


1



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Votre copie - Votre référence

Votre bibliothèque - Notre référence

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A TALE OF TWO HISTORIANS:

**The Involvement of R.W. Seton-Watson and Lewis Namier
in the Creation of New Nation-States in Eastern Europe
at the end of the First World War.**

BY



Mark Robert Baker

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Arts**.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Edmonton, Alberta
Fall 1993



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Votre bibliothèque

Our library

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-88287-5

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: **Mark Robert Baker**

TITLE OF THESIS: **A TALE OF TWO HISTORIANS: The Involvement of R.W. Seton-Watson and Lewis Namier in the Creation of New Nation-States in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War.**

DEGREE: **Master of Arts**

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: **1993**

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as hereinbefore provided neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Mark R. Baker", is written over a horizontal line.


**#23, 2 Georgian Way
Sherwood Park, Alberta
Canada T8A 5K3**


26 August 1993

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled **A Tale of Two Historians: The Involvement of R.W. Seton-Watson and Lewis Namier in the Creation of New Nation-States in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War** submitted by **Mark R. Baker** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Arts**.


Prof. John-Paul Himka (Supervisor)


Prof. Kenneth J. Munro (Committee Chairman)


Prof. Philip Lawson (Committee Member - History)


Prof. R.R. Gilsdorf (Committee Member - Political Science)

18 June 1993

To Laurie

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the political involvement of two historians, Robert William Seton-Watson and Lewis Namier, in the creation of new nation-states in Eastern Europe during the First World War and at the Paris Peace Conference that followed. Seton-Watson stubbornly promoted the creation of a unitaristic Yugoslav state throughout the war as his solution to the Southern Slav question. Namier advocated the creation of a separate, autonomous Eastern Galician state under the auspices of the newly-established League of Nations and railed against the inclusion of Eastern Galicia in a reunited Poland. Although the activities of these two historians in the promotion of their respective causes were similar in intensity, sometimes bordering on obsessive, the solutions they came to promote were strikingly different. Seton-Watson's solution to the Southern Slav question suggested his belief that a viable state had to be large in territory and population, and possess considerable economic resources, regardless of the compatibility of the nationalities it encompassed. Namier's solution to the Eastern Galician question suggested that his main test of the viability of a state was the compatibility of the nationalities that that state encompassed. The strikingly different conceptions that these historians expressed of what should constitute a viable state were the result of the equally disparate world views they brought to their respective national problems.

PREFACE

I met Lewis Namier while taking a graduate seminar from Professor Philip Lawson on Eighteenth Century British history in the fall of 1992. The more I learned about him from Professor Lawson, the greater became my desire to get inside his head. Unfortunately, he died in 1960 and I was forced to rely on the writings he left behind. One important result of my efforts, was the realization that Namier was not only an historian. He was an individual, a fascinating personality. He had been employed as a foreign language editor in America, a British government expert on Central and East European affairs, a representative of a cotton business in Prague, and later the political secretary of the Zionist Organization in London. I began to think of Namier, and historians in general, not only as historians who rummaged around in dusty old archives and wrote about what they found. I began to see how crucial it was, in trying to understand historical work, to study historians as historical actors themselves in the context of their own political realities.

The gentle hints of Professor Lawson, and later Professor John-Paul Himka, led me to research the political activities of various historians, eventually settling on comparing the activities of Namier with one other: Robert William Seton-Watson. I therefore met Seton-Watson later than Namier. But I was no less fascinated by him. His political activities on behalf of the "submerged" nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and his almost religious conversion to, and relentless promotion of, the Yugoslav ideal peaked my curiosity. Like Namier, Seton-Watson was very active politically throughout the First World War and at the Paris Peace Conference.

Through researching the political involvement of these two historians, and through lengthy discussions with Professor Himka, I uncovered a striking contrast between the solutions Namier and Seton-Watson posed to their respective national problems, Eastern Galicia and Yugoslavia. Moreover, I noticed a correlation between the solutions they came to promote and the world views they brought to these problems. This paper developed out of this rather long process. I learned a great deal in researching and writing it. I hope the reader can learn something from reading it. I am of course completely responsible for all errors and omissions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If it were not for Professor John-Paul Himka I would not have undertaken graduate work in history, and I probably would not have completed this thesis. His patience in editing the first *draft* (I use that term loosely), and his subsequent comments both inspired me and phenomenally improved the eventual result. I would like to first acknowledge his kind efforts, patience, and encouragement throughout my Master's studies.

I would also like to thank Professor P. Lawson who introduced me to Lewis Namier and first suggested the idea which eventually became this thesis. Both he and Professor Himka remained patient through many of my frustrated rantings in their offices and through all my unclear thinking. Professor Lawson also allowed me to sit in on two *pseudo-seminars* from which I learned a great deal about the writing of history. I also spent a lot of time in Professor David Marples' office. Professor Marples has always been supportive of my academic pursuits and was kind enough to allow me to sit in on his Soviet history seminar, when I was supposed to be writing my thesis. All three of these professors provided me with the help and encouragement I practically demanded, and I thank them all heartily.

I must also give credit to all the graduate students with whom I took courses, had conversations, had coffee, and drank beer. Their tolerance with my constant interruptions and boisterous behaviour in class and outside of class is greatly appreciated. In particular, I recall conversations of enlightenment with Aileen Espiritu, Andy Drummond, Carolee Pollock, Dan Brown, Brian Halsey, Carol Janigo, Robin Close, John Staples, and Naomi Nind, but the complete list is endless. I thank you all.

I would also like to thank Carolee Pollock, Elaine Chalus and Bruce Campbell for allowing me live with them in Oxford, while I did my research at the Public Record Office at Kew Gardens. Carolee, in particular, provided me with much advice and helped me get on in that peculiar place called Britain. Dan Brown and Kate Emck were also very hospitable and understanding of my comings and goings from Cambridge and even showed me the odd good time. Thank you all.

I would also like to thank Aileen Espiritu, who not only edited successively awful drafts of this thesis, but helped me flesh out a number of very difficult problems in long drawn out phone conversations, and in person. Without her presence and kind encouragement, I also fear that I would never have finished. Professor R. Gilsdorf, Professor P. Lawson, and Carolee Pollock also provided a number of useful editorial comments.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank the Government of Alberta for generously providing me with a Province of Alberta Government Grant, which enabled me to travel to Britain to carry out my research, and procrastinate the writing of my thesis for a whole year! I also received funding from the University of Alberta and the Department of History. All this was greatly appreciated.

While I am very grateful to all these people for their support and advice, I must make clear that none of the persons or institutions mentioned above should be presumed to have approved of any statements contained in this thesis. All errors and omissions are my responsibility alone.

Edmonton, Alberta
August 1993

Mark R. Baker

Table of Contents

Abstract

Preface

Acknowledgements

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
I Introduction	I
2 R.W. Seton-Watson and the Southern Slav Question	6
3 Lewis Namier and the Problem of Eastern Galicia	51
4 Conclusion	97
 Bibliography - Primary Sources	 107
Bibliography - Secondary Sources	108

I

Introduction

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German empires was perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of the First World War. Out of the rubble of those empires, the victorious Allies constructed new nation-states which supposedly represented the fullest application of President Wilson's profession of the principle of national self-determination. Poland and Yugoslavia were two of the most important applications. To a considerable degree, the creation of both was dependent on Allied, and particularly British, diplomatic support. Two prominent British historians, Robert William Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier, became intimately involved in the Yugoslav and Polish questions during the War and at the Peace Conference. More specifically, Seton-Watson promoted the creation of a Yugoslav state through the British press, through his involvement with the British Foreign Office, and his work for Lord Northcliffe's Propaganda Department at Crewe House. Namier railed against the creation of an overextended Poland that included the non-Polish masses of its eastern border areas. Through his articles in the British press and his position with the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, Namier defended, in particular, the right of the Ukrainians and Jews of Eastern Galicia to their own autonomous state. While the *influence* of both these historians was substantial, the focus of this essay will be on the *nature* of their involvement.

Through an analysis of their involvement, one can develop a clear understanding of the solutions they envisioned to their respective national problems. In contrasting these solutions, what emerges are two completely different ideas about what should constitute a nation-state. It will be suggested that these contrasting ideas stemmed from the disparate world views that these two historians brought to their respective problems. Seton-Watson saw his solution to the Southern Slav problem through the eyes of a Scot who embraced his British nationality. Namier saw his solution to the Eastern Galician problem through the eyes of an assimilated Jew who grew-up in an atmosphere of mounting national and social

antagonisms between the Poles and Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia. Neither historian could have or did remain a detached observer of the events of the Great War and the subsequent Peace Conference, or the impact of those events on their respective “pet projects.” Indeed, the intensity of their devotion to these national problems made such detachment impracticable.

The justification for this study stems from the assumption that one cannot divorce history from the historians. To examine interpretations of the past, without examining the interpreters, belies the realities of the process of writing history. It has been shown many times how important occurrences in the personal lives of historians have influenced their writings. By examining these historians, not only as historians, but as historical actors living and acting in their political environment, it is hoped that we may better understand the way that writing about the past is informed by the current reality of the historian.

It is important to note the role that historians played in British society at this time. Both Seton-Watson and Namier were educated as historians in Britain, and in that country, historians were held in great regard as intellectuals. During the First World War, both served as expert advisers to the British government. Their expertise was considered a valuable asset to the war effort. Indeed, the large-scale war-time recruitment into the civil service of British intellectuals, and the many promising, young historians among them, illustrates the important status they held in that society.

Seton-Watson was a young Oxford graduate studying the problems of the Austro-Hungarian empire when he became interested in the Southern Slav question. Eventually, he became one of the foremost authorities on East-Central Europe. During his lifetime he wrote fifteen books on various topics of East-Central European history - from *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy*, published in 1911 to *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks*, published in 1943. He also co-founded the School of Slavonic Studies at the University of London, and on 22 November 1922, he was given the first Chair of Central European History at the University of London. His inaugural lecture was titled: “The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe,” and certainly reflected his attitude towards the historical problems he studied. Seton-Watson never attempted to

divorce his historical work from his political activities. Although his books were written with the tone of objective analysis about specific historical problems, his political position was always clear. His involvement in the Southern Slav question thus provides an excellent opportunity to study the interconnection between an historian's writings and the political realities in which s/he writes.

The political realities of the Southern Slav question have been the subject of considerable historical controversy and misunderstanding. In particular, the question of whether the various Southern Slavs, or Yugoslavs, should have united into a common state in 1918 has attracted considerable attention in the twentieth century. At present, the violent clashes between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia and the many accusations of Serbian atrocities stemming from the policy of "ethnic cleansing" suggest that history has now decided that question for historians. But to Seton-Watson and his Yugoslav friends, living in the idealism of the early decades of this century, the Yugoslav idea was considered a serious alternative. At the time of the First World War, the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and their union with the states of Serbia and Montenegro was seen by many South Slav intellectuals as a practical alternative to the oppression of Austro-Hungarian rule. In particular, the grave injustice of the Zagreb treason trial of 1909, and the Hungarian government's policy of "Magyarization" pushed many Croat and Serb intellectuals towards the Yugoslav ideal. The possibilities created by the war and the subsequent collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy made the application of this ideal possible.

Lewis Namier was born into the questions of Poland and Eastern Galicia. But it was as a young Oxford graduate that he began his political activity on these questions in earnest. After graduating, Namier went to America where he worked as a foreign language editor until the war broke out in Europe. Having become a British subject in 1913, he quickly returned to Britain to enlist in the army and soon after was employed by the British government as a specialist on East-Central Europe. Yet, Namier is not really known for this particular expertise. He is known as one of the twentieth-century's most influential *British* historians. By focussing on the "structure of politics" in eighteenth century Britain and

closely analyzing the individuals that moved within that structure, Namier revolutionized the historical understanding of his adopted country's past. There have been many attempts to describe his tremendous impact on British history, but perhaps the greatest accolade bestowed upon him came in 1976, when the *Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary* "acknowledged that the verb 'to namierize', the adjective 'namierian' and the noun 'namierization' had become integral parts of the English language."¹

Despite the detached appearance of much of his historical work, Namier, like Seton-Watson, always remained politically active. His defense of the Ukrainians and Jews of Eastern Galicia during the war and at the Peace Conference preceded most of his historical work and his rise to preeminence as a British historian. Yet, it is clear that the practical experience and political insights he gained while employed at the Foreign Office influenced his later historical writings. As Colley states: "In the long term, this direct exposure to political intrigue and diplomatic manoeuvre would enrich Namier's historical work, lending it a degree of authority and confidence denied to most 'don-bred dons.'"² Thus, like Seton-Watson's involvement in the Yugoslav question, Namier's involvement in the Polish question and its impact on his later historical work provide insights into the interconnection between the historian's current political reality and the history that s/he writes.

But, unlike Seton-Watson's promotion of the union of all Yugoslav lands, Namier did not promote the reunification of all of the supposedly "Polish lands." Indeed, he discouraged the inclusion in Poland of any territory in which the Poles were not in a majority. In particular, he argued for the creation of an independent state in Eastern Galicia. Nominally under Austrian rule, that territory had been for some time ruled in fact by its Polish minority. As Namier was quick to point out, in Eastern Galicia the majority of the landlords were Polish and the majority of the peasants who worked their lands were Ukrainian. Thus, social and national differences reinforced each other and created intense

¹ Linda Colley, *Lewis Namier* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), p. 1. Without a doubt, Colley's book is an important study of Namier's historical writings. While she mentions Namier's Eastern Galician origins, the focus of her study is his historical work on eighteenth century Britain. For an analysis of Namier's historical writings on Eastern Europe see my article, "Sir Lewis Namier: An Eastern European's Historical Outline," *Past Imperfect*, Vol.I (July 1992):113-132.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Ukrainian-Polish animosity. There was also a sizeable Jewish minority of intellectuals, merchants and professionals in Eastern Galicia, whom Namier believed largely sympathized with the Ukrainians. Following the armistice of November 1918, intense fighting broke out between Poles and Ukrainians over whether Eastern Galicia should be united with Poland or become an autonomous Ukrainian state. The matter was referred to the Peace Conference in Paris.

Thus, two young historians imbued with the idealism of President Wilson's fourteen points, attempted to solve two of the most complex national questions of Eastern Europe, and promote their solutions in Paris, where the victorious Allies were attempting to reconstruct a Europe that had been ravaged by four years of mass warfare and the collapse of three multinational empires. The possibilities seemed endless to many at the time, but these two historians came up with two very specific and quite different ideas about what should constitute a nation-state in the new Europe. This paper will investigate the nature of these historians' involvement in their respective questions, the solutions they promoted, and suggest how those solutions reflected the disparate world views they brought to their respective problems.

2

R.W. Seton-Watson and the Southern Slav Question

The nature of Robert William Seton-Watson's interest in the Southern Slav question varied considerably over the period of his involvement. What began in 1909 as an important aspect of his more central interest in the Austro-Hungarian empire, led to his advocacy by 1914 of the destruction of that empire. Advocating a thoroughly Yugoslav position throughout the war, Seton-Watson consistently downplayed or disregarded any evidence which suggested the incompatibility of Serb and Croat national ideologies. Yugoslav infighting, Serbian intransigence, and the inactivity of both did not dissuade him. He became the chief British advocate of a unitaristic Yugoslav state and the intensity of his advocacy eventually surpassed that of many of the Yugoslavs he was supposedly helping.

Seton-Watson first became enamoured with the Austro-Hungarian empire at the age of 19. In August 1898, just before his first term of University, he accompanied his father to the cures at Nauheim and encountered the Empress Elizabeth of Austria who was also taking a cure.¹ The next month, Seton-Watson began his studies at New College, Oxford, where he read Modern History under the tutor, H.A.L. Fisher, to whom Seton-Watson believed he owed more than all his other teachers put together.² Fisher had some interest in the German Reformation and Luther, but he was "far more in sympathy with French than German standards of criticism or conduct."³ It was therefore not until Seton-Watson went to Vienna in November 1905 that he began to study the Austro-Hungarian empire seriously.⁴

By the time he returned to Britain in July 1906, he had become thoroughly

¹ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary*, (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 9. Taken from a fragment of what R.W. Seton-Watson had intended to publish as his Memoirs.

² Ibid., p. 12.

³ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴ Ibid., p. 28.

convinced of the possibilities for Austria on the continent:

And so I went home with all my ideals completely *bouleversées* by the varied experiences of these nine months. The thesis which I took back with me was that an Austria rejuvenated by universal suffrage, pursuing a liberal and farsighted policy of racial tolerance and forcing the Magyars to abandon their tyrannous designs of hegemony, might rapidly become one of the strongest states on the Continent, and render itself immune from the dictation of either Berlin or St. Petersburg. My whole outlook was Austrophil and even Germanophil.⁵

These Austrian possibilities were never fulfilled, and in the years leading up to the First World War, Seton-Watson became increasingly discouraged with Austria, particularly by the intrigues of the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Alois von Aehrenthal.

In 1909, Seton-Watson's discouragement was exacerbated by the Zagreb treason trial and the libel trial against Dr. Friedjung which followed it. In the spring of 1909, the Austrian and Hungarian governments found a common interest in the prosecution of 50 Austro-Hungarian Serbs on charges of treason on behalf of Serbia. Seton-Watson attended the trial in Zagreb and was thoroughly disgusted, concluding that "the whole trial is a travesty of justice, inspired and controlled by what to English ideas is a despotic Government."⁶

Yet, Seton-Watson did not easily shake free of his faith in the Habsburg Monarchy. In October 1909, his solution to the Southern Slav problem expressed a continued or perhaps renewed faith. In a letter to Ivo Lupis-Vukic, a Dalmatian Croat and member of the Dalmatian Diet, on 17 October 1909, he stated that he sympathized "strongly with the idea of Croato-Servian unity."⁷ But he was convinced that this unity could "only be realized within the boundaries of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and that its realization outside those boundaries would be desirable neither in the interests of the Croats and Serbs, nor in those of Austria and of Europe as a whole."⁸

⁵ Ibid., p. 40.

⁶ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 69. Taken from a letter to the editor of the *Morning Post* and dated "Zagreb (Agram), Croatia, June 1 [1909]," but Seton-Watson left Zagreb for Vienna on 26 March 1909.

⁷ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, eds., *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*. Vol.I, (London-Zagreb: British Academy-University of Zagreb, Institute of Croatian History, 1976), p. 51. Hereafter, this correspondence will be referred to as "*R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*. Vol.I."

⁸ *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*. Vol.I, p. 51.

Seton-Watson was also very reluctant to include the Serbs of independent Serbia in this "Croato-Servian unity." Until 1911, his attitude towards the Serbs seems to have been friendly towards the governed and guarded towards the government. His sons wrote that he "had most friendly feelings towards the Serbian people, and had good relations with Serbs whom he met in Zagreb and elsewhere; but he maintained a marked mistrust towards the political leadership of the Kingdom of Serbia."⁹ One might question whether "mistrust" is a strong enough word. In the same letter to Lupis-Vukic, Seton-Watson denounced the Serbian government as corrupt and argued against any Croat union with that state, suggesting that its influence on the Croats would be nothing but corrupting. "Rightly or wrongly, I regard the present regime in Serbia as thoroughly corrupt and inefficient - worse even than the Hungarian - and the tragedy of 1903 and such scandals as the Novakovic murders seem to me only symptomatic of the depravity of the governing classes. I would therefore deprecate the union of the other South Slav states with Serbia, as a step backwards instead of forwards."¹⁰ To Seton-Watson's condemnation of the Serbian government, Lupis-Vukic responded on 21 October 1909, that the government of Croatia could be just as repressive. He had been denounced by that government as a traitor and for that reason was "still convinced of the innocence of the Serbs, judging their own guilt by-- my own."¹¹

At the height of the Zagreb trial, Dr. Heinrich Friedjung, the prominent Austrian historian, politician and publicist, published an article, based on documents shown to him by the Austrian Foreign Ministry with Aehrenthal's approval, purporting to prove that the Croato-Serbian Coalition of Croatia was being used by the Serbian government to plot against the security of the Habsburg Monarchy. In December 1909, 52 members of the Croatian Diet launched a libel suit against Friedjung. During the proceedings, it was revealed that several of the documents shown to Friedjung were false. Eventually the case was settled out of court with Friedjung admitting the unreliability of most of the

⁹ Ibid., p. 20. (From the introduction by Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson.)

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 52. In 1903, the King and Queen of Serbia, Alexander and Draga Obrenovic were murdered. In 1907, the Serbian military officers, Milan and Maxim Novakovic were murdered.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 56. It seems that Lupis-Vukic took Seton-Watson's letter quite differently, and failed to see the quite clear distinction that he had made between the Serbian people and Serbia's "governing classes."

documents. For Seton-Watson, the trial exposed above all the intrigues of Aehrenthal and Austrian officialdom. "Seton-Watson was profoundly influenced by the revelations of the Friedjung trial. He now viewed with profound suspicion not only the Magyarizing policies of the Hungarian political leaders, but also the whole trend of the monarchy's foreign policy, and the men who made it."¹² On 1 January 1910, he wrote a letter to his brother George further expressing his disgust with these Austrian intrigues.

The Friedjung Trial is not merely a turning point in the history of the Croato-Servian race and so in a question which in the near future may affect the European balance of power and the strategic policy of the Mediterranean powers. It is also the most ruthless exposure of the medieval methods of diplomacy and of the secret workings of international relations, which the modern world has yet seen.¹³

While disgusted at the Austrian intrigues exhibited at the Zagreb and Friedjung trials, Seton-Watson continued to believe in the possibility of a "liberal" Austria and maintained his rather intense "mistrust" of the Serbian "governing classes." By 1911, he had formulated his solution to the Southern Slav question into a book, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy*. He advocated "a moderate form of Trialism, under the auspices of Vienna."¹⁴ Under this scheme, the Serbs and Croats of Austro-Hungary would be given some form of autonomy and be united to form the third unit, with Austria and Hungary, in a largely federalized state. In his book, he expressed his optimism for this solution. "The policy of Trialism...has been widely advocated, not merely among the Southern Slavs themselves, but even in German Austria; and if rumour may be trusted, it is favoured even in the highest quarters."¹⁵ Seton-Watson concluded that the Southern Slav question was pivotal to the Habsburg Monarchy.

Croato-Serb Unity must and will come. It rests with Austria to delay its attainment for another generation and reap the disastrous fruits of such a policy, or by resolutely encouraging Southern Slav aspirations, to establish Austrian influence in the Northern Balkans by lasting bonds of sympathy and interest. Upon Austria's choice of alternative depends the future of the Hapsburg Monarchy.¹⁶

¹² Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 78.

¹³ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 66.

¹⁴ R.W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1911), p. 341.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 338.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 343-4.

Seton-Watson was not ambivalent about Austria's role in Croato-Serb unity. He clearly preferred Serbo-Croat unification under the Habsburg crown. He thought that the Hungarian regime was "absolutist" and continued to malign Serbia as corrupt and stagnated by embittered party factionalism.¹⁷

Seton-Watson's trialist position was also expressed in a letter from Lupis-Vukic on the 25 February 1911. Lupis-Vukic wrote: "Now, I am of the opinion, nay, I am convinced, that your views about the policy that we ought to follow, are correct. Serbs should take the things as they are, join hands with Croats, and work together with us, to better our condition inside the boundaries of this monarchy. All should gather around Croatia and dynasty. And leadership ought to be left in the hands of Croats."¹⁸

Although Seton-Watson advocated Croatia as the centre of this new polity, some Croats could not accept Habsburg authority of any kind. On 30 July 1912, Hinko Hinkovic, a member of the Party of Right and of the Croato-Serb Coalition, sent Seton-Watson a letter in which he confirmed that, in a recent article in the Vienna newspaper *Zeit*, he had called Seton-Watson an Austrophil. "You speak with the greatest sympathy of Austria's mission in the Balkans! But I am sure Austria will never abandon the methods of Aehrenthal et consortes. Just now the Emperor withdrew the Autonomy of the Servian church in Hungary and Croatia!"¹⁹

Hinkovic's charge of "Austrophil" referred specifically to Seton-Watson's pamphlet, "Absolutism in Croatia," but his advocacy of the trialist position was well-known. Perhaps the most important personage associated with this concept was the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. For Seton-Watson, the accession of the Archduke and the implementation of Trialism were intimately related and together held much of the promise for the Yugoslav ideal. The farcical spectacle of the Friedjung and Zagreb trials had seriously shaken Seton-Watson's confidence in the possibilities for Southern Slav unity under the Habsburgs. But the assassination of the Archduke on 28 June 1914 by Bosnian nationalists shattered his hopes altogether. Seton-Watson took the assassination of the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 337-8.

