires but not true of sensations

and bodily strivings. Thus O'Shaughnessy's arguments - which appear to be both clever and sound - do seem to mark-off a genuine ontological divide within the "mind." Note: Mind, is understood by O'Shaughnessy to be the logical container of mental items that are of ontological status properly mental. Thus, thoughts, desires, emotings, etc. are all items pertaining to the mind. However, sensations and bodily actions being merely psychological are not strictly items of the mind but rather items of the Domain of the Psychological.[7] Again, this is a logical container, and because O'Shaughnessy does not believe we have any conception of what is the psychological - it is "primitive and indefinable" - his claim, to be described in a moment, that bodily arm rise in an essential part of a psychological event should not be seen as "turning on its head" some conception of the psychological. This fact, helps establish the psychologisation of the body.

The structure of bodily action or the psychologisation of the animal body

This ontological quest into the mental began in the hope of explaining the intuition that the act, trying to remember a name, must be ontologically dissimilar from the act of trying to chop down a tree. This intuition is explained by arguing that the first is properly mental, the latter, psychological. The second difficulty needs a more substantial explanation. Before going onto this explanation a question which O'Shaughnessy discusses should be noted. Can one ontological category cover such diverse phenomena as the sub-intentional-intentional-acting-trying? Both possess the same ontological status,

claims O'Shaughnessy, the mentalistic character of the intentional trying-acting being a 'shadow' of its intentional mental origin. To think that origin might effect ontological status, argues O'Shaughnessy, is to suppose that the mentalism of mental items is not intrinsic to or constitutive of those items. Yet this is very unlikely: for could something indistinguishable from a thought or image fail to be mental in ontological status? If not, why should things be different for actions? Thus whatever the ontological status of the sub-intental and intentional trying/acting they must both be of the same ontological status for the one is internally indistinguishable from the other. Thus, since the sub-intentional action can elude the attention and so is not a consciousness-of and fails to exhibit a belief or concept dependence and thus is not intentionalist, its ontological status can be none other than merely psychological and hence, the ontological status of the intentional act must be merely psychological also. O'Shaughnessy concludes that bodily acts are ontological status, psychological, and since bodily acts are bodily strivings it follows that bodily willing is ontological status, psychological.

Our second difficulty can now be resolved and O'Shaughnessy regards this as the problem of the unique structure of bodily action. As has been shown O'Shaughnessy argues that the act of kicking - psychological in ontological status - encompasses the event of leg movement that its occurrence entails. However, while the act is psychological, the leg movement is plainly physical. How is it that a psychological event encompasses a non-psychological event? How is the

relation of "encompasses' to be analyzed? O'Shaughnessy argues the following: kicking analyses into two parts - the leg movement and whatever remains once the leg movement is separated off. This remaining part is psychological and cannot be identical with the kicking since the kicking includes the non-psychological leg movement. Before examining the relation between the two, O'Shaughnessy notes that this structure is unique. No other item of the mind divides into such a priori determinable parts of such ontological dissimilarity. Action (bodily) is the only such instance and this is significant, and warrants O'Shaughnessy's claim that it is action (bodily) which is the bridge between inner and outer. For action is a psychological event that is at once endowed with an immediate mental cause (very often at least) and yet has as a part a surface goal event that is merely physical. This structure (to be spelled out exactly below) indicates that mind has in bodily action an immediate mediator between it and the rest of nature.

Certain things follow from what has been said, and with the claim in mind that the bodily will has its immediate object given to it sensuously, what follows can be called, 'The psychologisation of the entire animal body.' Psychological events cannot occur outside of the brain. However, some psychological events, bodily actions, have as essential parts, events, occurring outside of the brain, that are nevertheless immediately experienced psychological events. To see O'Shaughnessy's thought here one has to see the action from the inside. What does one find on doing so? One finds the trying event, the act of will, as it were, stretching out before one into the extremities of

one's body, i.e., the will takes its object sensuously and the 'feedback' as one acts amounts to one's body becoming phenomenalised. We know that this feature is a possibility due to the phenomenon of projection. So what one has is the following. There is a psychological event striving that has -a priori- as a part, a physical event. The two are non-distinct but also non-identical. If the striving is successful, that striving part event will have set into motion a series of physiological processes that extend down the arm and that ultimately, if all is working well, climax in the surface event of arm rise. All the while sensuous data are constituting the successful trying seen from the inside. Not that this is an accurate account of just how successful the trying is, how far it extends throughout the body, for there simply is not sensuous 'feedback' through the distance of the arm. If you like, underneath the sensuous data that bring parts of the body into the trying, and thus account for parts of the body being experienced immediately as psychological events - and thus for the psychologisation of the body - there is also a physical story ruminating below and itself constituting the bodily action from the outside, as it were. The imagery of dual-aspectism is vital to understanding the thesis. Schopenhauer claimed that the act of will is the act of body, and that we witness the act from the inside, but that it also has an outside. These are the insights that O'Shaughnessy has re-created for us in what he terms, 'The psychologisation of the entire animal body.' For us the action is a psychological event - and is indeed of psychological ontological status as shown above - and it begins with, and finishes with, a striving event whe[illegible]

dominate. There is the seeming of having tried (see 265 II for O'Shaughnessy's thought experiment), and there are also the seemings of having failed or succeeded, and these are provided by sensation. However, the physical is a silent undercurrent in all this. For as O'Shaughnessy has shown, the striving is the bodily action that succeeds and from this one knows that a priori striving is dividable into its psychological and physical components such that, one also knows that when a striving does not issue in the successful bodily act of psychological status, still the striving to whatever extent it was successful will include the psychological part event and the physical part event. A word on these part events: since it is obvious that one's arm or muscles can move without one's having moved them, these part events of the bodily act must be autonomous and whole events - for they can exist quite apart from the striving. However, the psychological part event of the striving event is not an autonomous part of the striving event for we know that no matter how unsuccessful the striving - even if it were to be snuffed out in the brain - still it must include a part that is merely physical. These facts help constitute the psychologistation of the body. The psychological beginnings of the striving confers upon the whole bodily event the character of being psychological. And we have seen that this character is made concrete by the seemings that constitute the trying for us. It is because we relate to our tryings as we do to our sensations, and because we know that a trying that succeeds is a successful bodily act that we know bodily acts are psychological even though they have event-parts that are not. This introduces the dual-aspect character of

bodily action and a bridge over the causal problem of mind-body interaction. The body and mind are intertwined in the bodily act itself! This is important: the body surface event is not at a "causal remove" from the trying itself since the body is "part and parcel" of the trying itself; it is its fruition.

Thus we come to understand that bodily willing itself incarnates a causal bond between the psychological and the physical; mind and body. O'Shaughnessy illuminates at length this causal interaction of mind and body and goes further in that he unites the intention and striving under psycho-physical law. Thus making clear the path from the antecedents of action, to the willing, to the movement of the body. For my purposes, it is enough to point out with the following quote just how tightly bound are striving and body: "Thus, a primitive element of animal consciousness, the trying to perform a physical act, has as object that which both is that act of trying itself and change in what necessarily harbours a potential for being the immediate vehicle of such tryings" (353 II).

The mind naturalized

I want to close this discussion of O'Shaughnessy's overall position by pointing out that his entire philosophy of action, and thus his theory on the nature of the will, is an attempt to understand the phenomenon of mind as a feature of the animal. O'Shaughnessy believes that if we are to understand the nature of our minds then the first necessary realization is that our minds are those of animals, i.e., the mind and body must not be put in opposition. The clues to the nature

of mind reside in the animal body, in particular, in the needs of the animal. Hence, O'Shaughnessy's pre-occupation with bodily action. Bodily action is the external manifestation of the animal's needs and thus it, and its nature, can be expected to abound in insights into the nature of those phenomena directly responsible for the co-ordination and instantiation of this most vital of phenomenon of the animal world - the animal mind is, and all its mysterious are, to be accessed via bodily action.

With the rationale of his entire project understood it is fitting to describe some of O'Shaughnessy's most fascinating comments. All have the feature of drawing mind and body together, of explaining why, in general terms, the mind is the way it is. One often hears the comment that though scientists and philosophers can tell us how the world comes to be as it is, they cannot tell us why. I suggest that the following, in this sense, constitutes the "Death of God" concerning the mind.

O'Shaughnessy accepts that there is a real distinction between mind and body but believes they have been put in false opposition. The reason that a division between mind and body does not entail an opposition between mind and body is because the mind itself - or more strictly for O'Shaughnessy, the Domain of the Psychological - knows of divisions and just because of the body! The first division noted is that between the mental and the merely psychological. A major difference, not yet noted, which pertains to this divide is the lack of tight psycho-physical law obtaining within the properly mental - O'Shaughnessy accepts Davidson's thesis here[8] - yet a necessary

condition of an item's being of ontological status, psychological, is that item's falling under a tight psycho-physical law. Earlier, a very rough sketch was given to show O'Shaughnessy's claims to this effect concerning the bodily act but it is also graphically true of the bodily sensation and visual sensation.

Sensations - because of the needs of the animal system - must be systematically causally sensitive to the environment. Sensations, and their bodily causes, must - in general - either structurally or qualitatively match the simple structure or qualities obtaining in certain external physical phenomenon. For this reason, and ultimately because of the needs of the animal, a part of the mind - in fact the merely psychological - must be facing outwards to the physical environment. And this part of the mind is noteworthy for, "the obtaining of type-type psycho-physical law, which is the primary encroachment of the body into the mind" (225 II). Hence, one can say that 'the mind has a body,' and conversely, 'the body has a mind,' since it is also true that certain extra-psychological events in the body are attuned to the psychological.

Moreover, one can also say that 'the mind's mind has a body,' and this because, within the mind, the logical container of the properly mental for O'Shaughnessy, there is a division into items such as thoughts, images, etc. and also, desires-to-(bodily) - do and intentions-of- (bodily) - doing. These last are necessitated by the causal interaction that must take place between the animal and its environment. By contrast to those items then, is that region of the mind the items of which are not devoted to the extra-psychological at

all; these items being mental images and general beliefs. Thus, 'the mind's mind has a mind.'

To complete this naturalism of the mind, and its upshot of tightening the bound between mind and body, O'Shaughnessy notes that there is an internal influence of animal body on the mind. A solely sufficient condition of animality, we are told, is the possession of psychological non-mental items. It will follow from the above that all which possess such psychological items will possess, or harbour the potential for possessing, properly mental items. This, of course, being necessitated by the faculties of agency and perception, and these necessitated by the very concept of animality itself. Thus, the mind can be seen to bear the mark of its evolutionary history. The developed body must have preceded the fully developed mind yet the body automatically requires a 'mind's body' within the animal mind, and this in turn demands the capacity to harbour intentions and seemings.... It follows then that the psychological non-mental is the past of the species in the mind, and "the intrinsic presence of the past in the mind is the intrinsic presence of the body in the mind" (225 II).

CHAPTER II

An alternative to O'Shaughnessy's conception of the will: a statement and first thoughts

O'Shaughnessy claims that the will is given its bodily object in an immediate sensuous non-thought-mediated manner. A first suggestion in opposition to this claim might be to point to the Bill Denby's of this world who, with two artificial legs beginning just below the thighs, play brilliant basketball as well as any person with natural limbs. The will is certainly operative, and in a manner not accounted for by O'Shaughnessy, since there is obviously no sensuous relation between agent and limb. This first thought, drives one away from O'Shaughnessy's position to a more Cartesian orientation, according to which the will relates to its bodily object via some thought-mediated relation. Since Bill Denby's will must relate to its bodily object without the aid of any sensuous awareness of his limbs, then notwithstanding the possession of feeling in a natural limb, may it not be the case that people do in fact relate to their limbs as does Bill Denby to his?

Descartes' view of the will was something like the following. Included in Descartes' definition of 'thought' are thoughts, imaginings, sensations and willings; all then, are on an ontological par.[9] Thought divides into two categories: ideas and volitions or judgements. For Descartes, items of both categories are intentionalist. In the III Meditation Descartes writes, "when I will, am afraid, assert or deny, there is always something which I take as the subject of my thought."[10] The division of thought into these two

categories is in fact a division of the mental into two faculties. There is the intellect, the faculty of knowing, whose function it is to perceive ideas for judgement by the will, the faculty of choosing. Interestingly then, judgements are acts of will and for my purposes what is important is that Descartes maintains that acts of will are performed with reference to the intellect. The intellect is the seat of knowledge and so for the act-situation one can assume something like the following is a fairly accurate account of how a voluntary bodily act comes to be performed.

