Korean Mothering and Education: A Hermeneutic Journey of Understanding

by

Hyekyung Kim

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Secondary Education

University of Alberta

© Hyekyung Kim, 2015

Abstract

This thesis is written in two phases. Phase 1 is a critical-historical description of a widely perceived crisis in (South) Korean mothering practices, especially with respect to English as a foreign language (EFL) learning and its implications in the broader spectrum of Korean education. Phase 2 is an examination of two themes in particular: (a) a genealogical exploration of the politico-economic background in which a monopolistic power structure has contributed to the formation of a new model of Korean mothering, and (b) a semiotic interpretation of *apartment mothering*, a sociogeographical structure that has been cultured at the interface between market and education, in a way that is unique to the Korean context.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
- Something Is Profoundly Wrong 1
- Autobiographical Consciousness 3
- Structure of the Inquiry 6

CHAPTER 2: PHASE 1: A CRITICO-DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF KOREAN MOTHERS' INVOLVEMENT IN EFL EDUCATION 9
- Nature of the Topic 9
- Research 12
- Hermeneutic Demand of Historical Consciousness 12
- Questions of Procedure 18
- Korean Model of Mothering 22
- Confucian Tradition and Capitalist Patriarchy 26
- Gender and Development in Korea 30
- The IMF Crisis and the Globalized Capitalist Economy 36
- The Hegemony of English 42
- Precarious Motherhood 49
- Suffering 57
- Research as Healing 67

CHAPTER 3: PHASE 2: DEEP STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING KOREAN MOTHERING AND EDUCATION PRACTICES 72
- Historical Perspectives on Korea's Colonial Experience 72
  - Tracing Back to the Roots 72
  - Underpinning of a Covin Between American Imperialism and Its Honorary Whites 73
  - American Protestant Missionaries and Capitalist Middle-Class Values 74
  - Ushering Colonial Collaborators Into the Game 78
  - McCarthyism Is Still Alive 80
  - Military-Barrack Culture 83
  - Ambivalence Between Reliance and Victimhood 87
- Corruption and Pedagogic Negotiation in the Oligopolistic Power Structure in Korea 89
  - Education and Elite Corruption in Korea 90
  - Failure to Eliminate pro-Japanese Colonial Collaboration: Root of Korean Elites 92
  - Nexus of *Hakbol* and *Chaebol* 93
  - Unequal Distribution of Risks and Pedagogic Negotiation 99
- Unequal Geo-Code of *Gangnam*: A Semiotic Interpretation of Apartment Mothering in the Process of Capitalist Development 104
  - Child to Seoul, Horse to Jeju: The Korean Cultural Origin of Spatial Segregation 104
  - Gangnam: An Uncomfortable Self-Portrait of Korea 107
  - Cradle of urban, white-collar, salaried middle class 111
  - Eighth School District: Benefits of the Vicious Cycle of Gentrification 113
  - Gendered Politics of Consumption and Geography 118
  - Gangnam and the Patrimonial Wealth System 120
  - Hagwon: Culturing Apartment Mothering in the Age of Consumerism 124

Wild Goose Mothering: Korean mothers’ Grand Tour in the Age of Knowledge Capitalism 125

CHAPTER 4: A FEW SUMMARY COMMENTS 134

REFERENCES 138

List of Tables

Table 1. Rate of College Entrance of High School Graduates in Korea, 1990-2009 40

Table 2. Students in Elementary, Junior, and High School in Korea, 1995-2005 40

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Something Is Profoundly Wrong

A sense of crisis in contemporary South Korean education was a driving motivation for my writing of this dissertation. Tony Judt (2010) lamented the breakdown of the late-capitalist consensus: "Something is profoundly wrong with the way we live today. . . . We cannot go on living like this" (p. 1). He demystified the 'virtue' we have made of the pursuit of material self-interest for 30 years since the rise of neoliberal economics and its political and social manifestations. South Koreans (hereafter *Korean*) also have been deploring social ills, especially since their traumatic experience of the 1997 Financial Crisis, which was a turning point in Korea's belated but full-scaled neoliberal transformation. Education in Korea is one of the most critical social aspects to have been affected by national neoliberal resetting. Although the state's economic growth has been slowing since the end of the 1990s, severe economic inequalities and seriously diminishing job security have been worse than ever, especially since the 1997 Financial Crisis, commonly called the *International Monetary Fund (IMF) Crisis* in Korean society. Anxiety has been a key word in our understanding of Korean parents' collective psychology, so obsessed are Korean parents with supporting their children's education. As the college entrance competition has gained intensity, apprehension from various parts of society has been growing with one voice: Something is profoundly wrong with the way that we educate our children. . . . We cannot go on like this. . . . But what else can we do? Although the historical-insight scale of this dissertation is not as grand as the prominent historian Judt's, my ethos throughout this work has followed a grave concern about the critical condition of Korean education.

This inquiry was concerned with tracing a complicated, entangled network of social ills, especially in terms of Korean mothers' pedagogic practices. Furthermore, it was an attempt to understand the relationship among Korean mothering practices, the widely known frantic English as a foreign language (EFL) phenomenon in Korea, and how they both fit within the developmental profile of Korean society since the realization of the Western, mainly American, imperial imaginary, an imaginary precipitated by the Japanese colonial occupation and its evolution. As well, one of my convictions is that all of this is additionally linkable to the nature of gender relations and their long development over time.

With respect to certain unique traits in Korean mothering focused on children's education during the last two decades or so, a major motivation for this inquiry came from my almost unbearable desire to speak of the uneasiness that has been encompassing Korean society, along with a sense of the urgent need for a deeper understanding of its motherhood practices as symptomatic of a paradoxically destructive reward system within the realm of contemporary pedagogical choice. My suspicion focuses on some social and political forces in Korean society that have been diminishing people's capacity to reflect upon their lives. Personally, my smoldering uneasiness eventually led to my decision to leave Korea more than 15 years ago, and yet I believe that the private uneasiness that I bore in my mind and heart still persists in Korean society today.

The general characteristics of Korean mothering practices in terms of mothers' involvement in their children's schooling can be summarized as follows: extremely dedicated to education matters; obsessed with children's academic performances and mostly ignore children's psychological, spiritual, and medical states over academic achievements; and adhering to mothering practices institutionalized in a predominantly managerial way. In the given constructed politico-economic Korean context, Korean mothers as individual agents make an effort to be competitive and pursue economic results; yet, in turn, they paradoxically become instrumental in aggravating their own socio-educational problematics in a dialectic mode. The uniqueness of Korean mothering practice has always perplexed me and led to the question, What makes it so? This inquiry, as a quest for some clues to answer the question, is a sort of progress report on my scholarly discipline in which, in a nutshell, I validate the idea behind the famous phrase "the personal is political" (Mills, 1959; Hanisch, 1970). My stance in trying to understand any social phenomenon is to stick to my belief that contemplating the social has to be based on a commitment to human integrity and well-being. Whether it is viewed from the standpoint of women's consciousness raising or from the perspective of sociologists, what most matters to me is to understand how personal choice is shaped specifically in the Korean context. Mills remarked, "Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both" (p. 3). Hence, it is important that I make an effort to demonstrate why these personal concerns have sociological and political causes, which will enable the reader to understand how my biography is linked to the structure and history of Korean society. I hope that this will help to empower individuals to transform personal unease into public issues to pursue individual and collective well-being by facilitating new conversations for social change.

Autobiographical Consciousness

At the very outset of this study was my journey as a mother of a Korean boy as well as a teacher who practiced in both the public school system and the tutoring system, well known as *hagwon*,[1] to start a new life in Canada to seek educational and career opportunities for my son. This study has developed, therefore, from an autobiographical orientation—a journey from being a somewhat naïve wild-goose mother[2] and a Korean teacher who left the Korean educational landscape. When I started my own graduate education in Canada, my graduate-program studies engaged the strong reflective tradition in the field of curriculum studies, in which my course work required that I retell my past educational experience. This helped me to understand in a more academic way the process of the shaping of personal educational experience by structure and force within contextual conditions. For this reason this study is a presentation of the process of my sociological scholarly disciplining. During my Master of Education program, reflection on my past educational experiences in Korea overwhelmed me. I was overwhelmed by the perplexities of being an individual from a non-Western background as well as by fundamental questions about the relationship between agency and structure and the Western imperial imaginary over the East. Another significant aspect of the early stage of my graduate-study experience included a complex of emotions such as anger, shame, nationalistic pride, and guilt about being ashamed of my beloved roots, alongside the fear of losing my strong self-consciousness in an identity crisis as an 'in-between' being. It was this academic whirl and emotional clutter that led to my future research and positioned me both as an insider from the perspective of the subject and as an outsider from the perspective of the observer. Alongside my grave concern about Korean educational ills, I have to confess that my anger kept me motivated to continue my academic journey when I began to realize that I was complicit in a vast and complex network of Korean assumptions that needed exploration. Throughout both my Master of Education and PhD graduate studies, the autobiographical approach tradition has served the evolution of my own thinking. I have ruminated on the abiding questions in my past educational experiences by using various methods of social inquiry such as psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, critical theory, postcolonial theory, feminist theories, discourse analysis, and intercivilizational dialogue, including second-language education theories and practices. In this process I originally framed the study on the wild-goose phenomenon and others, drawing on my own involvement as a Korean mother in EFL education. In this study I also examined the diverse practices of crossing boundaries, tactics of development, and experiences of the double and multiple political and national comparative attachments that resulted from my Korean-North American encounters. This advantageous cultural border crossing has broadened my perspective and helped me to understand what I see and what might be under the surface.

---

[1] *Hagwon* is a popular private cram school in Korea that offers afterschool reviews and prep courses for school tests and college entrance examinations.

[2] Korean wild geese families live separately, sometimes for years, to school their children in English-speaking countries such as New Zealand and the United States. The mothers and children live overseas while the fathers live and work in Korea and fly over to visit a couple of times a year.

Raising the question of identity as a postcolonial woman, I came to open the discussion on the 'self and other' relationship in its enactment of power relations in every class. Minh-ha (1988) remarked that

> identity as understood in the context of a certain ideology of dominance has long been a notion that relies on the concept of an essential, authentic core that remains hidden to one's consciousness and that requires the elimination of all that is considered foreign or not true to the self, that is to say, non-I, other. . . . [Therefore, in such a concept] the other is almost unavoidably either opposed to the self or submitted to the self's dominance. (p. 71)

This certainly reflected how, as a researcher, I experienced my identity struggle during my graduate studies. Minh-ha's description speaks to my position:

> The moment the insider steps out from the inside she's no longer a mere insider. She necessarily looks in from the outside while also looking out from the inside. Not quite the same, not quite the other, she stands in that undetermined threshold place where she constantly drifts in and out. Undercutting the inside/outside opposition, her intervention is necessarily that of both not quite an insider and not quite an outsider. (p. 76)

In the course of the development of my own thinking, however, I have had somewhat contradictory questions regarding self-exploration and self-interrogation, with which I had been disappointed in my Korean educational experience. How could I make sense of my assumption that the Korean educational landscape is irrational and destructive under the name of pedagogy, whether my dissatisfaction with and anger at Korean educational experience might be grounded on my condescending attitude to my non-Western background, or whether my purely deepest desire is to participate in the work of freeing my beloved fellow Koreans from enslaving chains of explicit and implicit colonization? Furthermore, could my study bear the scrutiny of enlightened pedagogical understanding such as “greater freedom from arbitrary power, freedom of speech, and freedom to realize one’s talents” (Gay, 1969, p. 3)

From the standpoint of biographical value, the evolution of my own thinking and emotions can be seen as the emergence of a kind of “biographical consciousness” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 150). Bakhtin identified two characteristics of biographical consciousness as *adventurous-heroic* and *social-quotidian*. Biographical consciousness is “grounded in the will to be a hero, . . . to the extent to which the strife for glory equals a desire to gain consciousness of oneself within the civilized mankind [*sic*] of history” (p. 156). It also presents the humanity of the living with an axiological center occupied by social values. As a researcher of ‘in-between,’ I have been haunted throughout my graduate studies by my pondering on my potential attitude toward a kind of enlightened pedagogical pretentiousness. Despite my cautious struggling, the biographical features have nourished the development of historical consciousness through a hermeneutic orientation that has opened, expanded, and transformed my limited range of vision from a given time and a particular vantage point. Gadamer’s (2004) concept of horizon has been helpful in this regard. My cultural hybridity offers a parallel with Gadamer’s fusion of horizons through a cultural inquiry into Korean involvement in the Western tradition of scholarly training. Influenced further by Freire’s ideas of critical pedagogy, the hermeneutic historical consciousness emergent in my academic journey is paralleled with critical consciousness focused on achieving a more in-depth sociohistorical understanding of the world: knowing where I have been dated and placed. In addition to a hermeneutic approach to my research, therefore, developing historical consciousness through the task of interpretation and a sociopolitical critique of this reality naturally involves a critical theorist intention to improve human existence by viewing knowledge for its emancipatory or repressive potential. Further, my research position in critical theory adheres to the principle that knowledge not only is socially constructed and contextual and requires interpretation, but also puts *problems* at the core of inquiry.

In sum, then, I want to situate this inquiry within my own personal experiences and convictions. Many thinkers who desire to think clearly about social and political phenomena and to relate their deepest thoughts to the ways in which they live have shared these personal experiences.

Structure of the Inquiry

This dissertation is comprised of two parts. Phase 1 is a kind of critical descriptive overview of Korean phenomena in education; I walk the reader through the contemporary Korean educational landscape by profiling the complex networks that entwine Korean mothers' involvement in their children's EFL education. Because the vast scope of the research is covered in a limited space, phase 1 tends to be implicit and somewhat superficial. Zooming in, phase 2 moves into a deeper structural analysis of selected themes from phase 1, and I specifically develop a deep-structure analysis of the complexity of Korean institutional structures. The division of this work into two phases became necessary with my gradual realization that the construction of Korean mothering practice in terms of the children's schooling and college entrance competitions is embedded in very deep threads and themes within the broader Korean experience, both internal and external, in the range of historical time and global space. For this reason it seemed to be efficient to explore the first and second parts separately.

The profile in phase 2 expands to the macro dynamics of gender relations in the Korean context, including Confucian tradition and patriarchal capitalist development; the grim aftermath of the 1997 Financial Crisis, followed by the neoliberal transformation; the global hegemony of English; and the ignored social sufferings caused by maternal obligations to serve families in response to a very cutthroat social reality in the contemporary Korean landscape; specifically, the urban landscape dominated by apartment culture.

In phase 2 I therefore explore the development of the formation of Korean mothering practice in Korea's specific politico-economic and cultural contexts, tracing a dispersion of some structural settings historically and contextually to discuss the subjectification—indeed, subjection—of Korean education mothering. The particular themes that I selected for deep-structure analysis in phase 2 proceed with two strands: (a) a genealogical examination of the politico-economic background in which a monopolistic power structure has contributed to the formation of new model of Korean mothering, and (b) a semiotic interpretation of a sociogeographical structure that I have called *apartment mothering* that lies at the interface between market and education in contemporary Korea. Most broadly, I discuss the process of Korean mothers' subjectification as a response to transforming capitalist development in the age of neoliberal and global capitalism.

Each section in phase 2 discusses the following, respectively. In Historical Perspectives on Korea's Colonial Experience I examine the historical context of the process of transposing the Japanese colonial legacy and Protestant-capitalist American geopolitical interests into Korea's endemic political corruption. Genealogical accounts recognize that Japanese and American colonial and imperial imaginaries affected Korean industrialization, which has been linked in turn to traditional cronyism and elitism, with all the corruption that that entails.

In Corruption and Pedagogic Negotiation in the Oligopolistic Power Structure in Korea I discuss the role of education in the network of the elite cartels, commonly referred as the nexus of *hakbol* (academic clique) and *chaebol* (family-owned conglomerates), and the relevance of the network to Korea's endemic corruption exacerbated by Korea's economic injustice within its neoliberal transformation. In addition, the neoliberal resetting of Korea since the 1990s has provided society with a validation of ruling-class norms alongside society's collective compromise with corruption over people's hoped-for economic benefits. The result has been a fostering of political immaturity in Korean society, revealed noticeably through a naïve toleration of a failing social welfare system under the delusion of the neoliberal ideology of personal responsibility. I also examine how economic inequality in Korean society affects individuals' life conditions, especially in the case of collective risks such as manmade disasters and the pervasive social anxiety over losing jobs, with the consequential downward mobility. I discuss the collision between these social impacts and the maternal pedagogical responses to them in terms of changes to individuals' family life, in which mothers are most directly responsible for their children's education. I discuss the theoretical implications of the process of negotiating a maternal pedagogy with regard to Korea's unprecedented worsening economic-disparity condition that has entrenched Korea's social ills, especially since the recent full-scaled neoliberal transformation after the 1997 Financial Crisis.

In a follow-up discussion to Korean gender relations in phase 1, I further analyze the subjectification of Korean women in phase 2. In a kind of pedagogic compromise, Korean mothers who suffer from low status and oppressive economic realities ironically embrace the existing male-dominant and exploitative capitalist values and thinking more than men do.

In Unequal Geo-Code of Gangnam: A Semiotic Interpretation of Apartment Mothering in the Process of Capitalist Development, I discuss Korean apartment mothering and wild-goose mothering on the premise that human practices are based on socially constructed subjectivities. I emphasize that the interplay between self-formation and cultural practices in physical conditions, institutions, and public discourses shapes women in today's Korean social context in powerful ways. From a feminist and sociogeographical understanding, I examine how geographical consumerism is linked with apartment mothering practices in Korea's uniquely pervasive apartment-complex lifestyle. The politically formed massive apartment dwellings of Korean industrial capitalization have played a conjunctive role in which education and consumerism have been working together. This conjunction has created an archetype of private tutoring schools called *hagwon*. Because I wanted to talk about structures in a social world that has cultured a model of Korean apartment mothering to better understand the Korean mothering phenomenon, throughout both phase 1 and phase 2 I attended to the fact that these structures reflect different interests based on concrete social groupings that contain power to shape social structure and meaning. In so doing, I identified some essential and intrinsic aspects of the dynamics in the orientation of social agents to their situations. For example, the Korean real estate bubble from the 1970s to the 2000s that has largely been composed of apartment complexes controlled by the interest of the elite cartel groups has been leading the direction of Korean mothers' orientation in their educational practices. Their parenting is evaluated mainly through their economic ability to choose a school district. Here, the purpose of educating their children is conflated with their pursuit of affluent dwelling locations. Based on this premise, I suggest that the trend of Korean mothers' obsession with good schools has always been on the same track with expensive districts because these two tracks are the point at which the exchange value of apartment and the symbolic value of school join precisely, so that their respective power and resource are both obtained and maintained.

Last, I discuss an extremely transnational form of Korean mothering practice in the age of knowledge capitalism.

CHAPTER 2: PHASE 1: A CRITICO-DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF KOREAN MOTHERS' INVOLVEMENT IN EFL EDUCATION

In phase 1, I critically describe the uniquely intense Korean model of mothering as a way of deconstructing two significant aspects of Korean contemporary educational malady; namely, the EFL phenomenon and the inordinate intensity of Korean mothers' involvement in their children's education. The discussions proceed along a hermeneutic approach that includes interpretation, understanding, and application in a continual interplay between thought and action by using bricolage pieces created from diverse resources such as media, statistics, and various kinds of published materials.

Nature of the Topic

Two symbolic aspects of the South Korean contemporary educational landscape instigated this study: English and mothering. As the nationwide pressure to learn EFL grew from the regular school system to a requirement in the labor market in the early 1990s when neoliberal discourses began to prevail in South Korea (hereafter *Korea*), private supplementary English tutoring became a major phenomenon in which Korean mothers have been heavily involved. EFL learning with a great fervor has heightened Koreans' deep-rooted educational enthusiasm (Park & Abelmann, 2004), which is closely related to their status-conscious cultural characteristics (Kendall, 1996; Lett, 1998). Park and Abelmann's (2004) anthropological research on Korean mothers' cosmopolitan aspirations related to English learning is unique and informative. The overheated private-tutoring phenomenon has thereby complicated different aspects of social problems (e.g., a social polarization shaped by inequality in educational opportunities), alongside the process of postmodern capitalist social changes (Go-Jung, 2001; Im, 2001; Kim, S-G., 2011; Koo, 2007).

English and mothers in this interpretive study are vital clues to the construal of a complex of educational competitive strategies in Korean culture, based on a continuum of expense, intensity, and cost. They are also important symbolic cues to understand (a) the ambivalent connection of education as the primary means of being successful in life and (b) human suffering as schizoid experiences from an inherent conflict between nurturing motherhood and victimizing children. It is, however, too simplistic to vilify Korean mothering because of children's suffering. It is not human consciousness that determines their existence, Marx (1904) suggested, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. Korean motherhood has been culturally constructed by the interaction between patriarchal relations and the capitalist processes locally and globally throughout the evolution of the nation's capitalist industrialization. The excessiveness of Korean mothering can be inferred as a gendered response to the spatial and temporal process of Korea's social change.

Because EFL tutees are younger, especially since the national financial crisis (the IMF Crisis) in 1997 (Im, 2001; Jung & Norton, 2002), the involvement of Korean mothers has become even more vigorous. Furthermore, the scope of educational investment and cost has reached a global scale (Cho, U., 2006; Kim, J. H., 2001) because of phenomena such as young children being sent abroad (*jogi-youhak*) and wild-goose families (*gireogy gajok*). With the collective consensus that English is a crucial ingredient in global competition, neoliberal government policies have increased the pressure to master English, and the dynamics between Korean mothering and the tutoring market have become more complex. Although one of the major implications in the growth of private tutoring in Korea is formal learning, English education eventually also began to have a profound impact on the livelihoods of Koreans in reality and symbolically. Bray (2004) noted that children who receive such tutoring are expected to perform better in school; that, in the long run, they will improve their lifetime earnings; and that children in low-income families might not be able to compete with their peers. Given that children in families with more resources have more opportunities for quantity and quality of private education, the issue of social inequality has grown. This is the argument for the inevitability of Korean mothers' involvement in their children's education. As the competition for educational credentials becomes more intense across North America, according to Bray, "Even mediocre students and their parents now expect to pursue higher education for fear of being otherwise relegated to the fringes of the labor market" (p. 233). Kwok (2004) also noted that North American franchised tutorial programs—for example, Kumon and the Sylvan Learning Centre—have increasingly grown in North America and Asia. Although Korea is not alone in this increasing phenomenon, the excessiveness of Korean mothering in this respect is a question that needs to be explored.

During the last decade studies on Korean mothers' involvement in their children's education are related mostly to private supplementary tutoring in general. The most frequent topic that researchers have addressed is the relationship between institutionalized motherhood and Korean mothers' motivation to support their children's education (Cho, H. S., 2004; Kim, J. H., 2001). Other related topics include women's desire for social mobility through their children's education (Im, 2001; Nah, Tae, & Jang, 2007); the link between competitive educational support and full-time middle class mothers' identity (Nah et al., 2007; Park, S. J., 2009); the demographics and psychological characteristics of Korean mothers that has resulted in their educational fever (Kim, S. Y., 2008); philosophical approaches to the meaning of mothering and women's work as it relates to their children's education (Kim, S., 2009); Korean mothers' location in the nexus of school, family, and market (Go-Jung, 2001; Park, S. J., 2009); the contest between motherhood and capitalistic productivity, particularly middle-class mothers' support for their children's education (Lee, K. A., 2009); the managerial role of mothers in the neoliberal transformation during the age of globalization (Cho, U., 2008; Park & Abelmann, 2004; Park, S. J., 2007a); mothers' role in the relationship between educational migration and globalization (Cho, U., 2006, 2008; Park & Abelmann, 2004); maternal practice as an educational investment (Min & Lee, 2000); Korean women and time in terms of three time scales: the *duree* of daily life, the *Dasein* of lifetime, and the *longue duree* of history (Shim, 1996); and an interpretive analysis of Korean traditional discourses of the connection between mothering and the Korean tradition of educational passion (Lee, S. I., 2001).

The approach to mothering in this study involves a critical interpretation of the tension between Korean motherhood with regard to children's education and their mothers' response to the process of global capitalist transformation in Korea that focuses on EFL education, which is the key catalyst of the Korean education frenzy. This study, at the same time, pays attention to the human suffering inherent in the problematic Korean educational environment, a topic that has received relatively minor attention and thus has not offered a way to view maternal introspection as cultural healing. Korean mothers' practices in EFL education is a microcosm of contemporary Korean society, revealed through the struggle between traditional social relations and the colonizing world order controlled by the process of the globalized capitalist economy. As a result, language education is ultimately defined only through a monetary value system. In this system, the unpaid work of Korean mothers is unrecognized, yet their performance has a complex impact on their children's lives and the whole society.

Research

I present my research as a critical-descriptive interpretation. The three tasks of the study were (a) to explore Korean mothering in the Korean EFL educational context; in particular, the tension between the construction of Korean motherhood with regard to children's education and Korean women's responses to the process of global capitalist transformation as formed by the interaction with a Korean patriarchal tradition; (b) to understand Korean mothers' reaction to the hegemony of English in an age of globalization; and (c) to understand the maternal introspection of cultural healing. I embraced a hermeneutic approach to the notions of interdependence and diversity in both West and East and paid attention to the human suffering inherent in the problematic Korean educational environment.

Hermeneutic Demand of Historical Consciousness

Following a hermeneutic approach, in this study I describe the sociocultural context of Korean women's historical understandings of the past, present, and future concerning the intensity of Korean mothering in children's education. My motivation was to understand the dehumanizing pedagogical conditions that have resulted from the material values emerging from and shaped by Korea's compressed globalized capitalist economic development. The hermeneutic task of this research was to call for a debate on the alternative worldviews of mothers to draw forth fuller human capacities in the contemporary Korean educational landscape. The unitary notion of a 'good mother' defined by material strategic values is prescribed as something that benefits only children, yet the manifestation of this good mothering is frequently considered controversial. From this definition, no matter how good Korean mothers' intentions are, the consequences of their behavior and values are degenerating the human potential and depriving younger generations of their genuine celebration of life. Furthermore, children's academic activities have become a form of labor under the enslavement of the neoliberal spirit.

Korean children are suffering from the violence of the ideology of a standard global competition and alienated from life activities because of the regime of a knowledge economy that focuses only on economic benefits. English is regarded as a key element of postindustrial development in Korea. The generation and exploitation of knowledge and technology are believed to create wealth in this age of globalization. From this belief, the hegemonic power of English has dominated the sociocultural and economic principles in Korean society. In effect, learning English as an ideology has been imposed and internalized in Koreans' everyday life in a complex way.

The relevance of Korean mothering to the global knowledge/economic drive regarding Korean EFL education is significant. Korean mothering as a subjugated social institution plays an important role as an agency that maintains and entrenches the formula knowledge = money within society and abandons the Eastern value of 'learning and knowing' that should be acquired for the common good based on self-cultivation. With many Korean women being confined to the domestic sphere of life, middle-class mothers' life-meaning, values, and outlook are glorified to proper status because they have been given greater control of their households, while at the same time they live under strict behavioral censorship (Cho, H. J., 2002). Korea is a largely homogeneous society (Kang, J., 2008) that emphasizes capitalist patriarchal social processes (Go-Jung, 2001). Korean women now locate themselves as the greatest consumer group, which has a profound impact on the market of consumption (Nelson, 2000) and housing and marriage (Kendall, 1996), as well as the educational experience, which are directly transferred into exchange values (Koo, 2007). By articulating what is going on in Korea, my hermeneutic expectation with this study was to step backward, as Illich (1976) suggested, to drop out, and to reorganize for a less destructive way of life in which Korean mothers have more control of their lives—lives that are currently entrapped in an endless game of survival.

The tasks of describing and understanding involve a hermeneutic demand for historical consciousness of Korean mothering, which is defined as both an individual and a collective outlook that mothers construct through their interpretation of their reality. The fulfillment of the hermeneutic requirement in this study was possible because my hermeneutic imagination was able to articulate the meaning, values, and relationships embedded in the coherent texture of humanly lived experience in the educational context of Korean mothering. That Korean mothers' support for their children's success in education raises a questionable condition of children's well-being generates hermeneutic presuppositions rooted in the history and culture of Korea. This paradox does not focus on proving by method, but on showing through understanding. That is, my hermeneutic understanding in this study aimed for historical consciousness, which is the way that we articulate complex questions of human condition and social reality. Hence, I devoted the question to exploring the extent to which we might consider this research a contribution to social and cultural healing.

Another way of understanding the Korean model of mothering as it relates to Korean EFL educational issues is a postcolonial view, both spiritually and politically. What is happening in the contemporary Korean EFL educational environment can be understood as Korean familial pedagogical responses to the historical interaction between two different cultures; that is, East and West. English is a symbol of the continuity of the dominance of Western White male values in the intercultural interaction between an Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture and the homogeneous trait of Korean culture.

English represents ideas and physical entities of Christianity and capitalism that were historically communicated with Koreans. Mastery of English signifies an admission to a group of the dominant. Korean native religions' encounter with Christianity, which brought English to Korea, is a significant point of intercultural interaction. Walter and Fridman (2004) stated that, despite Christianity's rejection of magic and wizardry, "evangelistic denominations have the largest number of adherents in Korea, and at the same time, shamanism thrives as a substantial feature of Korean culture" (p. 40). They observed that this encounter is not necessarily regarded as confrontational or contradictory. Shamanistic practices in Korean culture such as healing rituals and wishing rites have been resilient throughout the period of modernization and have melted into ecclesiastical practices. According to Chong (2006), Korean "women have long constituted the overwhelming majority of evangelical church membership" (p. 351) because the introduction of Christianity to Korean women offered culturally radical opportunities:

> Beyond their numerical predominance, what has been particularly remarkable about Korean women's evangelical involvement has been the fervent spirituality and dedication with which they have approached the religion since the beginning and the pivotal role they have played in the growth and maintenance of the churches. (p. 351)

It is not a coincidence that most Christian churches that are spread throughout cities and villages in Korea push spirituality as a path to passing the national college entrance examinations through organized prayer meetings and candlelight vigils. The interaction between Korea's capitalist transformation and shamanized Christianity grounded in patriarchal relations is one aspect of the understanding of intercivilizational communication in the EFL educational context. This massive interreligious encounter among Korean women is an important point of understanding the values and meanings of Korean mothering in terms of their support for children's education. Weber (1994) viewed Christianity, in his time, as the most crucial cause of the capitalist social process and social structures.

According to A. E. Kim (2000), more than 160 Protestant denominations and nearly 60,000 churches, as well as 1,100 Catholic churches, supposedly make South Korea the most Christianized non-Western country, outside of the Philippines, in the world; and Protestant Christianity has proceeded to become the nation's largest religion with over nine million followers, which represents more than one fifth of the total population. A. E. Kim suggested that the shamanization of Christianity in Korean society reveals a distinctly plausible affinity between Shamanism and the spirit of capitalism because Shamanism's singular emphasis is on material success as the supreme goal. This belief seems to converge with certain aspects of capitalism even though we consider that there is more to the spirit of capitalism than the acquisitive impulse and pursuit of wealth. This linkage might be seen as a clue to the contest in the Korean ethos between Western material values and Eastern nonmonetary moral values based on Confucian principles. The shamanization of Christianity makes excuses to cope with Koreans' moral conflicts. The everyday life of Korean mothers with children who are preparing for college entrance examinations is frequently organized around school and child care programs in a neighborhood, especially with a focus on religious activities. It is possible to infer that the spirit of capitalism has mediated the dynamics between education and religion in Korean society. English has been a symbolic mediator of Christianity into Korean culture historically since its introduction by American missionary institutions in the 1880s (Yoon, 2007).

A postcolonial view of political economy is also relevant to Korean mothering. Mignolo (2000) articulated that the West's "denial of coevalness" (p. 120) has relocated people in a chronological hierarchy. As a result of this hierarchy, languages, people, and knowledges have been relocated in time rather than space in the name of modern development. In the case of Korean mothering, the logic of the Western denial of coevalness has been blindly admitted. A westernized modernity has been fully credited for the better life and growth of an individual and a nation. This reception has resulted in Koreans' anxiety over the globalization of EFL education. It also is a failure of the historical understanding of the world, on the one hand, when we think about the painful truth of the human suffering of today's Korean young and adult children, mothers, and, indeed, the whole society. On the other hand, it might be an inescapable consequence of the globally unbalanced social processes in the globalized capitalist economy.

At this point we face the question, What can hermeneutic studies do about this? Smith (2002) understood the mission of a hermeneutic scholar: "Not playing with words; this is asking for the conditions under which it is possible for us to say that we are alive . . . and that living seems worthwhile, not just something to be endured until its putative end" (p. 85). To do this, I focused my research on language and history instead of looking for objective truths "tied to specific situations of history and place" (p. 86). In other words, the ultimate question that kept me awake throughout my study is, "What makes life Life?" (p. 85).

Drawing on the Marxist and feminist tradition of sociologic analysis, this descriptive study was critical and based on attention to language, which is essential to hermeneutic construction. It focused on the social context to which pedagogical agents (e.g., EFL learners and mothers) belong, instead of the merely individual learning process, and involved an exploration of such themes as inequality in class and gender and others, including human alienation, power and oppression from a Third World perspective, emancipation of self, the right to pursue human genuine happiness, and creativity in critical pedagogy. In addition, I examined the culture industry that manipulates populations and cultivates false needs and revealed the institutionalized duty of Korean mothers as dictated by capitalist market logic. I also used the notion of hegemony to interpret the reason that Koreans accept the controlling power that utilizes English as a medium of disseminating the dominant ideas in the capitalist world, wherein capitalist entrepreneurs play the role of the new intellectual. This might mean that this study explains the difficulty of raising critical awareness of the oppression by the dominant ideology and of raising the consciousness of Self for social action in this difficult era. The strong humanistic element in Marxist tradition was a major inspiration for the critical attitudes in the study toward the capitalist economic order that has enormously influenced the social processes of Korea. In this study feminist criticism fostered an understanding of both patriarchal relations and division of labor, which are crucially related to an interpretation of Korean maternal practice.

Allman (2001) claimed that the function of critical education is "to problematize reality—to ask probing questions about what is happening and about how we understand and feel about the events that are taking place" (p. 15). Marxist criticism of capitalism was profoundly inspiring in my interpretation of historically specific events related to Korean EFL education, the discovery of dynamic interrelations among those events, and the nature of capitalism/global capitalism that runs through my temporal and spatial hermeneutic imagination. As Allman stated above, this imagining would not work without problematizing EFL educational realities. Smith (2009) explicated Freire's (1970) human compassion in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* based on a recognition of the organic nature of dialectical relations in human conditions and relationships. His articulation of that recognition is as follows:

> The oppressor is *in* the oppressed, just as the oppressed are *in* the oppressor and neither can be free until there is a coming together to work out a mutual freedom. To be an oppressor is to be oppressed oneself, insofar as the unfreedom of the other is implicitly a denunciation of freedom itself, and hence my own. (p. 110)

In the process of problematizing Korean mothering in the EFL context, feminist approaches enabled me to rethink societal reproduction. Such reproduction is greatly concerned with the perpetuation of gender roles and the continuation of class relations in a combination of the organization of production and the organization of social reproduction, in which social reproduction includes the caring and socialization of children. The issues of patriarchal social relations in Korean society are culturally deeply rooted and politically persistent. The interaction between patriarchy and capitalist development processes creates a complex formation of social problems. The relationship between Korean mothering and EFL education is a significant aspect of those formations. Feminist theorizing of patriarchy based on its criticism of capitalism was an important part of the conceptualization of this research.

Concerning the language emphasis in this hermeneutic study, I accepted Smith's (2002) suggestion that our true being can be described through its enactments in time in language: Attending to language and using it become the primary means of understanding the operation of Being. Language matters to education and life in that language reflects the construction of the significances that affect our everyday lives. It also conveys the categories through which we understand ourselves and others. Interpreting language is therefore a way of understanding the human condition and its social relations. In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer (2004) emphasized that our understanding of language can be a negotiation between preconception and misunderstanding in our interpretations. These preconceptions and understandings are inescapable because of people's different historical backgrounds, but, eventually, the preconceptions and misunderstandings will contribute to a positive change in our understanding. What I tried to do through this interpretive research was to interpret past misunderstandings or the present's preconception of history to help the next generation to reinterpret my interpretation. That is how my research contributes to the world. The weakness of the study is its lack of application because I have not furthered the solution part. Despite the lack of alternatives, however, it was still a meaningful task to articulate what is going on and why things are happening in the complex Korean educational phenomena from historical, cultural, social, political, and economic perspectives.

Questions of Procedure

Facing the ambiguous nature of interpretive inquiry as a formal research project, I found the research path challenging. In the course of developing this thesis, I found that the work *per se* demonstrates an evolving process within which the work grew, formulated, and shaped. Admitting that the research topic area is ambitiously vast, I am mindful of Geertz's (1973) conceptualization of culture: that it is important not to lose cohesion in a web of many discursively related sociocultural aspects:

> Culture is most effectively treated, . . . purely as a symbolic system, . . . by isolating its elements, specifying the internal relationships among those elements, and then characterizing the whole system in some general way—according to the core symbols around which it is organized, the underlying structures of which it is a surface expression, or the ideological principles upon which it is based. (p. 17)

In terms of the characteristics of interpretive research, Ellis (1998) wrote that "the processes or dynamics of interpretation constitute our very mode of being in the world, rather than a prescribed method" (p. 15). From this view, an acknowledgement of the interrelationship between epistemology (interpretation) and ontology (interpreter) is important in the methodological process of interpretive study. I am a Korean mother and teacher whose lived experience in both practice and research is inextricably involved in the research questions as living knowledge through a reflective life. Greenbank (2003) pointed out the necessity of including reflexive accounts with the acknowledgement that educational research cannot be value free; similarly, my positioning as a researcher is as a historically embedded interpreter who combines psychological, historical, and social description to create a better knowledge of contexts. According to hermeneutic discussion, an interpreter or Heidegger's (1962) Being-in-the-World is subject to the way in which an object has already been understood in the tradition to which the interpreter belongs. From my personal experience from a native point of view, being a part of the Korean EFL educational situation demanded that I write. That is, the reality is overwhelming for me as an individual who is trying to understand what is going on; the situation does not allow me the freedom to make decisions simply for my own happiness. As a result, people forget the inevitable interdependency within the community in everyday life, whereby they are not able to care about each other. For this reason, as Smith (2009) noted, hermeneutics challenges us today to interpret the conditions of human freedom within a forced logic of capital and the inability of any type of educational agency to control the logic of capital for the broader service of meeting real human needs, not constructed ones.

Although hermeneutic license endowed this study with an epistemological freedom from the strict positivist duty to prove what I infer, the validity of hermeneutic presumptions is still indispensable. Thus, understanding languages and signs in the Korean EFL context with rich and detailed description offers the reader a picture of what is going on. In terms of epistemological questions, Gadamer (1975, 2004) argued, it is natural to face unique dilemmas in conducting qualitative research as social science; therefore, it has to be said that modern science armed with its methodic approach cannot claim to be the only locus of valid knowledge. In *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger (1966) was also concerned about our loss of meditative thought in the complete dominance of calculative thought. In contrast to positivist traditions, for Prasad (2005), interpretive traditions emerge from a scholarly position that takes human interpretations as the starting point for developing knowledge about the social world and human relationships. Because two important foci of my study are basically related to the human subjective condition, as Prasad (2005) described it, the research should be "the process of subjective reality construction in all walks of social life" (p. 14). My tasks were to articulate educational events and open discussions on the two, which are deeply concerned with the human capacity to understand historical conditions; specifically, (a) the impact of the globalized capitalist economy; namely, the neoliberal belief and practices of human subjugation to the logic of the market; and (b) the continuity of the patriarchal tradition in the capitalist social process. The scholarly endeavor to perform these tasks thus required epistemological freedom from the dominance of the logic of science.

The notion of text in terms of defining, gathering, and analyzing research texts as data should be expanded from written texts to human action. Ricoeur (1973) wrote that human action as meaningful becomes an object of science when "it constitutes a delineated pattern which has to be interpreted according to its inner connections" (p. 98); he argued instead that "the meaning of human actions, of historical events, and of social phenomena may be construed in several different ways, [which] is well known by all experts in the social sciences" (p. 108). Geertz (1973) also understood that human action is symbolic and wrote in *The Interpretation of Cultures* that culture is understood as meaning and expressed through symbols that publics create and use. Insofar as the interpretation of symbols and signs (semiotics) is a hermeneutic activity, "The whole point of a semiotic approach to culture is . . . to aid us in gaining access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense of the term, converse with them" (p. 24).

For Geertz (1973), the understanding of culture through a semiotic or interpretive approach requires isolating symbols to appraise their meanings and showing how they vibrate within the (Korean) cultural context. Culture is embodied in a society as a symbolic system that communicates meaning and produces a worldview, ethos, values, and others. Borrowing Geertz' notion of *thick description* concerning methodology and context, I present in this study a rich and extensive set of details to describe Korean mothering in EFL education.

Semiotic sensitivity was therefore one of the essential aspects of this study. Berger (1984) defined *signs* as "things which stand for other things or, add a different dimension to the matter; anything that can be made to stand for something else" (p. 1). My task in this study was, as Umberto Eco (1984) advised, "to explain why something looks intuitively, in order to discover under the felicity of the so-called intuition a complex cognitive process" (p. 9). In this conceptualization, English with regard to Korean mothering is considered a semiotic symbol of anxiety because English is the key to success in a child's life. The popular Korean term *SKY* (*seukai*) is the abbreviation of three nationally top-ranked universities that signify middle-class Korean mothers' desire but are unreachable in almost all cases. As I discussed previously, Korean educational issues are concerned with the social inequalities that were generated mainly by a material base during the evolving processes of modernity. SKY is a sign of a promising future that would guarantee membership in the affluent southern Seoul district of Gangnam, known as *pal hakgoon* (the eighth Seoul school district), which is the district that sends the largest number of students to SKY. *Gangnam moms* (*gangnam omma*) are role models in Korea (Park, S. J., 2007b). The apartment complexes in Gangnam are not only residential buildings, but also dwellings of costumes, manifesto, clothing for life, and social fetishes. Berger (1984) paid attention to language and noted that words are among the most important kinds of signs. Therefore, "many articles in newspapers and magazines are semiotic in nature in that they attempt to make sense of various objects and phenomena" (p. 48), which is a sign in itself (Berger, 2000).