¹⁸ *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*. Vol.I, p. 78.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Archduke especially hard, and even considered giving up on the Southern Slav question.

On 9 July 1914, he wrote to Stanoje Mihajlovic, the Serbian consul-general in Berlin:

As I dare say you can imagine, the murder of the Archduke has been to me, as to many other people, a deadly blow, from which I am only slowly recovering. Even from the Serb standpoint I regard it as a disaster; from the Southern Slav standpoint as something even worse...As for my work, in some respects it is not worth continuing now. And yet I intend to go on with it....I have often wished that I never touched the Southern Slav question, and now more than ever. But I suppose I must go on with it now; it is too late to turn back - leider Gottes."²⁰

Mihajlovic responded on 13 July, that "the murder of Sarejevo being a calamity for us from every point of view I did not consider it necessary to explain you fully our point of view but I am glad that you are of the same opinion."²¹ He stated that the assassination came at the "worst possible moment" and satisfied only the Italians.

On 21 July 1914, Seton-Watson wrote to Mabel Grujic expressing how crucial the Archduke had been to his solution to the Southern Slav problem. "The murder of Archduke was an overwhelming blow to me, from which I am only now recovering. For some years past I pinned all my hopes for the future upon him, and one result of my recent tour had been to confirm me still further in my estimate of him, as a result of the additional first-hand information from persons who were directly in touch with him."²²

Despite the devastating effect that the assassination had on Seton-Watson, its link to Serbia did not lead him to open hostility towards that country. It seems to have just been one more reason to mistrust the Serbian state. In the same letter to Grujic he wrote, "I have never believed in the Great Servian Idea; and propaganda by bomb and revolver is not likely to convert me." The assassination of the Archduke was enough for Seton-Watson to give up on Trialism and the Habsburg Monarchy, but bombs and revolvers were not enough for him to exclude the Serbs from his scheme. In fact, it was at this time that he began to include Serbia in his Yugoslav idea. He noted that the accession of Archduke would have "exercised an immediate and beneficial influence upon Austro-Servian relations - especially as some of the men who enjoyed his confidence and would have been his

²⁰ Ibid., p. 166. Emphasis in original.

²¹ Ibid., p. 168. Emphasis in original.

²² Ibid., p. 171. Mabel Grujic was the wife of Slavko Grujic, Yugoslav Minister in Washington, D.C and secretary general to Serbian Foreign Affairs, as well as minister to Switzerland.

lieutenants are not without understanding and sympathy for Servia.”²³

Perhaps Seton-Watson’s new-found sympathy for Serbia was not so surprising. He was not at all convinced that the Serbian government was behind the assassination of the Archduke. In a letter to the Foreign Office on 1 October 1914, he stated: “It is notorious that the murder of the Archduke was not the work of the Serbian government but the result of a spontaneous movement from within the Monarchy. This movement is traceable to the rapid growth of national feeling among the Croats and Serbs of Austria-Hungary.”²⁴

If the assassination of Franz Ferdinand dashed Seton-Watson’s hopes for the creation of a trialist state within the empire, it also removed his major objection to Croato-Serbian unity outside the empire. In 1911, he had stated that “Croato-Serb Unity outside the Hapsburg Monarchy can only be attained through universal war and a thorough revision of the map of Europe.”²⁵ Now Europe was entering into just such a war, and Seton-Watson saw in that conflagration the possibility of an independent Yugoslav state.

On 1 October 1914, Seton-Watson wrote a long memorandum to the Foreign Office on the Southern Slav question. It is an essential document in trying to understand the solution he came to promote. At the outset, he suggested how crucial the question was to the outbreak of the war and the future possibilities for peace, and he particularly stressed the need “to treat this problem on truly Southern Slav (as opposed to merely Servian) lines.”²⁶ Seton-Watson then laid down the principles upon which his solution would, and would not, be based.

The abstract principle already laid down by Sir Edward Grey, Mr Asquith and Mr Churchill in their speeches since the outbreak of war [is] that in any settlement due regard must be shown for the principle of nationality...There is no part of Europe where this principle and its corollary, the principle that the wishes of the populations affected by any territorial change cannot be ignored - supply so solid a basis for experiment as does the eastern coast of the Adriatic and its hinterland; but here as everywhere else attempts will be made to confuse the true issue by arguments drawn from a historic past which has no longer any root in the social and political life of to-day.²⁷

²³ Ibid., p. 171. Emphasis in original.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 182. Seton-Watson to the F.O. 1 October 1914.

²⁵ R.W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 338.

²⁶ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*. Vol.I, p. 181.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 180.

Seton-Watson cautioned against the Italians' claim to Dalmatia, which he admitted could be made "on the grounds of historical sentiment." He argued that the Italian occupation of Dalmatia would be fatal to Italy herself. Not only would this occupation be opposed by the Southern Slavs who already constituted "a military power of no mean order," it would lead Italy on "into the false and hopeless path of attempting to assimilate a hostile population by the aid of an insignificant minority [of Italians] which only exists in half a dozen towns and in all the rest of the province is simply non-existent."²⁸ Clearly, Seton-Watson saw the beginnings of the future Italo-Yugoslav dispute over rival claims on the Adriatic Sea.

By October 1914, Seton-Watson had also become quite impressed with the move towards Southern Slav unity. In his memorandum to the Foreign Office, he stated emphatically that "the movement is far too deep and universal to be arrested by the imposition of any patchwork settlement [such as a Greater Serbia]."²⁹ He then gave an account of a meeting he had had in Cracow with a Slovene priest, an Orthodox Serb student and a young Bosnian Croat. "All three declined to distinguish between Croat, Serb and Slovene, between Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem. In 1910 such a incident would have been rare, in 1905 unthinkable, to-day it awakens no surprise."³⁰

With these considerations in mind, Seton-Watson concluded his memorandum to the Foreign Office with a proposed solution.

Is there, then, any solution which would be received with acclamation by every Southern Slav? Most emphatically there is....In a word, the natural solution is a federal union, under which the sovereign would be crowned not only as King of Serbia, but with the Crown of Zvonimir, as King of the Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, thus reviving historic traditions dating from the tenth century and never abandoned or forgotten. The Croatian Parliament would continue in Agram (the local Diets of Dalmatia, Istria and Carniola being presumably merged in it) parallel with the Serb Parliament in Belgrade (in which that of Montenegro may also be merged); and a central Federal Parliament would be formed, either sitting permanently in Sarajevo as the centre of the new state or meeting alternately in various centres, Sarajevo, Belgrade, Agram, Skopje, Laibach.³¹

Seton-Watson had earlier discarded the Italians' claim to Dalmatia, despite his admission

²⁸ Ibid., p. 181.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 184. R.W. Seton-Watson to F.O., 1 October 1914.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 184.

³¹ Ibid., p. 185.

that it could be made “on the grounds of historical sentiment.” But now, he claimed that Dalmatia should be part of the federal union of Southern Slavs he envisioned, because that union revived “historic traditions.” Clearly, by October 1914, Seton-Watson had abandoned the idea of Trialism completely. He stated that “the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, Istria and Carniola await their liberation at the hands of their free kinsmen of Serbia and Montenegro.”³²

The Foreign Office’s response to Seton-Watson’s memorandum was significant. Sir Arthur Nicolson wrote on the memorandum: “I venture to subscribe to all Mr Seton-Watson’s conclusions....If the Secretary of State has any leisure, I would strongly recommend a perusal of Mr Watson’s memorandum.”³³

Serbian responses to Seton-Watson’s efforts on behalf of the Yugoslav cause were at first quite positive. On 15 November 1914, Milan Milojevic wrote Seton-Watson thanking him for his work on behalf of the union and emphasized that Serbia would respect Croat and Slovene cultural traditions.

Réunis les Croates, Slovènes et Serbes auront entière liberté de continuer à cultiver dans le sens le plus large du mot, leurs habitudes culturelles et nationales comme par le passé. Encore mieux, la ferme espérance des intellectuels, en Serbie est que le libre développement de toutes les trois branches des Yougo-Slaves aura infiniment plus d’élan que de l’époque de honteux procès d’Agram, de Friedjung et tant d’autres de la même espèce.³⁴

In the same month, the Serbian Government gave its clearest official recognition of the Yugoslav ideal. In a letter on 19 March 1915, Seton-Watson impressed upon the cabinet minister Walter Runciman, President of the British Board of Trade, the importance of M. Pasic’s “solemn declaration” of November 1914. “In this connection it is worth pointing out that the solemn declaration of M. Pasic in the Skupstina last November in favour of National Unity of the Serbs Croats and Slovenes, was *inter alia* a graceful way of nailing his colours to the mast in the face of a secret Russian suggestion that Serbia should content

³² Ibid., p. 185.

³³ Ibid., p. 402. Found in footnote 1 to the memorandum.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 187.

herself with liberating the Serbs and leave the Croats outside the new state.”³⁵ To Seton-Watson, this act clearly showed Pasic’s commitment to the Yugoslav ideal.

Throughout the rest of the war and the Peace Conference, Seton-Watson advocated the solution he had provided in his October memorandum. In his advocacy of the Yugoslav ideal, he assumed he had the support of the Yugoslavs themselves. But from almost the very beginning this assumption faced serious challenges. The first of these challenges came with the Allies’ secret negotiations to bring Italy into the war.

In April of 1915, Italy demanded major territorial concessions in areas that Seton-Watson considered to be Yugoslav in exchange for its participation in the war on the Allied side. Russia, in particular, advocated the concession of Dalmatia, an area Seton-Watson considered predominantly Croatian, to the Italians. For Seton-Watson, this was a complete renunciation of the principles upon which the war was being fought. In a letter to Runciman on the 26 April 1915, he wrote:

If we support Russia on this point, we ipso facto throw over the principle of Nationality which we have so solemnly proclaimed before the world as one of the main foundations of our policy. We throw it over on the first occasion when it seems inconvenient to stick to it, and we do so at a vital point, for it is the Southern Slav question which was the *causa causans* of the great war, and it is the same question which will provide the bone of contention among the allies if we set the principle of nationality at defiance.³⁶

But it was not only the practicalities of creating a lasting peace that concerned Seton-Watson. It was Britain’s honour. In a memorandum of May 1915 “for private circulation,” he concluded with respect to the secret Treaty of London that,

the honour of Britain is involved in this transaction, and until presented with a fait accompli, I absolutely refuse to believe that our statesmen - whose conduct of the great crisis of last July and of early phases of the war has been worthy of the highest traditions of British statesmanship (a high compliment which is anything but a mere phrase) - will now rashly abandon the principles to which they so irrevocably committed themselves. Loyalty to the allies whom we already have [i.e. Serbia] must come before opportunist concessions to the ex-ally of our enemies [Italy]. *To yield would be an eternal stain upon our honour.*³⁷

³⁵ Ibid., p. 206. W. Runciman then sent Seton-Watson’s letter to Sir Edward Grey, but its impact is questionable. In Runciman’s response he commented: “I do not think that Samuel [Herbert Samuel, President of Local Government Board and Postmaster-General, with special responsibility for relief and refugees] will be able to make a pronouncement on Dalmatia tomorrow, but that does not mean that we do not appreciate the views which you have been good enough to set out in your letter to me.” (Dated 21 March 1915, p. 207)

³⁶ Ibid., p. 213.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 219-20. Emphasis added.

The memorandum indicates that the principle of nationality was important in Seton-Watson's mind. He argued that the secret treaty, which conceded Dalmatia to Italy, violated this principle. "Dalmatia is a Slavonic country, 96 per cent of its population are Serbo-Croats by race language and sentiment; and under the proposed arrangement roughly a million Slavs would be handed over to an alien rule to which they are bitterly opposed. This is all the more monstrous because it is just among these very Slavs that the movement for Southern Slav Unity is strongest."³⁸ But he also saw Yugoslavia as a solution to German expansionism: "Without Dalmatia there can be no Serbo-Croat Unity, no Yugoslavia; and if we give this up, we renounce the creation of a really effective barrier to German expansion in the Balkans and the Drang nach Osten."³⁹ In his mind, the creation of a Yugoslav state was essential if the current conflagration was to lead to a lasting peace.

Seton-Watson's arguments may have made it to the Foreign Office and into Sir Edward Grey's hands, but they were eventually ignored. The Treaty of London was signed on the same date as Seton-Watson's letter to Runciman was written.

The implications of the secret Treaty of London for the Yugoslav ideal were great. Banac claims that the Treaty reflected the attitude of the Entente governments, who thought of "the South Slavic question as a nuisance that should be treated as convenience suited, in whatever way did the most to shorten the war."

The terms of Italy's accession to the Allied side were the gravest case in point: the secret Treaty of London which the Entente Powers concluded with Italy on April 26, 1915, promised Italy extensive territories, including Görz (Gorica), a portion of Carniola, Trieste, Istria, and northern Dalmatia with most of the offshore islands in exchange for a declaration of war on Austria. Word of the provisions of this treaty, which handed over hundreds of thousands of Croats and Slovenes to Italy, was sufficient to temper the JO [Yugoslav Committee]'s criticism of Serbia, since it was now apparent that the unity of the Croats and Slovenes more than ever depended on Serbia's successes.⁴⁰

But Seton-Watson claimed that the worst effects of the Treaty could have been avoided,

³⁸ Ibid., p. 217.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 214. Letter to Runciman, dated 26 April 1915.

⁴⁰ Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 119. The Yugoslav Committee [JO] was an organization of Southern Slav intelligentsia who had fled into exile at the outbreak of the War and claimed to represent the oppressed Southern Slav peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy abroad.

were it not for Yugoslav inactivity.

At various times, both Seton-Watson and his close associate, the *Times* journalist Henry Wickham Steed, complained that the Yugoslav leaders did not spend enough time in London promoting their cause at the British Foreign Office. Seton-Watson felt that the Yugoslavs' inattention to London, and the dilatory behavior of the Yugoslav leaders, Ante Trumbic and Frano Supilo, greatly inhibited the promotion of their cause, particularly at the time of the Treaty of London. "He believed that if the Yugoslav Committee had come to London in April, especially if Supilo or Trumbic had been there, they could, with the help which Steed and Seton-Watson and their friends in politics and the press could have given them, have had some real influence, and obtained better terms. For this he blamed Trumbic's dilatory tactics."⁴¹

Steed also regretted Supilo's absence from London during the early months of the war, in Steed's mind a fatal error. "Had he[Supilo] remained in England during the winter and spring of 1914-15 he might have persuaded British statesmen of the dangers involved in the secret Treaty of London which they negotiated with Italy as the price of her entry into the war, and might have led them to offer Italy inducements less detrimental to her and more consonant with Allied principles."⁴²

Indeed, it appears that Seton-Watson and Steed had to really push the leaders of this national cause to work for it. During the controversy over the signing of the Treaty of London, in the spring of 1915, Seton-Watson wrote to Hinko Hinkovic, a leading member of the Committee, strongly urging "that the moment had arrived for a Southern Slav manifesto, which will be published to the world."⁴³ Seton-Watson suggested that the prospects for a successful Yugoslav agitation had increased markedly in the last six months. "But a sign of life on the part of the Southern Slavs themselves is a *sine qua non*. In this idea, I have tried to draw up a rough sketch of such a programme, and send it to you

⁴¹ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 25. From Hugh and Christopher's introduction. They also claim that R.W. maintained this position throughout his life.

⁴² Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A Personal Narrative*. Vol.II, (London: William Heinemann 1924), p. 54.

⁴³ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 215. Dated 28 April 1915.

merely in the hope that it may goad you into drawing up a more serious programme of your own or communicating telegraphically with Nish (Supilo, Trumbic).’’⁴⁴

Seton-Watson and Steed were not the only Britons to notice the reluctance of the Yugoslavs. Next to Steed, Seton-Watson’s “most active ally” was the eminent archeologist Sir Arthur Evans.⁴⁵ In a letter of 31 December 1916 to Seton-Watson, Evans complained about the lack of Yugoslav resistance to the *Manchester Guardian*’s move toward a pro-Austrian stand. He asked: “Why do our South Slav friends neglect it [*The Guardian*]? The Chechs [sic] wrote at once to denounce Arnold’s figures - but I see nothing from them. I do not see their pronouncement either, about the Hapsburg plan, that appeared in the *Times*. Do stir them to assert themselves in that quarter.”⁴⁶

Yet Yugoslav leaders like Supilo and Trumbic, who had escaped from Austria-Hungary and formed the Yugoslav Committee abroad, were more committed to the creation of a Yugoslav state than the Serbian government. Although Seton-Watson considered Serbia’s Crown Prince Aleksandar to be the chief Serbian adherent to the Yugoslav ideal, even Aleksandar’s adherence was questionable. In January 1915, Seton-Watson wrote a memorandum intended for the Foreign Office on conversations that he had had with the Crown Prince during his visit to Serbia in January 1915. Seton-Watson’s comments appear overly optimistic:

I had the impression, *though I would not like to affirm it positively*, that though most reluctant to yield Macedonia and very furious with the Bulgars, he personally is

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 215-6. The correspondence contains a draft memorandum written in May 1915. It proposed a programme for the unification of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in a common federal state under the Serbian dynasty. It may have been the draft manifesto that Seton-Watson referred to in his letter of encouragement to Hinkovic. It was found type-written with the title written in Seton-Watson’s handwriting: “Rough Draft of suitable lines of Memorandum to be addressed to British Public. May 1915.” (See p. 435). The memorandum is not written in the third person to refer to the Yugoslavs, but in the first person plural. “We whom chance has rescued from the same fate, knowing the mind of our people, feel that the moment has come to speak out before Europe ”(p. 222) It appears that Seton-Watson was quite intimately involved in the drafting and promotion of this manifesto, perhaps more than some of its eventual signatories. Seton-Watson even suggested who should sign it: Supilo, Hinkovic, Trumbic, Vasiljevic Stojanovich, Potocnjak, Mestrovic, Tucic, Leontin, Ujevic, and Mitrinovoić.

⁴⁵ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 123.

⁴⁶ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 286. E.V. Arnold’s article was published in the *Manchester Guardian* on 22 December 1916. The “Hapsburg plan” referred to was the “Declaration by Southern Slav Committee on occasion of Coronation of the Emperor and King Charles of Hapsburg” which had been published in *The Times* of 30 December 1916 with the heading “Southern Slav Defiance: Faith in the Allies”. See also p. 407.

sufficiently fascinated by the dream of Yugoslavia to consent to certain concessions, if he could be sure of achieving the dream as reality. Assurances on the part of the allies in this direction might render him and kindred spirits in the army more amenable...⁴⁷

That Seton-Watson's main Serbian advocate was so reluctant to give up Macedonia in exchange for the Yugoslav ideal, and required such concrete assertions from the Allied governments in order to do so, casts doubt on his commitment to that ideal.

Yet, it was during this very visit to Serbia that Seton-Watson became convinced of Serbia's sincerity. In a letter to Grujic on 15 March 1915, he confided that his past anxiety over Serbian chauvinism had proved false.

So far as Yugoslavia is concerned, I returned from Serbia entirely reassured as to the intentions of Serbia. Till I went, I always had a lurking fear lest some Chauvinist current might favour some exaggerated scheme of unification to the detriment of local Croat institutions. As a matter of fact I only met one man - Prof. Stanojevic (this of course in confidence) - who was not ready to give the Croats what ever they like to ask for.⁴⁸

To this comment Seton-Watson attached the names of several prominent Serbs, including: Pasic, Jovan and Ljubomir Jovanovic, Marinkovic, Draskovic, Cvijic, Slobodan Jovanovic, Novakovic (who died shortly after), Markovic and many others. All had agreed to let the Croats decide for themselves their relations to Serbia. "No attempt will be made to incorporate the various provinces, unless their representatives decide in favour of such a course. So far as religious matters are concerned, the Archbishop of Agram [Zagreb] would take equal rank with the Serb Patriarch."⁴⁹

However, at the same time that Seton-Watson became convinced of Serbian adherence to the Yugoslav ideal, his promotion of that ideal in Britain suggests the uncertainty of Serbia's allegiance. In a letter to Runciman on 19 March 1915, Seton-Watson stated emphatically that if the Entente was unwilling to "adopt the programme of Southern Slav unity against Austria-Hungary," and attempted to impose a solution on Serbia with only "a mere promise of Bosnia and a vague expression of good will regarding Dalmatia," Serbia might quite easily be driven into "the arms of Austria, who has already

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 193. Emphasis added. Seton-Watson's conversations with the Crown Prince occurred on the 3 and 4 January 1915.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 200-1. Stanojevic was a Serbian historian.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 201.

twice made overtures on the basis of the status quo.”⁵⁰ But, if Serbia could so easily accept the status quo and the continuation of Austria as a state, one might wonder how committed Serbia was to “Southern Slav unity.”

Again in June 1915, Seton-Watson’s comments imply Serbia’s lack of commitment. In a letter to William Miller, an historian and correspondent for the *Morning Post*, he disclosed his disappointment with the Serbs’ representation in London. “Serbia has been served badly by her diplomatists. The one here is unspeakable. It is impossible to work with him, but providentially we have Professor Cvijic here. Even Vesnic has not altogether risen to the occasion, and set Delcassé’s back up at the critical moment.”⁵¹ The “unspeakable one” was the Serbian Minister in London, Mateja Boskovic. He was constantly at odds with Seton-Watson, who preferred to work through Jovan Cvijic, who had no official designation. Unfortunately, Cvijic was not in London very long. As a result, in the summer of 1915, Seton-Watson invited Milan Milojevic to replace Cvijic. But on 18 August, Milojevic declined. His response suggests the Serbs’ priorities:

J’étais tout particulièrement flaté de votre proposition pour venir remplacer en quelque sorte mon éminent ami Mr. Cvijic. Mr. Pachitch en voit également utilité. Cependant, je n’ai pas voulu insister parceque cela me fait paraître travailler pro domo sua. En dehors de cela je suis beaucoup trop occupé. Outre le travail au Ministère, je dirige presque entièrement la partie politique de l’organe de mon parti. Je me sens assez fatigué et je crois que le changement de travail me fera surement du bien. Il se peut que les choses s’arrangeront de la façon que je vous serre la main à Londres avant de vous saluer chez nous.⁵²

Seton-Watson was not satisfied at all with this response. On 20 September 1915, he wrote to Jovan Jovanovic, the Serbian Deputy Foreign Minister, complaining of Boskovic’s complete uselessness in London.

La Serbie n’est pas représentée à Londres. Le Ministre manque totalement d’initiative personnelle. Par contre son pouvoir d’obstruction est considerable et l’inélasticité de son esprit le rend inaccessible aux arguments...Monsieur Boskovic se trouve entièrement isolé à Londres. Il ne jouit de la confiance de personne et ne possède aucune relation dans le monde politique ou littéraire. Il ne comprend ni l’Angleterre ni le caractare ni les institutions britanniques.⁵³

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 206.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 226. Professor Jovan Cvijic was a Serbian Geographer and ethnologist, who worked for some time during the war in London. Theophilé Delcassé was the French Foreign Minister.

⁵² Ibid., p. 231. The organ of M. Milojevic’s party, the Radical Party, was *Samouprava*.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 242.