Knowledge of the body is given by the senses, this knowledge resides in the intellect where concept-using thought processes provide an understanding of the environment in the immediate vicinity of the agent. Conclusions of some variety are reached by the intellect for Descartes writes in a letter, "I have frequently observed that what men judge to be the case differs from what they really understand to be the case." These conclusions then are judged for their truth or falsity by the will and in so doing, the will embarks upon a course of action. It should be noted that Descartes regards this last stage of the process to be an unknown. That is, we know the will does provide for bodily action but we do not know how; we possess only a 'primitive notion.'

O'Shaughnessy denies that this is a 'primitive notion' and Chapter I illustrated in detail how O'Shaughnessy regards this "last stage of the process." Descartes' motivation for claiming that how the will causes bodily action is an unknown is just that it is here that the problem of mind-body-interaction is at its most prominent - as O'Shaughnessy points out. Descartes never faced up to this problem. I

think it is a major philosophical achievement that O'Shaughnessy's version of the volition overcomes this problem without any reduction of one or other of the elements of mind or body.

The bodily object of the will then, is presented to the will via the intellect, and based upon conclusions about the body and environment in the intellect, the will chooses, and in so doing, implements a series of physiological developments that ultimately issue in bodily movement. This is the Cartesian act-situation story. Descartes can cope with the Bill Denby example, for all he need claim is that inferences about the body and its location are made from the visual sensations, say, received in the intellect, and since mechanism of a kind is operative, any judgement made by the will can be implemented.

O'Shaughnessy could surplant the need for the Cartesian explanation by arguing that the basketball player actually relates to his artificial limbs only mediately via the feelings of his thighs and the feeling information that his torso carries![11] Denby could only play basketball then, because the feelings in his natural body orientate him and not because of any cognitive relation holding between the agent and his limbs. This reply enables O'Shaughnessy to maintain that feeling is the way in which we relate to our bodies: immediately in the case of our natural limbs, mediately in the case of our artificial limbs.[12]

The Bill Denby example does not trouble O'Shaughnessy's position but possibly the next example will encourage us to view the will as more intellectualistic than O'Shaughnessy would allow. As we know by

now, O'Shaughnessy believes that the will has its bodily objects given to it through feeling. Imagine a de-sensitized body such that feeling in that body no longer exists though sight and hearing remain active. The person with the de-sensitized body is placed on a beam and told to retain his/her balance on the beam for as long as possible. Balance is a function of hearing. Thus, there is little reason to think that the de-sensitized body would simply crumple in a heap on the floor, the person's legs nothing short of jelly! Would not this person just stand there, trying to keep his/her balance even though he/she possessed no feeling in his/her limbs? If balance is a function of hearing I cannot see why this person would not just stand there for as long as possible.[13] But if this is so, then the will is operative even though its object, the body, and the position of the person's legs and arms, is not given to it via feeling. The descriptions 'standing there' and 'keeping balance' are active descriptions for this person as much as any other, thus the will is operative, but operative without the aid of feeling or sensuous awareness. Therefore, from this example, it appears that the will's bodily object need not be given to it by feeling. Hence, in light of this example, we should possibly begin to think of the will as relating to the body through thought-mediated knowledge of the body and its exercise a matter of thought.

This does seem to me to be a plausible example but some may side with O'Shaughnessy and maintain that if all one had was a de-sensitized body then any act of will would simply be impotent. I think we can safely say that the conflicting intuitions here are the following. Descartes would say that granting a mechanism and some sensory input -

examples later will even doubt the need for this - though not feeling of course, the will can operate since the will and knowledge of its bodily object are thought-mediated. The necessary connections can all be made without feeling and thus there is no reason to think the will impotent without feeling. Those who disagree must take O'Shaughnessy's suggestion of the need for a power-line seriously; that the will is a phenomenon bound up with a sensuous awareness of one's body. To decide this matter it is necessary to inspect closely O'Shaughnessy's thesis that the bodily object of the will is given to the will immediately via sensation.

Establishing the possibility of some bodily sensations not appearing as at some body part.

In Chapter I we saw that it is O'Shaughnessy's claim that if there is feeling then there is also the following information: that such feeling is in a certain limb and that the limb is located at a point in body-relative physical space. The reverse is also true; that if this information is given to the consciousness of an animal then feeling obtains. The two come in a bonded package. I will argue that it is not necessary that feeling obtain if one is to possess knowledge about one's limbs and their position in a body-relative space. Indeed, while I shall first of all claim that some other sense would do just as well, I will finally claim that a 'mathematical sense,' radically unlike the senses we now possess, could do the job also. I shall also argue, that it is not necessarily true that if one has feeling then that feeling must contain knowledge of some limb and its spatial

properties. I shall begin these arguments dealing with this last first.

I offer the following thought to show that we can conceive of a sensation as appearing as at no place. O'Shaughnessy believes his treatment of the 'given' is correct irrespective of the truth-value of physicalism. Now, I doubt this. If certain forms of physicalism are true, then at sometime in the future it will be possible to locate a sensation in the brain. Once we have managed to pin-point a sensation we might expect to find that different neurons go to make different parts of the sensation. Why not? Won't the sensation be something akin to a machine with components? And just as different parts of a machine provide different features of the machine, why should the same not be true of a sensation? Then I think it conceivable that a scientist could separate off from the main body of the sensation those features responsible for giving orientation to the quale. And if this is possible, then it would be possible to have a sensation experienced as a pure quale, a sensation simpliciter. Without orientation the sensation would appear as spaceless, as though nowhere.

But would it? Might it not just be a feeling in the head because actually physically located in the brain? Would we not just have an example of a headache? It is possibly for this reason that O'Shaughnessy says that the location of a sensation as at some place is true irrespective of the truth value of physicalism. If we are to settle this difficulty we must consider the concept the 'location of sensation.' Thus it is not truly settled if O'Shaughnessy has, or has not, given us an accurate account of the 'given' in this respect.

Projection was seen to play a vital role in understanding the concept of the 'location of sensation.' It will be remembered that projection allows some item to be experienced as at. Thus, though a sensation is actually physically located in the brain it appears as at some body part. Projection is a psychological phenomenon and it enters as one part of the explanation for how it is that a sensation comes to have a location. In Chapter I, I made explicit the causal part of this explanation and omitted discussion of the psychological part. I wish to remedy this omission now, and to so, so as to highlight a tension in O'Shaughnessy's concept of the 'location of sensation,' a tension that encourages one to view the psychological aspect of the concept as redundant; and the importance of this is that the fall-out from so doing will include the possibility of a sensation appearing as at nowhere.

In examining O'Shaughnessy's comments on the possibility of projective illusions we saw that projection both brought a body part to consciousness and projectively 'landed' on that body part because there is a causal story determining that this be so. The illusion of referred pains is in fact explained by O'Shaughnessy at the level of physical causes. The superficial cause of a sensation connects incorrectly with the deep physical cause of a sensation and this deep physical cause is so 'wired' as to consistently cause some sensation that, because of a regular nomic link between this deep physical cause and some part of the body surface distinct from the superficial cause of the pain, always appears as at some other part of the body. Thus phenomenology diverts from cause.

In Chapter I, I said that the concept of the 'location of sensation' was a psychological concept because it also included in its formula seemings. However, I do not believe that this is really very instructive as to why O'Shaughnessy thinks of this concept - in part - as a psychological concept. I will now give my reasons for why O'Shaughnessy regards projection as a psychological concept, and gradually the root of the tension in this concept should make its presence felt.

The psychological concept of body image has so far gone unmentioned yet, O'Shaughnessy lays great stress upon its presence in bodily willing. He states, "a necessary condition of willing change in a physical object is that it be incorporated into the body image" (231 I). O'Shaughnessy's reason for saying this is that he believes any animal if it is to act at all must appear as a determinate shape to itself. The body image provides this, for it is "a form of physical self-consciousness." (O'Shaughnessy's argument for this contention is on 239 I). An a priori feature of any animal then, is that its body be seemingly present and as a spatially determinate object. O'Shaughnessy believes that this image is constituted by one's deeds. A 'practical photograph' of our bodies is composed over time through our acting such that, "we all of us have knowledge of our limb's spatial possibilities; so that a man will introduce his hand into a cupboard but will not attempt to insert it into a thimble!" (225 I)

What I am particularly interested in, is how this psychological phenomenon fits into the concept the 'location of sensation.' It does so by underwriting the psychological concept of projection. By his

graft-example (233 I), O'Shaughnessy shows that if one did not have a body image, and thus the body not appear as a determinate entity, the animal's life purposes would be severely hampered. For the pain of a new graft would appear as at some point close to the graft on the original body since, O'Shaughnessy believes, it is very unlikely that this new graft would make itself, its extent and shape, immediately felt to the subject whose graft it is. Only once this graft has been included in the body image over a number of years will novel experiences of the kind, 'as at a point on the graft,' be felt. Thus only when a part of oneself becomes a determinate part of oneself via the body image will that body part be able to receive sensation 'projects.' Thus, the mind projects in virtue of the sensation, "landing on an image surface that is a veridical internalization of the body part that lies there, and thereby lands on the flesh itself" (238 I). O'Shaughnessy writes further, "projection requires the existence of the internalised spatially given body part that is to receive the project. This is the body-image. [The] very concept, location of a sensation, necessitates such a something" (238-39 I).

Quite clearly then, the causal story of Chapter I is not a sufficient condition of a sensations appearing as at some body part. However, one's natural inclination is to wonder why this is so if the illusion of referred pains can be explained in terms of incorrect physiological connections alone. Is there not a sense of this "internalization of the body part" being unnecessary? Has not O'Shaughnessy invoked two explanations of the same phenomenon? One might think that all O'Shaughnessy is doing here is giving two

compatible explanations of a single phenomenon at two levels of description. This may be so, but the inter-dependence which O'Shaughnessy stresses to exist between the two, and this enters into the very formalization of the concept the 'location of sensation' itself, would seem to indicate that more is going on. So far as I can tell, O'Shaughnessy entertains this uneasy relationship between a causal explanation of the phenomenon of projection and a psychological explanation of the phenomenon of projection because he does not believe that the causal explanation can explain all the projective illusions. In particular, he singles out the notorious 'phantom limb' phenomenon for especial explanation via the body image (225 I).

The 'phantom limb' phenomenon is explained by the fact that the long-term body image, assembled over years of many deeds, has yet to take into account that the arm once possessed is no longer possessed. And since the body image is an internal representation of our bodies as relevant to our deeds it can take years to amend, via our actions, to a more realistic representation. It is the body image which provides the landing lattice for the projected sensations. Thus with the case of the 'phantom limb' the sensation is projected onto a no longer accurate image of the body and thus the sensation appears as at a no longer existing body part. If this is O'Shaughnessy's reason for believing two explanations to exist - namely, both are required to explain all the different kinds of projective illusions there are - then, if a causal explanation along similar lines to that of O'Shaughnessy's can account for the 'phantom limb' phenomenon, then certainly the body image entering into the explanation of the projection phenomenon, and

then the particular insistence that projection is a psychological phenomenon, will be a redundant and an untenable position to hold. This is not to say that the body image as a psychological phenomenon in bodily action is a redundant feature of the animal mind. Very possibly, it is the case that an animal must appear determinate to itself, and that this determinacy must be constituted out of seemings. What I have here to say passes no judgement upon this but it will follow by the end of Chapter II that the body image need not be constituted out of sensuous 'seemings.'

Then is there an alternative explanation along causal lines of the 'phantom limb' phenomenon? There is indeed, one from Descartes no less! In accounting for the 'phantom limb' phenomenon, Descartes in the VI Meditation[14] gave an account remarkably similar to O'Shaughnessy's. He imagined the nerve- relevant to the arm, say, - as a chord with points ABCD. Normally, when the present and healthy arm is damaged at D the message (carried by the animal spirits, or possibly tension) is carried through points CBA and transformed into the mental event of pain as at D. But says Descartes, if either A, B or C were activated, the same message, pain as at D, would issue forth in the mind. This is equivalent to O'Shaughnessy's deepest physical cause scenario but note, the 'phantom limb' phenomenon is explained in causal terms alone, there is no need for recourse to the body image to explain how it is that the sensation appears as at D. Simply, if any point on the relevant nerve is activated the same sensation issues; the nerve could be activated in the brain and the body not exist, but still the sensation will appear as at some point in/on the arm. If

Descartes' account is accepted, a causal rendition is possible of the 'phantom limb' phenomenon and the causal story here is consistent with O'Shaughnessy's. There simply is no need to bring into the explanation the concept of the body image. Explanation in terms of the body image just seems to be redundant. Not only does it seem that the body image is a redundant concept, but it follows that talk of projection as a psychological concept seems redundant. Does not the causal story reign supreme in explanation of the location of sensation? And if it does, will it not follow that it is possible - with a physicalistic programme assumed-to so doctor a sensation and its causal antecedents such that projection would not take place at all? Then returning to my earlier example of the de-orientated sensation being experienced as in the head - maybe we can now settle the issue. On O'Shaughnessy's thesis even to appear as in the head would require projection, but now we can envisage - with the causal story understood - the possibility of projection itself being sheared from our scientifically engineered sensation.

