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**Pedagogy and difference : A study in cross-cultural
adult education**

by

Patricia Hughes-Fuller



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education

in

Adult and Higher Education

Department of Educational Policy Studies

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 1995



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Patricia Hughes-Fuller
R. R. 4, Calmar, Alberta
Canada, TOC OVO

Date Oct 4, 1995


*What, after all, is an education system, other than
a ritualisation of speech, a qualification and a fixing of roles
for speaking subjects, the constitution of a doctrinal group...
a distribution and an appropriation of discourse with its
powers and knowledges?*

-Michel Foucault


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
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Dr. Marilyn I. Assheton-Smith



Dr. Judy Cameron



Dr. Daphne Read

Date September 22, 1995

Abstract

The starting point for my research was a series of questions about how the participants perceived their role(s). In reality the research did not deal with perceptions but rather with participants' discourse: what they said (and how they talked) about their experiences teaching Native adults. While there was a considerable range of experience, talk tended to orbit around recurring themes. I interpreted this as indicative of the ways that large-D Discourse (the conventions of a discipline such as education) circumscribes what we can --acceptably and intelligibly--say about our work.

The data showed that roles were in part shaped by theoretical models but institutional constraints and the (context-specific) circumstances of various educational settings also had an effect. Participants expressed frustrations over situations in which they felt caught in the middle. I ascribed this to a tension between their constitution as pedagogical subjects (through Educational Discourse) and real world conflicts and problems. Participants' talk also revealed a preoccupation with difference, supporting my suspicion that deconstructing difference remains an urgent and compelling project.

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I owe (and will continue to owe) a debt of gratitude to the participants. Without them, this thesis simply would not have been. Finally, thanks to my husband and daughter for putting up with me during the arduous, and seemingly endless, hours of preparation.

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Chapter I

"A long and terrible shadow"

I. Introduction.

The history of Native education in Canada has been shaped by the perceived need to Christianize, civilize, contain and control Native people (Urion, 1991). While many scholars and educators now recognize the wrongness of this approach, according to Carney (1982) "one of the reasons why many of today's adult education programs for Native people have been less than successful is because so little has been learned from the past" (pp. 1-2). This thesis looks at some likely reasons for this consistent failure to learn and suggests that we are presently at a place where a different perspective on the issues surrounding Native education is possible.

II. Background to the Study.

A. Christianizing and Civilizing:

The title of this chapter is borrowed from Thomas Berger's book of the same name, which describes the conquest of the Americas. It was during this period that the lives of Native people were first darkened by the "long and terrible shadow" of European civilization, a shadow that, in many respects, still hasn't lifted. According to the literature, the colonial period was characterized by a reiteration of the vast differences between the "deficient" Amerindians and the Europeans who were the chroniclers (today many would argue the creators) of what we think of as history. Carney quotes J. Axtell (1981) on the reasoning behind the colonial consensus that the Indian had to be changed:

From the European perspective, the Indians were deficient in three essential qualities: order, industry and manners. This meant in essence that they were non-Europeans, the polar opposite of what they should be and should want to be" (Axtel, p. 46, cited in Carney, p. 2).

Carney (1988) emphasizes that the above assumptions imposed practical constraints as well -- "the Indian must become non-Indian in order to achieve self-sufficiency or to become self-supportive" (p. 307). What is more, the type of education that Native people received was often limited. Carney (1988) and Roberts (1982) both remark on the vocational orientation of much

contemporary Native adult education, an orientation that can be traced back to the industrial schools of the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries.

To sum up, education was the label applied to a process that occurred within an institutional setting, whereby Native people could be "civilized" through a regimen of hard work, cultural repression and Christian dogma. This was the policy, but in many instances the actual practices were much worse (Bull, 1991; Haig-Brown, 1988). Until the end of the residential school era, Natives were usually denied the right to continue their schooling past the age of sixteen, which meant that for the majority postsecondary education was out of the question. (The enthusiasm with which the governments legislated enforced schooling provides a curious contrast to their indifference regarding both the quality and the duration...) During the period of residential schooling whole generations were "quarantined from both Native and colonial societies" (Carney, 1982, p. 2). They were trained to be farmers and laborers, housewives and servants, and relegated to the margins of white society where supposedly they would exist in a kind of limbo -- not proper Europeans, but not really Indians either.

Contemporary readers find it hard to conceive of the mind-set that allowed the clergy and government of what we now know as Canada, not only to treat Native people in this fashion, but to actually believe that it was just and proper to do so. In his discussion of Francization, Jaenen (1986) cites some pertinent quotes. Recollet missionaries described the need to "make them men (sic) before we make them Christians" (p. 46). Also:

Talon was instructed in 1665 to introduce manual labour early in their education...because, according to Louis XIV's information, laziness in the children was the cause of most adult traits of weakness, and he had heard that the Amerindian men were particularly lazy. (p. 47)

These and other comments express the conviction held by Europeans of the period (the French were not unique) that "the Native peoples of North American...were brute savages or barbarians" (Jaenen, p. 46). Two hundred years later, the "modern" British colonial administration had this to say:

It has been shown that, up to a recent period, the policy of the Government towards this race was directed rather to securing their services in time of war, than to reclaiming them from

barbarism and encouraging them in the habits and arts of civilization. (App, 1847, cited in Houston & Prentice, Eds., p.218)
The author assures us, however, that "Since 1830, a more enlightened policy has been pursued" (App, 1847). One of his "enlightened" recommendations was for the establishment of industrial schools

Circa the turn of the century, the Reverend Thompson Ferrier, another advocate of industrial schooling, advised "white well-wishers" to "measure (the Indian) by his own standards, as we whites would wish to be measured if some *more powerful race* (emphasis mine) were to usurp dominion over us" (Houston & Prentice, 1975, p. 228). He was also critical of government policy, the "inevitable result" of which "is discontent, lawlessness, unrest, laziness, debauchery and pauperism" and called for "the destruction and end of treaty and the reservation life" (Houston & Prentice, p. 228). As far as the education of Native adults is concerned, Rev. Ferrier offered little hope. "Nothing can be done to change the Indian who has passed middle life...We should make his declining years as comfortable as possible" (Houston & Prentice, p. 228). Again, the contemporary reader flinches; this is the language applied to the elderly infirm or the terminally ill.

It is possible to claim that the above was a conscious attempt to rationalize, and so justify, the invasion, subjugation and exploitation of the Americas. There is some truth to this argument, but unless we subscribe to the notion of an overarching conspiracy, it doesn't really explain the pervasiveness and unanimity of European attitudes. Educators today find it hard to recognize ourselves in such blatantly Eurocentric forebears. However before we take too much pride in our own "more enlightened approaches" we would do well to remember the warning -- "so little has been learned from the past"....

B. Acculturation Theory:

What are the perspectives that have defined Native education more recently? According to Orion (1991) acculturation theory, which insists that, sooner or later, a dominant culture will inevitably absorb minority cultures, still informs the attitudes of many educators:

The acculturation model has become a piece of embarrassing baggage in education; long after it has been discredited in theoretical anthropology, it is still the predominant model in

academic and applied educational discourse, and threatens to fuel another 50 years of discussion about conflicting values. (p. 8)

Within the confines of this model, individual behaviour is pre-determined by cultural norms and values, which are then acted out. Rather than being engaged in an interactive process, individuals are in effect "prisoners of culture". Cultures are disembodied and reified, somehow existing apart from and above the discrete populations that live with/in them. Definitions of cultural dominance are also problematic. Is dominance simply about issues of power, or does it imply that because a given culture is seen as more functional, it is, in a normative sense, superior?

Hedley (1976) correctly identifies the positivist and functionalist roots of the acculturation model:

The first is a form of empiricism which assumes that there is a world of facts that can be reached without *a priori* conceptions on the part of the observer. Secondly it is assumed that anthropology is, or should be, "value free". Together they obscure recognition of the fact that the perspective underlying acculturation studies embodies a particular viewpoint, and that as with any perspective the knowledge derived through it is partial. (Hedley, 1976)

Acculturation theory mystifies the legacy of colonialism and conquest, through a "whatever is, is right" cultural pragmatism. It also posits that individuals have no control over cultural behaviour and this in turn absolves them of any responsibility to engage in processes of criticism or change. Furthermore, by situating culture front and centre, acculturation theory precludes the possibility of other explanations, e.g. socioeconomic factors or racism. In challenging acculturation theory, Urion (1991) asks whether "an educational problem rests on an intractable cultural difference" (p. 8). What is worse, as Hedley (1976) points out, "it embodies a particular unrecognized conservative viewpoint which ... locates the cause of the problems faced by Indian people in the Indian community itself" (presumably due to their maladaptive refusal to yield to the inevitable!). This is a classic example of blaming the victim.

Urion's (1991) final claim is that acculturation theory makes a comparison "between cultural groups in terms that imply that the standards...of one are definitive of the good or desirable" (p. 8). If this charge

is valid, dominant really does mean superior. Assheton-Smith (1977) adds that "acculturation theory...is also a theory of development or modernization, pointing to the processes by which Indian groups become more Western, and therefore more developed". This is the crux of the matter because it shows that, beneath the rhetoric of cultural relativism, acculturation theory is every bit as Eurocentric as earlier models that defined civilizing and Christianizing as educational priorities. If the "feathered Indian" (LaRoque, 1975) is the stereotype associated with civilizing and Christianizing, then the stock character of choice for acculturation theory must surely be the (red on the outside, white on the inside) "Apple".

C. Contemporary Models/ Critical Theory:

The social upheaval of the late sixties and early seventies also had implications for educational theory and practice. The civil rights, anti-war, student and women's movements coalesced into what was referred to as the New Left. Black --and Red-- power groups staked out their political territory and the theoretical project of the day was to reconstruct older (predominantly Marxist) theories into contemporary radical models for social action. Native people were categorized as an oppressed racial minority, and the way out of their oppression was through the struggle for self-determination. This was the era of the American Indian Movement, and the National Indian Brotherhood's 1972 manifesto, *Indian Control of Indian Education*, reflects the spirit of the times. The image of the educator changed as well. S/he was no longer the missionary, nor the role model embodying white middle-class values. Instead, progressive educators defined themselves as change agents, within the framework of what was variously termed "critical pedagogy", "pedagogy of voice", "radical pedagogy", "pedagogy of empowerment", and "pedagogy of possibility" (Ellsworth, 1989).

For those of us with a left-of-centre view of politics and society, critical pedagogy seems very attractive. However a closer look reveals that it is not without its own contradictions and, in the last few years, it has received a barrage of criticism from a variety of sources. Some of the most salient and convincing challenges have come from feminism, postmodernism and cultural studies. According to Ellsworth (1989) "the discourse of critical pedagogy is based on rationalist assumptions that give rise to repressive myths"(p. 297). As an example, she cites her own experiences dealing with interventions against racism in the university and states:

when participants in our class attempted to put into practice prescriptions offered in the literature concerning empowerment, student voice and dialogue, we produced results that were not only unhelpful, but actually exacerbated the very conditions we were trying to work against, including Eurocentrism, racism, sexism, classism, and 'banking education'. (p. 298)

Ellsworth calls instead for a classroom practice that is "context specific" and suggests that critical theorists remember to ask themselves "what diversity do we silence in the name of critical pedagogy?"(p.299).

Lather (1991) is more sympathetic to critical theory but she echoes Ellsworth's (1989) concerns and warns that:

Deconstructing vanguardism means asking ourselves hard questions about how our interventionary moves render people passive, positioned as potential recipients of predefined services rather than as agents involved in...shaping their life conditions. (p. 47)

Grossberg (1994) is interested in the intersection between critical theory and cultural studies. He claims that what most distinguishes contemporary cultural studies from orthodox critical theory is its "radical contextualism" (p. 5) which means that "no single position can ever be secure in its correctness. Different strategies [and I would add theories] are right in different locations and at different moments" (p. 6).

This is the lens through which he identifies and criticizes "three models of progressive pedagogical practices. "The first, a hierarchical practice assumes that the teacher already understands the truth to be imparted to the student"(p. 16). This assumption (which sounds dangerously like knowledge-banking to me) means that the teacher ends up drawing the line "between the good, the bad, and the ugly, between the politically correct and the politically incorrect" (p. 16). He also describes what he terms a "praxical pedagogy [which] attempts to offer people the skills that will enable them to understand and intervene in their own history" (p. 16). He points out that:

The problem with this practice is not only that it assumes that people are not already trying to intervene in their own history, but more important, that it assumes that the teacher already understands the right skills which would enable emancipatory

and transformative action, as if such skills were not *themselves contextually determined* . (p. 17, emphasis mine)

His last example, described as dialogic practice, "aims to allow the silenced to speak; only when absolutely necessary does it claim to speak for them".

However, Grossberg adds that "This assumes they are not already speaking, simply because we...do not hear them, perhaps because they are not speaking the right languages or not saying what we would demand of them" (p. 16).

Grossberg concludes his argument with the following observation:

To repeat what I said earlier, people are not cultural dopes. After all, if they were, how could we teach them (other than through manipulation as grotesque as that which we claim to be struggling against). (p. 19)

All the above have reinforced my reservations about aspects of critical theory. I have other doubts as well. For instance, critical theorists emphasize the role of conflict and, while conflict is often a correlative of social change, I think we must ask ourselves if it is necessarily -- or in all situations and circumstances -- a catalyst? This question arises from my sense that as an ethically responsible educator, I must acknowledge that many Native groups and individuals are opposed to conflict. Surely it would be contrary to the spirit -- as opposed to the letter -- of emancipatory education to prescriptively impose a conflict-based process on these learners. This is the kind of disregard for context that Ellsworth (1989), Lather (1991) and Grossberg (1993) are concerned about. Speaking from within the context of Native education, Urion (1991) argues for "theoretical critiques of the concept of empowerment of critical education theory and other current models" (p. 9) so as to avoid repeating the errors of the past (i.e. education to Christianize, civilize, contain, and control Native people). If we aren't careful, critical educators may end up as the new missionaries, doing all the wrong things for all the "right" reasons.

D. Problematizing the Present:

Both Lather (1991) and Grossberg (1993) see a way out for critical theory. For Grossberg this means opening ourselves to "a pedagogy of articulation and risk" (p. 18) which refuses to assume that either...theoretical or political correctness can be known in advance" Lather makes explicit what Grossberg leaves implicit, i.e. that critical theory can, and should, learn from

postmodernism. She challenges Habermas' (1983) charge that postmodernism is neoconservative:

The incursion of postmodernism into the discourses of liberatory education foregrounds my position that there is nothing in postmodernism that makes it intrinsically reactionary. The postmodern movement is an open-ended construction that is contested, incessantly perspectual and multiple-sited. (p. 49)

Lather (1991) advises critical educators to abandon "crusading rhetoric and begin to think outside the framework that sees the 'Other' as the problem for which they are the solution" (p. 47). At the same time she reminds us that if we are really concerned with giving voice to the voiceless we should try to remember that often "*who* speaks is more important than *what* is said" (p. 47, emphasis in text).

Does the above mean that a new crop of educational models based on postmodern social theories will provide solutions instead? In the case of Native education this assumption would be wrong for at least three reasons. First, according to some (Lather, 1991) postmodern theories are postparadigmatic; there are no more grand narratives that will fully encompass, or adequately explain the complex interactions of human existence. Second (as already mentioned) thinking in terms of problems and solutions has proven to be counterproductive. Third, and perhaps most important, I suspect that the future of Native education will not be decided exclusively or even primarily in universities, through academic discourse.

If this is the case, then why bother? One reason is that while we may not be responsible for, or capable of, "fixing" Native education, we are responsible for reexamining our own thinking on the issue. Postmodernism and poststructuralism provide a useful vantage point from which to take a long hard look at how we, as educators, position ourselves relative to who we are and what we are supposedly doing.

Reexamining our own thinking can be a tricky process, as I discovered while writing this thesis. Initially, I felt that an introductory summary of misconceived rationales for Native educational policies was simply a way of setting the stage or providing background. If I had jumped from the "unctuous and pious society" (Urion, 1991) of the last century directly to the 1990's, perhaps my nod to the past would have remained an unexamined

academic protocol. In fact the decision to include more recent models, including critical theory, caught me in a snare of my own making. I could no longer look at the past as distant, nor feel secure about the correctness of my own views. Intellectually I recognized that it would be presentist not to acknowledge that the missionary educators, whose bizarre preoccupations and priorities baffled me, were often "good and earnest [men] who respected Indian people" (Urion, 1991, p. 1). This recognition did not prevent me from dismissing their views on Native education but when it came to critiques of what (until recently) had been my own position, I reacted differently. The terms of reference for this discussion seemed both natural and defensible. (No doubt Reverend Ferrier and the Seventeenth Century Recollets felt equally at home with the debates of their day.) I found myself wondering if a hundred years from now critical pedagogy would, in turn, be looked upon as a bizarre preoccupation. I also wondered if our ongoing failure to learn from history stemmed from an inability to see ourselves as part of it. Butler (1992) puts the dilemma very well. "It is clearly not the case that 'I' preside over the positions that have constituted me" (p. 9).

It occurred to me that while "Christianizing and civilizing", acculturation theory, and critical theory are all different, they have one thing in common. Their foundation is the western European epistemological tradition with its assumptions about the nature of knowledge and reality, assumptions that postmodernism calls into question. Of these assumptions, Sorri and Gill (1990) identify dualism as central:

Knowledge is construed as the bridging of an epistemic gap which is assumed to exist between the mind and reality, between the subjective and objective domains. This ...epistemological dualism has plagued the entire history of Western philosophy from classical through modern (rationalism and empiricism) to contemporary (positivism and existentialism) thought. (p.4)

One of Urion's (1991) criticisms of "dialectics"(p. 4) is that it is based on polar opposites and the a priori assumption of conflict. This has implications for conflict-based models such as critical theory. As well, both Assheton-Smith (1977) and Hedley (1976) have identified dualism as an aspect of acculturation theory. The polarity between the "civilized European" and the "barbaric savage" of earlier models is patently obvious.

In contrast, postmodern thought "is no longer binary thought" (Owens, 1983, p. 62). Owens adds that:

The critique of binarism is sometimes dismissed as intellectual fashion; it is, however, an intellectual imperative, since...(it) is the *dominant form both of representing difference and justifying its subordination in our society.* (emphasis added, p. 62)

A second criticism leveled at Western European epistemology by Sorri and Gill (1990) is that it disembodies ideas. They cite Merleau-Ponty to argue that "in a truly relational philosophy, what is often referred to by the misleading term of 'external world' is known in relation to the embodied self and other embodied persons" (p. 35). One of the charges against acculturation theory made by Hedley (1976) is that it reifies culture, (i.e. the concept takes on a life of its own external to human interaction). Similarly, Urion (1991) argues that dialectics "disembodies ideas" (p. 4).