Seton-Watson concluded that the entire reciprocal relationship between Great Britain and Serbia was at stake, and “il est essentiel que la Serbie soit dignement représentée à Londres, et que l’on mette fin à ces malheures intrigues sans trop tarder.”⁵⁴

By 26 September 1915, Seton-Watson’s disgust with Boskovic’s inaction and intrigues “à la Chlumetzky” led to a complete break in their relations. He warned Milenko Vesnic, the Serbian Minister to France, that the Serbian cause and the Serbian Government were quickly losing friends in London as a result of Boskovic’s intrigues:

Je n’ai plus de relations avec la Légation de Serbie ici, et une réconciliation est impossible, tant pour moi que M. Steed ou Sir Arthur Evans. On voudrait ruiner M. Supilo par des calomnies aussi bêtes que perfides, en insinuant qu’il travaille contre la Serbie, et même qu’il accepte de l’argent de - on ne savait pas dire qui. Bref, des intrigues à la Chlumetzky...Nous avons protesté très ouvertement à Nis, et si l’on ne ferait rien - et vie - j’irais moi-même à Nis.⁵⁵

Vesnic responded only that he was in complete agreement with Seton-Watson and that he despaired over Boskovic’s intrigues against Supilo.⁵⁶

Seton-Watson also complained to Bogdan Popovic, a literary historian and professor at Belgrade University, who spent the war in London. Popovic wrote back on 5 October 1915 assuring Seton-Watson that he was contributing to the “réalisation de notre commun idéal.” He expressed his and the Serbian government’s identification with the common Yugoslav cause and with his fellow Southern Slavs, the Croats and Slovenes: “Qui aime d’amour les Croates et les Slovènes comme mes compatriotes de Serbie; on peut bien penser que ce n’est certes pas au moment où cette cause est le plus proche de triompher, que je songerais à entreprendre quoi que ce soit qui peut lui nuire.”⁵⁷ But Popovic also suggested that there was a need to look at Boskovic’s side of the disagreement. It is questionable whether the opinion of Popovic was influential in Serbian, or even Yugoslav circles. Popovic was not directly employed by the Serbian Government. He was an historian living in London at a time when his government was in exile in Corfu.

Despite Seton-Watson’s complaints about Serbian representation in London, his

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 243.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 245. Emphasis added. Leopold Chlumecky was the editor of *Oesterreichische Rundschau*.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 246.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 247.

support for Serbia increased. Seton-Watson and Sreed had been instrumental in the creation of the Serbian Relief Fund in September 1914. On behalf of the Fund, Seton-Watson spent two months in early 1915 in the Balkans with George M. Trevelyan, another officer of the fund, inquiring into what was needed most. When they returned, they wrote a letter to the British press pleading for aid to Serbia. They concluded that "Britain's duty to Belgium comes first but the little State that has stood in the gap at the other end of Europe has established a second claim, and no small one."⁵⁸ By 15 March, things looked very promising. Seton-Watson wrote to Mabel Grujic that "the Serbian Relief Fund is being steadily taken up. Three weeks ago or a little more the Queen became Patroness and then Asquith, Bonar Law, Austen, Chamberlain, Churchill, Samuel and Noel Buxton have all become Vice-Presidents and the Government is more than merely friendly."⁵⁹ Seton-Watson also commented on the fund's success in a letter to Hinko Hinkovic. On 28 April 1915, he noted that "our 8 months' agitation for Serbia (on humanitarian grounds for the Serbian Relief Fund) has been 100 times more successful than I should ever have dared to hope (eg we may very soon reach £100,000)."⁶⁰ Seton-Watson's efforts on behalf of Serbia demonstrate his wholesale advocacy of that country's inclusion in his Yugoslav ideal, as well as his confidence in the Serbs' sincerity towards that ideal.

But by September 1915, Seton-Watson's confidence began to diminish. The Serbs may have been speaking in terms of "National unity," but what constituted that unity was a question of perspective. The Serbian Government's actions and comments indicated that its goal was Serbian national unity. Seton-Watson became concerned enough by the fall of 1915, that on 17 September he wrote a letter to Prince Regent Aleksandar, criticizing the Greater Serbian conception of unity, and arguing that "Serbia should conduct a consistently Yugoslav policy and become the Yugoslav Piedmont."⁶¹ Seton-Watson made clear to the Prince Regent the need for Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes to be given equal footing in the future Yugoslav state:

Comme récompense des sacrifices qu'on lui demande au sud de son territoire, la Serbie n'a

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 198.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 200. Letter was dated 15 March 1915.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 215.

⁶¹ Ibid., quoted from a translation of the French text, p. 437. The letter was marked "Très Confidentielle".

pas seulement le droit - l'honneur et l'intérêt l'oblige même - de demander d'être admise dans l'alliance à pied égal et non pas seulement comme la Serbie, mais comme le représentant et porte-parole de toute la race yougoslave, des croates et des slovénes autant que des Serbes, et comme protagoniste de ce principe nationale qu'ont adopté les nations alliées dans leur programme de guerre.⁶²

Serbian promotion of a "Greater Serbia" was not the only obstacle Seton-Watson faced in promoting his Yugoslav ideal. By March 1916, a disagreement had opened up between Frano Supilo and the main representative of the Yugoslav Committee, Ante Trumbic. Bitterly disappointed by Pasic's back-sliding since his declaration in the Skupstina in November 1914 in favour of the national unity of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, "Supilo had begun to think more and more in Croatian national terms."⁶³ Supilo's thinking put him increasingly at odds with Trumbic and the Yugoslav Committee. Seton-Watson and Steed met with both leaders in Paris in early March, in an attempt to bring about their personal reconciliation. Seton-Watson saw these negotiations as crucial. The Yugoslavs had to present a united front in order to obtain an equitable agreement with Pasic. And all three, Pasic, Trumbic, and Supilo, had to be in agreement, if they wished to negotiate effectively with the Italians, and negate the deleterious concessions granted by the Allies to Italy in the Treaty of London. On 12 March, in a letter to his wife, May, Seton-Watson stated that the Committee's "courage needs to be brought to the sticking point...This is in many ways for their cause the most critical moment of the war, and I am glad they realize it."⁶⁴

From the start, Supilo proved difficult. In a letter to May, Seton-Watson complained that "our friend from Fiume [Supilo] is showing his autocratic tendencies to an altogether excessive degree, and had succeeded in uniting practically the whole Committee against him simply by reason of his secrecy and *personal* manner."⁶⁵ Seton-Watson summarized "Supilo's line" as follows: Supilo "maintained that he no longer had any confidence either in Yugoslav Committee or in Serbian Government. He feared that the promises of the latter...would prove false, and that Pasic would yield to Russian pressure

⁶² Ibid., p. 237.

⁶³ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 155.

⁶⁴ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 260.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 260. Emphasis in original.

(and revert to his old attitude re Orthodox state)."⁶⁶ Supilo stated emphatically that he was going to the Rome Congress with the Italians "to save Croatia." Seton-Watson urged upon Supilo the need for the Committee to present a united front, that a clear basis should be "imposed upon Pasic and accepted by Crown Prince," and that Supilo must "under no circumstances go to Italy on his own."⁶⁷ Seton-Watson and Steed engaged in several long conversations with Trumbic and Supilo, both separately and together. Their efforts were temporarily successful. Seton-Watson noted that "as a result of our urgent appeals," Supilo was "reconciled," and that they had "held him back from separate action."⁶⁸

Further progress was made when the Serbian crown prince Aleksandar arrived in London on 31 March. He was welcomed by, and received, a number of Yugoslavs then living in London. On 2 April, Seton-Watson presented him with a memorandum which strongly urged that Serbian policy should be based on the unity of the Southern Slavs. It is not known what Aleksandar thought of this memorandum. However, on 6 April, he made a speech that suggested he agreed with its main outline. Aleksandar stated that Serbia's ideal was "the union in one single fatherland of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who are one people with the same traditions, the same tongue, the same tendencies, but whom an evil fate has divided. In this victory our Yugoslav people, united in a single State, will also have their part, for their destiny is irrevocably bound up with that of a new, a better and a juster Europe."⁶⁹ Partly in response to Seton-Watson's frequent complaints, Aleksandar also promised that Boskovic, the Serbian minister in London, would soon be replaced by Jovan Jovanovic.

While the spring of 1916 seemed to bring with it the promise of greater unity and cooperation among the Southern Slavs, the fall brought new obstacles to Seton-Watson's promotion of the Yugoslav ideal in Britain. One of the strongest challenges, on a very personal level, came from his former tutor at Oxford, Herbert Fisher. On 26 September

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 261. Emphasis in original. Seton-Watson noted in summarizing Supilo's line that Steed and himself "still believed" in the promises of the Serbian government.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 261.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 261.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson's *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 157. This was the first public use by a Serbian spokesman of the word "Yugoslav."

1916, he wrote to Seton-Watson assuring him that he was “in favour of a Greater Serbia.”⁷⁰ But he was concerned that Great Britain should stick to its commitment to Italy. Moreover, he wondered whether the Croats really wanted to unite with the Serbs. “In other words I would like to see every Southern Slav join in to Serbia who *wants* to come in to the new state, but do we any of us know enough to say that given the principle of free choice, *all* the Southern Slavs would join up?”⁷¹ After treading on a rather sensitive aspect of the Yugoslav ideal, Fisher backed off, concluding that these were only points of inquiry and that he was “in a large way...thoroughly sympathetic” with Seton-Watson’s work.

It is not surprising, considering the great respect Seton-Watson held for his former tutor, that his response was of considerable length.⁷² It was based on his personal experience living among and corresponding with the Croats and Serbs prior to the war. “During all this period I was on really intimate terms with several of the ablest Croat and Serb leaders, besides being personally acquainted with practically all others of any importance, and I can testify that practically all of them were permanently obsessed by the fear of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which to them meant a civil war and the most hideous calamity which could be imagined.”⁷³

Seton-Watson then described the Hungarian Government’s reaction to the Yugoslav Committee’s Manifesto to the British people of April 1916 being communicated to the Yugoslav peoples of Hungary, and the reaction of Croatian politicians to the resulting Hungarian pressure to renounce that manifesto’s profession of Southern Slav independence

⁷⁰ It is a bit confusing, or perhaps telling, to see a reference to “Greater Serbia” here. Certainly, Fisher thought that this state included the Croats in some sort of equitable union. The fact that Seton-Watson did not object to Fisher’s use of this term in his response suggests that he too considered it synonymous with Yugoslavia. In a letter that Seton-Watson co-wrote with Burrows to Members of Parliament on 28 March 1916, we find a similar association. “Only the completest triumph of the Allies in the war can fulfil *the ideal of a Greater Serbia, stretching north to include Croatia.*” (*R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 264.) It does seem peculiar that Seton-Watson was willing to use this term to describe the cause he promoted, when one considers his objection to the Serbs’ promotion of their “Greater Serbia” ideal.

⁷¹ *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 274. Emphasis in original.

⁷² In his concluding remarks, Seton-Watson said as much. Apologizing for the length of the letter, he commented: “I’m afraid it looks as if I was reverting to New College days in throwing a kind of thesis at your head!” *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

and unity.

These facts and the contents of the manifesto soon became known in Croatia, and great pressure was put upon the leaders of the various Croat parties by the Hungarian Premier Count Tisza, to disavow it publicly. But not merely could no party be induced to make a declaration of such a kind but not even any individual deputy, not even of the little anti-Serb group known as the party of Pure Right, and the Diet would not even consider a motion for the confiscation of Dr Hinkovic's property (one of the signatories and a member of the Diet).⁷⁴

Seton-Watson also recounted the desertion of many Croatian soldiers and officers from Austrian regiments to the Allied side to support his argument. "During the Serbian campaign of 1914, Serbian and Croatian regiments, including many officers, surrendered wholesale to the Serbs, and made up much more than half of their total of sixty to seventy thousand prisoners. The same is true of the Russian frontier, where the Croats and Serbs have surrendered as freely as the Czechs, when occasion offered."⁷⁵

Fisher was quite impressed by his former student's long disquisition, particularly by his account of the many desertions from the Austrian army and of the formation of an Allied Yugoslav division at Odessa. But he was not entirely convinced. He wondered about the underlying reasons for the actions of the Croats and Serbs under Hungarian rule. Were they really in favour of uniting all Southern Slavs, or were they merely anti-Magyar and willing to entertain any scheme which could end Magyar dominion? As Fisher put it, with regard to Seton-Watson's friendly reception in Croatia following his book promoting Yugoslav unity, "Was your enthusiastic reception ...accorded to the Hammer of the Magyar or to the apostle of Jugo-Slavia?"⁷⁶

Again, Fisher sensed the weakest point in Seton-Watson's argument, suggesting that even if one accepts the enthusiasm of the Croats towards unity, one must question the motivation behind that enthusiasm. Indeed, the anti-Magyar reaction cannot be ignored in trying to understand the motives of those wishing to create a new Yugoslavia. Both Seton-Watson and Steed saw the persuasive nature of Magyar oppression. They clearly expressed this motivation in a memorandum from the "British Friends of Serbia to Prince Regent Aleksandar," jointly composed on 5 May 1916. "The Yugoslav people is united in

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 279.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 279.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 282. Fisher's letter was dated 11 October 1916.

suffering, and an unique opportunity presents itself for rebuilding on the widest possible basis.”⁷⁷ If the unification of the Yugoslavs was brought about by common suffering (i.e. a common oppressor), then perhaps Professor Fisher was correct. No response from Seton-Watson to Fisher’s last question has survived and Seton-Watson was not deterred.

In October 1916, Seton-Watson and Steed collaborated in the formation of “The Serbian Society of Great Britain.” At its inaugural meeting of 24 October, Steed laid down their vision of the future Yugoslav state.

A thorough solution of the Southern Slav question requires not only political union between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but their eventual fusion into one united people. It is not a question of allotting to Serbia provinces inhabited by other branches of her race and tongue, nor of handing over this district or that to her as “compensation”. Nothing can “compensate” heroism so magnificent and sufferings so terrible as those of Serbia save the unification of the Southern Slav race. It is a question of giving practical application, in favour of the Southern Slav race as a whole, to the principle of nationality and the principle of equality of political and religious rights, and of securing for Serbia that seaboard of which her enemies have hitherto deprived her.⁷⁸

The aspirations of Steed, Seton-Watson and the Serbian Society were not immediately fulfilled. As Steed’s statement suggests, Serbia was looking for “compensation” for its sacrifices, and not simply a union with “the other branches of her race and tongue.” Seton-Watson was not the champion of “compensation” for Serbian sacrifices, but of a new state with greater protection for the oppressed nationalities of the crumbling Austro-Hungarian empire. He saw the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as separate at present, but like Steed, he envisioned “their eventual fusion into one people.” Seton-Watson thus adopted the unitarist Yugoslav position. “The crucial element of unitarist mentality was the belief that separate linguistic and literary media, state traditions, confessional allegiances, and so on, could be fused into a new quality....They wished to fire the crucible of the unational Yugoslav blend by denying the importance of historical influences in the life of the South Slavs.”⁷⁹ Unfortunately, the political struggle between the Serbs’ promotion of a “Greater Serbia” - bringing under Serbian rule the lands of the Croats and Slovenes formerly under Habsburg rule - and the latter two nationalities’ promotion of a Yugoslav ideal - three nations under

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 265.

⁷⁸ Reprinted in Steed, Vol.II, pp. 126-7.

⁷⁹ Banac, p. 102.

one federation - greatly inhibited the realization of the Serbian Society's and Seton-Watson's vision.⁸⁰

In the same month, Seton-Watson also undertook the publication of a new weekly, *The New Europe*. The founding group included: Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, Ronald Burrows (Principal of King's College), A.F. Whyte, Steed and Seton-Watson. But Steed noted that "Masaryk and Seton-Watson were the prime movers in the scheme. Seton-Watson bore practically the whole cost and, until 'mobilized,' did most of the work."⁸¹ *The New Europe* was never a widely circulated journal, but it has been argued that its impact was substantial. "Although its circulation never exceeded 5000, during the four years of its existence [1916-1920] it undoubtedly exercised a considerable influence on those people interested and involved in European affairs."⁸² Seton-Watson described the new publication's main objective in the first edition. "Its highest ambition will be to provide a rallying ground for all those who see in European reconstruction, on a basis of nationality, the rights of minorities and the hard facts of geography and economics, the sole guarantee against an early repetition of the horrors of the present war."⁸³

While this ambition seemed to include all "minorities" and nationalities, it is quite clear that the main focus of the journal was the Serbian and Yugoslav cause. Steed admitted as much in his memoirs, by stating that "simultaneously with the founding of *The New Europe* we formed a society called 'The Serbian Society of Great Britain' with the objects

⁸⁰ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson claim that the conflict between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee was one of the two main reasons why Seton-Watson and Steed failed to bring about British recognition of the Yugoslavs in August of 1918, when they did so for the Czechoslovaks. (The other reason was "the opposition of Sonnino.") *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 31. (From Hugh and Christopher's introduction.)

⁸¹ Steed, Vol.II, 124. In 27 March 1917, Seton-Watson was drafted as a private into the Royal Army Medical Corp, stationed in Blackpool. By 30 April, he had been transferred to the Intelligence Bureau at the Department of Information. (See Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, pp. 185-207.)

⁸² *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 28. (From Hugh and Christopher's introduction.) Accolades for *The New Europe* came from many intellectuals. The prominent historian, G.P. Gooch, wrote to Seton-Watson on 3 February 1918 suggesting that "it would be a pleasure to meet one day...I continue to read your interesting weekly with care and profit." (*Correspondence*, p. 313, letter dated 3 February 1918.)

⁸³ Quoted in Steed, Vol.II, p. 125 and originally printed in *The New Europe*, Vol.I, No.1 (19 October 1916).

of promoting Southern Slav union and of preparing the way for an agreement between the Southern Slavs and Italy that might neutralize the evil effects of the Treaty of London.”⁸⁴

Seton-Watson was not only instrumental in the creation of *The New Europe*, he was also a major contributor. Although it is perhaps impossible to ever know the full extent of his involvement, his two sons, Hugh and Christopher state that throughout its publication “Seton-Watson wrote not only many signed articles, under both his own name and the pseudonym Rubicon, but also many of its unsigned leaders and smaller items.”⁸⁵ They also argue that the mandate of the journal was wider than Steed’s comment implies. “Throughout its first eighteen months *The New Europe* conducted an increasing campaign in favour of Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav causes and against separate peace with Austria-Hungary or Bulgaria.”⁸⁶ Regardless of *The New Europe*’s exact focus, it was clear that a major impetus behind the new publication was Seton-Watson’s promotion of the Yugoslav cause.

Seton-Watson also promoted this cause at the Foreign Office. With Steed, he introduced important Yugoslav leaders to the Foreign Office and to Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary. Steed noted in his memoirs that they had introduced Frano Supilo to the Foreign Office, and helped him make a positive impression there. “Supilo continued to enjoy the respect of the British Foreign Office until his fatal illness and death in September, 1917.”⁸⁷

Unlike his friend and contemporary Lewis Namier, Seton-Watson was never employed by the Foreign Office. He offered his services to that office at the beginning of the War as a specialist on Central Europe and the Balkans. Being well off, Seton-Watson offered these services without pay, but he was politely refused. He spent the first two years of the war as a private citizen, while actively promoting the Yugoslav cause. In March 1916, he was conscripted as a private into the Royal Medical Corps, but was soon assigned to the Intelligence Bureau of the newly-created Department of Information, where he and

⁸⁴ Steed, Vol.II, p. 126.

⁸⁵ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 28. (From Hugh and Christopher’s introduction.)

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 29.

⁸⁷ Steed, Vol.II, p. 54.

Namier were put in charge of the East and Central European section. He was allowed to continue to write for *The New Europe*, but had to resign the editorship and leave his contributions unsigned. He remained with the Intelligence Bureau until it was transformed into the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office in April 1917. He was then attached to Lord Northcliffe's Propaganda Department at Crewe House. Sir James Headlam-Morley considered it a grave loss to the Foreign Office that Seton-Watson was not included in the transformation to the Political Intelligence Department.⁸⁸ At Crewe House he did valuable work in persuading the War Cabinet to establish a definite policy of encouraging the national aspirations of the oppressed nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

By the winter of 1916-17, some of the disagreements among the Yugoslavs broke out into the open. Steed noted that there were "serious bickerings" among the Yugoslavs, and that as a result "the [Yugoslav] Committee itself was far less efficient than the Czechoslovak National Committee under Masaryk, Benes, Stefanik."⁸⁹ The source of this bickering was, for Steed, clearly determinable. "The Serbian Government, in exile at Corfu, and particularly the Prime Minister, Pasic, were unwilling to accept the Southern Slav programme of national union on a federal basis with full political and civil equality for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes."⁹⁰

Seton-Watson was also unhappy with the behavior of the Pasic government. In January 1917, he once again complained of its lack of representation in London. On 10 January 1917, he wrote to Vesnic, the Serbian Ambassador to Paris, strongly urging greater representation in London, adding that it was especially pertinent now that Lloyd George was in power and the "old gang" had been removed. He argued that London was where the Yugoslavs could gain the most support. "In Geneva their time is more or less wasted: in Paris they are merely preaching to the converted: in London their presence is

⁸⁸ Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna Cienciala, eds., *Sir James Headlam-Morley: A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (London: Methuen and Co., 1972), pp. xx-xxi. Hereafter, "Headlam-Morley".

⁸⁹ Steed, Vol.II, pp. 165-6.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 166.

needed to complete and assist the work of conversion.”⁹¹

But Seton-Watson did not limit his complaints to the Serbian government. In the same letter, he complained about Supilo’s propensity toward “ploughing a lonely furrow,” remarking that this was “not quite enough.” In fact, he accused the entire Yugoslav group of being quite inactive, and hoped that the arrival of Mice Micic from South America would “bring matters to an issue.” He told Vesnic that he had begged Micic “to make use of the names of all the English friends of the Yugoslavs, in urging upon Dr. Trumbic and the others the absolute necessity for an abandonment of this policy of masterly inactivity.”⁹²

On 22 February 1917 in a letter to Ivo de Giulli, a member of the Yugoslav Committee, Seton-Watson complained once again of the Yugoslavs’ inactivity. Once again, he ignored the implications of his complaint and even decided to push on ahead with their cause without them.

As I think you know the English friends of Jugoslavia have been greatly disturbed by the inactivity of the Committee for many months past and by the absence of all solid work on its part here in London. ...We feel however that it is no longer possible for us to wait, and we have decided to embark upon an active policy of our own, hoping of course very much that the members of your Committee will understand our friendly motives and will agree to help us.⁹³

Seton-Watson’s impatience may have been warranted. But it seems peculiar that this Yugoslav inertia did not make him reconsider whether the Yugoslavs really wanted the type of state that he was promoting.

In May 1917, he wrote a memorandum to the Intelligence Bureau at the Department of Information, to which he had been transferred in April, arguing against the initiative in important circles in Britain for a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. Such a peace would have dashed Seton-Watson’s hopes for the re-division of East-Central Europe on the basis of the principle of nationality. In the memorandum, he argued that the Allies’ note of 10 January 1917 proclaimed this principle, and that their recognition of “respect for nationalities and the right to full security and liberty of all peoples small and great” committed the Allies to the break-up of Austria-Hungary. Seton-Watson alluded to the

⁹¹ *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol. I, p. 287.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 291. Dated 22 February 1917.

threat posed by the revolution in Russia and the calls for “no annexations” to argue against the Allies going back on their proclaimed principles.