It should be noted that Descartes, in offering a causal explanation of the 'phantom limb' phenomenon, is not just explaining projective illusion but projection itself. Descartes is telling us that the very character of our sensations appearing as at different body parts is to be explained by his chord theory, and that the 'location of sensation' is to be understood in causal/physical terms. It seems to me that Descartes' theory is sufficient, and so I reject O'Shaughnessy's insistence that for a sensation to appear as at some body part this seeming must relate in a quasi-sense-field like manner to an internal seeming image of the body. It follows from this

rejection, and the imagined causally doctored sensation, that a sensation could appear as at nowhere.

In fact, even if O'Shaughnessy could show that the causal story was not sufficient for projection and that indeed, the body image is required, I do not think this would gain him very much. I think it much easier to imagine the possibility of a sensation appearing as at no body part if the body image is involved in the phenomenon of projection! For I think it conceivable, a la brain-in-the-vat scenarios, to take a newly formed brain from an infant and provide via electrodes a sensation stimulus to the brain such that the quale is there waiting to be projected. Howe[redacted]t is to be projected ex hypothesi there is need of a body image. However, this internal object of the body simply will not exist in this case. Thus, there will be no conception of body-relative space so as to allow the quale to be projected - not even in the head, or brain, rather. Here would be an example, I think, of a sensation as at nowhere.

The first dent in O'Shaughnessy's position is now made. The 'given' is not as he claims. It is possible for there to be feeling - given by sensation - yet there to be no spatial information brought to consciousness with that feeling; for we have just argued for the possibility that there could be such a thing as a sensation appearing as at nowhere. Before going on to show that O'Shaughnessy is also mistaken about the reverse claim - namely, that if one has spatial information about one's limbs then feeling is present - I want to show how the result just obtained, can be used to show that the bodily will may not relate to its bodily object immediately via bodily sensation.

Showing that bodily sensation may relate the subject to his/her body mediately after the intercession of thought.

O'Shaughnessy argues at length against an alternative conception of how it is that bodily sensations appear as at some body part. The alternative conception to his 'given' is that bodily sensations relate to the body in a similar fashion to how it is that visual sensations relate to the world and more, that just as visual sense perception is a thought-mediated phenomenon so too, is body sense perception. This alternative conception is a representationalist theory of bodily sense perception. O'Shaughnessy conception is quite different: the 'given' brings immediately to consciousness the limb and its position in body-relative physical space. I shall now try to show that bodily sense perception may be of a representative nature and not at all dissimilar to O'Shaughnessy's conception of visual sense perception.

I will now outline O'Shaughnessy's - very briefly, since I did the same in Chapter I - theory of sense perception. Visual sensations reside in a two-dimensional psychological space that stands sensations in an [illegible] relations such as 'next-to,' 'further away-from' and the like, holding between individual sensations. O'Shaughnessy does not believe that the psychological space can be one-dimensional since all visual experience presents not only colour but shape and nor is three-dimensional psychological space a possibility either since, "psychological factors like concepts play a causal role in the [illegible] of visual depth experience" (171 I). The place of concepts in the generation of visual experience is important for my purposes. Perception is a composite of visual sensation and intentionalist

seeings; these last resulting from concepts and thought. [redacted] this intercession of thought that is so damaging to O'Shaughnessy's position on the bodily will. If bodily sense perception can be [redacted]ed in a similar manner to visual sense perception the path is cle[redacted] for arguing that the bodily object of the will is a thought-mediated phenomenon, i.e., knowledge of the limb and its place in body-relative physical space is the result of bodily sensation and intensionalist seemings - always. In O'Shaughnessy language, bodily sense perception would be an attentive consciousness and the bodily will would have to function by utilizing the knowledge therein and thus without more ado would be of ontological status, mental.

O'Shaughnessy argues that there are five differences between bodily and visual sensations so as to show that bodily sensations cannot be given in psychological space. The third and fifth I have in part replied to with my scientifically engineered sensation. The fifth, for example, picks out the difference that a visual sensation is simply 'red and bright' and not given inherently as of some object, e.g., a balloon. By contrast, the bodily sensation is either putatively or else, actually, in/on some body part - for example, headache, toothache, etc. I have indicated that it may be possible to experience a sensation as a quale ('texture' or 'feel') only, i.e., equivalent to 'red and bright,' and not of a balloon, i.e., not of some body part. If so, then the fifth difference picked out by O'Shaughnessy can be dismissed.

The third is more subtle but manageable. O'Shaughnessy claims that if a visual sensation fails projectively to 'land' then it still

retains a spatial position in the two-dimensional psychological system within which it inheres. However, if a bodily sensation fails to projectively 'land' it has no place in any spatial system. This is my example of a quale as at nowhere. O'Shaughnessy is quite correct, this sensation would appear as, alone, and not as at. So, here there does appear to be a major difference. The sensation I have imagined escaping appearing as at some body part also escapes appearing in any spatial system (!): how then can it appear at all? Has not O'Shaughnessy provided a reductio of one of my principal arguments against his position? If he has, it is time for my example to become a little bit more subtle. What I now suggest is that our scientist after ridding our bodily sensation of its orientation, i.e., its neurons that provide for its appearance as at, provide some orientation. How is this possible? O'Shaughnessy believes that visual sensations are just that, sensations. And he kindly provides certain features that are common to sensations. One of these is the condition that all sensations, "absolutely must have an extra-psychological bodily cause, and one can state causally sufficient bodily conditions" for the coming into being of a sensation. If it is possible to specify causally sufficient bodily conditions for a visual sensation it should be possible to pick out exactly those bodily events which are responsible for the visual sensation having a two-dimensional psychological orientation. And if this is possible, then I think it equally likely that a transplant be made such that neurons characteristic of the bodily sensation, and responsible for only the quale of the sensation, make a hybrid sensation with those neurons of a visual sensation

responsible for the two-dimensional psychological orientation of the visual quale (i.e., the quale is the bit that is 'red and bright.' This bit corresponds with the quale of the bodily pain that is 'nasty'!) Thus it seems possible to make a hybrid sensation - partly bodily, partly visual. And why not? They are both of the same genus. From the bodily sensation is taken the quale, and added to it are those parts of the visual sensation that provide for psychological orientation (i.e., 'over there,' 'to the left'). Thus I think it is conceivable that a bodily sensation find itself as at no place on/in the body yet find itself spatially located all the same - on a wall maybe? or just like the after-image with eyes closed. This amounts to the bodily sensation finding itself in a two-dimensional psychological space just like the visual sensation. I offer this thought as a conceptual possibility, maybe it is not, but I do not think that O'Shaughnessy has convinced us that it is not.

This claim amounts to exploiting the contingency surrounding our bodily sensations. Of course, O'Shaughnessy hopes to show that this contingency does not exist and it is here that I challenge his thought. The fourth difference listed seems to me to suffer the fate of only being contingently true of the bodily sensation. Each part of a sense field has a sensation value, this is true of the visual field. However, each part of the body is not a continuing bearer of a sensation. There are two replies to be made here. Implementing O'Shaughnessy's own distinction of the attentive consciousness, it might be said that each part of the body surface is the continuing bearer of a sensation - after all forces do play upon each part of the

body surface all the time - but that only sensations of a certain intensity have the possibility of being registered in attentive consciousness. Secondly, if this last was not true, it might be true. Or, it could be the case that a consciousness (of some variety) contain at once the multitude of sensations arising from each point of the body and that judgements be made continuously concerning those sensations and which of them should be acted upon. Thus it is entirely plausible that the body surface be the continuing bearer of a multitude of sensations, and so not unlike the visual sense-field. Three of O'Shaughnessy's five differences between touch and vision in regard to the obtaining of a sense field are inconclusive in supporting his denial of a touch sense field. Since I believe the first two differences can be argued against as above, I think that none of the differences which O'Shaughnessy here elicits for a difference between touch and visual sensations establish why it cannot possibly be that touch sensations inhabit a sense-field.

This conclusion allows the claim to be made that bodily sensations exist, like visual sensations, in a two-dimensional psychological space first and foremost. Then, like visual sensations, they are projected onto the world with the aid of concepts and thought via intentionalist seemings. This allows for the idea that bodily sensations form in an array that it is then projected in a 1/1 correlative fashion that matches the spatiality of the body of the animal. I take these possibilities to establish the claim that bodily sensation may relate the subject to his/her body mediately after the intercession of

thought. This result will allow major ontological gains against O'Shaughnessy's theory of the bodily will.

Establishing that spatial information about the body, that O'Shaughnessy claims can only be provided via the 'given,' can be provided in the absence of feeling.

If there could be human beings - or indeed any animal - that related to their bodies via the sense of smell in such a way as to allow for efficient bodily action, then we would have an example which reveals that feeling is not the necessary condition in human action that O'Shaughnessy thinks it is and more, an example which allows for the possibility of an error that picks out the immediate/mediate distinction very nicely. I offer the following scenario as laying the ground for the possibility of such an animal.

I think we can imagine an animal skin that for each point on that skin there is a distinctive smell that allows the animal - possessed of a sense of smell similar to that of a bloodhound, say - to make highly discriminate judgements about the smell activated when something prods the animal and thus to know exactly where on the body it had been prodded. However, since smell sensations do not have spatial location inherently this animal will have to learn over time - on a trial and error basis? - which smells go with which parts of its body. Thus sensations can be seen to come to give an animal spatial information about its body that O'Shaughnessy claims must be inherent in the medium that provides that information. At one stroke then, this example dismisses the idea that only feeling can provide spatial information

about the body, and thus that only feeling can provide for efficient animal action and dismisses also, the whole notion of a 'given' as such!

This last, to deny spatial information about the body is inherent in the sensory medium, is just to deny O'Shaughnessy's claim of 'immediate presence.' Clearly, O'Shaughnessy is in grave trouble if the body is not given immediately in sensation. I have outlined why this is so, and I think that the above example can be used to show that 'immediate presence' is not guaranteed by sensations of the body.

It is possible for a 'bodily smell sensation' not to be given as at some body part. The reason being the plausibility of the possible following error. The animal just described, which relates to its body via 'bodily smell sensations,' is presented with a new, non-bodily smell sensation and its actual non-bodily location is but one millimetre to the left of its upper right arm; sort of squashed between the upper arm and side of the upper body. I would have thought that it was possible for this animal (or human) to be confused as to whether this smell sensation was a bodily smell sensation that it had never experienced before. And the possibility of this confusion, and possible error, is just to affirm that via a bodily smell sensation we are not immediately aware of our limbs. For if we were, a confusion of this kind would simply not be possible. We would 'just know' that the smell sensation was a bodily smell sensation.

To return then to my scientifically engineered bodily sensations. Here were bodily sensations possessed of a spatial location, because in a psychological spatial system due to the transplant of visual

sensation orientation neurons, but appearing as at nowhere on the body. Only secondarily do these bodily sensations actually project onto the body in just the same fashion as visual sensations project on to the world. The basic datum, or 'given,' on this theory does not include the body part and it was precisely because the body part is included in the 'given,' in normal bodily sensation, that O'Shaughnessy could say that via awareness the body is immediately given to the owner of the body; immediately, because limb presence is logically inseparable from the feeling.

On my reading of bodily touch sensation all of the above would be true of it as it is for smell. Indeed, touch and smell would almost be equivalents. The same possibility for error would exist, and thus feeling cannot - in the name of logic - provide us with an awareness of our bodies that is immediate. There can be little doubt that this is a major blow to O'Shaughnessy's conception of the will and such shall be seen to be the case.