Using Eco's (1984) statement about interaction between the semiotic and the hermeneutic approaches, I was looking for the practicality of Gadamer's (1975) notion of the hermeneutic circle with regard to the problem of interpretation in my research. Because understanding and interpretation are possible only through language, there is no reading without interpretation, and interpretation inescapably comes from the understanding that lies on the border between semiotics and hermeneutics. Following Eco's (1994) "Peircian logic of abduction" (p. 59), the intention of the text is the result of a conjecture on the part of the reader. Making a conjecture means adopting a hypothesis; that is, "figur[ing] out a Law that can explain a Result" (p. 59). From a semiotic point of view, cultural artifacts constitute a series of signs, and every act of communication is regarded as a message sent and received through different kinds of signs. The abundance and richness of language circulation in Korean society both online and offline is one benefit of my research. Formal and informal languages (e.g., the vernacular, a sense of humor, slangs of catharsis) with regard to EFL educational trends in Korea fit the semiotic approach to the world.

Among the various social aspects of contemporary Korea such as the heated Korean housing market, excessive consumption, and prosperous private Korean English-tutoring market, this semiotic observation enabled me to find a common thread among the words and languaging habits signified by these aspects and connect them to the impact of capitalism. This semiotic approach possibly tells me that Korean parents' excessively enthusiastic support for their children's private education (*sagyoyouk*) and their uniform preference for apartment dwelling are closely related as a series of signs of status consciousness in the Korean cultural context. One of the semiotic tasks related to this relationship might be an examination of the complex rules that govern the combination of these signs. In particular, Koreans' popular apartment life and their zeal for education are prescribed by social codes that Eco (1994) called "Law" (p. 59). My hypothetical inference lies in capitalist socioeconomic processes and the way that Koreans have responded to them.

Research texts are gathered from preexisting and emancipated face-to-face or direct reciprocal oral communications. I extended the fixation of discourse in this study to semantic, pictorial, and structural elements in the oral, electronic and print medium (Ricoeur, 1973). My selection of texts in this study can be likened to the process of *bricolage*, coined by Lévi-Strauss (1966), for the gathering of data that could be interpreted hermeneutically to reveal the multidimensional and profound ways that mothers' involvement and human suffering relate to pedagogical practices in Korean EFL education. In *The Savage Mind*, Levi-Strauss attempted to characterize two modes of thought or methods of acquiring knowledge and stressed that both scientific and mythical thought should be understood as valid and that one does not supersede the other. Levi-Strauss drew an analogy to *bricolage* to develop his definition of mythical thought: "Mythical thought is . . . a kind of intellectual bricolage" (p. 17). The French term *bricoleur* has no English equivalent, but refers to the kinds of practices that a handyman performs with materials and tools that are at hand by appropriating preexisting materials that are readily at hand.

Korean Model of Mothering

During the last decade the topic of educational fervor in Korea has appeared frequently in Western media. Most reports have presented keen observations of some aspects of the Korean education frenzy. In the *Asia Times*, Card (2005) described Koreans' national obsession with university-entrance competition as "life and death exams". In the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, Demick (2002) described eager Korean parents who hoped that tongue surgery would help their toddlers with English. Considering the prosperity of prenatal English classes in Korea, such comments are not exaggerated. Demick continued that

> it is not unusual for 6-month-old infants to be put in front of the television for as long as five hours a day to watch [English] instruction videos or for 7-year-olds to be sent out after dinner for English cram courses [commonly called *hagwon*].

There are more. Newly emerged Korean transnational families, called *wild geese* (*gireogy*), are even more renowned. Wild geese family members are separated by an ocean to teach their children English in North America and other countries where English is spoken, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Philippines, as Ly (2005) reported in the *Washington Post*, Onishi (2008) in the *New York Times*, and many others.

Although Koreans' overly heated educational passion is peculiar enough to attract the attention of Western media, the internal social pressure that this reality exerts upon Koreans' everyday life is problematic and intricate. Behind this reality stand Korean mothers who are vilified as a competitive consumer group in the private education market (*sagyoyook sijang*) while at the same time receiving sympathy as sufferers of anxieties in a winner-take-all education race. Card's (2005) observation on the Korean educational landscape, based on his living experience as a journalist in Korea for 12 years, was realistic:

> They [Korean mothers] micro-manage every hour that could be spent studying, whether a weekend or holiday. It is common to study outside of the home past midnight. Students have come to loathe winter and summer vacations where they are enrolled in "intensive" gulag-like study programs. Having a summer or part-time job is rare for a college-bound South Korean teenager. . . . Being an educational agent mother sometimes involves bribery . . . for giving their students preferable treatment.

As Card suggested, it is commonly acknowledged that a new generation of mothers, particularly highly educated middle- and upper-class women in their 30s to 50s, has taken the role of educational agents for their children by enrolling and scheduling cram courses and driving their children to schools. Children often have a quick meal while they sit in the car while travelling from one cram course to another. Korean mothers are proud of the number of supplementary classes that their children take and relieved that their children are tutored by former SKY graduates or go to cram schools with the highest reputation.

In today's Korea, as Koo (2007) and many other scholars commented, Korean mothers spend enormous amounts of time and money to prepare their children to go to high-ranking schools, and this educational race starts in elementary school (or even in nursery school) and continues throughout college and the job market even after the children finish college. It is taken for granted, therefore, that most Korean mothers, whether staying at home or working for wages, have to negotiate the tasks of mothering to prioritize their children's private education. Their support for their children's extracurricular education bears on tasks such as updating and analyzing government policies and college admission information, collecting information about and selecting cram courses, hiring tutors, purchasing programs or resources, managing finances, scheduling, transporting, consulting, and many more. They often utilize their social networks through neighborhood, kinship, and religious activities to increase the efficacy of outcomes (Cho, H. S., 2004; Park, H. G., 2009). Of course, these numerous tasks are added to their regular housework of nurturing, cleaning, cooking, shopping, bookkeeping, caring for the elderly, and doing various chores, as well as providing emotional support for family members. Furthermore, in most cases it is the mothers who help with regular school activities (e.g., attending parent-teacher meetings, preparing resources for their children's class activities, assisting with homework, catering for school lunches, cleaning classrooms, assisting teachers, etc.).

Through in-depth interviews, Shim (1996) described the everyday life of Korean mothers whose children are preparing for college entrance examinations as the colonization of the lifeworld with time-space compression, because “every aspect of their daily life, even religious life, is organized for the studying children, sacrificing their leisure and even sleep, to help their children” (p. 40). To characterize Korean mothering, it seems to be labor intensive, patternized, obligatory, selfless, filled with anxieties, oppressive, deterrent to biological desire, managerial, driven by an invisible social power, and economically rational and instrumental.

Wente (2010), one of Canada’s columnists in the *Globe and Mail*, referred to today’s motherhood as “the new oppression”. Although every generation of mothers has been buffeted by different waves of social panic, she criticized the new ethic of mothering as having to find wisdom, happiness, and connectedness, not only with children, but also with the Earth itself. Basically, she argued that, by raising the standard, women are the ones who are in charge of both reproduction and remedies for the wounds of the masculinity of modernity. Although Wente’s case presents one of the aspects of mothering in the North American context, the duty of Korean mothering indicates the struggles of mothers in a newly developed country. Her column exudes, at least, more vitality and capitalist maturity (e.g., an overrated breastfeeding debate, fear of anything that is not chemical free) in the mothers’ world in developed countries. In contrast, Korean mothering is inorganic. In fact, according to Statistics Korea (2013), Korea had the world’s lowest fertility rate —1.15%—in 2009. The Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI) reported that 4 Korean parents out of 10 gave up their plans to have a second child because of the burden of educational expenses (Kim, S. G., 2011). Using survey data from 2,527 households with children under three years of age, S. G. Kim reported that 99.8% of the households responded that their children already participate in extracurricular courses.

Hays (1996) referred to the contemporary trend toward maximized expectations of motherhood as *intensive mothering* that is “child-centered, expert-guided, emotionally absorbing, labor-intensive, and financially expensive” (p. 8). Although Hays’ argument is based on North American culture, it still fits the Korean case. The application of Hay’s notion of intensive mothering, however, requires consideration of sociocultural differences such as culture, tradition, attitudes, value of education, economic activities, gender equality, socioeconomic structure, women’s self-consciousness, intergenerational mobility, and others. From this comparative approach, the significant characteristics of the Korean model of mothering are oppression, limited power within the household, questionable autonomy of agency, and less concern about human well-being. To summarize, Korean mothers' educational practice pattern is complex. At the same time, it offers a lens through which to gain insights into the interconnections of many contemporary social issues.

In this sense, when we think about the scientific analysis of social phenomena such as maternal practice, Weber's (1958, 1994) concepts are applicable. He adopted the view that ideas and values are the prime causes of social processes, social structures, and social change. The most crucial for him were religious. Drawing on Weber's interpretive understanding of social action, I believe that an exploration of Korean mothering should be based on Korean mothers' views of the world and the values that they accept as proper conduct. Geertz (1973), who was influenced by Weber, also regarded culture as a collection of symbols that transmit meanings within a society. In other words, it might eventually be possible to understand mothers' worldviews and values by examining the inferential patterns of their behaviors or actions and relations in the process of social change.

According to the *Encyclopedia of Korean Culture* (2001) published by the Academy of Korean Studies, the well-known Korean term *skirt swish* (*chima baram*) implies a derogatory attitude toward Korean mothers' social practice, which has grown since the 1960s. The skirt is a symbol of women whose area of practice used to be confined to family life. The meaning of skirt swish is ambivalent in today's Korean culture. The practice of more socially active mothers possibly benefits the family, while at the same time their socioeconomic activities threaten the Korean ethos of patriarchal social relations. Korean mothers' support for their children's education is frequently termed a skirt swish; in this case, even social equality issues are added to the social fabric. *Fly, Penguins* is one example. This Korean motion picture, directed by Im Soonrey (2009), was about a husband who blamed his wife for taking both too much and not enough action in his son's education. Korean mothering is conceived as ambivalent and vulnerable. So is the society.

Zaretsky (1976) viewed the family as an "integral part of society that changes continuously as a whole" (p. 32). This makes examining the family and the private arena to which mothers are confined important to an understanding of the process of large-scale structural change. It can be thus argued that ideas and values as prime causes of social processes in the Korean context are the spirit of capitalism and the social norms of patriarchal relations. The interaction of capitalism and patriarchal social conditions has produced even more multifaceted and complex characteristics of Korean mothering. The Korean educational phenomenon of English fever might be a partial consequential outcome of Korean mothers' response to the social processes and changes in the combination of the globalized capitalist development with English hegemony and patriarchal relations. Therefore, it is important to interpret latent meanings and signs within the backdrop of Korean cultural models of mothering. In the following section I discuss some questions about Korean mothering related to Confucian tradition and the partnership of patriarchy and capitalism in more detail.

Confucian Tradition and Capitalist Patriarchy

The nexus of Confucian parental governance and capitalist industrialization has been identified as an economic orthodoxy of East Asian miracles in newly developed countries (Henderson, 1993), including Korea. The Confucian emphasis on education is considered as fueling the high-speed national growth of Korea (Kuznets, 1988). Korean mothering in this study involves two areas of Confucian tradition. One is its contribution to patriarchal social relations, and the other is its emphasis on education. The points of Korean Confucian tradition that communicate with capitalist patriarchy are the exploitation and distortion of the practices of Korean mothers as promoted by the social process of preserving social dominant controls through values, attitudes, and interests.

To define the concept of patriarchy in my study, although the concept of patriarchy is defined in a number of different ways, I will discuss two similar core elements: the notion of gender inequality and a degree of systematicity (Walby, 1989, 1996). Walby's (1996) definition of patriarchy is a system of "social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress, and exploit women" (p. 21), and in this study I paid attention to both biological and social categories. Firestone (1970) described gender inequality as originating in the patriarchal relations imposed upon women through their biology, and Hartmann (1979) discussed how social structures and practices have maintained patriarchal control through the appropriation of women's labor. Regarding the partnership of capitalism and patriarchy, Mies' (1998) notion of *capitalist-patriarchy*—that patriarchy is usually combined with another social system through social change—seemed to fit my research.

Hartmann (1979) argued that the development of capitalism and patriarchal relations in a material base affected gender issues, particularly the gender division of labor, and all positions that strive for gender equality. Patriarchy, however, cannot be derived from capitalism, as Walby (1989, 1996) and Mies (1998) stated, because patriarchy both predates and postdates capitalism. In Korean society as well, patriarchal relations existed in the past before capitalist development, and they still prosper. Mies' capitalist-patriarchy means that patriarchy usually occurs in combination with another social system; for instance, feudalism. Therefore, for her, capitalism is the latest form taken of patriarchy. In the Korean case, patriarchal relations were fused into a precapitalist agrarian system for a long period in the past; its pinnacle was the era of the Chosun dynasty (1392-1910), when neo-Confucianism served as an underpinning philosophy in the establishment of the state. Later the legacy of patriarchal social structure masked with Confucian moral principles—to apply Mies' view—was combined with Western capitalist development. Their interaction is symbiotic and has been assimilated into the everyday life of Koreans.

In traditional Korean society, women's subordination to men was explicit: Men had power over other members of a family, community, or society; Korean women have been marginalized members of society for centuries. Koh (2008) stated that "not only is the father of a traditional family considered superior to any females, but so are the grandfather, the great grandfather, and the first and other sons" (p. 346). Korean women received legal equality in 1948, after independence. Despite this constitutional guarantee, women's social status has not been enhanced very much. The patrilineal family system that designated the eldest male as the head of the family (*hoju*) contained mainly male-dominant provisions in marriage, divorce, and inheritance (Park, K. A., 1993). Strict inheritance runs through the patrilineal line. The eldest son of a family could not give up his position regardless of his age: Even a two-year-old boy could become a *hoju* (Koh, 2008). Thus, it was not surprising that representatives of the Korean Confucian scholars group *Sungkyounkwan* protested when the *hoju* system was abolished officially in 2008.

Even in the present day, Confucianism is commonly blamed as the source of patriarchal ideology (Go-Jung, 2001; Li, 2000)—the main structural base of work, gender relations, and family life (Kim & Finch, 2002). Although classical Confucian texts reflect degrading and repressive attitudes toward women (Goldin, 2000; Koh, 2008), moderating groups of scholars have suggested that the old stereotype that construes Asian women as victims of tradition or Confucian patriarchy is too simplistic a picture (Ko, Haboush, & Piggott, 2003). It seems worthwhile to recognize, as they suggested, that “neither ‘woman’ nor ‘Confucian tradition’ is a uniform or timeless category” (p. 1). It is necessary to consider historical and cross-cultural variations in the forms of women’s subordination because Confucianism goes back to Confucius (551 BC–479 BC). For example, Mies’ (1998) historiographical description reveals women in medieval Western Europe living in a system occupied by Germanic tribes, where there was no Confucian influence, but where they were subservient to the *munt* (‘hand’ in Old High German) of their men—husband, father, son—all of their lives until the rise of the cities in the 13th century and emergence of an urban bourgeoisie. Koh (2008) defended the gender neutrality of Confucianism, arguing that Confucianism and patriarchy are historical because “the idea of women’s subordination to men was not embodied in Confucian philosophy but historically combined with Confucianism by those who established their social order based on patriarchy” (p. 354).

S.-H. Lee (2000) wrote that the influence of Confucianism upon Korean society has been both positive and negative: esteem for centralized power, human relations based on hierarchy and filial piety, commitment to education, family-oriented human relations, harmonious human relationships, authoritarianism, nepotism, favoritism, cronyism, corruption, bribery, and more. Reverence for education is a widely known Korean cultural characteristic rooted in the Confucian heritage. In the Confucian tradition education is supposed to be valued intrinsically and promote self-cultivation. According to S. Kim (2009), a Korean feminist Confucian scholar, Confucian teaching has been utilized as a philosophy that underpins a familial curriculum that reinforces traditional patriarchal relations through education, particularly mothering, in the family. Explaining contemporary Korean educational zeal as Confucian tradition is an oversimplification that risks appropriating the intrinsic values of the connection between education and morality as a blind discourse of development and competition.

Confucian ethics were interpreted and practiced as a separation of the roles of husband and wife and the wife’s subordinate position within the family, which persists. The belief is that in the capitalist patriarchal social structure husbands support their families in a family-wage system, whereas the wives remain at home as a major consumer group doing nonpaid housework. This moment reflects an intersecting point at which the traditional patriarchal order is transferred into the new emerging order. Scott and Tilly (1975) argued in their historical analysis of women’s work and the family in 19th-century Europe that

> traditional values did not persist indefinitely in modern or modernizing contexts. As families adapted customary strategies to deal with new situations they became involved in new experiences which altered relationships within the family and the perceptions of those relationships. As the process of change involved retention of old values and practices, it also transformed them, but in a more gradual and complex manner. (p. 61)

Their analysis contrasts West and East: Whereas the major transformation involved the replacement of familial with individualistic values in the West, in Korea it seems to have been the addition of individualistic to familial values.

I did not focus my study directly on whether or how Confucianism has contributed to gender inequality. I believe that it would be profoundly meaningful if Confucianism and feminism communicated with each other about human existence and ordinary human behavior. From this point of view, the importance of Confucian tradition in my research was an understanding of how the interrelations between the Confucian agrarian precapitalist and the globalized capitalist economy have affected Korean mothering and how Confucian humanistic values beyond its appropriated problem can contribute to the recovery of historically situated Korean mothering.

Another main concern with Korean Confucian heritage in this study was the possibility of how Confucian value as part of Asian traditional moral values might cope with capitalist neoliberal meritocratic ideology. I hoped that they could help to recover the side effects of Westernized modernization of Korea. S.-H. Lee (2000) noted that debates on Asian values take place during the historical ups and downs in economic development of Asian countries and that they include questions of moral recovery alternatives as the counterpart of Western values. Tu Wei-ming (1984, 1996) believed that the emphasis on individualism and materialism in Western culture is regressive and that Confucian values would counteract the effects of Western values. My study is outside the debate on whether Confucianism is an alternative to Western values or not. However, I was still interested in a critical view from the Confucian perspective on the central role that Western values play in modernity and the formation of Korean mothers' values and outlook.

Y.-B. Song (2002) criticized "a certain loss of humanity in the aftermath of a radical 'rationalisation' of the production process, . . . the degradation of traditional ethical norms and spiritual values" (p. 114) As Weber (1958) wrote, rational forms are regarded as one of the most important characteristics of the development of capitalist society in the West. The problem is that reason becomes instrumental, and human effort becomes translated purely into economic gain. Y.-B. Song admitted that a premodern ethical system that began in a simple agricultural economy of the distant past such as the Confucian model cannot serve as a ready-made instant alternative for today's society. He suggested instead that Confucian anthropocosmic ethics "sets great store by the practice of virtue ethics with its emphasis on the realization of the harmony between humans and Nature in the universe, in lieu of the promotion of anthropocentric self-interest" (p. 123). This idea also aligns with those of Whitehead (1927), who speculated that the world is not determined by material being, but by the course of events: "One tendency is exemplified in the slow decay of physical nature," and "the other tendency is exemplified by the yearly renewal of nature in the spring, and by the upward course of biological evolution" (p. 1). He considered this a function of reason in its relation to these contrasted aspects of history, with reason being the self-discipline of the originative element in history. This intercivilizational comparative perspective offers possible conceptualization and wisdom and thus alternatives for understanding and overcoming struggling Korean mothering.

Gender and Development in Korea

I developed the previous section under the assumption that Korean mothering can be identified as a cultural model and that it might be the consequence of a response to social change, particularly to the achievement of the amalgamation of economic development and patriarchal relations. In this section I discuss social change as an underpinning of the interrelations among Korean women and historical meaning and the ideology of development.

Although Korea's modernization began with Japanese colonization (1910-1945), it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that Korea was industrialized and the state pursued rapid growth (Lie, 1996). Korea is a densely populated country with little arable area; its total area is smaller than that of Cuba. In the aftermath of the Korean War the Western political strategy of the Cold War was an additional financial and military burden. Since Korean independence in 1945, this nation has evolved from a state of poverty accompanied by hunger and starvation in 1953 to a newly developed country whose annual GNP growth registered at 8% to 10% in 1990 (Park, K. A., 1993), the size of economy (GDP) in 2014 ranked 13th in the world according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015). Hidden behind the exceptional economic growth, as Lie argued, was a state in the form of an authoritarian regime that suppressed legal unions to undercut global price competition and sanctified the exploitation of Korean workers by large conglomerates (*chaebol*) that sought to institutionalize patriarchal control over workers in their family-owned firms. Lei reported that

> Koreans worked the longest hours in the world in 1986 and suffered one of the highest industrial accident rates. . . . Wages were low in comparison to other developing Asian economies, or to Mexico or Brazil in 1986. . . . A minimum monthly income for a family of five was . . . about US$335; . . . [it was] inadequate for many workers to acquire the basic necessities of life. (pp. 44-45)

Behind the glorification of national growth, the contribution of Korean women has been ignored. Han and Ling (1998) referred to this as “a hybrid product of Western masculinist capitalism and Confucian parental governance” (p. 53):

> Confucian parental governance refers to a politico-ethico ideology where the state acts as a firm but benevolent parent in exchange for filial loyalty and devotion from its children-subjects. Western masculinist capitalism refers to a mode of accumulation and competition that valorizes white male privilege despite claims of rationality, objectivity, and individuality. (p. 54)

Historically, this social change manifested itself in Korea as a nationalism that was entrenched in quasi-Confucian principles during both the premodern era and the postwar rehabilitation period under military regimes (1960s–1990s).

Nations are historical and institutional practices, as McClintock (1993) argued, through which “social difference is invented and performed. . . . Nationalism becomes, as a result, radically constitutive of people’s identities, through social contests that are frequently violent and always gendered” (p. 61). A century of the modern history of Korea (1900s–1990s), at least, has seen a series of colonialists that created a nationalism armed with a Cold War ideology and militarism accompanied by capitalist industrialization. Those are predictable terrains of power and oppression. McClintock pointed out that these institutions “have always been in large part contests over the meanings of manhood” (p. 61). Her argument is valid in a discussion of the role of Korean women and the working class during the transition from agrarian patriarchal social relations to industrial-capitalism.

Patriarchal bias in the process of development was common in many newly independent countries in the 20th century; for example, in Africa (Gordon, 1996). Although their actions often reflected pressures to cater to foreign capital, mainly from the United States (US), Korean rulers have had other agendas as well during industrialization. Similar to Gordon’s analysis of the African cases, Korean rulers must appease, co-opt, or repress multiple social forces such as the military, domestic business, agricultural interest groups, religious constituencies, and women's groups "in order for the ruling class to establish political stability and extract the economic surplus necessary for the regime's own activities . . . and to facilitate capital accumulation" (p. 109). Women are the most significant group who were repressed and exploited.

K. A. Park (1993) raised an important question: "Have the spectacular economic development and rapid modernization been accompanied by substantial progress in women's status in South Korea?" (p. 127); Park argued that the significant exploitation of women workers occurred in the context of Korea's extreme hierarchization of the labor force. Lie (1996; 1998) also stated that during the 1960s Korea's most important foreign-exchange earners were wigs, textiles, and US military bases: "Wigs literally came off women's bodies; textiles were produced by their sweat" (p. 46). The sex industry during that time period also played a major role in foreign-exchange accumulation. US soldiers in military bases created a demand for venal entertainment (Enloe, 2000; Lie, 1996). Another major market that Lie mentioned is Japanese men's tourism during which they entertain Korean women sex workers as escorts and sexual partners under the support of the government.

Meanwhile, state policies pressed the need for production and consumption to bolster economic development. This resulted in the creation of the middle-class family symbolized by a white-collar husband and an urban housewife in a nuclear family who lived mostly in an apartment complex. The new social roles of this economic unit are central to the promotion of consumption as the basis for modern identity. The urban architecture of mass-produced apartment complexes was a perfect master plan for mass consumption and geographical expansion of urban spaces that were propagated as indispensable conditions for economic growth. A rapidly increasing job market digested the influx of labor from rural to urban industries. Under these conditions, highly educated labor force benefited the most in the job market.

In the cultural transition of familial forms, a large number of college graduates came from rural households in which the male offspring were prioritized as the beneficiaries of education. As Ji-Sun Chung (1994) argued, women's unequal access to education because of Korean cultural and historical factors perpetuated the close relationship between capitalist industrialization and patriarchy. She demonstrated governments' gendered educational policies, gender-controlled ratio of enrollment in secondary and higher educational institutes, gender-biased school curriculum, and manipulated textbook contents. She also argued that these settings instilled prescribed gender roles in the familial institution; I argue therefore that this eventually maintained women as cheap labor resources for the international capitalist labor market and its relationship to global modes of production.

Owing to government's low-price policy on food grain for the purpose of maintaining low labor wages, the farming population declined by almost 50% from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s (Abelmann, 1977), and female workers' mobility outpaced males' migration by about 15% (Lie, 1996). Besides the government's manipulative agricultural policy as a salient factor in this surge in migration, "in major export industries such as textiles, garments, electronics and food processing, young women made up over 90% of total production workers in 1980" (Cho, S. K., 1985, p. 81). Women's cheaper labor created optimal conditions for capital, as did their docile trait for state control (Hartmann, 1976). Nonetheless, as factory laborers women, especially young women, had official and better opportunities. However, many women worked in the informal sector as domestic workers in urban middle- and upper-class households, construction employees, peddlers, petty home-based business workers, workers in subsistence farming, and a myriad of manual and menial work including as unpaid housewives in the family. In 1990 married women constituted 99% of the female workforce in agriculture and fishery, whereas young single women accounted for only 1% (Park, K. A., 1993).

Regarding the historical conditions between women and development, the Western liberal tradition holds that modernization through industrialization brings egalitarianism and mitigates the patriarchy of the traditional society through a change in the traditional sexual division of labor. Rosen and Raia (1972) described the relationship between industrialization and some of the family-linked attitudes and behaviors of Brazilian women as follows:

> Industrialization encourages new attitudes and behavior and stresses experiences women have in industrial society which enhance their competence and feelings of self-respect, and alter their relationships with others—particularly family members. . . . Everyday experiences . . . sharpen their faculties and sensitize them to the importance of competence and achievement. The opportunities for employment outside the home enrich them intellectually and emotionally as well as financially. (pp. 353-354)

Similarly in the case of Korean women, K. A. Park (1993) noted, "those who stay at home can also benefit from overall economic development and improved living conditions and adoption of modern values. In the process of development, women are to be liberated from the oppressive traditional patriarchy" (p. 128). In Marxist tradition, on the other hand, according to Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen (2000), women become incorporated into an exploitative global capitalism with deepened gender subordination because "within a limited world, aims like 'unlimited growth' can be realized only at the expense of others" (p. 29), who are mostly women and who have always remained a low-paid reserved labor force, particularly in the Third World.

Although industrialization had both an adverse and a proper impact on Korean women's lives, they benefited less. Despite women's profound contributions to Korea's remarkable economic growth, Korean industrialization has benefited primarily men, because only men worked in the public sphere and received wages for the family; women were confined to the domestic sphere or low-wage labor and had limited access to the new skills and training (Cho, U., 2004) that were necessary for the functional specialization that is required for future advance in any industrial society. There is not much difference in the political arena. Only a handful of women played a part: Seven female legislators were elected between 1948 and 1992, Congress had nine female members in 1996, and 13% of the total congress members in the 2004 election were women (Park, K. A., 1993). As these data show, Korean women have had fewer voices to represent their rights, welfare, and interests. The marginalization of half of the population cannot be accounted for in Korean society.

Modernity with industrialization has never replaced patriarchal tradition but has instead made women's roles and positions even more complicated and precarious. According to Statistics Korea (2013), women's economic participation rate was 49.9% in 2012, compared with an average of 57% in 2008-2010 for women in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011) countries. Economic participation rate among Korean women with university degree was 25.6% lower than university educated men's in 2012. The OECD (2012) reported on the gender gap in the median earnings of full-time employees for 2008: The gender gaps in Korea are the largest, sometimes as large as 38% compared to the OECD average of 17.6%. The World Economic Forum's (2010) *Global Gender Gap Report 2010* ranked Korea 97th among 128 countries around the world. Its index benchmarked national gender gaps on economic-, political-, education-, and health-based criteria; its country rankings allowed effective comparisons across regions and income groups, and it focused on gender equality rather than women's empowerment. None of the above social indicators reflects a proper distribution of national prosperity between the genders.

Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen (2000) argued that in globalized economic conditions women are "manipulated as 'producer-housewives' and as 'consumer-wives'" (p. 30). Their thesis for this argument is that the usual assumption that patriarchy is a system of male dominance would disappear and make way for equality between men and women that would include modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. However, it is only an assumption:

> Patriarchy not only has not disappeared in this process, which is identical with the spread of the modern capitalist world economy, but the ever-expanding process of capital accumulation is based on the maintenance or even re-creation of patriarchal or sexist man-woman relations, an asymmetric sexual division of labor within and outside the family, the definition of all women as dependent housewives and the definition of all men as breadwinners. (p. 30)

In the Korean context, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen's argument fits perfectly. Furthermore, this sexual division of labor has been integrated locally and globally throughout the history of Korean capitalist economic processes.

As I have discussed, Korean mothers' position and roles have been constructed on a solid foundation of the entrenched nexus of capitalism and patriarchy. Korean mothers' excessive support for child education is therefore an inevitable practice in the confluence of production and consumption. The production that they try to generate through child education not only is cultural capital through reproduction aimed at social mobility or the maintenance of social strata, but also has actual monetary benefit through phenomena such as property prices and their relationship to academic achievement.

According to the Korea Institute of Public Finance's survey report, the result of student achievement in the College Scholastic Ability Test (the national college entrance exam) affected local residential property values (Go & Kim, 2010). For example, one point in the school average of English as a subject in the test increased the price of property from 4,000 won to 550 won per 3.3 square meters, and property value increased by 380,000 won in neighborhoods located the closest to English special-purpose high schools. Thus, this study suggested tangible quantitative variables in the link between the housing market and English education. In an article published in *Hankyoreh* on May 10, 2010, I. Chung (2010) also reported a close relationship among students' college entrance exam results, parents' level of education, and the price of their residential property.

In the next section I explore the impact of the Korean economic crisis associated with the globalized capitalist economy on the aggravation of educational issues. I also discuss the new pattern of social inequality that emerged as the aftermath of the national economic downturn with regard to its influence on Korean mothers' practice in their children's education.

The IMF Crisis and the Globalized Capitalist Economy

The IMF crisis in 1997 was a pivotal point in which Korean EFL educational issues became more intensified as both Korean mothering and the English tutoring market moved toward globalization. This discussion includes the impact of the globalized capitalist economy, because the World Bank and the IMF are the actual instrumental institutes that have promoted aggressively neoliberal policies through free trade and globalization.

Because globalization has taken place on multiple economic, political, and cultural levels (Walby, 2003), in this study I have defined the concept of globalization as a part of neoliberal economic policy; the modern concept of the globalization of the economy emerged around 1990. Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen (2000) contended that neoliberal policies were aimed at "abolishing protectionist rules, tariffs and regulations by means of which the free flow of goods, services and capital to all nooks and crannies of the world could be hampered by national governments" (p. 27). As an outcome of this agenda, most national economies were integrated into one global market. Although this process has brought about a rapid qualitative change in the economy, politics, and social life, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen pointed out that most people were not able to fully understand the changes. Many Koreans did not know what an IMF bailout was at that time (Kim, S. K. & Finch, 2002). Later Koreans commonly referred to it simply as *ai-em-epu*, the Korean pronunciation of *IMF* and a term widely used in Korea. Koreans learned this term when they witnessed numerous Korean companies collapse and people lose their jobs and houses. The term *IMF* has become a symbol of economic disaster.

In their everyday life Koreans perceive two different strands of globalization: One is a naïve extension of euphoria as a result of economic achievement, and the other is the hardship that the IMF crisis caused. In this strong protectionist state, during the Park Chung-hee period (1960-1981), foreign imports were tightly regulated, and the consumption of imported foreign goods was strongly discouraged by the government and the imposition of social sanctions (Koo, 2007). Because of the government's control, domestic surplus profit circulated without threat from foreign markets. Nelson (2000) described the atmosphere of the capital city of Seoul in August 1997 when its residents took considerable pride in their prosperous city: It glistened with the effects of decades of economic growth and prosperity.

The globalized capitalist system, however, had already affected Korean society in the 1980s and forced Korea to accept the world's free market. In fact, the historical origin of the World Bank and the IMF traces back to the end of the Second World War. Korea as a newly developed country had been imposed upon to join the free competition with rich countries, the so-called G7, when the Uruguay Round 1986-1994 (World Trade Organization, 2015) reached agreements on agricultural trade and intellectual property, with a long list of other agreements. Clarke and Barlow (1997) noted that the Uruguay Round was the latest effort of big transnational corporations to globalize and legitimize the neoliberal agenda that consisted of multilateral trade negotiations conducted within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. At that time Korean farmers protested these agreements every day; meanwhile, the whole country was excited about and distracted by the hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul. Many Koreans expected this prosperity to continue indefinitely. People believed that a new era of globalization (*segehwa*), politically propagated by the Kim Young-sam government (1993-1998), would even escalate national wealth, especially when Kim Young-sam signed the agreement to become a member of the OECD in 1996.

One year later the Korean government was forced to apply to the IMF for a bailout. IMF negotiators insisted on deep cuts to public expenditure, which greatly affected economic and social policy. Koo (2007) described the reality that Koreans faced every day at that time:

> During the "IMF era," stories abounded of laid-off managers leaving home early in their usual dark business suits, riding subways back and forth aimlessly, or going to nearby mountains to kill time because they could not face telling their families they had been laid off. This was the first period after the Korean War that saw a large number of homeless people camping out in Seoul's Central Station or in subway stations. Most of them were people who had lost their jobs during this period, and not a small portion of them were previously white collar, salaried workers. (p. 3)

The national economy recorded a -6.9% growth rate in 1998, the number of households under the poverty line increased from 4% to 12% between the third quarter of 1997 and the end of 1998, and the number of jobless workers tripled from December 1997 to December 1998 (Haggard & Mo, 2000; Koo, 2007). Although the majority of those who lost jobs were manual workers, a significant proportion of the laid-off also included white-collar and managerial workers (Kim & Finch, 2002; Koo, 2007) who typically had a good education and owned a family house. Koo explained that, as the national economy grew enormously in more recent decades and living standards continuously improved, a large number of people believed that they belonged to the expanding middle class. Although Korea remained relatively egalitarian throughout the Korean War and land-reform periods (1949-1950), Koo argued that the pattern of social and cultural inequality had changed significantly since the IMF financial crisis. The financial difficulties hit middle-class households, which used to be economically secure. These middle-class families therefore suddenly found themselves facing pay cuts and unprecedented fears about job losses. The collapse of the middle class at that time signaled a change in parental support for children's education. Considering the position of middle-class families as a role model among social strata, this collapse was a crucial argument for the implantation of neoliberal ideology in Korean mothers' educational practice and its invocation of the haunting memories of the impoverished era of their parents' generations. Korea has experienced historically condensed and complex social changes in a short period. The response of society members to the social processes might be more dynamic because their historical memories are still vivid. The latest sociocultural shift that Korea's neoliberal resetting caused was Koreans' the harshest bodily experience of capitalism in their everyday lives.

Because education pertains to all aspects of each society in a temporal and spatial dimension, the impact of neoliberal ideology on the Korean educational context has evolved in a complex way. Since the mid-1990s, Korean public education has adopted the slogan of fostering global citizens, with the key driver being competitiveness. Smith (2011) explicated the influence of neoliberalism on public institutions that have been cast into the free market:

> New terms in education were born, such as "the new knowledge economy," which attempted to reduce all knowledge to commodity form for international trade in a conceived new "borderless" world of "globalization." Knowledge production itself became an "industry" subject to the efficiency requirements of industrial production, with universities held to new management rules of accountability and stricture. Because market logic is structured on a foundation of human competitiveness, education became articulated as the task of preparing students, defined as "human capital," for "global competitiveness." (p. 158)

In response to neoliberal transformation, Korean mothers' responsibility for supporting their children's education has become heavier and their accommodation of the neoliberal agendas prompt and dynamic. For example, children are joining the educational race at a younger and younger age—in elementary and nursery school or even in prenatal training—and the race continues throughout the formative years and into university. As Koo (2007) observed, "Educational competition has become greatly intensified and expensive in terms of time and money" (p. 11) in the new market logic of the new knowledge economy that is structured on a foundation of human competitiveness.

Under the neoliberal slogan, the competitive conditions based on self-interest affect how parents support their children and extend their scope and risk of investment (Cho, U., 2006; Park, S. J., 2009). Despite decreased household income during the financial difficulties, college entrance rates increased continuously between 1998 and 2000 (Table 1). Table 2 demonstrates the noticeably soaring number of students in 2000; in particular, when economic recovery was still on the way. These data also suggest new EFL educational trends, such as early study abroad (*chogi youhak*), which include only elementary, junior, and senior high school students, and the emergence of education immigration (*kyoyouk imin*). Education is the biggest terrain on which people have made a life investment globally.

Alongside the Korean government's voracious adoption of neoliberalism, the private tutoring market has played an important role in the marketization of education since the IMF crisis. M. Kim (2003) argued that the cram-school market continued to increase college entrance examination anxiety and encourage competition among students and parents. This led people to be depend more on the market, and the strategies of the tutoring market became even more sophisticated. Learning in advance (*sun-hang-hak-seup*) is a typical strategy that these companies use to incite mothers to have their children moved up one or two levels (e.g., a child in Grade 5 to Grade 6 mathematics). By attending cram schools as a kind of "nervous sedative" (p. 68), parents and children relieve their anxiety under severe competition. Because of the failure of the government's educational policies and parents' dissatisfaction with the quality of public education, the demand for private education continuously grew. Korean mothers' biggest fear is their children's falling behind in the competition, so they proactively participate in the tutoring market. This is an interesting aspect of how women as a marginalized class increase the aggravation of social inequalities.

Table 1

Rate of College Entrance of High School Graduates in Korea, 1990-2009

Year	College entrance/high school graduates (%)
1990	33.2
1991	33.2
1992	34.3
1993	38.4
1994	45.3
1995	51.4
1996	54.9
1997	60.1
1998	64.1
1999	66.6
2000	68.0
2001	70.5
2002	74.2
2003	79.7
2004	81.3
2005	82.1
2006	82.1
2007	82.8
2008	83.8
2009	81.6

(Statistics Korea, 2013)

Table 2

Students in Elementary, Junior, and High School in Korea, 1995-2005, Who Studied Abroad

Year	Number of students
1995	2,259
1996	3,573
1997	3,274
1998	1,562
1999	1,839
2000	4,397
2001	7,944
2002	10,132
2003	10,498
2004	16,446
2005	20,400

(KEDI, 2011)

According to Kim and Finch (2002), companies laid off disproportionately large numbers of women throughout the IMF financial crisis. Walby (2003) suggested that globalization does not have a simple effect on social inequalities, because the effects on gender are more complex and contradictory; however, it increases the effects of class inequalities at both the top and the bottom ends of the labor market. Walby's argument is valid in the case of Korean women because of the conflict between women's employment rates and their increased access to education. In 2009, according to *Newsis*, the college entrance rate of female high school graduates was higher than that of male graduates—as much as 82.4% to 81.6%—whereas the rate economic activity of Korean women was only 47.3% (You, 2010).

The sexually segregated job market was, as Kim and Finch (2002) pointed out, an additional problem that women who needed to find jobs to cope with the IMF crisis faced. At that time the jobs open to women were often temporary or part-time and unskilled service positions. Kim and Finch argued that conservative rhetoric dominated nationally to perpetuate men's status within the family during the recovery from the financial crisis. From early January 1998 and throughout the year, newspapers and TV news shows reported various stories about family members who showed their support for household heads who had lost their jobs:

> "Save Our Household Heads" reported, "Wives are showing lots of love for their husbands whose spirit has been quashed as a result of IMF layoffs and pay reductions. Some use letters, telephone messages, or faxes to send their love. Still others wash their husbands' feet. (p. 129)

For Korean women, the impact of the globalized economic agenda preserved even more securely the sexually segregated labor division. What is worse, many families needed two paychecks to make a living and avoid falling behind under more competitive socioeconomic conditions. That is, the polarization of wealth became another problematic in the sociocultural landscape of Korea wherein inequalities are critically associated with class since state's neoliberal restructuring. Walby's (2003) key argument was that class and gender have divergent implications according to globalization that widen the social inequalities based on the possession of human capital and capital. Walby also noted, however, that "globalization has, at least in the economic North, often speeded the modernization of the gender regime, especially in those instances where national economies are most exposed to advanced capitalist forces" (p. 5). This shows that women's work, especially mothering in outside welfare countries, is more divergent because child rearing involves more complicated factors and dynamics that are characterized as economic, political, social, and cultural.

The Hegemony of English

In 2010 a Korean prime time soap opera, *Jejoongwon*, aired on SBS in Korea. *Jejoongwon* is the name of the first modern Korean medical institute, established in 1885, with the support of royal funds. One of the characters of this television series, Horace Allen, is an actual historical figure who was a founding medical practitioner at the institute and an American Protestant missionary. His character in this drama is a Western man with the symbolic Anglo-Saxon White patriarchal image, from a scientifically engineered capitalist society built on technological progress, and with a democratic spirit. The English language that he spoke was a power symbol for Korean modernist movements and an instrument that was considered to have the power to determine the nation's fate during the historical upheaval of the late 19th century. Later, the colonial power of English played a heroic role when America confronted the communists during the Korean War, including after war aid and development loans. A thread that penetrates the history of English in Korea is the formula
modernization = westernization = globalized capitalist industrialization.