Thus, at the moment, the most urgent task of British statesmanship is at one and the same time to rally the democratic revolutionary forces on our side, and to counter the cry for “no annexations.” This can be done by proclaiming our determination to secure to every single nationality in Europe (whether as yet autonomous or not) *the right to self-determination*. This involves assuring to each of the races of Austria-Hungary the same right of settling its own future by means of a free and democratic constituent assembly, as Russia has done in Poland.⁹⁴

Seton-Watson called for a redefinition of Allied war aims commensurate with the goals of revolutionary democracies. “Our war aims have to be restated in a form which would bring out the underlying democratic principle. Revolutionary democracies will fight for principles, not for treaties, pledges or interests.”⁹⁵

Despite the best efforts of Seton-Watson and Steed, disagreements continued between the various Yugoslav leaders, particularly between the Serb Pasic and the Croat Supilo. Pasic continued to express allegiance to the idea of a Yugoslav state. But in his view, that state would belong to a Greater Serbia. “His foreign policy was based on the conventional wisdom of his age. He aimed to extend Serbia’s frontiers as far, and to include as many Yugoslavs, as possible.”⁹⁶

Supilo also voiced his allegiance to the Yugoslav state and considered an independent Croatia only “second-best.”⁹⁷ However, he objected to the idea of the creation of a Yugoslavia as compensation for Serbian sacrifices. He believed Croatia had a long history and traditions that should be preserved in a Yugoslavia that proclaimed complete religious and cultural equality. In a letter to Seton-Watson on 31 December 1916, Supilo argued that “in the future Yugoslav state there must be a guarantee of complete religious equality, and that Serbia is not ripe for its mission of unification.”⁹⁸ As time passed, Supilo’s demands for the equality necessary to preserve Croatian culture became more

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 294. This was Seton-Watson’s first memorandum to the Intelligence Bureau. Emphasis in original.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 294.

⁹⁶ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 137.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 155.

⁹⁸ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 286.

steadfast and bold. On 26 May 1917, he wrote to Seton-Watson insisting upon “the need to solve the Yugoslav Question on the basis of complete equality of rights for the Croatian nation, and the preservation of Croatian culture *in all regions where Croats live*.”⁹⁹

Because Supilo kept the preservation of Croatian culture uppermost in his mind, he often also ran into disagreements with Ante Trumbic, the founder and president of the Yugoslav Committee. They differed mostly in the amount of faith they placed in the possibilities of Serbian cooperation. Trumbic was more willing than Supilo to deal with Pasic and make compromises for the sake of a united Yugoslavia. Yet, when Seton-Watson and Steed had brought them together in March 1916 in Paris, Trumbic had maintained that there were no real political differences between them. He suggested that their disagreements resulted from Supilo’s character. Trumbic found Supilo to be subjective, and complained that he “would inflate a disagreement about a comma in a text into a major conflict; and anyone who was against Supilo would be against Croatia.”¹⁰⁰ The two had come to some sort of personal reconciliation in Paris, but their differences with Pasic continued into the spring of 1917.

In May of 1917, Pasic invited Trumbic to Corfu to clear up the disagreement that had arisen between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee. Before going, Trumbic went to London and conferred with Seton-Watson, Steed, and Supilo. The four came to an agreement “upon the mainlines of any declaration of Yugoslav policy to which the Serbian Government might subscribe.”¹⁰¹ The result of the Trumbic-Pasic negotiations at Corfu was the Declaration of Corfu in July of 1917. The Declaration recognized the desire of the peoples, as expressed by the representatives of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, to constitute themselves as an independent national state. It guaranteed freedom of religion, declared that the Adriatic must be free and open, and “that the Kingdom will include all territory compactly inhabited by our people and cannot be mutilated without attaint to the vital interests of the community. Our nation demands nothing that belongs to

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 444. Emphasis added. The letter can be found on p. 292. As it was published in Italian, I have relied on the editors’ translation summary. The letter was also published in D. Sepic, *Pisma i memorandum i Frana Supila 1914-1917*, (Belgrade, 1967), pp. 191-2.

¹⁰⁰ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 156.

¹⁰¹ Steed, Vol.II, p. 166.

others but only what is its own. It desires freedom and unity.”¹⁰² This agreement satisfied Supilo’s desire for religious equality and represented the high point of concord among the Southern Slavs.

In the same month, the Yugoslavs received some additional support from the Montenegrins. The Montenegrin Prime Minister, Andrija Radovic, had resigned over his support for union with Serbia. In a letter to Seton-Watson, he argued that he had been forced to resign because of King Nicholas’ opposition to a union with Serbia, which would have curbed the King’s power considerably. At that time, he gave clear support to the Yugoslav idea.

D’après les articles parus dans le ‘New Europe,’ et qui m’ont particulièrement intéressé, j’ai pu constater que vous et vos amis vous avez réellement compris le but que nous cherchons à atteindre. Nous désirons l’union du Monténégro à la Serbie et autres pays serbes, croates et slovènes, et en agissant ainsi nous songeons particulièrement aux intérêts des Monténégrins: et nous désirons qu’ils entrent dans le grand État serbe avec tout l’honneur qui leur est dû. L’idéal et les aspirations des peuples serbe et monténégrin sont identiques. Il n’y a aucune différence de race entre les deux peuples; leur dénomination seulement est diverse.¹⁰³

However, it should be noted that Radovic’s references to the union of Montenegrins and Serbians specifically suggests that he may have been more interested in Montenegrin incorporation into a Greater Serbia, than into a Yugoslavia, comprised of all the equal branches of the Southern Slav race.

The death of Frano Supilo in October 1917 was for Seton-Watson and Steed a grave blow to the Yugoslav cause. As one of their closest contacts, Supilo represented more than a leader of that cause. For Seton-Watson, Supilo epitomised the struggle of his people. This was certainly how he eulogized him.

Probably but few of those who read the announcement of Frano Supilo’s death had any perception of the man and what he stood for. And yet it is no exaggeration to describe him as one of the ablest political brains, not merely of his own nation, but of warring Europe as a whole - one of those who, if once assured a hearing, could not have failed to influence the deliberations of the future conference of peace. The story of his life is the story of a national idea which contributed materially to the causes of the war, and whose

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 166.

¹⁰³ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 304. The letter was dated 2 July 1917.

fulfilment must be a vital factor in any stable settlement of Europe.¹⁰⁴

As Seton-Watson admitted, Supilo's death diminished the Yugoslavs' chances for a just settlement at the coming Peace Conference. But Seton-Watson remained optimistic. He concluded his eulogy with the renewed determination of a religious zealot:

Supilo built surely upon unshakable foundations. He has died in exile, with the Promised Land not yet in sight, but truth is on the march, and nothing can arrest its course. That sense of spiritual unity which has been latent through centuries of oppression, has kindled into a flame by the great events of our own century, and has at last passed into the consciousness of the whole race. We cannot as yet foresee the political form in which this unity will find its practical expressions; but we know that as the sparks fly upward, so in one form or another - soon or late, with us or against us - the Southern Slavs will achieve their national ideal.¹⁰⁵

Yet, five months after Supilo's death the Southern Slavs still seemed to disagree about "their national ideal." In February 1918, the former Montenegrin Prime Minister Andrija Radovic suggested to Seton-Watson that the Southern Slav "sense of spiritual unity" was a rather recent development. Radovic contrasted the ancient historical claim for the reunion of Serbia and Montenegro with the recency of the Yugoslav claim.

It should be noted first of all that the two Serbian States, Montenegro and Serbia, have sprung from one and the same national State, i.e. from the Serbian State of the Middle Ages, which, as everybody knows, was destroyed by the Turkish invasion towards the close of the 14th century....Far back in the early days of her history, Montenegro, though separated, always aspired to the deliverance of all her Serbian brothers and to a happy return towards union. whereas the Yugoslav idea of unification is of recent date.¹⁰⁶

Radovic insisted that "Montenegro's aspirations differ in no way from those of Serbia, the two countries being inhabited by one people - the Serbian people. The inhabitants of Belgrade are to those of Cettigne what the inhabitants of London are to those of Winchester."¹⁰⁷

Yet, Radovic's understanding of what constituted a "people" was not very consistent, nor should we expect that it should have been. Seton-Watson and Steed used terms such as race, people, ethnicity, and nationality seemingly interchangeably. It is thus

¹⁰⁴ R.W. Seton-Watson, "Frano Supilo: A Southern Slav Patriot," *The New Europe*, Vol. IV, No. 51(4 October 1917). Reprinted in *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*. Vol.I, p. 379.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

¹⁰⁶ *R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 313.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

not surprising that Radovic went on to demand that the *Serbian people* be compensated for their sacrifices. "They demand the complete realization of their ideals, viz. the deliverance and the union of *all our people*, i.e., of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It is the will of those who are in freedom, it is the vow of those who are in captivity, it is the bequest of our glorious dead."¹⁰⁸

Throughout his long letter, Radovic appears to have been quite confused about Serbian and Montenegrin attitudes, and their relation to the Yugoslav ideal. He referred to the Croats and Slovenes as part of the Serb people only once. Otherwise he only included the Serbs and Montenegrins. Neither ideal was very close to the Yugoslav. He concluded that "Montenegro and Serbia *must* henceforth form one indivisible whole. And that must be not only because the two countries are inhabited by the *same people* and because traditions require it, but also because economic necessity and every condition of national existence imperatively compel it."¹⁰⁹ Clearly, Radovic desired the complete union of Serbia and Montenegro. But whether he considered them to be two peoples or one, and whether the Croats and Slovenes were part of that people was perhaps not as important a question for Radovic.

One of the greatest obstacles to the realization of a Yugoslav state was Italy's claim to the east coast of the Adriatic, which the Allies had largely conceded in the secret Treaty of London. In April 1918, Seton-Watson helped bring together the Yugoslavs and Italians in an attempt to settle their rival claims. The eventual result was the Pact of Rome. Signed in April of 1918, it was the result of a great deal of hard bargaining. The Yugoslav Committee proved especially intransigent throughout the negotiations. At the outset, Trumbic refused to send a delegation to Rome, demanding that the Italians first denounce the assertion of their former President, Boselli, that the Yugoslav ideal was a Viennese plot. Seton-Watson did not appreciate Trumbic's refusal and wrote to him expressing his displeasure:

There now prevails here considerable discouragement, and the effect of further bargaining, still more of the postponement of the conference, might be a very dangerous revulsion of feeling among Italians in favour of a less conciliatory attitude. I may add that I find even among the strongest champions of our ideas, the Unità group, a firm belief in Yugoslav

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 314. Emphasis added.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 315. Emphasis added.

intransigence and imperialistic aims. Your persistence at this very critical moment in an unbending attitude would unquestionably strengthen this erroneous estimate of Yugoslav leaders, and would incidentally place your English friends, who have always denied your intransigence, in a very awkward and weak situation.¹¹⁰

Seton-Watson managed to persuade Trumbic to attend. But the Committee's intransigence did not end there. Seton-Watson and Steed became very frustrated with the Committee's continued recalcitrance. Steed even questioned his support of the Yugoslav cause. He was ready at one point in the negotiations in March 1918 to abandon the Yugoslavs altogether.

During the early hours of March 7th, I and other friends of the Yugoslavs did our utmost to bring them to reason. Some of us even pointed out that, should their recalcitrance prevent an agreement, they might as well leave London, since they would have shown themselves pro-Austrian in practice however anti-Austrian they might be in principle. Torre [Chief Italian negotiator] was so dejected that I promised to give him a letter for publication testifying to his patience and saying that, henceforth, I and my friends should withdraw our support from the Southern Slavs.¹¹¹

Considering the power that Steed thought he wielded, this was certainly a serious threat from his point of view, and, in his mind, it was certainly lucky for the Yugoslavs that Trumbic gained the Yugoslav Committee's approval.

Seton-Watson was also frustrated by the intransigence of the Yugoslavs during the negotiations in Rome. In a letter to Steed on 30 March 1918 from Rome, he hoped that Steed would return there by 4 March, "because the team will obviously need a good deal of driving!"¹¹² Eventually, the Congress of Rome led to an agreement in April 1918 between the Italians and Yugoslavs, known as the "Pact of Rome." In August 1918, Seton-Watson explained in a memorandum to the Propaganda Department, the importance of that agreement. "The Congress of Rome of last April has a special propagandist value because 1) It represented the definite adhesion of Italy to Mazzinian principles; 2) Because the preliminary condition which made it possible was an agreement between representative Italians and Yugoslavs; 3) Because for the first time five of the oppressed Austro-Hungarian nationalities publicly collaborated on an anti-Habsburg basis."¹¹³

Yet, neither the Declaration of Corfu nor the Pact of Rome proved lasting. In the

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 317. The letter to Trumbic was dated 2 April 1918.

¹¹¹ Steed, Vol.II, pp. 183-84.

¹¹² R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 317.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 329.

summer of 1918, Steed found the attitude of the Serbian Government as a whole was “by no means satisfactory” and complained that “side by side with the defection of Italy from the policy of the Rome Congress of subject Hapsburg races, ran the defection of M. Pasic from the Declaration of Corfu [of July 1917] which had fore-shadowed a united Yugoslav State on the basis of complete political and religious equality between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.”¹¹⁴

Seton-Watson had also become quite disillusioned with Serbia’s failure to carry through its statements of adherence to a Yugoslav state. The Serbs had promised a great deal and left much unfulfilled. Their intermittent cooperation fuelled Seton-Watson’s optimism, while their continued association of Yugoslavia with a “Greater Serbia” repeatedly clashed with his vision of an essentially federal structure providing equality for Serbs, Croats and Slovenes alike.

This clash became more open in the summer of 1918 . Seton-Watson and Steed hoped that Allied recognition of the authority of the exiled Czechoslovak National Council in early August would soon be followed by a similar recognition of the *joint* authority of the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee. But when Trumbic approached Pasic about joint action in July 1918, Pasic declared it unnecessary. He told Trumbic that “Serbia...internationally represents our nation of three names....It is obvious therefore that there is no need to ask the Allies to do the same thing with us which they have done with the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles, for these two nations have not got their own free state, to represent their Piedmont.”¹¹⁵ Pasic’s response was a clear indication of his continued allegiance to the Greater Serbian ideal. As Banac notes, “equal recognition of the Serbian government and the JO [Yugoslav Committee] would jeopardize Pasic’s goal of unification along Great Serbian lines.”¹¹⁶ Seton-Watson was greatly disturbed by the Pasic government’s response, and in late August he went on the offensive.

On 22 August 1918, at a crucial stage in the attempt to gain international recognition

¹¹⁴ Steed, Vol.II, p. 230.

¹¹⁵ Official statement of the Serbian government, telegraphed to Trumbic on 5 August 1918, Jankovic and Krizman, *Gradje o stvaranju jugoslovske drzave*, pp. 243-4. Cited in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 300.

¹¹⁶ Banac, p. 132.

of a united Yugoslavia, Seton-Watson resorted to a virulent attack on Pan-Serbianism and the Pasic government. In an article in *The New Europe* titled "Serbia's Choice," he stated that

it is absolutely essential that if the recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks is to be followed by a recognition of the Yugoslavs, Serbian statesmen should close their ranks, and present a united front, both among themselves and as between themselves and the representatives of their Yugoslav kinsmen. There must be an end to the foolish policy of pinpricks which Corfu has latterly adopted towards the Yugoslavs, and which has taken the form of confiscation of Yugoslav pamphlets, special censorship methods and dismissal of high officials noted for their wholehearted advocacy of Yugoslav principles.¹¹⁷

The article reflects Seton-Watson's struggle to keep the Yugoslav factions together. While stressing the importance of Yugoslav unity at that particular historical moment, he could not resist questioning "how far Serbian statesmanship - as distinguished from those qualities of simple heroism and loyal endurance by which the Serbian people has won the hearts of its Allies - has been responsible for the change, and how far her leaders have not merely waited upon events in an attitude of masterly inactivity."¹¹⁸

Seton-Watson suggested that at the very heart of Serbia's "inactivity" were Pasic and his deputy, Stojan Protic, and their apparent backsliding into the "semi-Turkish traditions" of their youth. He concluded that "in Serbia, as elsewhere, our sympathy and support must be given, not to the old Oriental tendencies, now tottering to their fall, but to those new and democratic elements in whose hands the future of Yugoslavia lies."

Yet Seton-Watson's optimism shone through his attack. The anti-democratic tendencies were "tottering." Seton-Watson did not explain why there was a contradiction between his view of the future of Yugoslavia and those of the Serbian leaders. In fact, despite the virulence of his attack on the "semi-Turkish" Serbian leaders, he remained hopeful. He reminded his readers that in November of 1914, the Skupstina "had enthusiastically and unreservedly supported the programme of Yugoslav unity."¹¹⁹ He even attempted to reassure his readership that the disputes among the Serbs and between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee in the last year were no indication "of any slackening or uncertainty in the national ideal, though, on the other hand, they very

¹¹⁷ R.W. Seton-Watson, "Serbia's Choice," *The New Europe*, Vol. VIII, No. 97(22 August 1918):121-28.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

seriously affect the morale of those upon whom that ideal depends for its achievement.”¹²⁰

But Seton-Watson’s reassuring words could not have counter-balanced the main focus of the article, his open admission of a serious disagreement between Pasic and the Yugoslav Committee. The journal that Seton-Watson had originally founded to promote the Serbian and Yugoslav cause had now become the stage upon which its founder exposed the growing division among the Yugoslavs for all to see.

The Serbian response to Seton-Watson’s article was mixed. Seton-Watson published Stojan Protic’s reply in the 26 September 1918 edition of *The New Europe*. Protic defended the character of Pasic and questioned that of Seton-Watson. Protic denied that Pasic had ever been exposed to either “semi-Turkish” or Austrian influences. He suggested that these tendencies might be found closer to Seton-Watson and mentioned Serbia’s continued adherence to the creation of a Yugoslav state on the basis of the Declaration of Corfu. Protic admitted that Serbia had her problems, but asked whether it would be “too much to beg her tried friends, of whom you [Seton-Watson] are one, not to aggravate these difficulties by ill-founded criticism?”¹²¹

Svetolik Jaksic also denounced “Serbia’s Choice.” In quite derogatory language, Jaksic accused Seton-Watson of falsifications and cowardice. He suggested that Seton-Watson’s sources were inadequate, and that he was “un maquereau, soit d’origine, soit par votre veritable profession.”¹²² Jaksic concluded that, “je ne songe même pas, à cause de cela, de vous faire parvenir une rectification, car je pisse sur les écritures des gens ayant une morale pareille à la votre.”¹²³

But not all Serbian deputies denied Seton-Watson’s allegations. In September 1918, Milutin Stanojevic and Milovan Lazarevic wrote to Seton-Watson, attacking Protic. They argued that Protic’s response made inexact distinctions and they despaired that it was

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp. 124-5.

¹²¹ S. Protic, “A Serbian Protest,” *The New Europe*, 26 September 1918. Found in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, pp. 300-1. Originally published by Protic in Serbian in the official organ *Srpske Novine* of 22 September 1918.

¹²² R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 355. The letter was dated 10 October 1918. In using the word “maquereau” Jaksic associated Seton-Watson not with a fish, but with the French slang for a pimp.

¹²³ Ibid.

just this kind of inexactness that inspired and guided the current government of Serbia. The Serbian deputies protested strongly against such tendencies. "Protestons encore davantage contre fait qu'un ministre serbe et sous sa signature puisse supposer éventualité force majeure capable amener Serbie renoncer unité nationale intégrale et opter pour une patrie mutilée. Périront tous ceux qui sont contre grande cause nationale, mais unité intégrale de notre peuple se réalisera."¹²⁴

Jovan Cvijic also agreed with Seton-Watson's article. He even went so far as to send a telegram to Prince Aleksandar at Salonica, calling for the organization of all the forces capable of realizing "une fédération yougoslave" as he believed in the idea of a "U.S. of Yougoslavija."¹²⁵ He criticized "de servilité et des caractères des pandours," and called for a cessation of the Pasic administration's favouritism and corruption. The inactivity and disorder of Serbian external affairs should be replaced by an organisation of all those promoting the national point of view. "Pour réaliser ce programme former un gouvernement de la Concentration nationale avec les plus instuits et les plus laborieux de la Skupstina, en dehors de la Skupstina et des autres Yougoslaves. Le moment est le plus favorable."¹²⁶

Undeterred by Protic's negative reply and, perhaps, encouraged by the positive response of some Serb deputies, Seton-Watson continued his attack on the Pasic administration. On 4 October 1918, on the eve of Pasic's arrival in London for a meeting with Lloyd George, he wrote a letter to the Foreign Office on "The Policy of Mr Pasic and the Foreign Office." He laid out Pasic's position in Serbia, and his relations with the Yugoslav Committee. He criticized Pasic personally as anti-constitutional and autocratic, advocating intrigue and seeking the Entente's support to enhance his personal power in Serbia. Seton-Watson was now convinced of Pasic's detrimental effect upon the Yugoslav cause and that he was unfit to be a leading part of the future Yugoslav nation.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 339. Stanojevic was a deputy in the Serbian parliament and Lazarevic was a deputy and former vice-president of of the Serbian Chamber.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 348.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 348. Cvijic included a copy of the telegram to Prince Aleksandar in his letter to Seton-Watson.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 350-55. Letter dated 4 October 1918.

He defined the political aspirations of the leaders involved, setting forth his position as that of the majority of sane Yugoslav and Serbian intellectuals. Pasic and Protic were living by the old rules of diplomacy, and the situation was far too crucial to be left in their hands. The "Pan-Serb solution" they envisioned was really a form of "territorial compensation" for Serbian sacrifices and was completely at odds with the Yugoslav ideal, which had been "accepted by the great body of Serbian and Yugoslav intellectuals."¹²⁸

Seton-Watson then admitted that the motivation behind Serbian support for the Yugoslav ideal, as expressed by their signing of the Declaration of Corfu, was itself questionable. The Pasic administration had actually been "forced" into the agreement by "external events."

The Declaration of Corfu in July 1917...was in reality forced upon the Pasic Cabinet by external events - on one hand the Russian Revolution with its emphasis on "self-determination" and the American influence, and on the other hand by Mr. Pasic's need of the Yugoslav Committee's support or at least neutrality in internal politics. Since then the Pasic Government has publicly done lip service to the Corfu Declaration, but has steadily refused to apply the principles laid down.¹²⁹

In an interview with Steed in London on 8 October 1918, Pasic confirmed Seton-Watson's analysis of his degree of allegiance to the Declaration. Steed questioned Pasic's refusal to accept members of the Yugoslav Committee officially while in London and suggested that his actions reflected his recent retreat from the Declaration. In response he received a glimpse into Pasic's vision of the future state.

M. Pasic answered, somewhat angrily, that the Declaration of Corfu had merely been issued by him in order to make an impression upon European public opinion. At that time (July, 1917) there had been some talk of constituting Serbia-Yugoslavia as a Federation; but this was impossible. The Yugoslav people were very mixed. There were, for instance, a large number of Serbs in Slavonia and Croatia, all of whom were determined to belong to Serbia and cared nothing for what the Croats might do. Serbia had a right to liberate these people - and, if the Croats and Slovenes wished to belong elsewhere, they might do as they liked.¹³⁰

It must, of course, be remembered that Steed's account would not portray Pasic in a very positive light. Yet Steed claimed that after some debate, Pasic drew back and admitted that he was willing "to observe the Declaration, but that the dominant policy must be his policy

¹²⁸ Ibid., pp. 353-54.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 352-53.

¹³⁰ Steed, Vol.II, p. 236.

and that officials who did not obey his orders must be removed. He alone was entitled to determine what policy should be followed; and those whom he employed had to obey orders.”¹³¹ Steed retorted that the Allied peoples were “in no mood to tolerate Sultans.” The conversation deteriorated from that point on.