The act of handwriting: a general comment on the implausibility of O'Shaughnessy's thesis

I want to discuss how the will relates to the body in the act of writing. This example of an action seems to me to be particularly difficult for O'Shaughnessy's thesis to cope with. How much feel is there in one's fingers when one moves them? In particular how precise are the feeling messages that are given to us about our fingers? Is it not the case that there is just an amorphous feel, nothing determinate at all? In fact, O'Shaughnessy accepts that this is so. Then how is

it possible for the bodily will to relate to the hand and fingers in the extremely precise way that is required for writing? I do not think feeling is sufficient to explain how we manage to move our hand so precisely and thus that feeling cannot provide enough information about the hand and fingers to allow the bodily will to be operative in the act of writing if the only way the bodily will relates to its bodily object is via feeling. To help illuminate the force of this example let us imagine the following.

I take it that the feel in the tips of our fingers when we are writing helps, on O'Shaughnessy's thesis, the bodily will to move the pen instrumentally by effecting certain motions in the upper fingers and wrist, etc. The feeling in the tips of the fingers would enter - as 'feedback' - importantly into the story of writing for O'Shaughnessy. However, I think we can imagine the following, and if we can, this will show that feeling is not necessary for explaining how the bodily will relates to the body during the act of writing.

The lower arm and hand are anesthetized and remain so for two days or so. Gradually, beginning with the lower arm and spreading down into the hand, feeling returns. However, feeling never returns to the part of the fingers below the last joint of those fingers, i.e., the tips of the fingers remain de-sensitized. Other than this though, the hand and arm returns to normal. Would there be a loss of control over this hand such that the person could no longer write with it? Only the tips of the fingers of this hand are possessed of no feeling: does this (!) make the hand totally useless for writing? I find it hard to believe so. More, if you now move your finger you will see - if your fingers

are anything like mine! - that it is not possible to move that part of your finger, from the last joint down, without making use of the mechanism in the upper part of the finger; the middle joint always seems to move if the lower joint does. This suggests that in my example the important part of the finger for motion in the finger will still fall in the domain of the feeling hand. However, the 'feedback' about the position of one's finger (its most extreme point) is no longer given and yet it could seemingly still be moved because the mechanism responsible for movement is still encased in feeling. Therefore, being able to write does seem possible without feeling in the hand's finger tips, and thus the will is operative in that part below the last joint but not because of feeling; unless one was to maintain that one then moved the finger tips instrumentally but this is implausible. Yet, on O'Shaughnessy's account of writing, and the will's bodily object, writing should not be possible. This indicates that the bodily will can still function if a part of the body that enters into an action is not given via feeling. This moves us more towards an intellectualistic reading of how the will's bodily object is given epistemologically and reduces our commitment to the thought that the will needs a sensuous 'power-line' if it is to operate.

This is to arrive back at Descartes, and the view that if there is an operating mechanism, but no feeling, still the bodily will will be able to secure its object for it does so via thought. This brings us back to the balancing beam example. The Cartesian believes the person on the beam could actively strive to maintain their balance even though their body was de-sensitized. The O'Shaughnessian does not see this as

a possibility. The writing example seemed to show that the will was operating in a part of the body that was de-sensitized. Then I suggest the following: A person is writing a very important history paper - facts are "flying" through his/her head - his/her consciousness consumed by this task. Then let us suppose that we, from afar, begin to slowly de-sensitize the hand, the tips of the fingers, then the fingers and then the hand and so on the shoulder, such that the limb has no sensuous feel at all. Again, I am inclined to say that since the mechanism is unaffected, and this person knows what to write and how to write, this person will write! This just seems to me something that is possible ... but I do not pretend to have shown that it is. Note: in the example I assume that visual data locates the bodily object and that it would be sufficient to ensure the writing act's co-ordination.

Showing that the bodily will may relate to its bodily object in a purely intellectualistic manner

The following example I hope will show how it is entirely consistent for an animal to be possessed of senses, and its limbs be given to it epistemologically via sense, and yet for the animal to relate to its limbs intellectualistically. I want to suggest the possibility of a non-sensuous sense! By showing the possibility of such a sense in an animal with no sensuous sense the way will be open for the re-introduction of the five sensuous senses to this animal and thus for the limbs of this animal to be given to it via the senses but for the animal to retain its relation, for action and thus also for the

bodily will, to its limbs via this non-sensuous sense.

I think we can imagine an animal with an intellectual sense. The nerve endings of the animal are stimulated at some certain point by a cigarette end and messages transmitted to the brain. These messages once in the brain relate to consciousness, after having been assessed on some computer-like unconscious mechanism, as mathematical co-ordinates of the pain and simultaneously - on a richter-type damage scale - the intensity of the damage to the skin is also registered. The place of the damage is obviously given by the co-ordinates, say, '24, 10 left,' and by use of a numbered grid of the body (a mathematical body image) the place in body-relative space is locatable exactly, while the serious/non-serious nature of the damage is registered on a scale of 1 to 10 analogously to, a quale described as a 'dull throb' or 'stab.' Relating to its body through the grid and co-ordinates, action - in the manner of a Cartesian judgement? - can then be embarked upon by this animal to remove the limb from the offending burning cigarette end. Here then, is a quite reasonable example of a non-sensuous sense, and an example which shows the will's object being given to it non-sensuously. Interestingly, a behaviourist test would discern no difference between this animal and any other animal in its ability and quickness to avoid a damaging extra bodily phenomenon. More, a behaviourist test would reveal no difference between this animal with only this intellectualistic sense and the actions it performed, with those after the introduction of the sensuous senses. And this is what we now imagine: gradually the senses become operative in this animal, and just as in most, or all animals, feeling brings to

consciousness its body parts. But why need we suppose that this animal then changes the manner in which it relates epistemically to its body in a way relevant to the bodily will? If the mathematical sense catered for efficient action, I see no reason why such a change would occur. Thus here would be an animal which related epistemically to its body in two ways - intellectually and sensuously. However, the bodily will of this animal relates in the first manner, and thus in a way dismissed by O'Shaughnessy. For my purposes what is most interesting about this example is that it shows that it is possible for an animal to relate in two distinct ways to its body and, ultimately, to relate in a way relevant to action, non-sensuously. I do not believe then that O'Shaughnessy can dismiss the possibility that this is in fact how humans, and existent animals, relate to their limbs and thus how the bodily will relates to its object - the body.

O'Shaughnessy lists three ways in which the agent might possibly stand to his/her body. The first of these is called, Immediate non-sensuous intuition. O'Shaughnessy thinks this manner may be bona fide but doubts it. Here, the attention passes onto its object without the mediation of anything distinct from the object itself, and without sensation. Parts of my previous discussion are sympathetic to this way of relating to the body, though not completely so. Certainly, I have tried to show how the attention might relate to the body non-sensuously, but I seriously doubt that it can be established that the attention passes immediately and thus intuitionally onto the body. Similar arguments that I applied against O'Shaughnessy's own position, Immediate sensuous intuition, such that I showed that the attention

does not logically pass immediately onto the body, apply to my own position. The co-ordinates of the body part effected show up on a body grid, or radar screen, but are not logically compelled to do so. Just as I tried to show against O'Shaughnessy's position, it might be possible to experience a pure quale as at nowhere at all, i.e., in no spatial position, and it is surely a possibility to have an experience of a sensation as 'over there,' and not as at some body part. Here, also, it is certainly possible for a registering on the richter-scale alone, and certainly possible for a set of co-ordinates to appear but not in body-relative space, i.e., not locatable on the body grid. I actually doubt some logical bound as O'Shaughnessy contemplated in his 'given' does really exist,[15] and so possibly the only category that O'Shaughnessy provides that is plausible is, Mediate sensuous intuition. The idea here is that the attention passes onto the body by first attaching itself to a sensuous field that stands in a 1/1 correlation with the body. I think that this mediation is very possibly necessary! I have serious reservations about the immediate category. I offer my own fourth alternative to the above possibilities, Mediate non-sensuous intuition. In fact, my example is further evidence for bodily "awareness" coming via a sense field contra O'Shaughnessy.

The 'given' as a logically necessary composite of feeling and spatial information is not a feature of this sense and not because it is non-sensuous. Rather, it is because the logical possibilities for richter values without co-ordinates, etc. are really very numerous. Of the conditions said to pertain only to visual perceptions such that

only they could be thought of as inhering in a sense field, all can be seen to be satisfied by this body sense. Therefore, a body sense can be viewed as an array of sensations composing a two-dimensional sense field. Two things need to be said: First: the best argument for this is that this sense only works when richter values, co-ordinates and body grid coalesce; only then does one have a functioning body sense. The most important factor being, as far as O'Shaughnessy's argument goes, that if co-ordinates and richter values appear, but not within the body screen and hence, not in body-relative space, the "sensation" is simply 'over there.' Second: though I regard this 'mathematical sense' to be a purely intellectualistic sense, as thus so call it, I do so because this is what I refine it to be - ultimately. The sense is rich. I come to think of it as providing 'conclusions' about the body but at this stage one can literally think of it as a sense. Hence, I do not see my making use of the example to also show the possibility of a body-sense field as "foreign" to the "spirit" of the example.

Conclusion: a move towards Descartes' conception of the bodily will.

It is now necessary to draw together the conclusions of this chapter and indicate what they mean for O'Shaughnessy's thesis and a possible alternative.

While in parts of this chapter, I have been trying to offer some considerations that might draw one to a Cartesian stance on the will, I have been principally concerned with picking holes in O'Shaughnessy's own argument for how it is that the bodily will has its bodily object given to it. Then of the constitutive parts of this argument, I

concentrated upon showing that there is no logical force to the claim that the 'given' must necessarily present the body part wherein are located those sensations that constitute the given. By showing this, I proved that there is no logical force to the claim that we relate to our limbs via sensation immediately. However, this is not to show that we do not in fact do so, and thus O'Shaughnessy could come to rest his thesis upon a contingent claim that as a matter of fact we relate to our limbs via sensation immediately. This may very well not be the case though . O'Shaughnessy gives a number of features that can be taken as characteristic of why visual sensations inhabit a two-dimensional sense field. I take myself to have shown that bodily sensations can be viewed as possessing those features also. Therefore, I have made a case for why we might relate to our bodies mediately via sensation and the follow on from this, why the will might relate only mediately to the body if its bodily object is given via sensation. Then to make this suggestion concrete I offered my own example of a purely intellectualistic sense.

Via my 'mathematical sense' example, I can show that the suggestion about 'conclusions' concerning the state of the body can be taken quite literally. Making use of Descartes' causal theory of projection, I suggest that "information" about the body is carried via physiological processes - animal spirits, for Descartes - to the brain. The "information" about the body being veridical because of the established causal regularity. Once at the brain, the "information" mutates not into sensations but effectively, into 'conclusions' about the state of the body. The phenomenological aspect of bodily

information is cut out of the picture altogether, but this does not hinder knowledge of the body. Hence, the bodily object of the will is 'there' for the will and since this is so, it seems simply obstinate to deny that a de-sensitized body would simply fall outside of the domain of the will. To return to my person writing the exam or balancing on the beam then. Since mechanism is operational, and I am assuming that in some sense mechanism or physiology provides the data or "information" about the body, I think we can see that it is becoming implausible to deny that this person would not be able to balance or write. Certainly, if this is denied because the absence of feeling would entail an absence of body spatial information - and this was why the examples were faulted - then this denial is groundless. A principal objection to a Cartesian model of the will must then be abandoned.

The conception of such a sense, and with it the conception of how the bodily will might attain its bodily object without a sensuous 'power-line,' is corroborated by an experiment noted by Searle in Intentionality (Searle 147). Psychologists have documented people who can report accurately on what objects are before them and can do so without the obtaining of visual sensations. For Searle, this "blind sight" indicates that the intentional content of sight is based upon "optical stimuli" and not upon "visual experience." This "seeing" without visual sensations is just the possibility envisaged above: a bodily "awareness" based upon "bodily stimuli" but no feeling. These examples may be to endorse the category of Immediate non-sensuous intuition where there does exist a 'given,' as O'Shaughnessy thinks,

presented to the subject in "bodily stimuli." However, I am inclined to think not for the simple reason that there is no logical force to the notion of the 'given.'