The roles of English in the process of shaping the above formula in the Korean context reflect a relationship between language and hegemony. Gramsci (1971) penetrated these roles of language for social and political relations and wrote the following in his prison notebooks:

> Language is transformed with the transformation of the whole civilization, through the acquisition of culture by new classes and through the hegemony exercised by one national language over others, etc., . . . and what it does is precisely to absorb in metaphorical form the words of previous civilizations and cultures. (pp. 451-452)

Gramsci's insight is valid in the case of Korean modern history with respect to language and social relations. From a micro perspective, Ives (2004) construed Gramsci's suggestions as his rejection of the nomenclature model of language; rather, he embraced language as a system or process of meaning production and explained that "meaning is not produced primarily through the relationship between individual words and non-linguistic objects or ideas. Instead, . . . meaning is produced within language through the relationship among words and other elements of speech" (p. 85). Ives understood that language works through the process of metaphor, "whereby words, phrases and idioms 'stand in for' or denote something else" (p. 85). Another quotation from Gramsci (1971) explains this:

> The whole of language is a continuous process of metaphor, and the history of semantics is an aspect of the history of culture; language is at the same time a living thing and a museum of fossils of life and civilizations. (p. 450)

For evidence of Gramsci's theses in recent Korean colloquialisms, the indefinite and definite articles of the English language, *a* and *the*, have emerged but, in fact, never existed before in the Korean language structure. This phenomenon of linguistic structural change can be found in various forms of oral discourse, and literate resources, and commercial signs, including communications within academia. Because Chinese was replaced by English as a colonial language during modernization, the social group who was knowledgeable about the English language in Korea was able to benefit. Speaking or being familiar with English signified their involvement in the new world order that English-speaking groups have controlled.

Another example is a segment of the Gag Concert, a contemporary, popular Korean comedy show that airs on KBS. The secret of its popularity is that the actors in the segment of this show insert verbs into the first part of every sentence (subject–object–verb) during their performance. The word order of the Korean language in most cases locates verbs at the ends of sentences. This is the most distinctive aspect of the grammatical differences between Korean and English. The idea of this comedy segment is to satirize the linguistic behavior of young generations of Korean immigrant returnees from English-speaking welfare countries who, in most cases, were born or raised in those countries from an early age after the education immigration (*kyoyouk imin*) that emerged in the 1990s.

As an underpinning semiotic sign, the comedians in the show tweaked their utterances by mimicking returnees' language—English—to signify the fine edge of cynicism over the returnees' prestige and the benefits of competence in authentic English that Koreans who are afflicted by the pressure to become fluent in English perceive that the young immigrants retain. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note the reality that some detailed linguistic grammar components of English such as word order are creating a collective cognition among Korean audiences from a national TV show. That is, part of the linguistic knowledge of English grammar is already a must-have intellectual item in Korea.

In the above situation, Yoon's (2007) assessment of this society seems realistic: "English, colonialism in my mind" (p. 387). Yoon's main argument is that English controls Koreans' everyday life mentally, physically, and socially. Pavlenko and Lantolf (2000) saw learning another language "not as the acquisition of a new set of grammatical, lexical, and phonological forms, but as a struggle of concrete socially constituted and always situated beings to participate in the symbolically mediated lifeworld" (p. 155) of a different society. In other words, foreign language learning involves learners' identity, which is always associated with social power relations. In this case we understand that the ideology of English has been imposed and internalized in Koreans' identity in a complex way.

The term *hegemony* in this study, refers to the social, political, and cultural forms of control that a society exercises and achieves by ideological means. Ives (2004) also identified Gramsci's (1971) use of the term hegemony "as a synonym for the terms 'prestige' and 'attraction' to describe how certain populations adopt and adapt the linguistic forms of other social groups" (p. 85). A major controversy in English-language teaching (ELT) in Korea is the absence of coercion; that is, consent for the hegemony of English. Thus, English does not have to use power because the globalized capitalist culture has created consent and accompanied it with the advancement of technology, and vice versa. This multidimensional way of creating consent is the most effective way to maintain control of English.

As I stated in preceding sections, few academic studies have highlighted the huge amount of money, time, and effort spent in studying English in Korea and the exceedingly common phenomenon associated with mothers' nationwide desire to help their children to become fluent in English. The Korean government must be held responsible for its excessive, avid embrace of neoliberal ideology, which has induced a series of illogical neoliberal language planning. During the interview with the *Hangyoreh*, Hajoon Chang (2011), who has consistently criticized Korea's neoliberal adoption, commented that the Korean leadership's faith in neoliberalism seems to be almost religious despite the proven struggles in neoliberal home countries and the withdrawal from neoliberal policies of Latin American countries. D.-C. Kim (2010) also pointed out even more swaggering neoliberal deformations in Korea, especially considering that the debate in most parts of the world has ended. Korean policy makers appear to have been seduced by the neoliberal gospel, believing that it is the only option for continuous national growth.

To fulfill this neoliberal agenda, during the last two decades the mainstream discourses of Korean society have been filled with buzzwords such as *global competitiveness*, *national competitiveness*, *global market*, *individual competitiveness, individual responsibility, self-help, global citizens*, *global village*, *knowledge economy*, *technology power state*, and *knowledge industry*. The influence of neoliberal agendas on educational policies is reflected in the name of the ministry of education in Korean administrations: the Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development (2001-2008) and the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (2008-present). Despite the Korean governments' neoliberal creeds, in reality, J. Nam (2011) argued that the actual unemployment rate of new college graduates in 2011 was 38.5%. Considering Korean's high rate of participation in postsecondary education, this is a sign of struggle, and under these fierce competitive circumstances English has become even more crucial for entry into the job market. As we are all aware, these high rates of both national and youth unemployment are not just Korea's problem: As CBC (2010) reported ("Youth Unemployment Skyrockets: OECD"), these issues have become common worldwide during the last decades because of the failure of neoliberal policies.

In terms of language planning, one principle of the misled implementation of neoliberalism is Korea's recent English-only policy, which requires that English be taught progressively without mother-language support in school; the government mandated that English be used as the medium of instruction in classrooms as much as possible. Korean government's English-only policy planning is incommensurable with language immersion or bilingualism programs in Indo-European language family regions. The immoderate motivation for native-like English mastery for every Korean student has amplified a craze among affluent Korean mothers and the tutoring market followed by a boost in the stock market. The impact of this English-only policy on school education is significant. H. Shin (2007) argued that the increased expectations of students and parents have brought enormous social and institutional pressure on Korean English teachers for high proficiency in English. The dominant ideology embedded in these policies is that native speakers (NS) are the ideal language teachers. As a result, a large number of native speakers from English-speaking countries have migrated to Korea to teach full time; most lack teacher qualifications and cultural knowledge.

Kumaravadivelu (2008) criticized the English teaching culture's preoccupation with native speakers' linguistic performance and cultural perspectives. This preoccupation has resulted in government language policies such as a blind acceptance of communicative language teaching (CLT) in the Korean school system (Shin, H., 2007) despite merits in this teaching method, and an alignment with the government's globalization policy (*segehwa jungchack*). Since the adoption of the sixth reformed national curriculum, the major purpose of English teaching in the regular school system of Korea has been to improve students' oral communicative proficiency (Jung & Norton, 2002). Native-speaking English teachers were enlisted to invigorate the ineffective traditional English teaching system in Korea, whose weakness has often been attributed to the inadequate speaking ability of Korean English teachers (Shin, H., 2007).

According to the Government of Canada (2009), approximately 7,000 Canadians were teaching English in Korea in 2009. Considering the explosive increase in cram schools across the country, the actual population of native-speaking English instructors is difficult to calculate other than through government contract employees who hold teaching positions in the public school system. The last decade has seen new EFL educational policies almost annually. As I discussed, these policies were followed by reactions in the marketplace and, simultaneously, from mothers and students. The tutoring market continues to grow to fill the gap between schools' expectations and mothers' anxiety. This is the nexus of the so-called Korean English gale (*young-o youl poong*), wherein the significant role of English that merged education and market in the Korean culturally specific junction. McMurtry (1991) wrote insightfully, "The underlying conflicts between the principles of education and the market . . . [have resulted in] an international movement towards justifying excellence in education in terms of a goal external to education, namely to compete effectively in the international marketplace" (p. 209). This movement has influenced the private sphere of Korean society as well; for example, in the influx of young Korean children into English-speaking welfare countries (*jogy youhak*) to study and the emergence of the wild-goose (*girogy*) families. The regional marketization in Korea in the name of education reflects the global-market food chain.

Koo (2007) reported that the number of Grades 1–12 Korean students who moved abroad to study increased dramatically from 1,562 in 1998 to 16,446 in 2004. Although they might move alone, more often their mothers accompany them. This is the reason for the emergence of wild-goose families. Alongside the emergence of *jogy youhak* and wild-goose families, the number of postsecondary students who move abroad to pursue degrees or English training sharply increased from 192,245 in 2005 to 243,224 in 2009 (Kim, A.-G., 2010). The most desired destinations are mainly English-speaking welfare countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. The Korean agile study-abroad (*youhak*) market has also developed in the Philippines as an alternative for lower income households. Summer camp programs for K-12 students in those countries has become extremely popular as another option for parents who cannot afford *jogy youhak* or immigration for educational purposes (*kyoyouk immin*) during the last decade.

In this situation, EFL for children has become an explicit index of the social inequalities in today's Korea. *The Korea Herald* (2010) ("China, India, South Korea Top Student Senders to US") reported that Korea remains the third largest source of foreign students after China and India in higher education institutions in the US, and these statistics do not include Korean *jogy youhak*. Of course, Canada is not exempt from this international-education market. According to a news release from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (2009), Stockwell Day, Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, released a study that showed that international students contributed more than $6.5 billion to the Canadian economy in 2008:

> "International students provide a significant boost to Canada's economy," said Minister Day, "Their presence helps create thousands of jobs and generates billions in revenue. Our government will continue its efforts to promote Canada as the destination of choice for international students by enhancing outreach efforts at our missions around the world." (para. 2)

Minister Day's report is based on a study by Roslyn Kunin & Associates, Inc. (2009). The findings show that

> in 2008, international students in Canada spent in excess of $6.5 billion on tuition, accommodation and discretionary spending; created over 83,000 jobs; and generated more than $291 million in government revenue.
>
> Altogether there were 178,227 long-term (staying for at least six months) international students in Canada in 2008, generating more than $5.5 billion to the Canadian economy. Nearly 40 percent of that revenue came from two countries—China and South Korea. (p. iii)

The current international education market, dominated by rich, English-speaking countries, aggressively covers both higher-education and language-training programs; namely, English as a Second Language (ESL), EFL, Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL), Teaching English as a Second Language (TESL), and Teaching English as a Foreign Language (TEFL). In spite of expanded language-training education programs, nonnative-speaking graduates are often marginalized in both English-speaking countries and their home-language countries (Canagarajah, 1999).

A global EFL and ESL trend has resulted in a soaring number of examinees in international standardized language examinations. English is in the advanced guard as a national revenue source in the neoliberal guru countries that have exerted pressure on the global market. Korea has the highest number of examinees taking the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) around the world, especially in the last decade. Yet Korea ranks very low on international English-language tests scores such as the Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC), the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and TOEFL. An astronomical amount of money, however, has been spent on English education, as Card (2005) reported, because the result of these tests is important for university entrance and job applications in Korean domestic landscape.

The fever for these English tests in Korea has drawn even preschoolers into prep courses for the SAT Reasoning test for US college admission. The Bank of Korea estimated that in 2005 the private English-education market accounted for 4 to 5 trillion won, along with expenses of up to 68.4 billion won for students to study for TOEIC and TOEFL exams. The Statistics Korea (2013) office reported that expenses for private English tutoring in 2010 reached 7 trillion won.

For Koreans as members of late-coming participating groups in this globalized-market ‘rat race,’ the ideology of competitiveness, easily considered collective and individual empowerment, is nothing but a delusion because, historically, there is no such thing as egalitarian competition in international relationships. This delusion has been working because, as Allman (2001) also pointed out, “neoliberalism has been and continues to be an effective and efficient pedagogue of capitalist truths” (p. 217). The efficient pedagogue has eventually shifted multifaceted burdens onto Koreans. One of the most significant is the pressure to learn English. Furthermore, it is important to note that the hegemony of English maintains the exploitation of non-English speaking groups from newly developed countries under the mask of English as a *lingua franca*.

Mignolo (1998) claimed that “three previous stages of globalization under the banners of Christianization (Spanish Empire), Civilizing Mission (British Empire and French Colonization), and Development/Modernization (US Imperialism)” (p. 36) help to understand the world order. The ideology that underpins this world order is the domination of Western culture, which the teaching of English continues to disseminate. In fact, the history of the hegemony of English has been on the same trajectory as the genealogical progress of global power relations that the West has controlled for centuries.

From a semiotic perspective, language is a socially constructed sign system. For example, Volosinov (1973) linked the Marxist focus on ideology theory with the primary topic of semiotics: "Everything ideological possesses *meaning*: it represents, depicts, or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words, it is a sign. Without signs, there is no ideology" (p. 9). This means that language helps to develop human consciousness and that sometimes language is in itself a material reality. This belief closely relates language and human consciousness and represents them as dynamic social signs. However, different social classes take different meanings from different historical contexts. In this way English has become a material reality in Korea.

As Pennycook (1998, 2004) suggested, we can hardly deny that contemporary ELT reproduces colonial relations of Self and Other. Viewing the hegemony of English as the neocolonial power, he suggested that it is necessary to articulate ways in which marginalized social groups can resist the control of English and for learners to develop a critical awareness of the oppressive impact of English. It is urgent that we call for a critical approach to English learning and teaching in the Korean EFL educational context. Luke (2004) stated this urgency eloquently: "Refashioning of language and literacy in this way will have an impact not just on individual capacities and life pathways, but also on the reshaping of institutions, of local cultures, of social lives, and of civic and political spheres" (p. 28). There can be no more overtly normative challenges, as he asserted, to educational systems, educators, and the state other than how they manage their cultural and linguistic Others, as we see in Korea's educational realities.

Precarious Motherhood

In exploring the inordinate pattern of Korean mothering, particularly related to support for children's EFL education, I have discussed several themes. Viewing Korean mothering as activities based on material and cultural responses to social conditions, I identified two approaches: (a) historical criticism of Korea's gendered capitalist industrialization processes in interaction with patriarchal relations and (b) postcolonial criticism of the hegemony of English in the globalized capitalist economy under neoliberal influence. These two approaches are focused basically on the external causal factors of the excessiveness of Korean maternal practice. In this section it is fair to look at the internal aspects of the formation of Korean mothering and relate my discussion to the issue of human suffering.

There is a conspicuous absence of fathers in the Korean educational context. In fact, only a few academic studies on paternal practices in children's education are available (e.g., Lee, Y. & Koo's, 2006, study on wild-goose fathers). Otherwise, research on parenting practices is commonly conducted from a gender-neutral perspective. I have two explanations for this.

First, childrearing is a taken-for-granted woman's responsibility in Korea, where gendered segregation is more distinct than in Western societies. However, this phenomenon is also universal. Referring to fathers as *a silent majority* in the UK context, Reay (1995) suggested that there is a societal consensus on the inequalities in operating within parenting relationships as seen in privileging males as breadwinners in societies. This consensus is manifested in marriage, and the perseverance of heterosexual nuclear family institutions has been strongly instrumental in stabilizing the capitalist society and maintaining conservative social norms. Based on patriarchy with ethnic and cultural homogeneous tendencies, Korean society is socially exclusive and culturally averse to working mothers, unmarried women, divorcees, single mothers, lesbian mothers, and teen mothers.

Second, Korean manhood has been weakened historically (Cho, H. J., 2002) in spite of the strict patriarchal relations. Culturally, Korean manhood is multilayered. As I mentioned earlier, Korean modern history (the 1900s to the 1990s) consists of a series of terrains of power institutions such as colonialism, wars, and militarism, which, as McClintock (1993) suggested, have created a contest over manhood. It is noteworthy that the contesting tensions have emasculated Korean manhood. H. J. Cho (2002) argued that their emasculation has lasted for a century in global power relations. Skjelsbæk (2001) also noted that historical events often suggest an exertion of power and a control toward the Other by forcing a male group of the counterpart into a submissive role and consequent violence against its female group, which ascribes a national identity to it. This conceptualization is pertinent to Koreans' collective experience of oppression.

Korean history reveals that large-scale international and domestic migrations occurred from the late 1880s to the 1980s (Cho, H. C., 2006; Eckert et al., 1990). In many households fathers and sons lived in exile and/or were drafted during Japanese colonial occupation. Further, and consecutively, male household members were away during the Korean War and urban industrialization as part of the troops and civilian workers in the Vietnam War and as labor exports to the Middle East and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. The heads of families were often replaced by mothers, who had to stay strong and self-sacrificing to take care of their children and elderly parents. In this situation it was a patriarchal order founded in Confucian moral principles that maintained family life and the traditions of society. H. J. Cho (2002) pointed out that Korean society has been reproduced by conservative, inflexible, and self-defensive men and super-adaptive women: "The weakened agency of the Korean male subject forged gender relationship: over-protective mother and feeble but noble son" (p. 167).

The mothers of hardship are currently (the 1990s to the 2000s in particular) mothers and grandmothers of middle-aged women and are located in the middle of my discussion on contemporary Korean educational issues. In addition, mothers in their late 30s today might be identified as the youngest group to join the circle of these generations—along a path from colonial-modern to postmodern. On this path the capitalist notion of the middle-class nuclear family and housewives emerged. We have to remember that the middle-class Korean mothers in this study were mothered by their mothers, who reinforced a patriarchal social order with both passive and active attitudes from the intense historical experiences. This intergenerational connection plays a crucial role in the task of exploring motherhood because it connotes a temporally and spatially condensed collection of memories of social processes.

Ruddick (2009) reconfirmed what she argued 30 years ago:

> This mother mothers other mothers' children at a distance from her own children whom she mothers indirectly. (I describe a familiar situation of immigrant mothers) . . . It is inherently relational and generational—marking temporal identities that are at once past and future, legacy and promise. Our maternal stories tell us who we are as well as what we do. (p. 306)

A large number of East Asian immigrant mothers in North America emphasize their children's education. As Ruddick argued, those immigrant mothers never abandon the way that they were mothered under previous cultural conditions; rather, they continuously negotiate with new pedagogical strategies generated in the host culture. In the process of negotiation, their original pedagogical foundation might be difficult to change because of the weight of its fundamental values.

Radoshi (2008) suggested that Ruddick's central thesis, "maternal thinking develops strategies for preserving the life of the child, fostering the child's growth, and shaping an acceptable child" (p. 304), fits with Irish motherhood, which also reflects the intersecting influences of famine memory, religion, education, and emigration in postfamine times. She also pointed out that other cultural factors influenced Irish maternal thinking such as the fostering of highly repressive moral values that encouraged permanent celibacy and delayed marriage and the instilling of values that stressed sexual repression and guilt. The influences of religion, political oppression, and famine imprinted values in Irish mothering. Radoshi ultimately traced the patterns of Irish mothering that developed after the famine under the strict, moralistic, and highly inhibiting features of Irish culture that dominated the 19th and 20th centuries.

As in the Irish case, Korean mothering is a maternal adaptation to societal constraints, in this case based on the process of modern violent Korean sociopolitical social changes such as colonialism and the Korean War, both caused by international power relations and the capitalist transformation and cultural tensions generated mainly by the Western challenge to Korean tradition. Korean mothers were compelled to foster acceptable children who are diligent, docile, adaptive, utilitarian, competitive, and able to survive under their contemporary conditions. Radoshi's (2008) study suggests that Irish children's approach to food, sexuality, and the family structure is the result of their Irish mothers' pedagogical adjustments and interaction within the intergenerational mothering circle. Likewise, Korean mothers preserved the lives of their children and fostered children's diligence in everyday life under the conditions of strong family ties, following the way that they were mothered, which was patriarchal familism. It shaped Korean maternal thinking, which emphasizes family solidarity based on blood ties by transmitting family curricula such as rituals, food, and most of the house work.

A change in intergenerational mobility is a social aspect that might worsen Korean familism. According to H. S. Kim (2009), the rates of intergenerational mobility are dropping continuously with the IMF crisis. Comparing today's adult children in their 30s in Korea who are highly educated and earn higher incomes with their parents' generation reveals that their parents' generation used to have more varied opportunities to advance their economic standing. A higher rate of intergenerational mobility was possible in their parents' generation even though they were less educated and belonged to a poor working class compared to their children's generation. During the last three decades the globalized capitalist system has moved away from agriculture, away from manual work in manufacturing, and towards service work, especially that associated with knowledge-intensive work. A large number of jobs have been outsourced, and the market has become competitive. As a result, social inequality has become more permanent and, consequently, parents are more anxious about their children's future more than ever in today's Korea.

K. J. Yoo (2009) reported that during the last decade Korea's increasing Gini coefficient, a measure of the inequality of a distribution, has been followed by even faster increasing relative poverty measures, the most prominent being income-distribution measures. Additionally, he noted that the decrease in absolute poverty in the Korean economy has stopped recently. Such measures decreased consistently by 8.4% each year from 1982 to 1992. These changes are typical symptom of social inequality in developed countries—rich child from rich father, poor child from poor father. Shapiro (2004) discussed *head-start assets* in his work, *The Hidden Cost of Being African American*, which refers to the assets that children can inherit from their parents, and analyzed how the wealth from these assets perpetuates inequality. Under Korea's recent social conditions, with the low rate of intergenerational mobility, family support for children's education can be considered head-start assets to secure their future lives. This means that Korean educational competition has moved to a more complex dimension.

Today's Korean mothers are highly educated, yet still remain socially powerless. These ambiguous social conditions leave Korean women struggling between challenging and accommodating new patterns of social process. The ambiguity has repositioned Korean women as a notorious consumer group in the postmodern global age. This new position as consumers has encouraged them to become involved in the formation of a new class index, as Nelson (2000) pointed out, with Korean women's conspicuous patterns of consumption and speculation in the housing market. The McKinsey & Company (2010) global management consulting firm also reported that the luxury market for high-end designer clothing and accessories is thriving in Korea; sales rose significantly between 2008 and 2009 in Korea, unlike in Japan, Europe, or the US, where the sale of luxury goods has either stagnated or shrunken. The majority of consumer groups in the luxury market in Korea are middle- and upper-middle-class housewives. This phenomenon implies that Korean mothers react to the global market as a consumer group. The trend toward luxury in Korea, or *myoungpoom*, refers to prestigious or distinguished goods or, more simply, brand-name products. Koo (2007) described this trend:

> In a sense, *myoungpoom* served as a status marker for the people who became rich but were insecure with their status. Through exclusive consumption linked to the image of

> global bourgeois culture, the affluent segment of the Korean middle class sought to establish a new class identity, above the rest of the middle class. (p. 9)

However, it does not mean that the lower classes are left out of this new consumption-based status competition. In the highly status-oriented society, whatever upper classes do is bound to influence the consumption patterns of others. After all, precarious mothering has three aspects: where to live, what to buy, and at which schools children should study.

Meanwhile, French geographer Valérie Gelézeau (2007) studied Korean addiction to apartment dwelling and titled her work *The Republic of Apartments*. Whereas in Western cities apartment complexes are symbols of low-income family housing, it is different in Korea. The number of apartment dwellings in Korea is higher than in any other country, and living in apartment housing is very popular among the middle and upper-middle class. In many ways it is the outcome of the government's quick-fix housing policy and big corporations' preferential endowed-development projects. A massive array of high—usually from 15 stories up to 80 stories—apartment complexes favor efficiency over aesthetics, which is a symbol of the Korean model of the accumulation of wealth. From a distance they look like grey shoeboxes stacked next to each other. Korean housewives have flocked to the apartment market and contributed to the speculation bubble (*bock boo-in* phenomenon). Their primary motivations are money and children's education. The apartment market rose with the configuration of new school districts that include mainly prestigious schools. The visual of stacked apartment complexes is a sign of totalitarian control in this society. The uniform array of apartment buildings also signifies the tendency toward the ambiguous adaptation of Korean mothering. Mothers as socially disempowered subjects fully embraced modern life in the new housing model during the period of economic growth. Ironically, massively developed complexes have become the greenhouse of the dilemma 'keeping up with the Joneses.'

Kendall (1996) suggested that the ambiguity is a result of the ambivalent mix of pride in and misgivings about consumerism that emerged as a cultural theme in the 1980s:

> The 1980s was a decade of prosperity that saw the emergence of a full-blown consumer culture, at once celebrated, mocked, and criticized. It was a time of intense national pride, but also of uneasy wondering whether, in pursuit of economic stability and a comfortable standard of living, too much of Korea's own heritage had been surrendered or corrupted by Western influence. Despite these misgivings, most Koreans expected this prosperity to continue indefinitely. (p. 15)

Despite the recessions since the national financial crisis, Kendall's observation is still valid today. Not only is conspicuous consumption a behavior pattern, but it is also consumption of specific signs such as Gucci and Chanel that signify one's social location in such a status conscious society. The new pattern of social inequality needs new markers for social differentials, especially in the global age. Sending children abroad to study is also a purchase of signs: Oxford, Harvard, and so on. Too often, characters in Korean TV soap operas, which are particularly popular among women, transform their children's lives and image with the choice to study abroad. Airplanes and luggage are new signs of a life makeover in these dramas. A delusionary global citizenship is evident in many places in Korea.

As I discussed earlier, economic, cultural, and ideological changes have occurred in a complex mode of social inequality in Korea. Koo (2007) identified the three most conspicuous major areas of the social-inequality phenomenon in Korean society: work, consumption, and education. However, Korean mothers are identified and affected by their families, but without opportunities to develop their own potential. In an anthropological study that is the narrative of a Korean woman, Abelmann (1977) explained that Mrs. Kang represents Korean women's invisible identity: "Mrs. Kang is a propertyless, unschooled woman whose tiny business might not even render her a petite bourgeoisie; she shares the horizons and identities of her college-educated brothers" (p. 416). Invisible Korean women's identity is frequently signified by their husbands' social position and their children's success. The exercise of power by Korean women who are highly educated yet remain socially powerless is usually limited to the household, especially child rearing, and maintained in an ambiguous way.

Ruddick (1980) understood that central to the experience of mothering is "a poignant conjunction of power and powerlessness" (p. 343). An interview with three Korean children aired on KBS; it represents Ruddick's poignant moment of Korean mothers' power and powerlessness:

> "I wanted to die. I have too much homework to do from school and many different *hagwon*. But I can't think about it because my mother would be very sad if she knows this."
> "I have wanted to die whenever I thought about too much *hagwon* stuff that should be done."
> "My mom looks like a witch when she beats me when I don't finish homework. Yes, she is a vicious witch!" ("Children Who Are Suffering From Tutoring," 2010)

Ruddick pointed out that “children confront and rely upon a powerful maternal presence only to watch her become a powerless woman in front of the father, the teacher, the doctor, the judge, the landlord—the world” (p. 343). Children are aware that their mothers exercise power over them. They also admit that their mothers engage them in the world while remaining powerless without resistance.

Another media interview on PBS (Warner, 2011) also indicates Korean children’s situation. Yoo Jaewon, a high school freshman, said to the PBS reporter, “I think I need to study and work harder for my future” in response to the reporter’s question about how he deals with his highly demanding work and schedule. The way that Korean children are mothered by mothers constructs the children’s way of thinking. Their worldview is likely to remain at their mothers’ horizon.

Hyoung Cho (1997) showed that Korean middle-class full-time housewives are structurally disempowered and have no advantageous power resource; yet, they attain domestic power through full access to the family’s finances and emotional attachment to their family members. However, their limited power is confined to the domestic sphere and is instrumental in perpetuating social conservativeness. Precarious Korean motherhood produces and reproduces suffering as both a reflexive and a nonreflexive phenomenon, “as something which at times can be thought about, critically and creatively, and at times is embodied, enacted or projected precisely because it cannot be thought about” (Frost & Hoggett, 2008, p. 439). Frost’s (2008) psychosocial approach helps to understand the subject of Korean mother as “passionate, ambivalent and emotionally driven, existing outside (but defined within) processes of language” (p. 244). Korean mothers cannot say “No” to the taken-for-granted reality.

A psychological issue with regard to Korean children’s suffering is that they have often been diagnosed recently with hair-pulling disorder (trichotillomania) because of the pressure of a large amount of schoolwork and *hagwon* and the tightly designed *hagwon* schedules. In an interview on KBS (2010) (“Children Who Are Suffering From Tutoring”), Son, a pediatric psychiatrist, explained, “These stressed kids pull their hair out. Sometimes, some of them even eat them and it is identified in an excretion process.” A Korean mother with a daughter in Grade 1 told the reporter about cases that she has seen frequently:

> “Most of those mothers with children who have hair loss from a repetitive pulling of hair hush up. They never mention that their children are under stress. To see those kids breaks my heart. I also sometimes ask myself why I should force my Grade 1 child to

> attend so many different *hagwon* classes after school. . . . But are there any other alternatives for us? This is our undeniable reality. ("Children Who Are Suffering From Tutoring," 2010)

In the Human Development Report 2010 that the United Nations Development Programme (2010) commissioned, Korea is ranked as 12th in the category of Very High Human Development. Although the nation's economic growth is recognized globally, Korean mothers are anxiously trying to interpret the aftermath of the IMF crisis to accommodate the new conditions of social change to promote the welfare of their family no matter how uncertain the future looks. Warner (2011) commented that Korean's hypercompetitive personal drive is a byproduct of the nation's compressed development, which "jet-propelled resource-poor South Korea into the top ranks of world economies, from a war-torn wasteland, one of the globe's poorest countries 50 years ago, to the 12th richest today." In spite of Korean mothers' desperate reading of the world, motherhood remains even more dependent on circumstances beyond mothers' control, and hence insecure—precarious because their interpretation often results in their children's suffering.

Suffering

Concerning contemporary educational issues, almost every day Koreans read or hear through various types of media or from direct experience or their neighbors about the young who are unhappy, anxious, sick, exhausted, despairing, frustrated, sad, and suicidal. J. Chang (2011) reported on MBC that the National Police Agency noted that the suicide rate of college students was consistently in the range of 230 to 332 between 2007 and 2011. In *Hankyoreh*, H. Y. Park (2010) also discussed the continuous occurrence of not only secondary students', but also elementary students' suicides related mainly to schoolwork, grades, and examinations. This is deplorable, and, ironically, children's suffering is a result of their education.

Unfortunately, educating is hurting in a way in present-day Korea. Historically, as Radoshi (2008) noted, suffering used to be honored as noble and as evidence of strength during hard times. It is still in Korea. In this case, however, there must be some value in human suffering. With regard to Korean youth, an appropriate question is, "Why are they suffering?"

A contemporary and popular word in Korean is *spec* (스펙); even kindergarten children use it. The origin of this word is 'specification,' an English term that refers to a description or assessment of requirements or materials; for example, for a proposed building, a machine, or a technical standard. Although it has an impersonal connotation, it is interesting that in Korean it has a human connotation. Any educational experience that can be added to a resume to increase the chance of success in a future career is termed a spec. Without doubt, the most demanded spec is English-language competency, followed by a diploma from a top-ranked school. A hierarchy of the components of a spec naturally excludes the virtue of a variety of human freedoms in terms of pedagogical choice or a contingency of genuine pedagogical experiences because the symbolic power of the word *spec* determines what people should learn in a monolithic way.

I will discuss where Korean children are in this controversial educational reality by citing an excerpts from the interview aired on KBS (2010) ("Children Who Are Suffering From Tutoring") and from articles published in Korean and English media. In the streets of Seoul, which have many overcrowded *hagwon* buildings, a reporter, Kang Jiwon, interviewed several Korean Grade 1 and 2 student who were going to *hagwon* immediately after school:

> "I wanted to have a rest badly. But [Mom] was hard on me, saying, "Studying is the only way to survive in this world!"
> Mom yelled at me: "If you want to die, then go to *hagwon* and die there!"
> "I am so confused when I think why I should do so much work and why I should live like this."

These children's voices sounded like those of adults. From their voices we learn of the exigencies of human relationships and children's oppression.

In another image, a self-portrait by a Grade 1 student, a baby crawls with a pacifier in his mouth. The child and adolescent psychiatrist who was interviewed interpreted the drawing as an expression of the child's desire for regression: "Baby doesn't have to study. All he does is have milk." For that child, the only safety is in moving backward.

In another case, Seungjoon (pseudonym), a nine-year old boy, was going to *hagwon* with his mother. In the elevator his mother noticed that he was hiding a tiny teddy bear in his jacket. She asked him to give it to her, but he wanted to keep it because "I don't have anyone to play with." That night Seungjoon was too tired to finish his assignments from school and *hagwon*. He was currently taking two different English lessons and five cram courses after school, and his daily schedule was tight. The reporter suggested that it was too late for him to finish, but Seungjoon said that he would get up at five o'clock to finish his assignment. The reporter confirmed whether he meant five o'clock the next morning. The interview continued with Seungjoon's mother:

> I have never thought my child is taking too many lessons and *hagwon* classes. What my child is doing now is the same things that other kids are doing. And my son is doing only a minimum of work comparing with any other kids in my neighbor. Actually, I am thinking about adding another lesson to his schedule. ("Children Who Are Suffering From Tutoring," 2010)

The important point is the gap between common sense and the blindly embodied "regimes of truth" (Foucault, 1980) inscribed in Korean mothers' consciousness. Seungjoon's mother's belief that what she was doing was for her son's sake gained control of her moral reasoning in the furiously competitive reality; eventually, with her justification, she disciplined her child.

Mooni's (pseudonym) case suggests a different issue with regard to Korea's contemporary EFL educational problems. Her mother had spent over 25 million won (CAD$23,000) on Mooni's tuition for English kindergarten during the last two years. This is not exceptional in Korea. In the interview Mooni pointed to pictures of her classmates and said their English names: "Amie, Daniel, Janelle, Geoffrey," and so on. Then she recalled that she wanted to call their Korean rather than their English names at that time. Mooni read English picture books to the reporter with a fluent, native-like English accent. Although she could read every page, she did not know the meaning of the contents of the book. When her mother asked her what her teacher had said about it, Mooni's answer was simple: "He is a foreigner, you know." Mooni's mother replied that her daughter did not like her English kindergarten class because the English-only instruction was stressful. Mooni's mother now regretted her selection of institution: "I would design her English learning program differently next time" ("Children Who Are Suffering From Tutoring," 2010).

Mooni's experience is typical of Korean middle-class mothering. It is quite different from the experience of low-income mothers' support for their children's English lessons. In their struggle they often describe themselves as having a 'bad-mother complex,' a result of the combination of financial shortages and frustration with the reduced benefits of their children's education because of the lack of head-start assets. Working mothers who have little time to support their children's tutoring also have a bad-mother complex. Compared to full-time mothers, wage-earning mothers often feel guilty. In fact, many working mothers quit their jobs.

The findings of the Samsung Economic Institute's survey of Korean wage-earner mothers (Ye et al., 2010) reflects the struggles that they face with children.

Suffering as an experience of motherhood is evident in relationships between mothers and their children. The inescapable aspect of the mother-child relationship often has certain relational implications in the form of suffering in the lives of mother and child because of the gap between mothers' dissatisfaction with their inability to fulfill their desires, which they project onto their children, and the values that they acquire from their own lived experience and knowledge; it is a gap between the reality and their values. The mother-child relationship in this discussion, however, is distinct from the old-fashioned assumptions about motherhood: that women should unremittingly and maternally make self-sacrifices through mother-child bonding. It is necessary to avoid simplifying or romanticizing the act of being a mother. My argument in terms of the mother-child relationship is based on a humanistic, ethical life stance. Human beings have the right and duty to promote their well-being in a material sense centered on human and other natural values, needs, interests, and abilities. This kind of endeavor has been evident throughout human history in most traditions such as the ancient Greek and Asian.

From this perspective, if we accept the general premise that mothers' actions are inseparable from both the material and the mental aspects of their children's well-being, it is necessary to examine the matter of Korean children's well-being as part of the relationship between mothers and their children. A large amount of research data on the individual situation implies that the suffering of children and mothers is related to education. If so, in contrast, we can analogize the whole from a part. That is, all of Korean society is suffering because of education. My focus is on connecting individual suffering as it is portrayed in the literature on lived experience to collective suffering in the social context. Furthermore, this task helped me to articulate the impact of the nexus of education and market logic on the cause of Koreans' suffering because of education.

M. Lee and Larson (2000) investigated the higher rate of Korean adolescents' clinical depression compared to that of American adolescents. It is related to Koreans' daily ordeal, which they commonly call *examination hell*, of studying and completing schoolwork in preparation for the competitive college entrance examination. In the 2000s many studies have been conducted on the poor health of students that is the result of the clinical approach to children's and adolescents' stress and depression, mothers' stress and depression, children's suicide, and suicide associated with education. A sociocultural approach with a critical perspective on this issue might reveal the limitations of a clinical approach. The increase of young and adult children's suicides related to education is a significant example of suffering on the Korean educational landscape. Despite the urgency, it has been ignored.

Between January and April 2011 four Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) students and one professor killed themselves. KAIST is one of the most academically challenging and prestigious state-funded universities in Korea. According to J. Lee (2011) and Ramstad (2011), many students, professors, and the public have blamed the spate of student suicides at KAIST on the neoliberal policy that university president Suh Nam-pyo, a 74-year-old former MIT professor, instituted; he has vigorously pushed academic competition since 2006. Suh's controversial policy is that students will lose their tuition-free status if their grade point average dips below 3.0 on a 4.0 scale. The further the grade dips, the more tuition the student has to pay. Considering the weight of this prestigious school's reputation with regard to the merits of free tuition in the Korean context, their peers shame students who have to pay tuition. In addition to the school's punitive policy, in fact, a criticism of the KAIST incidents is the language policy. Students must use English in all courses in all faculties at KAIST, under all circumstances. The public's criticism is twofold. One is that KAIST's English-only policy is the primary factor in students' depression and suicides; the other is that the school administration has blindly adopted American neoliberal higher-education policies.

The incidents at KAIST drew relatively strong attention from the public. When a student suicide occurs, in most of cases a bureaucratic effort is often made to reduce the impact of the incident by ignoring or silencing its fundamental causes. H. Y. Park (2010) pointed out that local school administrators and teachers try to suppress these incidents instead of publicizing the issue to find a solution through open discussion. In this environment important issues remain the individual's responsibility because they are considered matters of self-management. The significant absence of pedagogical and ethical endeavors is often manifested in only blaming students' suffering on individual poverty or personal relations and emotions. Recently, Korea's high rate of student suicide was followed by the top ranking in OECD countries and the second highest ranking in the world for general suicide. The Yonhap News Agency ("35 Commit Suicide a Day: Highest Rate Among OECD Countries," 2010) reported that 12,858 Koreans killed themselves in 2008, an average of 35 per day.

Frost and Hoggett (2008) explained the issue in developed countries:

> In societies like Britain and the United States, where it has been argued that globalization requires flexibilization, the consequences of the neo-liberal belief that there is 'no such thing as society' are being experienced. Trade unions appear to be rendered impotent and traditional communities fragmented, and social inequalities increase as a super-rich prosper in the absence of government intervention. (p. 441)

The idea of suffering in this study involves the subjective notion of well-being as well as social factors. The question is whether we can define the prevalence of Korean young and adult children's suffering as including mothers as social or personal factors. I consider them a social factor.

According to Oh (2010), a mother who lived in Pusan, the second largest city in Korea, was arrested for shoplifting. She stole five DVDs that help children to learn English, worth CAD$150, from a bookstore on February 23, 2010. She stated, "We are worse off recently. I didn't mean to steal, but I found myself picking them up. I wanted to give them to my children so badly." Numerous readers commented online after the story was published. The majority of the comments expressed sympathy for the mother's situation and blamed the society that pushed her to commit this action. This event evidenced this poor mother's struggle because of her desire and general moral need to benefit her children's education. A moral dilemma reflected in many comments is that the public related her actions to the case of *Les Misérables* because they believed that the reality prevented moral behavior. English has become as necessary as bread in Korean society. The public's forgiveness is partially a result of Korean culture in which motherhood is too often transcendentally romanticized: Mothers can do anything for their children even if it is wrong; therefore, occasional wrongdoings can be forgiven. The two selves of the Pusan mother—one who stole another's property and one who cared about her children—are separate, which induced a moral schism. The frustration of the public over the instrumentality of education as a social force in contemporary Korea is reflected in resistance to a moral reasoning standard.

Canagarajah's (2004) elaboration of identity formation is valid to understand the Pusan mother's incident. He explained that language learners are understood in a new social turn of applied linguistic pedagogy: "The Self is shaped considerably by language and discourses" (p. 117). His conceptualization of learners' identities is that Korean English learners—the mother in this case—should be regarded as complex social beings who "negotiate competing subject positions in conflicting discourse communities" (p. 117). Korean mothers' struggles shape their practices in the context in which children learn English. As Canagarajah emphasized, these Korean English learners are imposed upon to take on the "unitary conditions of identity formation" that are related to "dependency, inferiority, and disadvantage, . . . conferred on them by the dominant discourses" (p. 117). Language learning, as he argued, is motivated by the desire to construct identity and communities' will to engage in social communication. This motivation is consistently hampered by mothers' values, which are socially imposed ideological imperatives in the Korean reality. In the intrinsic struggle of EFL learning, mothering is the most intimate agency with the capacity to make a choice and to impose that choice on their children. From a pedagogical perspective, however, many cases of Korean mothering with regard to EFL education are uncertain and ambiguous.

On May 6, 2010, the Christchurch Police of New Zealand released the names of a Korean woman and her two teenage daughters who were found dead in their house. (The Press, 2010) Although they lived in New Zealand, the father lived in South Korea; they were a wild-goose family. After the father flew to New Zealand to arrange the funerals, he too was found dead. Four days after his wife and two daughters committed suicide, he also killed himself. Tan and Masters (2010) wrote about this tragic incident in the *New Zealand Herald*. They lamented

> the despair and loneliness some temporary migrants can feel when they land in a country with no family, no support and very little English. Because they are not planning to stay, women such as these don't put down roots and can find themselves isolated, even with other new immigrants who are making New Zealand a permanent home.

Joong Ang Ilbo (2010) also reported that this family had been struggling financially and had found it difficult to manage tuition and dual living expenses in Korea and New Zealand.