Despite Pasic’s attitude towards the Declaration of Corfu and the future Yugoslav state, Seton-Watson continued to lobby for that state. In the same memorandum, he stressed the importance and representative nature of the Yugoslav Committee and dismissed the suggestion that it was merely a product of Austrian intrigue. “Allegations are being put about from Serbian Governmental circles to the effect that the recent Slav Congress at Laibach was an Austrophil and trialist manoeuvre, whereas in reality it was perhaps the most striking of all the demonstrations in favour of Yugoslav unity and the independence which had hitherto taken place inside Austria.”¹³²

Seton-Watson concluded by advocating the policy of the Committee. The Committee was “unanimous in holding that the only possible basis of Yugoslav union is one of complete equality between the various kingdoms and provinces - assuring free expression to the populations of the Yugoslav countries, to decide their own fate.”¹³³ In the Yugoslavs’ opinion, and that “of all their friends,” Serbia should be given no territory as compensation, or to provide access to the sea, but only as the result of “a free expression of will on the part of her kinsmen across the frontier.” Final union could only be decided by the various constituent assemblies. The exclusive recognition of the Serbian government as the representative of all Yugoslavs at the Peace Conference would be protested with the “utmost vigour.” The Committee claimed “absolute parity of treatment, though leaving diplomatic and military matters to the care of Serbia.”¹³⁴

Seton-Watson’s memorandum clearly showed his complete support for the Committee and his disdain for the Pasic government. Yet, he continued to throw olive

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 237. Pasic’s reference seems to have been a response to the accusation of Seton-Watson in his article “Serbia’s Choice,” already mentioned. Steed does not explain what Pasic meant by “observe”, but it seems questionable whether it meant allegiance to the Declaration at all.

¹³² R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 351.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 354.

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp. 354-55.

branches Serbia's way. On 10 October 1918, in cooperation with Steed, Seton-Watson wrote a memorandum from the Propaganda Department to the Foreign Office asking the British government to present to the Serbian government a formula to reunite the Serbs with the Yugoslavs. He called for "recognition of [the] Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary as Allied Nations, enjoying full right to declare their union with free kinsmen of Serbia and Montenegro in single independent state."¹³⁵ He also recommended the recognition of the Yugoslav troops of the rapidly collapsing Hapsburg Monarchy as constituting an "integral part of the Serbian Army," of the Yugoslav Committee as representing their kinsmen at home, and of the "Serbian Government and Yugoslav Committee as equal contracting parties in all matters concerning the Yugoslav nation as a whole."¹³⁶

Seton-Watson also offered alternatives. On 15 October, he wrote another memorandum to the Foreign Office outlining the Committee's plan of action and again inviting the Serbian government to "an immediate conference on the basis of the Declaration of Corfu."¹³⁷ By 18 October, a temporary agreement was reached. As a result of conversations between Pasic, Trumbic, the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, and the President of the Roumanian National Council Take Ionescu, suggestions were put forward for a compromise between the Serbian government and the Committee.

At the same time, Seton-Watson continued to lobby for Allied recognition. In another letter to the Foreign Office, he called for "the immediate recognition of the Yugoslav Nation as an allied and belligerent nation and of the Yugoslav Committee as its mouthpiece abroad, until direct contact can be established with the responsible parliamentary Yugoslav leaders at home."¹³⁸ He also called for the immediate convocation of the Serbian Parliament, and the formation of a "Serbian Cabinet of Concentration." He did not suggest that this had to be led by Pasic. He also recommended the establishment of a joint department of Foreign affairs with two representatives from each of the Serbian Government and the Committee. He explained the necessity of this last step, by noting how

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 355.

¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 355-56.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 356. Dated 18 October 1918.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 357.

crucial this moment was for the Yugoslav cause. "Foreign policy of all the Yugoslavs inside and outside Serbia would thus be unified and placed in direct contact with their principal Allies during the critical period which is impending. This would obviously merely be a provisional arrangement until the conclusion of the Peace Treaty."¹³⁹ For Seton-Watson, the critical moment was clearly the Peace Conference and he believed that a united front was the only way that the Yugoslav cause would be successful there.

With the Peace Conference approaching, Seton-Watson struggled desperately to bring about a consensus among the Yugoslavs and between the Yugoslavs and the Pasic government. Progress was made on 5 October in Zagreb, when the Southern Slav political parties inside the rapidly federalizing Austro-Hungarian empire formed their own supreme representative body, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. Under the leadership of the Slovene leader, Anton Korosec,¹⁴⁰ the National Council soon gave the Yugoslav Committee a mandate to represent it abroad.

However, Pasic soon moved away from the agreement reached in October. Seton-Watson's frustration is reflected in a letter to his wife, May, written on 5 November 1918 from Paris.

The Pasic crisis still drags on, and the old man changes his mind every few hours and cannot be trusted for five minutes with his word of honour or anything else. Unfortunately no one seems to have the energy or courage to knock him over, though he would certainly go like a ninepin. If he does not take care, and if matters are allowed to slide much longer, the dynasty will go the way of other dynasties. The movement in favour of this is gaining ground alarmingly.¹⁴¹

Just four days later, the British ambassador in Berne communicated to Seton-Watson the results of negotiations in Geneva between the Pasic government, the Serbian opposition, Korosec, and the Yugoslav Committee. Pasic, finding himself isolated, admitted that Serbia was not the only representative of the Southern Slavs, and agreed to recognize the "National Council in Zagreb as the legitimate government of the Serbs, Croats, and

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 357.

¹⁴⁰ Anton Korosec was the leader of the Slovene People's Party, chairman of the Yugoslav club in Vienna (1917-18), and President of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb in 1918. Ibid., p. 465.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 359.

Slovenes, who live on the territory of the [former] Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.”¹⁴² The note spoke of the creation of a new Joint Yugoslav War Cabinet designated to draw up a constitution and administer foreign affairs. This twelve-member common ministry was to consist of six members from each of the Serbian government and the National Council, none of them party leaders. Pasic reluctantly agreed to this proposal and on 9 November 1918, a united state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was agreed upon, and Montenegro was also invited to join.¹⁴³ The joint declaration signed by Pasic, Trumbic, Korosec and three Serbian deputies, Draskovic, Marinkovic and Trifkovic announced that “the new State exists....The frontiers which formerly divided us have ceased to exist.”¹⁴⁴

On the same day, Melko Cingrija,¹⁴⁵ one of the leaders of the National Council negotiating in Geneva, wrote to Seton-Watson thanking him and Steed for all they had done for the Yugoslav cause. “If a ray of light and hope has now broken through the dense gloom which until yesterday oppressed us, we know how much that is due to my two friends: Watson and Steed. These things are unforgettable. Within a few days I hope to be able to embrace you both, and it will be one of the happiest moments of my life.”¹⁴⁶

In a letter to May on 10 November, Seton-Watson wrote with certainty of the precarious political position of Pasic and Prince Aleksandar.

Pasic is to be definitely excluded from both small and big Cabinet. Prince Aleksandar arrives to-morrow and it will be a matter of ratifying finally the new era. If he wobbles or tries to save Pasic, he is lost. The Republican movement is rapidly gaining ground, and he has already been very nearly compromised by his support of Pasic and Protic. We are going to speak to him with the utmost plainness and make it clear that there is not a moment to lose.¹⁴⁷

Seton-Watson believed that the situation was so grim that the survival of the Serbian

¹⁴² Jankovic and Krizman, *Gradje*, vol. 2, p. 514. Cited in Banac, p. 134.

¹⁴³ Banac, p. 134. Banac gives a concise account of the Geneva Conference.

¹⁴⁴ Typed copy of the declaration can be found in the *Seton-Watson Papers*. The declaration was printed in full in a slightly different translation in “The New Yugoslav Government,” *The New Europe*, No. 110(21 November 1918). Cited in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, p. 320.

¹⁴⁵ Melko Cingrija was mayor of Dubrovnik 1911-12 and 1918-20, Croatian Deputy in the Austrian Parliament, representative of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs of Zagreb at Geneva Conference in November 1918. See R.W. *Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 460.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 362. Also cited and translated in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, p. 320.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

dynasty was itself questionable. Yet neither Seton-Watson nor Steed were willing to give up on the dynasty very easily. Despite the Prince Regent's support for Pasic and his own ambivalence on the Yugoslav and Macedonian compensation questions, he continued to enjoy their confidence. Pasic had claimed that the Prince Regent would not agree to the Geneva agreement. But Seton-Watson and Steed, as well as Korosec and Cingrija would not believe that Pasic spoke for the Prince.

On 15 November 1918, Seton-Watson and Steed wrote the Prince a letter, in an attempt to directly confirm or disprove Pasic's claim. They noted the disappointment of Cingrija and Korosec with the actions of the Pasic government. These two Croats from Zagreb regretted that Pasic's "reactionary tactics and misstatements" had almost destroyed the harmony created by the Declaration of Corfu and "created a situation which may be dangerous to the dynasty if it is allowed to continue."¹⁴⁸ Both were "extremely anxious that the Prince Regent should realise this without delay, since were he to support the present obstructionist policy of Pasic, the position of the dynasty might be imperilled."¹⁴⁹ The regret of Cingrija and Korosec was shared by Seton-Watson and Steed.

Yet Seton-Watson's assessment of Pasic's position proved faulty, or perhaps, it was indicative of his continued wishful thinking. He was correct in noting that Pasic was not a member of either "cabiret," but this was because no party leaders, Serb, Croat, or Slovene, were allowed to be members. Pasic's absence was no indication that he had lost prestige or political power in Serbia. In fact, his acceptance of the Geneva proposal had been purely tactical. In a letter to Protic on the same day as he signed the Geneva proposal, he noted that "in any case the regent can entirely and without limitations use his right and seek other crown advisors."¹⁵⁰ On 11 November, Protic took up Pasic's suggestion, resigned from the Serbian cabinet and urged Pasic to do the same. The ensuing cabinet crisis lasted seven days and was resolved through the installation of a coalition cabinet, headed by Pasic. Pasic included in his new cabinet members of the parties that had opposed

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 365.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 365.

¹⁵⁰ Pasic to Stojan Protic, 9 November 1918, in Jankovic and Krizman, *Gradja*, vol. 2, p. 214. Cited in Banac, p. 134.

and isolated him in Geneva.

As a result, Pasic was able to regain power in Serbia with the Yugoslav Committee and the National Council already committed to unification. All he had to do was transform the rather “confederalist slant” of the Geneva proposal into a centralized one.¹⁵¹ Pasic found a ready ally in the leader of the Independent Party in Croatia, Svetozar Pribicevic. Pasic utilized Pribicevic’s increasing power in Zagreb to pressure the National Council into accepting the idea of a centralized and unified state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Karadjordjevic dynasty. He threatened that if this idea was not accepted, “all the Serbs would go over to Serbia without hesitation.”¹⁵² Pasic also had the support of the military. By playing on the Zagreb leaders’ fears of Italian aggression and internal disorder, he forced the National Council into accepting the Serbian army’s occupation of most of the territory inhabited by the Yugoslavs.

On 24 November 1918, the Central Committee of the National Council decided on an immediate unification with Serbia and Montenegro. On 30 November 1918, a twenty-eight-member National Council delegation arrived in Belgrade. After some minor resistance, the delegation agreed not to insist that their directives be fully implemented during the negotiations and instead presented a general statement to Prince Aleksandar the following day. In response, Aleksandar proclaimed the unification of Serbia with the lands represented by the National Council into a single unitary Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.¹⁵³

It was therefore on 1 December 1918 that the new Yugoslav state was officially established. Its establishment was dictated by the Pasic government and it largely took on the form of the Serbian state. “Given the role of the Serbian state in the construction of Yugoslavia and the actual if not formal continuation of Serbian state institutions after the unification, the Serbs could adjust to the new circumstances without a feeling of loss, without being deprived of their sense of nation individuality. For the other nationalities, the

¹⁵¹ Banac, p. 135.

¹⁵² Momcilo Nincic to S. Pribicevic, 16 November 1918, in Jankovic and Krizman, *Gradja*, vol. 2, p. 591. Cited in Banac, p. 135.

¹⁵³ Banac, p. 138.

unification was not so simple.”¹⁵⁴

Despite these developments, or perhaps because he did not perceive their import, Seton-Watson continued to promote the Yugoslav cause throughout the Peace Conference. On 25 November 1918, he wrote another extensive memorandum to the Foreign Office: “Respecting Austria-Hungary: Legal Factors Replacing the Dual Monarchy.” The establishment of a united Yugoslavia was presented as “an accomplished fact with which the Entente must reckon.”¹⁵⁵ He also continued to defend Yugoslav claims along the Adriatic coast against the Italians. In January 1919, Seton-Watson was even accused of promoting “Yugoslav imperialism” by the Italian political writer Guglielmo Emanuel.¹⁵⁶ Despite all the intransigence and inactivity of the Serbian government, the masterly inactivity and dilatory behaviour of the Yugoslavs, and even the creation of a unitary Yugoslavia on a largely centralized Greater Serbian basis, Seton-Watson remained true to his cause.

The most comprehensive and thought-provoking historical work on Yugoslavia, Ivo Banac’s *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*, suggests its creation belied the national political realities of the time. The national ideologies of the three principal nationalities had “assumed their all but definite contours well before the unification and could not be significantly altered by any combination of cajolery or coercion.”¹⁵⁷ Banac attributed the fact that these divisions did not forestall that unification to the Yugoslav ideal itself.¹⁵⁸ Yet, one might wonder whether the idea could have been more important than the individuals who promoted it. Indeed, Banac gave some credit to the Yugoslav intelligentsia as well:

They looked upon themselves as engineers who would pull a passive backward country into modernity, if need be by force. Instead of recognizing that the separate South Slavic peoples were long formed and could not now be integrated, they tried to bring about a

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 138.

¹⁵⁵ R.W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: *Correspondence, 1906-1941*, Vol.I, p. 370.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., Vol.II, p. 14. Dated 3 January 1919.

¹⁵⁷ Banac, p. 406.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 407.

Great Serbia or a Great Yugoslavia, some out of sheer idealism, some for more pragmatic reasons. Their attempts to accomplish the impossible were doomed to failure and only succeeded in provoking resistance of such intensity, notably among the Croats, that it could be stemmed only at the expense of parliamentary democracy. Instead of creating a powerful modern state, the intellectual makers of Yugoslavia paved the way for instability, dictatorship, and foreign intervention.¹⁵⁹

Seton-Watson's involvement in the creation of Yugoslavia suggests that perhaps he too enjoyed a pride of place among these Yugoslav intelligentsia.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 225.

Lewis Namier and the Problem of Eastern Galicia.

While Seton-Watson's obsession with the Southern Slav question led him to ignore the political realities of the people he was trying to help, Lewis Namier's obsession with the Eastern Galician question reflected a profound understanding of the political realities of the people he was trying to help. Born into a Polonized Jewish family in Eastern Galicia, Namier was intimately involved in that question from the start. Raised by parents who had rejected their Jewishness and embraced the Polish nationality, he came to reject that nationality in favour of the peoples he feared Polish rule would oppress. Namier's advocacy of Eastern Galician autonomy under the League of Nations reflected his belief in the principle of self-determination for the people of that territory. His continued advocacy throughout the Peace Conference, despite Polish intrigue and personal tragedy at the hands of the Ukrainians and Jews of Eastern Galicia, tested and proved his devotion to that principle.¹

Lewis Namier's origins are very important to understanding his position on the Eastern Galician question. "Born in 1888, so frail that he was initially given up as dead, Ludwik Bernsztajn vel Niemirowski spent most of his youth on his family's estates in Eastern Galicia."² Ludwik was born a Jew in what was then Austrian Poland. He received much of his early education at home from his father, Joseph, whom Namier later described

¹ One article has been written on Namier's promotion of the Galician Ukrainians' cause: Taras Hunczak, "Sir Lewis Namier and the Struggle for Eastern Galicia, 1918-20," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2 (June 1977): 198-210. This brief account of Namier's involvement in the Eastern Galician question argues that Namier's personal influence was instrumental in the formulation of the British pro-Ukrainian policy at the Peace Conference.

² Linda Colley, *Lewis Namier*, p. 7.

as consistently pro-Polish.³ Yet, he also developed a sympathy for the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia at a very young age. Concerned about the “coarsening” effect that the marriage of his first teacher, Ella, to a local widower was having upon Ella’s intellect, Namier developed, at the age of 14, a rather paternalistic, yet “intense sympathy for the submerged and inarticulate part of the population whose vision was sadly limited.”⁴

Namier’s first political ideas were formed under the tutorship of Edmond Weissberg. “Whatever elaborations of thought he reached in time, all stemmed in some circuitous way from the convictions of Weissberg, the brilliant publicist steeped in the Galician-Polish mood prevalent at the turn of the century.”⁵ Weissberg was a young Jewish socialist who later became known as the writer E. Borecki. “Passionately ethical, deeply concerned with every manner of underdog,” Weissberg’s “general political and economic assumptions were Marxist, but the urgent concern was with agrarian reform - the righting of the dispossessed native Ruthenian peasantry’s wrongs; a concern which was reinforced by a mounting sense of outrage at vast acres too often seen to be mismanaged by the stewards of the absentee landlords.”⁶ Growing up in Eastern Galicia, Weissberg, and subsequently Namier, became well aware of the ethnic tensions created by the majority of Ukrainian peasants tilling the soil of Polish landlords. Weissberg believed in and desired the reunion of all Polish lands, but he also thought the Ruthenians should be given their own state. “Would it not be just for tracts of land tilled by Ruthenians to form a separate state, with laws better suited to the Ruthenian peasants, not exclusively to their Polish landlords?”⁷

Under Weissberg’s tutelage, Namier became thoroughly imbued with the ideologies

³ Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier: A Biography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 144. Julia was Namier’s second wife. Her book is the major source on Namier’s personal life. She wrote it at his request and it is based largely on Namier’s own recollections to her in his later years. Indeed, Julia claimed that her book was almost Namier’s autobiography. “After much checking and cross-checking I am satisfied that I have got right even the most tricky sequences; and that this biography presents his life such as he deemed it to have been. If any fact is at all distorted, it was unconsciously shifted from true by him, owing to the mental process he called ‘telescoping’ - an effect of time on memory” (p. xi).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 40-1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

of nationalism and socialism. Yet, it was important to both tutor and pupil that these ideas were carried into action peacefully and democratically. Namier soon joined Weissberg's political party, the Polish Social Democratic Party. Namier claimed that throughout the time of his involvement, that party remained "absolutely true" to its "basic ideals of total ethnic equality among nationalities headed and guided by the Poles."⁸ From as early as 1902, Namier's solution to the Eastern Galician problem included a reunited Polish state for Poles, "administered by socialists with firm liberal intentions." But by 1905 Namier had begun to seriously question the Polish socialists' political programme. "On the one hand they preached national self-determination as the due of every group that ardently wished to set itself free; on the other hand they proclaimed the 'universalism' (the one-ness) of all the dispossessed - a great body of people whose most ardent wishes were assumed to be identical."⁹ By the time Namier matriculated in 1906, he had already begun to question his socialist ideals, while his advocacy of the right of all peoples to national self-determination remained with him and largely informed his later political activities.

In that same year, under his father's insistence, Namier attended Lviv University. It was there that he first experienced a much more intense form of Polish nationalism. As a Jew, Namier's first experience of the Polish nationalism of Roman Dmowski was a lasting one. Namier's wife Julia recalled his description of his short period of study at Lviv.

Apparently, at the faculty of Law L [Namier] at once came up against nationalist students of the extreme type - resembling the Nazis of later days. They took their ideas and inspiration from Roman Dmowski - an aggressively anti-Semitic politician of considerable stature who during World War I became L's personal enemy and proved himself a most unscrupulous intriguer. In 1906 Dmowski had already drawn round him a small but vociferous group of Poles mostly resident in Warsaw, and had gained sympathizers in Austrian Poland too. At Lviv University L [Namier] was confronted by a closely-knit anti-Semitic gang of fierce young Dmowski-ites - the only politically organized group of students.¹⁰

Namier's first encounter with Polish anti-Semitism clearly influenced his later criticism of Dmowski and his followers. It also contributed to his opposition to Polish rule in Eastern Galicia. In fact, the animosity between Namier and Roman Dmowski became a central

⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

⁹ Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 61. "L" was a term of endearment used by Julia and some of Namier's closest friends.

aspect of Namier's whole involvement in the Eastern Galician question.¹¹

Namier soon left Lviv and returned to his family's estate at Koshylivtsi. But he did not stay there long. His father took him to Lausanne University where he attended the winter term of 1906-7 at the faculty of Law. Unable to confine himself to the pursuit of his father's profession, Namier also attended Professor Vilfredo Pareto's lectures on sociology. Pareto left a strong impression on Namier. In fact, it was Pareto who first recommended the London School of Economics to Namier. "He held in high esteem some of the men who taught there and expected much of their pupils."¹² In the summer of 1907, Namier used Pareto's recommendation to convince his father that the "School" was the place for him. But after one year at the L.S.E., Namier again took flight, this time to Oxford where he was taken under the wing of the prominent British historian, A.L. Smith. Residing at Balliol College from 1908 to 1911, Namier blossomed into a promising, bright young scholar. In 1911, he obtained a first class degree in Modern History.

From then until the First World War, Namier engaged in private business in the United States to help pay off his father's mounting debts. In 1914, Namier, who had by then become a British subject and was becoming an enthusiastic Anglophile, returned to Britain and enlisted in the British army.¹³ He was soon released from military service, partly as a result of his very poor eyesight, but also due to the influence of some Balliol chums, and more importantly, his recently developed association with Lord Eustace Percy. Percy also helped him obtain a position at the Intelligence Bureau at Wellington House in

¹¹ One article has been written specifically on this animosity. Paul Latawski, "The Dmowski-Namier Feud, 1915-1918," *Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies*, Vol. 2 (1987): 37-49. Latawski's article sparked a debate with Jędrzej Giertych over the supposedly "tendentious" nature of the article and the relative merit of Dmowski and Namier. See *Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies*, Vol. 5 (1990): 303-26. Both sides of the debate failed to even mention Namier's promotion of the Ukrainian cause in Eastern Galician. Latawski and Giertych focussed on the debate over Dmowski's anti-Semitism and the question of Jewish autonomy in Poland.

¹² Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier*, p. 67.

¹³ It appears that Namier became a thorough-going Anglophile as early as 1910, perhaps first signified by the act of changing his name to "Lewis Bernstein Namier" in that year. Later, on 25 March 1913, he was granted by "one of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State" a certificate of naturalization and was declared a British subject. In the same month, he swore an oath of Allegiance to King George V, and on 17 April he changed the spelling of his name, omitting the "y" after the "a." *Ibid.*, p. 107.

1915.¹⁴

At Wellington House, Namier became directly involved in the complex problems of East and Central Europe, and began to look for a solution to the Eastern Galician question. He was immediately put in charge of monitoring the press of the Austro-Hungarian empire as far south and south-east as the borders of Serbia and Romania, and soon discovered that his home province of Galicia had become “a contentious part of re-emerging Poland.”¹⁵

Yet, he did not submit his first full exposition on the Eastern Galician question to the Foreign Office until 14 September 1917, by which time he had been transferred to the Intelligence Bureau at the Department of Information. Namier titled his memorandum “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe.’” Not surprisingly, the treatise subjected to Namier’s “Remarks” had been written by Roman Dmowski. Namier’s memorandum certainly reflected his animosity toward the Polish National Democratic leader, as when he dismissed Dmowski’s sources. “For his reflections on Austria, he is mainly indebted to memory, for his facts about Russian borderlands, to the toil of his imagination.”¹⁶ Yet, we cannot dismiss Namier’s criticisms as mere polemic. In typical Namierite fashion, his memorandum was lengthy, thoroughly researched, and meticulously argued. Moreover, as long as his conflict with Dmowski is kept in mind, one can draw from his “Remarks” certain underlying assumption about his solution to the Eastern Galician problem.

In his remarks, Namier expressed his concern with Dmowski’s new Poland. At this stage, his comments did not suggest a particular concern for Eastern Galicia, but for the imperative of a future peace. He held that the Entente Powers had to realize the centrality of Russia to any settlement of Eastern Europe, and he argued that Dmowski’s demands required the defeat of not only the Central Powers, but also of Britain’s then ally Russia.