Denzin (1991) describes postmodernism as "an oxymoron with a short history" (p. 2), then provides a series of more serious, if contingent, definitions including "a form of theorizing and writing about the social which is post-positivist, interpretive and critical" (p. ix). Postmodernism is characterized by a crisis in representation which Lather (1991) defines as "an erosion of confidence in prevailing concepts of knowledge and truth"(p. 25). Owens (1983) concurs: Postmodernism "is usually treated as a crisis in cultural authority, specifically of the authority vested in Western European culture and its institutions" (p. 57). According to Said (1993), "There has been a Copernican revolution ...Eurocentrism has been challenged definitively" (p. 310).

If educators who are concerned with Native education are to find a lesson in the postmodern critique of Western European epistemology it is probably the realization that our assumptions about knowledge and cultural authority may have blinded us to the possibilities of other ways of knowing. We will never get the answers we need if we are unable to ask the appropriate questions. Urion (1991) contrasts First Nations discourse with academic discourse in insightful ways. According to Urion, academic discourse on First Nations education "has yet to get the question right"(p. 1). This is far more likely to happen, if "postmodern knowledge... refines our sensitivity to differences and increases our tolerance of incommensurability"(Lyotard, cited in Owens, 1983,p. 57). At least that is my premise.

III. Problem Statement and Research Question:

The history outlined earlier provides a glimpse, but only a glimpse, of the sorts of policies that were imposed on Native peoples who were to be mentally and morally reconstructed via education. As I reviewed this history I reached the uneasy conclusion that, while educators may not always repeat our mistakes, we are certainly capable of inventing new versions of old errors. I found myself wanting to understand the "why" of these mistakes. How could well-meaning and well-educated people have come up with what later generations have recognized as impossibly skewed questions? Also, how do educators today decide what questions are appropriate, and why are we more likely to ask some questions than others?

As educators we traffic in knowledge. Our working lives are taken up with researching, interpreting and communicating the content of our particular disciplines to others who, willingly or otherwise, are positioned to learn from us. While knowledge is involved, the process itself is pedagogical rather than epistemological, bound up more with the activities of teaching and learning than the nature and production of knowledge (though in practice it is sometimes difficult to separate the two). In terms of this process, I also wanted to know why do we do what we do in the *way* that we do?

This prompted me to ask the following questions:

How do non-Native adult educators who work with Native students and whose concept of education is based on a Western European epistemological and pedagogical tradition perceive their role?

1. What theories, educational models, and/or tacit cultural assumptions do their attitudes reflect?
2. What evidence is there of critical reflexivity, i.e. to what extent are the foundations of their practices examined or questioned?
3. How might their perceptions of difference influence their pedagogical practices?
4. What do their experiences reveal about how pedagogy defines, articulates or otherwise structures attitudes about difference?
5. What are some implications of the above for cross-cultural adult education?

My first assumption was that educators act -- not always consciously -- from within a worldview. As Blumer (1969) notes " one can see the empirical

world only through some scheme or image of it" (p. 25). I also assumed that there is some consensus about the negative role that Eurocentrism and cultural hegemony have played in cross-cultural education.

I have not attempted to survey a broad sample of non-Native educators working with Native adults. Instead I restricted my research to in-depth interviews with a small number of participants. This limits the range of this study, but I think it was the most suitable method for acquiring the kind of information needed to address my questions. I also excluded a lengthy discussion of the current status of Native education. This information is available elsewhere (Barman, et al., 1987; Haig-Brown, 1995; Tanguay, 1984) and is not directly relevant to my questions. Finally I decided against interviewing Native students because I think that their perspectives are a separate question. Teun van Dijk (1993) sums up my position very well: "In line with some critical directions of modern anthropology, this study is not interested in 'exotic' people, here or there, but focuses on Our own ways of thinking and writing about Them"(p.16).

IV. Justification for the Study.

There are both theoretical and practical reasons for exploring these questions. On the most immediate level, we need to do a better job of providing education for Native people. While there has been some improvement in withdrawal rates for Native students in the K12 system they are still much higher than are comparable figures for non-Natives (Sawyer & Rodriguez, 1990). Depending on the source, Native unemployment runs at 50-80% , and many Native communities experience endemic poverty. Social problems such as substance abuse and family violence have shattered the lives of countless Native adults and children (Ross, 1992). While education may not be a cure-all it should at least be an available and accessible resource.

Other reasons have to do with our obligation, as academics, to broaden our understanding when the opportunity presents itself. In the words of Edward Said (1993):

Most scholars and students in the contemporary American academy are now aware, as they were never aware before, that society and culture have been the heterogeneous product of heterogeneous people in an enormous variety of cultures, traditions, and situations. (p. 311)

Over the course of the last decade, many scholars have been "occupied with critical ground clearing --dislodging canons to make space for alternatives" (Clifford, 1986, p. 24). Questioning our own role as educators -- what we do and why we do it --is a necessary part of this process.

Today we live in a world that is simultaneously compressing and fragmenting and this also points to the importance of dealing with difference. Racism is foregrounded by events such as those currently occurring in the former Yugoslavia but according to Van Dijk (1993) it is neither unique to settings of open conflict nor the exclusive preserve of the ignorant and brutalised:

Racism...is not just in the streets...[it is] sometimes subtly and indirectly enacted or preformulated by various elite groups and their discourses. The racism of political elites, for instance, has a long tradition and, despite routine disclaimers and official appeals to tolerance, continues even today and at the very top. (van Dijk, 1993, p. 2)

Van Dijk cites then-President George Bush's veto of the 1990 Civil Rights Bill as an example.

Despite Said's claim that we've finally begun to recognize difference, knowledge workers such as educators and academics are among the "elite groups" van Dijk refers to. He adds that:

For most members of elite groups this thesis is hard to swallow being fundamentally inconsistent with their normative self-concept...[however] the vicious conservative attack on "political correctness" when there are modest changes in the curricula of schools and colleges...show how deeply Eurocentrism is rooted as a force of ethnic and cultural dominance. (van Dijk, 1993, p. 9)

The nineties has witnessed the rise of "Campus wars" (Arthur & Shapiro, 1995) and "chilly climates" (Dean, 1995) as women and minorities accuse universities and colleges of discriminatory practices. In Los Angeles, thirty years after the Civil Rights movement, the public also witnessed -- literally -- the video-taped beating of Rodney King, not by vigilantes but by officers of the law. Their subsequent acquittal by what truly must have been a jury of their peers was, if anything, even more distressing than the act itself.

In Canada, the 1990 crisis at Oka and, more recently, the decline of the west coast fisheries sparked confrontations between Native and non-Natives

that are reminiscent of the early seventies. Supposedly "natural" alliances between environmentalists and Native people have been strained, on the one hand, by the Walt Disney style excesses of some animal rights groups and, on the other, by the alacrity with which Native entrepreneurs have taken advantage of opportunities to promote tourism or manage nuclear waste storage and disposal. Meanwhile, despite criticism from international organizations including the United Nations, our federal and provincial governments still fail to behave honourably towards the Lubicon Cree.

Finally, the nineties have also seen the rise of right wing populism, a phenomenon that ranges from self-declared racists and Real Women to a surprising number of people who are neither, but who appear to have lost faith in public institutions. These same people seem to feel they are becoming increasingly impoverished (economically, but also emotionally, intellectually, and spiritually) and -- through tax revolts, anti-gun control lobbies and support for the Reform Party -- have signalled that they are "prepared to defend Our way of life". Van Dijk (1993) comments on a similar groundswell in Europe:

It should be noted that this special focus on the influence of elite discourse ... does not imply that there is no popular racism, nor that popular discourse and racism may not influence, bottom - up, the social cognitions and actions of the elites. Research has repeatedly documented white popular resentment against either new immigrants or resident minorities, especially under conditions of competition for scarce resources or in political crises. (van Dijk, 1993, p. 10)

The idea that "special interests", a term that was once applied to powerful lobby groups but is now used to label women and minorities, (Chomsky, 1991) are undermining democracy appears to have captured the popular imagination. This is a misconception but it is one that we ignore at our peril. Nor is it reductionist of van Dijk to point out that economic crises exacerbate this tendency to scapegoat and blame. At the same time, I believe it is possible to argue that separatism, exclusion, or any form of difference *against*, is a dead end whether it is self-proclaimed or imposed from without (by racism, sexism, homophobia etc) . "Them against us" invites conflict, but so does "each against all". We desperately need to build more genuinely pluralist

communities. This is not just an academic question, I believe it is a matter of survival.

V. Conclusion.

What follows is my research on pedagogy and difference. In the methodology section I describe my processes of collecting and analysing data; in subsequent chapters I present the data that I consider relevant and interpret the results. My conclusion summarizes these results, discusses the implications for cross-cultural adult education, and suggests possibilities for further study.

At this point I would like to clarify some of my terminology. The research question states that I am looking at role perception, but I wish to make clear at the outset that I am not using "role" in the sense that it is used by functionalist social theorists such as Talcott Parsons. I did not assume, when I framed my research question, that the participants in this study were "role players who 'internalise' the norms and values of society" (Layder, 1994, p. 22) so as to adapt and conform to this best-of-all-possible, educational worlds. "Role" as used in this study is more or less synonymous with "persona" -- an "aspect of personality as shown to or perceived by others" (*Concise Oxford Dictionary*, 1976, p. 824). I assigned role titles (agent of change, advocate, role model, therapist/counselor, agent of control and generic academic) as well as the participants' pseudonyms.

My use of the term "discourse" also needs some unpacking. Discourse analysis is both a specific part of my methodology and a general theoretical referent throughout. In order to avoid confusion, I use discourse (small "d") to mean any one of a variety of verbal strategies used in talk and text, and Discourse (large "D") when I am discussing "broad cultural/subcultural discursive formations" (Coupland, 1988, p. 6) such as Educational Discourse.

"Pedagogy" is used to describe all institutionalized teaching and learning, not simply the education of children. With the exception of quotations or unless otherwise specified, "Native" refers to all Indian (status or non-status, treaty or non-treaty) and Metis people.

Chapter II The Tool Kit

I. Rationale:

The following led to my decision to do a qualitative study: First, the research question itself deals with perceptions and points-of-view which can be answered best through interview data. Also, the lack of an extensive body of literature meant a deductive approach would have been difficult to do well. Fortunately, qualitative research is an appropriate method for exploring new terrain, and the challenge posed to the traditional Western European view of knowledge by those previously marginalized (by gender, ethnicity etc.) is fairly new. This thesis is an attempt to map out the spaces where those some have termed "border workers" (Haig-Brown, 1992; Giroux, 1993) situate themselves and, in turn, are situated by the discourses of pedagogy and difference. It is not a fact-finding mission.

II. The Participants:

Again, due to the nature of the research question, I decided on a purposive sampling of key informants. Beth Harry points out that:

The idea of key-informant interviewing...flies in the face of a prevailing notion in education research that truth resides only in large numbers....It refers to an individual in whom one invests a disproportionate amount of time because that individual appears to be particularly well-informed, articulate, approachable, or available. (p. 195)

Participants were selected in consultation with my thesis supervisor.

The following were criteria for inclusion:

- those interviewed should be instructors in adult or higher education
- they should be non-Natives with experience as cross-cultural educators of Native students.
- they should represent a range of educational contexts.

Access was also a factor in the final choice of informants.

I approached seven potential participants, six of whom consented. In light of the in-depth nature of the interviews and the nature of purposive sampling, my supervisor and I decided that six would be enough.

As mentioned, the six were selected from different adult and higher educational contexts. Because of the range of contexts, my hope was that the process of generalizing across cases would tend to focus on the cross-cultural aspects of each. It seemed reasonable to assume that structuring the research in this way would facilitate my analysis by initially excluding some potential blind alleys. Participants were drawn from the following areas of adult and higher education:

- Popular theatre/community development education
- Off campus university courses in the humanities and university preparation writing courses
- Community college, pre-UCEP (University and College Entrance Program) upgrading
- Social work education (community college and band consortia)
- Mainstream university instruction (Social Sciences)
- Native Studies university instruction

The first four involved outreach programming at various reserves and cultural colleges, the last two were campus-based, although in both cases the instructors had prior experience working in Native communities (either teaching, conducting research or consulting). Four of the interviewees were female, two were male. Only one had received teacher training (B.Ed., University of Alberta) and had worked in the school system.

III. The Process:

I conducted two rounds of interviews with each informant, the first to collect as much information as possible, the second to focus on emerging themes, or clarify apparent confusions. Both interview formats were semi-structured. The first round was characterized by open-ended questions, which Spradley (1979) refers to as grand tour questions. The second round involved greater specificity. All of the interviews were audio-taped and I did full transcriptions of each of the first round interviews.

My starting point for analysing the data was the original research question (See Appendix "A"). The inductive nature of my inquiry indicated that I should begin data analysis right away. This meant I was doing a kind of grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) which I hoped would allow subsequent interview questions and possibly even my research questions to

evolve in the direction pointed to by the data. Initially, I opted for a method that involved systematically coding, clustering and eventually categorizing data according to theme.

While I did not set out to do a pilot interview, the first interview, in effect, served this function. As I reviewed the transcript I found, to my dismay, that very little of the data actually addressed my research questions. I spent a few days frantically revising, trying to generate interview questions that would act as “magic bullets” infallibly seeking out the targeted information. Eventually I realized I was fighting the open-endedness so necessary to the qualitative process, and if anything, my interview questions should be fewer and more general. I also reminded myself that my co-researchers had far more knowledge and experience than my (or any outsider’s) questions could possibly anticipate. This meant the data would have greater richness without the restrictions imposed by narrow and overly-specific questions. With this in mind, I modified (i.e. loosened up) my original interview questions. As the research progressed, I also added others, but these arose from the data itself, as part of the analytic cycle.

Predictably enough, the combination of open-ended questions, differing individual experiences and a variety of educational contexts led to a considerable range of data. Because my research question provided the initial structure for analysis, I soon found myself with two general categories of data, to which I assigned the temporary labels “themes that address the research questions” and “other”. As the work progressed, it became apparent that responses tended to cluster around issues of pedagogy and difference. This eventually led to a revised research question (i.e. the one shown on p. 11).

At a certain point in the process I realized I was having some problems with hierarchical thematic clustering as a method of analysis. With over two hundred pages of transcription, I felt I had more material than I could effectively use, and this was further complicated by the range of participant experiences. There were commonalities, but there were also many differences. When I complained to a colleague about what I thought of as the impossibility of tying it all together, she remarked that I would “just have to work it a bit more”. This disturbed me, because it sounded like the opposite of what I had assumed qualitative research was supposed to be about. (If we are being true to the data, surely this precludes shrinking or stretching it simply to make it fit within our analytical framework.)

I was also concerned because I felt that instead of serving as a way in to the material it seemed to me that this process was moving me farther and farther away from it. I was afraid I might end up with a set of floating generalizations, at best tenuously tethered to the data. I decided I needed an approach that was more context sensitive. Granted I was dealing with a series of very different contexts and the similarities and differences among them were not what I wished to discuss. However, in each individual instance I did need to examine what is being said with a view to where it was being said *from*.

A third difficulty stemmed from my wish to avoid all methods of analysis or interpretation that pit what people say against what they "really" mean, the latter being something they are supposedly not conscious of, yet I, an outsider, am somehow privileged to uncover, assuming in the process the role of an "authority who has seen the truth and must lead the self-deluded participant to see it too" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. xxii). This was a far cry from the relationship of mutual trust and respect which I had envisioned between myself and the participants (who are also my co-researchers).

My fourth and final concern had to do with the nature of language and what some postmodernist and poststructuralist scholars have described as the "crisis in representation which is, in essence, an uncertainty about what constitutes an adequate depiction of social reality" (Lather, 1991, p. 91). While I wished to respect the integrity of the participants' statements (I believe that, to the best of their abilities, they said what meant and meant what they said) there is a kind of doubleness and lack of transparency "built in" to language itself. Somehow I had to find a way to acknowledge both the sincerity of their intent, and the inevitable gap between all such commentary and real experience.

It was primarily this last reservation, i.e. my preoccupation with difficulties inherent in the use of language that sent me back to the literature, in hopes of finding a method that would at least reflect an awareness of the complexities involved in people's accounts of their experiences as constructed through language. I decided to treat the interview data as text, and this pointed me in the direction of discourse analysis as an alternative to thematic analysis or, more accurately, as a kind of second stage meta-analysis which would enable me to interrogate the previously-established content areas.

Discourse analysis incorporates a plurality of approaches, ranging from the highly structural to “much broader, historically developing, linguistic practices” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 7). It has roots in a variety of disciplines, including literary criticism, social psychology, speech act theory, ethnomethodology, sociolinguistics and semiotics. The following quote summarizes the perspective on discourse analysis that I found most useful:

For some, it is through the identification of broad cultural, subcultural discursive formations, and *only* through this, that the operation of societal power-codes can be read and conceivably broken. This tradition of discourse analysis (epitomized in the writings of Foucault) argues a systematic relation between discourse, power, and knowledge, wherein self-justifying modes of discourse set the boundaries of and sustain ideologies -- principally those of the dominant social groups and institutions. In consequence, critical analyses present the sole route to contextualising such discourses and possibly recovering rights over what may be said, what may be thought, what may be known”...(Coupland, 1988, p. 6)

Discourse analysis as utilized in this thesis means a reading of the text (in this case interview data) which was premised on the following assumptions about language:

1. Language has both a content domain and a rhetorical domain.

Renkema (1993) explains the distinction:

In the content domain questions such as “What shall I write?” and “Is this a fact, an opinion, or a suspicion?” are dealt with. In the rhetorical domain, the questions are on the order of “How do I present this to a given group of readers?” and “Is this argument convincing?” (p. 172)

He adds that writers go back and forth between the two domains more or less continuously. This process also occurs in conversation.

2. Foucault has shown that the institutionalization of knowledge and subsequent “discipline-ing” of discourse works, through normalizing processes, to control what may be said and who may say it. This means there is a difference between (merely) “internally persuasive discourse, and authoritative discourse” (Rosen, 1988, p. 82). Not only is the power of rhetoric itself limited, but (paradoxically) the rhetorical nature of the content

domain stands revealed for what it is: The relationship of "truth" to opinion or suspicion may have less to do with any one-to-one correspondence with reality, than with how well it conforms to a set of normative standards within a grid of power relations.

3. The above represents a site of contestation. Rosen (1988) cites Bakhtin's (1981) observation of the tension between the centripetal and centrifugal forces at work in language, the former which "pulls us towards a center of linguistic norms"(p. 82), the latter which "pulls us away from the normative centre"(p. 83). In the instance cited Bakhtin is using discourse in the more narrow linguistic sense but Rosen expands the frame by referring to:

that crucial attempt which we all make to struggle against the given and already determined in language, a struggle which is an attempt to assert our own meanings against the matrix of already-codified meanings lying in wait for us (p. 83).