Onish's (2008) article, "For English Studies, Koreans Say Goodbye to Dad," published in the *New York Times*, was about the newly emerged Korean transnational families:

> [the] 'wild geese' families living separately, sometimes for years, to school their children in English-speaking countries. . . . The mothers and children live overseas while the fathers live and work in South Korea, flying over to visit a couple of times a year. . . . The phenomenon is the first time that South Korean parents' famous focus on education has split wives from husbands and children from fathers. It has also upended traditional migration patterns by which men went overseas temporarily while their wives and children stayed home, straining marriages and the Confucian ideal of the traditional Korean family. . . . Now, there are also 'eagle fathers,' who visit their families several

> times a year because they have the time and money. Those with neither, who are stuck in South Korea, are known as 'penguin fathers.'

The remarks of a mother whom the reporter interviewed revealed her and her husband's eagerness to school their children in English-speaking countries without any hesitation:

> "We talked about coming here for two years before we finally did it," said Kim Soo-in, 39, who landed here 16 months ago with her two sons. "It was never a question of whether to do it, but when. We knew we had to do it at some point."

The emergence of wild-goose families in Korean society is, as I discussed earlier, a complex package that involves the issue of Korean mothering amid the educational reality aggravated by the national implementation of neoliberal policies and the impact of their ideological imperatives on Koreans' lives. More important, the influence of this phenomenon has transformed the excessiveness of Korean mothering in education into an even more intensified state. With this change, suffering has evolved in many negative ways. So has the impact.

The notion of suffering for children, mothers, and the family is difficult for academic study because it has subjective meaning and involves individual material values in a broad sense, including individual physical and mental experiences and emotions. However, the common acceptance of some assumed external and internal causes of these phenomena and the collective attitude within this context must be noted. Drawing on the conceptualizations of Bourdieu (1999) and Frost and Hoggett (2008), my discussion focuses on human and social misery and moral failure. It is therefore important to consider people's lived experience of domination and repression despite the risk of involving subjective meaning and value. Feelings such as humiliation, anger, despair, and resentment are often related to poverty, gender, class, or race. Frost and Hoggett write that the notion of suffering "denotes the intermeshed components of thinking, feeling, responding, acting" (p. 439) back and forth between its individual approach and its social dimension. Bourdieu was concerned about social suffering comprehensively, because "using material poverty as the sole measure of all suffering keeps us from seeing and understanding a whole side of the suffering characteristic of the social order" (p. 4). Frost and Hoggett interpreted this as follows: "Social suffering draws attention to the lived experience of inhabiting social structures of oppression and the pain that arises from this" (p. 441). From this psychosocial view, I can argue that Koreans, especially children and mothers, have been suffering from the reality of the problem of EFL education as a major part of the structural social oppression.

No matter how much we consider the multifaceted causes of social suffering in the Korean educational context, Korean mothers are in any event responsible for children's suffering. The importance of Korean motherhood in my study is this responsibility and Korean mothers' faulty reasoning about what they ought to do morally for their children's benefit. More important, in this study I explored the potential for Korean mothers' agency. The paradox of Korean motherhood is that mothers view their children mainly as capital, as material assets; they view their children's self as object. The imposing idea of competitiveness based on the capitalist spirit is powerful enough in mothers' consciousness to dissociate them from their children's being. For this reason they ignore their children's physical and emotional suffering. McMurtry's (2002) insights remind us of the principle that "humans are value-bearing beings, and their ultimate ground of value is life itself; but, because the ruling economic order has no life co-ordinates in its regulating paradigm, it is structured always to misrepresent its *life-blind* imperatives as *life-serving*" (p. 55).

Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen (2000) rephrased Rosa Luxemburg's question about "why capitalism requires, contrary to Marx's opinion, 'non-capitalist classes' (e.g., third world women), societies and milieu in order to start and maintain the 'extended reproduction of capital,' that is to say, accumulation of capital—the essence of capitalism" (p. 10). Their answer was that "the basic precondition for the ongoing accumulation of capital [is what is] generally called 'economic growth'" (p. 10). Luxemburg criticized the reality that the forceful conquering, acquisition, and destruction of noncapitalist economies—the traditional subsistence economies—are not only the prehistory of capitalism, of original accumulation, but also still exist today. Korean women have historically been appropriated by global capitalism in the name of the nation's growth and are therefore a noncapitalist class in the Third World. Today, Korean mothers are still a noncapitalist class who have been appropriated to maintain postmodern capitalist economic social order. They view their children primarily as assets. This is how the history of capitalism repeats and evolves.

The overwhelming evidence of child suffering through labor exploitation in Britain and the US with the arrival of industrialization has already proven the dark side of capitalist development. Child labor was the optimal condition to maximize profit. Scott and Tilly (1975) reminded us that, in early industrialization, the child labor exploitation also exacted great costs in terms of infant and child mortality, and the family ethic sponsored intergenerational mobility.

Today, the capitalist scheme—in other words, neoliberal belief—is even more complex and subtle to be able to build a counterargument about what has affected the pedagogical foundation of Korean mothers. They have internalized the prevalent economic requirements of entrepreneurship and self-management. The transitional process from traditional to capitalist patriarchal social relations has entrenched the neoliberal magical spell, competitiveness, as the core of Korean motherhood. Korean youth are being exploited by the cruelty of a particular social force, with the result that children view the world from the same viewpoint as they are mothered.

A recent study demonstrated how this tendency affects Korean adolescents' social activities and attitudes. In the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, and Losito (2010) investigated the ways in which young people are prepared to undertake their roles as citizens in a range of countries from 2009. The researchers gathered data from more than 140,000 Grade 8 (or equivalent) students and more than 62,000 teachers from over 5,300 schools in 38 countries, as well as contextual data from school principals and the study's national research centers. Their initial findings reveal students' achievement on a test of conceptual understanding and competencies in civic and citizenship education and included data about students' dispositions and attitudes to this education. The Korean students' data show that they rated significantly lower in general among all of these students. Their lowest ratings were in the categories of attitudes and civic engagement, participation in civic activities outside of school and participation at school, expected civic participation in the future, students' attitudes, and civic engagement and students' trust in school, in different civic institutions, and in people in general. The implication of the findings is a pedagogical alert with regard to Korean students' perceptions and behaviors relevant to social inclusion. Korean motherhood might be one of direct factors in the remediation of and recovery from social damage.

In its fierce educational competition, Korea is trapped in the Red Queen's dilemma of Alice's Wonderland: "'Now, *here*, you see, it takes all the running *you* can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!'" (Carroll, 1953, p. 44); ultimately, all members lose their mutual trust and fear falling. Allman's

(2001) suggestion is even more insightful: Critical education seems to be the answer to the cruel absurdity of capitalism that has spread unrelentingly throughout the global reach of human existence, wreaking havoc and despair everywhere. “Abolish it we must, but to do that, first, we need to understand it” (p. 1). During the last century, Koreans’ experience has lain in the legacy of the West’s construction of the world order. Today an urgent move is required to discover who and where they are. However, self-realization does not take place through individuals only, but also, and much more, through the self-empowerment of society.

Research as Healing

When we contemplate healing, we have an image of hope for improvement; for instance, a repaired scar, recovery from wounds and illness, a comforted soul, soothed pain, eliminated anxieties or fears, and many other things. According to *Online Etymology Dictionary*, *heal* shares its etymological origin with the word *whole*; they are derived from Old and Middle English. As another image of transformation, healing is making a fractured aspect of body or mind healthy, repaired, and regenerated, eventually reaching a state of wholeness. One thread that runs throughout these images is the potential strength of the whole, which is closely connected to the word *educating*. Jardine (2000) understood that education is concerned with the “bringing forth” (*educare*) of human life, that education is “essentially a ‘generative’ discipline, concerned with emergence of new life in our midst, and what it is we might hope for this new life, what it is we might wish to engender” (p. 115).

In terms of healing, I do not have the answer to the question of Koreans’ suffering from the education issue. However, it is clear that their suffering is caused by the misinterpretation of *educating* in the Korean context. This is the point of demand for hermeneutics in this study. In *Medical Nemesis*, Illich (1976) recommended a step backward to drop out and reorganize for a less destructive way of life that gives us more control. I have had similar thoughts about healing: about the need to step backward and articulate what is happening through research to gain a better understanding of the current reality. We can articulate and understand reality only when we are mindful of the *now*. The excessiveness of Korean mothering involves their obsession with tomorrow rather than with knowing today. Koreans have too often neglected a noble humanity under the guise of development during the last 50 years, which indicates, as I discussed in previous sections, that the Korean social process of capitalist development has been based on patriarchy and accumulation on a local and global scale. The logic of development always imposes the delusion of a hopeful future that has historically been recognized as the optimism of modernity. Newcomers in Korea are familiar with the Korean term *pali pali* (Quickly, quickly!). The obsession with tomorrow makes people anxiously expect immediate outcomes because they forget about today, which they have to experience before tomorrow arrives. That is, their obsession prevents them from appreciating the process of self-development.

With regard to understanding reality, I believe that a critical interpretive approach to the Korean pedagogical crisis is one way of healing. Knowing is often healing because we learn the reason for our pain. For my study, knowing required historical consciousness. With respect to a critical approach as an alternative healing of social suffering, the history of the exploitation of child labor is a good example. Tuttle (1998, 2001) and Humphries (2010) noted that there have been many reasons for the changing role of child labor during the Industrial Revolution. Identified various social factors in the decline of child labor abuse were: (a) the rise of the domestic ideology of the father as breadwinner and the mother as housewife that was embedded in the upper and middle classes and spread to the working class, (b) the rise in the standard of living that accompanied the Industrial Revolution and allowed parents to keep their children at home, (c) the growing interest of families in education and in voluntarily sending their children to school, and (d) the advances in technology and the new heavier and more complicated machinery that required the strength of skilled adult males. Nardinelli's (1980) argument that child labor laws were not considered much of a deterrent to employers or families is convincing because the fines were not large, enforcement was not strict, and the implicit tax that the employer or family paid was fairly low compared to the wages or profits that children generated.

None of these factors can be considered solutions to the problem of exploitation, however. Rather, it is social change through the process of capitalist developmental itself. Academic research contributes to the world by providing us with information, analyses, evaluations, and knowledge of specific events. Through research, we can articulate and understand historically even though there is no way to single out a cause and an answer from any social phenomena. The benefit of academic tasks is maximized especially when research on problematic social phenomena is critically conducted. This will help to better articulate and understand social problems because the oppression will be evident in this kind of research. When the empirical evidence of suffering greatly affected Marx, he detailed the social degradation, physical torment, and misery of industrial labor. His historical research was grounded in humanity with a critical attitude.

Although social suffering from the exploitation of child labor has become a fading memory for Britons, it still remains a social problem and political issue in developing countries today. The education of Korean society has become a mechanism that focuses on nothing but immediate payoff and makes large, long-run payoffs less visible and effective. Education has become a formation of the market. Everything must be evaluated quantifiably in a competitive setting. In the Red Queen's garden, everyone has to run twice as fast as to get anywhere. Korea is the Red Queen's garden. If we accept this, healing should help to find a way out. Of course, it will not be easy. It is, however, urgent to call on the academic experience of humanity in all aspects of educational practice.

Often, justice can heal social suffering. Because the character of suffering in this study is social, it is necessary to think about the capacity of a person or institution in this society to promote social justice and the recovery of the collective awareness of the interdependence of life. In other words, if we consider Korean educational issues as a collective crisis, we need to call for a collective consciousness of those problems. In an intercultural study on happiness (subjective well-being), Diener, Suh, Kim-Prieto, Biswas-Diener, and Tay (2010) reported that Koreans have demonstrated the lowest level of subjective well-being, especially considered against the backdrop of the nation's economic successes. For example, their levels of anger and depression are higher than in any other country in the study: US, Denmark, Japan, and Zimbabwe. Diener et al. identified Korea as a case study for the fact that rapid economic development and success do not guarantee more happiness, and they pointed out that a liability of low subjective well-being might be social relationships. They noted that a significant number of Koreans feel they have no one on which they can rely, that almost half do not feel respected, and that the level of corruption is high for an economically developed country.

Problematic social relations in Korean society are associated with the multifaceted issues of class and gender that are reproduced in the nexus of capitalism and patriarchy, which are frequently reflected as middle-class values. Education nurtures and systemically perpetuates middle-class values to expand and maintain the unequal social relations of the capitalist social process. To repair these educational problems, as Diener et al. (2010) suggested, the government should keep national accounts of Korean citizens' well-being to assess their happiness. When a sense of social agency brings about changes in the patterns of life individually or collectively, social problems will improve. To make change happen, individual social agents must try to focus on the inappropriateness of the rhetoric of false empowerment and choice with regard to market logic. This will enhance the capacity of human beings to make choices based on autonomy. The significant existence of the oppression of women in Korean society does not often benefit men, but capital. The Korean EFL educational situation is a good example of this. Subjugated Korean women's self-consciousness has intensified the educational problems. At the same time it has resulted in a collective crisis in education and other aspects of society. The key to the solution therefore does not lie in changes in Korean mothering patterns. Rather, the key is further down the sociocultural spectrum, through an awakened collective historical consciousness.

Because Koreans are still experiencing the last vestiges of the Cold War, their collective anxiety from their wounded past and their unsolved historical meditation are often reflected as ambivalence about America and the Western tradition. The origin of social suffering in today's Korea that I explored to understand the Korean EFL educational reality can be traced back to the continuity of colonization in Koreans' everyday lives. Their suffering is related to Korea's yesterday and Korea's today. If this is true, cultural healing has to be looked for in its origins. Suffering is a co-product of now; that is, modern times (from Latin *modus* meaning 'just now'). To be mindful of reality (what is going on around us now), we need to understand what modernity means to us, what the West (the English language) means to Koreans, and how Korean tradition intersects with those of the Others. In this seeking process, we can find healing in the deconstruction of Koreans' geohistorically destined today—global capitalism, which has been "announced as a universal truth" (Smith, 2006, p. xxi). My effort to interpret and reinterpret must therefore be intercivilizational, because the Korean education reality is currently trapped in a schizoid space between Western capitalist values and Eastern nonmonetary values. Shi (1997) explained that the main tendency of Confucian philosophy is to oppose crass utilitarianism:

> Confucianism was not concerned with profits. The neo-Confucian tenets "preservation of the heavenly principles and the elimination of human desires" suppressed the human quest for material interests. . . . Confucianism advocates a way of life in which men feel at ease in poverty and find their delight in the pursuit of the Way; therefore, economic activities lack a strong dynamic attractiveness. (p. 15)

This intercivilizational interpretation focuses on the differences in this intersection—East and West and old and modern; at the same time, there are common principles in both sides' traditional outlooks on life and nature. Gadamer (2004) explained that historically affected consciousness is embedded in a particular history from others people's interpretations. The disparity in wealth between the poor and the rich in East Asia is not as great as in the West. Yet the expansion of the capitalist spirit is more vigorous in the East. This means that urgency and possibility co-exist in the East today.

The biggest barrier to articulating the issue of suffering in the Korean educational reality is that suffering is frequently regarded as a personal matter. Wilkinson (2005) suggested that the unsharability of suffering is one of its most essential attributes, possibly precisely "as a result of suffering being locked in the realms of personal experience that it succeeds in causing us so much distress and harm" (p. 16). Illich (1976) also pointed out that because suffering is such a deeply personal experience, this might well be part of the reason that it remains so difficult to agree on a definition. This study helps to gather the scattered individual experiences in the same arena for a more comprehensive view.

Any mature society has a duty to face the connection between personal matters and social problems. If educational suffering is regarded as not only a matter of interfamily relations, but also a collective matter of class and gender centered on the issues of inequality and a dehumanizing environment, Korean mothers will be better able to understand their children's pain, have the wisdom to see their lives further grounded in the *now*, soothe their children's worries with benevolence, and share their compassion with others. Mothers have to free their enslaved selves linguistically and meaningfully from the outside oppressive relations that paralyze human perception of or responsiveness toward the destruction of the human condition and its relationships. The viciousness of oppression in this contemporary material world makes everyone within a community suffer, and it blocks the noble human spirit from questioning human suffering and alienation.

CHAPTER 3: PHASE 2: DEEP STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING KOREAN MOTHERING AND EDUCATION PRACTICES

Phase 1 was an overview of contemporary Korea's educational landscape, with a focus on mothering practices and the EFL phenomenon, and phase 2 is a deeper structural analysis of three specific aspects: the historical tracing of symbiotic dynamics between the unjustifiable Korean elite power and the United Sates' politico-economic interests in the Korean peninsula, the relationships between Korean mothers' pedagogic negotiation and the entrenchment of Korean corrupt elite cartels through the nexus of education and market; and Korea's geographically institutional structure of Korean apartment mothering, including the culturally unique tutoring commodity (*hagwon*) and transnational maternal practice (wild-goose mothering). These analyses will show more clearly how Korean mothering practices and the EFL phenomenon are linked to heavily embedded deep-structure assumptions about how life should proceed.

Historical Perspectives on Korea's Colonial Experience

In this section my genealogical interpretation traces the compromise between the colonial roots of corruption among the Korean reactionary class (*soogu bosoo*) of the elite power and the geopolitical and capitalist intervention of the US in the Korean context.

Tracing Back to the Roots

This study required a historical self-reflection because the historical roots of social issues are, in fact, contemporary. Against this backdrop, the US must be regarded as one of the strongest players in the politico-economic and cultural transformations in Korea. In a way, consistent US influence has been involved in many different aspects of Korea's social changes: Korea's transition from premodern colonialism to industrialized imperialism; the postliberation impeded clean-up of colonial collaboration; the implant of American capitalist middle-class values; the accumulation of Korean right-wing authoritarianism, the military regimes, Christianity; McCarthyism; and contributions to the emergence of today's Korean elite power cartels. What has penetrated the US's influences upon Korean society the most fully is corruption, which has driven the society to a state of socioeconomic injustice and collective amnesia with regard to most of Korea's traditional virtues. The American Protestant missions accompanied with a predominant middle-class phenomenon in the US introduced the values and culture of the Western capitalist middle-class through Christianity in the late Korean monarchy system, and the values and culture of Christianity were also presented as exemplary resources in enlightening Western civilization.

Underpinning of a Covin Between American Imperialism and Its Honorary Whites

To interpret the historical implications of Japanese colonial experiences in Korean society, the role of the US should not be overlooked. Theodore Roosevelt's secret diplomatic mission on a cruise ship, the USS Manchuria, involved the designation of Japan as watchdog in East Asia. In 1905, Bradley (2009) reported, Roosevelt dispatched Secretary of War William Taft; his daughter, Alice Roosevelt; and a team of congressmen on a mission to Japan, the Philippines, China, and Korea with the intent of forging an agreement to divide Asia. The colonization of Korea, which was the result of a collusive agreement between the US and Japan, is clearly evident in the memorandum between the US's Secretary of War Taft and Japan's Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Katsura Kogoro, on July 27, 1905.

As the 1905 secret pact reveals, in the confidential conversation Taft brought up the Philippines issue, and Katsura responded with a statement that Japan did not have any aggressive designs on the islands, but he proposed the establishment of an understanding or informal alliance among the three powers in the Far East, Japan, the US, and Great Britain. Then Taft expressed his opinion that the Japanese suzerainty over Korea was a logical outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. Three days later, President Theodore Roosevelt fully concurred with Taft's statements (Chay, 1968).

The early US role in Korea, as Deane (1999) explained, was essentially imperialist. Zadoc Pratt, who represented New York's 11th district in the US House of Representatives, introduced "a measure to extend commerce to Japan and Korea by dispatching a mission to them" (p. 12) in February of 1845, and the 1866 incident of the General Sherman, an armed ship, and a number of hostile conflicts on the shore of Korea foretold the future of US foreign policy in the Far East.

Theodore Roosevelt announced in his Annual Message to Congress in 1904 (House Records HR 58A-K2) his dream of the US becoming an international police power, which was nothing but a mask for America's imperial plan for Asia. Bradley (2009) noted that Roosevelt, a Harvard-educated, White, male Christian, and other staff in his government strongly believed in the ‘Aryan myth’ that he and other White Americans were destined to rule the world. Korea was secretly allowed to be taken over by the Japanese, on whom the rising superpower, led by Roosevelt’s imperial leadership, bestowed the title of Honorary Whites. The US’s imperial ambition ignited Japanese territorial expansion in Asia and beyond the Indo-Pacific; decades later the Pacific war was the final outcome that included other devastating wars: World War II (WWII), the Korean War, and the Communist Revolution in China.

Social Darwinism developed an interesting variant in North American theory, as Williams (2005) wrote: “An even more vigorous hybrid of the Anglo-Saxon race happens to have established itself in the United States, and its turn will come” (p. 93). The Japanese colonial agenda was justified by its application of social Darwinism to the Honorary White position that the West had granted. Williams’ comment suggests that social Darwinism became a very powerful component of the ideology of imperialism:

> In the case of imperialism it was perfectly possible to argue, and many did, that the strongest, the best survivors, the Anglo-Saxon race, had a duty to humanity to continue to assert itself, not to limit its competition with weaker peoples out of some false ethical consideration for them or out of some legalistic notion of their rights. (p. 93)

Despite America’s ideological distaste for formal colonialism, as Tyrrell (2010) characterized it, American expansionism was not a unique characteristic of the empire because as its tendency to deploy hegemonic transnational organizations and institutions was rooted in American experiences. Tyrrell also pointed out the collaboration between colonialists (Japan in East Asian) and imperialists to acquire continental territories, set up trading posts, and create strategic steppingstones to gain markets.

American Protestant Missionaries and Capitalist Middle-Class Values

In the process of US imperial expansion, as Harris (2011) argued, religion was a major factor in the Americans’ deliberations over their national obligations, in tandem with race and commerce. Tyrrell (2010) argued that “this strategy of cultural hegemony was pioneered in the expansion undertaken by Protestant reformers and missions in the late nineteenth century” (p. 45). Korea was a typical case in this imperialist formula.

As I mentioned earlier, a prime-time soap opera, *Jejoongwon* (2010), aired on SBS in Korea. In 1885 Jejoongwon became the first modern medical institute in Korea, with the support of a Korean royal fund. A character in this TV series, Horace Allen, the founder of the institute, was actually a historical figure, an American Protestant missionary, as well as a medical practitioner. His character in this drama was depicted as a paragon of Western man, as a symbolic Anglo-Saxon White patriarch who came from a scientifically engineered capitalist society built on technological progress and democratic spirit. Allen considered Koreans, who were desperate to survive amidst invasive Western interests in 19th-century Asia, similar to Rudyard Kipling's (1899) "White man's burden."

In 19th-century America, Protestant men and women who moved out of their homes and societies to make their own contributions to global evangelization, literally obeyed the biblical command (Goucher, LeGuin, & Walton, 1998; Hutchison, 1987). With respect to the surge of interest in foreign missions in the early decades of the 19th century, Ryu (2001) showed that the American missionary enterprise was fueled by the growing economic strength of the republic and propelled by the dominance of evangelical Protestantism. While they converted other peoples to Christianity, many missionaries continued to engage in the modernization of medical and educational services abroad and set up hospitals and schools. These institutions often served as bases for their evangelical activities. Goucher et al. (1998) stated that it is noteworthy that the goals of missionaries dovetailed with the political and economic goals of the American nation state. Especially in Asia and Africa, the Protestant missionary enterprise provided ideological support for the new imperialism, because the very nature of the missionary movement reinforced the imperialistic goals, which resulted in essential information that was needed for conquest and was a critical communication link with areas that were remote from the colonial control centers.

From the point of view of US political and economic interests, D. Y. Ryu (2013) suggested that the American Protestant missionary movement achieved its goals. The American Protestant missionaries especially were perceived as some of the most sympathetic and dependable outsiders with regard to the desperate position of Korea's last royal family in the late 1800s, which they ameliorated by maintaining amicable and personal relations with the leaders of the American missionary community. Hidden at the back of the friendship, the American missionaries were the incidental forerunners of an expanding America, because American citizens sojourning at the cutting edge of America's overseas frontier were "subject to Washington's cautious international policy that went against the wishes of the Korean king" (p. 133). Not only did American missionaries see themselves as emissaries of God bringing salvation to the Korean people, but, as Ryu commented, the mission organizations also reflected many American middle-class values, including modern capitalist pragmatism, as well as late-

Victorian culture. Taking advantage of their position as cultural preachers, they maintained a safe and comfortable life in the Far East. Through the religious outreach in preindustrial Korea, according to Harris (2011), American material culture and capitalist expansion became one and the same; they disseminated an American way of life in which the practice of Christianity meant consumerism and civil liberty meant unrestricted commerce.

By portraying missionaries as ambitious, responsible, and heroic people, Ryu (2001) explained, the American foreign missionary enterprise of the time, such as the Student Volunteers Movement, spurred restless, hard-working, success-driven, self-conscious youths of the middle class who were anxious about their socioeconomic status to readily embrace the ideals of personal responsibility and hard work as the epitome of those values. This is the point at which the Christian mission enterprise and imperialism met each other's mutual needs. The American evangelical religion and worldview that the missionaries had disseminated earlier was effective because religious motivation was promoted through the upholding of capitalist middle-class values.

S.-Y. Yoo (2001) suggested that modernization during the Japanese colonial period meant 'Americanization' to the colonized Koreans; they represented it by copying and mimicking new and modern bodily gestures, ways of speech, facial expressions, languages, and outlooks. They sought escape into a new self-identity dwelling "inside the world of individuals' private desires, needs and interests" (p. 424); hence, it was an escape from their own dysfunctional and mutilated traditions as well as from the oppressive Japanese occupation. The Korean people perceived the American capitalist middle-class lifestyle as an alternative regime of values that became the criterion for differentiating and positioning them, thereby creating a new order in society:

> Individual identity was formed along this new value, and the degree of individual modernization became a token of differentiating oneself from the others. As soon as modern education became the royal road to modernization, the body was rapidly reconstituted as a stage of surfacing specific forms that indicated the individual status of enlightenment. (p. 424)

Language became the most essential element in the diffusion of a modern Western lifestyle, and leisure, technologies, rituals, and other cultural features used the dominators' languages (Japanese and English). Speaking Japanese was a form of institutionalized and compulsory assimilation under Japanese colonialism, whereas, on the other hand, English was a symbol of modern American civilization that promised a new world alongside an image of capitalist resources and culture. For that reason, American Christians in colonial Korea were perceived simultaneously as a form of symbolic power in the Korean modernist movements and as instruments to reverse Koreans' fate during the historical upheaval of the late 19th century. After the liberation in 1945, the English colonial power played an even further heroic role when America faced Communism during the Korean War by offering aid and development loans. The social significance of the English language is a thread that has consistently penetrated the formulas for Korea's history of progress since the colonial, premodern monarchy: modernization = westernization/Americanization = globalized capitalist industrialization.

The sociopolitical implications of the American mission in Korean society are still notably consistent in its political and cultural domination, which tend to rely on the process of acculturation. The transmission of the dominant culture to the colonies thus eventually created a culturally unified political entity. E. Cho (1998) asserted that the influence of the American missionaries of the 1900s in colonial Korea determined the direction of the mission from sociopolitical concerns about colonial realities to the spiritual dimension, and the Korean pastors of the 1970s and throughout the notable great-church growth period were silent or apolitical about the flagrant injustice and quietly obeyed political authority during the dictatorships of the repressive military regimes. The philanthropy of Protestant missionaries glamorized being a church member. Western scholarships to attend US colleges and universities conveyed America's imperial ambition and the biased outlook of the dominant, but they were positively perceived as salvation through Protestantism as well as a path up the social ladder. Matsutani (2012) observed that being a loyal church member and a nationalist were incompatible roles in the mission-dominated Korean Christian church, where the church held primacy over the nation in colonial Korea. Despite the democratic movement of some progressive Christian church leaders, most Christian church leaders played an important role in the modes of transaction among right-winged political elites on the edge of Korean McCarthyism, which divided civil society. K. Y. Shin (2007) referred to *democratization by transaction*' as "the making of the new rules of the game through negotiation between ruling elites and opposition elites" (p. 127). McCarthyism in Korean society was, and still is, compounded by Korean Christian conservatives' retention of significant power and resources within society; for example, the mobilization of mass rallies to condemn the government's policy toward North Korea and the anti-American trend among Koreans.

The educational implications of the American missionary movement, including the Japanese colonial experience in the modernization of Korea, were Japanese imperial institutionalization and Americanization in the name of modernization. Compared to Koreans' resistance to colonial institutionalization, the American missionaries' work of establishing higher learning institutions was successful and encouraged some Korean landlords and religious leaders to open private educational institutions (Lee, S. -H., 2004). This trend especially prompted the Korean colonial *nouveau riche*, who were pro-Japanese authorities and American missionaries, to open schools and run the institutions as promising new business models. The colonial situation has not changed much with regard to the current state of Korean education; the majority of the higher education institutions (85%) are private (Kim, T., 2008). What is worse, the colonially situated commercialization of Korean education involved contemporary neoliberal higher education policies that the Korean government has enacted over the past two decades. The American influence on Korean education is still persistently predominant. Thus, the dependence of Korean academic circles upon American academic discourse and theories is extremely high, and academic imports such as research methods and trends, publishing, and data access have all been weighted towards the American academic tradition and market. Many American-educated Korean students have returned home, carrying with them their pro-American and neoliberal values. According to the Statistics Korea (2013) survey, between 2007 and 2012 the number of doctoral degrees bestowed in the US was 4,589, compared to a global total 7,802 foreign degrees. J. Lee and Park (2014) suggested that key policies of the US and Korea on school reform and outcomes over the past three decades have converged in several ways: standardization versus differentiation, high-stakes testing versus individualized assessment, and centralization versus decentralization. Keeping pace with the education trend in the US, Korea has benchmarked American reforms, which has been criticized as a cause of the failure of public education in Korea.

Ushering Colonial Collaborators Into the Game

The US has intervened at crucial moments of Korean history through various channels. A politico-historical tracing of their intervention reveals that American interests in Korea are a perfect example of the gaining of power and economy over the misfortunes of the vulnerable.

Korea was one of the most sensitive areas that American forces occupied after WWII in that the US exerted its superpower to control another country's fate. D.-C. Kim (2013) encapsulated the early years of postliberated Korea:

> The U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), unprepared and uninformed regarding the administration of South Korea, outlawed the communist-led people's committees. In order to suppress the communists, the military government resorted to the assistance of the rightists most of whom were pro-Japanese elites. The USAMGIK's policy of using colonial administrative machines and Japanese collaborators to keep South Korea from communist influence coincided with Washington's global foreign policy of roll-back after World War II. (Notes, p. 135)

The survival of the Japanese collaborators had a profound influence on Korean society in the postliberation restructuring and in the future.

In competition with the Soviets, the US military forces' political purpose was to assert the American superpower's role in Koreans' aspirations to build a Korean republic. Compared with the provisional government of the French Republic, led by de Gaulle under US occupation, the US military government never recognized the Korean provisional government; instead, it supported pro-American Christian Syngman Rhee, whose past actions as a nationalist activist were questionable and who later stepped down shamefully from his position because of the people's protest against his dictatorship and corruption. Elich (2010) explained that the entire Syngman Rhee regime, the first government of Korea after the liberation, could, in fact, be characterized by the ferocious lawlessness and repressiveness and failure to brook dissent. US military authorities supported Rhee, who then hired past colonial collaborators to commit heinous crimes such as torturing Koreans during the Japanese colonial occupation. The aftereffect of the role of the US in the birth of the Rhee administration still haunts Korean society like a cancer and has impeded the achievement of national unity.

At the peak of the Cold War, D.-C. Kim (2004) suggested, the US army entered a Korean war that was fundamentally different from any kind of warfare they had encountered during WWII in Europe: "The Korean War thus stands as the first test case for US troops to engage in a civil war in the Third World, aiming toward the project of nation building without fully understanding the historical background of the region in question" (p. 539). The ongoing antagonism between South and North Korea, which has been constructed as a consequence of the civil war, might be the primary obstacle to reaching common ground in the citizens' historical understanding of the situation of the two Koreas, which holds the critical view of America's role during the process as a form of Communist action.

McCarthyism Is Still Alive

McCarthyism was to re-imagine forms of rule in postcolonial Korea in the international system maintained by US hegemony determined to create new order in the international system after WWII. The Korean civil war was a key strategic event for US foreign policies in the East Asian region in which an ideological conflict was growing between the US and the Soviets. The Korean War has scarred the people's consciousness and subconsciousness, and their postwar pain lingers because it is ongoing. The McCarthy years in the US coincided closely with the duration of the Korean War (1950-1953). Bruce Cumings (2004) revealed the extraordinary destructiveness of the US's air campaigns against North Korea during the Korean War, from the widespread and continuous use of napalm to threats to use nuclear and chemical weapons, and the destruction of huge North Korean dams in the final stages of the war. Yet, as D.-C. Kim (2004) and Cumings have noted, even historians are unaware of these events, and they were never mentioned in the past decades of media analysis of the North Korean nuclear problem. Cumings reported that more napalm, which was invented at the end of the WWII and was a major issue during the Vietnam War, was dropped on Korea than on North Vietnam, and with a much more devastating effect, because North Korea has many more populous cities and urban industrial installations. Koreans have been paying for the aftermath of the massive destructive attacks against the North and are still haunted by McCarthyism's militaristic mentality. Totalitarian uniformity rooted in McCarthyism in Korean society has been supported by a constructed memory of the war that still poses it as an emergency regime. D.-C. Kim (2006) reported that the stated used this political strategy to maintain the vicious cycle of violent governance that takes different forms within institutions. The end of the Korean War is still pending since the ceasefire agreement in 1953, now internalized in every aspect of Korean society and utilized as a political strategy—not simply, however, as an ideological conflict, but as war mongering among Koreans themselves, whose memory has been manipulated by the political interests of reactionary right-wing elites.

A symbolic byproduct of McCarthyism in Korea is the National Security Law, which was enacted in 1948 in response to threats from communist North Korea. As Kraft (2006-2007) explained, concerned Koreans and many international organizations such as Amnesty

International HAVE called for the abolishment of the law because the government has long used it to silence legitimate opposition in South Korea. Despite the criticism of the law, the Park military regime created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which was a duplication of the US's CIA, to reinforce the implementation of the law. Kraft described the law as "a tool of oppression in an insecure world" (p. 627). Political maneuvering and corruption have been rampant, and Korean citizens who protested dictatorship and labor oppression have been imprisoned or executed. Highlighting a worrying trend toward law enforcement authorities' increased arbitrary use of Korea's National Security Law since 2008, Amnesty International has consistently documented the use of the law's poorly defined provisions in practice to imprison people engaged in nonviolent political activity. In the historical context of the law's enactment, the Korean implementation of McCarthyism has been backed with US silent strategic condoning and implicit sharing of reciprocal benefits with Korean right parties from Korea's politically constructed rigid social environment.

Over the past 70 years, as Mearsheimer (2011) argued, fear mongering has played an important role in US foreign policy and is evident in Korean politics. By hijacking carefully selected memories of the Korean War, the McCarthy era still casts a long shadow over Korean society and has created a climate of fear and the misconceived notion of democratic capitalism that the US's persistent politico-economic intentions have instilled. The US influence has fostered a Korean attitude of extreme hostility toward Communism. This hostility has also been directed at academic positions, such as in the study of Marxism, which is considered dangerously sympathetic to Communism. The leftist intelligentsia, academics, and civil activists used to be under special scrutiny, and many were jailed during the military regimes from the 1960s to the 1980s. Numerous political scandals have shown how a paranoid McCarthyist frame of mind (Elich, 2013) has motivated Korean political elites even in the 21st century. According to the Freedom House (2014) report, Korea's political human-rights rating has declined because of the high-profile scandals that have involved corruption and the abuse of authority, including the National Intelligence Service's (formerly the KCIA) alleged meddling in political affairs.

Giroux (2011) commented that authoritarianism is generally associated with tyranny and governments' exercise of power in violation of the rule of law, a condition in other allegedly less developed or civilized countries. In the World Press Freedom Index 2014, Reporters Without Borders (2014) ranked Korea 57th in the category of freedom and information. The rigid modes of censorship and the chilling constraints and violence of Korean extremist right-winged governance have repressed rational opinions about and criticisms of social illnesses and malfunctioning public policies. The government uses the powers of its repressive state apparatuses to fashion followers in its own ideological image and collective identity. Fear mongering is the consistent justification for political manipulation and the perpetuation of right-wing authoritarianism; it is an efficient tool to nourish the docility of the human spirit by inflicting self-scrutiny on individuals' development of autonomy. The three decades (1961-1993) of military dictatorship and two coups in 1961 and 1980 had profound impacts on Korean politics and the formation of democratic citizenship.

In the Korean economic context, McCarthyism is a typical manifestation of the symbiotic relationship between politics and capital. Covering their contentious past, the first and second generations of past pro-Japanese collaborators protected their status and wealth by taking advantage of right-wing authoritarian regimes (Kim, D.-C., 2013). The successful example was the emergence of *chaebol*, a unique form of conglomeration in the Korean economy. As D.-C. Kim asserted, the birth of Korean *chaebol* among the postcolonial economic elites was possible because of the amicable relationship between the US military authorities during postliberation after US occupation and Korean conservative political elites. Hart-Landsberg (1993) criticized South Korea's rush to development, saying that "the South Korean approach to development, based on brutal dictatorship and inequality, does not deserve our support" (p. 93). Korean McCarthyism is based on the fact that U.S. imperialism frustrated the realization of the socialist dream in post-war Korea (Amsden, 1995) when Japanese imperialism concluded and the groundwork was laid for "a communist-led, working-class movement committed to building a socialist Korea" (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, p. 116). The US never showed territorial interest, yet established many military bases abroad as a constant goal. For Korean conservatives, this has been a nothing-to-lose proposition. Korea's economic-development background has been a breeding ground for corruption. Corruption Perceptions Index published by the Transparency International (2013) ranks Korea 46th globally 2013. Despite the state's wealth achievement, individual Koreans' quality of life has not improved as much as the nation's growth. Freedom of speech and thought among the working classes are restricted, and labor protestors have been accused of inciting a Communist rampage. McCarthyism has always been instrumental in repressing people's consciousness of the unfair distribution of wealth and the distortion of public good and delegitimizing critical thought on ill-performed political governance. McCarthyism has portrayed Korean people as docile agents to enable the dominant to effectively maintain totalitarian rigidity in the social system.

Military-Barrack Culture

Alagappa (2001) suggested that, in general, the weight of coercion in governance in the political role of the military in Asia has declined and the level of economic development has increased. In Korea, however, as the weight of coercion in governance increases, so does the political power and influence of the military. The ongoing threat of war and conscription system have strengthened the state and exerted control over individuals' bodies and minds. Korea has presented an exceptional case to Alagappa's theory, whereby less coercion through advanced economic progress has been compromised with more consent of social members under the military hegemonic. Korea's spectacular economic progress has somewhat blinded individual consciousness and promoted insensitivity to the uniformity of Korean society, which, in fact, has been perverted from an earlier cooperative spirit among social actors. The ideology of national security with hostility against the left-winged political stance, in particular, is often reflected in policies that urge passive social reception to political coercion through self-imposed societal scrutiny.

Korea's patriarchal culture based on a male-dominant socioeconomic system (Han & Ling, 1998), with political coercion aggravated by military authoritarianism with regard to gender, is even more complex. Koreans believe that a real man is one who is made complete only through military service and that only he should be endowed civil rights. Women, who are not obliged to serve, are positioned as Other within the social order and hierarchy. Culturally speaking, therefore, women's autonomy should not be claimed. Even after a prodemocracy movement pushed the military out of power, as Kwon (2000) pointed out:

> compulsory male military service has played a crucial role in constructing citizenship, nationhood, masculinity, femininity, motherhood and fatherhood and in creating the essential 'glue' that binds each of these six potent ideas to the concept of the nation-state in contemporary South Korea. (p. 26)

Kwon's argument is that we will not be able to make adequate sense of the persistent culture of militarism today without understanding the subtle gendering of conscription in Korean society in which military service is a rite of passage to be considered a real man.

The conscription system in Korea corresponds with the totalitarian worldview in which the power elite is maintained in the ideology of national security, which utilizes demonized images of the political left. In this environment, as Hart-Landsberg (2009) noted, the Korean people were/are subjected to "the result of a forced march, and one in which workers enjoyed few of the benefits" (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, p. 205), mostly under a military dictatorship, which resulted in significant national economic transformation. Amsden (1995) agreed with Hart-Landsberg's (1993) point that Korean workers paid a high price for development in the form of long hours of work and repressive political and working conditions. The Park Jung Hee military dictatorship (1961-1980) emphasized the forced march of the Korean people as a form of military enlightenment and anticommunism (Diffrient, 2005), followed by prolonged consecutive military regimes (1981-1997) that stressed that hard work and sacrifice for South Korea were the pathways to success.

The field of education is the most targeted area of this interest. In schools government propaganda has been evident in a form of hidden curriculum that consists of unspoken messages from the dominant. The culture of hard work is ingrained so deeply in an authoritarian corporate culture and becomes harder to shake off, especially when employees are trying to impress management. Military-style boot camp is one of the most popular activities in many Korean education and business sectors. Students' military training on campus was a part of the national curriculum for high school students for about three decades (1969-2003). In the name of discipline, corporal punishment and uniform attire in secondary schools have been prevalent.

Korean people's stigma of overwork is a worse version of *karoshi* (death by overwork), which emerged in the 1980s in Japan. Korean society takes the culture of hard work for granted. Olson (2013) of *Forbes* magazine interviewed a Korean civil servant, Lee, who arose at 5:30 a.m. to commute to Seoul and left his office at 9:00 p.m. or later, six days a week almost all year. Lee had three days of vacation a year and saw his wife and three teenage children for 10 or 15 minutes a week and then on the weekends. His story is familiar to most Koreans. It typifies the average Korean employee's 2,357 hours of work per year; that is, 6.5 hours every single day of his or her life. According to an OECD (2012) report, Koreans work the greatest number of hours per year of employees in any country. On the surface, the cause of this hard-working culture used to be explained as Koreans' high motivation to achieve. Underpinning this, however, is their unquestioning submissive attitude under a long period of political coercion.