The [Dmowski’s] new Poland is to include, besides the provinces in which Poles form a majority (Russian Poland, Western Galicia, Posnania and parts of Austrian and Prussian Silesia), also the Lithuanian and White Russian governments of Kovno, Grodno, Vilna

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 119-21.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 122-23.

¹⁶ Public Record Office (P.R.O.), London, Foreign Office (F.O.) 371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,’” p. 3. Dated 14 September 1917.

and the greater part of Minsk, and the Little Russian provinces of East Galicia, Cholm and the western and greater part of Volhynia; East Prussia, most of West Prussia and a slice of Pomerania. Moreover, Austria-Hungary is to be broken up into national states. *Obviously the scheme presupposes a crushing and simultaneous defeat both of the central Powers and Russia.*¹⁷

Namier continued to advocate the inclusion of Russia in the post-war settlement throughout the period of his involvement. His comments also imply that he believed that the areas in which the Poles had a majority should be part of the new Polish state and that those areas that did not hold a Polish majority should not be part of that state. This point is illustrated by a further extract, which displays Namier's intimate knowledge of the class relations in the eastern part of Dmowski's Poland and suggests why Namier argued against these areas being included in a re-united Poland.

The Little Russians, White Russians and Lithuanians of these provinces hate the Poles with a truly fanatical hatred, it is the hatred of a land-hungry peasantry against alien landlords. Polish dominion over the Lithuanians and the two south-western branches of the Russian nation could be maintained by force alone, and the necessary support which the Poles would then require could be obtained exclusively from the Central Powers. In the State as mapped out by M. Dmowski the Poles would form in reality only about 50 per cent of the population.¹⁸

Namier catered to anti-German sentiments by noting that such a state would be inevitably embroiled in a constant conflict "between the dominant and submerged nationalities." This struggle would only serve "to establish the secure dominion of Germany over all of them."¹⁹ In a rather effective manner Namier then compared the situation to that of Hungary. "The dominant Poles would be like the Magyars who feel of course little enough sympathy for Germany but remain her most faithful allies simply because this is the only way in which they can maintain their dominion over the non-Magyar nationalities."²⁰

Namier then launched into a detailed demolition of Dmowski's treatise. Dmowski claimed that the new Polish state would have a population of about 38,000,000 of whom

¹⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" p. 1.

¹⁸ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" pp. 2-3.

¹⁹ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" p. 3.

²⁰ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" p. 3.

those “Polish in language, culture, ideas and feelings would represent no less than 70 per cent.”²¹ Namier calculated in a most exaggerated fashion the highest possible number of Poles in Dmowski’s prescribed state and concluded that “the wildest and highest estimate ever made of the number of Poles, shows up M. Dmowski’s calculations as completely fanciful.”²² Underlying Namier’s critique was the assumption that the new Polish state should only encompass lands peopled by a Polish majority. This conception of the state was not seriously questioned by Namier or Dmowski. What was questioned was the nationality of the particular peoples encompassed.

It seems that what Namier and Dmowski mostly disagreed about was whether a particular people were a “distinct” national group. Namier objected strongly to Dmowski’s suggestion that Polish rule over other nationalities was justified because those nationalities were “for the most part indifferent to, or at any rate had no clear consciousness of their nationality.”²³ Namier pointed out that even Dmowski had admitted the strength of Ukrainian nationalism. Dmowski had argued that that nationalism had such “centrifugal force” that Ukrainians might be unable to grasp “in sufficient measure the idea of compromise without which no solid federation [i.e. with Russia] can be built.”²⁴

Namier also questioned Dmowski’s statements about the size and attitudes of the large Jewish minority included in his proposed state. Namier noted that “it is easier to get precise figures in the case of the Jews than of any other nationality because of their clearly marked distinction from other communities. No official statistics ever exaggerate their numbers nor have the Jews themselves an interest in doing so, and no Gentiles feel tempted to disguise themselves as Jews.”²⁵ Namier suggested there were about 4,000,000 Jews in

²¹ Found in P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,’” p. 4. Namier quoted this from p. 77 of Dmowski’s memorandum.

²² P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,’” p. 6.

²³ Found in P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,’” p. 3. Namier gave no page reference for Dmowski’s suggestion.

²⁴ Found in P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,’” p. 4. Namier quoted p. 11 of Dmowski’s memorandum.

²⁵ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,’” p. 6.

Dmowski's proposed Polish State, as opposed to the latter's figure of 2,500,000. But what Namier failed to mention in the quotation above was that many Jews were more than *tempted* to disguise themselves as Gentiles. Namier's own parents had followed a common fashion among the more prosperous Jews of their time and completely thrown off their Jewishness in favour of the Polish nationality and Roman Catholic faith. His comment suggests that Jewish population figures were accurate because of "their clearly marked distinction," however, his parents would not have been counted as Jews in that census.

Namier used the term "national unity" throughout the memorandum, and clearly saw it as a vital concept in determining the future states of Eastern Europe. For example, he disagreed with Dmowski's assertion that the Ukrainians would agree to a compromise with the Poles that was based, as Namier saw it, on "a complete disruption of their national unity."²⁶ Yet to Namier, what was most vital was not whether a particular people were "a separate nation," but rather the degree of allegiance those people expressed toward their nationality.

Whether the Little Russians are a separate nation or merely a branch of the Russian people is here immaterial; in any case the Little Russians of East Galicia, Volhynia and Cholm (which M. Dmowski claims for Poland) insist on being united with the Little Russians of Podolia and the Ukraine. Moreover, having for generations experienced at the hands of the Poles the healthy, invigorating treatment which M. Dmowski recommended in his book (*Thoughts of a Modern Pole*), they hate the Poles, and especially their alien Polish landlords, with a truly fanatical hatred.²⁷

It did not matter to Namier whether the Ukrainians were "a separate nation," or whether they defined themselves mainly by their hatred of their Polish masters. They desired a union with others claiming to be of their nationality and, therefore, they should be granted that union.

Namier's belief in the principle of self-determination comes out clearly in this memorandum. He not only argued that the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia should be left to

²⁶ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" p. 11.

²⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" p. 11.

be “masters in their own homes.”²⁸ He also disputed Dmowski’s claim that the Belarusians desired inclusion in Poland. “As to the White Russians and their desire to be included in Poland the following may serve as an illustration. In April 1917 a White Russian Peasant Congress at Minsk declared against autonomy for White Russia and in favour of a direct union with Russia.”²⁹ It did not matter to Namier that the Peasant Congress did not vote in favour of the creation of a separate Belarusian state. What the Congress’ decision provided was an indication of what the population wanted, and it was this that Namier thought should determine the division of Eastern Europe in the post-war settlement.

Not surprisingly, Namier’s advocacy of popular consent did not extend to the Central Powers. In regard to Dmowski’s claims for Poland to the west and south, Namier was willing to accept the possibility of including a hostile German irredenta. “It is quite a different matter with the Polish aspirations to recover *unity* with their kinsmen on the west or south. Even an extension of Poland to the sea at Danzig might be reconciled to some extent *with ethnographic justice*...But a realisation of Polish ambitions on the east could end only in making Poland another Hungary, a State dependent for its very existence upon Teutonic support.”³⁰ One would certainly like to know what Namier meant by “ethnographic justice,” and why it could be applied in the west and south, while in the east the demands of the population were the most important consideration.

It is not surprising then that the Foreign Office’s reception of Namier’s memorandum was considered within the context of his dispute with Dmowski. Namier’s “Remarks” were submitted to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, on 19 September 1917. They were prefaced with the following note:

You will I think like to look at the attached notes by Mr. Namier on the document compiled by M. Dmowski, which you read when you were in the United States. Mr. Namier is an American - half-Pole - half-Jew & is therefore torn by different emotions.

²⁸ This quotation was taken from a defense that Namier made of Ukrainian control of the Galician oilfields. It was a response to three letters from Dr. Leon Litowski on the need for the oilfields to be under Polish control to protect British shares in that industry. (See: P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.48975, pp. 3-4 of Namier’s comments).

²⁹ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,’” pp. 11-12.

³⁰ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: “Remarks on ‘The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,’” p. 16. Namier also referred the reader to his article in *The Nineteenth Century*, February 1917. Emphasis added.

His sincerity & patriotism cannot - I think be questioned - they are proved by the fact that when the war broke out he left America to fight for the Allies. I do not however believe in his judgment. He is a violent opponent of Dmowski & much of what he writes & says is colored by this dislike.³¹

The Foreign Secretary then noted on the cover of the file: "I would think that the Poles have a much better Ethnological claim to Posen (a part of it) than to [missing word] or Lithuania - But I am no expert."³² Expert opinion was then requested and on 26 September, Professor Charles Oman, one of Namier's former Oxford examiners, provided a letter criticizing Namier's critique of Dmowski. Oman's comments suggest that Namier's memorandum was received with a degree of skepticism, based largely on Namier's ethnic background and hostility to Dmowski.

I know Mr. Namier well, having examined him when he was an Oxford undergraduate, and seen him a good many times in later years. He is quite sincere, but very self-centred and disputatious: he used to consider himself as the only authority in England on the Ruthenian question, and to resent any one else having independent views upon it. He was (I believe) though a Jew, a landholder in the Bukovina, where Pole, Ruthenian, and Roumanian Ethnological boundaries meet...In my opinion Mr. Namier's criticism of "The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe" is written in a spirit of exaggerated hostility, making the worst of the Polish case whenever it is possible to do so.³³

Yet, Namier's memorandum was at least read by such important decision-makers as Sir Eric Drummond, private secretary to Balfour, as well as the Foreign Secretary himself. It is also clear that as the Peace Conference approached, Namier's comments received increasing attention, particularly after he was transferred from the Intelligence Bureau at the Department of Information to the Political Intelligence Department at the Foreign Office in April 1918.

To understand Namier's role in the Eastern Galician question, it is important to

³¹ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/ fol. 193872/ file no. 194876. Namier was not American at all. He was in the United States prior to the war working for a former servant of his father's, who had prospered after emigrating to the United States. Namier's father had always been a compulsive gambler and had accumulated a considerable debt with his former servant. Namier went to work for him out of obligation to his father as an editor of the foreign language press. As already mentioned, he became a British subject in March 1913. See page 51 above.

³² P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" Noted in Balfour's hand on the cover.

³³ P.R.O./F.O.371/3016/fol.193872/file no. 194876, memorandum titled: "Remarks on 'The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,'" Dated 26 September 1917, from Oman to Sir Eric Drummond. Professor Charles Oman was an historian of some reknown. He had succeeded Montague Burrows as the Chichele chair of history at Oxford in February 1906.

discuss his employment at the Foreign Office, near the end of the War and during the Peace Conference, as a member of the group of experts, dubbed the Political Intelligence Department. The need for such expertise on the internal political situation of foreign countries was expressed at the highest level in February 1917, and no doubt reflected the Russian Revolution's unexpected outcome. In that month, Balfour noted that "the course of the war has demonstrated the importance of my receiving regular and accurate reports on the internal political situation in foreign countries."³⁴ Balfour was referring to the reports emanating from His Majesty's Missions abroad. But importance was given to the writing of reports by experts in London as well.

There were, of course, no ambassadors in the countries of the enemy. It was, therefore, deemed necessary to bring together a group of experts who would keep abreast of and make reports on the internal political situation of these countries as well. Largely as a result of this necessity, the Political Intelligence Department was constituted in April of 1918. This group possessed considerable expertise.

The Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office was nicknamed the "Ministry of all the Talents." They were indeed a gifted crew. My father [James Headlam-Morley] was assistant director under Sir William Tyrrell. The members included Arnold Toynbee, Lewis Namier, Alfred Zimmern, Rex and Allen Leeper, Edwyn Bevan, George Saunders. The number of inquiries and the output of memoranda constantly increased. They were frequently shown papers and invited to comment before action was taken.³⁵

Despite their expertise, or perhaps because of it, these experts could not avoid initially stepping on some bureaucratic toes. There was enough resistance that Sir William Tyrrell was prompted to write a memorandum to the missions abroad explaining the new department.³⁶ Tyrrell explained that the new department had been originated by the Foreign Office, had been working somewhat independently, but had now been brought into the Foreign Office as a permanent department. This was not exactly the case. It actually originated under the Department of Information, as that department's Intelligence Bureau.

³⁴ P.R.O./F.O. 371/ fol. 3087/W37391/1917. The letter was dated 24 February 1917 and appears to have been addressed to the ambassadors abroad.

³⁵ Headlam-Morley, p. xxi.

³⁶ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D. 74): file 74/fol. 50. Tyrrell noted that "there is some danger that other Departments of the Foreign Office and the Missions abroad will feel that our memorandum in the P.I.D. go over their heads and are based on less accurate information than that in their possession. There has already been a complaint privately corresponded from Copenhagen in this sense."

In fact, Namier and Seton-Watson worked together as the East and Central European section of that bureau.³⁷ Intended to be a group of experts to generate propaganda, it had, according to Robert Donald, “developed into a source of political intelligence from foreign countries.” Donald, who had been asked by Lloyd George in October 1917 to investigate the overlap in propaganda between the War Office and the Department of Information, recommended that the Bureau “could be useful as an adjunct of the Foreign Office but not as a branch of propaganda.”³⁸ Largely as a result of Donald’s report, the Intelligence Bureau was attached to the Foreign Office and renamed the Political Intelligence Department.

In accordance with this decision, Tyrrell described the basic duties of the new department, presumably in an attempt to define its mandate more precisely as one of political intelligence:

The primary duty of the new Department is to collect information and take, to some extent, off the shoulders of the administrative Departments the task of keeping up to date, in a readily available form, the knowledge of foreign countries which should exist here. In this connection it will frequently write memoranda for the information of the Government on the situation in particular countries or on current problems of foreign policy, and every effort will be made in future to base these memoranda on the reports of our Missions abroad, as well as on a reading of the foreign press and other sources of information.³⁹

Seton-Watson did not accompany Namier to the new department. His decision was partly a result of his military obligations, but he was also concerned that under the Foreign Office, the propaganda work of the Intelligence Bureau would have been “silenced...at the very moment when propaganda effort is most needed.”⁴⁰ But as Seton-Watson later admitted, his fears proved unfounded. “Bailey, Headlam, the Leepers, Namier, Powell, Saunders and Toynbee all continued to write for *The New Europe*. In general the P.I.D. continued the activities of the I.B. with little change except that it enjoyed greater access to confidential information and could speak with greater authority as part of the Foreign

³⁷ Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 207. Headlam-Morley, Edwyn Bevan, Allen Leeper, and Arnold Toynbee also worked at the Intelligence Bureau.

³⁸ CAB 27/18, PAC 3. Found in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 253.

³⁹ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363(F.I.D.74):file 74/fo154.

⁴⁰ From a draft letter from Seton-Watson to John Buchan, 14 January 1918 and contemporaneous draft memorandum. Found in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe*, p. 253.

Office.”⁴¹ Namier’s access to information and influence increased markedly in the new department.

As Tyrrell stated, these experts’ primary responsibility was the preparation of “Monthly Confidential Reports” on the countries to which each was assigned. At first there was some question about the utility and purpose of the reports. In July 1918, Viscount Harding responded to one with the question: “Who wrote these reports?” The response was quite informative about their nature.

The Monthly Confidential Reports are prepared by our Political Intelligence Department, which department is composed of independent experts on the various countries dealt with. The remarks of these experts do not, and are not intended to, represent the views of the Foreign Office, and in fact reflect little more than the personal opinion of their respective authors. I trust, however, that you will let me know if you feel that any further such Reports are likely to create a misleading impression, since it is only such criticism which can enable us here to check the value of the Reports with which our P.I.D. provide us.⁴²

As a member of this department, Namier was given far greater access to information, allowed to continue to write for various publications, although he could not sign his articles, and even encouraged to provide his personal expert opinion to the Foreign Office.

At the age of 30, Namier was now in a position to exert considerable influence. One can imagine that his powerful intellect often dominated Departmental meetings. Namier’s large frame and broad shoulders presented an imposing figure. The overwhelming impact of his personality has been recounted by a number of his contemporaries.⁴³ He was quite arrogant and disputatious, and would often get carried away on a point of detail. But the strength and exactness of his mind must not be overlooked in discussing his involvement at the Political Intelligence Department. Namier would have often won over or demolished any opponents he encountered in promoting his solution to the Polish problem. Moreover, as he was now employed directly by the Foreign Office, his comments carried greater

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 254.

⁴² P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/file 84/fols.176-7.

⁴³ For examples see: Isaiah Berlin, “Lewis Namier: A Personal Impression,” *Journal of Historical Studies* 1 (Winter 1967-8): 117-136; John Brooke, “Namier and Namierism,” *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History*, 3 (1964): 331-47; Colley, *Lewis Namier*; John Kenyon, *The History Men: The Historical Profession in England since the Renaissance*, (1983), pp. 254-269; Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier*; G.S. Rousseau, “Namier on Namier,” *Studies in Burke and His Time*, 8 (Fall 1971): 2016-2041; and J.L. Talmon, “The Ordeal of Sir Lewis Namier: The Man, the Historian, the Jew,” *Commentary* 33 (1963): 237-45.

authority and were regularly seen by the most important British decision-makers.

During his employment at the Political Intelligence Department, Namier spent most of his time commenting on the Polish question. He immediately began to point out the problems with the direction in which the plans for the future Polish state were heading. He began with a comment on the "Polish character." On 25 April 1918, in a report on the newly elected Council of State in Warsaw in German occupied Poland, Namier noted that the relations between two leading Polish groups - the Regency Council and the Inter-Party Union - "are continually changing, because the personal element counts in them for quite as much as the political."⁴⁴ Like Seton-Watson, Namier viewed East Europeans as very personal (perhaps too personal) in their political dealings.

Characteristically, Namier's report included his objection to Polish claims in the East. His argument did not initially involve Eastern Galician autonomy specifically. He actually argued from a Polish viewpoint. If Poland was to be independent, a buffer would have to be allowed in the East against Russia. "It is obvious that an extension of Polish dominion over White Russian territory would involve Poland in a permanent feud with Russia and possibly also with the Ukraine and Lithuania, and thus render her absolutely dependent on Germany."⁴⁵ Yet Namier also lamented the "encirclement" of Poland being carried out under German occupation. "In the east slices of Polish territory are to be ceded to Lithuania and the Ukraine, and a common frontier established between these two states in White Russia is to complete Poland's encirclement."⁴⁶ He further reported that the "Extreme Polish Activists" had failed in their attempt to reach an understanding with the German authorities and suggested that Poland's existence as a state was in danger. Namier wanted to limit Polish expansion to the east, but he was not willing to limit that expansion to the extent that it extinguished the state.

Namier's report was clearly informed by his belief in the self-determination of peoples and in the need for governing bodies to be representative of the people. He denounced the newly elected Regency Council because of its unrepresentative nature. "In

⁴⁴ P.R.O./F.O.371/4293/file 84. Titled: "Confidential - P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001 - April 25, 1918," p. 117.

⁴⁵ P.R.O./F.O.371/4293/file 84. Titled: "Confidential - P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001 - April 25, 1918," p. 117.

⁴⁶ P.R.O./F.O.371/4293/file 84. Titled: "Confidential - P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001 - April 25, 1918," p. 117.

these circumstances it is indeed surprising that the Extreme Activists should have secured eight seats in the Council, and this fact serves only as further proof of the unrepresentative character of that Assembly.”⁴⁷ Namier’s report concluded with a return to the need to limit Polish claims on its eastern borders. And again, he suggested the pivotal role that he thought Russia would have to play in the re-organisation of Eastern Europe.

Even whilst the policy of the Inter-Party Union is considered consonant with our own purposes, a very sharp line must be drawn between their attitude in Poland and their attitude with regard to Lithuania, White Russia and the Ukraine, and most of all with regard to Great Russia, which alone can serve as pivot for British policy in Eastern Europe. It is hard to see how policy of aggression on the part of Poland towards its neighbours in the east can ever square with our anti-German policies.⁴⁸

Although Namier’s comments were now given greater consideration, his old examiner continued to preface them. Regarding Namier’s opposition to extending Poland’s eastern border into non-Polish ethnic territory, Professor Oman agreed. “I agree with Mr. Namier in thinking that this line would be unwise, in face of the growing sense of Ukrainian nationality, to press for the addition to Poland of any Ukrainian population, such as that of the Ruthenian districts of Galicia [which are universally anti-Polish in spirit] or the Western half of Volhynia.”⁴⁹ But Oman did not agree with Namier’s comments on Dmowski. Namier had suggested that the reports on Poland given by “individual émigré leaders” were sometimes “misleading,” clearly referring to Dmowski.⁵⁰ But Oman argued that Namier had been too critical of Dmowski. He had conversed with that “émigré leader,” and had found him “by no means intransigent on the Eastern frontier of the New Polish State.”⁵¹

Oman’s comments did not temper Namier’s attacks on Dmowski, partly because Dmowski continued to attack Namier. In May 1918, the Polish newspaper, *Tygodnik Polski*, printed in London under the auspices of the Polish National Committee, noted that

⁴⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/4293/file 84. Titled: “Confidential - P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001 - April 25, 1918,” p. 117.

⁴⁸ P.R.O./F.O.371/4293/file 84. Titled: “Confidential - P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001 - April 25, 1918,” p. 117a.

⁴⁹ P.R.O./F.O.371/4293/file 84. I believe that the “[...]” addition on the “universally anti-Polish” Ruthenians was Oman’s.

⁵⁰ P.R.O./F.O.371/4293/file 84. Titled: “Confidential - P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001 - April 25, 1918,” p. 117a, point e.

⁵¹ P.R.O./F.O.371/4293/file 84. Titled: “Confidential - P.I.D. F.O. Poland/001 - April 25, 1918.”

“for some time past the English press has shown an interest in the tendencies of the weekly *New Europe*. Several polemical articles have been published discerning in that paper tendencies analogous to those of Russian Bolshevism. In that connection the attitude of that paper towards the Polish Question has been raised.”⁵² In particular, the article noted that it had recently been determined that the author “N.” of a number of articles in *The New Europe* was actually Mr. Ludwik Bernstein. “Mr Bernstein comes from a Jewish family resident at the village of Koszylowce in Eastern Galicia.”⁵³ It was Namier who found, translated, and submitted this revealing article in *Tygodnik Polski* to the Foreign Office. He suggested that the purpose of the article was not merely to expose his penmanship, but to let the Poles know the location of his family in Eastern Galicia.

Namier further illustrated his point with a second extract from *Tygodnik Polski*. “It is for us interesting and instructive to know that the author of numerous articles directed against Poland and published in different English papers is Mr. Bernstein from Galicia...Mr Bernstein is the author of an enthusiastic article in *The New Europe* on Mr. Braunstein (Trotsky), the leader of the Russian Bolsheviks.”⁵⁴ Namier clearly believed this to be a thinly veiled attack on him and his family.

It will be marked that the *Tygodnik Polski*, which is to convey news from London to Polish papers abroad, especially picks out from the article in the *New Witness* the Eastern Galician address, obviously for the use of the Austrian police. For its better convenience the attack will probably be reproduced in the Cracow *Glos Narodu*, the Lemberg *Kurier Lwowski* and in some other papers connected with the National Democrats.⁵⁵

Namier pointed out how widely this edition of *Tygodnik Polski* would be circulated and named the source of this intrigue. “The *Polish Weekly* is a National Democrat paper and has therefore plenty of funds. Although its nominal price is 4d., I think they will distribute it gratis and the workmen will not be such fools as to pay for *Pravda* when they can get the

⁵² P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D.137):file 137/fol.302. The article was translated by Namier and submitted to the Foreign Office on 15 May 1918.

⁵³ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D.137):file 137/fol.302.

⁵⁴ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D.137):file 137/fol.302. Namier’s sympathetic article on Trotsky appeared in the 17 January 1918 edition of *The New Europe*.

⁵⁵ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D.137):file 137/fol.303.