Hymes (1972) reminds us that this struggle always takes place in a specific social context. Instead of using centripetal and centrifugal he characterizes language use as "personal" and "positional", and links these not just to what is given in language, but to "a general theory of the interaction of language and social life" (Hymes, 1972, p. 39):

Explanation faces two ways, towards generic possibilities and general constraints on the one hand (Chomsky's "essentialist" form of explanatory adequacy) and towards the types that are historically realized and their causes (an "existentialist" or "experiential" form of explanatory adequacy) on the other. (Hymes, 1972, p. 49)

To put it another way (and in doing so, paraphrase a famous quote) we use language, but we do not use it entirely as we choose.

I also discovered that some discourse analysts share my worries about thematic analysis. Potter and Wetherell (1987) point out problems which (they claim) qualitative studies may be especially prone to, in instances where "the analyst is operating within a common sense, 'realistic' model of language" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987,p. 42). Selective reading, reification, and ironization, are all methods of imposing unity on diverse data. In the first instance, the researcher "makes selections (from interviews or texts) that simply mirror his or her prior expectation" (p. 42). The other two strategies are more complex:

Reification refers to the process where abstractions are treated as material things or...where words referring to objects or processes are treated as guarantees of [their] actual existence. For example, a spoken account of an event which describes it as a quarrel might be taken to indicate that the event was in fact a quarrel. Ironization is the reverse....Ironization refers to the process where descriptive language is treated not as genuinely descriptive, or as having another purpose, or as deception (P. 42)

These are the means by which, they conclude, "the data can be used to buttress the favourite analytic story rather than...to critically evaluate it" (p. 42).

Potter & Wetherell (1987) also provide some concrete suggestions about ways to actually do discourse analysis, while stressing there are no rigid guidelines or fixed formulas:

It is important to re-emphasize that there is no method to discourse analysis in the way we traditionally think of an experimental method or a content analysis method. What we have is a broad theoretical framework concerning the nature of discourse and its role in social life, along with a set of suggestions about how discourse can best be studied and how others can be convinced the findings are genuine. The ten stages we have outlined are intended as a springboard rather than a template (p. 175).

Interestingly enough, their "stage six" is a kind of thematic analysis, however they point out that this is a preliminary to a closer examination of the material. Its function is more pragmatic than analytic. Subsequent analysis (of discourse) involves an interrogation of the language-in-context used to construct the above versions of events. (This, in essence, is the procedure I followed during my own analysis.)

At this point, I would like to state that I recognize that various types of thematic analysis are legitimate qualitative methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Bogdan & Biklan, 1992) and I do not wish to disparage those whose views of language and subjectivity are consistent with a more traditional realist or representational approach.

IV. Questions of Rigour

It is probably also appropriate to comment briefly on the protocols by which we determine how well a method of data analysis measures up. Does discourse analysis meet the criteria of validity and reliability, criteria we have inherited from the exact sciences and which shape our expectations of what research should look like. Quite apart from the extent to which these criteria are or are not appropriate to the study of human beings, a question qualitative researchers have struggled with (Lincoln & Guba, 1992), they don't always reflect the way exact science is actually done -- its reversals, epiphanies, and discontinuities. Discoveries are sometimes made more or less by accident, and only later is an experimental procedure designed that will reproduce the desired result (Gilbert & Mulkey, 1984). While it is difficult to apply conventional criteria for rigour to qualitative studies (Lincoln & Guba, 1992), I think it is important to remember the *raison d'être* for these criteria. They are what enable us to distinguish between research and opinion. Briefly, I've attempted to ensure that my research is trustworthy in the following ways:

1) Audit trail: I've kept a record of all decision points and methodological steps taken at every stage of the process (some have already been summarized in the preceding sections). According to Lincoln and Guba (1992) this addresses issues of dependability and confirmability.

2) Member checks: Member checks are important for many reasons (including ethical ones). Participants were given the opportunity to question, qualify, or even reject, my interpretations of their statements. (See Appendix "B".)

4) Triangulation (of data, method, or sources): While the literature review was ongoing, it played a special role during the later stages when I re-examined the results of the interviews in the light of feminist and postmodernist theory. The interplay between discourse analysis and thematic analysis also made for a stronger process.

No discussion of methodological issues would be complete without some mention of objectivity. If qualitative studies are to be taken seriously there is some need to acknowledge that we are at least aware of the problems that interpretive approaches to data analysis inevitably confront. To the best of our abilities we try to ensure that it is the data that does the talking, even if what it says does not necessarily support our academic agendas or personal

beliefs. The fact remains that as human instruments we are all carrying a certain amount of baggage, and this needs to be taken into account.

In qualitative studies there are at least three generally accepted ways of dealing with the problem of bias. One approach, associated with phenomenological methods of analysis, involves something called bracketing which (as I understand it) means deliberately setting aside our prejudices and preoccupations. We strip down to our barest and most essential selves, a kind of pure, uncluttered consciousness. For some this approach works well; however if one subscribes to the view (and I do) that subjectivity is socially constructed, then such consciousness as I do possess can never be pure or uncluttered. I exist as a situated entity, in terms of gender, race, culture and class. Also, my self has a history --I exist in time as well as space. This is why I find it difficult to conceive of ever really transcending my place or my past.

A different approach (one I find more congenial and workable) is for the researcher to state his or her assumptions, intentionality, and general theoretical perspective as explicitly as possible (Lather, 1986). This in itself will not eliminate bias, but it does alert the audience to where the author is coming from and they may then attempt to factor this into their reading. It also allows the work to be evaluated in terms of whether or not it is internally consistent i.e. how well it reflects the perspective the researcher claims to be speaking from.

Another strategy has to do with how the author positions him or herself relative to the truth claims s/he is supposedly making. If we acknowledge that even our most rigorously analysed conclusions are of necessity both contingent and partial, then researchers cum authorities may find that most of their former privileges have been revoked. As Fischer (1986) points out, "using the narrator as inscribed figure within the text whose manipulation calls attention to authority structures" (p. 232) is one way of reminding the audience that analyses are also interpretations. If we don't pretend our conclusions represent universal truths, or that we somehow speak for all people at all times and in all places, then the spectre of bias becomes much less threatening. Potter & Wetherell (1987) remind us that:

infallible criteria exist only in the land of positivist mythology:
there are no crucial experiments, knock down refutations or
definitive replications in the real world of science (p. 172

V. Conclusion:

Interpretation and analysis are inextricably related, especially in qualitative research. Theory provides the framework in which specific analytical methods are applied (e.g. for gathering and organizing data), it is a lens for interpreting the data, and it organizes the framing/reframing of the research question(s). In keeping with Patti Lather's (1986) advice, I would like to reflect a bit on my own use of theory.

Gilles Deleuze (1977) in conversation with Michel Foucault describes theory as being "exactly like a box of tools" (p. 208). I was instantly attracted to this formulation. No single key can open every door and even master narratives (Lather, 1991) like Marxism or Freudianism lack the explanatory power to (single-handedly and exclusively) account for everything.

Layder (1994) comments on the dualisms (macro/micro, structure/agency, society/individual, base/superstructure, etc.) that have characterized the development of social theory, and which he claims lead to "misleading and unhelpful distinctions"(p. 2):

dualisms like macro and micro... mutually imply and influence each other. They are not opposed to each other in some kind of struggle for dominance. (Layder, 1994, p. 2)

I share Layder's views about "theory wars". My own use of theory, in this thesis, is rather eclectic and involves trying to fit the tools to the task. This does not mean making a pragmatic stew of incompatible concepts, but rather recognizing that some theories are better at addressing social structures than they are at explaining people's attitudes (and vice versa).¹ Structure establishes the parameters, but within this bounded space other processes are at work, and boundaries can change. Foucault reminds us that there is a tension between dominant ideologies and consensual day-to-day practices.

My perspective might be characterized as "critical postmodernism". While I am committed to change, it seems to me that before there can be any talk of reconstruction, there must first be a thorough and unrelenting deconstruction. We can't keep repeating the same old stories. I don't think this means throwing the tools away (at least not all of them), but it probably means using them differently.

¹ I consider the Marxist formulation "false consciousness" to be an example of the former.

Chapter III

The Text as Data

My first interview question was: "Tell me about your experiences working with Native people...what was it like?" and it elicited a series of retrospective narratives. In each case the shaping of the story was done by the participants; they chose what they felt was important for the record. Despite the range of educational contexts, their accounts were surprisingly similar.

I. Perceptions of Pedagogy.

Initially I was able to identify a variety of pedagogical roles that participants assumed. Later it became clear that these roles were linked to different "philosophies of education", i.e. that certain lines were being drawn by (implicit or explicit) theoretical assumptions. It also became apparent that participants often felt uncomfortable, positioned as they were between, on the one hand, the agendas of educational programs and institutions, and on the other, their perceived need to be responsive to their students.

A. Roles.

1. Catalyst/ agent of change: Maggie is a popular theatre educator. During the mid-1980's she organized a theatre project in a semi-isolated northern Alberta Native community. This is how she describes her work:

The kind of theatre I predominantly do, my area of expertise as it were, is popular theatre...So I do a lot of different kinds of work in the area of social action and social change --well, social change is a bit ambitious (laughs)-- I don't see much that changes, reallyBut community-based and issue-oriented theatre.

This government-funded project was aimed at community development:

...the notion that popular theatre was a tool or a weapon and a way for people to begin to identify...I mean it's the whole sort of Freirean model...you use this for liberation, you work with them so that they have a tool. Then they can express what's happening. Then they can make steps towards social change.

Maggie and her four colleagues (including two Native actors) were attempting to facilitate social change through the medium of theatre and this proved more difficult than they had anticipated:

I guess my expectations were that the community would know who we were, it's a small community....Initially there had been a crisis committee that had gotten together as a result of a high number of glue-sniffing deaths, and they were going to sponsor us...so there would be this committee of adults who lived in the community that we were in some sense connected to....I expected, we were supposed to be based in the school, we were going to spend six weeks in the school working with all the grades...My expectation was that we would live with people in the community, that we would be billeted....Um, and that it would be difficult but there would be certain kinds of structures in place that would allow us to make contact with this community in a fruitful way....Now of course when we arrived there, NONE of that was in place!

Maggie ended up focusing on a small group of young adults who created a play that was later performed at a major theatre festival. As for her efficacy in the role of change agent:

I don't know....I find it very complicated and I don't know in the end....I don't think that the project over time... I don't think it did any active harm which I've come to see as pretty significant. But I don't know in the end if it did any active good, EXCEPT for those individual participants who were involved ...I believe it was a very useful experience for them. In terms of the community at large, I don't know if it did anything at all....

2. Advocate: Pauline teaches university-level humanities courses, as well as non-credit writing skills courses. In the late seventies she was employed by several institutions that brokered courses at a college which had recently come under Native control. (She was also employed directly by the college at various points during the several years she worked there.) It was a period of rapid change and no very clear direction, and many of those involved had different agendas. There were even conflicts among various Native groups:

There were a number of...things which were going on which hadn't really been worked out which would show themselves in the classroom by people refusing to talk or feeling free to talk. And I would discover afterwards in private conversations with

people -- because I lived at the residence-- that there were problems. Like somebody was connected to the key families on the reserve and therefore could miss several sessions and not be docked pay, whereas other people who were not well-connected would be...Um, the school had high school students in the basement, most of them from [the nearby reserve] but because the school could get more funding, the people who sat on the board advertised, um, widely and so they were getting people who were actually Slavey and Chippewayan, who were traditional enemies of the Cree....These kinds of problems were aggravated and would usually come up outside school hours. On the upper floor were residences for high school students who were brought in from these far-away places, so actually it was a lot as it had been -- a residential school -- for them....Because I stayed there I was aware of some of the problems that were going on. Another example was that the hot water was turned off after the business of running the school for the day was over. There would be no hot water for baths. Though the people in charge said that was "just a mistake" it was a mistake that happened rather often....

Over time Pauline became increasingly sympathetic to perceived injustices and critical of the way the college was being run. An element of advocacy even crept into her assignments:

It tended to be people who were not part of [the local reserve clique] who were drawn from Fort Chippewayan and who would come to me after class and talk about various inequities, which I tried to encourage them to address in letters, which I said would be part of their assignments and even if they wrote the letters and didn't send them, that was okay. But they could see what use writing was....

As confidante to "outsider" Natives, and as a vocal member of the group of students and instructors living on site, Pauline may have been perceived as a potential troublemaker by the administration. Before her tenure there ended the decision was made that teaching staff would no longer live in residence:

Later on, the last year of my term there, the board bought a house for the instructors in town...I suspect they did it because

they didn't like the complaints we were making about food and about the things that we were having to suffer and so were the students...We were taken out and put in a house, and no longer did you have that kind of camaraderie....

Although it was never stated explicitly, Pauline ascribes the eventual failure to renew her contract as a result of her being identified with the wrong side of a faction fight:

I asked them [i.e. her students] if they would get a Native person to come in to class and tell some of the traditional stories...and we did. They got two Native menNeither of them would speak English. And they told stories and I taped that....But I got into serious hot water at the school for doing this -- from [an influential Native family] -- because the school had its OWN story teller and I had not gone through the school to get a story-teller, I'd gone directly and asked my students to bring in story tellers....That was my last year of teaching there, and I don't know if that's why....They said they wanted new blood....You question whether it was an administrator or whether it was [members of the family referred to above], because on the whole my impression was [the influential family] set the agenda....I mean it sounded so fishy to me...and then my students came and said, well, really the people we brought in were part of the clique that was trying to oust [the influential family].

Pauline's situation was further complicated by the fact that she had also challenged the college's non-Native administrators over aspects of the curriculum.

Brenda also taught adult upgrading courses while working on a reserve near Edmonton during the late 1980s. Her particular form of advocacy involved gender issues as she became the confidante and, according to her, even protector of some of the women students:

...and in the writing they did for me in their journals, which I assured them would be very private and locked up in cupboards and nobody would ever see them. Some of the women were afraid to take them home at night because they thought their

husbands might read them so they left them with me and I locked them up.

Tony's field is social work education. Most recently he has worked in an urban community college and for band consortia. Some of his early experience with Native people involved formal advocacy work:

I was with a school board and I had quite a few cases involving Native children, and I more-or-less did workshops for schools....I worked more as an advocate and I helped other teachers understand Native culture....

He later helped his adult students "beat the system" -- advocacy of a more underground sort:

[The community college] had rules where if you missed 10% of your classes, no matter what, you were asked to leave. You had to leave the class. And I never agreed with that...So we would manipulate that a bit....

3. Therapist/ counselor . Perhaps because of his training as a social worker, for Tony, being an educator is in large part about providing personal support in a caring way:

So what I do, I try to create, I guess, a warm sort of caring, nurturing type of environment where people feel comfortable and not in any way intimidated or threatened. And then I try and teach the material as best I can. And I try and incorporate as much experiential material in my presentation, with respect to myself, uh, personal stuff....

This meant that, at times, he assumed the role of therapist/counselor, a role he acknowledges is a demanding one:

So what happens is a lot of students come in...being a social worker I would treat them like they were cases, almost. Like personal types of situations threaten to be really involving sometimes...But that takes a lot out of you, physically and emotionally, because there's no boundaries. Like in my situation they would phone me up in the middle of the night if, you know, they were suicidal, depressed: I'd get phone calls at 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning. I'd be taking people to doctors or going to reserves and rescuing people from who knows what....

4. Role model . As well, Tony assumed the more conventionally “teacherish” function of role model. When asked what he thought his students had learned from him he gave the following response:

I think students learned a lot from me. They had an opportunity, especially the women, to see a man, to be with a man, who could be a friend. And not be threatened and not be used. My support for them was unconditional, no matter...I never took it personally. I saw them as people who were human and so if they hurt me or lied to me, I never -- I would talk to them as a human being and say, you know, you hurt me, what’s going on. I would never yell at them and call them whatever and lay any guilt trips on them. I’d always try to make them accountable and understand what they were doing. So I think they learned from me, in that I think I was a positive role model.

Brenda also saw herself as a role model. Prior to her work in adult education she had been a junior high school teacher, and in the school system the importance of positive role models is emphasized:

I always look very professional when I’m teaching and that didn’t change when I went to the reserve. However I felt uncomfortable thinking “Here I am flaunting my wardrobe, um, and these people have two outfits to their name and have trouble getting to school with clean clothes”....So I thought maybe I was making them feel uncomfortable, but you know what happened after a few weeks was the women started taking real pride in how they looked and started wearing makeup and doing things with their hair and fixing their clothes and trying new things...and so I thought that was very positive....It sounds superficial but I... I don’t know...It just struck me....And I feel my standards drop when I don’t dress like a teacher.

5. Generic academic. Grant and Melissa are both university lecturers. He is a faculty member in the mainstream social sciences and she is a sessional lecturer within a Native Studies program. While the majority of Melissa’s students were Native, in Grant’s case Native students tended to be a subset of the class as a whole. Grant’s mandate, as he expressed it, is to communicate the fundamental concepts of his discipline:

What I try to do in these courses is give the students a way of thinking, a mode of analysis, a set of concepts that they ought to be able to apply, even though the specifics can change....So the model doesn't necessarily transfer to aboriginal politics but the categories may give them cause for thought and some help with analyzing what's going on....it's not the consensus model of government which tends to have been the aboriginal tradition, but you try to give categories that could apply to a variety of systems.

Melissa described some of the tensions involved in reconciling the notion of Native Studies with the orthodox view of the kinds of subjects that "belong" in universities:

The idea of having this [program] was to recognize that Native Studies was a legitimate academic discipline, that there's lots of material there, in terms of substance and theory, and to help Canadian society assess where it's actually at. Plus a lot of Native issues are also Canadian issues, not just simply because Natives are part of Canada, but because they are issues not only for Native people; Canadians of other types face those issues as well....After all, the library is the heart of the university here, and uh...the literary tradition is what makes it all work...I mean we can talk about experience and we can bring in oral traditions but there's still a literary tradition that we have to deal with.

6. Authority / agent of control. This was a role that some of the participants were much more conscious of than others and that no one really embraced or identified with. Yet to a greater or lesser extent it seemed to come with the territory. For Pauline, exercising authority was a necessary means to an end (i.e. getting the students to successfully complete the course requirements) but she found it tremendously difficult:

...you might have to repeat things, and you couldn't say no...because what are you going to do? Two thirds of your class aren't there because they're at a funeral. I mean it's all very well to say "I'll go ahead and teach" -- and there were instructors who *would* insist on doing that -- They'd say "Well, too bad. They're adults, I'll go ahead and teach and if they miss it, they miss

it"....And that happened to me. I insisted on doing that, and it sure happened to me. I also insisted on saying "Okay, when you come into my class, I'm shutting the door, and if you are late, you can't come in"....And THAT didn't work out very well...(laughs)....But on the other hand, if you have no rules and don't try to have rules...then what you found was people would take longer and longer smoke breaks, and they wouldn't come because the atmosphere in the class was so lax.... So it was always this kind of -- (long pause) --you constantly trying to shape them, but then you had to forgive them....