Political coercion has created a mistrust based on fear among the members of society and turned neighbors against one another. The vestiges of the earlier tyrannical days in Korean history have not been cleared away, a condition that is interestingly comparable to McCarthyist America in the 1950s and the recent War on Terror and Homeland Security program of the Bush administration. Beyer and Beyer (2006) expressed the fierce irony poignantly of an antiterrorist world system that in the end internalizes terror, inflicts it on itself, and empties itself of any political substance—and then goes so far as to turn on its own population. Unfortunately, this irony has been transplanted on Korean soil and has lasted for a very long time in the Korean political context.

Behind the political validation of the tactic of perpetual internalization of fear in Korea has been the US's consistent pursuit of economic benefits. During all of the conflict periods in post-1930s history, the benefit to the US economy of higher gross domestic product (GDP) growth is not a secret. The Institute for Economics and Peace (2011) reported that the heightened military spending of the US during conflicts such as WWII, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War does indeed create employment, increase economic activities, and contribute to the advancement of new technologies that then filter through into other industries. An analysis of the relationship between the US's conflict strategies and their aftermath is much more complex because the fate of developing countries has always been involved. It is commonly known that WWII established the appropriate conditions for future growth of the US and ended the Great Depression. In terms of the Iraq war, Egan (2007) argued that the war represents an attempt to solidify the global hegemony of US-led neoliberalism:

> As a result, the left critique of the war has focused on the political-economic aspects of imperialism, emphasizing either the specific sectors of capital that have benefited from the war (such as oil companies and the military-industrial complex) or the significance of Middle Eastern oil for the United States and its competitors. (p. 142)

Politics in modern capitalist societies is founded on corporate profit-pursuing activities, and the logic of war (conflict) lies in the logic of pursuing profits, on the premise that war is an extension of politics. Common requests from the IMF and other hegemonic international organizations are flexible labor markets and easy entry of foreign capital into developing countries. This is an alternative form of conflict in the age of late capitalism. Mainstream US economists and media often shift the responsibility for lack of transparency, outmoded management, and too strenuous union activities to other countries that suffer from financial crises. Partially, that might be true. Yet this is an essential capitalist logic that involves the US's principles of administration and policy. We should then ask an important question: How much autonomy do developing countries have in protecting their own survival in a situation in which the United Sates never gives up its geopolitical and economic benefiting from other societies' troubles?

From Seoul, *Agence France-Presse* (2014) reported on the Korean armed force's annual joint military drills, "Key Resolve" and "Foal Eagle," with the US—drills they carried on despite vocal opposition from North Korea. The drills, which they kicked off without exception on March 27, 2014, involving a combined total of 12,700 US troops and many more from South Korea, even though the North condemned them as rehearsals for invasion. (Seoul and Washington insisted that they were defensive in nature.) Despite Koreans' concerns over military tensions in the Korean peninsula, the politico-economic control over the complex needs of the military industry has maintained the relationship of mutual assistance between Korean conservatives and the US. In this situation, what puzzles many Koreans is why several million troops from both the South and the North waste resources that could have been used for the welfare of their respective societies. To what extent does the US contribute to Korea's peace or misery? The answers to such questions share the same story as the origin of the separation into two Koreas.

According to Hart-Landsberg (2000), Korea is the last place on earth to exhibit the remains of the Cold War,[3] which technically meets every condition that the US has set. The mastering of space in the East Asian region through American hegemony has maintained the nexus of US foreign policy and the US military-industry complex interests since the 1800s. Korea has been an important geopolitically strategic bridgehead for the US to sponsor tensions with both Russian ideology and arms competition and the Chinese economic challenge. Hart-Landsberg (1998) also explained that the US forced a policy, under the guise of the Cold War that prefers security and regional power over the promotion of the democratic process in Korea; accordingly, this assisted Korea's corrupt regimes in oppressing many Korean opposition groups who called for democracy and Korean reunification in the years prior to the Korean War. The

---

[3] This was prior to the current crisis in Ukraine.

Korean War was the consequence of American operations in East Asia during the Cold War and still justifies America's perpetuation of its powerful influence in the Korean peninsula.

Ambivalence Between Reliance and Victimhood

The Korean people's attitude toward the US, as Moon (2005) analyzed it, has lingered because of the dynamics between anti-Americanism (*banmi*) and worship of the US (*sungmi*) for many decades. Korea's encounter with the US began with violence. An American merchant ship, the *General Sherman*, demanded open trade and sailed farther inland, up the Taedong River, to threaten Koreans violently by taking Korean officials hostage (Brown, 1866; Strand, 2004). The foreign interests of the US in Korea, as D. Y. Ryu (2001) wrote, followed American missionary projects and the expansion of markets. The onset of US intervention in Korean history was an archetypal form of imperialism. The negativity surrounding the US's intervention in the Korean peninsula has been steady. Although the area of Korea below the 38th parallel came under US protection in 1945, Korea did not become democratized until over 40 years later, in 1987. Williams (2004) noted that the US was the greatest benefactor of the authoritarian Korean government during that period and supported and legitimized the regime through aid, presidential visits, affirmations of friendship, and economic support even as Korea's authoritarian leadership conspicuously suppressed democracy and human rights.

The sentimental dependence upon the US has centered the common anti-Communist ideology between the Korean conservative elites and the US, and the 1980 Kwangju Uprising was a pivotal moment. Koreans' memories of the uprising have lived on in symbolic importance in the Korean democracy movement. In *Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Uprising*, Lewis (2002) wrote her own eyewitness account and later testimony of victims or their relatives; they were some of the few Western eyewitnesses to the uprising. What had begun as a fairly standard student demonstration in May 1980 turned into a bloody people's revolt that massive military forces smashed. Lewis recorded that many were killed, and others went missing, never to be found. Many others were put on trial.

After 1980 anti-Americanism developed into a significant problem overnight, one that simply will not disappear, as Katsiaficas (2012) explained:

> Even during the uprising, the point of genesis of contemporary anti-Americanism, a rumor was widely believed that the aircraft carrier *USS Coral Sea* entered Korean waters to aid insurgents against Chun Doo-hwan and the new military dictatorship. Once it became apparent that the United States supported Chun and encouraged him to suppress

> the uprising (even requesting that the military delay the reentry of troops into the city until the *Coral Sea* had arrived), anti-Americanism in Korea emerged with startling rapidity and unexpected longevity. (p. 247)

Before the Kwangju Uprising, the vast majority of Koreans believed that the US was a great friend and never believed that the US would support a military dictatorship. However, in the *New York Times*, Stokes (1982) reported that two American officials, Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., commander of the US's forces in Korea, and Ambassador Richard L. Walker had made insulting comments about Korea. Stokes quoted Korean progressive Christian leaders who recalled the two top American officials saying on April 19, 1982, that "Korean people are like 'lemmings' who are willing to follow any leader they get, . . . with student demonstrators [who are] only 'spoiled brats'". In addition, "The U.S. Government should look into the realities of increasing anti-American feeling, should recall General Wickham and Ambassador Walker and should apologize publicly for these people's remarks". Stokes noted that spokesmen for the two American officials had no comment on the statement.

In US Embassy documents, World Bank statistics, and a memoir of former US Ambassador Gleysteen and Commanding General Wickham, Katsiaficas (2005) revealed that the Embassy's chief concern during Chun Doo Hwan's first months in power by means of a military coup was mainly "liberalization of the Korean economy and securing US bankers' continuing investments" (p. 35). The argument in this review of those documents is that

> the timing of economic reforms and US support for Chun indicate that the suppression of the Gwangju Uprising made possible the rapid imposition of the neoliberal accumulation regime in the ROK [Republic of Korea]. With the long-term success of increasing American returns on investments, serious strains are placed on the US/ROK alliance. (p. 35)

The US made every effort to protect the interests of US investors even during Korea's political upheaval when another military came into power in another military coup after ex-Dictator Park had been assassinated.

Three decades after the Kwangju massacre, US Vice President Joe Biden visited Seoul in December 2013 for talks about regional and global issues, including China's new air defense zone and the North Korean nuclear standoff; he noted that the 60-year evolution of the alliance into a comprehensive partnership had contributed to peninsular, regional, and global stability (Song, Y.-J., 2013). Biden's recent remark, which was headline-grabbing news, was laden with significant concerns with which the Obama administration has been dealing; namely, instability in East Asia because of the rising hegemon, China. Said Biden (White House, 2013): "The United States never says anything it does not do. . . . It has never been a good bet to bet against America. And America is going to continue to place its bet on South Korea".

It is important to continue to discuss the continuum of the recalcitrant US's dominant intervention in the Korean peninsula because, as Iadicola (2008) asserted, "the forces of the United States empire are key elements in describing the most recent process of globalization" (p. 3). Not only America's geopolitical interest in Asia, but also its influence on Koreans' lives, both physically and mentally, is intractable. Korea's rapid economic growth from its position as the world's poorest country has involved aspects of social change: chasing an American fantasy in the name of globalization. Meanwhile, American expansion and shaping of globalization has endlessly increased through commodification in favor of a view of globalization as a free-market utopia that entails the powerful cultural process of liberation for the masses through consumption.

American influence on the material character of Korean society is ingrained alongside Korea's historically rooted corruption and the practice of immense social injustice, especially in the establishment of new classes during the long period of vast urbanization. In this context, materials such as apartments and luxury goods have played a tangible role in the creation of a new class. I will discuss this point in more length later in the thesis. America is still a dominant influential factor in most of Korean society as the object of either *banmi* or *sungmi*. This broad context must be kept in mind as a key factor in the evolution of mothering and EFL practices in contemporary Korea.

Corruption and Pedagogic Negotiation in the Oligopolistic Power Structure in Korea

In this section I discuss Koreans' failed clean-up of their colonial past, which America backed in its prolonged pursuit of self-interests, to foster an understanding of the social background of the corruption of the Korean elite. Relevant to the topic of this thesis is the relationship between this corruption, nurtured in a nexus of pedigree diplomas (*hakbol*) and oligopoly in the economy (*chaebol*) and maternal pedagogic negotiation as a social agency that developed in relation to Korea's deepening economic disparity.

Education and Elite Corruption in Korea

Most societies have a small number of plutocrats and oligarchs. When their influence on a society increases, the society itself is prone to corruption. The power of plutocrats and oligarchs in Korea seems to be too large to fail. The general public in Korea is familiar with the rich and powerful groups with high profiles who have been gaining free passes for their transgressions while complaints about the minimum level of well-being and social support for all citizens has grown louder. In this sociocultural context in which the educational actions of the less prestigious become attuned to oligarchic and plutocratic influence, parental pedagogic responsivity ironically, and perhaps tragically, stimulates parents' support for their children's education, with poisonous results for both children and parents. The excessiveness of Korean mothering in relation to the trend toward children's tutoring frequently crosses boundaries of the "poisonous pedagogy" (Miller, 1987). This should be an indication of malignant social forces within the prevailing capitalist system, forces such as the increasingly severe economic polarization in the broader society. Korean parents' support for their children's tutoring lessons in after-school cram schools (*hagwon*) require considerable investment, and as Hadzantonis (2013) keenly observed, Korean children's excessive studying promotes plutocracy more than scholastic merit.

A new class division in Korean society consists of small groups of the rich and powerful, and everyone else. In Korea's plutocratic state-led capitalist system (Witt, 2014), the simple dichotomy is more pronounced today, especially when the current recession gives prominence to the economic disparity in the Korean state. The World Top Incomes Database (Facundo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez) as online open data indicates in a comparative analysis of top-income shares in Korea (1933-2010) that the total income of the top 10% was 45% of the national total in 2012, which is slightly lower than the 48.16% of the US, but higher than Japan's 40.50% and France's 32.69% (Kim, N.-N., & Kim, 2015). In response to a question on where inequality leads society, J.-S. You (2015) hypothesized that countries with young democracies easily suffer from rampant corruption because "inequality increases the risk of clientelism and elite capture, thereby isolating democratized countries that are plagued by corruption from those that manage to control it" (p. 21). According to *Yonhap News Agency* (2014) ("S. Korea's GDP per Capita to top USD$30,000 Next Year: Think Tanks"), although the Korean government expects the GDP per capita to reach USD$30,000 in 2015, the issue of the deepening economic disparity must be associated with corruption and inadequate democratic progress in Korea. In this section of the thesis I discuss the correlation between economic inequality and corruption, especially among the elite, in relation to how education might interpenetrate the oligopolistic power structure of Korean mothers' parenting.

The corruption of the Korean elite is a major source of the structural inertia on Korean society's chronic trajectory of deep-seated plutocracy and oligarchy. Despite the fact that the Korean elite lead prestigious lives, their lack of basic human decency frequently creates sleazy scandals, that affects the lives of the general public through economic, social, and political deprivation. A society is decent, according to Margalit (1996), when its institutions do not humiliate people. Various factors cause humiliation. Margalit viewed poverty as humiliating, for example, and contended that Korea still has a long way to go before it becomes a secure welfare state. Since the Financial Crisis in 1997, however, recessions have resulted in a severely insecure economy for the larger society. Korean taxpayers have finally realized the contradiction of capitalism: that, despite their long, hard-working efforts, their lives are still precarious. When the nation's inexorable economic growth finally stopped, losing their jobs pushed many into poverty immediately. Newly emerging forms of systemic capitalism are shaking up the old industrial capitalist foundation in which middle-class life was designed, based on the premise of lifelong full-time employment income, mortgages, and pension plans. With regard to the issue of education, Korean citizens are humiliated that their governments have made little effort to create a quality welfare society despite the fact that governments are wealthy from the accumulation of capital to which the working class has continuously contributed. In the current Korean social system, setting aside middle-class anxieties, those who are poor or afraid of being poor or are considered failures easily lose the ability to satisfy their basic human needs because poverty closes off their life options. Korean elites who have been enjoying the privileged benefits of the nation's growth cannot escape responsibility for this situation. Furthermore, education declines with a corrupt and unjust society, because education about injustice is disallowed. To return to Margalit's ideas about decency in society, everything matters when society is decent: citizenship, snobbery, privacy, bureaucracy, unemployment, punishment, military training rites, and concepts such as rights, dignity, integrity, honor, self-esteem, servility, cruelty, and more. A decent education is an essential tutor with regard to all of these aspects in society. Black and Black (1999) pointed to the collective failure of Korean elites, who were responsible for the unprecedented but predictable financial crisis of 1997, and called Korea "Korea Inc.," which "consisted of strong relationships between politicians, bureaucrats, banks and *chaebols*" (p. 45). Since the crisis, Korean taxpayers who have had nothing to do with the mistakes have been suffering in the IMF's food chain.

Failure to Eliminate pro-Japanese Colonial Collaboration: Root of Korean Elites

The exploration of Korean elites' inadequacy in terms of the Korean mothering practice and educational suffering turns on the uniqueness of the Korean cultural mechanism of power concentration. The elites' monopoly over power and material resources is often described as problematic since modern Korea's opening to the imperial superpower of Japan in the early 1900s. The notion of elitism paradoxically suggests the democratic and liberal values that originated in Western thinking. Indeed, as Higley (2009) wrote, Western thinking on elitism is "evident in the preoccupation with spreading democracy to the world's every nook and cranny" (p. 92), despite its illusory characteristics. Pakulski (2012) viewed the structure and character of modern elites as complex and diverse. As well, Weber (1968) emphasized the capacity of these groups to form cohesive power relations through the assumed legitimacy of rule and leadership.

The Korean elites can be characterized as a conflict-bearing entity, a political and economic oligarchy in a Korea-specific context. Calling the Korean elite "Elite Cartels in money politics," Johnston (2005, p. 103) explained that "corruption has been integral to all aspects of development, supporting a hegemonic elite, aiding early economic development, and exacerbating deferred economic risks and political resentments. It remains a serious concern today" (p. 103). In this context, in the early developmental stage the belief was that high-quality educational attainment was the way out of a low-income bracket. With a long historical association with despotism, Confucianism has been appropriated to justify the contradiction of liberalization and democratization. Korean elites have taken sociopolitical and economic advantage of this appropriated Confucianism instead of stressing, for the sake of social members' well-being, liberal and democratic values that support individual liberties, a free-market economy, and a rational defense policy. Although the state's economy has reached a level of abundance, corrupt elites, with a weak sense of democratic and liberal thinking, have jeopardized the material and mental well-being of middle- and low-income Koreans who themselves have paid the costs of governance crises and economic woes and predicaments since the 1997 Financial Crisis. The rise and corruption of Korean elites is well documented in public opinion and the mass media, and their effects on Korean society have been deep and broad. At this point I will focus on two central aspects relevant to Korean educational developments, *hakbol* and *chaebol*.

Nexus of *Hakbol* and *Chaebol*

Power concentration in a small number of the elite groups is significant in Korean society. Steinberg (2006) keenly described keenly how Koreans' social and economic opportunities at the societal apex have been restricted by an entrenched elite based in considerable part on an educational structure that allows the perpetuation of their status and entrenched interests. Lew et al. (2003) referred to the cohesive power formation of Korean elites as the continued presence of strong "affective networks", which is one of the seeming anomalies of Korea's rapid transition to modernity. One of the affective networks among Korean elites is the academic clique (*hakbol*), which is responsible for questions about the excessiveness of Korean mothering practices in support of their children's education. The intensity of Korean mothering practices is typically represented in children's college entrance competition. Korean mothers' support for education, perceived as an obligatory duty, is directed toward their children's gaining *hakbol* access. To belong to the circuit of *hakbol* in Korean society means essentially to be an alumnus of a prestigious school. Koreans' desperate pursuit of *hakbol* is a result of its unparalleled value as a form of social capital. It comes from the irresistible social pressure to attain degrees from better colleges within Korean society, in which the enrollment rate is higher than 80%. With a degree from a mid-level college, it is not easy to find a job. In this dire job market, as S.-K. Yoo (2013) reported, high school diploma is hardly recognized in the job market, and wages with no college degrees are low. What is worse, part-time or temporary positions are often the best options even for many college graduates. In particular, Korea's lowest economic growth ever during the 2000s has aggravated the *hakbol* competition. In this context, as I discussed in phase 1, the prerequisite for 'high' *hakbol* has resulted in the new term *spec* since the early 2000s. The category of spec ranges from the reputation of a school to quantifiable credentials such as English language test scores (i.e., TOEFL), diplomas from prestigious schools abroad (mainly the US), family backgrounds with a focus on parents' wealth, residential locations (i.e., *Gangnam*), and more. In this Korean environment, education has become a form of suffering. It is not surprising that Jin (2003) asserted that *hakbol* is at the root of the suffering.

The concept of *hakbol*, which is culturally unique, is often translated as "academic clique." The Korean concept of *hakbol* has nothing to do with scholarly beliefs and theory development; instead, the meaning is derived from a handful of elite school ties. It is not a scholarly tradition that centers on certain academic traditions, but involves social connections among the alumni of elite schools. *Hakbol* has two connotations: (a) socioeconomic power and (b) the exertion of power of certain cliques in elite groups from prestigious schools. It is important that *hakbol* power is tacit and yet influential in many fields in society. Mills (1956) argued that power elitism as the organization of major national power resides, although it is not unified, exclusively in the economic, political, and military domains.

Korean elites have formed cartels (Jin, 2003; Johnston, 2005; Kim, S.-S., 2008) that have eventually constituted a monopolistic power structure in Korean society since modernization began in the 1900s. The majority of the Korean elite, as Em (2012) explained, are beneficiaries of pro-Japanese collaborators and band together through diploma networks (*hakbol*). The culture of *hakbol* is traditionally rooted in the interconnection between the Confucian academy and politics. The symbolic power of *hakbol* was focused on the caste system in premodern Korea. The elites of the Joseon dynasty (1392-897) split into different political factions, which resulted in strife over the seizing of power during Confucian academic disputes on the scholarly interpretation of Confucian classics. Each faction was called a political Confucian clique (*moonbol*), which is *hakbol* today.

In 1948, when Korea was established south of the 38th parallel, which is the boundary between the Soviet and American occupation zones, after the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, nearly 80% of the population was illiterate because of the limited public access to formal schooling. In the early 1960s the enrollment at each level of schooling in the 6-3-3-4 educational system (elementary school, junior and senior high school, and university) increased rapidly to 90% for primary school and similar levels for junior high school in 1980 and senior high school in 1990 (Cheng, 1993). Although school attendance in elementary and secondary programs rapidly improved, data from KEDI (Kim, S. G., 2011) show that enrollment in higher education grew more slowly and remained at 30% until the mid-1990s. Since the late 1990s, Korean society has been characterized by a tremendous degree of competition for entrance into prestigious universities, premised on Koreans' conventional belief that affiliation with a prestigious university has a strong effect on work-life success and social status. In this cultural context, there is no doubt that the university system in Korea was developed as a structure characterized by clear hierarchical rankings of schools, with prestigious rankings in particular reflecting different qualities of human capital; this has greatly affected the Korean social context generally because the real merits have been proven in individuals' material and nonmaterial welfare. In this context, the hierarchical ranking structure of higher educational institutions has heightened the tensions among Korean mothers, whose main duty is emphasized as supporting their children's education. Education in Korean society pivots on college entrance competition.

S. Lee and Brinton (1996) suggested that the benefits of attending a prestigious institution might be cumulative. That is, those who have developed the human capital necessary to enter a prestigious university might accrue additional benefits, which Lee and Brinton identified as institutional sponsorship in the form of university-specific social capital—access to job-placement offices, professors, alumni, and classmates:

> The stratified nature of the higher education system implies that the usefulness or effectiveness of this social capital may vary by the specific institution attended. Not only is the available information about employers likely to differ according to the prestige of each school, but so, too, is the ability of university friends or alumni to influence employment decisions. (p. 182)

Sponsorship from the most prestigious universities gives graduates an extra boost. In this culturally specific setting, the influence of the academic clique on society is significant.

The institutional domination of *hakbol* is often considered the central cause of Korea's unbalanced regional development based on economic and political discrimination (Jin, 2003; S.-S. Kim, 2008). The majority of elite schools are located in the Seoul metropolitan region. The remaining regions (*jibang*), have been marginalized for decades. That is, the dominance of *hakbol* connections controls the employment market by excluding graduates from *jibang* colleges. Jin viewed this phenomenon as a vestige of premodern Korean elitism. As an archetype of Korean elitism, civic agencies' recruitment through the government examination system (g*wageo*) during the Choson era (14th century to 19th century) has been carried over to the modern age of *hakbol* hegemony. The past *gwageo* effectuated and rationalized extremely competitive sentiments in the name of education, which is still widely accepted in government recruitment for public positions such as the civil service, teaching, and so on. The competition of the government examinations, commonly referred to as *gosi*, forces college graduates into a repressive life of preparatory examinations in adult *hagwons*, which have been booming during the last two decades. Conventionally legitimated elitism has framed Koreans' perceptions of, interactions between, and attitudes toward social relations and spun off different forms of competition based mainly on the principle of exclusion. In this context, it is natural that education has been overemphasized as a tool to justify the abandonment of any tradition of meritocracy, particularly within the unique social conditions in Korea that the vertically rigid hierarchy and authoritarianism have shaped.

The oligopolistic power structure in Korea converges at the nexus of *hakbol* and *chaebol*. Koreans have a unique form of business *chaebol*, numerous international enterprises, often transnationals, that families with power over all operations control. The elite cartels that form mainly through *hakbol* connections have grown even stronger with the economic strength of the *chaebol* networks, and vice versa, and have reached the peak of the oligopolistic power structure in Korean society. More important, working together, these two power domains internalize their influence upon the everyday life of Koreans. The nexus of *hakbol* and *chaebol* is historically rooted in Korea's modernization and capitalist industrialization. After liberation in 1945, the government attracted large landowners who registered their properties as educational institutions on the condition of the benefit of tax exemption. According to J.-K. Kim (2005), the Rhee administration's desperate pursuit of a high demand for educational institutional facilities was evident at that time. This was an identity shift that introduced rich political collaborators who became philanthropic capitalists during the course of modernization. Hong (2013) and S.-B. Kim (2013) argued that land reform in 1950 was the momentum that established the interrelationships between the business sector and education as the socioeconomic basis of the liberal democratic and capitalist system; it combined the government's purchase of land with the transformation of landlords into capitalists. Today, large companies own a large number of educational institutions such as universities and high schools, as well as large hospitals. About 85% of the higher education institutions, as T. Kim (2008) reported, are private in today's Korea, and about 78% of university students and 96% of professional school students are enrolled in private institutions. Capital controls Korean education.

Another aspect of the nexus of *hakbol* and *chaebol* is the mutualism among Korea's elite cartels in that economic capital requires human capital, and vice versa. Elites with high-quality *hakbol* are preferred employees in *chaebol* companies.

Korean *chaebol* has emerged through 'money politics'—the cronyism that has been nourished by the corruption that has spread throughout many aspects of Korean society during the post-Independence era (Kang, D. C., 2002). With regard to the onset of corrupt accumulation by *chaebol,* Amsden (1989) explained that the windfall from US aid for reconstruction was the basis of the emergence of an altogether new entrepreneurial element and that "political connections led to an uneven distribution of the spoils especially during the period when venality was pervasive" (p. 39) in the First Republic, 1948-1960:

> Fortunes, therefore, were amassed, the "gravy train" starting with sales of Japanese property at below-market prices. Favored firms, whatever their origins, were allocated hard currency to import scarce materials—grains and fertilizers—that they then resold on the domestic market at monopoly prices. They were given loans at subsidized interest rates. They were granted tax exemptions, and they were awarded preferential contracts for large-scale government projects. (p. 39)

The tenaciousness of pro-Japanese colonial collaborators persisted during the postliberation period and entrenched the nexus of wealth and power for posterity in the connections between *hakbol* and *chaebol*. Cain (2013) described the one key strength of Korean conglomerates (*chaebol*) that persists today: the rapid reworking of existing technologies and sales at lower prices than their American and Japanese counterparts. Besides numerous scandals over the problematic management associated with both moral and legal issues, the incalculable profits that Korean conglomerates made and are making is related to the following: (a) ethically controversial marketing and management, such as the rejection of unions; (b) the covering up of work deaths, injuries, and poor working conditions (Choi & Lee, 2014; Kang & Kwon, 2011; Lee, W. S., 2013) the outsourcing of fatality risks such as child labor (Arthur, 2012); and (d) the intentional understating of work hazards that have led to employees' death (Lee, Y., 2013). As Cain (2013) pointed out, the top-down Spartan ethic that differentiates Samsung (a Korean *chaebol*) from its more informal Silicon Valley competitors is defined by its perpetual crisis mode and the militaristic culture of the management of human resources. New-employee orientation, for example, is almost a boot camp. *Chaebol* wealth also comes from long collusion with political elites who have backed them with tariff benefits and easy loans (Albrecht, Turnbull, Zhang, & Skousen, 2010) and insulated ownership groups from competition while they exploited young female laborers and low-education workers whose rights are not protected because of companies' no-union policy (Lie, 1996, 1998). The dictatorship of Park (1960-1981) openly encouraged *chaebols* to amass economic power and near-monopoly control in return for lifting the war-ravaged country out of poverty (Kim, J., & Park, 2012). The politico-economic ground of any Korean government has been based on trickle-down economics. Until the 1997 Financial Crisis, and possibly still, people consistently believed in Park and his successors' policies, which favored mainly the wealthy via tax cuts for the upper-income classes and *chaebol* companies. The increased wealth has been propagandized as flowing down to those with lower incomes.

Korean *chaebols* resemble Japanese *zaibatsus* of the Meiji era; that is, family-controlled industrial and financial conglomerates. The dictatorship regime of Park Jung Hee (1961-1979) modeled the arrangement of *chaebol* on the *zaibatsu* system. This arrangement allows families to control a broad range of businesses, even those in which they hold few if any shares; eventually, they pass ownership down to their sons and daughters. Korea's largest *chaebol*, Samsung, a symbol of Korea's greatest economic success, has recently become the subject of a major controversy because it has overpowered the country, wielding influence that almost matches that of the government. Harlan (2014) of the *Washington Post* discussed how to curb the size and power of Samsung and other family-run conglomerates. This became the key issue in Korea's latest presidential election, and the polls showed that about three of every four voters felt negatively about the country's few behemoth businesses. Critics say that Samsung has elbowed its way into new industries, knocked out smaller businesses, limited choices for Korean consumers, and sometimes colluded with fellow giants to fix prices while bullying the investigators. J. Kim and Park (2012) called *chaebol* "Koreans' unloved", and Samsung is the picture of closed-door wealth, a family affair, with Chairman Lee Kun-hee passing power to his son, which marks three generations of power.

Since the early 2010s, as Arthur (2012) reported, a hot topic in Korea is the trend of daughters and granddaughters of *chaebol* families to open bakeries and other small food outlets, which threatens local shopkeepers because these plutocratic patisseries have deeper pockets than any of the small bakers against whom they compete. Wielding 70% of the country's economic power (Kim, J.-C., 2012), *chaebol* groups' social control over Korean society pervades the everyday lives of individuals. E.-J. Kwon (2012) noted that the Korean top 10 *chaebol* groups account for 80% of the national GDP. Samsung alone is responsible for 20% of the country's $1.1 trillion economy (Weissmann, 2012). The total assets of Korea's 30 largest *chaebols* in 2011, according to J.-C. Kim, were worth more than Korea's GDP; and their annual sales of 1.134 quadrillion won accounted for 96.7% of the GDP, which grew mainly between 1980 and 2011; and their sales increased 48-fold.

The management of *chaebols* requires quality human resources. Talented applicants for *chaebols* are sorted through the *hakbol* system as a kind of filtering. Recruitment into *chaebol* reflects their conservative ways, how they maintain what they have in society, and avoidance of innovative challenges. They annually recruit newly graduated or enrolled bachelor's or master's degree students with a GPA of over 3.0/4.5. Samsung, which runs many subsidiaries, administers, for example, the Samsung Aptitude Test, which 200,000 college students and 100,000 graduates took in 2011 to apply for 12,700 positions. The recruitment test is designed as a multistep screening tool for entry-level application. The *Samsung Recruiting Magazine S^2* is a guidebook packed with knowledge and advice from veteran employees, and it offers potential hires generous tips (Kang, E., 2011).

The socioeconomic inequality in Korea was one of the key factors in my exploration of the contextual peculiarity of Korean mothering work. Although much of Korea's progress toward prosperity is obvious, as Russell (2013) wrote, the status of women remains deeply problematic. Because the outlook of Korean women is constructed through the nexus of power and wealth, which in turn constructs the boundaries for class division in society, in this social context Korean mothers have developed their own pedagogy for child rearing. Since the 1997 Financial Crisis, both capital and state have even further marginalized or exploited Korean women (Kim, S. K., & Finch, 2002). This is the basis for the question, Why was the crisis a turning point? 1997 marked the time when Korean education became even more competitive, especially with regard to Korean mothers' support for their children's tutoring lessons, and the *hagwons* arose.

Unequal Distribution of Risks and Pedagogic Negotiation

Risks reveal the basic character of a society in many aspects. A corrupt society such as Korea incubates different kinds of inconvenient realities such as discrimination, dehumanization, and decivilization. Fundamental ethical distortions within the society are revealed, particularly when a disaster takes place. The risk-disaster relationship can be defined as not only a one-time event, but also a long-term issue that creates considerable collective stress because of a society's structural problems. Barton (1969, 2005) focused on the fact that disasters cause a broad range of collective stress in society; he defined collective stress situations as those in which "many members of a social system fail to receive expected conditions of life from the system" (p. 126). Barton (2005) also explained that this type of stress arises from large-scale deprivation of the conditions of a socially defined normal way of life. In *Risk Society*, Beck (1992) defined risk as "a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself" (p. 21). As with ecological and nuclear fallouts, the undeniable "boomerang effect" (p. 23) ignores the borders of class and nation so that even the rich and the powerful are not safe from them. Beck explained that the late-capitalist system has created risks for people according to class. That is, the distribution and growth of risks affect some people more than others: "In some of their dimensions these follow the inequalities of class and strata positions, but they bring a fundamentally different distributional logic into play" (p. 23).

In Korean society, in terms of the issue of the unequal distribution of risks, S.-T. Hong (2007) argued that risks in the Korean context are directly related to the corruption of the elites. In Korea average citizens have been exposed to risks relatively more frequently. These risks range from external to internal sources (Gillespie, 1988) and from natural disasters to economic depression factors such as inflation, unemployment, and slums, including endless political repression. During the last several decades Koreans have been devastated by numerous manmade disastrous accidents related to the collapse of buildings, bridges, ferries, subways, and so on. The unequal distribution of risks is revealed in the social, physical, and economic vulnerabilities of each class and preexists disaster itself. The most significant point about the recent chain of public disasters in Korea is that they are manmade, particularly related to elite corruption, incapacity, negligence, and the lack of social and philosophical vision in leadership. These qualities of corruption are maintained through an inner circle of particularized trust among the elite cartels in the areas of bureaucracy, finance, the military, business, journalism, and the academy. The worst features appear during postdisaster periods. S.-T. Hong criticized that those who are responsible for disastrous accidents are forgiven, which ends controversies with a preposterously low degree of punishment in many cases. This corruption-prone condition in the Korean context has thus had a large impact on the formation and agency of class subjectivity.

The history of the corruption of the Korean elite having put Koreans at risk is long. In 1995 the Sampoong store in Seoul collapsed, killing as many as 200 people and injuring more than 1,000. Local and foreign journalists suggested that the accident was a byproduct of Korea's rush to industrialize. Fenton (1995), the reporter of *the Independent*, argued that the problem is quite distinct from that of the pace of industrial development, that corruption is the main cause. He claimed that the corrupt elites in Korea are not just greedy, but also pitiless. Fenton criticized that commentators on the Far East have often accepted this pitilessness as a fact of life:

> A country is doomed to authoritarianism because that is "in the culture"; to corruption because—well, have you ever known the East to be without it? One is shown the success stories—Singapore, Japan, South Korea—and there hovers over them the implication: this is the only way it can be done, this is the only way to achieve progress. So for many years strong military government in South Korea was deemed to be a necessary concomitant of a strong economy. The generals and the tycoons were part of the same deal. They were in control. Any criticism was Communism.

On April 16, 2014, more than 300 people died when a passenger ferry, the 6,825-ton *Sewol*, carrying mostly high school students from a central-west working-class town, sank off the south coast of Korea. "Sadly, inexcusably, the country has done too little in the year since to prevent another such tragedy" ("South Korea's Ferry Disaster Isn't Over," Editorial Board (2015) in *Bloomberg View*; nine passengers are still in the water. Unexceptionally, the *Sewol* tragedy revealed a series of corruptions and transgressions in the bureaucracy, politics, business, judiciary system, police system, and many more. In the process of rescue and investigation, human error (Choe et al., 2014) was strongly suspected in many areas, and cronyism and corruption were blamed for the disaster (Kwon, 2014). The criticisms included the deregulation of marine transportation security policies such as the questionable extension of the lifespan of the ferry and permission for illegal remodeling; the incomplete passenger list (the total number of passengers was never confirmed); the total failure of the rescue operation; suspicious business favors between government and certain enterprises; malpractice in safety inspection, breakdown in safety training, and lack of safety guidelines; massive extensions of overload; temporary employment with low-income contracts for major crew positions; illegal bank transactions in purchasing the vessel; and the corrupt revolving door of retired personnel from regulators and industries (Choe et al., 2014; Eum, 2014; Kwon, 2014). In an article in the *Washington Post*, Harlan (2014) described the undeniable reality of contemporary Korean society:

> Korea has a history of disasters, from building collapses to airplane crashes. But the slow sinking of a passenger ferry this month has become its Katrina moment, a failed test of capability in a country obsessed with progress and success. After decades of

> development, South Korea has approached Western living standards. And yet the capsizing of the *Sewol*—with 476 people on board—had the markings of a Third World calamity.

The impact of the *Sewol* ferry disaster has been tremendous for the Korean people, especially because of the incapacity of the government, despite enough time, according to many local and foreign experts' point of view, to manage the rescue. The government rescued none of the passengers. It has been a horrendous collective experience.

Working conditions in Korea are no exception. During the last decade (2001-2010), K.-Y. Shin (2013) reported, 22,890 workers were killed at work in Korea, which means that an average of five workers die at work every day. This is often called *invisible death* in Korea. Among these victims, 70% are male breadwinners, so that the actual impact of industrial death on society is much greater when the surviving family members are taken into consideration. The government and capitalists who manipulate statistics, deregulate related policies, water down reports, and conduct cover-ups have neglected the matter of industrial death and injury in Korea, as J. Im (2013) suggested. In 2009 the Ssangyong Motor Company announced plans to shed 36% of its workforce but then faced protests from about 900 employees who barricaded themselves. The struggle is still unsettled. Clashes between workers and police over illegal job cuts has left 129 workers dead, including 22 suicides of workers and family members. Traumatized families and workers number in the thousands. According to the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (2014), one worker is killed every three hours and one is injured every five minutes at work in Korea. When a worker dies in the UK, the employer pays an administrative penalty of KRW790,000,000 (USD$771,619.86) for violations of the Workers Compensation Act or the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation: the failure to comply with Work Safe orders, failure to take sufficient precautions to prevent work-related injury or illness, and failure to provide an unsafe workplace or working conditions. On the other hand, in Korea the penalty is only KRW50,000 (USD$488). In Canada, the Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia (2014), for example, stipulated that the maximum penalty amount must be adjusted yearly, and as of January 1, 2014, the amount is CAD$607,297.58 CAD (KRW572,200,000). In advanced welfare countries, work-safety regulations are based on the idea that, as a fundamental human right, no penalty is financially adequate when lives are lost or workers suffer serious injuries.

The lack of moral principles in Korea's political power has shaped its bureaucracy, especially at senior levels, into outright indifference and a lack of commitment to public service, while maintaining the appearance of obedience to established and formal political and administrative policies and rules to protect its own security. Korean bureaucrats function as inadequate blind spots, similarly to Veblen's concept of "trained incapacity" (Veblen, 1914) institutionalized corruption has flourished and created not only instability, but also growing resentment among the populace who are at the receiving end of bureaucratic malfeasance. This bureaucratic malfeasance, especially among the ruling class, varies in different social contexts. Habituated to these social conditions, each time that the public rages at the manmade disasters, they cool down quickly and forget the trauma to enable life to return to normal.

Risk in Korean society is always political. The vicious cycle of violence in Korean culture never stops at school or at work after military service. Political violence and repression, which have been consistent in Korea since the liberation in 1945, have had negative consequences in Koreans' lives. They have shed blood fighting for democracy and human rights: from the April 19 Revolution in 1960 against systematic fraud in the presidential election to the May 18 Uprising in 1980 in Gwangju, in which the people resisted Chun's military coup and fought for democracy and human rights, to the June 10 Uprising in 1987, which ushered in a peaceful transition from military rule to a democratic process of government. Despite Korean people's tenacious fight for democracy and social justice, ruling governments have repeated human rights violations and disrespect for human lives in an atmosphere of political instability, economic slump, and rampant corruption. Although the aim of laws and the judiciary system is to safeguard the weak and protect fundamental human rights, many political prisoners have languished in jail, and many have been victims of extrajudicial execution and torture. Without judicial protection of basic human rights, too often protesters (journalists, trade unionists, farmers, students, and activists) are harassed and intimidated, even today. During the last several years, conservative governments' censorship and surveillance of civilians' lives have sparked public outrage. The longstanding history of political repression in Korean society teaches the lesson that only elites can get away with social risks.

B.-S. Kim (2015) suggested that the new pattern of emigration is related to the high frequency of risks in Korean society. During the last two decades many parents, frustrated with the dire situation in the country, have left Korea with their children, seeking quality education and life. This phenomenon is commonly called *education immigration* (*kyoyouk-imin*). According to the Isaac Brock Society (2012), the number of people who have given up their South Korean citizenship is much higher than in any other country. Korea is the only developed country in Asia in which the number of people who have renounced their nationality exceeds the number of immigrants who have become naturalized in Korea. Furedi (2007) explained that adverse events such as disasters are "interpreted through a system of meaning provided by (the broader) culture" (p. 482). At this point pedagogic principles are negotiated. Making sense of and responding to adversities can easily make self-defense intuitional from experience. If people's collective experiences consist of a chain of corruption in their society, victims' decision making might involve negotiating their principles of pedagogy and teaching their children to work hard to reach the safest position. This is the core of the contemporary issue of educational distortion in Korea; it is a notable reflection of unsolved questions about the unequally distributed risks in Korean society. Individual parents quickly become defensive to protect their children's safety—or so they think they are doing. In terms of the unequal distribution of risks, the fierce college entrance examinations to gain a quality *hakbol* place should be viewed as a form of parenting negotiation to protect children in this society of risk.

Unequal Geo-Code of *Gangnam*: A Semiotic Interpretation of Apartment Mothering in the Process of Capitalist Development

In this section I present my semiotic interpretation of the Gangnam apartment culture in Korea's gendered capitalist-development process to unpack the role of Korean mothers in the formation of elite classes and the commodification of maternal practice. I further discuss the evolution of apartment mothering into wild-goose mothers' response to Korea's neoliberal transition in the age of knowledge and information capitalism.

Child to Seoul, Horse to Jeju: The Korean Cultural Origin of Spatial Segregation

A subtle incitement to class tolerance within society is frequently represented in various forms of popular media. Soap operas are a typical genre because women constitute a vast consuming group for such cultural products. A popular nostalgic storyline as a media text in the Korean cultural context is rural migrant families' coping with their abject poverty through hard work in a shanty town of the capital city, Seoul. A common denominator of these sentimental narratives is the success story of the oldest male offspring in a poor migrant family who is sent to a prestigious university in Seoul. Without exception, he becomes successful at a great cost to his siblings, especially the females, who become factory workers or housemaids who sacrifice their own educational opportunities. Several topics such as education, gender, class, and urban industrialization are intertwined in the most typical historical reality in the Korean social understanding; hence this kind of story never dies in popular media production in Korea. Like this integral storyline, my discussion proceeds through a complex web of cultural interpretation and description toward a deepening understanding of educational phenomena.