Weekly free.”⁵⁶ Namier denied that the campaign was started in the *New Witness* or the *Morning Post*. It was started by the *Tygodnik Polski* in the first weeks of March 1918. “And it was started on the very same lines on which it was afterwards developed in the other two papers. The *Tygodnik Polski* then already hinted at my being the author of the articles on Trotski.”⁵⁷

The reaction of the Foreign Office to Namier’s submission was mixed. Sir Eric Drummond wrote to Sir Charles Harding, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, that the articles were probably written by Dmowski’s subordinates, but they did not represent a fresh attack on Namier. He concluded that it was “certainly not the business of the Foreign Office to defend the *New Europe*. This paper has contained most violent attacks on the F.O. and its members. You will no doubt remember the articles by Mr. George Young. I think also that I ought to remind you that it was the *New Europe* who first started the ball, and the articles in the other papers have been replies.”⁵⁸ Harding responded that he did not know about *The New Europe*, but he objected “to articles in the *New Witness* or other papers by certain Poles attacking gentlemen employed by the F.O.”⁵⁹ There was then support for Namier as an employee at the Foreign Office, but not much sympathy for *The New Europe*.

Perhaps encouraged by Harding’s support, Namier continued to comment on the Poles’ “imperialistic” demands on their eastern border. In a memorandum in August 1918, Namier reported on the German attempt to put the Austrian Archduke, Charles Stephen, on the Polish Throne, set up a puppet regime there, and gain Polish support for the German war effort. He argued that “Poland’s adherence to such a scheme can be obtained in no

⁵⁶ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D.137):file 137/fol.302. Namier found the information on the *Polish Weekly*’s circulation in the “Fortnightly Report on Polish Affairs” by M.I.9c, based on letter No.6, 18 March 1918, page 6, R. de Truskowski, Dalston, E.8. to the *Przegląd Codzienny* of New York, dated 4 February 1918. His reference to the Polish National Committee’s “plenty of funds” probably alluded to the fact that the Committee had been receiving £3000 per month since February 1918 from the British government.

⁵⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D.137):file 137/fol.303.

⁵⁸ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D.137):file 137/fol.304.

⁵⁹ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D.137):file 137/fol.304. Latawski concludes his article, “The Dmowski-Namier Feud, 1915-1918,” with the statement that their “struggle for influence in London essentially ended...in May 1918” (p. 47). Our subsequent discussion will suggest it did not.

other way than by satisfying the imperialist ambitions of her upper classes, which would of course come at the expense of Russia.”⁶⁰ Namier claimed that these upper classes’ imperialistic demands in the East would include parts of the territories around Grodno, Minsk, Mahiliou, and Vilnius. The motivation for such demands was largely economic and their fulfilment would be disastrous.

Although Poles form hardly more than about one-tenth of their population, the Polish upper classes have very considerable vested interests in those territories. Their population is White Russian, and Russia can never permanently renounce them - even the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had left most of these districts to Russia. If they were assigned to Poland, any recovery of Russia will threaten her long before it threatens either Germany or Austria.⁶¹

Though these comments were aimed at a German occupation policy that was never fulfilled, they suggest that Namier’s primary concern with the eastern border of Poland was satisfying the Russian western border claims of the Bolsheviks.

In the same month, Namier commented on a series of telegrams received from Sir H. Rumbold, the British representative in Berne. Namier warned that “the Lithuanians are not likely to wish for, or even to agree to the inclusion of the whole of White Russia in the new Lithuanian State; for the White Russians would then be considerably in the majority.”⁶² In August 1918, Namier’s primary concerns with the resettlement of the lands east of Poland were clear: despite the end of the Russian empire, the claims of the new Bolshevik state could not be ignored and neither should the will of the peoples inhabiting those lands.

By October 1918, the Austrian Emperor Charles had set in motion a rapid devolution of power in favour of the nationalities of his empire, hoping to gain their support. But the crushing military defeat of the Austro-Hungarian forces soon extinguished the Emperor’s hopes. Although the Galician Ukrainians were relatively late in getting organized, compared to the other nationalities of the empire, they had begun to plan the establishment of their own independent nation-state before the Hapsburgs had admitted defeat. On 18 October 1918, Ukrainian parliamentarians, party leaders, and church

⁶⁰ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/file no.84/fol.130. received at the Foreign Office on 19 August 1918.

⁶¹ P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/file no.84/fol.130A, received at the Foreign Office on 19 August 1918.

⁶² P.R.O./F.O.371/4363/(P.I.D. 313): file 84/fol. 130A. The telegrams were dated 14 August 1918.

hierarchs from Eastern Galicia and Bukovina formed a Ukrainian National Council to act as the Ukrainian representative body. The Council also announced its intention to unite all West Ukrainian lands into a single state. At the same time the Poles also prepared to take over Eastern Galicia.

On the night of 31 October, a group of young, impatient Ukrainian officers, led by Captain Dmytro Vitovsky of the Sich Riflemen, gathered all available Ukrainian troops in the vicinity of Lviv, and quite peacefully took control of the city. On 1 November, Ukrainian flags flew over Lviv city hall, all major administrative offices were in Ukrainian hands, and placards everywhere informed the residents that they were now citizens of a Ukrainian state. The Ukrainians carried out similar takeovers across Eastern Galicia.

While the Ukrainian and Jewish populations of the territory responded quite positively, the Poles of Eastern Galicia almost immediately began to resist the new regime. Resistance soon turned into violent confrontation in the streets of Lviv, and the conflict spread rapidly from there. Soon the Poles of Eastern Galicia were at war with their Ukrainian neighbors. From November 1918 until July 1919, Ukrainians and Poles waged a bitter struggle for control of Eastern Galicia.

In January 1919, the Peace Conference began in Paris. While Poles and Ukrainians fought each other in a desperate battle for control of Eastern Galicia, the leaders of the Great Powers deliberated on how to establish a lasting peace through the resettlement of Europe. Namier had some influence over the shape of the post-war settlement, particularly in Eastern Europe, through one of the main British facilitators at the Paris Peace Conference, Sir James Headlam-Morley.⁶³ Headlam-Morley played a major role in the drafting of the minorities treaties for the re-construction of Eastern Europe. He corresponded regularly with Namier throughout his work in Paris, and according to his daughter, credited Namier with considerable input. "In the drafting of the minorities treaty

⁶³ Headlam-Morley conversed quite regularly with the principal heads of state at the Peace Conference. He was there in a "semi-official" capacity, attached to Sir William Tyrrell, head of the P.I.D. The value placed in Headlam-Morley's opinions was suggested by a letter that he wrote to S.W. Phillips on 18 April 1919: "Personally, it is interesting to get rather behind the scenes. I had a long conversation with President Wilson and several talks with Lloyd George, and I have been 3 or 4 times to the Council of Four meetings, which of course is the holiest of holies. It is amusing finding oneself sitting in a room with Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau; at any rate one sees the raw material of which history is, or rather ought to be, made" (Headlam-Morley, p. 82).

my father was much indebted to Namier's advice and the information he supplied."⁶⁴

Namier's influence on Headlam-Morley was evident from the start. He wrote to Namier on 13 January, shortly after his arrival at the Peace Conference, stating that "the very first thing I have done on arriving here is to begin getting in touch with the Poles."⁶⁵ On 22 January, Headlam-Morley had a discussion with Stanislaw Posner, a former leader of the Polish Socialist Party and a close friend of Namier. According to Headlam-Morley, Posner "entirely confirmed Mr. Namier's observations with regard to the personalities of the present [Polish] Government; he said that all members of the Government who had political experience and capacity were National Democrats and that the others, who did not belong to that party, were men, so far as his knowledge went, entirely without political experience or influence."⁶⁶

Yet, Namier and Headlam-Morley were not in complete agreement on the Polish question. Headlam-Morley's daughter stated that "on one point they disagreed. In regard to the Polish Treaty Namier constantly referred to "Jewish National Autonomy"; my father [Headlam-Morley] objected that although it was legitimate for Zionists to seek national independence in Palestine it would be dangerous for them to claim separate nationality within the states to which they owed citizenship."⁶⁷ Headlam-Morley put his finger on the focus of Namier's apprehension. The oppression of Jews and other minority groups in the future Poland was central to Namier's position on the Polish question.

⁶⁴ This comment was a memory of Headlam-Morley's daughter, Agnes. See Headlam-Morley, p. xxix.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 12. This was an extract from a memorandum that Headlam-Morley wrote on an interview with Mr. Posner on 22 January 1919.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. xxix. Headlam-Morley's opposition to some form of Jewish autonomy was not surprising, although he professed to "have been fighting for the Jews throughout" the Peace Conference (p. 106). In another letter to Sir M. Hankey on 23 June 1919, he argued against the teaching of Yiddish in the schools of the newly created Polish state. He warned that, "there is, however, a real danger that if these schools are placed under Jewish management, the more extreme national elements among the Jews may use these schools in order *artificially* to foster the use of the Yiddish language in such a way as to increase the separation which the use of this language produces between the Jews and other citizens of Poland"(pp. 158-9). Of course, when it came to the protection of the language rights of many of these "other citizens," such as the Germans, Headlam-Morley's chief concern was "Polish imperialism." In fact, he was even willing to compare the relative merit of these two languages as a justification for advocacy of such a policy. "Yiddish, moreover, is not a language such as German, which is of high value for educational and cultural purposes and we do not wish that its use for these purposes should be deliberately encouraged"(p. 159).

However, Headlam-Morley disagreed with Namier on more than “Jewish National Autonomy.” He was also not entirely convinced of the reactionary nature of the Polish National Democratic government, or, rather, that that government was too reactionary. In a letter to Namier on 3 February 1919, he wrote: “I will confess that I am not entirely convinced by your apprehensions of the danger of Polish imperialism. I do not deny they exist, but I should have thought that an alternative danger of a complete collapse in Poland would be greater, and that we should do all we could to support any administration which would keep things together during the crisis.”⁶⁸ It would seem then that Namier was willing to risk “the complete collapse of Poland,” if supporting Poland entailed support for Dmowski and the National Democrats. Perhaps this was because he felt that a National Democrat government would be so repressive to Jews and Ukrainians, that the collapse of its authority would be better. His youthful faith in the possibilities of a reunited Poland was now quite conditional.

In a letter on 27 February 1919, Headlam-Morley suggested that this conditionality was possible for Namier, because of Namier’s partiality towards Bolshevism.

Where I think we differ is that you on the whole are inclined to regard Bolshevism as a lesser evil than Polish Imperialism; in this I cannot follow you; I suppose the difference springs from ultimate causes and our whole attitude of mind towards political affairs, but in the long run if they can get the Polish State started on a liberal basis with the necessary agrarian reform, then in the long run I should not be frightened of Polish imperialism.⁶⁹

Namier’s sympathies towards the recent revolution in Russia were unclear.⁷⁰ But certainly one can hear Namier retorting, in view of his remarks about the National Democrats, that under their authority, the new Polish state would hardly be “started on a liberal basis” and agrarian reform, in Eastern Galicia at least, where Polish landlords held most of the land and all of the political power, would be cosmetic at best.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 20. Letter to Namier dated 3 February 1919.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 36. Dated 27 February 1919.

⁷⁰ Namier expressed optimism about the Revolution as late as 1921. In his article, “The Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy,” he argued that it had spawned a number of social and national movements in Eastern Europe and had pulled Europe out of a vicious circle. “The Russian Revolution came like a current of fresh air through a stifling heavy atmosphere. It came like the promise of a new, better world. Europe was turning in a vicious circle, and a struggle was dragging on which by then everyone wished had never broken out.” Published in *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol.IV*, edited by H.W.V. Temperley (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 76.

It is also clear that Headlam-Morley could not have had the whole story. As his notes from an interview with the American Professor George Davis Herron on 23 January suggest, he was very concerned that the French government was preventing the Ukrainians from speaking in Paris.⁷¹ It would have been difficult for Headlam-Morley to confirm Namier's claims, when only the Polish National Democrats were allowed to speak with any authority on the various claims to Eastern Galicia.

In January 1919, Namier also began to criticize the reports coming into the Foreign Office from Colonel H.H.Wade, who was out in the field observing the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Eastern Galicia and who Namier believed was only hearing and providing the Polish viewpoint. Namier criticized Wade's proposal for a line of demarcation that he felt prejudiced the Ukrainians. "If the line indicated by Colonel Wade is imposed on the Ukrainians, then of course one can hardly expect the Ukrainians to stop fighting. The leaders may agree, the rank and file will not obey."⁷²

In another report of 29 January, Wade argued that the line of demarcation for a Polish-Ukrainian cease-fire should be drawn along the Buh-Stryi line, that this line prejudged nothing and would not determine the eventual Polish-Ukrainian border. Namier commented that if the line of demarcation prejudged nothing, why should they not follow the San river line, proposed by the Ukrainians. He argued that that line was "in accordance with the distribution of the two nationalities."⁷³ Namier wondered how the Eastern Galician Ukrainians could be expected "voluntarily to evacuate half their country?"⁷⁴ He then gave a fuller explanation which again suggests his concern with the desires of the population.

I venture to submit once more that no other line of demarcation except that of the San can

⁷¹ Headlam-Morley, p. 14. Headlam-Morley wrote of the French intransigence in a note on an interview that he had with Professor Herron on 23 January 1919. Herron was described as "an American clergyman, lecturer and writer who to a certain extent had President Wilson's confidence. He had been nominated as one of the American representatives at the proposed Prinkipo Conference. In January 1919 Wilson used him in an unsuccessful attempt to achieve agreed revision of Italian claims under the Treaty of London." Headlam-Morley, p. 193.

⁷² P.R.O./F.O.371/3897/fol.4306. Wade's report was dated 15 January 1919.

⁷³ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.30572, p. 1.

⁷⁴ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.30572, p. 2. Colonel Wade's report was written on 29 January 1919 and sent from Lviv to the Foreign Office. Namier's comments, dated 1 March 1919, were sent with Wade's report to Sir William Tyrrell in Paris.

serve the purpose of peace. The other lines being at variance with the ethnic distribution will never be accepted by the population which the Ukrainian authorities would then be unable to control. The offer made by the Ukrainian government to the Polish minority in article 7 of the document enclosed by Colonel Wade seems very generous, and we might demand that it should hold good even in a provisional settlement which naturally cannot prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference, and see to it through special Allied representatives that it should be carried out in letter as well as in spirit.⁷⁵

It seems that what Namier held uppermost in his mind was the preservation of peace. He believed that these peoples - Poles and Ukrainians - would only be satisfied in their own separate states. It was not that "nation-states" were the destiny of all nations. He simply argued that borders along ethnic lines satisfied the demands of the majority of the population, thus limiting the possibility of German influence in Eastern Europe, and thereby preserving international peace.

Namier also disputed the Polish claim that the Ukrainians were basically Bolshevik. A proclamation from the Ukrainians to Polish soldiers was included in the report from Colonel Wade to suggest these Ukrainian tendencies. Namier commented that the proclamation was "more Ukrainian Nationalist in spirit than Bolshevik."⁷⁶ And even if the proclamation was considered Bolshevik "in spirit," Namier remarked that "in this War it has not been unknown for other and more important Powers to use Bolshevik propaganda to demoralize the enemy armies."⁷⁷

Namier concluded that it was "even" in the interest of the Poles of Eastern Galicia, that the armistice should be based on "just principles." He argued that the Polish chauvinists, and even the Poles who argued for the Buh-Stryi line, "endanger the lives of the Polish minority beyond that line. It seems most unlikely that the Ukrainians should agree to that line. But if their representatives abandon half of East-Galicia to the Poles, there will be an outbreak of despair in the rest of the country which may have the most fearful consequences."⁷⁸

At the same time, Namier questioned the accusations of the Polish representative in Bucharest that Ukrainians had committed atrocities against Poles. On 4 March, Namier

⁷⁵ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.30572, pp.3-4. The article 7 did not survive.

⁷⁶ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.30572, p.3.

⁷⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.30572, p.3.

⁷⁸ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.30572, p.4. Namier's comment's dated 1 March 1919.

minuted that the Polish representative's claims of Ukrainian atrocities were exaggerated. He suggested that the statistics seemed to include Jews massacred in the Polish pogroms that followed the Polish capture of Lviv in late November 1918. "In reality the percentages of Poles in East-Galicia cannot possibly exceed that of the Roman Catholics, which amounts to 23 per cent, and in all probability the proportion of the Polish-speaking population in East-Galicia is not more than about 15 per cent."⁷⁹ He also noted that the a number of the alleged atrocities took place on territory never claimed nor occupied by the Ukrainians.

The Polish-Ukrainian fighting in Eastern Galicia was soon incorporated into the Namier-Dmowski dispute. Dmowski and Ignace Paderewski, the world-famous pianist who had represented the Polish National Committee in the United States, were appointed as the Polish delegates to the Peace Conference. Namier carefully monitored Dmowski's comments at the Conference and tried to ensure that these comments were questioned regularly. Besides incorporating his comments into his correspondence with Headlam-Morley, he wrote several memoranda criticizing Dmowski's claims. On 20 February 1919, he attacked Dmowski's statement of 17 January, that the people of Eastern Galicia were unable to organize a government because of "the fact that in Eastern Galicia in the intellectual professions, excluding small farmers and clergy, there were 400,000 Poles and only 16,000 Ruthenes."⁸⁰ Namier questioned the accuracy of these figures. He noted that it was impossible to determine how Dmowski defined "the intellectual professions" in Eastern Galicia, especially if he did not include the clergy. Namier attempted calculations based on several different definitions and found Dmowski's proportions impossible. He concluded that,

as a matter of fact, the Ruthenes have a much smaller intelligentsia than the Poles, this being one of the harmful effects of Polish rule over East-Galicia, but the proportion is certainly not 25 to 1, as M. Dmowski tried to make it. It is much more likely to be 4 or 5 to 1. Moreover the Jews who have a well developed intelligentsia would no doubt loyally cooperate with the Ruthenes in building up their state, and finally even the Polish minority might see its way to doing so.⁸¹

Namier's frankness about the Ukrainian intelligentsia did not imply there should be no

⁷⁹ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol 32477. The accusations had been communicated to Lord Curzon, acting Foreign Secretary during Balfour's absence in Paris, on 19 February 1919.

⁸⁰ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.28086, dated 20 February 1919.

⁸¹ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.28086, dated 20 February 1919, p. 4 of the memorandum.

independent Eastern Galician state. It appears that he envisioned an essentially autonomous state made viable by an alliance of the Ukrainian and Jewish intelligentsia, and possibly even including local Poles. Namier wondered if Dmowski included "the Jews among the Poles - after the pogroms and although his own committee refused on principle to issue certificates of Polish nationality to Jews? If so, his statistics are valueless as the Jews of Eastern Galicia would much rather co-operate with the Ruthenes than with the Poles."⁸²

But Namier did not limit his criticisms to combatting Dmowski's statements on the Eastern Galician question. He also questioned the absence of any Eastern Galician or Russian representatives, or experts on that area, from the Peace Conference and noted that these absences allowed Dmowski to make any allegations and claims on Poland's eastern border he wished. Namier wondered whether sound conclusions could result from such one-sided input. "Should Poland's neighbours be left without representatives who might enable the Conference to form a balanced judgment?"⁸³

If Headlam-Morley was not entirely convinced by Namier's claims, he was enough aware of the one-sidedness of information at the Peace Conference to write a letter to Sir William Tyrrell on 26 February 1919 about the matter. "I am a little anxious as to the situation with regard to the method by which a provisional boundary is being established between the Poles and the Ruthenians. It is, I think, unfortunate that as would appear from the available information, the only representatives of the Allies who are in charge of the matter are those who are in a position to hear the Polish side of the case."⁸⁴

In March 1919, progress was made toward Allied recognition of the Ukrainians' claims. On 19 March, a dispatch was sent by the Great Powers to General Pavlenko, Commander of the Ukrainian forces at Lviv. He was told to cease hostilities in the area around Lviv and informed that a similar note was sent to General Rozwadowski, head of the Polish forces. More importantly, the dispatch recognized the Ukrainians' right to negotiate. "Supreme Council add that they are ready to hear the territorial claims of *both parties* concerned and to approach Ukrainian and Polish Delegations in Paris or through

⁸² P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.28086, p. 1 of the memorandum.

⁸³ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.28086, dated 20 February 1919, p. 4 of the memorandum.

⁸⁴ Headlam-Morley, p. 35.

whatever authorized representation the parties may select with view to changing suspension of arms into an armistice.”⁸⁵

Yet, Allied recognition did not mean Allied support for the Galician Ukrainians. To gain such support it would have been necessary for the Allies to have heard the Ukrainian side of the dispute. Neither Namier’s nor Headlam-Morley’s protestations about the one-sidedness (i.e. the Polish bias) of information and representations to the Peace Conference had much effect. Headlam-Morley noted the exclusively Polish nature of Major A.L. Paris’s Allied Mission sent to Warsaw in March. On 20 March 1919, Headlam-Morley confirmed to Namier that his “prognostications have come quite true and I understand that the members of the Mission to Warsaw have all become pure Poles.”⁸⁶

A major reason for Namier’s attempts to limit Poland’s eastern borders was his desire to protect the rights of all minorities that might fall under Polish rule. In another report of 27 March 1919, Namier voiced his concern with the Polish army’s advance into largely Lithuanian and Belarusian territories. He considered the army’s behaviour towards the Jews in Lithuania particularly despicable. “It seems an undoubted fact that a number of excesses have been committed against the Jewish population and that it has been treated in a brutal and ruthless manner.”⁸⁷ Namier also complained of the Polish incursion into Belarus’. He noted that the Poles had captured the Belarusian Government of Grodno “under the pretence of fighting the Bolsheviks,” that these “bandits” acted on the same moral level as the Bolsheviks and had been bullying and pilfering from the helpless population.⁸⁸

Namier pleaded for adherence to professed Allied principles. “I venture once more to raise the question whether it is compatible with the policy and the principles of the Allies to support the advance of such an army into the ethnically Russian territory and to take upon themselves the moral responsibility for its doing? And if not, whether such explicit instructions should not be sent about these matters to the British representatives in

⁸⁵ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 26011/fol.43555. Emphasis added.

⁸⁶ Headlam-Morley, pp. 52-3.

⁸⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/4379/fol.269(P.I.D.269). Namier’s comments were dated 27 March 1919. Namier used as a source an article in *Robotnik* by M. Mieczysław Łódzia, dated 12 March 1919.

⁸⁸ P.R.O./F.O.371/4379/fol.269(P.I.D.269), pp. 2-3.

Poland?”⁸⁹ Once more, Namier made a definite distinction between the interests of the Poles and the population of ethnically Russian territory, but no distinction among the various inhabitants of those territories, even after pointing out the particularly “brutal and ruthless” treatment of his fellow Jews.

Perhaps because Headlam-Morley played the role of conciliator at the Peace Conference, he never really subscribed to the almost entirely negative picture of the Polish Government portrayed by Namier. His correspondence suggests that he was particularly concerned about “unreasonable Polish propaganda and the penalisation of the German language.”⁹⁰ But he remained quite optimistic about the possibility of finding a “liberal basis” and a “Counsel of Moderation” in Poland. He therefore remained open to meetings with the Polish representatives and recounted to Namier in a letter on 9 April 1919, his rather positive impression of a meeting that Lloyd George and he had with Paderewski:

You will be amused to hear that I have just been lunching with the Prime Minister and Paderewski; the conversations turned on a great number of subjects and I felt that we much wanted your knowledge in order to be able to check the truth of much Paderewski said. On the other hand, I must say that he made a very good impression; he talked well and clearly. Zaleski is coming again this afternoon and he is especially attached to Paderewski, I see some hope that we may have found a channel by which to approach what the diplomatists call ‘Counsels of Moderation.’⁹¹

Namier was quick to attempt to crush Headlam-Morley’s hopes. He wrote back that “Paderewski is a fantastic liar, if anything worse than Dmowski....Moreover he has a brazen cheek.”⁹² But Headlam-Morley was not convinced. In another letter to Namier on 13 April 1919, he insisted upon the sincerity of Paderewski’s character.⁹³

⁸⁹ P.R.O./F.O.371/4379/fol.269(P.I.D.269). Namier’s comments were dated 27 March 1919.