It was a balancing act that Pauline was not always able to maintain: Then there was the incident when the young man who was a star hockey player in [a nearby town]. He came to class, but invariably late....And I had been told that , um, you do not criticize anybody in public and you do not put anybody on the spot publicly. This was my -- the initial session that I went through....But I found it extremely irritating that this young man came in late time after time and slammed the door every time he came in. So I blew up at him and he went roaring out -- slamming the door AGAIN --and didn't come back to class. He didn't come back to class and I had to go and see someone and be "counseled"....

Pauline acknowledged that cultural difference was a factor here, but she also saw it as a more generalizable issue of teacher authority:

I've learned subsequently that you get those kinds of antagonisms in the classroom and you have to deal with them before they reach the level at which somebody can polarize the classroom into those who are for you and those who are against....But at that time, you know, I thought a show of authority was the way to deal with it....

Maggie's situation with the theatre group was rather different. She was not under pressure to push her students because of the need to cover a given amount of material within a prescribed timeframe. On the other hand, she lacked the clout that credentialism automatically imparts:

My authority was not very... "legitimate". I wasn't in a situation where I was going to pass people, where I could determine

whether they would go on to the next thing, whether they would get the certificate or whatever. The authority I had was, um.... "You're being paid for this....And nothing can happen if you aren't there because this is a group, a collective experience. So if you can't make it here at nine o'clock in the morning, if you can't get up, if you just, like, skip...then there are twelve other people in this room who can't do anything and who are really upset." And it is the main authority of the theatre...."This is a collaborative effort and uh, if you're not here then we have to say, right, we're going to go on without you... So if you want to be involved in the play and go to the performances you have to be here".

She also felt that a certain amount of positive authority flowed from her knowledge of her craft: "Other sources of authority were 'I know what I'm doing, and this is not just fun and games, this is how it works'...."

Tony's relationship to authority was primarily one of mediation, between students and non-Native staff or between students and the requirements of the program:

In field practicums it's pretty major. Some of our students ...basically what happens is they wouldn't show up -- because they had so many personal problems in their lives, they wouldn't show up on time, or they would miss an appointment and then the supervisor would reprimand them and they would claim that this guy's a racist, he doesn't understand Native culture. And I would say, that's not the issue. Were you there, were you supposed to be there, did you have a contract, did you have an appointment, did you keep it, did you break it, did you even phone the people?...No, no, no, no, no...Okay let's look at that, and not fog the issue by calling this guy a racist.

Clearly the six roles discussed above (catalyst/change agent, advocate, therapist/counselor, role-model, generic academic, and authority/agent of control)do not form an all-inclusive or definitive list. Nor do I wish to posit an identity between these roles and the real people I talked to. Roles shifted; often participants assumed more than one role, and even seemingly contradictory roles. For example, there is an obvious tension between an

“agent of change” and an “agent of control” yet paradoxically this is where Maggie found herself. She wanted to animate and empower a community, but at the same time was instrumental in linking her students to the umbilical of grant funding (she ended up paying people to participate in the theatre project which was then viewed, in her words, as “a scam to get money from the government”). In Pauline’s case the polarization was between advocacy on the one hand and more negative disciplinary functions -- where she also acted as an “agent of control” -- on the other. As well, virtually all of the participants functioned as “generic academics” at some time or another because all were involved, to varying degrees, in the transfer of knowledge and skills.

The initial signposts on my journey through the transcripts were statements that related to the research question. I was dealing with “role perceptions” but I was also becoming increasingly aware that these were not pure inventions, constructed inside the heads of the participants and unique or peculiar to them. One of my first clues came when I began to see how these roles were linked to various “philosophies” of education.

B. “Philosophies” or Educational Models.

1. Liberal education. This view of the meaning and purpose of education stems from a tradition that can be traced back through the Enlightenment and the Renaissance to the classical culture of ancient Greece. For liberal educators (Adler, 1982), its single most defining characteristic is that it is content-centred; there is something called Knowledge (very much with a capital K) and it is up to the teachers to ensure that this Knowledge is disseminated and passed on to future generations. Also central to liberal education is the notion that knowledge has intrinsic value. It is always better to know than not to know. This is why education should never be (simply and instrumentally) a means to an end.

The role of “generic academic” is an obvious fit, in part because of the emphasis placed on the value of learning. Brenda provided the closest thing to a definitive account:

That’s a tradition in our family too, is a really...a liberal arts education, not for what it can get you, as a job, but because it makes you a well-rounded person and gives you exposure to all sorts of different... all sorts of different avenues of thought and

things that you could pursue if you were interested enough to follow them up.... So that's why I'm all for the BA, whether it's practical or not....So I think that's my philosophy, is that people should be exposed to as much as possible and learn things just for the sake of learning, not because it's going to get you anywhere....

In Melissa's case, her adherence to the values of liberal education was one reason why she was critical of the educational allowance for Native students:

I come out of a sort of general arts background where it's learning -- learning is good for its own sake -- and to try and offer a course to people who are not so interested in that particular course, or that particular material, but who have this financial incentive to be there, but who aren't willing to do any of the preparatory work....This is a real problem....

She was not opposed to the allowance per se, nor did she question whether Native people had a right to it, but she did feel that while many individuals took the money so they could go to school, others went to school just so they could get the money. In her view their indifference to the subject matter tended to "drag down the whole group".

She also expressed concern about the lack of adequate preparation for university-level courses:

One of the things that concerns me is not enough assistance is given to people to acquire the writing and research skills that they actually need. There's a kind of expectation that we don't have to worry about that....As I've gone through life I've realized that I went through a high school education that was very good, as far as a European kind of education was concerned, and I already had those skills before I hit university... And I kind of had this expectation on the part of students as well and I'm continually having this expectation disappointed....they really have to focus on providing writing -- the analytical skills...how to read something, what does it mean...? How to read a paper and get something out of it....

Both Pauline and Brenda were involved in remedial work aimed at providing the kind of assistance Melissa refers to. Brenda explicitly stressed academic standards:

I was still coming from an academic point of view -- "These are the skills, this is the concept, we need to get to here, this is the mark"...I still had to base what I did on where I thought they were going, making no exceptions for who they were or where they were. And I think that was probably the best choice for me, and I was thanked for it later by those who did go into the UCEP...that I didn't make exceptions, and that I had high standards, and that they weren't allowed to just get away with whatever....

Because liberal education is involved in cultural transmission, the educator as "role model" also belongs under this theoretical umbrella. Finally, because it is the most thoroughly institutionalized and hegemonic of all current models, liberal education tacitly endorses the role of "authority/agent of control", a role that helps maintain the educational status quo.

2. Critical pedagogy. In contrast to traditional liberal education, critical pedagogy does see education as a means to a variety of ends, all more or less dealing with issues of equity and social reform. Whether or not we accept the criticisms of critical pedagogy discussed in Chapter I, its goals are clear: the point of education is not to reproduce today's society, with all its attendant injustices, but to change it. This is familiar terrain for those who believe that an educator's role is to act as a catalyst/change agent and, as we saw earlier, Maggie was explicitly following a Freirean approach when she embarked on her project involving theatre as community development. Her intentions were consistent with this model:

...things I remember identifying [as goals] were to involve as many people as possible in this project, uh, and to look for ways that people could celebrate their own community...um...and identify issues in their community and address them using theatre...

The ideal process is one of animation, empowerment and ultimately social change. Theatre was seen as a way to do this:

we had a lot of discussion early on about why we would use theatre, what was the point of using theatre for this as opposed to some other kind of community development....but [a colleague] and I sort of came together in saying "It's because it's

what we do. If we were good at something else we would do something else".... I mean there are lots of reasons: it's accessible, it's nonverbal, there are ways people can be involved with relatively low risk... I mean it sounds like it's high risk but it's not...um, there are ways to democratize because you don't have to be articulate to be powerful in the group, you know. ..

In contrast, Pauline (trained as a "generic academic") did not consciously adhere to a programmatic approach involving education for social change. In many ways the role of advocate was imposed on her by the politically-charged context in which she struggled to find her footing, and where, in her words, "you couldn't 'just teach'". Nevertheless, because an advocate campaigns for fairness and challenges elitist power structures, this role also belongs in the (symbolically) armed camp of critical pedagogy.

3. Rogerian humanism. This model derives from the theories of psychologists Carl Rogers (1961) and Abraham Maslow (1962). Assisting in the personal growth of the individual is seen as the *raison d'être* of education. As we learn, i.e. experience our environment, we engage in a process of self-actualization aimed at achieving authenticity:

psychological research and therapy should focus on this authentic true self. An individual's life is seen as a process of searching to establish this true self, as a quest for self-fulfilment and self-actualization. (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 100)

It is not surprising that Tony, with his background in sociology and psychology, frequently took on the role of therapist/counselor, a role that is consistent with the Rogerian approach to teaching and learning. While he stated that he found this role congenial for other reasons (his particular personality, having grown up in a traditional and "very giving" Italian family), he also acknowledged his debt to the theoreticians:

I guess my perspective comes more from what I've studied and experienced from more of a humanistic experiential base....My background is more humanistic, you know, Ronald May [(sic) Rollo May, or Ronald Laing, possibly??] and more kind of existential. Probably that's the approach that I like to use, with some experiential stuff, you know, some Rogerian stuff where you accept someone. Unconditional positive regard. So it's a mixture of more psychological principles....

When questioned about the meaning and purpose of education, Grant's response was a synthesis of all three of the models described above:

Well...um...I take a page from the book of the philosophers, I guess, and say "What are human beings about?" ...If what separates us from other species to varying degrees is our capacity to think, then assisting people to develop their capacities to think -- and also feel -- is a worthwhile enterprise....Also, we are people who attempt, for better or worse, to make our environment more congenial...so if I can help students develop skills that enable them to make their way in the world, that's a good thing also. And so it's those...the qualities of analytic thinking and communicating the results of that thinking that I try to emphasize....Inevitably people find themselves in political situations and ought to understand how the choices they face are structured, how they come about, what their implications are...so they can decide how to respond. Whether to attempt to change the range of choices that they have, or merely to choose among them...So I think that, you know, education helps people actualize themselves and make the most of the environment they find themselves in....

The words are his own (to the extent that words ever can be), and it's a cogent reply, but it also reveals how unobtrusively yet insidiously our thinking about education has been disciplined and points to the (internalized and consensual) parameters of this particular Discourse.

While theory draws lines that are not always visible, the constraints imposed by the structures and processes of institutionalized teaching and learning tend to confront us more directly. Some participants were ambivalent about the educational system. They expressed approval in principle while describing various strategies they felt compelled to use in order to humanize the environment or circumvent institutional constraints. Others were highly critical, but no one assumed neutrality, detachment or innocence. They knew that somehow they were caught in the middle, and it was this meta-role of "middleman" that subsumed all the other roles, and was most clearly revealed in their attitudes to programs and institutions.

C. Institutional Constraints.

When asked to identify aspects of her work that she found especially rewarding and/or frustrating, Brenda gave a telling reply:

...The most frustrating thing was being caught between the requirements of [the community college] and the governmental agencies, with their records and documents -- and wanting to do what they [her students] needed. And I just never knew where I fit in . So I had to try and do a little of both, but of course with my background in the public schools, I did what I knew best. Which was taking attendance, and keeping records, and giving tests and teaching and lecturing and marking....I was just trying everything...that was the most frustrating thing....

As well as criticizing (implicitly and in passing) the bureaucratic aspects of the school system, this passage reveals her impatience with an institution that was vague regarding educational issues such as curriculum guidelines but rigid about other things (e.g. attendance). These and other inconsistencies meant she was "not clear on what the agenda was from [the community college] and what I was supposed to be doing, and what my limits were supposed to be...."

Tony also commented on the arbitrariness of certain rules, and what he perceived as the need to occasionally circumvent them:

they also provide a lot of very strict guidelines and rules, which sometimes can be a little bit insensitive...patronizing and paternalistic...a lot of students ...who don't have any defined boundaries, it helps them to find them, gives them firm guidelines..but, uh...I found them sometimes a little difficult because I tend to be more on the lenient side....Still, there's room to play around with those rules....

He found that some administrators and instructors were more concerned with how well students followed rules than they were with their overall abilities:

I had to be constantly explaining to them, trying to get them to understand that just because people hand things in late, or don't write as well, maybe, doesn't mean that they don't have the intelligence -- the intuitive or life intelligence -- to become effective social workers...it doesn't mean that they're less

experienced in any important way than someone [with credentials] who's never been in trouble. And unfortunately that system denies that.

Brenda experienced other difficulties involving administrators at the local level, including the Band's Director of Education (who was non-Native, and according to Brenda, meddlesome and officious) and, to a lesser extent, the Education Counselor (who was Native but, Brenda felt, largely oblivious to what went on in his jurisdiction). As well, other educators were less than supportive of the fledgling adult education program:

there was an established elementary school which had a lot of money put into it -- they'd just built a new building -- so the principal ...wanted to know what we were doing and he caused a lot of problems because when we wanted to use his gymnasium it "wasn't convenient" or we "didn't give him enough time".

And when we wanted to put on events we had to clear it with him, as if he owned the building, whereas it was supposed to be a community building used by the entire reserve for any purpose, uh, to bring people together.

There was one other teacher who also worked with adults, and while he provided a modicum of personal support, pedagogically, according to Brenda, they were "not on the same wave-length as far as what we were trying to accomplish....But nobody had told us what we were there for, so we had to just sort of sink or swim"

Pauline experienced numerous frustrations with a system that she later characterized as "geared to perpetuating failure". Some of these involved inflexible course structures and unrealistic time frames:

We fought to teach 3-credit courses in 3 months. There was some feeling that because the students were coming every day, and because of the way that the programs were funded -- because the government was only funding a 3 year degree -- therefore people had to finish their courses..um...within the normal span of time allowed by [the mainstream university]. So if people were only taking two courses -- two 3 credit courses -- and they were coming to school every day, therefore they should finish them as quickly as people finished them at summer school.

Which was absurd because people read far too slowly to be able to do that....

Melissa encountered similar difficulties while working for the same university:

In the early eighties I was asked to teach a course...Issues for Native Canadians... at a project they were doing at [a central Alberta reserve]. Now [the band] had taken over their own educational system a few years prior to this...they had all these people who were teaching assistants [i.e. teacher aides] and they wanted to get them into university. But they wanted them to be able to take at least the first year actually in the community... it turned out the abstract I had prepared had not been given to the students, so they were under the impression I'd be dealing with uh, violence in the family and substance abuse and would have sort of experiential work shops...So I think they were taken aback, and not only by my course, but they were taken aback by the sheer amount of work that was involved in doing 3 courses...They should not have been asked to do 3 courses, they should have started with a maximum of 2. Because 3 was too much, considering you were working half-time and they all had families and the usual obligations outside of school.

Lack of communication coupled with an excessive workload helped create a situation which was not conducive to learning:

I look back now, and some of the people in that class were just so stressed out, because I think they had really high expectations...you know, to get 3 university courses, and then they were just freaked out by the amount of work they had to do, and the realization that maybe they weren't going to make it, you know, through all those courses...I can't remember now, the failure rate, but certainly it was higher than it would be here....

Melissa also pointed out that some educational programs for Native adults had unrealistic goals, referring specifically to manpower-style vocational programs:

I was thinking of my experience in the North where the band can arrange for training in a particular area...People will go because at least they'll be paid while they are there. But they

know, and so does the band, that there's going to be limited requirement in that area, in that region, for...oh...heavy truck drivers, Macs or whatever. And so the main benefit to them is the money they receive while they're getting the training because there just simply aren't that many jobs around for them once they are finished.

In her view Natives were much less likely than non-Natives to leave their homes to find work and she emphasized the unfairness and cultural bias of assuming people will simply "go where the jobs are", since "for a society which traditionally has depended on the extended family and the community for survival, that's asking quite a bit, and it's not likely that people are going to...it's just kind of 'pie in the sky'".

Standardized testing was another institutional constraint that posed problems. Pauline responded by developing her own "diagnostic", a combined strategy of oral reading and journal writing:

Because people had terrible problems writing essays and...in fact uh, [the brokering institution] was trying to force people to take the diagnostic, which was being given province wide at this point and so I was um,...I really thought the diagnostic was ethnically and class slanted, and it was very clear when we would give topics to people from [the college] who could not understand the questions and who did not have that kind of background....

Pauline ascribed many of the anomalies she encountered to a lack of direction resulting from the fact that "the larger issues hadn't been sorted out at the larger scale". Neither the non-Native administrators nor the politically influential Natives had a very clear idea of what Indian-controlled education should look like, and this had an impact on the programs:

the programs tended to be shaped by the white administrators who'd be in contact with [the influential Native family] and they would, uh, what you would then end up with would sometimes be really peculiar. So there would be these kinds of fads....

Arguably a certain amount of volatility and "confusion at the helm" is not entirely negative if it allows breathing room for students and instructors.

According to Pauline:

The discussion with instructors and students after class was extremely important for a sort of dynamic teaching process. I mean now that I talk about it...I realize it was incredibly dynamic compared to what I do here (in a mainstream university). Even though you are facing really serious problems which you can't solve -- and which are fundamental and can't BE solved, I suspect --but at least they were out in the open and we were arguing about them and the students were...not in a formal way, but they did put their two cents worth in...would talk to you about it. It was quite dynamic.

This special time came to an end when the administration moved the instructors out of the college residence and into the nearby town. According to Pauline, this was a deliberate political move. Deliberate or not, such a move would serve to effectively weaken student/ instructor rapport and preempt potential interference with the smooth running of the educational machine, a machine that demanded certain "outputs":

But over-riding it all was the fact that these courses had to be done. Even when we fought hard, they had to be done in 3 months. That was the only concession we got, that and a smaller class size. Those have all broken down again, now it's fill the classes as full as you can get them....

Melissa and Grant also mentioned class size and composition as very much affecting their teaching. For Melissa, smaller was better:

I really enjoy the dynamic that goes on at [a band consortia-run program] in many ways because the people do know each other and there's much more student/student interaction, whereas the [mainstream university] courses (laughs) once they get fairly large, you don't find the interaction among students.

Grant expressed concern over the size of some of his undergraduate courses because it made connecting with individual students very difficult. He found himself making a conscious effort to overcome this problem, particularly with students who "he identified, or who identified themselves" as Native. He worried that they might find large impersonal classes especially alienating for cultural reasons, because:

While that student has come up through the school system and has been exposed to all the socializing mechanisms of society,

there may have been, based on family experience or background, an....aspect...or some element of his or her learning strategies that ...is a more personal and interactive form of learning....What would cross my mind would be a heightened wish or concern to make contact with the student, to appreciate that the method -- particularly in large 200 level courses -- the organization of the course is perhaps not congenial to the student's way of um, uh learning...so you'd try to make contact and to encourage the student to visit you during office hours to talk about the term paper and to encourage the student to bring an outline ...so as to get a kind of dialogue going....I've never made that mandatory because, uh, I don't think people learn well by coercion.