Thus I have pressed throughout this chapter for understanding the awareness of our bodies as mediated to us through thought. This is Descartes' position, and some of the examples given suggest that it is the correct position. To show what this means for O'Shaughnessy's conception of the will we shall put these results in his own language. As stated in Chapter I, it is a central concern of O'Shaughnessy's to show that 'immediate presence' is a reality, for then he can maintain that bodily sensations are not like visual sensations in needing to inhere in a two-dimensional psychological space that co-ordinates them as at some body part. Chapter II has shown that O'Shaughnessy cannot maintain this disparity between bodily and visual sensation. Bodily sense perception could be, and is if mathematical sense is the true state of affairs, akin to visual sense perception in that it relates to its object via psychological space. If bodily sense perception is thus akin to visual sense perception then on O'Shaughnessy's own terms it is a thought-mediated relation. Since the bodily will must have its bodily object 'there' for it to operate, bodily willing is seen to be a thought-mediated phenomenon. Chapter III shall explore the ramifications of this in terms of the ontological status of bodily willing, but remembering Chapter I it should already be clear that it cannot be as O'Shaughnessy claims. It is not to over-estimate the results of Chapter II to regard them as devastating - so far as O'Shaughnessy is concerned.

CHAPTER III

The unconscious thought event: an introduction.

In Chapter II the possibility of a thought-mediated bodily object for the bodily will was shown. This was shown through a variety of means but principal among these was the critique of O'Shaughnessy's own position and what this told us of the possible relation between subject-sensation - body. This critique, leads to a revision of O'Shaughnessy's position on the nature of bodily willing. O'Shaughnessy had wanted to maintain that the bodily object of the bodily will was epistemically secured in an immediate primitive fashion: through bodily sensation that established a sensuous 'given' of limb presence and spatial data concerning the limb. The revision that comes out of the results of Chapter II is that the bodily object is epistemically 'there' for the bodily will only after the intervention of thought processes. There are two options here: either the bodily object is the "finished product" of information processing at a non-conscious level or the bodily object given in sensation only relates to the body after intentionalist seemings project the bodily sensations onto the body with the aid of concepts.[16] In both cases, the bodily will can only relate mediately to the body; only once thought - of some description - has enabled the body to be epistemically 'there' for the will. That the body is mediated through thought, eliminates the primitiveness that O'Shaughnessy takes to characterize bodily willing. It might be noted that this primitiveness of bodily willing is said to pertain in a number of ways: I am only concerned with showing that bodily willing is not cognitively 'simple'

in the way that O'Shaughnessy thinks it is. To this revision, O'Shaughnessy's immediate objection shall be that bodily willing simply cannot be dependent upon the body being 'there' via thought. If thought were involved, O'Shaughnessy would argue, then I could never act unawares. But this I precisely do do, e.g., the foot-tapping to the music while engrossed in the film. It will immediately be seen, that here, O'Shaughnessy is the Cartesian: one must be aware of one's thought processes. Then the roles are now reversed, for I do not believe that this is so, and I shall try to show that this is not so.

As we saw in Chapter I, O'Shaughnessy gave as a paradigm example of a content of the self-conscious consciousness the thought event. Finding an alternative to this Cartesian conception of thought is a vital task if the intellectualistic position is to be able to provide an adequate explanation of how thought is involved in a bodily action done unawares. Then the pre-occupation of this third chapter is to reveal two conceptions of unconscious thought processes. I shall show the possibility of the unconscious thought process that is conceptual, rational and logical i.e. just like a conscious thought excepting its conscious status. I do this by an appeal to Freud. This is an important demonstration for it is conceptual, rational, logical thought that O'Shaughnessy believes must be conscious. It is thought <u>just like</u> conscious thought, that I aim to show exists at an unconscious level, and thus that such thought could mediate the bodily will. Such thought, I term "free-floating" thought. This kind of thought process is different from the more regimented thought process - that is also conceptual, rational and logical - which is so dear to the cognitive

psychologist. I think that this somewhat more "mechanical" thought process plays a very important role in bodily action; a role overlooked by O'Shaughnessy.

In reference to O'Shaughnessy's epistemological map of the mind, illustrated in Chapter I, the intuitive difference between these two kinds of unconscious thought process can be picked out in terms of their different epistemological types. The Freudian unconscious thought process is, not surprisingly, of the second epistemological type listed by O'Shaughnessy; that type which may or may not, given Cartesian Conditionalism, become conscious. The thought processes of cognitive psychology are of the first epistemological type; that type that can never be conscious - they are like O'Shaughnessy's forgetting process. I take Fodor to be picking out this fact when he claims that the perceptual mechanism that is constituted by information processing is "cognitively impenetrable."

In Chapter III then, I shall make my case for the unconscious thought process and its ramifications as regards bodily willing. Dennett is mentioned first since he helps understand the possibility of behavourial control that falls outside of consciousness. This discussion leads to the first claims for the existence of the unconscious thought process that is conceptual and rational. Dennett basically solves the problem of the 'action unawares' that also involves thought. The sub-intentional act is then shown to be a myth: Freud, Fodor and Dennett help establish this. Arguments are then forwarded to show the need for sub-terranean thought processes of the information processing variety in the bodily act-situation, and a

defence against Ryle is staged in this regard. Finally, I draw some conclusions about O'Shaughnessy's thesis of bodily willing as ontological status merely psychological.

Dennett: an explanation of the 'unawares act' as involving thought

To arrive at an anti-Cartesian conception of thought, I shall begin to making mention of the work of Dennett. It shall be seen that Dennett endorses the unconscious thought process of the information processing kind as an explanation of bodily action that the agent is paying no attention to. This example of an unawares act is very different from O'Shaughnessy's idle tongue movings, etc. Dennett claims that the piano player can play very beautiful, complicated music his/her mind "elsewhere." The only time this person need pay attention, thinks Dennett, is when a mistake is made. To make this claim plausible, Dennett argues that 'awareness' is a confused concept and that there are in fact two very distinct ways in which one can be aware. The following distinction seems to be very O'Shaughnessian but in fact it is not.

I: A is aware$_1$ that p at time t if and only if p is the content of the input state of A's 'speech centre' at time t.

II: A is aware$_2$ that p at time t if and only if p is the content of an internal event in A at time t that is effective in directing current behaviour.

II is not to endorse immediate bodily awareness as the explanation of behavioural control. This should be obvious from the example of the piano player. Dennett claims that the piano playing when the pianist's

mind is "elsewhere" is the result of behavioural control at level, $aware_2$. Thus even with his/her mind "elsewhere," the pianist is aware of the notes on the page, the phrasing of the notes, the position of his/her fingers and feet. $Aware_2$ is quite capable of sustaining very sophisticated behavourial control. The piano playing only enters $aware_1$ when a mistake is made, then behaviour is commanded through the "speech centre."

To some, this might seem totally implausible - it certainly would to O'Shaughnessy. But Dennett can hold to this position because of the appearance of the term 'content' in the distinction and how he understands this term. It is this 'content' which prevents the behavourial control from being mere behavourial control and thus constitutes a rejection - in this role - of immediate bodily awareness.

Dennett believes that it is possible to ascribe content to neural states and events. Then what it means to talk of 'content' is to regard an internal state of the brain as somehow relating to the external world, i.e., having a reference in the world. An incomplete way of securing this reference is to regard an "afferent event" or input event in the brain as "reporting upon" some stimulus caused in the body by some feature of the external world. Then what an "efferent event" - one leading to behaviour in the animal - can be said to "mean to" the animal is what the animal does with it. Content then - in part - is related to appropriate behavourial response. "That the stimulus does not mean danger to him would be abundantly clear from his reaction." Dennett also writes, "the criterion for intelligent information processing must involve this behavioural link...."

Behaviour is the result of interactions between neural events that both reflect the world and respond to it. This reference to the world, Dennett renders as the content of the neural state. This content allows a particular verbal expression to be associated with the event and this completes the securing of reference. Thus an "afferent event" of some animal may be associated with the expression 'food,' and this could be said to be the meaning available to the neural state. In this manner one can build the conception of a physical system as an Intentional system, such that one can talk of this "afferent event" as the belief that there is food nearby. Dennett's programme is to make us accept that we can quite literally talk of brain states as instanstiating concepts.[17]

With this understanding of what a concept can amount to, it is time to return to the level of awareness which Dennett calls, '$aware_2$' since this is of especial interest to me. When talking of the piano player as $aware_2$ of all that he/she is doing in playing the music Dennett is meaning that concepts are at work; thought processes are occurring and these are the explanation of the pianist's achievement ... one is not witnessing magic! Then Dennett offers an example of an action that is the result of thought and concepts, and yet the whole goes on unawares. Since this, for many, is difficult to countenance, this conception of thought[18] shall be elaborated throughout this chapter. Let us take stock of what one of its implications would be.

A challenge to the existence of the sub-intentional act

O'Shaughnessy endorses the existence of the class of bodily acts known as 'sub-intentional.' A part of their nature was discussed in Chapter I. Their nature will be examined more fully in response to my suggestion that, in fact, this class of bodily acts are intentional. O'Shaughnessy insisted that a pre-requisite for judging these acts to be intentional must be that we are able to ascribe a reason that is the owner's reason for carrying out such an act. Then O'Shaughnessy's example of an act failing this test is an 'idle' tongue moving. To examine this category we shall begin with the following question: could the position or movement of our tongues be a rational concern to us in our minute to minute, hour to hour, activities? If it is, it will have to be shown how at all (most?) moments of the day the position and state of our tongues can be registered in our concept and belief systems such that rational concerns, expressed via thought, can determine intentional states about our tongues.

This should no longer seem such a tall order given that Dennett has indicated how brain states can be seen to instantiate concepts. But more, he has indicated how these concepts can operate in the control of behaviour at the aware$_2$ level; even to the extent of governing sophisticated piano playing. How much more then can we say that the movement, or position , of our tongues could be registered by concept using thought processes in the brain at the aware$_2$ level! And that it is this awareness which accounts for behavioural control of the tongue. What makes me think this quite plausible, is the parallel between the mistake of the piano player and the possible unusual

occurrence with one's tongue. For imagine you are talking to someone and all of a sudden your tongue "pops" out of your mouth.....certainly entering level, aware$_1$. This parallel is altogether plausible and so suggests, on Dennett's terms at least, that the tongue is throughout the day, a registered item in the brain, at level aware$_2$. I like Dennett's distinction, and it might seem all the more reasonable to apply it to the case of the tongue for certainly the tongue enters into our body image and, since our bodily comfort is a rational issue throughout the day, why should not the comfort of our tongues be likewise?

To be honest, one could in this case just say that the tongue enters aware$_1$ when something unusual happens or when it is needed for some purpose. One might deny as O'Shaughnessy would, that it was prior to this, in level, aware$_2$.

Thus O'Shaughnessy's interpretation might seem as reasonable as that which I endorse. However, I think the more appropriate interpretation comes to view in the following manner. In criticizing Skinner, Chomsky argues that the ability to learn some new piece of verbal behaviour is to be accounted for by the complexity of the grammar "that each individual has somehow and in some form internalized." That is, recognizing a new sentence is not achieved "because it matches some familiar item in any simple way" but rather, "because we are somehow capable of determining the process by which this sentence is derived in this grammar.". (Block 59)[19],

This is to postulate a deep generative grammar that, as we shall see later in this chapter, is very remote from consciousness.

Analogously, Dennett might reply to O'Shaughnessy, that behavourial control at the aware$_2$ level is the explanation of our ability to use our tongues in a conscious manner for some specific purpose. That a conscious ability to move our tongue is in fact based upon a non-conscious ability of behavourial control that is very often exercised at the level, aware$_2$. This would be to say that our conscious utilisation of the tongue makes use of a non-conscious ability of tongue control that is akin to consciousness making use of a non-conscious generative grammar that"goes into action" to provide consciousness with an understanding of the new sentence it has just heard. Then behavioural control of the tongue at aware$_2$ level is responsive to the needs of the "executive branch" of the mind but that the consciously exercised ability of tongue movement is in fact to be explained by , as is language acquisition, abilities functioning at a level of brain activity other than consciousness. The putative idle tongue movement, I would claim, is an example of that ability being exercised at a non-conscious level - aware$_2$ in Dennett's terminology - and a reason for its actually being moved, and thus the ability being exercised, I would account for in terms of bodily comfort. Reasons have been given for why we might think the position of our tongues a rational concern to us throughout the day and more, that behavourial control is exercised over our tongues at all (most?) moments of the day via aware$_2$. However, if we are here to talk of "behavourial control" then somewhere along the line intention needs to make its presence felt. This is how it seems to me, but not for Dennett. So far as I can discern, in Content and Consciousness, Dennett never actually

discusses how intentions fit into behavioural control at level, aware$_2$. Indeed, he seems to be blatantly inconsistent, or just wrong, when he writes, "for an action to be intentional . . . the actor must be aware$_1$ of the action under that description" (Dennett 170). Does Dennett seriously think that the piano playing is unintentional? It has been suggested that Dennett's definition of intentionally is really a definition of "intentionality for the purposes of legal and mundane accountability." That is, Dennett does not concern himself with the "full scope" of the intentionality issue. Dennett aside then, O'Shaughnessy sees this as an issue, and so do I. Let us take it then, that for all (most?) of the time tongue position and movement are rational concerns of people and that the movement, even when unnoticed, is controlled. I must now show that this control can be intentional. If I can do so, an all important class of action for O'Shaughnessy's theory - the sub-intentional act - will be shown to be a myth.