⁹⁰ Headlam-Morley, p. 48. This concern was expressed specifically with reference to the decision to give Danzig to Poland “without conditions or reservations,” a matter which concerned Headlam-Morley greatly because of the large German population there. It should be noted that Headlam-Morley had considerable sympathy for the Germans throughout the Peace Conference, attempting to preach moderation in an atmosphere of revenge. Headlam-Morley’s German sympathies predated the war and were partly the result of the fact he had married a German woman.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 70. August Zaleski was educated at Warsaw and the London School of Economics. In London during the war, he made several contacts in the British government, notably Lloyd George, on behalf of Joseph Pilsudski. During the Peace Conference, he advised Paderewski and helped him to keep in touch with the British Delegation. His views were moderate and he did not share the anti-Semitism of the Dmowski group.

⁹² Ibid., p. 70, footnote 1.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 72.

Perhaps, what is most interesting about this interchange over the nature of Paderewski's character was not that Headlam-Morley questioned Namier's pessimism, but that Namier eventually gave in, yielding to Headlam-Morley's judgment and closer contact with the Polish President. Namier wrote back that "there are people who are better than their reputation and I am quite prepared to accept that Paderewski is personally sincere."⁹⁴ In fact, according to Headlam-Morley, it was at Paderewski's request that Lord Harding "agreed to order Namier to Paris," mainly in order to discuss the Jewish question with him.⁹⁵ Headlam-Morley explained that M. Zaleski had stated that Paderewski would like to talk to Namier. "I do not know precisely what the subject of the conversation would be but I gather that Mr. Namier's name has been so often mentioned in Polish circles, both on other matters, and particularly about the Jewish question, that M. Paderewski feels that an interview with him might be helpful."⁹⁶

It was on the Jewish question in particular that Headlam-Morley relied on Namier's expertise. In an extract from his diary of 30 April 1919, Headlam-Morley noted that a new Committee had been invented "to consider what guarantees have to be found for the protection of Jews, and other minorities in the New States, especially Poland." This committee would have to consider the question of the Jews in Poland. Headlam-Morley found Namier's presence in Paris quite useful and commented in his diary that "it is very fortunate that Namier is here and I have kept him two or three days longer as he could give me lots of information about the matter, and I think he is really doing useful work buzzing about between Poles and Jews."⁹⁷

Namier did not limit his activities to the question of Jewish rights in Poland, or to criticizing Polish claims in Eastern Galicia; he also promoted Ukrainian claims there. In April 1919, he commented on a memorandum from Dr. Yevhen Levytsky, a representative of the Ukrainian National Council of the Western Ukrainian Republic. "A very sensible & moderate memorandum. The statistics seem accurate. Especially interesting is the analysis

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 73, footnote 1. No date was given for Namier's reply.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 86, footnote 3.

⁹⁶ P.R.O./F.O.371/4379/P.I.D.364. Signed by Headlam-Morley and dated 22 April 1919.

⁹⁷ Headlam-Morley, pp. 98-9.

of the population of Lemberg on pp.36-40 which clearly proves that even in that town itself the Poles have *not a majority*.”⁹⁸

In another memorandum of April 1919, Namier openly criticized the political party of his youth, the Polish Socialist Party. He again stressed the importance of understanding the ethnic composition of the territories claimed by Poland.

The territorial demands of the national Socialists differ little from those of the National Democrats, Daszynski & Moraczewski in Poland correspond to Schneidmann & David in Germany, & are no more reasonable about East-Galicia & White Russia, than the latter were about German Poland & Alsace-Lorraine. The enclosed memorandum of these Socialists admits that the new Polish State as they plan it would count 20 million Poles in a population of 30 millions; in reality there would not be even 20 million Poles. Anyhow a hostile irredenta of 1/3 is quite sufficient to wreck any State in Poland's position.⁹⁹

Namier still envisioned a reconstituted Poland, but he also envisioned a stable Poland, that did not include “hostile irredenta.” He argued for a separate Galician Ukrainian state, because he believed that the Ukrainians would not tolerate Polish rule. Again, Namier's comments suggest his belief in the principle of self-determination.

In that same month, Namier also protested against the Poles' use of General Jozef Haller's army against the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. Formed in France from Polish prisoners of war, this 60,000-man army was superbly trained, equipped and led largely by French officers. The Allies had dispatched it to Poland to help the Poles combat the Bolsheviks, but the Poles redirected Haller's forces against the Ukrainians, rationalizing that the Ukrainians were Bolsheviks as well. Namier commented on a memorandum of 8 May 1919 from Lord Acton in Berne to Curzon: “Captain Johnson who has just returned from Poland confirms the news that the Poles have utilized the coming of Haller's army for

⁹⁸ P.R.O./F.O.371/3906/file 28011/fol.62580. The memorandum was dated 17 April 1919 and was sent through Lord Acton in Berne to Curzon. Namier's comments were dated 30 April 1919. The memorandum was titled: “Mémoire Relatif à la Guerre Polono-Ukrainienne et à la République Ukrainienne de l'Ouest: Soumis aux Gouvernements et aux Représentants des Grandes Puissances Alliées à la Conférence de la Paix.” Levytsky's survey also showed that although the Poles were not a majority in Lviv, they were the largest group. “Il en résulte, par conséquent, que la population polonaise de Léopol ne représente que le 46.53% de la population totale, ou, exprimé en chiffres, Léopol ne compte parmi sa population que 93,602 Polonais en regard de 57,387 Juifs, 39,839 Ukrainiens et 10,862 Allemands.” Levytsky's statistics were taken from the official statistics of Lviv for the year 1910.

⁹⁹ P.R.O./F.O.371/3921/fol.60635. Namier's comments were dated 25 April 1919.

pressing still further their advance into East-Galicia.”¹⁰⁰ Curzon wrote on this memorandum that the Poles’ use of Haller’s troops was “arbitrary and unjustified.” But Namier’s influence and special knowledge comes out clearer in Curzon’s response to a more complete report on the Polish action by M. Janoobis.

This Polish misuse of General Haller’s army certainly seems a deliberate defiance of the wishes of the Allies. There are also some very ugly reports of pogroms in Galicia which if only partially true corroborate this inherent lack of statesmanship in Polish Politics at the moment. It seems to me that in Poland Pogroms and this Eastern advance against the Lithuanians in the North and the Ukrainians in the South are closely interconnected. The Jews are accused amongst other things of not being in favour of military service and any such use of General Haller’s Army as that to which it is now being put is bound to influence the anti-Semitic passions of the non-Jewish populations. Thus causing the intolerable pogroms.¹⁰¹

Curzon’s comment follows closely Namier’s criticism of the Poles’ misuse of Haller’s forces against the Ukrainians, as well as Namier’s concern with its impact on the Jewish population.

The first clear indication of Namier’s solution to the Eastern Galician question came in May 1919. In commenting on Lord Acton’s recent interview with the Ukrainian representative in Berne, Baron Mykola Vasylo, Namier expressed his faith in the new international order and in the possibilities of a settlement with Bolshevik Russia. “As to the settlement of East-Galicia in the Peace Treaty it would seem best if, until Russia recovers & a final settlement is made, it was put under a High Commission of the League of Nations. This is the solution which seems most favoured by the members of our Delegation dealing with the subject.”¹⁰²

In that same month, the Inter-Allied Commission for the negotiation of an Armistice between Poland and Ukraine reported. Curzon found the report “very interesting,” but Namier immediately noted that the report had only led to further hostilities. “After having received the terms for an armistice unanimously adopted by the Inter-Allied Commission & accepted by the Ukrainians, the Poles opened their offensive on May 18. The Dmowski

¹⁰⁰ P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.72158. Namier’s comment was dated 14 May 1919.

¹⁰¹ P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.74033. Curzon’s comment was dated 16 May 1919.

¹⁰² P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.67131. Namier’s comment was dated 10 May 1919. Vasylo was not an Eastern Galician, but a wealthy landowner from Bukovina, who had been involved in the leadership of the Bukovinian Ukrainians since the 1880s and was a member of the Ukrainian National Council.

Press openly declared that the terms for the armistice being based on the war-map, the thing to do is to change it by means of a vigorous offensive.”¹⁰³

The Allies refused to take action to enforce the armistice. With reinforcements from Poland proper and Haller’s army, the Poles soon broke the Ukrainian encirclement of Lviv, and drove back the Ukrainian forces to the Zbruch River. The Allies’ inaction was probably more discouraging to Namier than the Poles’ “vigorous offensive.” On 4 June 1919, he commented on a report from M. Nattigan in Bucharest on the progress and failure of the negotiations. “The enclosed document gives an account of the several attempts which the Ukrainians made to conclude an armistice with the Poles & of the way in which the Poles managed to keep them cut off from Europe. It is rather pathetic to see how these people counted on the Peace Conference, to enforce its decrees.”¹⁰⁴

Namier’s discouragement was only exacerbated by the events of June 1919. His idealistic belief in the Allies’ adherence to the principle of self-determination was challenged at every turn. Headlam-Morley also placed a lot of faith in Allied professions of principle. By June he was becoming quite disillusioned with the Peace Conference’s deliberations, but he still argued with Namier over what would be a “just” reorganization of Poland. In a letter to Namier on 11 June 1919, Headlam-Morley wrote of his disagreement with Namier over whether Poland’s borders should be expanded to the east or to the west.

I cannot reconcile myself to the position that it is the right thing to satisfy the Poles by giving them more than they can justly demand on their western frontiers, so as to relieve the tension on the eastern. Of course this arises from the fact that I really know nothing about the problems on the eastern frontier of Poland, but I feel that it would be a fatal thing to give to the Poles more than they can justly demand at the expense of Germany; *in my mind Germany is more important than the White Russians.*¹⁰⁵

And in another letter at the end of June, Headlam-Morley tried to elucidate Namier’s “fundamentally” different view. “As far as I can understand your view, you would almost welcome unjust Polish gains against Germany, provided that there was strict justice on the eastern frontier of Poland; I am afraid that it seems to me that in the long run the Germans

¹⁰³ P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.77887. Namier’s comment was dated 27 May 1919. The memorandum was dated 13 May 1919.

¹⁰⁴ P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.82800. Namier’s comment was dated 4 June 1919.

¹⁰⁵ Headlam-Morley, p. 141. Letter to Namier dated 11 June 1919. Emphasis added.

are more important than the Little Russians.”¹⁰⁶

Namier was discouraged but not deterred. He continued to argue against Polish rule in Eastern Galicia. On 13 June 1919, he criticized the pro-Polish nature of Major Paris’s reports on the situation in Eastern Galicia. He contrasted Ukrainian and Polish claims and once again suggested that the solution was not Polish rule. “Major Paris thinks that there is ‘good proof that the Ukrainian regime was not one that people could be expected to live under.’ Nor is the Polish regime. The outrages alleged to have been committed by the Ukrainians against the Poles in East-Galicia are in no way worse, and indeed on the whole less serious, than those proved to have been committed by the Poles against the Jews.”¹⁰⁷ Namier’s comments also continued to influence the British position on Eastern Galicia. In a letter to Namier of 17 June 1919, Headlam-Morley commented: “I have just been reading the long telegram to Sir Percy Wyndham [British Representative to Poland], in which I seem to recognize your handiwork; I must congratulate you on it.”¹⁰⁸

Eventually, Headlam-Morley became quite exasperated with the Polish claims at the Peace Conference. He complained in a letter to M. Carnegie of 23 June 1919, that “all these things are rather wearisome. It would be easy enough if we had time, but the Poles are, I believe deliberately adopting dilatory methods and I expect that they get support in Paris.”¹⁰⁹ Headlam-Morley was essentially correct in his accusations of French support for Poland. The French were motivated by their desire to prevent the reemergence of a powerful Germany. They “sought to prevent this possibility by creating a powerful Polish state on Germany’s eastern border. And if a powerful Poland demanded the absorption of Eastern Galicia, then so be it.”¹¹⁰

Partly as a result of Namier’s influence, the British resisted calls for Polish authority to be recognized in Eastern Galicia, but the French position prevailed in Paris. On 17 June, the Commission on Polish Affairs presented its report. The next day Balfour had

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 176-7. Letter to Namier dated 30 June 1919.

¹⁰⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.86258. Namier’s comment was dated 13 June 1919.

¹⁰⁸ Headlam-Morley, pp. 146-7.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 157.

¹¹⁰ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 371.

a note circulated among the foreign ministers of the Great Powers suggesting the appointment of a High Commissioner for Eastern Galicia under the League. The note also maintained that the Ukrainians should “be told that, though the Poles are temporarily in occupation of their country, they are acting under the directions of the League of Nations,” and that they would be given the opportunity to express their desires by a plebiscite “within limits fixed by the League of Nations.”¹¹¹ The impact of Balfour’s note was minimal. On 25 June 1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers unanimously agreed to the Polish administration of the Province of Eastern Galicia, with the proviso of broad autonomy.¹¹² On 29 June, the British Foreign Office received a declaration of protest against the decision from the Ukrainian Delegation to the Peace Conference.

Headlam-Morley found the decision to give Poland authority over Eastern Galicia “incomprehensible.” In a letter to Namier on 30 June, he blamed the Americans for the decision. “It is quite impossible to follow all that goes on in East Galicia, but the last decision, by which it is apparently to be given over to Poland, seems to me to be quite incomprehensible. Here it is above all the Americans who are responsible; as so often is the case, they let us down on the most important points. I can see no sense of intelligence in their policy.”¹¹³

Namier made no immediate comment on the Council of Foreign Ministers’ decision. But indications are that he did not despair and continued to speak on behalf of the Ukrainians. On 23 June 1919, the Polish Diet sent a telegram through the British representative in Warsaw, Sir Percy Wyndham, requesting that Allied representatives be sent to a Commission inquiring into “atrocities in Eastern Galicia.” Namier suggested that if the Allies were to send representatives to the Polish Commission, the inquiry should also cover possible outrages “committed by, as well as on, Poles,” that the representatives should be persons with a good knowledge of the country, and that the Ukrainians should

¹¹¹ P.R.O./F.O.371/4377/fol.4389, p. 9. Found in Hunczak, pp. 205-6.

¹¹² P.R.O./F.O.371/4377/fol.4389, pp. 1-9. Found in Hunczak, p. 206.

¹¹³ Headlam-Morley, p. 177. A footnote to Headlam-Morley’s comment suggests the centrality of the Bolshevik threat to the Council’s decision. “In late June the Council of Ministers took up the question, it had to choose between ordering a Polish withdrawal, thereby opening up Eastern Galicia to the Bolsheviks, or of sanctioning Poland’s military occupation. Reluctantly, it chose the latter.”

be represented. Namier's suggestions were followed by the comment that "if representatives are sent it would probably be desirable that they should make inquiries independent of [the] Polish Commission." 114

On 25 June, the Foreign Office received an "expert" report from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on "Alleged Atrocities Committed by Ukrainians." On 30 June, Namier again voiced his concerns with the Polish Commission and suggested the motivation behind the Polish government's accusations of atrocities committed by Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. "The Poles, disregarding warnings repeatedly given to them by H.M. Government invaded East-Galicia. They now try to justify their action by tales of Ruthene atrocities. A peasant in revolt and driven to utter despair is not so soft-handed as his oppressor. But this is not a sufficient reason for continuing Polish dominion over Ruthene country."115 Namier also questioned the validity of the Commission's findings. Ukrainians who claimed that atrocities had been committed against them were allowed to testify before the Commission. But Namier pointed out that their interpreter was "Dr. Stephan Dobrowski, attached to the Mission by President Paderewski." Namier rather sarcastically commented that "the use at an inquiry of an interpreter supplied by an interested party is surely 'une haute nouveauté' in judicial procedure and deserves to be noted. One wonders whether this is an exceptional case or whether it is the custom of Allied Missions in Poland."116

Namier also criticized the "expert" report submitted by the Polish government listing atrocities committed by Ukrainians against Poles. "I cannot see how we can take any responsibility for its accuracy. Or if we publish it should we also publish the fact, reported by the D.M.I.'s agent in Poland, that the Lemberg pogrom in which 72 Jews were massacred was authorized by the Polish military authorities? Or that General Razdowski, now head of the Polish Military Mission in Paris, boasted in conversation with Capt.

114 P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.94173. Namier's comment was dated 30 June 1919. Emphasis added.

115 P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.95869.

116 P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fol.95869. Namier's comment was dated 30 June 1919. The reference to "Allied Mission in Poland" probably referred to Major Paris's mission there, and to Namier's suspicions about the one-sided nature of Paris's reports.

Johnson R.N. of having executed Ruthene prisoners of war?"¹¹⁷ It appears that following the Peace Conference's decision to allow Polish administration of Eastern Galicia, Namier's criticisms became more bitter in tone.

But the Foreign Office's response clearly suggested that Namier's influence continued. The Office sent a telegram to Balfour in Paris on 3 July 1919 suggesting that "enquiries of proposed Commission should be - so far as Allied representative is concerned - impartial as between Poles and Ukrainians and that the fact that allegations have been made against the Poles should be borne in mind...our representatives should know something of the languages."¹¹⁸

Perhaps, the most interesting aspect of Namier's continued support for the Galician Ukrainians in their struggle with the Poles occurred when that violent struggle affected him personally. At the beginning of June 1919, about the same time as Namier was commenting on the Poles' "imperialistic" tendencies and defending the Ukrainian's claims in Eastern Galicia, soldiers of the retreating Ukrainian Galician Army¹¹⁹ sacked his family's farm at Koshylivtsi, terrorized his family, kidnapped his mother and sister and killed their estate manager. The news reached Namier through the Polish Foreign Office. Considering the source, it was not surprising that Namier waited until 12 July to write to one of his Polish friends, Dr. Rajchman, of the Polish Ministry of Health, requesting his assistance. Namier reported the occurrence as follows:

I have received news that our house has been sacked by the Ukrainians. My father, rescued since, is ill in hospital at Kolomea, my mother and sister have been deported by Ukrainians to Borshchiv. Kozlowski of the Polish Foreign Office, who brought the news, suggests that they might be rescued in an exchange of prisoners. Could you help in

¹¹⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fo1.95865.

¹¹⁸ P.R.O./F.O.371/3907/file 28011/fo1.94173.

¹¹⁹ The Galician Ukrainian Army was in early June retreating from the Polish forces, which had been reinforced by General Haller's French trained, equipped and led army. The Ukrainians attempted one final counteroffensive on 8 June 1919, under the commander General Oleksander Grekov. This final attack was initiated near the town of Chortkiv, very near to Koshylivtsi. Whether the attack on Namier's parents' estate occurred before or after this counteroffensive cannot be determined, as Namier was never able to determine the exact date of the outrage.

arranging matters and communicate with my father?¹²⁰

Wyndham transmitted Namier's letter to Dr. Rajchman. He also talked with Pilsudski about the exchange of Ukrainian prisoners for Namier's mother and sister. According to Wyndham, Pilsudski¹²¹ responded quite positively. "He said that he would be glad to be of any assistance possible and that he would send an officer to Kolomea now in Roumanian occupation in order to see Mr. Alexander [Joseph?] Bernstein."¹²²

By 21 July 1919, the emergency was over. A telegram from Wyndham stated that "Mr. and Miss Bernstein have returned to Koszylowce."¹²³ But accurate information on the occurrence only came to Namier slowly over time. Wyndham's report of the same date stated that Pilsudski had sent out an "Aide de Camp" and found that the Bernsteins had been forced by the Ukrainians to walk on foot to Zalishchyky, despite an injury they had caused to Mrs. Bernstein's leg. Furthermore, "the murder of M. Mazurek [the estate manager] is confirmed as is also the destruction by the Ukrainians of Mr. Bernstein's country house and property."¹²⁴

Namier read every report on his family that came through the Foreign Office. The reports characteristically portrayed the Ukrainians as "barbarians." On August 4, Joseph told Major A.L. Paris that "he had been robbed of practically everything by the Ukrainians, and expressed the opinion that they were worse than Zulus."¹²⁵ Contrasted to this

¹²⁰ P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/file 102247/fol.102247. Julia states that the news came from "a man called Frazer" on 4 July 1919. "Having been confined in Austria during the war, Frazer had known some friends of L's family, had been entrusted with a letter, and was volubly communicative." Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier*, p. 142.

¹²¹ According to Julia, Pilsudski had been the "first political hero to fire L's imagination" (p. 41).

¹²² P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/file 102247/fol.105826. Wyndham's response was dated 17 July 1919. Wyndham seems to have gotten Joseph's first name wrong, but not his last. As Julia recounted, it was most telling to Namier that his father stressed the name Bernstein, not Niemirowski. This suggested to Namier that Joseph was hiding behind his Jewishness, because the Ukrainians were more antagonistic to the Poles, and particularly Jewish landlords. As he recounted to Julia, "Ukrainians, no less enthusiastic Jew-baiters than were the Poles, confined their pogroms chiefly to small towns and particular villages where Jews clustered. But owners of manor houses were beaten-up, tortured, and killed because they were Poles." Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier*, p. 143.

¹²³ P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/file 102247/fol.104157.

¹²⁴ P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/file 102247/fol.107643.

¹²⁵ P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/file 102247/fol.113659. This report was from Wyndham, but included a report from Major Paris, the British Officer in charge at Lviv.

statement was Joseph's great appreciation of what the Poles had done to help him and his family through the emergency. Joseph even travelled to Lviv on 2 August 1919 to thank the Polish general staff in person for their assistance.¹²⁶

A more extensive report, by H.G. Picton, was received at the Foreign Office on 7 August. Picton's description was quite explicit.

Mr. Bernstein stated that he had been very badly treated by the Ukrainian soldiers who robbed him of everything and it is with great difficulty that he escaped and took refuge at a friendly peasant's barn. He remained in this hiding place for 48 hours, when it was discovered by the Ukrainians and Mr. Bernstein and his companions were literally thrown out and dragged into a stable, where a Ukrainian soldier hit M-me. Bernstein in the face so violently that she fell and severely injured her leg. At this time also the soldiers robbed Mr. Bernstein of his last pair of boots.

Mr. Bernstein's bailiff, Mr. Mazurek, was taken away to Buczacz, where he was shot. Miss Jalowiecka, M-me and Miss Bernstein were imprisoned for 3 days and only released at the approach of the Polish Army.¹²⁷

Picton also recorded Joseph as stating that "many Jews were among the Ukrainian soldiery," as well as "many German and Austrian ex-officers," and Namier's mother, Ann, recognized one Jew as a Mr. Epstein from Stanyslaviv.

Namier's reaction to this personal tragedy suggests an amazing degree of self-control and devotion to principle. Since the founding of the Political Intelligence Department, he had been commenting extensively on almost all memoranda that crossed his desk, particularly those regarding Poland and Polish claims in Eastern Galicia. On the cover sheet of Picton's report someone remarked: "What savages!"¹²⁸ But this comment was not in Namier's hand. In fact, the only evidence that Namier even read these memoranda was his signature, "LBN," on the cover sheets. Unlike many previous cover sheets on which he had written extensive comments concerning the memorandum enclosed,

¹²⁶ P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/file 102247/fol.111561. The telegram was dated 2 August 1919 and was transmitted via Wyndham from Pilsudski.

¹²⁷ P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/file 102247/fol.114763. Picton's reliability is questionable. P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/ file 103821/fol.103821 noted that Picton was considered "an inadequate representative" of the British government. He was considered very pro-Polish, and this certainly may have coloured his transmission of Joseph's statements. However, Namier himself described his father as consistently pro-Polish. "My father was always on the Polish side and known to be closely involved with the Polish nobility. The wave of cruel reprisals could hardly by-pass him." Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier*, p. 144.

¹²⁸ P.R.O./F.O.371/3923/file 102247/fol.114763.