As an independent popular theatre educator, Maggie obviously did not struggle with institutional constraints as a part of the day-to-day reality of her work. However, prior to going up to [the Native community], she had assumed that the local school would provide a jumping off point for accessing the community at large. She quickly learned this was not the case:

when we arrived we discovered that the guy who was our liaison at the school really hadn't set up anything for us and the principal was extremely wary and leery of what we were doing and didn't know we were coming, so hadn't found a way to accommodate us.

After some initial confusion they managed to sort things out, and during the project's first few weeks they did work in (and with) the school. However it soon became apparent that the school itself did not have a good relationship with the community. Maggie and her co-workers decided they would be better off on their own, in fact they concluded it was crucial to avoid being identified with the school:

We worked in that school for six weeks and it was horrific. I have never seen such a batch of -- of worthless, anxiety-ridden, paranoid, semi-hysterical and just plain BAD -- teachers....It was appalling...I mean they would sit in the staff room -- It's one of the reasons we didn't go back to the school the following year. Because people were f--king NUTS there!! And saying "There are so many people in this community that want NOTHING to

do with this school, and they are RIGHT!". So we cannot work in the school system because once you are in the school system in a Native community you're f--ked!! I mean nobody wants to have anything to do with you...except a very small group of people who are connected to the school for whatever reason....

Ironically, the decision to leave the school left the project's future in free-fall. Other local institutions/organizations it might have linked up with either did not exist, or were not receptive:

About half the people in the community are status and about half are not...There's two Metis associations and there's been a huge split in the community around which of the associations you're related to. The band wants nothing to do with the people who are non-status, obviously....There isn't a cohesiveness in terms of finding a political structure or a structure of power that you might be able to access as a group in order to...have some kind of longevity and ongoing stuff....I mean the person who picked up the project after I left was the forester's wife -- another nice, young, white, liberal woman! Who managed to get some more grants going to run some more drama programs in the summer as a recreational thing for kids....

Discussion about institutional constraints contained a curious mixture of both commission and omission: things that shouldn't be done but are, versus things that aren't done, but should be. And surely comments such as the above are not news; complaining about "the system" is almost part of an educator's stock-in-trade. What is more, being positioned in the middle is never comfortable. Lower level management personnel (foremen and supervisors) know that, as do prison guards. Also, because the agenda is determined elsewhere, their criticism tends to be reactive. Educators are critical of the structures and priorities of programs and institutions, perceiving them to be impediments to the real work of teaching, yet they are also dependent on them for credibility and various kinds of support. They are tethered to the system.

Quigley (1995) offers a thoughtful exploration of the relationship between practitioners and institutions. He identifies a polarization between what he terms the political perspective (government departments, program planners, funding agencies, and administrative bodies) and the popular

perspective (usually reflected in classroom practices). Quigley uses gender categories to symbolize the dichotomy (political =paternal, popular =maternal), and while he is specifically addressing the field of adult literacy education, his characterization of the two perspectives is worth a second look. The political is identified with "coercion", "macro & policy" issues, and is viewed as "punitive". In contrast, the popular perspective is associated with "cooption", "micro and student" issues, and a "humanistic" or caring approach (Quigley, 1995, p. 261). (Interestingly, he characterizes *both* as "prescriptive"):

The above model posits that the illiterate has been presented in the popular perspective as a romanticized "Heroic Victim"....and consistently in a "maternalistic view" -- carried into the classroom. The political perspective sees illiteracy (not "illiterates") as a paternalistic consensus building issue linked consistently with crises used for the policy regulation of subordinates. (Quigley, 1995, p. 262)

Quigley's gender symbolism takes on an added resonance when he reminds us that , in literacy education most administrators are in fact male, while most practitioners are female volunteers.

The gender symbolism does not transfer well to Native adult education, but other aspects of Quigley's model do, including his contention that the two poles of his dichotomy work to reinforce each other, thereby creating a model for stasis. Historically, we've seen similar dichotomies between (dehumanized) colonial, commercial and military interests on the one hand, and (caring, self-sacrificing) missionaries on other, and how the two worked in tandem. We still place Native education off to one side and see it as somehow in need of special attention. As far as romanticism is concerned, the "Heroic Victim" looks very much like a less exotic version of that well-known stock character, the Noble Savage, and the perceived need for "regulation of subordinates" (containment and control) has always, explicitly or implicitly, been part of the rationale for Native education.

II. Perceptions of Difference.

We live in an extraordinarily diverse world, where difference is a given, yet we are much more aware of some differences than we are of others. As well, certain contexts or social settings seem to encourage us to recognize

difference. Cross-cultural education is one example of a place where difference calls attention to itself, premised as it is on challenging the role that Eurocentrism has played in establishing and maintaining one-sided educational practices. When I began my research, I didn't anticipate the element to which I would be addressing difference. While I knew it was an important theoretical issue, I hadn't realized that it would also be a preoccupation for the participants.

A. Personal Perceptions.

One of the questions that triggered talk about difference had to do with participants' expectations of what working with Native people would be like. Maggie acknowledged that her expectations had been shaped by indirect or anecdotal knowledge and popular stereotypes:

I hadn't, previous to that, had major connections with any Native communities, I mean I'm a classic...Edmontonian kid...my parents had both worked in the North West Territories, and so there were lots of stories about Native people. I'd heard things, but really my main contact was driving down the road and going through somebody's reserve and seeing kids on the side of the road...I don't remember ever going to school with Native kids, although I know NOW that they were Native kids, but at the time I didn't know they were Native, I didn't know they were Metis, I didn't know any of that stuff...(long pause)...And also the urban Native person that you would see, kind of, you know, dishevelled and drunk downtown, and uh...So I'd had a fairly classic, in my younger years, sort of notion of what a Native person was and what a Native community was....

Melissa's expectations were based in part on her prior experience conducting research in Northern communities, but this experience proved to be of limited usefulness:

I worked in Northwestern Alberta, mostly interviewing Elders but also interacting with most of the people in the villages. And there's a very definite attitude...people are very quiet generally, very reserved. You don't really say strongly aggressive sorts of things. There's a real sort of waiting and listening kind of approach. And there are people who will say this is typical of

Native people as a whole...and I guess I kind of expected some of those same behaviours to be carried over when I was teaching at [a central Alberta reserve] and that was a contrast, certainly, that I noticed...They were much more aggressive and much more outspoken....

Like Melissa, Grant had experience working in the North. He stated that this experience did help him "get a handle" on Native cultures, although he stressed that his exposure was limited to certain types of formal political situations and events:

I've been in Whitehorse and Yellowknife quite a lot, but a lot less in the smaller communities where I feel aboriginal culture really lives and breathes...So I've really seen things sort of one step removed. I've had a bit of opportunity to be in smaller communities...kind of a window...but that's primarily a window on public meetings and that's already not truly traditional form....the public meeting takes the form of: visitors come in from Yellowknife and they do their kind of slide show, and then ask for responses. It's not a decision making exercise among people, all of whom know one another and have all of their lives...and so on. And so even that's not really traditional

When describing his expectations, Tony positioned himself somewhat differently. He emphasized similarities rather than differences:

I'm Italian, so... I'm an immigrant actually, I came here at age five...and uh, I took some courses at university, in sociology, on Native people, and on studying their habits and culture. To me it seems very similar to the Italian culture. By that I mean...I don't mean the modern, kind of cosmopolitan Italian culture...I come from a Sicilian background and our roots were more peasant...and uh, very family oriented. You know, respect for elders, and a lot of feasting, a lot of social contact, a lot of visiting....Where your whole life revolves around the family and uh, after taking some sociology, you know, cultural courses, I learned that Natives were a lot like that, so I had an idea of the Native world.

The one thing he admitted he was unprepared for was "the disfunctionality within Native cultures, because of the colonization and the oppression...the

residential schooling and all those things that happened to them". He acknowledged he based his expectations on cultural studies done about the "characteristics of Native people", including an engagement with ritual and spirituality, with which Tony (raised a Catholic) felt an affinity.

On the other hand, he did not deny that differences exist. This was brought home to him during an early experience as a social worker in the far north:

It was very difficult because the Inuit...their whole sense of time and reality is different, so I had to adjust and accept the fact that uh, you know, there were people that were different culturally...but, uh, familiarly they weren't. So I guess what I'm saying is it's also, for me, it is a different culture....

Initially, Pauline also expected similarities. Unlike Tony's, her assumptions were not based on perceived cultural parallels but rather on her personal history:

I had had some contact before and didn't regard these Native students as foreign...because I'd been friends with [a Native woman] and had gone down and stayed with her. And I had been to [the local reserve] myself, with the [a prominent Native family] who I didn't know were important at that time...and with [the Native friend mentioned above] who was connected by marriage to that family. I'd been there before and I wasn't looking for people who had Native costumes and so on....I tended to regard them as being more like me, because I'd already been through that, earlier when I was in high school, being disappointed that they didn't ride horses and so on....My process was more one of...perceiving that there were differences, that they weren't like me. Because my tendency was to think that they would be...like the me who was rural, not the me who lived in the city....I used to have people [in class] who told me, "Well, I saw a coyote this morning and I'm leaving"....That's where I discovered that even though I knew they didn't ride horses... and they didn't uh, trap for a living...that trapping is not dead, and having horses is not dead...um, it still goes on and it's still a sort of, a live part of the culture, and it might come before whatever you had planned for school....

Sometimes participants were given small reminders. When asked to describe an event or incident that "stuck in her head", Maggie told the following story:

The third year I was up there, I was staying with one of the young women and her sister and they were in a trailer...And when I was living with her at one point she was doing the wash with a wringer washer --they had electricity-- and she said, "Do you remember when your mom had a wringer washer?" and I said, "Oh yeah, I do..." and she said "I remember when my mom used to go and chop a hole in the lake!"....And I'm going, yes, that's right. We come from different worlds....

Discussion of difference also came up when participants were asked to narrate how they first became involved in working with Native people. Brenda described an early encounter in which she was guided by a more experienced relative:

She was working on [a southern Alberta reserve] at that time. And so I would go down to visit her, and of course she had personal relationships on the reserve and so we'd go to the homes. And she'd say, as we got out of the car, "keep your mouth shut" meaning like, don't let your mouth drop open when you see what you see, just watch and see what it's like. And so of course the first house we went to was a two bedroom bungalow. There were holes smashed in the walls and there were about thirty people living there and the bathroom was just...uh, unspeakable. But of course I didn't say a word. And after five minutes, you know, the teapot comes out and a plate of cookies, and everybody's laughing and talking and treating you like their...like you're part of the family. So that was a real eye-opening experience....

B. Racism.

Racism is difference with a vengeance. At no point did I raise the topic of racism (although I did probe if and when it was mentioned) but this did not prevent four of the six participants from bringing it up, and two of them more than once. Tony expressed his concern that some of his students used racism as an excuse:

You know, sometimes people project and say, oh that person's a racist, and you say, now wait a minute, let's get back to you...I try

to look at things clearly, what's a racist issue and what isn't...You know, not that there isn't racism, there's lots of it. We've had racists, we had one guy who was a real racist teacher..it was terrible, you know....

Maggie described how someone she'd hired to help with the theatre project used the charge of racism to challenge her authority:

It was really difficult, because I'd hired this Native guy [who was not from the community] and it was the first time I'd hired anyone in my life...and he was just a f--kup from one end of town to the other...I ended up having to fire him and it was really ugly. It was all about how I didn't understand anything about Native people, I was racist...uh, I was just everything....And I ended up saying "I'm calling this one....Yeah, that could all be true but I don't think so"....I mean I probably think I am a racist, I don't know all the shapes and sizes of it...but what's at work there is not racism. I mean I think if a whole bunch of Native people say to me "You're racist", I can't ignore that....but I knew what was happening with this guy.

In Brenda's case, her early experiences in the school system were full of examples of how white teachers abused Native students:

I taught in [a central Alberta school] in 1986, and it was the same thing as in [a different central Alberta school] in the junior high. The teachers were just abominably rude and racist in their remarks, not only in the staff room but in the hallways and to the kids themselves, saying that they couldn't learn, they never did want to go to school, their parents were drunks and weren't going to look after them....

C. Culture and Education.

In the first round of interviews I did not ask about the familiar and frequently discussed pro's and con's of whether or not educational methods and content should be modified in order to make curricula more accessible to Native learners. Again, it was the participants who brought it up, and again they expressed a range of views. Some were enthusiastic about incorporating a cultural component while others were highly critical, dismissing it as patronising and paternalistic.

Tony was the most strongly in favour of such modifications. According to him, [a community college] had “pioneered and modelled a fantastic program”, one that he was active in for a number of years:

It’s a very powerful, kind of empowering type of program...I’m impressed with them really...They’ve taken a very good model and they integrate a lot of cultural components, a lot of healing, a lot of professional development, into their programs which I think is really critical....At [the community college] one of the components...is a Native cultural component, and ongoing Native cultural input, and we usually bring in an Elder....the most significant thing for me has probably been my involvement and participation in healing circles....I consider myself very fortunate to be part of the circle...I try to get totally involved with my students....

Within mainstream university departments designing special programs for minority students was not on the agenda, however on a classroom level Grant also implemented certain strategies aimed at making his courses more culturally comfortable for Native students. If they expressed interest in a topic that “related to their aboriginality” he tried to make their assignments flexible enough to allow for this :

I try to accommodate that with an aboriginal take on uh, that question, to see if it is possible to stretch the boundaries of that module of the course so they can do something that relates to their personal backgrounds.

He was also willing to modify his teaching style:

I’m not a very directive classroom instructor in any case, I’ll put out questions and so on, but by and large I let students volunteer, because I sense there are some students who may be very capable students, learning a lot , but who don’t like to speak in front of the class...I don’t think it helps to coerce these people. I may be wrong, but that’s a general principle. To the extent that I ...um...I break my own rule, I don’t do it with Native students, because I sense that there may be personal protocols about when they want to speak and I may not fully understand, so I let them take the lead. If they want to talk, fine.

Grant also brought in Native expertise whenever the opportunity presented itself:

In the North course what I try to do, if I possibly can, is get an aboriginal speaker in. So just two weeks ago I had [a guest speaker] in, and he talked about Native political traditions. There are two aboriginal students now in that class and they may have found that an affirming kind of experience, that you would bring someone from this different cultural world into the analytic, objective, social scientific world of the university....(laughs) uh, I bet it was much more valuable for non-aboriginal students who found it just fascinating....

At the same time, Grant expressed doubts about the extent to which certain kinds of cultural accommodations could -- meaningfully -- be made:

Can you teach a different form of knowledge using your own epistemology? Can you teach aboriginal culture, land values or whatever, using our approach or do you just come up with something very flat...I mean you can talk about it, sure, you can talk about anything...I can *talk* about childbirth, but I don't think with a lot of authority, you know...or that would convey the fullness of the experience to my audience...So how do you....That to me is one of the most interesting questions, educating about another culture in an institution of a different culture...On the one hand you want to give the most appropriate experience. On the other hand the certification the students get is a [mainstream university] degree, with certain general elements that comprise that degree....

He also suggested it was probably more critical for Schools of Native Studies to address this question than for "mainstream" departments such as his own.

Melissa's comments revealed that in Native Studies programs such a debate was in fact going on. She recalled her discussions with one Native student who wanted his courses to be more congruent with what he saw as traditional aboriginal practices:

He was...very much for an individualized type of schedule, which he felt would be more appropriate to a Native style of education. So we sort of had discussions about what the school should look like...Should the school be trying to provide, uh, an

education which is organized along the principles of Native education....seeking an Elder and establishing your own personal relationship and then coming along entirely at your own pace, so on and so forth...And he was also someone who didn't want to deal with literature. If it was written he didn't want to have anything to do with it, he felt that a lot of his education should be done in the oral tradition....Now, was it then appropriate to make those demands of an institution which is in the "heart of the university"...? We didn't resolve this particular argument, believe me (laughs). But comments from this perspective would certainly emerge in class....

While the above remarks suggest a degree of skepticism regarding wholesale cultural incorporation, Melissa (like Grant) was very willing to adjust her teaching techniques:

...with aboriginal speech patterns there's a longer pause often between what is said. Because a person pauses and it goes beyond one or two seconds, it doesn't actually mean they're finished, and that's something a nonaboriginal lecturer really has to be aware of....I think that if you can introduce that into the classroom though, to kind of slow down...that nonaboriginal students will also take advantage of it and will pause longer. And (laughs) maybe even be more thoughtful in their answers.... So you can actually use that aspect of aboriginal communication to affect the dynamic of the class.

Pauline's experience provides an interesting contrast with Melissa's. Her early attempts at adding a cultural component (in this case, some readings from Native writers) met with opposition from her Native students, who, she claimed, were not at all sure this was a good idea:

There was a reaction by some of the Native people, especially the ones who had fairly strong ties with whites. They wanted, when they took literature, to take the classics. They wanted to take Shakespeare, they wanted to know that stuff...the people who had power, and were connected with people with power, were very clear about wanting to learn more about white society and wanting to come up to the marks of white -- you know, the standards of white society. They were very conscious that at

some points in their own educational background, things had been watered-down. So they were...they weren't sure if you got taught something like "Native" literature, are...was I then watering the literature down?

Pauline also got into trouble over her choice of Native authors:

I had a serious run-in with my students over [a well-known Native writer]. We read the essay in class...it was not 'til I went downstairs to a dinner meeting two days later and students were there having coffee, that some of them said --they had roomed with her in fact -- and they said "You should not be teaching her, she's a w_____!"....And I had been suggesting in class that we try to get her to come there....So these things which sound so easy to do [i.e. develop a culturally sensitive curriculum] turned out to be a lot more difficult....

For Maggie, the issue was not about curricular content, but rather standards and quality:

I think it's one of the problems in popular theatre...I mean that's the big debate, right, what is good art, and who decides the canon and stuff.... Unfortunately, I have seen that as a way [for some people] to just sort of do crappy theatre, and say "well, these are people who don't have the Western aesthetic" and you know, "you're just basing it on *The Phantom* " or whatever. In fact that's not true. I think we allow mediocre work to happen, and [an authority] says that popular theatre should be the BEST theatre, it should never be "well, that's good enough because after all you're not professionals, and you're not trained" and da-da-da...There is a way that you can go beyond just "we're Indians so we're not very good" or "we're just young people" or whatever, and make the jump into the satisfaction of actually creating art.

She reflected on her realization that she too had been guilty of using difference as a kind of excuse:

[A friend and colleague] came and did a week-long mask workshop with the group...He treated them as if they were working artists and he made absolutely no concessions to them being between the ages of 17 and 22 or being Native. He just

said, "This is work, this is creative work" and he never had any qualms about ...um, losing his temper and saying "you guys are screwing around, now get at it!", and I think I did. I think I tried...a significant amount of the time to uh -- in both a good way and a bad way-- to recognize that this was different from working with a group of kids in the city , you know, at Vic Comp or whatever. And [the friend referred to above] really just reminded me, um, that that's a kind of racism and to DROP it, you know...And they did -- during that week -- they did INCREDIBLE work, they did spectacular work for him....