An old Korean proverb says that children (obviously, male offspring) should be sent to Seoul and horses to Jeju Island. Traditionally, Koreans have yearned to live in Seoul, and the proverb is applicable even today. A large population has relocated to Seoul, which was conceived of as a city of opportunities during the state's industrialization of the 1970s and 1980s. This, however, is based on a sentimental understanding of the geographical monopoly of Seoul. Seoul, the capital of Korea, is highly populated. State-led industrialization demanded a huge labor force, which extended the city into a mammoth-sized metropolitan (*sudokwon*) area.

Seoul, the fourth most populous city in the world, has over 10 million inhabitants, 22 million in the greater metropolitan area. Its population has grown exponentially since the late 1960s, from 3 million in 1963 to 8.5 million in 1981, and then to over 10 million in 2000. While Seoul's metropolitan area covers only 11.8% of the nation's land area, 48.9% of the total population live there (Chung, L., 2010). The peculiarity of the rural demographic influx in the process of Korean urbanization lies in the high regional concentration of power and resources as a result of the state's biased planning. L. Chung analyzed the centralization of the political, economic, and cultural infrastructure in the Seoul metropolitan area thus: most of the nation's top private corporations' head offices, 85% of the central government's offices, 84.8% of state-owned corporations, 65% of top-20-ranked university campuses, 58.7% of the state's manufacturers, and 90% of major cultural facilities and institutes. In the US, 69% of the population lived in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in 1970, and the population in these areas grew (Mieszkowski & Mills, 1993). The US Office of Management and Budget (2013) defined *metropolitan statistical area* as a geographical region with a relatively high population density at its core and close economic ties throughout the area. Although the concentration of population in cities is universal, the US has more than 300 MSAs. Comparing the scales of MSAs between the two countries reveals that the degree of concentration in Korean MSAs is much higher. This implies that the Korean experience of urbanization has been much more intense in a short period of capitalist development than that of the US.

Ginsberg et al. (1991) noted that the emergence of mega cities is common in Pacific Asian areas as a result of the interdependence of globalization and urbanization. The accumulation process in a given Third World capitalist country is largely determined by the way its economy is integrated into the global capitalist system in which labor is intensely exploited, especially female labor who earn wages. Korea was a part of this group. Between 1961 and 2000, Choe (2005) reported, 33 million people moved from rural to urban areas, and Seoul alone absorbed 60% of the total net rural-urban migration in the 1960s. Alongside the centralization of power in the capital city, Choe also pointed out, the social-rewards system with an emphasis on higher education is common in Asian countries that have a long tradition of centralized political and educational systems. The ultrafast economic growth during Korean industrialization, which is often termed *late industrialization*, was possible because of the almost unlimited labor supply (Amsden, 1989) that consisted of rural migrants who were infused into the labor-intensive, low-wage, export-oriented industries (Cho & Koo, 1983a, 1983b). Nevertheless, although these explanations of the extreme centralization of Seoul's metropolitan areas make sense to Koreans, it should not be overlooked that Korean elites have been interested in factional gains without any long-range vision of state development based on any form of human-centered philosophy. A discriminatory sociocultural development of the metropolitan area has placed profound downward pressure on the rest of Korea and generated various issues of interregional inequality in material and immaterial senses.

Harvey's (1990) interest in time and space as sources of social power corresponds with the significant position of Seoul in the Korean context: "The intersecting command of money, time and space forms a substantial nexus of social power" (p. 226). Moreover, Seoul's geographical monopoly can be viewed as typical in that ideological and political hegemony as a cluster of power and resources depends on "an ability to control the material context of personal and social experience" (p. 227) of the marginalized (e.g., the population in rural areas and cities other than Seoul, the working class, women, and children), whose lives the centralization process tends to exploit. The counterparts of Seoul's monopoly are the remaining provinces across the country. These areas are called *jibang*. The linguistic sense of the term connotes a lack of competiveness or a representation of peripheral and marginalized people in the contemporary

Korean labor market. The extreme centralization of the Seoul region has resulted in an uncontrollable regional imbalance in politics, economy, and culture (Chang, M. H., 2002; Jin, 2003; S.-S. Kim, 2008). For instance, the city has only 0.6% of the nation's land area but is home to 35% of the nation's population. Ronald and Lee (2012) thus suggested that such attraction has reinforced the concentration of economies and attracted more and more people, which has led to movement from local areas: approximately 2.3 million to Seoul, 225,800 to Incheon (west of Seoul), and 759,000 to Gyonggi province, which encompasses Seoul. This imbalanced landscape best explains Korea's hierarchical hypercompetition for college entrance: *in-Seoul* or *jibang*.

Education in Korea is one of the major social domains in which significant interregional gaps between Seoul and *jibang* exist. Low employment among graduates from *jibang* schools has caused the most crucial issues of social exclusion and income inequality during the last few decades. Despite the large enrollments in the universities in *jibang*, commonly called *jibang dae*, S.-B. Kim (2004) suggested that the *jibang dae* graduates have been unfairly treated and are Others in the Korean labor market. On the contrary the graduates from *in-Seoul* (inclusively Seoul metropolitan area) universities are preferentially hired (Jin, 2003; Kim, S.-B., 2004; Shin, 2012). A sense of relative deprivation among *jibang dae* students is pervasive; moreover, these unemployed graduates are a major factor in the social polarization that has eventually become associated with educational maladies in Korea. The swollen number of Korean higher educational institutions because of government support for a policy of higher education autonomy since the 1900s was the prelude to Korea's diploma inflation. With this phenomenon, the interregional gaps between Seoul and *jibang* have widened. Parents' anxieties about their children's education have evolved from the desire for a general college diploma or an *in-Seoul* college diploma.

Gangnam: An Uncomfortable Self-Portrait of Korea

The omnipresence of apartment buildings has given the Korean state a series of satirical euphemisms such as *apartment republic* (Gelézeau, 2007) and *concrete utopia* (Park, H. C., 2011). The endless gridlines of high-rise concrete-block apartment complexes, called *apatu danji*, are one of the symbols of modernized Seoul. Since the 1980s the apartment construction business, backed by Korean government housing planners, has boosted the housing market. The mass production of high-rise apartment complexes has dramatically transformed the skyline of

Seoul. The state's pushing ahead with apartment housing plans as a flagship project has shaped Koreans' material and mental sense within the framework of certain values, and they conceive of the manmade physical surroundings as an emblem of the Korean middle-class lifestyle.

A French geographer, Valérie Gelézeau (2007), studied Koreans' addiction to apartment dwelling. When she first visited Seoul, Gelézeau confessed that she was shocked to see endless rows of concrete apartment blocks lining both sides of the Han River. Many of her interviewees told Gelézeau that Koreans had no choice but to build tall apartments because of the country's small space. However, she raised important questions about Koreans' excuse because Japan, the Netherlands, and other countries in Europe also have high population density in small land areas, yet none of them is dominated by massive-scale apartment dwellings nationwide as in Korea. Gelézeau also pointed out some specificities in Korea. Although Western apartment complexes often represent common ills in urban planning such as unemployment, poor hygiene, and high crime and poverty, including racial/immigrant issues, life in a high-rise apartment is a dream for the Korean middle and upper-middle classes and a symbol of a modernized Western lifestyle with economic stability.

This cultural contradiction requires deeper historical insight into Koreans' everyday experiences in the process of development. Lifestyle in a constructed environment is an important stimulator that shapes and reflects social discourses in terms of individual perspectives, patterns of market and consumption, and policy initiatives. In other words, as J. Park (2013) explained, the interactional relationship among social discourses depends on people's interpretation of their built environment, which, in turn, reinforces the structure of a built environment. Gelézeau considered Koreans' addiction to an apartment lifestyle as a unique byproduct of modernization and concluded that Korean apartments function as factories that produce a middle class through property investment. Learning that Korean apartments are products to be owned, measured by price, mass produced, and so hugely popular, Gelézeau focused on Korea's unique apartment marketing system of the presale process (*bunyang*), which is vulnerable to corruption. Clients buy apartments for lower prices before they are built, and when construction is complete and the values soar, they find themselves suddenly wealthy. The culture of high-rise apartment dwelling has shifted to a money-making project characterized as a speculative investment. Lett (1998) observed that the stereotypical image of Korea's middle and upper-middle classes is not only that they reside in Gangnam, but also that they live in a high-rise apartment complex. Gangnam is the initial form of an urban middle-class residential neighborhood and has played a major role in the eye of a typhoon when the real estate boom began alongside the expansion of Seoul during the 1980s.

A massive apartment complex trend has sprawled in most of Seoul's satellite cities. This proliferation of apartment complexes was the major impetus for expansion of the capital city on a metropolitan scale. They spread to other regions (*jibang*) and eventually to rural areas. By the 1990s, more than half of Koreans lived in apartment dwellings. The number of apartment dwellings per capita in Korea is higher than in any other country. S.-H. Park reported a survey's finding that 58.3% of the total dwellings in the nation are apartments, and Sung (2010) noted that 73.8% of the 3,560 participants wanted to live in an apartment in 2009. Calling this a mystery, Ko (2011) wondered why Korean middle-class families choose high-rise apartment living over a single-family house and why Koreans cannot resist a landscape of concrete blocks. I do not consider it a mystery, but rather a consequential phenomenon of social construction in which apartment projects satisfy Koreans' material desire and class interests in Korea's specific socioeconomic context. I believe that they have taken precedence over aesthetic and philosophical values when a society is not mature enough to maintain more comprehensive human values.

An apartment (*apatu*) complex consists of a large number of multistory, boxed, concrete buildings. In many cases a complex is comprised of thousands of units. The aligned apartment blocks on the Korean landscape are reminiscent of the domineering Stalinist architectural characteristics or the fascist-era buildings that lack aesthetic design and emphasize symmetry, simplicity, and practicality. Wide roads and box-shaped buildings seem to be lined up for a parade of military dictators. The layout of apartment complexes facilitates the growth of shopping areas and facilities such as grocery stores, medical clinics, banks, parks, recreation centers, and private playschools. The patterned spatial structure of apartment complexes was an efficient outline design for an emerging lifestyle in the age of consumerism that came alive in 1980s Korea. This dwelling design took advantage of a large consumer segment in a single compact residential complex and adjusted consumers' taste to the market (i.e., the people). The apartment culture also created a new form of class hierarchy in real life. The location, the size, and the specific names of builders (e.g., *chaebol* companies) are crucial variables in a method of creating new classes. Not only is the notion of apartment a place to live, but it is also a class marker with the masses controlled by apartment signs and discourses.

Using a semiotic definition (Berger, 1995), the denoted message of Gangnam is simple. It means "southern side of a river." There are thus hundreds of *gangnam* across the country. In contemporary Korea, however, Gangnam has a specific semiotic meaning. In both popular and academic discourses, the term refers particularly to three affluent municipal wards (*Gu*) of the city of Seoul located on the south side of the Han River, which runs west through the city. Joonman Kang (2006), a Korean sociologist, described Gangnam as the uncomfortable self-portrait of Koreans. Kang suggest that Gangnam has two faces that represent Korea's growth, like two sides of the same coin: One is a blessing, and the other is a catastrophe. Kang emphasized that education is one of the most crucial means of Koreans' making sense of the cleavage between the blessing and the catastrophe. During the last five decades Gangnam has been at the center of Korean development narratives, riding the wave of its prosperity. Kang wrote poignantly that, in reality, the real face of Gangnam has been riddled with greed, corruption, and illusion. Chanting "Seoul is full," military dictatorial regimes in the 1970s initiated the development of Gangnam by promoting of real estate asset bubbles (Kang, 2006; Park, H. C., 2011; Na, 2011). As Y. –T. Ryu (2004) pointed out, stakeholders such as policy makers, builders, financial institutions, and real estate agencies were intimately connected to the division of the work of construction and allocation and the money-market system to run the apartment-construction project. In response to the framework, Gangnam was created as a concrete town of desire. Lowe-Lee (2007) encapsulated skyrocketing real estate prices because of the Gangnam property bubbles:

> The real estate market has been the subject of interest since the late 1970s when the government transformed rice paddies and green fields in southern Seoul (*Gangnam*) into the first modern residential district in Korea. During the economic recession in the early 1980s, the government further expanded green fields in *Gangnam* in order to help revive the ailing economy. It focused on building residential buildings, good infrastructure, and reputable schools. The former agricultural land, then worth 300 won per *pyong* (3.3 square meters), has now become the nation's most expensive area, worth around 30 million won per *pyong*. The price of land in *Gangnam* has thus soared 100,000 fold in nearly three decades, making the original land owners very wealthy. (p. 1)

Gangnam has become a myth that carries a desire for the untouchable, and the spatial segregation associated with income status has shaped its meanings and signs of class.

Because of the modern transformation of the housing system in Korea, Ryu (2004) argued, “housing choices and the price mechanism have been crucially distorted” (p. 783). House buyers are therefore looking for new housing, “not based on their need, but based on when and which houses will give them the greatest windfall gains, leading to speculation in real estate” (p. 783). With this phenomenon, Ryu commented, low-income households were “overlooked by the interests of large housing developers and by the inconsistency of the government’s quantity-oriented housing policy” (p. 783). Pushed to poorer neighborhoods, the children of low-income families could not attend the same schools as their wealthier peers.

Cradle of urban, white-collar, salaried middle class.

Throughout their compressed historical period, as J. Park (2013) pointed out, Koreans have experienced bodily trauma as a result of a series of upheavals, from the premodern monarchy to the colonial period, followed by the Korean War and worse poverty than in the colonial era, to persistent political oppression from corrupt elite cartels, and, finally, the new system of capitalism because of the race for supremacy between superpower countries. This continuum has become the context for Koreans’ cult of money and power and has played into Koreans’ conception of house (a place in which to live) as a result of state-led urban development during industrialization. The growth of Gangnam is a tangible illustration of the history of the continuum. Gangnam was transformed from desolate land into a sea of high-rise apartments and modern skyscrapers and initiated a spatialized concept of social class in Korean society.

The absorption of the new white-collar, salaried class with a college education and the pervasiveness of apartment (*apatu*) dwellings in Gangnam have created the Korean middle class. Luring the educated, white-collar, salaried working class effectively took advantage of Korea’s traditional occupational segregation characterized as a contempt for blue-collar labor. McDowell (1999) understood that places are made through power relations, which construct the rules that define boundaries that are both social and spatial. The boundaries thus define who belongs to a place and who is excluded, as well as the location or site of the experience. In his historical study on the making of the English working class, Thompson (1963) explained what happened in the British context:

> Some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is

> largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily. (p. 9)

In other words, class is a cultural as much as an economic formation; thus class consciousness is the way in which common experiences are dealt with in culture and embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas, and institutional forms. J. I. Kim (2014) viewed the development of Gangnam as a demonstration of the process of class making, which goes hand in hand with spatial production, the reorganization of urban space into a hierarchical form, and the defining of particular modes of lifestyle and social identification. Initially, Gangnam represented the creation of the Korean middle class, which consists of salaried office workers who are motivated to climb the social ladder by means of higher education credentials.

In reflecting on the history of Gangnam, many scholars and commentators have pointed out the complexity of its social implications (Kang, 2006; Kim, J. I., 2014). It is a result of the intricate dynamics of Korean society as a whole, and Koreans' conception of Gangnam reflects the paradoxical discontent with and shame about the society, while also glorifying it. The most salient impact of the social dynamics that resulted from the creation of Gangnam can be seen in the emergence of the white-collar, salaried middle class in Korea. The material conditions of this new urban middle class have improved with the benefits of government policy. The military-authoritarian government offered these new middle-class homeowners-to-be with apartments at a price lower than market value by means of the apartment lottery system.

During industrialization and even today, becoming a salaried employee of large companies (mostly *chaebol*) or at least well-paid office jobs is interpreted as climbing the social ladder in Korean society. The dorm-like, uniform architectural design of apartment complexes created an image of mass production of the urban white-collar labor force, which was essential in the newly blooming capitalist Korea. In each complex housewives are engaged in childrearing duties to prepare the future labor force, whereas the male breadwinners make the inner-city commute from home to work. The inner-city design of divided public and private spheres is clearly marked in Seoul. It seems to be a scheme for the invisible control of capitalist ideology whose design lies in the enhanced utilization of the labor force by reducing the distance between family life and labor space.

Vogel's (1963) study on the process of forming the new salaried class in Japan demonstrates similarities between Japan and Korea. In both cases college graduates in large cities have played an important role in the large-company-centered economic growth. Identifying Japan's new middle class as the *salary-man class*, Vogel viewed the family as the locus of the dialectic between change and tradition that occurred in the years after the war among the residents of suburban neighborhoods. The college entrance competition of those days in Japan is correlated with urban middle-class mothers' intensive involvement in their children's schooling in Korea. Japan's *keiretsu* and Korea's *chaebol* are East Asian–style industrial conglomerates that have demanded a large number of college-graduate, white-collar, salaried workers in their unique-natured business territories.

Despite the similarities, there are also some differences between Japan and Korea. Lett (1998) explained that the concept of Japanese *salary man* does not have the same significance in Korea:

> I will argue not only that South Korea's so-called contemporary urban middle class exhibits upper-class characteristics, but also that this is due to a culturally inherited disposition on the part of Koreans to seek high status, combined with a favorable political and economic climate that has made it possible for many Koreans in South Korea to actually achieve this status; . . . more specially, the legacy of the *yangban*, the aristocratic elite of Korea's former Confucian state, and especially their concern with status, that has been a driving force behind the development of South Korea's new middle class and the nation's rapid emergence as a major player in the global economy. (p. 2)

Lett focused on the industrial reformation of class structure in Korean society since the postcolonial egalitarian state that came with the advent of the new white-collar middle class in the culturally status-conscious environment.

Gangnam, the wealthiest district, a 15-square-mile area in the south of Seoul, accounts for a massive 7% of Korea's GDP. It has become a place of lavish lifestyles and a preferred address for the elite executives who run *chaebol* conglomerates and their well-educated offspring. With only 1% of the country's population, 6% of the students at the elite Seoul National University (SNU) come from Gangnam (Wang & Goodman, 2012). The widening spatial gap with the development of Gangnam has plugged into the "vicious cycle of education divide" (Park, H.-Y., 2007, p. 450) in Korean society.

Eighth School District: Benefits of the Vicious Cycle of Gentrification

People who owned property in Gangnam gained wealth and status because the majority of the development of apartment complexes is a property-based form of urban renewal. The residents of early Gangnam, the white-collar, salaried middle-class families, have been replaced by wealthier and higher salaried earners during the last two decades. The rapid class shift involved two significant variables: the transplantation of prestigious elite schools in Gangnam and the opening of high-end department stores. Coupling education and consumerism was a perfect project and a guideline to motivate middle-class families to pursue social mobility through investment in their children's education. Gangnam has been the greenhouse of the Korean power elite. Its endowed characteristics have been a perfect match for the corrupt power elite in Korea who have always blatantly served their own interests with urban renewal projects. H. B. Shin (2009) described Seoul as a "wholesale redevelopment which had been a dominant approach to urban renewal, leading to redevelopment-induced gentrification" (p. 906). The redevelopment program in Seoul was "effectively a market-oriented, profit-led renewal approach, in line with a national housing strategy that favored increased housing production and homeownership at the expense of local poor residents' housing needs" (p. 916).

Many cases of urban renewal were evident citywide in Seoul, from less wealthy to wealthier neighborhoods. Korea's high corruption and low transparency in policy making and the judicial system have weakened the voice of the poor, who were pushed out without fair compensation and fell into the poorest class. The wealth of the Gangnam area has been built on the vicious cycle of gentrification that has been developed in tandem with promoting property ownership, real-estate development, and the construction industry. In this cycle, Korea's deepening economic stratification and spatial segregation and, accordingly, its hierarchy of school districts have been determined and rearranged according to the wealth of residents. The hierarchical arrangement of secondary schools that is consistent with spatial segregation reflects the outcome of children's acceptance into elite universities. Because Gangnam is viewed morally as revealing progress from deprivation, there is little room for a broader dimension of ethical principles in the education of the next generation in Gangnam schools.

Neoliberal discourse has intensely positioned educational institutions in service to the economy and promoted the marketization of education since the 1990s. Most cases of gentrification have involved the renewal of existing neighborhoods into apartment complexes, which caused a hierarchical arrangement of schools during the most active gentrification period of the 1990s to early 2000s. Bartlett, Frederick, Gulbrandsen, and Murillo (2002) described a distinctly negative social consequence in North Carolina, where local elites have utilized neoliberal gentrification to further their own race and class interests to the exclusion and detriment of poorer African American parents and students. Despite the difference in social conditions between North Carolina and Gangnam, a common ground is the institutional differentiation and exclusion because of wealth and income disparity. A new arrangement of schools occurred according to the characteristics of neighborhoods, such as government public housing apartments or homeowners' apartment complexes, the size of apartment units in a complex, the specific name of apartment builder, and so on. The result has been that many public high schools have become less popular, serving only students who are poor, underresourced, and low performing. The decline of public high schools has turned high school into another class marker in Korea society, which in turn has made the college entrance competition begin even earlier for children.

According to S.-A. Kim (2013), the average lifespan of Korean buildings is relatively short, at 20%-40% of those in Europe and the US. Compared to the average 74-year lifespan of buildings in the US and the 77-year lifespan of buildings in the UK, the much shorter lifespan of Korean housing is a waste of social capital while at the same time a means of profit making for the power elites and constituents who seek windfall gains from the rising house prices. Perez (2004) viewed gentrification as an example of how the pursuit of greater exchange value disrupts the life of the poor even further; Perez defined gentrification as "an economic and social process whereby private capital (real estate firms, developers) and individual homeowners and renters reinvest in fiscally neglected neighborhoods through housing rehabilitation, loft conversions, and the construction of new housing stock" (p. 139). Likewise, most affluent neighborhoods in Seoul have been gentrified by victimizing low-income tenants.

A connotative message of Gangnam is complex and symbolic. It represents a place of new learning among Korean mothers who have been forced to play a very managerial role in educating their children. The significant parenting style of Gangnam moms requires high financial burden, which implies a sense of relative deprivation, gaps in wealth and consumption patterns, and class consciousness within society. Under Korea's successive military dictatorship, Gangnam was constructed as a manmade colony where people believe that money makes anything possible. Parenting has been more financially demanding than ever. In the case of Gangnam, class desire increases at the confluence of parenting and education.

Korean mothers' obsessive educational investment has been encouraged in the same track as the Korean totalitarian apartment culture. Apartment lifestyle in a massive complex (*apatu* *danji*), which began in Gangnam, serves as both a seed and an emblem for a managerial model of Korean mothering and education that has led to tutoring fever (*kyoyuk yeol*) and the district of popular private cram schools (*hagwon ga*).

The early stages (1970s-1980s) of Gangnam that began with the influx of the white-collar, salaried middle class has transformed into the next stage (1990s to the present time), the inrush of upper-middle class families. A major factor in the transformation has been the educational environment of elite schools (*myoungmun kyo*). These elite schools are a handful of high schools, later called the eighth school district (*palhakgoon*) and regarded as the cradle of Korean leadership, which was established mainly during the Japanese colonial period. Most members of the alumni cartel from those elite schools are also major players in the power elite cartels in politics, economy, the academy, culture, and other professionalisms of Korean society. The government has strategically moved these high schools, which were located in northern Seoul, to draw more white-collar residents to Gangnam.

The *palhakgoon*, referred to simply as the eighth school district of the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education, covers three affluent wards in the Gangnam area. Although the school district policy was removed in 1998, the symbolic weight of the term is still influential in Korean society because it is conceived as the key affinity between the socioeconomic status of Gangnam and the Gangnam model of an educational subculture within Korean mothers' educational practice. The popularity of the subculture has resulted in derivatives such as *Gangnam mom*, *Daechidong* (*hagwon* street in Gangnam), and *a mecca of Gangnam moms' knowhow*; and it comes from Gangnam moms' successful management of their children's entrance into elite school. The reality, according to K. H. Yoo (2013), is that 7 of every 10 applicants who passed SNU's admission process between 2011 and 2013 came from Gangnam areas. SNU is the top elite school in Korea.

The symbolic significance of the *palhakgoon* in Korean society lies in the upper middle class's grip on a handful of elite high schools whose reputations have been built on the social network of elites who enter top-ranked universities, commonly known as *SKY* universities in Korea. Attending *palhakgoon* schools is a sign of guaranteed symbolic and material capital, a sure conduit to social and material success in Korea. At the same time, it means that parents can afford to pay *palhakgoon* school expenses. The multiple dimensions of the maximized educational consumption of parents fulfills the interplay between education and class; in other words, they spend money to purchase or maintain social status.

Many cities in Korea can have so-called eighth school districts in their cities. The symbolic implications of the term are popular even among Koreans who live overseas. For instance, the Vancouver School Board (2015) in British Columbia, Canada, actively has been recruiting young Korean students. The board's recruiting pamphlets call the affluent district of West Vancouver the *eighth district of Vancouver*. For Korean mothers, the schools in West Vancouver are the flagships for the recruitment of Korean children who are studying abroad (*jogi youhak*). According to the article "Studying Abroad: Fair Opens, Consulting *jogi youhak*, and Immigration" in *Seoul Shinmun* (2014), Canadian school boards, especially in Vancouver, BC (School Districts of Abbotsford, West Vancouver, Coquitlam, and Delta, and Langley School Board), began to recruit young students several decades ago, when Korean immigration agencies opened the *jogi youhak* at the Canada Fair in Gangnam.

In addition to the schools in the eighth district are two distinguishable kinds of privileged high schools. One is specialized high schools, and the other is *jasa* high schools, the majority of which are located in Seoul. In 2006, according to H. Y. Park (2007), Seoul had 57 specialized high schools nationwide that included 29 foreign language, 18 science, 6 independent, and 4 international high schools, with a total enrolment of about 12,000 students. *Jasa* high schools are a hybrid version of American charter schools and elite prep boarding schools. Currently, the 49 *jasa* high schools exemplify the marketized private high schools (Hart, 2011). These private schools were designed as substitutes for children from relatively affluent families whose grades were not high enough to enter specialized high schools. Sending children to both specialized and *jasa* high schools is a guaranteed investment in children's enrolment in high-ranked universities. Like the filtering system for college admission, the top specialized schools such as foreign language and science schools absorb elite students, and the *jasa* private schools, on the second tier, accommodate the top 10% of high-achieving students from junior high schools. Last, the remaining junior high school students attend public high schools. This hierarchical school ranking system has been enhanced with the deregulation of the existing school district system to give parents freedom in their choice of schools. Korean parents who are concerned about the high cost of school fees and other expenses reluctantly choose specialized or *jasa* private schools. As a result, the majority of teenagers who attend public high schools tend to feel a sense of failure not only in themselves, but also in the level of their parents' wealth and income. This system forces young children into competition at elementary-school age.

It is not surprising that the majority of students in the specialized and *jasa* private schools are from higher income families in Gangnam. With this trend, as H.-S. Song (2013) warned, public schools are becoming 'slums' for students from low-income families who cannot afford to jump on the elite-school bandwagon. The government has increased the number of specialized and private elite schools with the excuse of discouraging young students from going abroad to study (Eum & Kim, 2014). Yet these schools have played a role in pushing Korean youth into the inextricable cycle of competition at a very early age.

Within the same paradigm of Korean capitalist development, the massive scale of urban housing projects built during the industrialization period is associated with the promotion of mass consumption. Urban transformation through the apartment-dominant culture, which began with the development of Gangnam, instigated unprecedented consumerism in Korean life. The transformation has also determined new models of parenting that value and internalize consuming practices with rewards. The anonymizing homogeneity of these buildings and landscapes has promoted consumerism as a means of making a dwelling one's own by purchasing, paradoxically, goods from mass production. Y.-N. Kim (2011) and J. Park (2013) reported that Koreans came to differentiate themselves, their values, and their desires through trivial arrangements in their lifestyle such as new furniture, new home appliances, and pictures on walls. The mismatch between the homogeneous structural base of the apartment lifestyle and individuals' recreated taste in a physically unified environment enticed housewives into competitive consumption behaviors such as 'keeping up with the Joneses' in a culturally specific mode.

Gendered Politics of Consumption and Geography

From a comparative perspective, common ground between the massive scale of Korean apartment planning and suburbanization in North American cities lies in the shared homogeneity of their lifestyles through standardized patterns of mass consumption and behavior induced by the manipulation of supply and demand in both markets and capital flow. Seemingly in service to domesticity in both cases, the geographical structures connect women to products in the market and establish a continuity between consumerism and house labor. As Brown (1990) noted, "The institutionalization of women as consumers that was accomplished by the incorporation of consumerist sites into women's sphere established the primarily public nature of women's new domestic performances, the visibility denoted in Veblen's 'conspicuous consumption'" (pp. 182-183). Needless to say, the overproduction caused by Korea's rapid economic growth resulted in a mass-consumption society in the same manner in which Western capitalist society has undergone such social changes. The material advance of society induced the complexity of economic, social, political, and cultural changes in both cultures.

Despite the similarities between suburbs in the West and apartment complexes in Korea, key differences lie in the way that gender roles have become configured. In the Korean context, apartment complexes have come to exist singularly as women's sphere, like isolated islands in their own inner cities, differentiated from the public sphere, in which men work as breadwinners. MacKenzie (1984) explained the appropriateness of a feminist approach to geography that is "cognizant of the importance of environment in reflecting, reproducing, and altering gender relations" (p. 192). Urban planning and design decisions reinforce the sexually segregated public-private dichotomy that is fundamental to the modern capitalist social process (Wekerle, Peterson, & Morley, 1980).

In Korea, Amsden (1989) explained, the state has secured educated white-collar male workers for the growing national economy by offering their families high salaries, social recognition, and prestige, which encourages middle- and upper-middle-class housewives to stay at home and take full responsibility for social reproduction. Men and women pervasively take this structural condition for granted even today. To be frank, smooth-running families seldom exist in reality. Nonetheless, Korean women's responsibility for and authority over childrearing as social-reproduction duties have been emphasized under the pressures of nationalism (Kim, H.-K., 2009), hypermasculine capitalism (Han & Ling, 1998), and gender-biased cultural norms (Cho, H. J., 2002) and have, furthermore, evolved under the influence of postmodern dominant social discourses.

In *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Bourdieu (1984) conceived of the consumption realm as a field of power relations and as a site of struggle in which individuals seek to maintain the distribution of the various forms of capital. Allen and Anderson (1994) referred to the field as a "multidimensional space of positions or locations in which a person's coordinates are determined by both the amount and composition of the types of 'capital' that they possess" (p. 70). De Grazia and Cohen (1999) assumed that the answer to the question about how class relations inflect consumption, or vice versa, is bound to the problems of social injustice, economic inequality, and the exclusion of the working class from social and economic citizenship. The interconnection between education and how class relations inflect consumption in the contemporary Korean context is tied to competition within the middle class to define standards for class, “one that legitimated itself with respect to old class stratifications by its capacity to master Western-type technologies and patterns of consumption” (p. 2).

The status-conscious character of Korean society (Lett, 1998; Seth, 2002) evolved into a relatively equalized class stratification with active social mobility after the land reform following independence and the Korea War (Koo, 2007) and the nation’s active industrialization (1970s-1980s). The Korean dictator regimes that desperately needed loyal voters shaped middle and upper-middle classes through Korea’s development economy represented as Gangnam and nationwide highway construction, which rescued impoverished postwar Koreans. The capacity for consumption in today’s Korea reflects critically on individuals’ identity and status. The prosperity of the tutoring market, for example, is a typical consequence of the coalescence of three components: education, class, and market. In Korea public education spending depends more on parents than it does in any other developed country; it is three times the OECD average (Kim, K. J., 2014).

Gangnam and the Patrimonial Wealth System

The class shift in Gangnam indicates that wealth has been passed down to the next generation; it has resulted in the slowing down of intergenerational mobility since the 1997 Financial Crisis (Kim, H. S., 2009); the growing issue of house-poor people (Oh, S.-D., 2010), who spend a large proportion of their total income on home ownership; the creation of an *edu-poor* (J.-H. Chung, 2012) class who pay education expenses from home-ownership monies (Oh, S.-D., 2010; Chung, J.-H., 2012); and the shrinking middle class (Nahm, 2008). No less than these symptoms, some educational phenomena are a clear manifestation of the class shift in Gangnam. For example, parents’ socioeconomic status determines students’ academic performance (S. Eum & J. Kim, 2014); and there are clear relationships among children’s test score, parents’ educational background, and house prices (Chung, I., 2010). Wealth is hereditary in Korea, and the cultural reproduction of social class is associated with the effects of cultural capital on students’ tested ability (Chang, M. H., 2002). Gangnam is the area in which most data indicate clearly consistent implications for those changes (Song, H.-S., 2013). This kind of class shift causes different social issues. The worsening and complicated education phenomenon and feverous competition in Korean society can be seen as consequences of the evolution. Korean job applicants often face a set of loaded questions in interviews, such as, What is your parents' educational background? What do your parents do for a living? How much property and savings do your parents possess? (Jung, S. H., 2014; Kim, J., 2014). In the ferocious current Korean job market, Korean applicants are unlikely to complain about these kinds of absurd questions. Moreover, this cultural phenomenon reveals how crucial parents' educational background and financial resources are to their offspring's well-being. Individual potential and efforts used to matter in Korea regardless of family background and support. The patrimony of wealth in upper-middle-class families has become a hot topic, especially during the last few decades in Korea.

Returning to the comparative approach to suburbanization in the US, the situation has changed as the capitalist system has evolved. Kneebone and Berube (2013) reported that today nearly one-third of all Americans are poor or nearly poor, and one in three poor Americans live in the suburbs and over 10 metropolitan regions. The highest increase in suburban poverty between 2000 and 2010 stretched across the nation. During the same period, suburban school shootings have occurred in many areas in the US. Although many factors need to be considered, Kramer (2000) argued that broader social and economic forces such as poverty, inequality, and social exclusion shape most of the problems of youth violence in America. For example, gun dealers claim that White suburbia purchases the greatest number firearms (Rothberg, 1968), and this holds true across the US (Bullington, 2012). One of the largest issues in American society today is gun-related crimes and damage caused by class-related, racialized, and gendered moral panic. Considering these possible variables, Americans cannot afford to ignore the latent interconnection between the social issues of gun ownership and the impact of suburban issues. Mobility in class, wealth, and demography in relation to capitalist development, as well as many other factors, are inevitably necessary resources that affect the understanding of educational practice and culture.

Leach (1984) suggested that "capitalist culture was so powerful as nearly to dwarf all alternative cultures" (p. 320). Koreans consider capitalism a system imported from advanced Western countries whose domination is destructive because of the greed-stained process now endemic in Korean society. Despite Korea's spectacular economic growth, wealth and income inequality have also been tremendously evident over a very short period (1960s-1980s) based on the uprooted social conditions and the anonymity of the newly imported capitalist culture. Although Americans had already experienced significant wealth inequality in the 1960s-1980s (Halttunen, 1982), manifested in geographical segregation and suburbanization, these processes began in the 1800s. In contrast, the extremely compressed process of Korea's capitalist development in the 20th century is already catching up with America's and the UK's, whose economic disparity issues are relatively worse than those of any other advanced country (Kim, N. N., 2014; Lee, J. K., 2014; Rho, 2013), despite their advanced social-welfare systems. Considering Korea's poor social-welfare system, the deepening inequalities in income and wealth distribution tend to incur a bigger risk in Korea, with the accompanying cultural ruination under the influence of the inherently destructive features of capitalism. One of the risky impacts on Korean people, who have barely began to glimpse public expenditure on social welfare, is the obvious patrimony of wealth throughout the society. Korea, which is still in the early stages of capitalist development, is already facing the collapsing stage of capitalism witnessed in Anglo-American countries.

To understand the class shift from the middle class to the upper middle class in Gangnam, Piketty's (2014) voluminous study on 21st-century capitalism might be useful. Piketty suggested that capitalism in this century has widened the disparities between the superrich and everyone else. His argument is that, first, in general, we are returning to the age of patrimonial capitalism; and second, wealth grows faster than economic output; that is, profits from property especially eventually exceed increases in labor income. Piketty's idea is that the core factor in inequality in distribution is capital, which might explain why the status of descendants who inherit their parents' capital is incorporated into the ruling class regardless of their ability and efforts. Gangnam is an economic context in which Piketty's premise that wealth grows faster than economic output has undeniably been demonstrated. Piketty's third point regarding the severe degree of wealth concentration also fits Korea's oligopolistic structure of economic resources. As income concentration has increased rapidly in Korea, especially during the 10 years after the financial crisis in 1997, according to N.-N. Kim (2014), the higher the tier of the ladder on which an income group sits, the more rapidly it gains income share during those 10 years. From an international comparative perspective, N. N. Kim (2014) and Rho (2013) pointed out that the income concentration of Korea, which used to be low and similar to the levels in continental

Europe or Japan, has been rapidly approaching the higher level of English-speaking countries; Korea is now ranked fifth from the top among OECD countries. Warning that Korea should not emulate the US, which in fact demonstrates the most inequality among all advanced economies, Joon Koo Lee (2014), a prominent Korean economist, was deeply concerned that Korea's inequality is approaching that of the US. Allianz (2014), a German multinational financial-services company, reported that Korea ranks first in the level of poverty of the elderly and women. In addition to Korea's worsening conditions for the elderly and women in poverty, growing youth unemployment and the low birth rate create a gloomy picture of Korea's future. The Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education & Training (Ryu, N. Y., 2013) predicted that the number of students from the elementary level to university in 2030 will be 410,000, only 59.4% of the 690,000 students in 2012. As a result of the consistent economic recession, Koreans are reluctant to trust predictions of recovery. Joo's (2014) comparison analysis based on data from the World Top Incomes Database (Facundo et al., Online Open Data) showed that income inequality in Korea will be the worst among OECD countries by 2019.

Although the Korean War, which broke out in 1950, finally ended the old agrarian elite of the Korean class structure, Koo (1987) claimed that the industrial elite of the new capitalist class structure during the last several decades has been shaping late capitalism into a form of patrimonial capitalism. The 1997 Financial Crisis was a turning point at which Koreans could finally visualize in real life the aftermath of the decades-long developmental ideology that excused successive authoritarian regimes for eliminating or subordinating all potential countervailing requests of well-being (Kang, C. S. E., 2003; List-Jensen, 2008), with incalculable human costs and the sacrifice of human values. The current tendency toward patrimonial capitalism in Korea is certainly interacting with the worsening income inequality and high rate of youth unemployment, alongside the cultural avoidance of manual labor caused by diploma inflation (Eckert et al., 1990).

The reality of average Koreans is that the new trend toward wealth patrimony has jolted them into action to buy tutoring commodities for their children. Anxiety and the tutoring market have paired perfectly to encourage Korean mothers' commodified parenting. In Korea the young generations avoid marriage, and the childbirth rate is quickly declining. These phenomena—the tutoring fetish and the declining birth rate—can be considered a consequential response to Korea's worsening wealth inequality. Although low fertility rates can be a symptom of lifestyle choices in many affluent economies, it is worthy of note that the pressure of education expenses, including the lack of gender equity, are major factors in the low fertility rate (Parry & Lee, 2011), especially when education is viewed as a crucial factor in the issue of wealth patrimony. According to the Observatory on Borderless Higher Education (Parry & Lee, 2011), education expenses on child schooling consume 48% of the average Korean family income. Government spending on higher education in Korea is less than that of other developed countries, and few loans and grants are available. The Hyundai Economic Institute (2013) survey demonstrated that 75% of over 1,000 respondents to the questionnaire think that the possibility of social mobility in Korea is declining significantly.

Lazear (1977) wondered whether education and income are related because "schooling allows individuals to earn higher income, or because higher income individuals purchase more of all normal goods, including schooling" (p. 569). The reality of parenting in a country such as Korean with low social welfare, however, seems to be more complicated than what Lazear might assume. The notion of income is obscure in the financial economies of late capitalism, largely because people are forced to borrow money, which in turn obscures their actual income. Simply looking at the relationship between income and education is thus sometimes not useful. In Korean society, many parents spend more than they earn on their children's education, especially on tutoring lessons; consequently, they invest in their children's education irrationally regardless of whether they fall into heavy debt (Chang, Lee, & Kang, 2011). They are commonly referred as *edu-poor* in Korea (Chung, J.-H., 2012). This trend began when Koreans finally became suspicious of the destructive features of the contemporary capitalist system, which seemed to be patrimonial in the post-1997 Financial Crisis. The gap of wealth and income in Korea was clearly identifiable when income segregation became linked to geographical setting, alongside segregated school districts and electoral constituencies. Many Korean families have suffered from having to pay back their debt from borrowing money to migrate to prestigious neighborhoods. This is an aspect of the complex relationship between education and income in today's Korea and helps explain to a degree the frenzied nature of mothers' obsession with education.

Hagwon: Culturing Apartment Mothering in the Age of Consumerism

My argument in this section is that Korean women, who are called apartment mothers, have become accustomed to the cram-school (*hagwon*) culture and have purchased tutoring services to support their children’s schooling. They commonly rationalize their desire to send their children to *hagwons* as not wanting their children to fall behind in their school performance, or simply as ‘every mother does it.’ Purchasing *hagwon* tutoring lessons for their children fulfills their duty of child care, especially in a cultural context in which educational competition is serious. The Korean cultural context substitutes the traditional mothering pedagogy with the consumption/accumulation model of education. The reality of contemporary Korean apartment mothering is often depicted in popular TV shows in which mothers who resist or ignore ‘the way that things should be done’ are often treated as bad and incompetent mothers (e.g., “Wife’s Credentials” on JTBC, 2012; “Catching up with *Gangnam* Moms” on SBS, 2007).

Wild Goose Mothering: Korean mothers’ Grand Tour in the Age of Knowledge Capitalism

In the feminist understanding of the role of motherhood within a capitalist system, the conception of mothering practice is not limited to biological maternity, but also deals with adoptive and foster mothering. Because mothering is intensively emotional, on the surface it looks different from the cold logic of the market. In the late-capitalist system, however, the construction of maternal identity has been influenced by the economic ideology of the definition of a good mother; as Taylor (2004) emphasized, maternal status imposes a psychology of commodification onto the caring and fostering of children in the global capitalist context. The ultimate Korean model of commoditized mothering lies in transnational mothering: wild-goose mothering. As consumers of knowledge products for their children’s education, wild-goose moms migrate mainly to English-speaking countries and, more recently, to Chinese-speaking countries such as China and Singapore.