Showing that the paradigm example of the sub-intentional act is in fact intentional

Dennett can be seen to have given a guide on how to show that an intention is involved in idle tongue moving; for he has shown the possibility of unconscious thought processes that are at once conceptual and rational. But it is O'Shaughnessy himself (!) who really provides the lead, for we have seen that he is quite willing to accept that there exist intentions, beliefs and desires in the Freudian Unconscious. For instance, he has no trouble in accepting that someone might harbour an unconscious intention to drive someone mad over a

period of ten years. O'Shaughnessy believes this demands, "unconscious beliefs concerning the vicissitudes of the active means (to be) employed" in the action that the intention causes, "for how else would one know what next to do when mid-way through, and how would one know when to stop?" (62 II). Clearly, this allows that unconscious conceptualized beliefs exist and it is these that support the unconscious intention. O'Shaughnessy does not accept that there are conceptual beliefs in the case of the sub-intentional tongue moving, and thus no intention can be supported. The two cases differ in two ways. Of the putative idle tongue moving, O'Shaughnessy writes, "the only knowledge that obtains in idle tongue moving, is in the first place inarticulated and unconceptualised, and in the second place related non-rationally to the doing of the deed." I hope to have given one reason why we might view putative idle tongue moving as rational but now I must turn to the claim that the beliefs which allow for the tongue moving are unconceptualised. O'Shaughnessy's identification seems to be that only if a belief resides in consciousness or has done so at some time or another can it be conceptualized. For he writes a little later, "if reason and consciousness completely fail thus to govern this act, how could the act be intentional?" This then is the difference between the beliefs involved in the Freudian case and the tongue moving. The beliefs which make possible the tongue moving are beliefs that are not and never have been registered in consciousness. I wish to challenge O'Shaughnessy on this specific issue: must a belief reside in consciousness or have done so to be conceptual?

O'Shaughnessy argues that prior to noticing-that one's tongue is moving, an event which focusses the attention and thus brings into consciousness that act, any knowledge concerning that tongue is sub-propositional therefore, non-conceptual. O'Shaughnessy explicates his position in terms of Freud's meta-psychology. O'Shaughnessy claims that Freud held the view that propositional knowledge is only possible once an idea is linked to a 'word presentation.' O'Shaughnessy writes of the belief/knowledge of one's tongue before the noticing-that event, "it is only when it is brought to awareness that it is brought under preferred descriptions ('word presentations'). Prior to that important event, which consists in its linking up with the concept and thereby also with the memory system, the natural manifestation of such knowledge is entirely manipulative and practical" (65 II). Conceptualization only occurs in the domain of self-conscious consciousness and only by a conferring description is meaning imbued in the act (via the intention) by the agent, and thus pre-attentive knowledge is "incapable of founding an intention."

I object to the first premise of this argument - that there cannot exist a concept-using state of knowledge that such mental phenomena as putative idle tongue movings are occurring other than in consciousness. Thus, I wish now to discuss whether all knowledge that does not and never has resided in consciosuness is sub-propositional. I will suggest that it is certainly true of Freudian theory that conceptual knowledge that has never resided in consciousness is a possibility. It seems to me that in his desire to theorize in a manner consistent with Freudian theory, O'Shaughnessy opens the flood gates to positions on knowledge,

the rational and thought that his Cartesian alter-ego is unwilling to accept. I hope now to show that if one accepts the Freudian network one must accept the possibility that a putative idle tongue moving is known to the organism at an unconscious but conceptual level.

My moving intuition here is: what is so special about consciousness that it is only in consciousness that knowledge can take on a conceptualized form? I think if we ponder on consciousness there is nothing about it per se that does guarantee O'Shaughnessy's thought. Indeed, some examples should make us doubt this. Dennett gives the following common kind of saying to reveal some need for a computational understanding of reasoning. "It cost only a pound, so it can't be a real antique" (Dennett, 155). The point being that the reasoning necessary to reach this conclusion involves a host of beliefs concerning the supply of and demand for antiques, the shrewdness of antique dealers, etc. Dennett claiming that these beliefs must all have been processed and analysed at a different level of the brain's functioning, other than that functioning which is consciousness, since all that is in consciousness is the fact - the price of the article - and a conclusion as to the nature of the article ... but where are all the missing links?? Dennett's example showing that although some of the beliefs used in this reasoning process were once conscious, still some new beliefs will have issued from the process and provided the conceptual piece of knowledge which is the conclusion. And since the conclusion is 'presented' to consciousness, it must be the case that this conceptual knowledge first came into being at a non-conscious level of thought.

This understanding of thought processes constituting reasoning, with its necessary manipulation of concepts old and new, is very much a possibility for the brain at a non-conscious level given that we have seen that Dennett subscribes to the view that brain states can instantiate concepts. What we have here in the antique example, so far as Dennett is concerned, is an extension of the possibility for the identification of neural states of the dog (Dennett, 84-85) as having certain content or meaning; revealed by how those neural states fit into the behaviour of the dog. Likewise, neural states here instantiate the content that, just like the dog's content, amounts to beliefs about a good many things that are then processed to determine an "efferent event"; in this case that event leading to that conclusion-that the "antique" is not an antique-being expressed in verbal behaviour.

Fodor provides a second example: a "psychological party trick" he calls it! It is the example (Fodor, 57) where a person is asked to look at their watch and tell another person the time. This is done. Then this same person is asked <u>without being able to look at his/her watch again</u> to report the shape of the numerals on the watch face. The person is unable to do so. The point being that the shape of the numerals had to be registered if the time was to be reported. Then how is it that there is no memory of the shape of the numerals? Fodor argues that the shape of the numerals must have been processed - and thus the time reported - at a level of brain activity not accessible to consciousness. Then consciousness was presented with a 'conclusion.' This fact entails that a conceptual understanding of the good many

things that go into telling the time was present in the brain at a level other than consciousness. Fodor "backs this up" with mechanics similar to those argued for by cognitive psychologists. Then, contra O'Shaughnessy and Freud, Fodor and Dennett, in arguing for unconscious representations are claiming that propositional knowledge, and I take it we could use a Dennett - like method to "cash" this knowledge out, exists even though no 'word presentations' are involved; Dennett's dog knows nothing of language but still has certain beliefs that manipulate its behaviour.

Though this understanding of propositional knowledge is a challenge to Freud's necessity claim that 'word presentations' must be utilised if one is to have propositional knowledge, it is not, paradoxically, a direct challenge to O'Shaughnessy. Let me explain: it seems to me that the most severe blow which can be delivered to O'Shaughnessy is by arguing within his framework and showing him to be in error. Thus, on the nature of the thought process and concept, O'Shaughnessy might allow for the possibility of sub-terranean information processing and not feel overly threatened by so doing. However, if one can show the possibility of thought processes just like the ones in consciousness but which are actually unconscious and capable of issuing in new belief sets, then one has a major gain against O'Shaughnessy. Then to show this possibility I offer an example from Freud and go on to claim that O'Shaughnessy has not interpreted Freud on 'word presentations' correctly.

Freud recalls an instance - The Ego and the Id (Freud, 26) - of a mathematician who had wrestled with a particularly difficult

mathematical problem all day and who had gone to sleep at night very frustrated. In the morning, upon waking, the mathematician had solved the problem. Freud concluding, "even subtle and difficult intellectual operations which ordinarily require strenuous reflection can equally be carried out preconsciously and without coming into consciousness." There being here no question that conceptualized beliefs came to exist at an unconscious level, and that these beliefs had never before been in consciousness.

This example from Freud should reveal that O'Shaughnessy then misrepresented Freud's position, and this surprises me, for O'Shaughnessy is an expert on Freudian theory. I will now reveal, via Freud's own words, exactly what his own position is. Talking of thought processes - The Unconscious (Freud, 202-3) - Freud writes, "being linked with word-presentations is not yet the same thing as becoming conscious, but only makes it possible to become so ..." Thus an idea's being linked with 'word-presentations' is not a sufficient condition for that idea becoming conscious, and, of course, it is not a necessary condition either for sensations are conscious (or can be) without being linked with 'word-presentations.' I take this to be enough to establish that it is not Freud's opinion that conceptual knowledge, propositional knowledge, is possible only in consciousness. Indeed, it is first and foremost true of the preconscious system. More, this allows for Freud, the possibility of sub-terranean thought processes that are rational, since a part of the rational ego is unconscious. Thus I take the view that I am proposing, of thought processes at an unconscious level manipulating concepts that have never resided in consciousness,

to be entirely consistent with Freudian theory in contradistinction to O'Shaughnessy's own pronouncements. More, the possibility of unconscious, conceptual and thus propositional knowledge is now established. This shows that prior to the noticing-that event the putative idle tongue moving could have been registered in the brain in a conceptual manner such that an intention concerning that tongue movement could be supported. Thus it is entirely possible that the tongue moving is intentional, and indeed this would concere with the rational want for one's body to be comfortable. Thus I deny idle tongue moving is an instance of a sub-intentional act and since this is the paradigm example of this category of act, I reject the existence of the sub-intentional act per se.

In these last sections then, I take myself to have argued for the plausibility of unconscious thought processes with all their "baggage," being propositional, conceptual, rational and logical, as an explanation of how the bodily will, understood as a phenomenon that relates to its bodily object in the wake of thought providing the requisite data to allow for the bodily willing of that object, might operate and yet the agent be unaware of doing the bodily action. In so arguing, I have suggested that the sub-intentional act be viewed as intentional and that we can make sense of this thought in the light of a less Cartesian understanding of what the propositional and rational can amount to. Then to finish this section, I will give a few quotes from Dennett who, in sections VI and VIII of Content and Consciousness, argues for much the same position as that which I endorse. He writes, "experience suggests that although we can only be aware$_1$ of one thing

at a time the brain can control a number of complex activities at the same time" (Dennett, 123). Thinking or reasoning argues Dennett can be said to refer to 'conscious mental acts' - as O'Shaughnessy would claim but also, rule manipulating processes of which Dennett writes, "whatever one wants to call these subconscious productions of new information, their operation is essentially logical and they must occur if behaviour control is not to be sheer magic" (Dennett, 154). I see no reason why these processes should not be termed 'thought.'

Why unconscious thought might be necessary in the bodily act-situation.

To save the all-important sub-intentional act, O'Shaughnessy may turn the tables and argue that it is not the simplicity of some bodily action that defeats an intellectualistic model of the bodily will but rather the complexity of bodily action. O'Shaughnessy may pick upon the most startling feature of action from an intellectualistic theorist's point of view. That is, the seeming lack of attention that needs to be paid in order to carry out an action. For a thinker like O'Shaughnessy this is simply death to an intellectualistic model. For if action was thought-mediated, rule-governed, then clearly consciousness would be swamped by all the thought processes required! And clearly, this is not the case. Thus reasons a thinker like O'Shaughnessy: the whole affair from knowledge of one's body, to acts of will, must be altogether more primitive; consciousness simply isn't cut out to sustain action. Thus, and because of the identification of attention and thought, actions cannot be thought-mediated and thus an intellectualistic model of action is false.

We now know, however, where lies the crucial flaw in this argument. It is with the identification of thought processes with the attention or consciousness. As soon as the possibility of subterranean thought processes is contemplated - with all the complexities of rational, conceptual, intentional thought occurring at an unconscious level - this inversion of O'Shaughnessy's argument falls apart. Knowledge about one's body, I would claim, can be assessed, the required action can be determined, and the action executed by thought-mediated processes without any of the requisite beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, etc. entering consciousness. Dennett's example of the piano player might be cited here. Indeed, an example might convince us that O'Shaughnessy is the one who is being a little unrealistic about the components of an action, i.e., he does not give credit to the complexity of all that must go in to making an action possible. And importantly, I think it will be clear that this complexity can only be accounted for by thought processes of a subterranean information processing nature.