Brenda was perhaps the most critical of all. She strongly objected to what she termed " this brilliant idea that you had to teach Natives differently because they were Native" perhaps because it clashed with her hard-won practical knowledge.

I looked back on my experience and I thought, well, I didn't do anything different with them, as a teacher, than I was doing in any public school situation....You don't teach them differently because they're Natives, they're still people....And if you try to -- to give them that feeling that "you're different, you're special"...they get really resentful....So that's why that literature really bothered me a lot. I didn't go in there saying "Oh these are Natives, I wonder how I should approach it, maybe I should teach differently or change my methodology. I just went in there and said "these are adults, people, just people"....I think , as a teacher, teach everybody the same way. And going into Native education with that attitude -- that this is a "special" education is wrong....I think that if you go in with that attitude, that these are different people and that you change everything because they are Native you are going to get into big trouble and get a lot of resentment. Because they just want to be treated like everybody else....

The claim that her Native students had shared this view signaled me to probe. I asked about what they might have said which led her to this conclusion. She gave some examples:

Well, as simple as a question like "Is that the way you would teach it in a high school?" or, "Is this what they do in high

school?"....just to check every once in a while. And then of course when I was doing interviews two years later ...they said much the same thing.

Brenda's own tentative analysis placed the blame on the school system:

It ...was connected in my mind with their junior high experiences that were really negative. They were stereotyped. There were expectations of them as students the minute they walked in the door at [a central Alberta school], and counselors who would just tell them "You are going in to the vocational stream". They really, really resented that and a lot of the feedback was "Why do these people think that just because we're Indians, we can't do the smart work "....And I think that's why many of them were really excited about [the program Brenda was teaching], because it's an *academic* upgrading, and that was the first time they had been offered a choice....

Despite her general objections, to some extent even Brenda adapted the curriculum to accommodate her students' aboriginality:

My background is in history and I've always been interested in the Metis and Native history of western Canada, so I thought this would be a great opportunity to get western Canadian history from the Indian perspective...not remembering that they had been in integrated schools...so they had got the same version as I had. And it wasn't very flattering to the Indians or the Metis, if they were mentioned at all. It was like they hardly even played a part except for the Riel Rebellions... And they were totally ignorant of western Canadian history. So I used that as a jumping off point and taught them their history...Which made me feel really uncomfortable, I thought "how presumptuous", but they just soaked it up. They were just amazed that all these Indians had done such important stuff and nobody had ever told them before...

(Arguably what Brenda taught them was not "their history" but rather our latest version of their history, certainly a less overtly biased version than the accounts presented in school textbooks during the fifties and sixties.)

Part of the rationale for the need to design special education programs for Natives stems from a set of theoretical assumptions about the relationship

between culture and cognition. Some participants questioned these assumptions. According to Brenda:

a lot of very technical studies, it seems to me, were done to prove that Natives learned differently because of the way they think. That we think in a linear pattern and they think in a circle pattern. That's why they can't write essays...Because an essay starts with a thesis and moves in a straight line to a conclusion...And they like to start with a thesis and tell lots of stories and seem to be getting off track until they return to the original thesis again....That may very well be true, maybe it is proven, maybe it is valid, but ...I still saw them as trying to bridge two worlds, and if you want to succeed in mainstream institutions, you adjust...You're going to have to think in linear patterns; if that's what they expect then you give it to them...

This was a contentious issue for Pauline also:

...I got taught my theory by [a non-Native academic] who's the person who said Natives can't do analytical thinking, that's not something which is part of the language, it does not have general categories, it makes no distinctions between male and female...I mean there's a sort of real antipathy within the language to certain abstract categories which are actually, uh...European. And he taught me that, and I fought against him...I didn't think that was right because we both knew that students downstairs were, at that point, not being taught math past grade nine because they didn't have the "analytical capacity"....so I was fighting against that. And yet he could explain very clearly that, you know, it's part of laying on your own culture to force people to think in certain analytical categories which are not part of their culture....

III. Conclusion.

As the data shows, participants' role perceptions turned out to be shaped by both pedagogical issues and issues of difference. With reference to the former (pedagogy), at times participants seemed to (implicitly or explicitly) follow a specific educational model or approach, but contextual factors such as rules, regulations and policies also had an impact on how they did their work.

Some expressed frustration with this, and indicated that they felt caught in the middle -- perhaps because we really are located at the place where systematized education intersects with the lifeworld of Native people.

Perceptions of difference were characterized by a clash between expectations and reality. Participants ascribed causes having to do with either a lack of experience working with Native people, or the wrong kind of experience (i.e. generalizations about Native behaviours did not transfer well from one context to another). Two kinds of processes were involved. In some instances participants assumed categorical difference, based on stereotypes or some kind of cultural overview, then discovered that, on a one-to-one basis Natives were "just people". Others, because of prior personal relationships with Native individuals or because they identified with what they perceived as "Native" values, mistakenly assumed that cultural differences would never assert themselves. Participants also expressed disapproval, even distress, about racism, while giving examples of how racism can be used as an excuse or a weapon.

Participants held strongly differing views on whether or not educators should modify curriculum to accommodate cultural difference. Some felt a cultural component was essential, while others opposed it. Concerns about academic standards were expressed and also about the possibility that "special" programs for Native students were somehow demeaning. At the same time, virtually everyone admitted to making some adjustments (Grant called it "stretching boundaries") to either course content or teaching methods, adjustments that were aimed at accommodating their students' aboriginality.

They also raised some very good questions about the nexus of pedagogy and difference: Is it possible, as Grant wondered, to "teach a different form of knowledge using [our] own epistemology" (and, I would add, pedagogy)? Also, what are the implications of theories that link culture and cognition -- the talk about "Native mind" that Pauline and Brenda found so provocative? In later chapters I address some of these questions.

Chapter IV

The Text as Discourse

The preceding chapter dealt with perceptions of pedagogy and difference, but it is important to remember that these perceptions are themselves social artifacts. We are dealing with retrospective reconstructions of experiences, not the experiences themselves, and these accounts are carefully clothed in costumes that are deemed appropriate in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. (To extend the metaphor, language is the wardrobe mistress, discourse designs the sets....) From a scholarly starting point, if we accept the premise, outlined in the methodology section, that language has both a content domain and a rhetorical domain (Renkema, 1993), then this conceptual framework precludes the possibility of focusing on the former while excluding the latter. We are obliged to take a second look.

Another reason for including discourse analysis has to do with *who* is speaking. I must interrogate the language of the participants in order to avoid privileging their interpretations of what it means to do cross-cultural education. If I had taken a more straightforward, representational approach, I would have included the voices of students as well as instructors, and Natives as well as non-Natives. I chose not to do this, and in Chapters I and II I explained why. Even so, there is always the risk that someone might "read in" more in the way of truth claims than I intend. Emphasizing the ways in which language is something other than a conduit of transparent, literal meanings should help to prevent this from happening.

I. Double Talk:

The above means that statements are not always taken at face value. Sociolinguist John Gumperz reminds us that:

linguistic constraints operate largely below the level of consciousness...speakers themselves cannot be expected to provide adequate explanations for their verbal behaviour.

(Gumperz, 1972,p. 6)

This is not surprising since we are born into language, what Gayatri C. Spivak refers to as the "mother tongue" (Spivak, 1993, p. 35). We learn to speak as we learn to walk and both feel as natural as breathing.

While sociolinguists (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972) are more interested in the social aspects of language than in exploring the relationships between

language and cognition, the above statement could be read as an invitation to use discourse analysis to dredge up deep truths and hidden meanings. This is not the project of this thesis. If there are unintentional or implicit meanings to be revealed these have more to do with language in context, and the tension that exists because language is simultaneously a medium of personal expression *and* a pre-existing cultural and social matrix, resonant with the echoes of prior and distant conversations. To put it another way, it is what Patti Lather is referring to when she talks about "The way I use language and the way language uses me" (Lather, 1991, p. 8). According to Potter and Wetherell (1992) language is "an intrusive and sticky medium [and its] surface can never be wiped clean" (p. 62). I have chosen to investigate language rather than speculate about the insides of the participants' heads. This choice reflects my personal preference but is also consistent with recent trends in discourse theory that "direct attention away from the cognitive processes assumed to be operating under people's skulls" (Potter & Wetherell, 1988, p.137) and towards more accessible phenomena, such as the ways in which language is actually used.

Because it was methodologically necessary to look at language-in-context, I could not simply attempt a discourse analysis on the results of my prior thematic analysis. Instead I returned to the transcripts and started over, this time explicitly looking at both ostensible and implicit content (or subtext). The reexamination that followed was both challenging and time-consuming, but it had the added effect of serving as a form of triangulation (of method) reinforcing some of my earlier conclusions, while modifying others.

II. Discourse Strategies:

Van Dijk (1993) lists some of the structures and strategies commonly used in text and talk:

graphic layout, intonation, stylistic variations of word selection or syntax, semantic implications and coherence, over-all discourse topics, schematic forms and strategies of argumentation ..rhetorical figures such as metaphors and hyperbole, speech acts; and dialogical strategies of face-keeping and persuasion. (Van Dijk, 1993, p.12)

Van Dijk's list is not an exhaustive one, but it includes most of the patterns I was watching for during the discourse analysis process. Even so, I did not find instances of every type mentioned above (no one wanted to argue) nor

were the instances I did find always significant given the context (some topic choices and changes were imposed on the participants by my questions).

Because verbal communication is a social as well as a linguistic activity there is another kind of context that is also relevant. As Hymes (1972) points out the strategies that are operationalized depend in part on the nature of the setting and scene in which the discussion occurs. A private conversation between friends will obviously be conducted differently than will a public speech. Levels of formality and even such things as physical circumstances may have an impact on both what is said and how it is said. According to Darnell & Scherzer (1972) one of the differences between formal and informal conversation has to do with ways that, in the former, the idea of an audience and a spokesperson impinges on the more technical concept of a speaker/listener (or sender/receiver) dyad. My interviews were formal speech events. They may sometimes have had the appearance of two people casually chatting over coffee, but participants were fully aware that their statements were being made, not just to me, but "for the record", i.e. the potential audience of curiously faceless strangers and colleagues who might read this thesis. They were also aware that they were being interviewed specifically because they were non-Native educators of Native adults. This meant I was not likely to ask them about their families, their hobbies, or the effects of global warming. More importantly, it meant they were each forced to take the position of spokesperson, in some sense "representing" their discipline(s) or, at least, speaking through the personae that resulted from my asking them to isolate one facet of who they are.

A. Presentation strategies: The strategies that occurred most frequently were of this type (including Van Dijk's examples of "facekeeping and persuasion") and I suspect that this was in part due to the formal nature of the talk, i.e. as interview. As mentioned, participants were aware that their descriptions of their own educational practices would be subject to scrutiny. It is therefore not surprising that they would attempt to deflect or mediate potential criticism. Potter and Wetherell identify what they term "standard discursive moves for coping with negative evaluation", including "redirecting the accusation" to other individuals or groups, and (by doing so) "distancing oneself" (Potter & Wetherell, 1992, p. 212).

The transcripts contained many examples of this strategy. Pauline's commitment to her students seems even more laudable when placed next to

her descriptions of some of the other instructors: (... "they'd say, 'Well...too bad. They're adults, I'll go ahead and teach, and if they miss it, they miss it'"). Brenda made comments (more than once, and in discourse analysis repetition is noteworthy) such as the following:

Somehow, I had a really good rapport with them [i.e. her Native students]. They would come to my room at noon hours and after school and just check in and see how things were going....*And I think I was the only teacher that they felt comfortable enough to do that with.* And I don't know *what it is about me* ...um....(emphasis mine)

She is referring here to her early experiences in an integrated junior high school where "she was just appalled at the way other teachers in the school were treating the Native kids" ("other" teachers whom she characterized as "racist"). In Tony's case, the contrast was between himself as a caring and nurturing (male) friend to Native women, and the physically and sexually abusive men they often encountered in their own community. Even the tepid response of [the Native community members] to the theatre project is offset by Maggie's descriptions of the disastrous relationship between the community and the schools.

Potter and Wetherell (1992) also point out that "credentializing or disclaiming" (p. 212) can be used as presentation strategies. Of these, the former (credentializing) occurred less frequently, and in quite predictable ways. In three instances it was elicited by an interview question about educational models. Tony responded by calling on Carl Rogers, as well as gestalt and Freudian theory to support his practice, while at the same time stressing the extent to which he relied on his own personality and experience. Brenda did not cite individual experts, but instead declared her allegiance to what was recognizably a description of liberal education. Although his tone was semi-facetious, when Grant talked about "borrowing a page from the philosophers" he placed himself in good (i.e. respected and authoritative) company. Others did not wait for my question; Maggie voluntarily referred to several authorities (most frequently Paulo Freire and Ross Kidd), while at one point Melissa invoked Native scholar and educator, Vera Kirkness, a discursive move which instantly enhanced the credibility of her statements about the relationship between Native culture(s) and education.

Pauline was the only participant who did not make use of the credentializing strategy. Disclaiming, however, was another matter. According to *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* (1976) to disclaim is "to deny one's connection with" (p. 293). It is a way of distancing (from) some one or some thing and Pauline did this fairly often. Sometimes she would shift between the passive and active voice. Pauline tended to use the passive voice to discuss controversial topics, or assumptions/conclusions that she appeared to feel were central to a discussion of Native education as she encountered it, but that she personally disagreed with or did not wish to endorse:

There were ... certain things which *it was said* the Indian mind couldn't grasp, and that was certain kinds of abstractions....

We know from comments cited in Chapter III that Pauline questioned this approach, in fact argued against it. Similarly, the following passage is riddled with disclaimers:

It was decided that the best thing to do would be to give these sessions where you talked about -- *where the people at* [the college], the people who were running the university level programs *talked about what they saw as Native problems.*

Who decided? An anonymous someone, certainly not Pauline. The personal (and inclusive) "you talked about" is cancelled in favour of the more distant formulation "the people talked about". Instead of "Native problems" (which blame the victim and might also implicate Pauline in the labelling process) we have the more qualified "what *they saw* as Native problems".

It occurred to me that the above choices might merely be about tone, i.e., that Pauline was using the passive voice in order to sound more "academic". After all, she is a spokesperson in a formal speech event and until recently, active voice formulations, especially those involving the first person singular, were frowned upon by universities. (Cumbersome syntax, on the other hand, was forgiven as long as it achieved the rhetorical effect of objectivity). While tone is relevant in discourse analysis, Pauline's transcript contains tonal variations that would not be there if sounding academic was her main concern, and at times Pauline's "I" is very much in the foreground:

I found a [Native artist's] painting which had been thrown in the garbage and which I tried to rescue....

Note the shifts in the following passages:

That was one thing that I did, the reading out loud, and I simply did that so I could find out who could actually read and who couldn't. Because there were people *who were being put* in the class who couldn't....

And...

We fought to teach 3-credit courses in 3 months...um, *there was some feeling that ...* people had to finish their courses within the normal span of time allowed by [the mainstream university].

There is agency galore in the assertion "we fought". Against whom or what is less clear. Someone (or something -- Individuals? Committees? Policies?) put people who couldn't read in classes, and chose to arbitrarily enforce time limits, but because of the hidden nature of the adversary their (i.e. the instructors') fighting is reduced to shadow boxing.

Pauline's use of this strategy may also be about a reluctance to assign blame, since it contrasts with many of her positive comments where credit is given via use of the active voice:

Every class of Native people I've taught Dickens to has appreciated the humour without my ever saying anything... in a way that I do not find at [the mainstream university].

She does not say "Dickens' humour was appreciated" -- by person-or-persons unknown....

Where straightforward content was concerned, Grant was not as critical as some of the other participants so I was surprised to discover, through discourse analysis, that he was adept at the use of the disclaimer. I recalled Del Hymes' (1972) comment that how something is said is part of what is said and realized it was a good thing that I had taken another look at Grant's transcript. While he did not use the disclaimer strategy often, he did so in ways that were both subtle and effective. The following was in response to a question on the possibilities of being bicultural:

...understanding how to use lawyers, how to use consultants, how to build alliances with other groups, how to deal with the media....All of these are not traditional skills but they are essential. For example, Inuit are just BRILLIANT at it, they are -- *here's the conventional wisdom* -- "a very adaptable people" and yes, they have learned to play the European politics game very, very

capably...uh, the question you sometimes hear raised, though, is
"Have they forgotten where they come from?"

By parenthesizing his response with the statement "here's the conventional wisdom" he simultaneously presents established opinion and steps away from it. "Conventional wisdom" (a dash of expertise and a dollop of common sense) may carry considerable weight in some quarters, but Grant is not (necessarily) prepared to endorse it. Later he uses the formulation again. This time we are discussing what he describes as the need "to create more of a constituency for education" in Native communities:

The conventional wisdom -- I don't claim to be an authority on this -- is that the egalitarian sort of feeling in a community, in aboriginal communities, um...places a negative value on people who behave differently or who uh, acquire a higher status than the others and it may be that uh...going on for higher education implies a negative judgement of the others who are not moving ahead that way, and uh so...it could be that consideration.

Again he distances himself, and this time he underlines it with an explicit denial of authority. What is also interesting about the above is it shows how a remark that acts as a disclaimer has the potential to be interpreted as credentializing. It all depends on whether the words "conventional wisdom" inspire trust or skepticism in the mind of the reader.

As mentioned, Pauline's active/passive voice shifts sometimes worked to avoid blaming or to mute criticism. There are other rhetorical strategies that also produce the effect of downplaying statements that might be perceived as negative. One example is prolepsis (Billig, 1988) a kind of diffusion *via* anticipation which Potter & Wetherell describe as "an 'on the one hand, on the other hand' discursive move" (Potter & Wetherell, 1992, p. 212). Participants used this strategy on several occasions and for a variety of purposes. In the following passage, Pauline is softening comments that could be taken as critical of her students' behaviour and/or abilities:

...[teaching] over the telephone ...was extremely unsuccessful because the students would not get hold of me by telephone... but they sent me material. They were taking a course that was a little advanced for the level they were at, I thought, but I didn't really know them....

Melissa used this strategy as a way of undercutting statements that might otherwise be construed as stereotyping and (like Pauline) to shift blame away from Native students:

Some of these students seem to come in...*and this is true of non-Native students as well*, but probably more so of the aboriginal students...come in without these skills...and uh *I think we've been really derelict or negligent in not providing that background...*

The following passages also show how statements that might be heard as stereotypical are "balanced":

You know, a paper with statistics on Native housing or Native education or Native unemployment, whatever....for many of the students it's sort of so generalized that...well it may be good to know this but let's move on and talk about something that relates more to humans on an individual level where we can actually see a face....*And I think this is true of non-Native students as well...they also feel that way...*but I think it's particularly true of Native students.

And:

A lot of Native societies were based on small communities, basically with a lot of face-to-face interaction, and the values --*in many ways they're great values anywhere* -- but there are some things that are done that are more appropriate to a small community.