Transnational mobile parenting is not new historically. It is useful to compare the Korean wild-goose trend with other global cases. From the mid-17th to the 19th century, royalty and aristocratic families from Northern Europe, especially England, practiced the custom of the Grand Tour, and wealthy Americans later adopted it. At all levels of society, as Wallis and Webb (2011) explained, how children should be educated has been a perennial problem because “education is one of the key devices by which social groups reproduce themselves and the choices that families make for their children can reveal much about expectations, negotiations and transfers between generations” (p. 36).

Wallis and Webb (2011) also explained that children from the gentry in early England faced particular pressures and temptations, and their education and training were inflected by conflicting concerns about preserving or improving their social status, conserving the family's lands, and securing future incomes. The upper-class trend of the Grand Tour in the West, as Black (2003) described it, was a popular way of parenting in class-based societies in which the social norms of inheritance and birth order in the patrilineal class structure were of fundamental importance. The Italian peninsula and France were the primary destinations for the Grand Tourist who was attracted to their cultural treasures. Brigstocke (2004) wrote that the Grand Tour brought the visitor "face to face with more recent artistic achievements: the splendor of the Renaissance and the exuberance of the baroque" (p. 332), which conjures an image of British travelers reciting the works of Cicero, Virgil, and Horace and reliving in their minds the great journeys of Odysseus. Despite the similarity of the idea of patrimony (sometimes upward mobility) of family's wealth and status through sending children abroad for their education, Korean wild-goose mothering and the Western Grand Tour differ in two ways. One is, as Brigstocke (2004) explained, that the Grand Tour was intended to be edifying and associated with classical education for the classically educated male members of the north European ruling or aristocratic class in a closed class system. On the other hand, Korean wild-goose mothering is a gendered labor project, with the role of male parents being merely to maintain financial stability. The Grand Tour trend is characterizable as male-dominant parenting with the purpose of children apprenticing for ruling-class positions, and the mother's role is less dominant. Wild-goose mothering, on the other hand, relies upon an appropriation of women's childrearing labor by means of inducing Korean women to stay at home, even abroad, as major global consumers of education. The other difference is based on modes of production in the capitalist economic system. The Grand Tour as an education commodity seemed to emphasize and reinforce the essential elements of academic discipline and sociocultural capital in the upper-class circle. Similarly, during the colonial modernization of Korea in the early 1900s, male offspring from upper-class families were sent abroad, mostly to Japan or China. Meanwhile, the contemporary wild-goose trend, a Korean version of the Grand Tour, is taking place in a more opportunistic style of class behavior in an advanced market mode, relying on wild-goose mothers' multiple identities.

The ideas of Norton (2000) and Park and Abelmann (2004) help to interpret the wild-goose phenomenon as a form of gendered transnational mobility. Analyzing the narratives of wild-goose mothers, H. Lee (2010) and Carroll, Motha, and Price (2008) explained that wild-goose mothers liberated themselves from certain constraining social values or inhibiting gender-role expectations by learning foreign languages, and then redefined and repositioned themselves. Wild-goose mothers typically move to English-speaking countries with their children and thereby experience different gendered positioning from that in their homeland of Korea. Wild-goose mothers, according to H. Lee (2010), create a distance between themselves and other mothers in Korea, or even between themselves and their husbands, to frame their own identities as exceptional not only because of their experiences of merging with a new society, but also because of the need to emancipate themselves from their traditional society. They also see themselves as "empowered" (p. 262) and construct themselves as "good mothers" (p. 262). Pavlenko's (2001) definition of *self-translation* helps to understand wild-goose mothers' transformation; it is a reinterpretation of one's subjectivity to position the self in new communities and to find meaningful life in the new environment. This involves a transition to a different culture and society and extremely profound changes in how one sees oneself and behaves.

More important should be how the global extension of the commodification of education is injected into the process of the wild-goose transformation of maternal identities. It is in addition to class interests that this peculiar phenomenon of female international relocations for education has been interplayed. Although wild-goose mothers self-evaluate highly because of society's perception of wild-goose mothering as an ideal model in the age of neoliberalism, their own society does not necessarily appreciate their emancipation. Their own individual interests generally initiate their exceptional experiences and challenges, and although they generally plan to take their children back to Korea, they do so without any formal resistance against the Korean system with which they were always dissatisfied. In this sense, wild-goose mothers' transformation can hardly be expected to contribute to structural or institutional improvements in the Korean system. Their challenges do, however, impact Korean women's existing status in an even more delicate way because they indirectly upgrade the standards of mothering performance as women's social-reproduction labor. As a result, the range of Korean mothers' education consumption has broadened to the global market. Although only a small population has been involved in wild-goose transnational experiences, prestigious schools in the US and Britain are highly popular among Korean mothers. It is not surprising that, although the majority of wild-goose mothers are from Gangnam, the trend is popular enough to spill down on a significantly national scale. Thanks to agile marketing, as J. Kim (2010) noted, the number of wild-goose mothers has grown because now even lower income mothers have alternative and less expensive options in South East Asian countries such as the Philippines and Singapore.

Concerning the relationship between consumption and gender roles in the global capitalist economic system, Korean wild-goose mothering can be seen as a global version of apartment mothering cultured in geographical and politico-economic contexts. The diasporic character of wild-goose mothering is an active form of childrearing that requires new knowledge and information of new globalized realities, especially when English is recognized as a global hegemonic instrument of communication in the expanded market and finance economy. Wild-goose parenting can thus be interpreted as a shift to a mobile dimension of consuming pedagogic commodities. The effect of wild-goose mothering has sent a shock wave to Korean parents who expect a simple college diploma to be good enough for upward social mobility, because wild-goose children's foreign college credentials and language skills have proven to be a good form of cultured capital passed from parents to children (Bowles & Gintis, 1976, 2002).

The neoliberal restructuring of the Korean economy was part of the context when wild-goose mothering became trendy. The move from an industrial economy to a knowledge economy boosted the trend of wild-goose mothering when knowledge became more clearly articulated as a form of capital, especially through new discourses that described technology and information as industries. The government conveyed these discourses through the slogan of globalization (*segyehwa*), which blinded Koreans to the inherently exploitative features of neoliberalism. In response to the government's propaganda, Koreans developed a romantic sentiment toward globalization through the influence of the media and business campaigns. Koreans' illusory optimism reached great heights with the hosting of the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games during the Chun military regime (1979-1988). This timely event eased restrictions on overseas travel and lifted the midnight-to-four curfew; Chun sought "popular support by freeing his country from the austerity enforced by his predecessor" (Kim, J. W., 2012, p. 479). Even Koreans who only belatedly recovered from a new pause in freedom were encouraged to participate in globalization and to imagine a global village (*jiguchon*) while taking pride in their economic achievement. A political campaign that lasted until the early 2000s promulgated Korea's advanced technology and communication industry and spread the gospel that Korea should play a leading role in the advent of knowledge capitalism.

Discourses of globalization and the knowledge economy have offered Korean apartment mothering a substantial component of ideological correctness. Just in time, early study abroad (*jogi youhak*) became legal. Korean mothers received the neoliberal message of self-responsibility, self-management, and self-help through the collective chanting of *segyehwa* almost as an ethos. To elaborate on the meaning of ethos, Ong (2006) explained that neoliberalism is an ethos of self-governing that encounters and articulates other ethical regimes in particular contexts. Ong gave the example of market rationality that "promotes individualism and entrepreneurialism [and] engenders debates about the norms of citizenship and the value of human life" (p. 7); that is, "questions of status and morality are problematized and resolved in particular milieus shaped by economic rationality" (p. 7). Accustomed to the neoliberal ethos, Korean mothers conceived the platform of good mothering: (a) The trend of English language training is an essential condition in the age of globalization, and (b) it boosted the emergence of the wild-goose mothering phenomenon. Embracing the nationalistic ideology of raising children to be competitive global citizens, Korean mothers also believed that mastering the English language should be their first priority as a mothering duty. Against this background, training in English-language skills became overestimated as a compulsory prerequisite for both college entrance examinations and job-market applications. Korean mothers' belief in the value of English has escalated because of the optimism of globalization discourses, which, in fact, seem to be nothing but an illusion based on the state's structural logic of globalization which ironically could be read as rationalizing the strong state (Ryoo, 2005). Korea's economic growth has bestowed great pride on Koreans, who escaped from poverty in a short period, and yet their pride has been followed by the hollow empowerment of individuals who have blindly consented to the neoliberal inducement of unlimited individual responsibility for human well-being. As Korean mothers have been seduced by neoliberal principles, their assumption of human progress has relied on newly emerging discourses such as individual choice, self-centeredness, economic efficiency, and competition in their social-reproduction labor. S. J. Park (2009) suggested that Korea's neoliberal transformation has fostered neoliberal subjectivity, which emphasizes individuals as subjects of self-development who tend to perceive their lives in terms of individual choices and conditions rather than in relation to structural inequalities. Especially after the 1997 IMF crisis in particular, mothers became strategic in rearing their children to become more competitive to enable them to belong to a promising labor force in an unpredictable era. J. H.

Choi (2012) argued that the neoliberal restructuring of Koreans' everyday life has been reinforced by a hegemonic discourse strategy; for example, the educating-economy trend of the 2000s.

To understand these issues from a Marxist feminist perspective (Mies, 1998; Mies & Bennholdt-Thomsen, 2000), despite some degree of women's self-empowerment in the patriarchal sociocultural conditions of Korea, the phenomenon of wild-goose mothering is an extreme case of the exploitation of women's unpaid labor because of their prescribed role of social reproduction in the advent of knowledge capitalism. Whereas conquest and exploitation of the colonies was the basis for capital accumulation in Europe, knowledge capitalism today has become an alternative global way of exploitation to conquer marginalized objects such as women, nature, and postcolonial colonies. From this point of view, wild-goose mothering fulfills women's roles as consumers in the global market.

Allied with the rise of neoliberalism, the notion of knowledge economy in which accumulation is centered on immaterial assets can only be a propagandized scheme of capital because knowledge itself, including information, has always been valuable in both the material and the mental aspects of human relations and social structure and is simply a part of human nature. Thus we should not focus too much on knowledge per se as a form of capital because we cannot and do not relate to the world only from the view point of market principles. However, today's Korean mothers are suppressed to become more knowledgeable and informed than ever to fulfill their newly assigned caretaking responsibilities so that the larger society can attain a global standard of knowledge workers. This pressure is a form of oppression if Korean mothers as social agents are not able to trust their own autonomy-based judgments. Indeed, their accumulation of knowledge under these conditions could never be for their own empowerment and fulfillment.

The subjectivity of Korean mothers is never autonomous: If any mothers resist rules and deny resources in Korean social structure, they take the risk of being conceived as bad or incompetent mothers under the contemporary hegemonic discourses that currently shape social forces and structures. The subjectivity and identity of a Korean woman as a mother is thus contingent and a culturally specific production of the interaction between mothers and structure, even if we recognize the process of the creation and reproduction of social systems.

In a micro dimension of contemporary neoliberal dominance, its logic of governance seems to influence Korean mothering practice in relation to all other social structures such as family, policies, economy, culture, and class. In the market logic of the current knowledge-society trend, an abundance of self-help literature has persuaded Korean mothers to view their homes as models of entrepreneurship and misled them to believe that they are active rather than passive agents. To entrepreneur mothers, only their children's test results matter, just like only profit matters in business. Korean mothers whom the highly patriarchal capitalist system has marginalized are vulnerable to the ideological strategies of neoliberal governance that mystifies the principles of freedom and self-centeredness so that they can view themselves as part of the enterprise.

A better understanding of contemporary knowledge capitalism is crucial to the interpretation of the Korean dilemma in the relationship between education and mothering. Despite some internal factors such as elite corruption and incompetent policies that depict Korean women as precarious agencies, the dilemma has a global dimension. Drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci, Neubauer (2011) argued that information- (knowledge-) age theories have facilitated the neoliberal project and obscured it behind a veil of teleological inevitability and technological determinism. Neubauer observed that the central tenets of informational-neoliberal ideology have come from the world's most powerful sources of corporate and government power. In this globally neoliberal environment, as Olssen and Peters (2005) stated, government consider the role of higher education in the economy as having greater importance to the extent that it has become the new starship in the policy fleet of governments around the world. Concerning the fundamental shift in the way that universities and other institutions of higher education operate, Olssen and Peters pointed out that the ascendancy of neoliberalism has replaced the traditional professional culture of open intellectual enquiry and debate with an institutional stress on performativity, "as evidenced by the emergence of an emphasis on measured outputs, on strategic planning, performance indicators, quality assurance measures and academic audits" (p. 313). From a feminist perspective, the imposed neoliberal outlook in the age of the knowledge economy can also be considered a utilized ideological tool to restore class power in the case of the evolving middle class. The Korean middle class, represented as apartment mothering, is a typical case of the struggle to restore class power. Walby (2011) pointed out that the gender composition of the knowledge economy is "predominantly [in] male areas of employment" (p. 22), particularly the areas of high technology and information. Women are often marginalized in the environment of knowledge capitalism's labor force, which often requires different responsibilities in the sphere of social reproduction inside the family. An irony is that, despite their home-confined duties, women are encouraged to increase their knowledge and update their information to raise their children as knowledge workers who can keep pace with global transformations. From a practical view, however, it appears that Korean mothers' hope to raise their children to become high-income earners within the contemporary capitalist system might in fact blur the class frontiers in the neoliberal income trend, a trend that has seen the emergence of a new layer of the working rich or super salary (Dumenil & Levy, 2004) within a globally overpopulated cognitive labor force.

Korean mothers' anxieties about their children's academic success often manifest in delinquent acts. The Korean Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) scandal is a typical case. In 2013 Korean cancelled SAT, a standardized test for college admissions in the US, three days before the test date after it discovered questions from the tests circulating in test-prep centers in a few *hagwons* (Kwaak, 2013) in Gangnam. In terms of academic cheating, Kwaak commented that high-profile scandals over unfairly earned or bogus qualifications are commonplace in Korea, where people who seek top government office have often been caught with plagiarized dissertations or fake degrees, including people in the academy, arts and culture, sports, and entertainment industries. Korean mothers' bribery practices are also infamous. It has taken a long time to rid public schools of their bribery culture even though Korean mothers often still offer teachers money or expensive gifts in *hagwons*, and sometimes even in regular schools. Overprotection and intense involvement are further issues even in the higher educational context, where Korean mothers still hover over their children's college campus life. Some Korean universities allow parents to check their children's grades through the schools' online systems as a result of Korean mothers' overintervention (Cho, Y. H., 2013).

The process of knowledge-capitalist development implies unpredictable changes in cognitive labor. In the current situation of the college-degree inflation in Korean society, anxieties among Korean middle-class mothers who are heavily involved in their children's education tend to be magnified because of the mismatch between their conceptions of high exchange value and the reality of professional occupations, which are typical cognitive labor. I explored the cultural characteristics of Korean apartment mothering for this reason. The symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1992) of Gangnam in the Korean cultural context might decrease or vanish according to certain forms of changes in the future. A different context would also shape a new model of Korean mothering practice. Future models of Korean mothering, however, will not improve with respect to human exploitation as long as Korean society does not make an effort to cope with mothers' sense of inadequacy, which is based mainly on socioeconomic inequality.

CHAPTER 4: A FEW SUMMARY COMMENTS

Over the course of this long journey I have gained an understanding of Korean mothering practices, especially in the mothers' conspicuously intense involvement in their children's education since the 1997 Financial Crisis. As a form of social agency, the extreme nature of Korean mothering seems to be a response to Korea's neoliberal transformation into an advanced capitalist society on both a domestic and a global scale that eventually moved toward a knowledge economy. From a historical perspective, in this study I explored a number of key developments, including the deep structure of oligopolistic power concentration that has led neoliberal restructuring in Korean society. I have looked into the historical background of the Korean elite's integration in relation to international geopolitics during the colonial and imperial past and focused on the uniqueness of Korea's geographical consumerism, which is center on its pervasive apartment culture. Both oligopolistic power structure and geographical consumerism are associated with the formation of Korean mothers' subjecthood, which has eventually begun to underpin their pedagogic choices as they try to negotiate broader realities.

Installing the elite-school connection (*hakbol*) and material oligopoly (*chaebol*) in society, Korean elites have been given the rich license and power to amass unimaginable wealth at the expense of ordinary Koreans and have destroyed the basic possibilities of democratic institutions and mechanisms that might at least contribute to piecemeal reform. The material success of both *hakbol* and *chaebol* keeps social agents out of the democratic pursuit of diversity in human life, which is reflected in desires, values, imaginary visions, and outlook. As a social order in the Korean milieu, the nexus of *hakbol* and *chaebol* is a irresistible matching point at which Korean mothers' pedagogic choices meet social oppression wherein Western capital interests have been crystallized on the Korean structure of oligopolistic power.

As another significant topic in terms of the construction of Korean mothering, the large-scale EFL fuss in Korean society during the last decades can be understood as a symptom of exploitative Western capitalist tactics. Systemic hypocrisy in Korean leadership in politics comes from the cultural philistines who are preoccupied with sustaining the corruption of Korea's elite. English can be read as a semiotic implement that diverted the homogeneous Korean outlook into the global participation imaginary of Western imaginaries of civilization. Paradoxically, in terms of Koreans' feverish English-learning trend, they seldom use the language in their lives except in a few business spaces. I have traced the hegemonic influence of

English upon Korean elitism back to American imperial maneuvers alongside fundamental Christianity missionary campaigns on Korean territory since the late 1800s. With regard to the current knowledge economy, pressure from EFL for education has paralyzed Korea's educational systems by shaping Koreans' Western capitalist outlook under a political slogan of (illusory) cosmopolitanism. The Korean capitalist system has copied the Western logic of materialism by expanding sweatshops in every corner of the Third World and outsourcing all domestic industry, thereby making the Korean economy sluggish and increasing the unemployment rate and level of household debt.

Although this thesis might be regarded as an unusual case of academic research, I hope that its importance lies in addressing the urgent state of contemporary Korean educational realities, in which the process of Korean mothers' subjectification has been entangled with multilayered social ills. One major type of social ill that affects Korean mothers' pedagogic practice is the markedly unjust distribution of the economic fruits that Korean people have accomplished through their hard work during the last several decades. Elite corruption has resulted in Korean society's institutional incompetence and involved failing policies and moral collapse. Korean mothers' economic sensibilities react to the worsening economic disparity, unequal distribution of risks and disasters because of the income gap, and hereditary wealth among the elite groups. Eventually, and, I believe, tragically, Korean mothers have reconciled their pedagogic values with economically induced ones.

Some limitations of this study are that, first, it has been a challenging task to argue the linkage between Korea's complicated educational phenomena and the subjectification of the social agency of Korean mothers under the influence of the elite integration institutionalized and entrenched by means of enslavement under the rubrics of *hakbol* and *chaebol*. I recognize, however, that the nature of any phenomena can never be fully understood because of the complexity of their inherent characteristics as research topics. Second, it is difficult not to fall into a purely moral judgment of Korean elites. To cope with these limitations means embracing them to continue to question and imagine.

The lack of resources and models from previous studies has been another obvious challenge because this attempt is fairly new, at least according to my reading of multiple literatures. In addition, as a researcher I have always had to work hard to avoid self-censorship because of the sensitivity regarding Koreans' own cultural weak points. Perhaps this is because of the subjective hermeneutic characteristics of this inquiry.

Last, the biggest personal barrier that I faced in the course of this study was the limitation of my own English-language competency. As an ESL student whose mother tongue is Korean, I have always struggled with the discordance between thinking and languaging about certain concepts and comprehending them. Sometimes, my foreign-language background results in some creativity gifted from the cultural differences; however, more often than not I have faced the challenge of frustration in developing arguments. The bright side of my language challenges is the linguistic endeavor to describe certain cultural artifacts in my own cultural context, especially when those efforts bring together scattered concepts and phenomena to form a common understanding of various aspects of human action and thinking, despite different language forms. Carrying through my convictions about the universality of human nature and value in some fundamental dimension, I have tried to be honest in speaking about what I observe and sense with my rational intuition, as much as scholarship per se allows. I believe that the scholarly practices of interpretation and understanding need to follow things that are, at once, commonsensical, sophisticated, particular, and sometimes general.

In light of the foregoing, further research on the following three issues would be especially beneficial. First, the rise of China in this century might mark the emergence of a new form of global imaginary. It is uncertain whether the singular challenge of English as the global capitalist mode of discourse can last. Whether the hegemonic power of English diminishes or not, I am interested in how Korean mothering might change as an object of women's social-reproduction duty through pedagogic choice.

Second, certain parts of the social index of Korean life have been changing drastically under the notable impact of late capitalism. The decreasing youth population in the quickly aging Korean society, for example, is a signal of the long-range transformation of Korean maternal negotiation as a social-reproduction agency that faces an uncertain future. My question expands to Korean mothers' language choice in the event that a new power such as China emerges. A trend toward Chinese lessons among Korean mothers has already appeared. In this case, is Korean mothering based on nothing but the promise of material success? My academic imagination is related to the process of Korean mothers' choice. Women's empowerment especially has increasingly raised self-awareness of what is actually happening at this moment of the transparent breaking down of the Korean capitalist system. The significant growing inequality in income and the unequal distribution of disasters have revealed to Koreans that they might no longer be able to trust the future in ways that they have in the past. The extremeness of recent Korean mothering practices seems to reflect an empty effort to keep things in order in the way that they used be.

No one can deny that the modes of educating children in today's Korea have produced immense suffering. Distress in the Korean educational context has been produced at the confluence of destructive and exploitative capitalist assumptions and Koreans' response to their sociohistorically specific conditions. Insofar as C. Wright Mills (2000) argued that the material success of the power elite is "their sole basis of authority" (p. 328), if what Korean mothers aim for is merely material success in their given conditions, their suffering might never disappear. Any fun-filled concept of well-being in their own and their children's lives would be an unattainable good as the power elites maintain their grip. Witnessing the continual failure of the current capitalist system, however, no one can be sure what will follow the contemporary global capitalist vision. As modern history has shown, it is clear that capitalism survives because of the creation of fundamental social crises. Can the awareness that historical reflection brings be a starting point to rethink what the education of human beings should look like? As part of an interpretive data matrix in maternal practice as a form of social agency in a capitalist system, the model of Korean mothering practice that I explored in my research might point to the need for something like a 'reflective commons' to help future researchers to face what is also happening globally.

REFERENCES

Abelmann, N. (1977). Women's class mobility and identities in South Korea: A gendered, transnational, narratives approach. *The Journal of Asian Studies, 56*(2), 398-420.

Agence France-Presse. (2014, March 27). S. Korea, US launch massive landing drill amid tensions. *Channelnews*. Retrieved from http://www.channelnewsasia.com /news/specialreports/mh370/news/s-korea-us-launch-massive/1050214.html

Alagappa, M. (2001). Introduction. In M. Alagappa (Ed.), *Coercion and governance: The declining political role of the military in Asia* (pp. 1-26). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Allen, D. E., & Anderson, P. F. (1994). Consumption and social stratification: Bourdieu's distinction. *Advances in Consumer Research, 21*, 70-74.

Allianz. (2014). *In love, engaged, married, divorced, poor in old age?* Retrieved from https://allianz.com/oneweb/cms/www.allianz.com/en/press/news/studies/news_2014-03-06.html

Allman, P. (2001). *Critical education against global capitalism: Karl Marx and revolutionary critical education*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Amsden, A. H. (1989). *Asia's next giant: South Korea and late industrialization*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Amsden, A. H. (1995). The rush to development: Change and political struggle in South Korea by Martin Hart-Landsberg. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 43*(3), 669-671.

Arthur, C. (2012, November 26). Samsung unearths illegal work practices at Chinese suppliers. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/nov/26 /samsung-illegal-china-suppliers

Bakhtin, M. M. (1990). *Art and answerability: early philosophical essays*. Austin, TX: University of Texas.

Bartlett, L., Frederick, M., Gulbrandsen, T., & Murillo, E. (2002). The marketization of education: Public schools for private ends. *Anthropology & Education Quarterly, 33*(1), 1-25.

Barton, A. H. (1969). *Communities in disaster: A sociological analysis of collective stress situations*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

Barton, A. H. (2005). Disaster and collective stress. In R. W. Perry & E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), *What is a disaster? New answers to old questions* (pp. 125-152). Bloomington, IL: Xlibris.

Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society: Towards a new modernity*. London, UK: Sage.

Berger, A. A. (1984). *Signs in contemporary culture: An introduction to semiotics*. New York, NY: Longman.

Berger, A. A. (1995). *Cultural criticism: A primer of key concepts*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Berger, A. A. (2000). *Media and communication research methods: An introduction to qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Beyer, M., & Beyer, M. (2006). McCarthyism today. *International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 3*(1). Retrieved from http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol3_1/beyer.htm

Black, J. (2003). *France and the grand tour*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Black, T., & Black, S. (1999). The Korean financial crisis: Causes, effects, and solutions. *Policy, 15*(1), 42-47.

Editorial Board. (2015, April 15). South Korea's ferry disaster isn't over. *Bloomberg View*. Retrieved from http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-15/south-korea-s-ferry-tragedy-hasn-t-changed-enough

Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste* (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1992). *Language and symbolic power* (G. Raymond & M. Adamson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Polity.

Bourdieu, P. (1999) *The weight of the world: Social suffering in contemporary society*. Cambridge, MA: Polity.

Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1976). *Schooling in capitalist America: Educational reform and the contradictions of economic life*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Schooling in capitalist America revisited. *Sociology of Education, 75*(1), 1-18.

Bradley, J. (2009). *The imperial cruise: A secret history of empire and war*. New York, NY: Little, Brown.

Bray, D. (2004). School choice by default? Understanding the demand for private tutoring in Canada. *American Journal of Education, 110*(3), 233-255.

Brigstocke, H. (2004). The 5th Earl of Exeter as grand tourist and collector. *Papers of the British School at Rome, 72*, 331-356.

Brown, G. (1866). Last months of the Taeping Way. *Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 32*(191), 594-601.

Brown, G. (1990). *Domestic individualism: Imagining self in nineteenth-century America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Bullington, J. (2012, July 16). In suburbs, gun range and shop expansions near Chicago trigger debate. *Chicago Tribune*. Retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-16/news/ct-met-lincolnwood-gun-range-20120716_1_gun-range-shooting-range-gun-rights-advocates

Cain, G. (2013, July 26). Samsung: Fomenting crisis at the world’s largest electronics company. *Global Post*. Retrieved from http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/business/technology/130726/Samsung-innovation-TV-smartphone-crisis

Canagarajah, S. (1999). Interrogating the “native-speaker fallacy”: Non-linguistic roots, non-pedagogical results. In G. Briane (Ed.), *Non-native educators in English language teaching* (pp. 77-92). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Canagarajah, S. (2004). Subversive identities, pedagogical safe house, and critical learning. In B. Norton & K. Toohey (Eds.), *Critical pedagogies and language learning* (pp. 116-137). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Catching up with Gangnam Moms. (2007). SBS. Retrieved from http://tv.sbs.co.kr/mother/

Card, J. (2005, November 30). Life and death exams in South Korea. *Asia Times*. Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GK30Dg01.html

Carroll, L. (1953). *Through the looking-glass and what Alice found there* (Sir J. Tenniel, Illust.). London, UK: Macmillan.

Carroll, S., Motha, S., & Price, J. N. (2008). Accessing imagined communities and reinscribing regimes of truth. *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies, 5*(3), 165-191.

CBC. (2010, April 21). Youth unemployment skyrockets: OECD. *CBC Television.* Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2010/04/21/youth-unemployment-oecd.html

Chang, H. (2011, March 6). 한국 정부 신자유주의 신봉, 종교에 가깝다 (Korean government’s religious belief in neoliberalism). *Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture_general/466692.html

Chang, J. (2011, March 27). 벼랑 끝 대학생들 . . . 한 해 2-3 백 명 자살 (Korean college students on the standing on the edge of a precipice; . . . two or three hundred commit suicide each year). *MBC*. Retrieved from http://imnews.imbc.com/replay/nwdesk/article/2820071_5780.html

Chang, J., Lee, S., & Kang, J. (2011, October 26). 아줌마들 밤늦게까지 ‘투잡’ 뭐하나 보니 (Korean middle-aged housewives are driven out to work for two paychecks). *Joongang Ilbo*. Retrieved from http://money.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?Total_Id=6507981

Chang, M. H. (2002). 사회계급의 문화적 재생산: 대학간 위계서열에 따른 부모의 계급구성의 차이 (Cultural reproduction of social class: Effects of cultural capital on student ability test). *한국사회학 (Korean Journal of Sociology), 36*(4), 223-251.

Chay, J. (1968). The Taft-Katsura Memorandum reconsidered. *Pacific Historical Review, 37*(3), 321-326.

Cheng, T. (1993). Regulating access to higher education in South Korea and Taiwan. In L. B. Krause & F-K. Park (Eds.), *Social Issues in Korea* (pp. 219-260). Seoul, Korea: Korea Development Institute.

Cho, E. (1998). The Great Revival of 1907 in Korea: Its cause and effect. *Missiology, 26*(3), 289-300.

Cho, H. (1997). Domestic power of urban middle class housewives: Structural disempowerment and constructive empowerment. *Hankook Yeosunghak, 13*(2), 199-240.

Cho, H. C. (2006). *새 인구론* (*A new argument over population: A spatial and social approach*). Seoul, Korea: 푸른길.

Cho, H. J. (2002). Living with conflicting subjectivities: Mother, motherly wife, and sexy woman in the transition from colonial-modern to postmodern Korea. In L. Kendall (Ed.), *Under construction: The gendering of modernity, class, and consumption in the Republic of Korea* (pp. 165-195). Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.

Cho, H. S. (2004). Mother's role in early education. *Hankook Yeosunghak, 20*(1), 123-161.

Cho, S. K. (1985). The dilemmas of export-led industrialization: South Korea and the world economy. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 30*, 65-94.

Cho, U. (2004). Gender inequality and patriarchal order reexamined. *Korea Journal, 44*(1), 22-41.

Cho, U. (2006). The encroachment of globalization into intimate life: The flexible Korean family in 'economic crisis.' *Korea Journal, 45*(3), 8-35.

Cho, U. (2008). The contested terrain of class and gender: Landscapes of Korean family politics in globalization (in Korean). *Hankook Yeosunghak, 24*(2), 5-37.

Cho, U., & Koo, H. (1983a). Capital accumulation, women's work, and informal economies in Korea. Working Paper 21 (April 1983). East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, Office of Women in International Development.

Cho, U., & Koo, H. (1983b). Economic development and women's work in a newly industrializing country: The case of Korea. *Development and Change, 14*(4), 515-531.

Cho, Y. H. (2013, July 10). 야간 자율학습에 학부모 성적 열람까지 대학들이 왜? (Why do universities involve parents in their night class policies and grade monitoring?). *Media Today*. Retrieved from http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno =110754

Choe, S. (2005). The impacts of globalization on the urban spatial-economic system in Korea. In H. Richardson & C.-H., Bae (Eds.), *Globalization and urban development* (pp. 59-78). Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag.

Choe, S.-H., Lee, S.-H., & Ham, J. (2014, April 17). Human errors suspected as hope fades in Korean ferry sinking. *New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04 /18/world/asia/south-korean-ferry-accident.html?_r=0

Choi, H.-M., & Lee, Y. J. (2014, March 27). 삼성전자 수원사업장서 이산화탄소 배출 . . . 1명 사망 (One dies of carbon dioxide emissions at Samsung factory). *Yonhap News*. Retrieved from http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2014/03/27 /0200000000AKR20140327062652061.HTML

Choi, J. H. (2012). Neoliberalization of everyday life and hegemonic discourse strategy: Based on analysis of ‘educating economy’ discourse in 2000s. *Sahoe Younkoo, 23*(2), 7-33.

Chong, K. H. (2006). In search of healing: Evangelical conversion of women in contemporary South Korea. In R. E. Buswell Jr., & T. S. Lee (Eds.), *Christianity in Korea* (pp. 351-370). Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.

Chung, I. (2010, May 10). 전교조 “수능성적, 부모학력·, 집값과 상관관계 (The relationship between test score, parents’ educational background, and the housing market). *Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general /420117.html

Chung, J.-H. (2012, August 26). 교육비에 등골 휘는 에듀푸어 82만 가구 (Eight hundred twenty thousand ‘edu-poor’ households, struggling with tuition and tutoring payments). *Chosun Biz*. Retrieved from http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/08/26 /2012082600094.html

Chung, J.-S. (1994). Women’s unequal access to education in South Korea. *Comparative Education Review, 38*(4), 487-505.

Chung, L. (2010, February 24). 무엇이 공룡서울을 만드나 ? (What makes dinosaur Seoul?). *Sisa Journal.* Retrieved from http://www.sisapress.com/news/articleView.html?idxno =51413#

Clarke, T., & Barlow, M. (1997). *MAI: the Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the threat to Canadian sovereignty*. Toronto, ON: Stoddart.

Cumings, B. (2004, December). Korea: Forgotten nuclear threats. *Le Monde Diplomatique*. Retrieved from http://mondediplo.com/2004/12/08korea

De Grazia, V., & Cohen, L. (1999). Introduction. Class and consumption. *International Labor and Working-Class History, 55*, 1-5.

Deane, H. (1999). *The Korean War, 1945-1953*. San Francisco, CA: China Books and Periodicals.

Demick, B. (2002, April 8). Surgical snip a language aid? *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*. Retrieved from https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20020408&id=JucjAAAAIBAJ&sjid=mz8EAAAAIBAJ&pg=3576,5714133&hl=en

Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Kim-Prieto, C., Biswas-Diener, R., & Tay, L. (2010). Unhappiness in South Korea: Why it is high and what might be done about it. *Proceedings of Korean Psychological Associations*. Unpublished conference proceedings, Seoul, South Korea.

Diffrient, D. S. (2005). “Military enlightenment” for the masses: Generic and cultural intermixing in South Korea’s golden age of war films. *Cinema Journal, 45*(1), 22-49.

Dumenil, G., & Levy, D. (2004). Neoliberal income trends: wealth, class and ownership in the USA. *New Left Review, 30*(November-December), 105-133.

Eckert, C., Lee, K.-B., Lew, Y., Robinson, M., & Wagner, E. (1990). *Korea old and new: A history*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Eco, U. (1984). *Semiotics and the philosophy of language*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Eco, U. (1994). *The limits of interpretation*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Egan, D. (2007). Frantz Fanon and the construction of the colonial subject: Defining “the enemy” in the Iraq War. *Socialism and Democracy, 21*(3), 142-154.

Elich, G. (2010, December 5). Korea: Still an unknown war. *Monthly Review Magazine.* Retrieved from http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/elich051210p.html

Elich, G. (2013, September 12). The return of repression: Political firestorm in South Korea. *Counter Punch.* Retrieved from http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/12/political-firestorm-in-south-korea/

Ellis, J. (1998). Interpretive inquiry as a formal research process. In J. L. Ellis (Ed.), *Teaching from understanding* (pp. 15-32). New York, NY: Garland.

Em, H. (2012). Governmentality in late colonial Korea. *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal, 5.* Retrieved from https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-5

Encyclopedia of Korean Culture. (2001). *skirt swish* (*chima baram*). Academy of Korean Studies. http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/

Enloe, C. (2000). *Bananas, beaches, and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Eum, S., & Kim, J. (2014, March 11). 경제력이 학생들 차별로 이어지는 사회 .. 해법은? (Parents' socioeconomic status determines students' academic performance: Solution?). *Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/schooling/627717.html

Eum, S.-W. (2014, April 22). 비극 부른 선원, 선사, 관리 당국, 구조당국 이 중 누구 하나라도 정신 차렸다면 (Tragedy by crews, cargo-passenger company, authorities, and emergency management system). *Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr /arti/society/society_general/634135.html

Facundo, A., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (On-line Open Data). *The world top incomes database.* Retrieved from http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/

Fenton, J. (1995, July 3). Pitiless corruption and national shame. *The Independent*. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/pitiless-corruption-and-national-shame-1589623.html

Firestone, S. (1970). *The dialectic of sex: The case of feminist revolution*. New York, NY: Morrow.

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. (2009, October 28). International students contribute over $6.5 billion to Canadian economy. *News Releases*. Retrieved from http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/news-communiques/2009 /319.aspx

Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977* (C. Gordon, Ed.; C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, & K. Soper, Trans.). New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Freedom House. (2014). *Freedom in the world 2014: Highlights from Freedom House's annual report on political rights and civil liberties*. Washington, DC: Author.

Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Seabury Press.

Frost, L. (2008). Why teach social work students psychosocial studies? *Social Work Education, 27*(3), 243-261.

Frost, L., & Hoggett, P. (2008). Human agency and social suffering. *Critical Social Policy, 28*(4), 438-460.

Furedi, F. (2007). The changing meaning of disaster. *Area, 39*(4), 482-489.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1975). Hermeneutics and social science. *Philosophy Social Criticism, 2*, 307-316.

Gadamer, H.-G. (2004). *Truth and method* (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). London, UK: Continuum.

Gay, P. (1969). *The enlightenment* (2 vols.). New York, NY: Knopf.

Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Gelézeau, V. (2007). *아파트 공화국* (*La République des Appartements. Regards d'une géographe française sur les grands-ensembles sud-coréens*) (H. Gil, Trans.). Seoul, Korea: 후마니타스.

Gillespie, D. F. (1988). Barton's theory of collective stress is a classic and worth testing. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disaster, 6*(3), 345-361.

Ginsberg, N., Koppel, B., & McGee, T. (1991). *The extended metropolis: Settlement transition in Asia*. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.

Giroux, H. A. (2011). *Zombie politics and culture in the age of casino capitalism*. New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Go, S., & Kim, J. Y. (2010). A study on local primary and secondary school finance in Korea. Retrieved from http://www.kipf.re.kr/study/study_report_view.aspx?sn=1668

Go-Jung, G. H. (2001). Systemic cooperation between school, family, and market (in Korean). *Yeo_seong Ieron, 4*(6), 58-80.

Goldin, P. R. (2000). The view of women in early Confucianism. In C. Li (Ed.), *The sage and the second sex: Confucianism, ethics and gender* (pp. 133-161). Chicago, IL: Open Court

Gordon, A. A. (1996). *Transforming capitalism and patriarchy: Gender and development in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Goucher, C., LeGuin, C., & Walton, L. (1998). *In the balance: themes in global history*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Government of Canada. (2009). *Bilateral relations: Canada-Korea relations.* Retrieved from http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/korea-coree/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/index.aspx

Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (Q. Hoare & S. G. Nowell, Trans. & Eds.). New York, NY: International.

Greenbank, P. (2003) The role of values in educational research: The case for reflexivity. *British Educational Research Journal, 29*(6), 791-801.

Hadzantonis, D. M. (2013). *English-language pedagogies for a Northeast Asian context: developing and contextually framing the transition theory*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Haggard, S., & Mo, J. (2000). The political economy of the Korean financial crisis. *Review of International Political Economy, 7* (2), 197-218.

Halttunen, K. (1982). *Confidence men and painted women: A study of middle-class culture in America, 1830-1870*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Han, J., & Ling, L. H. M. (1998). Authoritarianism in the hypermasculinized state: Hybridity, patriarchy, and capitalism in Korea. *International Studies Quarterly, 42*(1), 53-78.

Hanisch, C. (1970). The personal is political. In S. Firestone & A. Koedt (Eds.), *Notes from the second year: Women's liberation: Major writings of the radical feminists* (pp. 76-78). New York, NY: Radical Feminism.

Harlan, C. (2014, April 27). After ferry disaster: A Katrina-like reckoning in South Korea. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/after-ferry-disaster-a-katrina-like-reckoning-in-south-korea/2014/04/27/963586ca-cd21-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html

Harris, S. K. (2011). *God's arbiters: American and the Philippines, 1898-1902*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Hart, D. (2011, August 3). Aiming for one hundred Jasa high schools? Charter schools that are failing in America. *Ohmynews.* Retrieved from http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web /view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000849959&CMPT_CD=A0289

Hart-Landsberg, M. (1993). *The rush to development: Economic change and political struggle in South Korea*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.

Hart-Landsberg, M. (1998). *Korea: division, reunification, & U.S. foreign policy*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.

Hart-Landsberg, M. (2000). Setting the record straight on the Korea War. *Monthly Review, 52*(5). Retrieved from http://monthlyreview.org/2000/10/01/setting-the-record-straight-on-the-korean-war

Hart-Landsberg, M. (2009). The promise and perils of Korean reunification. *Monthly Review, 60*(11), Retrieved from http://monthlyreview.org/2009/04/01/the-promise-and-perils-of-korean-reunification

Hartmann, H. I. (1979). The unhappy marriage of Marxism and feminism: Towards a more progressive union. *Class & Capital, 3*(2), 1-33.

Harvey, D. (1990). *The condition of postmodernity: An enquiry into the origins of cultural change*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Hays, S. (1996). *The cultural contradictions of motherhood*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time* (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Heidegger, M. (1966). *Discourse in thinking*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Henderson, J. (1993). Against the economic orthodox: On the making of the East Asian miracle. *Economy and Society, 22*(2), 200-217.

Higley, J. (2009). Elites' illusions about democracy. In H. Best & J. Higley (Eds.), *Democratic elitism: New theoretical and comparative perspectives* (pp. 79-94). Lieden, The Netherlands: Brill.

Hong, S.-C. (2013). Land reform and large landlords in South Korea's modernization project. *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies, 26*(1), 23-45.

Hong, S.-T. (2007). *대한민국: 위험사회* (Korea: Risk society). Paju, Gyounggi: Dangdae.

House Records HR 58A-K2. (1904). *Theodore Roosevelt's annual message to Congress for 1904; House Records HR 58A-K2; Records of the U.S. House of Representatives; Record group 233; Center for Legislative Archives; National Archives.* Retrieved from http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=56

Humphries, J. (2010). *Childhood and child labour in the British Industrial Revolution*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hutchison, W. R. (1987). *Errand to the world: American Protestant thought and foreign missions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hyundai Economic Institute. (2013, September 8). 계층상승 사다리 강화해야: 고령층 영세 자영업자 계층하락 심해 (Reinforcement of social mobility in Korea: Weakening social ladder among elderly and self-employed small business owners groups). *현안과 과제.*

Iadicola, P. (2008). Globalization and empire. *International Journal of Social Inquiry, 1*(2), 3-36.