The example is a simple one: crossing the road for an ice cream. It is surely just phenomenal how much reasoning goes into crossing the road. Presumably what is foremost in one's consciousness is not to be struck down by a car. But to cross the road do not we simply look at the car, pick the optimum time to cross and begin walking? And more, while all this is going on, the thought of the impending ice cream is probably uppermost in consciousness as well. Consider now all the beliefs and judgements that must have been processed or made in 'picking the optimum time to cross the road'!!! The beliefs about the

nature of cars, the possibility for quick acceleration, the rationality of their owner . . . the list goes on and on. (See a similar point made by Searle in Intentionality, 143). The point now to be made against O'Shaughnessy is this: that if all this intellectual activity is going on when crossing a road, and none of it "surfaces," as it were, why should one not think that intellectual processes are always taking account of how our bodies are moving, and intellectual processes always altering our behaviour as that accounting is being done. This example shows that unconscious information processing must be going on in our everyday actions and also, just because 'everyday actions' demand this kind of explanation, it is only a short step to claiming that the putative sub-intentional act has the same explanation and therefore, this class of action is a myth - a conclusion reached earlier anyway.

There is in fact a third, and very interesting, possibility picked out by Searle. Walking is like skiing for Searle, a physical skill. In learning to ski, as is the case in walking, one begins slowly, inadequately, to move one's body as is demanded by the snow and contours. Indeed, in skiing, as in walking, certain internal commands are given that are known to be required if one is to stay on one's feet. Gradually, one learns, and the rules by which one [illegible] longer consume consciousness; the whole affair becomes more [illegible] There are two alternatives, listed by Searle, about what has [illegible] lace in order for one to become a competent walker or skier. O'Shaughnessy accounted for the will and its bodily object in terms of Immediate Sensuous Intuition. This is not to say that this is all action amounts

to for O'Shaughnessy. There is, of course, for most actions, substantial mental antecedents but importantly, the most primitive action, the sub-intentional act, is an act with antecedents amounting to no more than unconceptualized desire and belief, and these causing the bodily will to secure its object via feeling, bodily sensation. Throughout Chapter II, I encouraged - contra O'Shaughnessy - the view that the body part may be given not through feeling but through thought. This is one of the options Searle considers. In learning to walk, ride a bicycle or ski, the rules or practical reasoning to make these activities possible register in consciousness, "one pays attention" to what one is doing. After some time, however, the rules and reasoning become internalized, and function unconsciously. In contrast, Searle writes, "the rules do not become 'wired in' as unconscious intentional content, but the repeated experiences create physical capacities, presumably realized as neural pathways, that make the rules simply irrelevant" (Searle, 151). Searle's suggested alternative is interesting but it seems to me that this example is really just O'Shaughnessy's Immediate Sensuous Intuition. The neural pathways cannot be the end of the story unless one literally thinks the walking or skiing is done by the body itself!!! This is in fact how Searle talks. Of the skier, Searle writes, "his body makes thousands of very rapid adjustments to variations in the terrain ... the racer's body is so trained that these variations in the terrain are dealt with automatically" (Searle, 151). This seems a little strange to me but this is possibly because I cannot free myself from one of O'Shaughnessy's thoughts that all actions have a psychological origin;

that behavioural control is first and foremost, in some manner, mind-dependent. Searle's suggestion seems to be that the body just bends its knees in certain parts of the downhill, and just swivels this way and that way in finding the course of least resistance. I guess we are to think of the skier as a natural force, like water going down a hillside. I do not think this is the correct image of the skier. The idea that the body of the skier merely adjusts is not plausible when you watch how a skier copes with a downhill. Some of the changes in direction, the leaning this way and that way at some acute angles, are just to large to think of them occurring because of some natural bodily propensity. Minor changes in body weight, etc. might be accounted for in terms of reflex actions but to broaden the notion of the reflex action - which is what Searle has basically done - cannot seemingly account for the phenomenon of skiing. Most of the changes made would require <u>decision</u>. Searle does write, "this is not to deny that there are forms of Intentionality involved in the exercise of skills ..." (Searle, 151). Nobody would deny this, but for Searle the difficulty is that if he allows too much intentionality, thought, rule observance, what else he says is of little interest: he only tells us that there is reflex action in skiing and <u>this</u> is no surprise. Yet if Searle says something interesting - namely, the concept of reflex action should be extended to cover physical skills, that skills <u>are</u> reflex actions - he ends up saying something a little implausible. One might seriously wonder why the olympic medals are not given to <u>the body</u> rather than the person!!! It seems to me that O'Shaughnessy could give the better account in terms of the bodily will sensuously latching on to the body

and making rapid adjustments in the actions of the body in line with the "feedback." Here, decision enters the picture giving a sense of unity between body and agent that fits our intuitions the better. Thus, I still see the competition between O'Shaughnessy and the intellectualistic model.

However, Searle does force a difficulty in O'Shaughnessy's thesis out into the open. O'Shaughnessy can only maintain "unity" between the agent and his/her body in skiing if the will does not take over completely and go, as it were, on "automatic pilot." O'Shaughnessy has the more plausible view than Searle on skiing only if decision is a feature of the occurrent physical skill. This is a problem for O'Shaughnessy, given his claim that what thought does enter into a bodily action is in terms of "antecedents" which must be in consciousness. Then he is caught on the horn of his own argument. For how, given that decision must somehow account for the operation of a physical skill, does O'Shaughnessy account for the naturalness of action, for its failing to swamp consciousness? O'Shaughnessy looks to have a difficulty with accounting for the phenomenology accompanying acting. The skier, as Searle points out, is literally performing thousands of actions. We allowed many to be accounted for on a reflex model, and for the sake of the argument, we will allow O'Shaughnessy to hold that many are sub-intentional. However, this still leaves a good many to be accounted for, e.g., the substantial shifts in posture and direction, etc. These actions demand that the environment be understood and decisions be made as to how to cope. O'Shaughnessy does have an answer but one which I think might "boil down to" a rule-

internalized-model. The London bus driver displays a knowledge of bus and environment in his ostensive judgements, claims O'Shaughnessy. Thus on being confronted with the aperture formed by two parked cars, bodily action follows upon the judgement, 'not that much, this much.' These examples of "practical seemings," as O'Shaughnessy calls them, can be true also of the skier. This approach is consistent with how it is that people learn to ski, as described by Searle. Again, here, O'Shaughnessy is Cartesian. Descartes talks of the understanding we have of the world and the action-responses that follow upon this understanding in different situations as inculcated "from our earliest years." This is how O'Shaughnessy models physical skills. But I ask: what is this model if not that of the internalized-rule-model? Descartes talks of drawing upon memories of past situations and this is just what is required for "practical seemings." Is not this though, tantamount - since there is no experience of flicking through one's memories and remembering that this feat amounts to being selective - to agreeing that in some sense, one is presented with what has to be done? And this being 'presented' amounts to accepting that at some level other than consciousness the present situation has been analyzed. I do not see the Cartesian escaping this conclusion, and thus I see O'Shaughnessy's account of the naturalness characteristic of performing a physical skill to be an unrecognized tacit acceptance of the internalized-rule-model of human action. Then if this is so, arguing that idle tongue moving is sub-intentional becomes all the more difficult to maintain for all the constituents involved in my reading of the putative idle tongue moving are tacitly accepted by

O'Shaughnessy in his account of physical skills.

Searle's suggestion is interesting for a further reason. It helps us see what the "internalization" of rules might amount to. Most of the rules that we learn we learn inductively, and I think it a fascinating idea that as those rules are learned they are anchored in a neural network. This helps us understand the "naturalness" that pervades walking or riding a bicycle on the rule-guided model. This is not to admit Searle's biological account. Rather, the image is one of programming a computer. The rules that govern walking become "internalized" and take up some physical location in the brain, where they then function at an unconscious level, "switched on" by other mental phenomena (e.g., my mathematical sense of the body or higher mental states like the intention. Again, this is not to admit O'Shaughnessy's point about consciousness for the rules of walking can be implemented during one's sleep and awareness, or level, $aware_1$, for Dennett, not obtain.

This idea seems to be one that might settle for Chomsky what is the "physical significance" of the rules of grammar. Chomsky holds a view about the rules of grammar - aspects of which we have already met - that accords nicely with much that I have been suggesting. Nagel, in an article on Chomsky, picks out the following statement from Chomsky's, Aspects of the theory of Syntax: "It seems plain that language acquisition is based on the child's discovery of what from a formal point of view is a deep and abstract theory - a generative grammar of his language - many of the concepts and principles of which are only remotely related to experience by long and intricate chains of

unconscious quasi-inferential steps" (Harman, 219). This quote needs no explication to reveal points of contact between the intellectualistic position that I have been pushing along and Chomsky's view of the nature of language acquisition. Concepts being tapped at an unconscious level, along with rational or logical thought processes, are both advocated here. More, the following and operation of rules at an unconscious level of mental functioning parallels my understanding of action. The crucial point being that an intellectualistic model is not "tied into" consciousness: language, thoughts and actions can all be evaluated and activated at an unconscious level of mental activity.

Arguments against Ryle's knowing how - knowing that distinction

This idea of the "naturalization" of thought processes, as an opening up of a neural network of behavioural control, will help in rebutting Ryle's attack on the intellectualistic model via his knowing how - knowing that distinction. Ryle, in the Concept of Mind, accuses the intellectualists of confusing knowing that with knowing how. All intelligent activity the intellectualist believes involves the observance of rules. As Ryle mockingly puts it, "He must preach before he can practise" (Ryle, 29). Ryle tells us that this position holds that before every bodily action the agent must go through in thought the appropriate rules, deciding upon one or more and then executing his action in accordance with the 'maxim,' 'imperative' or 'regulative proposition.' It is some such theory I endorse. The body is assessed according to rules in order to discern the appropriate action and then more rules dictate how that action is to be performed. The appropriate

response being churned out swiftly and unproblematically because the rules have been "internalized," and thus, I suggest, "naturalized."

Searle thinks such a theory implausible, Ryle thinks it confused. To show that it is confused, and that many intelligent activities must have another explanation, Ryle provides a series of examples. The first is that of the proverbial wit. This person knows how to make a good joke and what makes a bad joke. However, claims Ryle, this person could not tell us the recipe for what is, and is not, a good joke. This surely is not true though. Is not the wit one who plays upon language, exploiting its ambiguities (think of Wilde) in order to make a pun. What is here the essence of the wit is his/her knowledge of grammar and the mores of society. A perfect example of this is a joke made by Paul Schaffer, from David Letterman's "Late Night," apropos Swaggart: "I was down in Louisiana last weekend, and there I was told that ministers do more than lay people." This joke would simply have been impossible if certain rules had not been followed. People do know what makes a good joke, they know certain inversions have to be made, some events exploited, others not. And more, I take it the better one is at imaginatively putting together situations with ambiguities in language the better wit one will be. What should probably be added here is that a la Chomsky these rules never need be consciously acknowledged to be operative yet they <u>are</u> being followed. This is possibly something Ryle missed, yet I think it certainly true. One need only consider the argument of someone with no formal education whatsoever to see that this person knows if the argument is sound, if he/she has just contradicted themselves (this latter usually

articulated, "Ups, I can't now say that"), etc. The point being that logical strictures are being followed even though this person would probably be shocked if you turned round to them and said, "Oh, you're very good at logic"! Oddly enough, Ryle makes the point that people could detect a fallacy before Aristotle articulated the rules of practical reasoning and thinks that this shows his point! Indeed, it seems more than likely that practical reasoning has some "physical significance" in the higher animals via evolution. Just think: where would we be without this capacity!? Chomsky holds that the rules of grammar are innate and by saying this, I think he holds to some sort of evolutionary model of language capability. This idea shall be expanded below in reply to another of Ryle's criticisms.