In the above passages, generalizations actually are made ("probably more so", "particularly true of ") but they seem less threatening, because of the signal ("don't take this the wrong way") sent to the audience by the preceding statement.

B. Figurative language: Some of us indulge in figurative language freely and frequently, others prefer more direct (if less evocative) ways of communicating. Of those interviewed, Tony and Melissa were the least given to figurative language, while Maggie and Pauline used it the most. I was interested in looking at both the kinds of metaphors that were used, and when and how they were used.

Grant opted for personification (or animation at least) in describing the remote communities where Native culture ... "lives and breathes" and compared learning about another culture to taking a trip "without having to

catch a plane". Brenda compared her first encounters with Native people as an "eye-opening experience", and both Grant and Brenda spoke about being given "a window to another world". Maggie and Tony also described Native culture as "a different world" (the latter when referring to the Inuit).

At first I wondered if these usages were simply random sprinklings of picturesque speech, then I began to notice some patterns. Almost invariably, participants resorted to figurative language when they were describing aspects of Native culture(s) that they found incomprehensible, fascinating or exotic. To put it another way, figurative language appeared to be the preferred way of discussing and describing difference. The second thing that caught my attention was a specific strategy, metaphorical polarization, used by Pauline and Maggie to make sense of some of these differences.

For Maggie, difference was defined in terms of visibility and invisibility. Unlike their stereotypical counterparts (the "feathered" Indian; the skid row Indian) the classmates and neighbours of Maggie's childhood, urban Indians and Metis, were invisible (see excerpts in Chapter III) i.e. as far as she could tell, they were "like everybody else". When she stepped through the looking glass and suddenly became the minority (as one of a handful of non-Natives living in a Native community) she was clearly *not* like everybody else, and the implications of this disturbed her:

You are very visible in a Native community, they always know who you live with, where you live, whether you drink, what you drive, where you buy your gas, where you buy your groceries..I mean all of that stuff...I hadn't known how visible I was...It's the kind of thing that I found really paralysing because the minute you were with someone, seen talking to someone, then your political alliance was assumed so you had to be really careful...because you couldn't know before the fact...I mean it was things like drinking for example. I went to one dance there and I was offered a drink --and I've only had one other experience like this which was one time I was offered a joint [marijuana cigarette] in prison (laughs)...and you just go "It's so PUBLIC, it's so SEEN, it's so clocked by everybody in the room, whether you are going to have a drink with this person, which means therefore that you are a drinker, or whether you are not, which means a whole bunch of other stuff....I found it very, very

difficult, so I ended up just not going back to dances and stuff...It's too on the edge, it's too...I mean for one thing you are virtually the only white person in the room, and for another -- uh -- it's not that you aren't welcome, but you take a whole bunch of steps that you don't even know you are taking....

Being visible means being the recipient of the gaze, not the one who sees (defines, classifies, categorizes) but the one who is seen. Suddenly *you* are the specimen inside the glass display case, it is your image you see reflected in the eyes of the spectators. Like the proverbial well-behaved child you are seen but not heard (from). It is not surprising that Maggie found the experience paralyzing.

In contrast, Pauline heard rather than saw. According to her, personal and political minidramas were played out among her students in terms of those who "refused to talk" or "felt free to talk":

There were resentments which came out in the classroom in the form of silences and who was able to speak and who was not able to speak....

Over time she came to realize that these silences were loaded:

What I learned most strikingly at [the college] was that silences have differences...there's different moods and different tones for silences...and I -- over a long period of time-- began to read the moods of silences. I was very used to reading the moods of words, and tones of sentences, but I actually *had* to learn to read silences. And that was, um, something which I found interesting and fairly exciting but I didn't do it very well...

Her students taught her that silence was not just the absence of speech but rather an actual language with its own tonal variations and shades of meaning. There is a semanticity to silence. Silence is also a text to be translated and interpreted, assuming one has learned to "read" well enough to do so.

Participants also used hyperbole, but not often and not in ways that allowed the strategy to draw attention to itself. The one exception that stands out is Maggie's description of the schools at [the Native community] and the [the school division] in general (see Chapter IV). While the inclusion of this description served as a presentation strategy (the schools, their staff members, and their relationship to the community at large became an effective foil for

the theatre group) the power of the description was achieved primarily by means of hyperbole. Maggie's tone of voice became louder and more dramatic, individual words were emphasized and her choice of words changed (more adjectives, usually pejoratives, the use of colourful language, swearing etc.). Hyperbole is defined as "exaggeration for effect", and in this case the effect was to underline how (in Maggie's words) "appalling" conditions in these schools were, which would in part explain (justify?) why the majority of Native community members wanted nothing to do with them. Let me stress that the presence of hyperbole does not imply that "in reality" the schools were less bad. Rather it suggests to the reader/listener that a more matter-of-fact description lacks the power to adequately communicate just how bad they were. The use of hyperbole is a red flag, a way of saying "STOP -- Pay attention. This is important."

C. Topic and "interpretive repertoire":

As stated earlier, the questions I asked influenced the topics that were discussed, however participants also raised topics that I hadn't asked about (although I suspected some of them might come up). These had to do with issues of difference, including the relationship between education and Native cultures; and racism. Racism is a major social issue, and it is not surprising that participants were preoccupied with it. Tony and Maggie were wary of manipulation and false accusations, what Tony described as Native "trying to lay a guilt trip on you" while Brenda spoke passionately about the harm done to Natives by racism. None of them enjoyed talking about it yet they did so, presumably to make clear their positions (and by doing so, position themselves). No one wants to be labelled a racist, hence Tony's concern to sort out "what's a racist issue really and what isn't...."

Potter & Wetherell (1992) describe some of the ways we try to "dodge the identity of prejudice" in our discussions of racism. Some of these are applicable to negative evaluations in general and were discussed earlier under the subheading "presentation strategies". Others were not, but the passage is worth quoting in full:

...one can (a) admit the offence but offer mitigations or excuses, or (b) deny the offence and claim that one is wrongly accused, or (c) accept the blaming in its entirety and perhaps intensify or expand on it by giving other examples (ask for other offences to be taken into account, if you like). One could also (d) undermine

the accusation itself by renegotiating the offence, recategorizing it as something less negative and more excusable, or (e) redirect the accusation to another group of people...separating or distancing oneself from the accusation. (Potter & Wetherell, 1992, p.212)

The transcript passages that discuss racism are full of these and similar maneuvers. Tony's statement "not that there isn't racism, there's lots of it", followed by "we had one guy who was a real racist teacher" is an example of strategy "e" above. We've already seen that one of Brenda's presentation strategies was to distance herself from other "racist teachers" (again strategy "e"). In contrast, she referred to herself as "ethnocentric" (strategy "d"), then accepted the blame for this lesser offence, because "we are all ethnocentric" (strategy "c"). Maggie's remark that "I think I probably am a racist", is mitigated by her "not knowing all the shapes and sizes of it" (strategy "a") and occurs as a side-bar to her main argument which is that she was wrongly accused (strategy "b").

Talking about racism is clearly a risky business, particularly for white people, and this may be a disincentive to do so. Still, because of the centrality of racism to any discussion of Native education, the fact that roughly half the participants chose *not* to bring it up is a conspicuous omission. I can't help feeling this is also a statement (possibly an example of the communicative power of silence) but it is one that I am uncertain about how to read.

While some topics are so much a part of a Discourse that to not talk about them is to talk about them, in other instances whether or not we discuss something, has more to do with the sociolinguistic resources that are available to us. Choice of topic is related to the notion of "interpretive repertoire". According to Potter & Wetherell (1992), interpretive repertoires are:

...broadly discernable clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images...we can talk of these things as systems of signification and as building blocks used for manufacturing versions of actions, self and social structures in talk. They are some of the resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions. (Potter & Wetherell, 1992, p. 90)

Certain topics are selected because they are part of a generalized and ongoing conversation within a specific Discourse. For example, participants had differing views about the culture/education nexus, but all of them treated it as something to be talked about. It was a base to touch, a reference point that signalled their awareness of and involvement in the Discourse "Native education". Interpretive repertoires provide a kind of script, yet they also allow us to improvise. Potter & Wetherell stress that interpretive repertoires allow for a considerable degree of flexibility in the ways that we resort to them:

there is an available choreography of interpretive moves --like the moves of an ice dancer, say -- from which particular ones can be selected in a way that fits most effectively in the context.

(Potter & Wetherell, 1992, p. 92)

Interpretive repertoires provide a way of suspending contradiction and maneuvering our way around controversial and emotionally charged topics. Hence Maggie can both state she "probably thinks" she is a racist, yet argue she has been falsely accused, or Tony can talk about "real" racism. They also help us understand the ways in which individuals interactively *via* language construct (and are constructed by) their knowledge of the world, and identify the parameters that frame our interpersonal communications.

III. Conclusion.

The interpretive repertoire functions as a resource which people can draw on to organize intelligible and socially acceptable versions of their experiences. In essence, interpretive repertoires occupy the space where Discourse in the Foucauldian sense and actual linguistic performance intersect (Potter & Wetherell, 1992). What may be less apparent is the extent to which such repertoires also limit the explanations or descriptions which are likely to be deemed plausible. They are both enabling and constraining. Tilley (1990) observes that often:

Convention organizes truth, rather than the usual philosophical candidates, correspondence with the world or the internal coherence of statements (Tilley, 1990, p.325)

As well, individuals who are thrust into the role of spokesperson experience added pressure. They may feel an obligation to adhere more strictly to the conventions of their discipline, and to avoid controversy or speculation, however this did not prevent participants from expressing explicit criticisms

about aspects of their work (as we saw in Chapter III). Also, in different ways and to varying degrees, while they dutifully tipped their hats to “conventional wisdom” (Grant’s phrase) they also moved to distance themselves from it. This may reflect a number of things: the tension in language between its centripetal and centrifugal functions referred to in Chapter II, the likelihood that they were at least somewhat uncomfortable in the role of expert, and ambivalence about cultural difference, a topic that seemed to be a preoccupation, but was spoken about with caution.

Chapter V

Difference

The history of European expansion has shown how travelers, explorers, traders, and the military were often accompanied by academic or religious scholars interested in the soul, the mind, and the body of the Other. The very notion of race is of their making and resulted from a desire to classify and categorize as much as from the will to dominate (van Dijk, 1993, p. 159).

I. Difference, the self, and culture:

The transcripts revealed a gap between participants' expectations about what working with Native people might be like and the experience itself. They recalled moments of self-awareness, realization, surprise and discomfort. Most of the responses to the question about "describing a memorable incident" involved discomfort: an event in which they felt rejected, even humiliated, by their students, or conversely one in which they had committed a cultural gaffe that resulted in hurt and humiliation for the students. All admitted that despite varying amounts of book knowledge they were relatively ignorant about Natives as people.

Some described their preconceptions of Natives as stereotypical which is not all that surprising. According to Potter & Wetherell (1987) there is a tendency within mainstream social psychology that views stereotyping as an inevitable part of perceptual categorization. They question this view and while I do not wish to explore the pro's and con's of this debate here, I will say that, whatever else they may or may not be, stereotypes are certainly categorical. They are blanket formulations that obscure more than they reveal, leave little room for individual difference, and usually have just (barely) enough phenomenal accuracy to work as ad hoc explanations in areas where we have little actual knowledge. We rarely use stereotypes to talk about things with which we are familiar. In a world torn apart by racism and fear of the "Other", it should come as no surprise that negative stereotypes are part of the interpretive repertoire for discussing differences, including those relegated to the catch-all category of "culture".

Admittedly, categorization can't entirely be avoided. If we accept that Native people are an identifiable group, then certain generalizations are necessary in order to be able to describe them as a group. Problems arise when

the process somehow is reversed and individual members are reduced to mere composites, or repositories of group attributes. Urion (1992) has commented that while many Native communities are communities in crisis this should not be taken as typical or descriptive of all Native communities. This is a good example of how stereotyping ascribes negative attributes to whole populations.

The participants who spoke about stereotypes and racism were unanimous in their condemnation of both. In the instances where stereotyping was acknowledged it was described as something that happened "elsewhere and in the past" (van Dijk, 1993, p. 182), or as something that real encounters with Native people had shaken them out of. While references were made to feathered Indians, drunken Indians, alcoholism, beatings and physical and sexual abuse, all such commentaries were situated, qualified and (in the first two cases) critiqued as being stereotypical.

Re-reading the transcripts during discourse analysis, I was struck by the frequency with which anecdotes or verbal asides about differences came up. Usually these would be comments about Native attitudes towards money and children, their erratic attendance and lack of punctuality (i.e. where classes were concerned) and traits such as reticence, humour and spirituality. Some of these were presented as good differences (humour and spirituality) some were given mixed reviews (comments about attitudes towards children and reticence tended to be ambivalent) and the remainder (attitudes regarding time, money and attending class) were described as "bad, BUT...". The "but" (or some other qualifier) would then introduce a list of extenuating circumstances (poverty, alcoholism, "because of their culture", etc.) which would both explain and even justify the "bad" behaviours as well as helping to ensure that the criticisms made were not seen as judgemental. At the same time, there were many instances where participants would deny or downplay the importance of difference. Participants either stated that Natives are "just people" or declared themselves to have a kind of special, transcultural rapport with Natives (or, in one case, both).

Potter & Wetherell (1987) point out that "the humanist tradition in psychology ...(Perls, 1971; Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961)" (p. 100) has been a major influence on our thinking about selfhood: "It is assumed that the conventions of social and public life form a veneer over an older, deeper, more basic self *we all share in common*" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 100;

emphasis mine). This view of the self makes it possible to lump us all together ("just people"). It is also a view that has increasingly been subject to criticisms from many who have difficulty with the notion of a transcendent, universally human self:

Instead of emphasizing the psychological cast of cultural forms, this recent turn -- elaborated perhaps most tellingly in the works of Clifford Geertz (1973a) -- insists that meaning is a public fact, (and) personal life takes shape in cultural terms... (Rosaldo, 1984, p. 140)

Rosaldo adds that:

Conceptions of the self...are aspects of particular forms of politics and social relations. Cultural idioms provide the images in terms of which our subjectivities are formed and furthermore, these idioms themselves are socially ordered and constrained. (Rosaldo, 1984, p.150)

Tilley (1990) puts this last point (which I think bears repeating) in a somewhat different way:

The subject and subjectivity have no enduring essence. There is no such thing (except ideologically) as human nature. The subject is thoroughly constructed....(Tilley, 1990, p. 340)

Geertz (1984) goes even further and states that the "western conception of the person" is, in some cultures, considered a "rather peculiar idea"(p. 126). He warns that our tendency to privilege this conception can be a barrier to cross-cultural understanding and communication:

Rather than attempting to place the experience of others within the framework of such a conception, which is what the extolled 'empathy' usually comes down to, understanding them involves setting that conception aside and seeing their experiences within the framework of their own idea of what selfhood is. (Geertz, 1984, p. 126)

Geertz shows how attempts to transcend or deny difference can end up as a kind of ethnocentrism. "We are all alike" side-steps to "we are all like me" very easily. If we refuse to be dislodged from our own culturally-based certainty that this is how things really are, we will be unlikely to ever set "that conception aside" or try to look beyond it.

The argument that personal life takes shape in cultural terms (Geertz, 1984; Rosaldo, 1984) also has implications for how we look at racism, a topic that preoccupied some participants. Potter & Wetherell (1992) are critical of what they describe as "the prejudice problematic" (p. 206) i.e. the tendency on the part of some social psychologists to view racism as a personality trait:

Prejudice remains a personal pathology, a failure of inner-directed empathy and intellect, rather than a social pathology shaped by power relations and the conflicting interests of groups. (Potter & Wetherell, 1992, p. 209)

It's not a huge leap from the prejudice problematic to the position that racism is (regrettably) just part of "human nature" (which in turn means we can't actually do much about it). Potter & Wetherell (1992) and van Dijk (1993) have conducted studies that show it is difficult, if not impossible, to divide the world into racist vs. nonracist individuals (a process akin to sorting pears from apples) because of the ambiguous or "shifting" aspect of racist discourse. They argue that rather than thinking of racism as something people *have* (like blue eyes, a game leg or an "honest soul") we should look instead at how racist discourse is *used*.

In his introduction to *Elite discourse and racism*, Van Dijk (1993) identifies another problem:

Much of the discourse we shall study in this book does not appear to be racist at all. On the contrary much elite text and talk about minorities may occasionally seem to express tolerance, acceptance or humanitarian world views, although such discourse is contradicted by a situation of structured inequality largely caused or condoned by these elites. (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 6)

Here van Dijk reminds us that lip service to tolerance and racial equality can be a kind of ideologically-driven "double-speak" that helps conceal socioeconomic inequities. Potter & Wetherell (1992) provide an excellent summary of the ways in which culture too can become a kind of euphemism:

Culture discourse takes over some of the same tasks as race. It becomes a naturally occurring difference, a simple fact of life and a self-sufficient form of explanation. Culture also continues the doctrine of fatal impact and the white man's burden; but this time around the 'fatal flaws' do not lie in...genes, but in...traditional practices....In addition culture has this aura of

'niceness' of progressiveness and humanitarianism....Colonial history can be reconstructed as a story of clashing values, the modern against the traditional, as opposed to a story of conflicting interests, power relations, and exploitation. (Potter & Wetherell, 1992, p. 137)

This theme is also explored by Kalantzis (1988) who challenges the rhetoric of "multiculturalism", and argues that "superficially pleasant diversity has embedded within it another diversity: that of inequality"(p. 92).

Kalantzis' critique of multiculturalism speaks to another difference-related topic that arose from the interview data. Participants had mixed views on the both the desirability and the "do-ability" of special, culturally-enhanced education programs for Native people. Would this lead to watered down education, and could it even be done in a meaningful way? In her critique of how the Australian education system has dealt with this issue Kalantzis makes the claim that:

The interpretation of culture and ethnicity mainly at the level of cultural phenomena has contributed to an understanding of difference that masks inequality, that ignores the pedagogical imperatives of modern industrial societies, and that provides an inadequate social analysis. In consequence, despite its intentions, multiculturalism can and does end up being racist. (Kalantzis, 1988, p. 93)

Kalantzis' main concern (as I read her) is with the "structural basis for the reproduction of life of the indigenous people(s)" (p. 93). The survival of living human beings is a corequisite for the (meaningful) survival of their cultures. Heritage Festivals are no substitute for such things as affirmative action programs, more just immigration policies, or Native land claims settlements. She goes on to argue that education in and of itself cannot "dismantle" racism, and suggests that the danger lies in assuming it can, rather than realistically assessing both its possibilities and limitations.

According to some Native scholars and educators instead of finding ways to bring culture into education we should focus on how to bring "education into culture" (Charters-Voght, 1991, p. 125). Beatrice Medicine explains that:

Essentially Natives have been educated to a Native mode. They must be aware of the non-Native mode so they can make a better life for themselves and their children. (Medicine, 1987, p.24)

Others call into question whether or not Native cultural components which are extremely context sensitive can be incorporated into mainstream education without losing whatever it was that made them Native in the first place. Hampton (1993) has described the mainstream education system as "hostile in its structure, its curriculum, its context and its personnel"(p. 301) and Kirkness & Barnhardt (1991) have argued that one of the reasons why Native Students have difficulties with post secondary education is because as a prerequisite they "must be willing and able to park their own cultural predispositions at the university gate"(p. 3).