Illich, I. (1976). *Medical nemesis: The expropriation of health*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Im, J. (2013, April 30). 산재통계, 깍기만하고 더하진 않는다 (The statistics of industrial death and injury is watered-down). *Pressian* . Retrieved from http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=40777

Im, O. H. (2001). 제도화된 모성과 자녀교육 히스테리 (Institutionalized motherhood and hysteria over children's Education). *Yeo_seong Ieron, 4*(6), 35-57.

Im, S. (2009). *Fly, penguins*. Seoul, Korea: National Human Rights Commission of Korea.

Institute for Economics and Peace. (2011). *Economic consequences of war on the U.S. economy* [Pamphlet]. Washington, DC: Institute for Economics and Peace.

Isaac Brock Society. (2012). *Comparing renunciation rates around the world.* Retrieved from http://isaacbrocksociety.ca/2012/05/23/comparing-renunciation-rates-around-the-world/

Ives, P. (2004). *Language and hegemony in Gramsci*. London, UK: Pluto Press.

Jardine, D. (2000). *Under the tough old stars: Ecopedagogicical essays*. Brandon, VT: Foundation for Educational Renewal.

Jejungwon (제중원). (2010). SBS. Retrieved from http://tv.sbs.co.kr/jejungwon/

Jin, M. (2003). 학벌과 삶의 방식: 학벌사회의 보고서 (Hakbol and way of life: Report 1 on our hakbol culture). *한국교육연구* (*Hankook Kyoyook Youngoo*), *9*, 70-92.

Johnston, M. J. (2005). *Syndromes of corruption: Wealth, power, and democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Joo, Y. J. (2014, September 12). 한국 소득불평등, 2019년 OECD국가 중 1위 된다 (Korea will be the worst case in income inequality in among OECD countries by 2019). *Kyunghyang Shinmun*. Retrieved from http://bizn.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201409121602481&code=920100&med=khan

Joong Ang Ilbo. (2010, May 11). 세 모녀 이어 아버지까지 . . . 뉴질랜드의 비극 (*Wild goose father followed his wife and two daughters: A tragedy in New Zealand*). Retrieved from http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=4164716&cloc=olink|article|default

Judt, T. (2010). *Ill fares the land*. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Jung, S. H. (2014). "일하는데 부모 학력이 무슨 상관이죠" (*Korean job applicants are facing a baffling question: What is your parents' educational background?*). Retrieved from http://www.segye.com/content/html/2014/09/15/20140915004183.html

Jung, S., & Norton, B. (2002). Language planning in Korea: The new elementary English program. In J. Tollefson (Ed.), *Language policies in education: Critical issues* (pp. 245-265). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Kang, C. S. E. (2003). The developmental state and democratic consolidation and South Korea. In S. S. Kim (Ed.), *Korea's democratization* (pp. 220-244). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kang, D. C. (2002). *Crony capitalism: corruption and development in South Korea and the Philippines*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kang, E. (2011, September 13). 삼성맨이 되려면.. 입사가이드 봤더니 (How to be a Samsung man). *Yonhap News*. Retrieved from http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/09/09/0200000000AKR20110909131200003.HTML

Kang, J. (2006). 강남, 낯선 대한민국의 자화상: 말죽거리에서 타워팰리스까지 (*Gangnam: The unfamiliar self-portrait of Korea*). Seoul, Korea: 인물과 사상사.

Kang, J. (2008, February 28). 중산층은 포로수용소에 갇혔다. *Hankyoreh*, 21. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/section-021128000/2008/02/021128000200802280699023.html

Kang, S.-K., & Kwon, O.-J. (2011). Occupational injury statistics in Korea. *Safety and Health at Work, 2*(1), 52-56.

Katsiaficas, G. (2005). The United States and South Korea: An alliance under stress—a reassessment. *Korea Policy Review, 1*, 35-44.

Katsiaficas, G. N. (2012). *Asia's unknown uprisings: South Korean social movements in the 20th century*. Oakland, CA: PM Press.

KBS. (2010, May 12). Children who are suffering from tutoring (추적 60 분-사교육에 병든 아이들). KBS: *Choo-juk* (60 Minutes). Retrieved from http://www.kbs.co.kr/2tv/sisa/chu60/vod/1649278_879.html

Kendall, L. (1996). *Getting married in Korea: Of gender, morality, modernity*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kim, A. E. (2000). Christianity, shamanism, and modernization in South Korea. *Cross Currents* (Spring-Summer). Retrieved from http://www.crosscurrents.org/springsummer00.htm

Kim, A. E., & Park, G.-S. (2003). Nationalism, Confucianism, work ethic, and industrialization in South Korea. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 33*(1), 37-49.

Kim, A.-G. (2010, March 29). 해외 유학생 인턴 고용통계 허수 (Studying abroad and internship among Korean youth don't count employment stats). *Kookmin Ilbo.* Retrieved from http://news.kukinews.com/article/view.asp?page=1&gCode=kmi&arcid=0003551372&cp=nv

Kim, B.-S. (2015, May 1). 학교 비상벨은 양치기 소년? 학부모들 이민 가고파 (Faulty school safety drills makes Korean parents think immigration after Sewol Ferry trauma). *Asia Economy*. Retrieved from (http://www.asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2015050109430025485

Kim, D.-C. (2004). Forgotten war, forgotten massacres: The Korean War (1950-1953) as licensed mass killings. *Journal of Genocide Research, 6*(4), 523-544.

Kim, D.-C. (2006). *전쟁과 사회: 우리에게 한국전쟁은 무엇이었나* (*War and society: what does the Korean War mean to Koreans*). Pajoo, Korea: Dolbegae.

Kim, D.-C. (2010). 한국형 신자유주의와 기업국가로의 변화: 이명박 정부 하의 한국의 정치경제 (Korean model of neoliberalism and transition toward corporation state: Korean politico-economy under Lee Myung Bak administration). *Hwang Hae Munhwa,* Spring, 243-287.

Kim, D.-C. (2013). The long road toward truth and reconciliation: Unwavering attempts to achieve justice in South Korea. In J.-J. Suh (Ed.), *Truth and reconciliation in South Korea: Between the present and future of the Korean wars* (pp. 19-38). Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

Kim, H. S. (2009). 세대 간 경제적 이동성의 현황과 전망 (Intergenerational mobility in Korea: present and future). *KDI 정책포럼, 220*.

Kim, H.-K. (2009). Should feminism transcend nationalism? A defense of feminist nationalism in South Korea. *Women's Studies International Forum, 32*(2), 108-119.

Kim, J. (2010). Downed and stuck in Singapore: lower/middle class South Korean wild geese (*kirogi*) children in Singapore. In E. Hannum, H. Park, & Y. G. Butler, (Eds.), *Globalization, changing demographics, and educational challenges in East Asia* (pp. 271-311). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group.

Kim, J. (2014, September 13). The awkward personal questions asked in Korean job interviews. *Quartz*. Retrieved from http://qz.com/264182/if-you-want-to-get-a-job-in-south-korea-prepare-to-answer-some-pretty-personal-questions/

Kim, J. H. (2001). Educational change strategies and feminism in the age of globalization. *Hankook Yeosunghak, 17*(2), 35-68.

Kim, J. I. (2014, February). *Gangnam* style again? The origins of South Korean urban modernity. Paper presented at the 2014 ARCC/EAAE Architectural Research Conference, University of Hawaii, Hawaii, Manoa. Retrieved from http://www.arcc-journal.org/index.php/repository/issue/current

Kim, J. W. (2012). *A history of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to states in conflict.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Kim, J., & Park, J.-M. (2012, April 5). Analysis: South Korea's unloved *chaebol*. *Reuters*. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-korea-chaebol-idUSBRE83405T20120405

Kim, J.-C. (2012, February 13). *Cahebol* control pervades life in Korea. *Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/518723.html

Kim, J-K. (2005). 평야지대에 사립학교가 많은 이유 (The reason why bigger number of private school are located in the prairie areas). Secretary to the President for Education and Culture of the Office of President, Blue House Briefing, (December 20, 2005), Retrieved from http://16cwd.pa.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/archive_view.php?meta_id=people_col2&id=6acc3ad9e646c0ef24a22ca

Kim, K. J. (2014, September 1). 가장 빨리 늙고, 교육비에 찌들고 (Korea, aging most rapidly, worn out by education spending). *Seoul Shinmun*. Retrieved from http://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20140910002017

Kim, M. (2003). Private institute education: competition and anxiety of South Korean middle class. *Korean Journal of Sociology of Education, 13*(3), 67-87.

Kim, N.-N. (2014). *Income concentration in Korea, 1976-2010: Evidence from income tax statistics.* Naksungdae Institute of Economic Research, Working Paper 2014 (3). Retrieved from http://www.naksung.re.kr/xe/index.php?mid=workingpaper&sort_index=extra_vars1amp%3Border_type%3Ddesc&page=2&document_srl=76521

Kim, N.-N., & Kim, J.-I. (2015). Top incomes in Korea, 1933-2010: Evidence from income tax statistics. *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 56*(1), 1-19.

Kim, S. (2009). The meaning of mothering and women's work in the Korean family: Focus on the children's education. *Hankook Yeosung Cholhak, 12*, 31-58.

Kim, S. K., & Finch, J. (2002). Living with rhetoric, living against rhetoric: Korean families and the IMF economic crisis. *Korean Studies, 26*(1), 120-139.

Kim, S.-A. (2013). 장수명 주택의 특성과 활성화를 위한 방향 (Characteristics of long-life span house and promotion of longevity of house). *Real Estate Focus, 59*, 59-74.

Kim, S.-B. (2004). *학벌사회* (*Hakbol society*). Seoul, Korea: 한길사.

Kim, S.-B. (2013). South Korea's land reform and democracy. *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies, 26*(1), 47-74.

Kim, S.-G. (2011, February 6). 학부모 42% 교육비 부담 둘째 포기 (42% of parents choose not to have second child because of education expenses for children). *MK News*. Retrieved from http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2011&no=76343

Kim, S.-S. (2008). Symbolic violence and pre-modern academic clique society. *Society and Philosophy, 16*(10), 131-160.

Kim, S. Y. (2008). Korean mothers' fervor for their children's education with a focus on the demographic and psychological characteristics. *Daehan Gajeonhakji, 46* (2), 1-11.

Kim, T. (2008). Higher education reforms in South Korea: Public-private problems in internationalizing and incorporating universities. *Policy Futures in Education, 6*(5), 558-568.

Kim, Y.-N. (2011). Urban space and visual culture: The transformation of Seoul in the twentieth century. In R. M. Brown & D. S. Hutton (Eds.), *A companion to Asian art and architecture* (pp. 153-177). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Kipling, R. (1899). The white man's burden. *McClure's Magazine, 12*(4), 290-291.

Kneebone, E., & Berube, A. (2013). *Confronting suburban poverty in America*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Ko, D., Haboush, K. J., & Piggott, R. J. (2003). *Women and Confucian cultures: In premodern China, Korea, and Japan*. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

Ko, N. (2011).미스터 리도 궁금한 한국 아파트의 미스터리 (Mysterious Korean apartment culture). *Hankyoreh 21, 863*. Retrieved from http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/cover/cover_general/29725.html

Koh, E. (2008). Gender issues and Confucian scriptures: Is Confucianism incompatible with gender equality in South Korea? *Bulletin of SOAS, 71*(2), 345-362.

Koo, H. (1987). The interplay of state, social class, and world system on East Asian development: The cases of South Korea and Taiwan. In F. C. Deyo (Ed.), *The political economy of the new Asian industrialism* (pp. 165-181). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Koo, H. (2007). The changing faces of inequality in South Korea in the age of globalization. *Korean Studies, 31*, 1-18.

Korea Herald. (2010, November 16). China, India, South Korea top student senders to US. Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20101116000614

Korean Confederation of Trade Union. (2014). *Industrial disaster posters.* Retrieved from http://nodong.org/publicity/6872863

Korean Educational Development Institute. (2011). *Research Reports.* Retrieved from http://eng.kedi.re.kr/khome/eng/archive/report/listReports.do

Kraft, D. (2006-2007). South Korea's National Security Law: A tool of oppression in an insecure world. *Wisconsin International Law Journal, 24*(2), 627-659.

Kramer, R. C. (2000). Poverty, inequality, and youth violence. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 567*, 123-139.

Kumaravadivelu, B. (2008). *Cultural globalization and language education*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kuznets, P. W. (1988). An East Asian model of economic development: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36*(3, Suppl.), S11-S43.

Kwaak, J. S. (2013, May 9). SAT scandal shines harsh light on South Korean academics. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article /SB10001424127887323744604578472313648304172.html

Kwok, P. (2004). Examination-oriented knowledge and value transformation in East Asian cram schools. *Asia Pacific Education Review, 5*(1), 64-75.

Kwon, E.-J. (2012, August 28). Top ten *chaebol* now almost 80% of Korean economy. *Hankyoreh.* Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business /549028.html

Kwon, I. (2000). A feminist exploration of military conscription: The gendering of the connections between nationalism, militarism, and citizenship in South Korea. *International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3*(1), 26-54.

Kwon, J.-Y. (2014, May 7). Cronyism, corruption to blame for disaster. *Korea Times.* Retrieved from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/05/116_156747.html

Lazear, E. (1977). Education: consumption or production? *Journal of Political Economy, 85*(3), 569-598.

Leach, W. R. (1984). Transformation in a culture of consumption: Women and department stores, 1890-1925. *The Journal of American History, 71*(2), 319-342.

Lee, H. (2010). “I am a *kirogi* mother”: Education exodus and life transformation among Korean transnational women. *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education, 9*(4), 250-264.

Lee, J. (2011, April 12). KAIST crisis raises calls for change. *The Korea Herald*. Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20110411000945

Lee, J. K. (2014). 분배문제, 절대로 미국을 닮아서는 안 된다 (*In terms of economic redistribution, the United Sates must not be a role model to Korea*). Retrieved from http://jkl123.com/sub3_1.htm?table=my1&st=view&page=1&id=167&limit=&keykind =&keyword=&bo_class=&fpage=&spage=

Lee, J., & Park, D. (2014). Do American and Korean education systems converge? Tracking school reform policies and outcomes in Korea and the USA. *Asia Pacific Education Review, 15*(3), 391-399.

Lee, K. A. (2009). *A study on the contest of motherhood with capitalistic productivity: Focused on Korean middle class mothers' support for child education.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Ewha Women’s University, Seoul, Korea.

Lee, M., & Larsen, R. (2000). The Korean 'examination hell': Long hours of studying, distress, and depression. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 29*(2), 249-271.

Lee, S. H. (2004). Korean higher education: history and future challenges. In P. G. Altbach & T. Umakoshi (Eds.), *Asian universities: Historical perspectives and contemporary challenges* (pp. 145-173). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lee, S. I. (2001). Education and motherhood in the Korean traditional discourses. *Yeo_seong Ieron, 4*(6), 10-34.

Lee, S., & Brinton, M. C. (1996). Elite education and social capital: The case of South Korea. *Sociology of Education, 69*(3), 177-192.

Lee, S-H. (2000). Asian values and the future of the Confucian culture. *East Asian Review, 12*(1). Retrieved from http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol12_1/leeseunghwan.htm

Lee, W. S. (2013, January 28). 삼성전자 화성공장, 불산누출 1명 사망 4명 부상 (One dies, four injured from hydrofluoric acid leaks at Samsung electronics factory). *Yonhap News.* Retrieved from http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2013/01/28 /0200000000AKR20130128190400061.HTML

Lee, Y. (2013, October 23). Studies understate hazards in Samsung factories: South Korea court. *CTV News.* Retrieved from http://www.ctvnews.ca/business/studies-understate-hazards-in-samsung-factories-south-korean-court-1.1509619

Lee, Y., & Koo, H. (2006). Wild geese fathers and a globalized family. *IDPR, 28*(4), 533-553.

Lett, D. P. (1998). *In pursuit of status: The making of South Korea's "new" urban middle class*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Levi-Strauss, C. (1966). *The savage mind.* (G. Weidenfeld & N. Ltd., Trans.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lew, S.-C., Chang, M.-H., & Kim, T.-E. (2003). Affective networks and modernity: The case of Korea. In D. A. Bell & H. Chaibong (Eds.), *Confucianism for the modern world* (pp. 201-217). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, L. S. (2002). *Laying claim to the memory of May: A look back at the 1980 Kwangju uprising*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.

Li, C. (2000). Introduction: can Confucianism come to terms with feminism? In Li. (Ed.). *The sage and the second sex: Confucianism, ethics, and gender* (pp. 1-21). Chicago & La Salle: Illinois: Open Court.

Lie, J. (1996). From agrarian patriarchy to patriarchal capitalism: Gendered capitalist industrialization in Korea. In V. M. Moghdam (Ed.), *Patriarchy and economic development: Women's positions at the end of the twentieth century* (pp. 34-55). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Lie, J. (1998). *Han unbound: The political economy of South Korea*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

List-Jensen, A. S. (2008). *Economic development and authoritarianism: A case study on the Korean developmental state.* Aalborg, Denmark: Aalborg University, Department of History, International and Social Studies

Lowe-Lee, F. (2007). Korea's real estate market: Are we overreacting to skyrocketing property prices. *Korea Insight, 9*(2). Retrieved from http://www.keia.org/publications/category /kei-insight

Luke, A. (2004). Two takes on the critical. In B. Norton & K. Toohey (Eds.), *Critical pedagogies and language learning* (pp. 21-29). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Ly, P. (2005, January 9). A wrenching choice. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59355-2005Jan8.html

MacKenzie, S. (1984). A socialist feminist perspective on gender and environment. *Antipode, 16*(3), 3-10.

Margalit, A. (1996). *The decent society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Marx, K. (1904). *A contribution to the critique of political economy* (Translated from the 2nd German ed. by N. I. Stone). Chicago, IL: C. H. Kerr.

Matsutani, M. (2012). Church over nation: Christian missionaries and Korean Christians in colonial Korea. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

McClintock, A. (1993). Family feuds: Gender, nationalism, and the family. *Feminist Review, 44*, 61-80.

McDowell, L. (1999). *Gender, identity and place: Understanding feminist geographies*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

McKinsey & Company. (2010). *South Korea: Living it up in luxury. Special report: 2010 Luxury Goods Survey by McKinsey & Company, South Korea.* Retrieved from http://www.mckinseyonmarketingandsales.com/sites/default/files/pdf/CSI_2010 %20Korea%20Luxury%20Report.pdf

McMurtry, J. (1991). Education and the market model. *Journal of Philosophy of Education, 25*(2), 209-217.

McMurtry, J. (2002). *Value wars: The global market versus the life economy*. London, UK: Pluto Press.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2011). *Why leaders lie: The truth about lying in international politics*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Mies, M. (1998). *Patriarchy & accumulation on a world scale: Women in the international division of labour*. New York, NY: Zed Books.

Mies, M., & Bennholdt-Thomsen, V. (2000). *The subsistence perspective: Beyond the globalised economy* (P. Camiller, M. Mies, & G. Wieh, Trans.). New York, NY: Zed Books.

Mieszkowski, P., & Mills, E. S. (1993). The causes of metropolitan suburbanization. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7(3), 135-147.

Mignolo, W. (1998). Globalization, civilization processes, and the relocation of language and cultures. In F. Jameson & M. Miyoshi (Eds.), *The cultures of globalization* (pp. 32-53). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mignolo, W. (2000). Local histories/global designs: coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Mignolo, W. (2007). Delinking. *Cultural Studies, 21*(2-3), 449-514.

Miller, A. (1987). *For your own good: Hidden cruelty in child-rearing and the roots of violence* (H. Hannum & H. Hannum, Trans.). London, UK: Virago.

Mills, W. C. (1956). *The power elite*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Mills, W. C. (1959). *Sociological imagination*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Mills, W. C. (2000). *The power elite.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Min, S. S., & Lee, K. Y. (2000). Education investment behavior of mothers about children of the lower grades in primary school. *Hankook Gajeongwanrihakhoeji, 18*(3), 115-127.

Minh-ha, T. T. (1988). Not you/like you: Postcolonial women and the interlocking questions of identity and difference. *Inscriptions, 3/4*, 71-77.

Moon, C.-I. (2005). Between *banmi* (anti-Americanism) and *sungmi* (worship of the United States): Dynamics of changing U.S. images in South Korea. In D. I. Steinberg (Ed.), *Korean attitudes toward the United States: Changing dynamics* (pp. 139-152). New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Na, S. (2011, June 4). 개발 40년 . . . 한국인에게 서울 강남이란 (Forty-year development: What is the meaning of *Gangnam* to Koreans?). *Donga Ilbo.* Retrieved from http://news.donga.com/3/all/20110603/37767329/1

Nah, Y., Tae, H., & Jang, I. J. (2007). Motherhood as a process: Focusing on highly-educated mothers' commitment to children's after school. *Journal of Lifelong Education, 13*(4), 55-87.

Nahm, J.-W. (2008). Shrinking middle class and changing income distribution of Korea: 1995-2005. *The Korean Economic Review, 24*(2), 345-365.

Nam, J. (2011). 체감 청년 실업률, 몇 %나 될까? (Korea's actual youth unemployment rate?). *Nodong Review, 4*, 48-58.

Nardinelli, C. (1980). Child labor and the factory acts. *Journal of Economic History, 40*(4), 739-755.

Nelson, L. C. (2000). *Measured excess: Status, gender, and consumer nationalism in South Korea*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Neocleous, M. (2003). *Making the state*. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press.

Neubauer, R. (2011). Neoliberalism in the information age, or vice versa? Global citizenship, technology, and hegemonic ideology. *tripleC, 9*(2), 195-230.

Norton, B. (2000). *Identity and language learning gender, ethnicity, and educational change*. New York, NY: Longman.

Oh, S. (2010, March 30). "애들 영어공부 때문에 . . . " DVD 훔친 주부입건 (A Busan mother was charged with stealing English drill DVDs). *Yonhap News*. Retrieved from http://media.daum.net/society/affair/view.html?cateid=1067&newsid =20100330071607933&p=yonhap

Oh, S.-D. (2010, August 3). 빚내서 강남이주, 이자, 교육비만 400 만원: 학군 따라 이사했다가 (Loan on property to move to the best school district neighborhoods: Paying 4 million per month for loan interest and children's tutoring fees). *Seoul Shinmun*. Retrieved from http://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20100803017007

Olson, P. (2013, May 21). The world's hardest-working countries. *Forbes*. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/2008/05/21/labor-market-workforce-lead-citizen-cx_po _0521countries.html

Olssen, M., & Peters, M. A. (2005). Neoliberalism, higher education, and the knowledge economy: From the free market to knowledge capitalism. *Journal of Education Policy, 20*(3), 313-345.

Ong, A. (2006). *Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Onishi, N. (2008, June 8). For English studies, Koreans say goodbye to Dad. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/world/asia/08geese.html ?partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all

Online Etymology Dictionary. Heal in Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved from http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=heal&searchmode= none

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2011). *OECD Factbook 2011-2012: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.* Retrieved from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2011-en/07/01/01/07-01-01-g3.html?contentType=&itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2011-58-en&containerItemId=/content/serial/18147364&accessItemIds=&mimeType=text/html&_csp_=6766215f43539500f582f224d298af80

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2012). *Labour productivity levels in the total economy.* Retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode =LEVEL#

Pakulski, J. (2012). The Weberian foundations of modern elite theory and democratic elitism. *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, 37*(1), 38-56.

Park, H. C. (2011). *Concrete utopia*. Seoul, Korea: 자음과 모음.

Park, H. G. (2009). Competition over children’s education and the ‘full-time mother’ identity in Korean middle class families. *Hankook Yeosunghak, 25*(3), 5-33.

Park, H.-Y. (2007). Emerging consumerism and the accelerated ‘education divide’: The case of specialized high schools in South Korea. *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, 5*(2). Retrieved from http://www.jceps.com/archives/559

Park, H.-Y. (2010, February 3). 끊임없이 터지는 입시자살, 무감각해지지 말자 (Endless spate of exam suicides; let’s not be callous to our children’s suffering. *Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/schooling/402599.html

Park, J. (2013). Institutional explanations of shaping a particular housing culture in South Korea: A case study of the Gangnam district in Seoul. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK.

Park, K. A. (1993). Women and development: The case of South Korea. *Comparative Politics, 25*(2), 127-145.

Park, S. J. (2007a). Educational manager mothers: South Korea’s neoliberal transformation. *Korea Journal, 47*(3), 187-213.

Park, S. J. (2007b). Spatial stratification tropes and making distinctions: Kangbuk mothers’ narratives of their children’s education (in Korean). *Korean Cultural Anthropology, 40*(1), 43-81.

Park, S. J. (2009). Anxious lives in the period of ‘self-management’ and ‘family management’: Neoliberalism and neoliberal subjectivity (in Korean). *Economy and Society, 84*(Winter), 12-39.

Park, S. J., & Abelmann, N. (2004). Class and cosmopolitan striving: Mothers’ management of English education in South Korea. *Anthropological Quarterly, 77*(4), 645-672.

Park, S.-H. (2012, April 17). 아파트에 질렸다 단독주택의 부활 (Fed up with apartment dwellers' return to single detached homes). *Donga Ilbo*. Retrieved from http://news.donga.com/3/all/20120416/45572000/1

Parry, Z., & Lee, S. H. (2011, October). The higher education sector in Korea: What you see is not always what you get. *Borderless Report*. Retrieved from http://www.obhe.ac.uk/newsletters/borderless_report_october_2011/higher_education_in_south_korea

Pavlenko, A. (2001). How am I to become a woman in an American vein?: Transformations of gender performance in second language learning. In A. Pavlenko, A. Blackledge, I. Piller, & M. Teutsch-Dwyer (Eds.), *Multilingualism, second language learning, and gender* (pp. 133-174). Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter.

Pavlenko, A., & Lantolf, J. P. (2000). Second language learning as participation and the (re)construction of selves. In J. P. Lantolf (Ed.), *Sociocultural theory and second language learning* (pp. 155-177). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Pennycook, A. (1998). *English and the discourse of colonialism*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Pennycook, A. (2004). Critical moments in a TESOL praxicum. In B. Norton & K. Toohey (Eds.), *Critical pedagogies and language learning* (pp. 327-345). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Perez, G. M. (2004). *The near northwest side story: Migration, displacement, and Puerto Rican families*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the twenty-first century* (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Prasad, P. (2005). *Crafting qualitative research: Working in the postpositivist traditions*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Radoshi, P. F. (2008). Sara Ruddick's theory of maternal thinking applied to traditional Irish mothering. *Journal of Family History, 33*(3), 304-315.

Ramstad, E. (2011, April 11). The KAIST suicides. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2011/04/11/the-kaist-suicides/

Reay, D. (1995). A silent majority? Mothers in parental involvement. *Women's Studies International Forum, 18*(3), 337-448.

Reporters Without Borders. (2014). World Press Freedom Index 2014. Retrieved from https://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php

Reyes, D. R. (2011). History and context of the development of public administration in the Philippines. In E. M. Berman (Ed.), *Public administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao* (pp. 333-354). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis.

Rho, H. W. (2013, February 27). 통계청 지니계수 구멍, 소득불평등 OECD 5위 (Korea's income inequality ranks fifth among OECD countries). *Hakyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/economy/economy_general/575882.html

Ricoeur, P. (1973). The model of the text: Meaningful action considered as a text. *New Literary History, 5*(1), 91-117.

Ronald, R., & Lee, H. (2012). Housing policy socialization and de-commodification in South Korea. *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 27*(2), 111-131.

Rosen, B. C., & Raia, A. L. (1972). Modernity and women: An index of social change in Brazil. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 34*(2), 353-360.

Roslyn Kunin & Associates, Inc. (2009). *Economic impact of international education in Canada: Final report.* Retrieved from http://www.international.gc.ca/education/assets/pdfs/RKA_IntEd_Report_eng.pdf

Rothberg, D. (1968, April 18). White suburbia purchases more guns, dealers claim. *Lawrence Journal World*. Retrieved from http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2199&dat=19680418&id=dYkyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=keYFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3367,5193729

Ruddick, S. (1980). *Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Ruddick, S. (2009). On maternal thinking. *Women's Studies Quarterly, 37*(3&4), 305-308.

Russell, M. (2013). *Prosperity in depth: South Korea ready for prime time: Legatum Prosperity Index 2012.* Retrieved from http://media.prosperity.com/2013/pdf/publications/2013-prosperity-in-depth-south-korea-ready-for-prime-time.pdf

Ryoo, W. (2005). The role of the state in the national mediascape: The case of South Korea. *Global Media Journal, 4*(6). Retrieved from http://lass.purduecal.edu/cca/gmj/gmj_pastissues.htm

Ryu, D. Y. (2001). Understanding early American missionaries in Korea (1884-1910): Capitalist middle-class values and the Weber thesis. *Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 113* (janvier-mars). Retrieved from http://assr.revues.org/20190

Ryu, D. Y. (2013). Religion meets politics: The Korean royal family and American Protestant missionaries in late Joseon Korea. *Journal of Church and State, 55*(1), 113-133.

Ryu, N. Y. (2013, June 10). 학령인구 감소—학력인플레 등 과제도 (Concerning the decreasing number of students, diploma inflation, and more). *Newsis*. Retrieved from http://www.newsis.com/ar_detail/view.html?ar_id=NISX20130610_0012149561&cID=10201&pID=10200

Ryu, Y.-T. (2004). The (re)production of housing space and housing policies in South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s: From institutional perspectives. *Journal of the Korean Geographical Society, 39*(5), 768-785.

Schulz, W., Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Kerr, D., & Losito, B. (2010). *Initial findings from the IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education study.* Retrieved from http://iccs.acer.edu.au/uploads/File/Reports/ICCS_10_Initial_Findings.pdf

Scott, J. W., & Tilly, L. A. (1975). Women's work and the family in nineteenth- century Europe. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17*(1), 36-64.

Seoul Shinmun. (2014, September 15). 캐나다 유학박람회 개최, 조기유학부터 이민까지 상담 (Studying in Canada: Fair opens, consulting *jogi youhak* and immigration). *Seoul Shinmun*. Retrieved from http://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20140915500171

Seth, M. J. (2002). *Education fever: Society, politics, and the pursuit of schooling in South Korea*. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press and University of Hawaii, Center for Korean Studies.

Shapiro, T. M. (2004). *The hidden cost of being African American: How wealth perpetuates inequality*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Shi, Z. (1997). The dual economic function of Confucianism. In X. Yu, X. Lu, F. Liu, R. Zhang, & G. Enderle (Eds.), *Economic ethics and Chinese culture: Chinese philosophical studies, XIV*. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

Shim, Y. (1996). Women and time: Tradition, modernity, and postmodernity as revealed in the everyday life of mothers who have children preparing for college entrance examination. *Hankook Yeosunghak, 12*(2), 1-41.

Shin, H. (2007). English language teaching in Korea: Toward globalization or glocalization? In J. Cummins. & C. Davison (Eds.), *International handbook of English language teaching* (pp. 75-86). New York, NY: Springer.

Shin, H. B. (2009). Property-based redevelopment and gentrification: The case of Seoul, South Korea. *Geoforum, 40*(5), 906-917.

Shin, K. Y. (2007). Contentious politics, social movements, and the divided civil society in South Korea. In P. Hsu & C-L. Huang (Eds.), *Political challenges and democratic institutions: International and Taiwan's perspectives* (pp. 125-150). Taipei, Taiwan: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

Shin, K.-Y. (2013, August 13). 인도보다 높은 산재사망률 (Korea has a higher industrial death rate than India). *Kyunghyang Shinmun*. Retrieved from http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201308132120215&code=990308

Shin, S. (2012, July 3). 취업 차별도 서러운데 스펙도 서울 집중? : 방학마다 서울 학원가 지방대생들로 북새통(Centralized employment market and spec in Seoul: Crowded *hagwon* streets with job searching *jibang* university students in summer). *Maeil Shinmun*. Retrieved from http://www.imaeil.com/sub_news/sub_news_view.php?news_id=39915&yy=2012

Skjelsbæk, I. (2001) Sexual violence and war: Mapping out a complex relationship. *European Journal of International Relations, 7*(2), 211-237.

Smith, D. G. (2002). The mission of the hermeneutic scholar. In M. Wolfe & C. Pryor (Eds.), *The mission of the scholar* (pp. 75-88). New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Smith, D. G. (2006). *Trying to teach in a season of great untruth: Globalization, empire and crisis of pedagogy*. Rotterdam; Taipei: Sense.

Smith, D. G. (2009). Critical notice: Engaging Peter McLaren and the New Marxism in education. *Interchange, 40*(1), 93-117.

Smith, D. G. (2011). Can wisdom trump the market as a basis for education? In D. Stanley & K. Young (Eds.), *Contemporary studies in Canadian curriculum: Principles, portraits, & practices* (pp. 153-185). Calgary, AB: Detselig Enterprises.

Song, H.-S. (2013, March 31). 일반고 슬럼화 진행 중, 숫자로 드러났다 (Stats reveal the public schools that are becoming slums). *Kyunghyang Shinmun.* Retrieved from http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201303311415281&code=940401

Song, Y.-B. (2002). Crisis of cultural identity in East Asia: On the meaning of Confucian ethics in the age of globalization. *Asian Philosophy, 12*(2), 109-125.

Song, Y.-J. (2013). *Historicizing the discourse on pro-Japanese collaborators in contemporary Korean history from the late 1970s to the late 2000.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles, CA.

Statistics Korea. (2013). *통계로 보는 여성의 삶 2013* (Statistics of Korean women's life, 2013). Retrieved from http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/kor_nw/2/1/index.board?bmode=read&aSeq=306961

Statistics Korea. (2013). 외국 박사학위 신고현황 국가 연도별 *2007/1/1-2012/11/30* (*Foreign doctorate degree holders by countries (January 1, 2007—November 30, 2010*). Retrieved from http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1550

Steinberg, D. I. (2006). The new political paradigm in South Korea: Social change and the elite structure. *Joint U.S.-Korea academic Studies, 2006*, 81-103. Retrieved from http://www.keia.org/publications?pcat=122&%3Bauthors=All&%3Btitle=&%3Bitems_per_page=20

Stokes, H. S. (1982, April 20). 42 South Korean Christians ask recall of 2 top U.S. aides. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/20/world/42-south-korean-christians-ask-recall-of-2-top-us-aides.html

Strand, W. (2004). Opening the hermit kingdom. *History Today, 54*(1), 20-26.

Sung, S. (2010, May 25). Why dream of a high-rise apartment? *JoongAng Daily*.

Tan, L., & Master, C. (2010, May 16). Separation anxieties. *The New Zealand Herald*. Retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10644980

Taylor, J. (2004). Introduction. In J. Taylor, L. L. Layne & D. F. Wozniak (Eds.), *Consuming motherhood* (pp. 1-16). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

The Press. (2010, May 6).”Dead Christchurch mother and daughters named.” Retrieved from http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/national/3662454/Grim-find-at-Christchurch-home

Thompson, E. P. (1963). *The making of the English working class*. London, UK: V. Gollanz.

Transparency International. (2013). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results

Tu, W. (1984). *Confucian ethics today: The Singapore challenge*. Singapore: Federal Publications.

Tu, W. (Ed.). (1996). *Confucian traditions in East Asian modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tuttle, C. (1998). A revival of the pessimist view: Child labor and the Industrial Revolution. *Research in Economic History, 18*, 53-82.

Tuttle, C. (2001, August 14). Child labor during the British Industrial Revolution. *EH.Net Encyclopedia* (R. Whaples, Ed.). Retrieved from https://eh.net/encyclopedia/child-labor-during-the-british-industrial-revolution/

Tyrrell, I. (2010). Woman, missions, and empire: New approaches to American cultural expansion. In B. Reeves-Ellington, K. K. Sklar, & C. A. Shemo (Eds.), *Competing Kingdoms: Women, mission, nation, and the American Protestant Empire, 1812-1960* (pp. 43-66). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

United Nations Development Programme. (2010). The *human development report.* Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Tables_reprint.pdf

United States Office of Management and Budget. (2013). *OMB Bulletin No. 13-01: Revised delineations of metropolitan statistical areas, micropolitan statistical areas, and combined statistical areas, and guidance on uses of the delineations of these areas, February 28, 2013*. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb /bulletins/2013/b-13-01.pdf

Vancouver School Board. (2015). *Welcome.* Retrieved from https://intered.vsb.bc.ca/

Veblen, T. (1914). *The instinct of workmanship: and the state of industrial arts*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Vogel, E. (1963). *Japan's new middle class: The salary man and his family in a Tokyo suburb* (2nd ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Volosinov, V. N. (1973). *Marxism and the philosophy of language* (L. Matejka & I. R. Titumik, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Walby, S. (1989). Theorizing patriarchy. *Sociology, 23*(2), 213-234.

Walby, S. (1996). The 'declining significance' or the 'changing forms' of patriarchy? In V. M. Moghdam (Ed.), *Patriarchy and economic development: Women's positions at the end of the twentieth century* (pp. 19-33). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Walby, S. (2003, April 11-13). *Modernities, globalization, complexities.* Paper presented at the conference of the British Sociological Association, University of York, York, UK.

Walby, S. (2011). Is the knowledge society gendered? *Gender, Work, and Organization, 18*(1), 1-29.

Wallis, P., & Webb, C. (2011). The education and training of gentry sons in early modern England. *Social History, 36*(1), 36-53.

Walter, M. N., & Fridman, E. J. (Eds.). (2004). *Shamanism: An encyclopedia of world beliefs, practices, and culture*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Wang, J., & Goodman, M. P. (2012). Gangnam's pile. *Global Economics Monthly, 1*(10). Retrieved from http://csis.org/publication/global-economics-monthly-gangnams-pile

Warner. (2011, January 24). *South Korea's 'education fever.'* PBS Newshour Extra: Student and Teacher Resources 7-12 Grade Level. PBS.

Weber, M. (1958). *The Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism* (T. Parsons, Trans.). New York, NY: Scribner.

Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology* (G. Roth & C. Wittich, Eds.; E. Fiscoff, Trans.). New York, NY: Bedminster Press.

Weber, M. (1994). *Sociological writings* (W. Heydebrand, Ed.). New York, NY: Continuum.

Weissmann, J. (2012, July 31). Whoa: Samsung is responsible for 20% (!?) of South Korea’s economy. *The Atlantic* Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/whoa-samsung-is-responsible-for-20-of-south-koreas-economy/260552/

Wekerle, G. R., Peterson, R., & Morley, D. (1980). *New space for women*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Wente, M. (2010, June 25). Motherhood: The new oppression. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/motherhood-the-new-oppression/article1618807/

White House. (2013, December 6). *Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden and Republic of Korea President Park Geun-Hye in a bilateral meeting.* Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/06/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-and-republic-korea-president-park-geun-

Whitehead, A. N. (1927). *The function of reason*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Wife’s credentials. (2012). JTBC. Retrieved from http://home.jtbc.joins.com/Vod/VodView.aspx?epis_id=EP10011274

Wilkinson, I. (2005). *Suffering: A sociological introduction*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Williams, R. (2005). Social Darwinism. In *Culture and materialism: Selected essays* (pp. 86-102). New York, NY: Verso.

Williams, T. (2004). Rhetoric, reality, and responsibility: The United States’ role in South Korean democratization. *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 4*(1), 62-75.

Witt, M. A. (2014). South Korea: Plutocratic state-led capitalism reconfiguring. In M. A. Witt & G. Redding (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of Asian business systems* (pp. 216-237). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

World Bank. (2015). *World Development Indicators*. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators

World Economic Forum. (2010). *The global gender gap report 2010.* Retrieved from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2010.pdf

World Trade Organization. (2015). *The Uruguay Round*. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm

Ye, J. et al. (2010, September 8). 대한민국 워킹맘 실태 보고서 (A survey on working moms in Korea). *Samsung Economic Research Institute CEO Information, 771.* Retrieved June 17, 2011 from http://www.seri.org/db/dbReptV.html?g_menu=02&s_menu=0202&pubkey=db20100908001

Yonhap News Agency. (2010, March 24). "하루 35명 자살" OECD 최대 자살국. ("35 Commit Suicide a Day: Highest Rate Among OECD Countries,") Retrieved from http://media.daum.net/society/others/view.html?cateid=1067&newsid=20100324092824622&p=yonhap

Yonhap News Agency. (December 29, 2014). S. Korea's GDP per capita to top US$ 30,000 next year: think tanks. Retrieved April 28, 2015 from http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2014/12/29/21/0502000000AEN20141229001700320F.html

Yoo, K. H. (2013). *Analysis of the successful applicants of Seoul to the Seoul National University, 2011-2013.* Retrieved from http://www.kihong.or.kr/lawmakers/lawmakers2.asp?bbs_code=2&mode=view&bbs_idx=26712&page=8&search_type=0&search_word=&bbs_class=

Yoo, K. J. (2009). 우리나라 빈곤변화 추이와 요인 분석 (Analysis of poverty change and its factors in Korea). *KDI 정책포럼, 215* (2009-8). Retrieved from http://www.kdi.re.kr

Yoo, S.-K. (2013, October 23). 고졸 전문가—대졸 전문가 임금격차 여전 (Consistent income gap between professionals of high school and college graduates). *MBC Evening News.* Retrieved from http://imnews.imbc.com/replay/2013/nw1800/article/3358109_12114.html

Yoo, S.-Y. (2001). Embodiment of American modernity in colonial Korea, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 2*(3), 423-441.

Yoon, J. (2007). *Youngo, naemaeumewi sigminchuwei*. Seoul, Korea: Dandea.

You, J.-S. (2015). *Democracy, inequality and corruption: Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines compared*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

You, N. (2010, July 4). 지난해 여성 대학진학률 82.4% . . . 처음으로 남성 추월 (Female college entrance rate reached 82.4% last year, overtaking male students' enrollment rate). *Newsis*. Retrieved from http://www.newsis.com/ar_detail/view.html?ar_id=NISX20100704_0005585466&cID=10201&pID=10200

Zaretsky, E. (1976). *Capitalism, the family, and personal life*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.