Ryle argues thus: the consideration of rules is an operation which is done intelligently but if so then the consideration of the rules itself must be dependent upon certain other rules, since all intelligent operations are rule dependent, thus a regress issues. Ryle sees this as a fatal blow to any intellectualistic model of human behaviour. To answer this I turn to a point made by Nagel in his paper on Chomsky. Nagel talks of an idea formulated by Wittgenstein. It is possible that epistemological principles have no conventional justification but only an innate and natural propensity to be accepted. Nagel talks of epistemological principles that "form part of one's basic constitution" (Harman, 227). The idea seems to be that functioning with certain grammatical rules or epistemological tenets is something we can not but do, it is a part of our nature and evolution is the source. Chomsky writes, "the fact that all normal children can

acquire essentially comparable grammars of great complexity with remarkable rapidity suggests that human beings are somehow specially designed to do this, with data-handling or "hypothesis-formulating" ability of unknown character and complexity" (Block, 60). This is an idea I like - for many reasons. It can be used to answer Ryle.

The consideration of rules will not issue in an infinite regress as Ryle thinks, for some rules will just come into play in certain situations. This can, but need not, be to endorse some form of innate knowledge. Some rules or knowledge will be accepted without consideration as a matter of necessity, e.g., the rules that govern walking. For instance, I might walk backwards but since my eyes are not in the back of my head there is surely a natural propensity to walk face forward. Possibly a child might begin walking by walking backwards but it would not take long for this child to learn - and by 'learn' I mean, articulate some practical reasoning or some rule to the effect that it will be much more advantageous to walk face forward. Thus, against Ryle, I would suggest that some intelligent operations while rule governed are simply adopted by us because of our physical structure. It seems reasonable that those rules thus accepted are those most relevant to our survival and that the specific consideration of other rules follows upon this "naturalistic" base.

Throughout Ryle's discussion it is obvious that he has a rather Cartesian view about thought or rules: he does not escape the view that thoughts or rules must be known to, and easily articulable by, their owner. This fact is clear through his example of the child playing chess (Ryle, 41). The child has learned to play chess by

watching others ... he has never had the rules explained to him/her. Ryle concludes that this child knows how to play chess but that rules do not dictate this ability; the knowing that of chess playing does not enter the picture. I would conclude a little differently: the child, having learned to play chess by watching others, has in fact learned the rules of chess and is, in playing the game, following the rules. The simple intuition here being that, if the child was not following the rules, he/she would not be playing chess at all. But more, the manner in which the child learned the game, while not being the expression of the rules in verbal propositions, was still the learning of the formal rules of chess except in some other medium than a standard language. Yet, why should this effect the fact that the child still plays the game by following rules, juggling those rules inside his/her head? And this is what the knowing that claim amounts to: it is by no means essential to the intellectualist's position that those rules be specifiable by their user, [redacted] that they be specifiable in terms of an alphabetic language! The issue is does the child follow rules, and I think it clear that he/she must if playing chess. Chomsky noted that following a rule of English grammar is done all the time by English speakers yet few could say what rule they were following. This is why I say Ryle is a Cartesian over rules, or the thoughts which instantiate those rules; he simply dismisses this Chomskian possibility and seems to insist that unless those rules are specifiable by the user, and that the user will report working through the rules prior to making his/her move, then this person cannot be following rules but must rather only know how to play chess.

A decisive rebuttal to Ryle can be given by the example of music. If one is actually playing the piano then one is following the rules of musical theory. Just banging down notes is not playing music on the piano, and what we mean by saying this, is that it is not following certain rules of propriety, e.g., to play in one key at a time. An even better example is musical composition. Isiah Berlin, or maybe Bernstein, I forget, cannot read music at all. Yet, in composing his music, he follows the rules, for he does not leave a tune on an imperfect cadence, since such a cadence "demands" to be completed, but rather ends upon a perfect cadence and this is just what the theory of music dictates. I see absolutely no difficulty for the intellectualist from Ryle's putative distinction.

Conclusions

Having shown the possibility of the unconscious thought process and having defended, in one or two aspects, the claim that bodily willing must involve such thought processes, it is time to utilise these results in assessing the ontological status of bodily willing. Then on O'Shaughnessy's own terms, I suggest that bodily willing must be itself an example of an attentive consciousness or make use of attentive consciousnesses and thereby, fail to be the primitive phenomenon it is thought to be by O'Shaughnessy. To say this, is to argue that bodily willing is not ontological status, psychological non-mental but properly mental.

I am claiming that bodily sensation is akin to visual perception. This can be read two ways: it is akin to visual perception in being an

example of an information processing system a la cognitive psychology. Or, bodily sensations are to be regarded as residing, first and foremost, in a two-dimensional psychological space and projected onto the body as are visual sensations projected onto the world, with the intercession of thought or 'intentionalist seemings,' in O'Shaughnessy's language. This last, and again in O'Shaughnessy's language, is to argue that the concept and memory system go into analyzing the bodily data that is provided by sensation. It is clearly O'Shaughnessy's view, and I take it that he subscribes to the Cartesian explanation, that concepts determine the projection of visual sensations and thus likewise, since I take myself to have argued O'Shaughnessy into this corner, concepts determine where bodily sensations 'land' on the body. That this is so, allows, I think, the charge of naivete to be brought against O'Shaughnessy and Descartes. Just as I claimed that O'Shaughnessy had underestimated what his view of the "antecedents" of action would amount to in terms of the "swamping of consciousness," then so too here, with perception and bodily sensation. The latter only being fair if my arguments against the 'given' <u>are</u> successful. This brings one to the conclusion that if O'Shaughnessy maintains his position on perception, and thus the forced position on bodily sensation, he must, in order to account for phenomenology, subscribe to the presence of unconscious thought processes. Then for the faculties we are here talking about, this must be to endorse information processing. Though I will just add that if one is sympathetic to O'Shaughnessy's following words - "the advent of <u>self-consciousness</u>; and with it the coming into being of rational,

general, modal, concept-dependent, truth-sensitive thought, i.e., of anything that is really worthy of the title 'thought'" (231 II) - and thus feel unable to regard information processing as thought then, I also mean to suggest that a la Freud, "free floating thought" - as one might call it - also "bubbles away" at a non-conscious level of mental activity. Thus, in so arguing, we come to endorse the concept of the 'unconscious attentive consciousness.' In this manner, I come to explain the possibility of the thought-mediated bodily willing occurring completely unawares.

However, it is the significance of these findings for ontology that I am interested in. The bodily object of the will must be epistemologically 'there' for the will if it is to operate. We have seen that it is so, only via the mediation of thought processes therefore, in some sense or other, bodily willing must be a thought-mediated phenomenon and hence, at the very least, an attentive consciousness and of ontological status properly mental since O'Shaughnessy teaches that this is so of attentive consciousnesses. I add the qualifications because there are a number of possibilities. I am assuming that since the bodily object is epistemologically 'there' for the bodily will via thought so too must it be 'there,' in the same way, for bodily willing <u>as such</u> and therefore, the active expression of the will can only be via thought. This is certainly to make an attentive consciousness out of the will if not more. For, on this understanding, the bodily will is an attentive consciousness <u>upon</u> an attentive consciousness, since the bodily object that is 'there' for the will is an attentive consciousness. Because of this, one might be

forced, in the desire for cogency, to claim that the bodily will is a conceptual consciousness! A far cry from what O'Shaughnessy had in mind and revealing the vital need for a correct understanding of the 'given'; the 'given,' in O'Shaughnessy's philosophy of action, is a foundational element.

I suspect the will is a conceptual consciousness for a further reason. Namely, this is the conclusion from my 'mathematical sense,' understood as the purely intellectualist sense, i.e., one is simply provided with conclusions from physiology about the state of the body. Here, there are no sensations to be accounted for, and thus this thought-mediated relation cannot be an instance of an attentive consciousness but must rather be that of a conceptual consciousness. I guess one could regard this as an extreme form of Cartesianism.

I do not pretend that there is not a 'nasty' fall-out from regarding the will as of ontological status mental. It seems to me that a strength of O'Shaughnessy's work is in closing the gap between mind and body. In fact, from what I have read, it is the only serious attempt at doing so! That is, O'Shaughnessy assembles the intuitions of Cartesianism and physicalism and melts them together. For my money, to sacrifice either option in a theory of mind is to sacrifice one's theory of mind. This advice I have not taken. My only excuse is that I have been carried by the flow of things. I rejected the 'given.' I rejected O'Shaughnessy's pivotal class of action: the sub-intentional. This class of act established bodily willing as psychological non-mental, for this class of act is a possible immediate object of the attention and unrelated to the concept system in its genesis. My

Chapter III attempted a rebuttal to this last, and since it follows from what is said in Chapter III and immediately above that bodily willing is certainly an attentive consciousness and very possibly a conceptual consciousness, it follows that bodily willing cannot be an immediate object of the attention, but since bodily movements certainly can be as O'Shaughnessy shows, a schism of mind and body or at the very least, a dis-identification of the willed surface event and the willing of that willed event, is an unsavoury upshot. The surface willed event is a possible immediate object of the attention, bodily willing is not, therefore, one cannot resolve the mind body division as does O'Shaughnessy. One is left with all the old problems that it is a spectacular achievement of O'Shaughnessy's theory to avoid.

FOOTNOTES

1. All page references to The Will shall take the following format: page number, followed by volume number.

2. Note: 'feeling,' 'immediate presence,' the 'given,' 'immediate awareness' and 'bodily sensation' are, more or less, all interchangeable in what follows.

3. O'Shaughnessy is very un-Cartesian at this point - a major point of his thesis. For O'Shaughnessy, many knowings begin in sensuous experience and awareness is knowledge of one's body only it is not a Cartesian thought-mediated knowledge. "Awareness of one's body must be an experienced seeming that is not knowledge of one's body and that is distinct both from the phenomenon of self-conscious consciousness and the knowledge of one's present existence that it ensures" (148 I).

4. This "trade-off" does not seem to me to be ultimately successful. In the first part of my Chapter II, I examine the nature of the psychologicality involved in projection and the status of the relation existing between projection as a psychological concept and as a causal concept.

5. The phrase, "if it seems to some person," is important. O'Shaughnessy believes that it is this phenomenology which is the surest sign of an act of will, a striving. The seeming to have tried is something beyond the intention to try and clearly less than the successful act. This something is aptly termed a 'striving.' O'Shaughnessy has no doubts that it is a striving or try-event that the volitionists call 'a volition' for its characteristics match that which they endorse to explain the voluntary act. It is psychological and de re essentially intrinsically active since it can be intended and chosen and something internally indistinguishable from it could not fall to be active. As to voluntariness, O'Shaughnessy believes it a mistake to think that if an event is caused by another event that is non-voluntary then that following event must also be non-voluntary. O'Shaughnessy endorses the idea that some event's happening in one is not that event's happening to one. Acts of will do not happen to one since they are active even though they issue from a desire. O'Shaughnessy sees no problem in this for the volition theorist, and declares, "acts spring into being out of non-acts." (283 II)

6. This fact will be put to very important use in my Chapter III. O'Shaughnessy's identification of the thought event with the mental image as regards epistemological type, reveals that O'Shaughnessy is most Cartesian as regards the thought event. That O'Shaughnessy is quite Cartesian in this matter, and others, will be shown in detail in my Chapter III.

7. It follows from above that since a necessary condition of an item's being of mental status is that it be psychological, the mental proper, falls within the Domain of the Psychological, and that mind is a sub-sector of this Domain.

8. Davidson has tried to show that there can be no tight psycho-physical law of a type-type variety holding between thoughts and mental images of a determinate content and brain events.

9. Definition I, CSM II, 113.

10. III Meditation, CSM II, 26.

11. On ABC's '20/20,' Denby actually said that this is how he relates to his artificial legs.

12. This commits O'Shaughnessy to the claim that the moving of a leg is an instrumental act for Denby.

13. An assumption being, of course, that though the body is de-sensitized, mechanism is unaffected.

14. VI Meditation, CSM II, 60.

15. As my example is constructed with information processing mechanics, it is certainly the case that this animal does not relate immediately to its limbs via sensation. This, however, does not obscure the logical point that concerns O'Shaughnessy so much.

16. This is to say that in this case, the 'bodily object' amounts to no more than bodily sensations spatially located in a sense-field but not inherently given as at some body part. This last being provided by and through the application of concepts.

17. Dennett's point being that one can talk of the dog as possessing the concept 'food.' Time and time again, this dog could recognize some substance as 'food' though not as 'sliced meat' or 'steak.' It is this ability to classify which presumably is the mark of the possession of a concept.

18. That it is Dennett's contention that these thought processes are of the information processing variety will only become clear later on. Though, I think it fairly obvious that the piano playing at level, $aware_2$, must be explained by such processing.

19. References from contemporary sources will all be indicated by the thinker's name and page reference to the book under their name in the Bibliography.

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