Te Hennepe (1993) a non-Native educator who has had extensive experience working with Native adults, gives an example that shows the confusion and damage that can result from botched attempts at "culture into education":

In an anthropology class an anthropology instructor dressed up as a shaman. He wore a paper headband and a green shawl over his shoulders. The students in the class asked him questions about shaman practices. There were First Nations witnesses in this classroom (Te Hennepe, 1993, p. 228)

Te Hennepe asks whether the anthropologist-instructor who designed the role play "imagined First Nations witnesses in his classroom"(p. 230) and adds that "the incident of the role-playing shaman is burned into my heart and mind"(p.232). Here we have an anthropologist -- a cultural expert, supposedly -- but the academy's faith in expertise may be why he apparently did not question what he was doing, or consider how Native people in the classroom might react to such a travesty.

The rationale for the "culture into education" approach relies in part on the claim that there is something called a Native learning style (McShane et.al., 1984; cited in Chrisjohn & Peters, 1986) According to this theory, Indian learners are right-brained, hence visual rather than verbal. They supposedly prefer experiential, hands on learning, and have difficulty comprehending certain kinds of abstractions. If we assume this is true, then it follows that we will adapt curriculum and instruction to make it more "culturally compatible" (i.e., more visual, experiential, etc.). Despite the fact that this

notion of a universal, panNative learning style has been challenged by both Native and non-Native scholars and educators (Chrisjohn & Peters, 1986; Sawyer, 1991) it retains a tenacious grip on much educational practice. In the case of my particular study, only two participants were strongly critical, while two were more-or-less accepting and one was strongly supportive. (The sixth did not discuss the issue.)

Because we cannot see inside people's heads, Native learning style boils down to a set of predilections or traits. Trait theory, according to Potter & Wetherell (1987) "sees the person as consisting of measurable personality traits, abilities, and attributes"(p. 96). This means that:

A person's behaviour or actions are thought to be largely determined by the combination of traits they possess. These traits outweigh the influence of the immediate situation or the context surrounding the person....(Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p.96)

When we ascribe shared traits to people who are already aggregated along lines of racial and cultural difference I believe we are on dangerous ground. Not only is it essentialist it is potentially (if not actually) racist, and at a practical level it shifts the focus away from what we do as instructors and opens the door to blaming the victims. Sawyer (1991) contends we should do exactly the opposite, i.e. recognize that in any group of learners there are likely to be many individual differences in learning styles and try to ensure that our instructional strategies are equally varied. This not only increases the likelihood of better over-all student achievement, it also exposes students to new ways of learning and allows them to stretch their mental muscles, something that won't happen if their limits have been decided in advance. (It is ironic that well-meaning attempts at cultural accommodation also have the potential to turn Native students into prisoners of culture.)

Finally, comments about difference were elicited by the question of whether or not it was possible to be bi-cultural. As was often the case, participants gave voice to a range of views: it was not only possible to be bicultural, but necessary, especially for Native political leaders; it was necessary in order to function "in two worlds", but probably very difficult; it was possible in some cases, but Natives are legitimately afraid that they will be "educated out of their culture"; it was possible for women, but less so for men....etc. There was a general consensus that becoming bicultural was a pragmatic move, a kind of coping strategy. Participants also agreed that the

assimilation of “minority” cultures, while a risk, was not probably not an inevitability.

The most striking thing about their responses was that the participants (with one exception) assumed that my question meant “was it possible *for Native people* to be bicultural?” (although it was not so worded, nor, in keeping with my research protocols, would I have asked the participants to speak for their Native students or try to interpret their motives). The exception was Maggie, and I found myself wondering if her experience of being the visible one in a predominantly Native community had had a more profound impact on her outlook than I had realized. She spoke about non-Natives who had spent years living in and working with Native communities and her concluding statement raises interesting questions, including whether or not what appears from the outside to be acculturation can sometimes be a form of camouflage:

I don't know if it's possible to be bicultural...I think that some people get quite close...I think it's really tricky, and I think there may be a thing about, if you are a white person who wants to go live in a Native community...you probably want to be Native...I think that's part of your drive...Then there's the thing about “passing”... and sometimes it's done quite consciously. At the university I'm working at, I can't pass, but I can “pass” at the university, I can generate certain kinds of ways of talking and ways of being that allow me to not be sort of, just dismissed...

She also stressed that when working cross-culturally it is important for non-Natives to “try to be polite...and not force our way in”...and added:

I'm not bicultural. And I think you can only have that bestowed upon you. Someone from that other culture can say “Yes, you are” but you can't say it about yourself...I think you can only name it for someone else....

(For me this comment rang like a bell. “*You can only have that bestowed upon you....*”)

The other participants (implicitly) spoke from the position that mainstream society is somehow cultureless although it is both the measure and the norm. This leads to yet another paradox: Native people simultaneously “have culture”, perhaps even excessive amounts of it (the ubiquitous feathered Indian again) but they also have a cultural deficit, i.e.

they must familiarize themselves with mainstream culture in order to successfully adapt to our society. The fact that most of the participants automatically assumed that the onus to be bicultural falls on the socioeconomically marginalized and culturally marked group only shows how entrenched this position has become. It would seem some of the premises of acculturation theory (critiqued in Chapter I) are still with us. This underlines my sense that much of the above is not unique to the group of educators who agreed to talk to me about their work. They are embroiled in a much more generalized and ongoing discourse about how we look at difference, the self and Other(s).

Difference is double-edged and needs to be handled carefully. Even when we identify something as a good difference, it may be because we wish to claim it for ourselves. The siren call of secret knowledge was something that participants responded to. Tony and Brenda wanted to learn about Native spirituality, and the latter also wanted to understand history "from a Native point of view". Pauline spoke about "the idea that you were going to somehow discover Native education and Native ways". (Note the use of the term "discover", evoking new worlds and lost continents). Maggie and her colleagues saw the practitioners of traditional Native religion (not the Catholics or fundamentalist Christians) as suitable spiritual mentors for the young people in the theatre group. (Traditionalists were in fact a minority in the community, and when healing workshops were set up several people accused the theatre project of promoting "witchcraft".) Grant referred to remote communities where "Native culture really lives and breathes" emphasizing the gap between our knowledge of Native culture and what's really out there, and Melissa ranked the various Native groups she'd worked with in terms of the extent to which they did or did not display dominant culture behaviours.

Some have theorized that the above reflects a fascination with the exotic and along with it a desire to embrace and so appropriate the Other. Carpenter (1967) says of European attitudes to indigenous peoples: "We recast them accordingly, costuming them in the missing parts of our psyches and expecting them to satisfy our secret needs" (p. 105). Young (1995) characterizes the above as "a logic of difference as hierarchical dichotomy"(p.207) and explains how:

The second term...is defined as the complement to the valued term, the object correlating with its subject, that which brings it to completion, wholeness, and identity....The exotic orientals are there to know and master....In every case the valued term achieves its value by its determinately negative relation to the other. (Young, 1995, pp. 207-208)

At first glance, cultural relativism looks like a way out for those who would posit difference without hierarchy, because it insists that each culture be evaluated by its own standards, and not norms imported from elsewhere (the elsewhere in question usually being European and white). This is fine as far as it goes. Unfortunately, cultural relativism can also be a kind of racism because it presupposes that cultures are homogenous. Difference defines the boundaries between cultures, but it doesn't exist within them -- it's "Us" and "Them". This means that cultural relativism cannot deal very well with multiple or competing values internal to a culture, or with the complex process of identity construction. Gutman's (1995) research into the religiously sanctioned practice of polygamy within turn-of-the-century Mormon communities, reveals that what outsiders would likely describe as a "Mormon" value was not universally held:

There are...some rare accounts, even more revealing, like that of a Mormon elder's efforts to marry a second wife. The elder's first wife had told him that if he ever brought a second wife in the front door, she would go out the back one... "Finally," this account goes, "he told her that he had a revelation to marry a certain girl and that in the face of such divine instructions, she must give her consent." The next morning his first wife announced that she too had had a revelation, to "shoot any woman who became his plural wife." He remained monogamous. (Gutman, 1995, p. 66)

Gutman (1995) gives another example. She argues that the idea that "woman's place is in the home" has had cultural credibility not just because of our physiological capacity to bear and nurture children but also because "most men (or for that matter most men and women) sincerely believe" (p.67) this to be true. Obviously this "truth" is one that some women have challenged. Gutman concludes:

Faced with the problem of indeterminacy created by multiple understandings...within a single culture, cultural relativism might specify that the dominant understanding should rule...If cultural relativism relies upon the standard of dominant understandings, it threatens to identify justice with the social understandings of dominant groups, and by so doing, implicitly denies that justice can serve as a critical standard to assess dominant understandings. (Gutman, 1995, p. 67)

II. Conclusion.

What does it mean to be a member of a culture? Which issues are about race (itself a construction) or a shared tradition and history? Which are socioeconomic? How do categories such as culture break down in the face of the manifest diversity of Native peoples and the diaspora of identities that this implies? What happens when we move, as we must, to larger categories such as "humanity" or "life"?

Difference is a topic many find difficult to deal with and the participants in this study were no exception. While stereotyped views of Native people did not stand up to cross-examination by actual knowledge and experience, much of the interpretive repertoire for situating difference relies on discourses and vocabularies that are in some sense racist. Because we see the Other through ourselves, difference cannot be put aside through a belief in a universal, transcendent, humanist self, or any form of psychoanalytic "deep self". At the same time, neither should difference be stabilized via the notion of an essentialized self that is a direct, uncomplicated and one-dimensional manifestation of (mutually exclusive) categories of race, class or gender. Above all, we should be wary of versions of difference recognition that turn people into prisoners of culture:

...only the oppressed and excluded groups are defined as different. Whereas the privileged groups are neutral and exhibit free and malleable subjectivity, the excluded groups are marked with an essence, imprisoned in a given set of possibilities. By virtue of the characteristics the group is alleged to have by nature, the ideologies allege that group members have specific dispositions that suit them for some activities and not others.

Difference...always means exclusionary opposition
(Young, 1995, p. 208)

Chapter VI

Pedagogy

I. The disciplined subject and Educational Discourse.

Van Dijk (1993) sees a clear connection between pedagogy and difference. He argues that symbolic elites have:

a primary role in setting the agenda and hence have considerable influence in defining the terms and margins of consent and dissent for public debate; in formulating the problems people speak and think about and especially in controlling...changing systems of norms and values by which ethnic events are evaluated. (van Dijk, 1993, p. 47)

Educators and academics, according to van Dijk, are members of symbolic elites, and in cross-cultural education, difference is articulated on a grid defined by what pedagogy has already declared to be the norms, values and problems. Moreover when we speak of such things we do not do so simply as people but rather as educators. Our individual discourses have been disciplined even before we speak and there are pre-established limits to our interpretive repertoires. This disciplining is a complex process, compared to which overtly authoritarian constraints such as censorship appear clumsy and crude. Nor is the process entirely a repressive one. Just as it becomes impossible (or at least difficult) to say certain things, it becomes possible (even advantageous) to say others.

The most comprehensive exploration of the claim that subjectivization is a disciplinary process comes from Michel Foucault. (Those who believe in the originality of authors might say he invented it.) Foucault takes the view of the self as socially constructed as a given:

In his model of the self, Foucault refuses the idea that there is any presocial potentiality or inner nature that is necessarily expressed or realized through the individual's interaction with the world. He repeatedly emphasizes that identity is a radically contingent phenomenon constructed through social practices rather than an expression of an inner nature....(McNay, 1992, p 171)

Foucault describes some of the mechanisms by which a specific kind of social self or "subject" is created, including hierarchical observation, normalizing

judgement and the examination (Foucault, 1977). He also links (but does not restrict) these practices to specific social institutions: the penal system, the military, medicine and -- last but not least -- education. The following discussion of Bentham's Panopticon is both a snapshot of history and a potent metaphor:

Each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by a supervisor; but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication....And this invisibility is a guarantee of order. If the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape...bad reciprocal influences; if they are patients, there is no danger of contagion; if they are madmen there is no risk of their committing violence on one another; if they are schoolchildren, there is no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those disturbances that slow down the rate of work...a collective effort is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities. (Foucault, 1977, pp. 200-201)

According to Foucault it is the inmate's "state of conscious and permanent visibility that ensures the automatic functioning of power" (p. 201). Power is both diffused and omniscient, at once everywhere and nowhere. "The inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he *may* always be so" (p. 201, emphasis mine). The end result is he becomes his own supervisor; societal discipline is internalized as "self-discipline". For Foucault this is the signal that the machinery of power has taken over. The warders (likewise the drill sergeants, doctors, and teachers) may now go home.

Within this disciplinary system, Otherness and nonconformity are seen as manifestations of delinquency (Foucault, 1977). He adds that:

Generally speaking, all the authorities exercising individual control function according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal) and that of coercive assignment, of differential distribution (who he is; where he must be; how he is

to be characterized;...how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an individual way, etc.)...the universality of disciplinary controls makes it possible to brand the 'leper' and to bring into play against him the dualistic mechanisms of exclusion. The constant division between the normal and the abnormal, to which every individual is subjected, brings us back to our own time...(Foucault, 1977, p.199)

Individuality, for Foucault, is not the prerogative of individuals. It has little to do with what we may like to think of as our cherished, unique, personal selfhood. The digit has replaced the name. Similarly to be a subject is to be a prisoner, but of a special kind -- disciplined, yes, even domesticated, but not entirely without power:

It should not be forgotten that there existed at the same period a technique for constituting individuals as correlative elements of power and knowledge. The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an "ideological" representation of society' but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called "discipline". (Foucault, 1977, p. 194)

Tilley (1990) echoes the above in his assertion that the subject is formed through "a dialectic of power and knowledge" (p. 313). Racevskis (1988) defines a subject as "that which is amenable to the effects of power: it is the *handle by which power takes a hold of/on individual human beings*" (p. 23, emphasis added). One of the best explanations of how exactly this might work comes from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who speaks thusly of *pouvoir/savoir* :

The trick is to get some of the homely verbiness of *savoir* in *savoir-faire*, *savoir-vivre* into *pouvoir*, and you might come up with something like this: if the lines of making sense of something are laid down in a certain way, then you are able to do only those things with that something which are possible within and by the arrangement of those lines. *Pouvoir-savoir -- being able to do something only as you are able to make sense of it.* This everyday sense of that doublet seems to me indispensable to a crucial aspect of Foucault's work. Power as productive rather than merely repressive resolves itself in a certain way if you don't

forget the ordinary sense of *pouvoir/savoir*. (Spivak, 1993, pp.34-35, emphasis added)

Spivak shows both the repressive (don't cross the lines) and the enabling (because you can make sense of it) dimensions of the power/knowledge doublet. My own analogy is to a game of some sort -- hopscotch, or perhaps chess. It is possible to win, but only if you make the right moves, and you will be disqualified (punished) if you break the rules.

It would appear that the Foucauldian universe is not a comfortable place. What does it mean to be a student in this setting? What does it mean to be a teacher? How are we simultaneously enabled and restricted via our subjection to the discipline of education?

The most obvious response would be to talk about the effects of institutional constraints (discussed in Chapter IV), such things as inflexible program structures, authoritarian attendance policies, and standardized methods of evaluation with their obvious potential for culture and class bias. Certainly these were things the participants were critical of, and certainly they are the kinds of things that have an impact on student performance and morale. Yet at the same time they also establish the parameters and guidelines which make it possible for the "system" to function, credentializing some, excluding others, etc.

While the above are obviously power effects, they are not what Foucault is talking about when he refers to "docile bodies" and disciplined subjects. They are too external, too visible. The power effects that worry Foucault the most are those which are internalized:

The single experience which was always at the source of his thought was the reality of imprisonment, the incarceration of human beings within modern systems of thought and practice which had become so intimately a part of them that they no longer experienced these systems as a series of confinements but embraced them as the very structure of being human. (Bernauer, 1988, p. 45)

External constraints are merely the tip of the iceberg. Foucault would have us focus instead on such things as the ways we are turned into entities called teachers and students, what forces shape our notions of what education is, and why it seems natural and normal to educators that designated groups of people be rounded up and confined (sometimes by law, sometimes by other

means, e.g. the promise of a better life) to institutions of learning. Also: why, within these institutions, we engage in (and are engaged by) certain practices, and not others.

As it turned out, it was participants' role perceptions, flowing as they (in part) did, from implicit or explicit models or "philosophies" of education (see Ch. 4) that spoke to Foucault's concerns. It was here that their comments revealed the extent to which they acted as disciplined agents of pedagogy. Even Pauline, who claimed to have "made it up as she went along", selected many of her strategies from the repertoire of liberal education.² This is not surprising, since this view of education is so ingrained in Western European culture that it tends to act as a kind of default setting. (If we are not consciously attempting to do something else, then what we *are* doing is probably some form of liberal education.) Foucault would probably argue that when we are acting in our capacity as educators there is really very little that we make up on our own, because the educator that does the making up is already a construct, designed (trained) to function in certain ways. Variants of critical pedagogy such as the Freirean model that Maggie attempted to implement, or the education for self-actualization that was Tony's preferred approach; are also not things we've made up on our own. Students processed in these ways will, ideally, end up as particular kinds of educational products (empowered, self-actualized, crammed full of Knowledge, etc.) and while theorists and practitioners may disagree on their relative merits, they will still recognize them as belonging to something called education.

The formulation "agents of pedagogy" used above has a dangerously deterministic ring to it. Despite his insistence that power has positive as well as negative effects, Foucault has been accused of elevating the extent to which we are disciplined, i.e. controlled, and neglecting any potential we might have to challenge or resist (Hartsock, 1990; McNay, 1992). As we've seen, participants in this study were not automatons; by their own accounts they did resist. As mentioned, to an extent their perceived roles flowed from pedagogical models, but other, often unanticipated, personae were site specific and imposed by actual practice. Pauline expected, was trained for, perhaps even took for granted, her role as "generic academic", she neither expected

² She is referring here to specific instructional methods and strategies. As mentioned earlier, an intense, dialogical process was taking place among the students and instructors, (re. what they ought to be doing and how they should go about doing it) and this also shaped her practice.

nor intended to become an "advocate". Again, through an integration of practice and critique (if you like, praxis), participants were sometimes able to deconstruct themselves as pedagogical subjects. Maggie began the theatre project as a committed community developer and ended up questioning both herself and the model. Several of the others talked in ways that expressed tensions about aspects of their work, or showed a kind of wariness of "conventional wisdom". Even Tony, who seemed the most immersed in his Rogerian approach (doubly disciplined as he was, by social work as well as education) acknowledged that too much nurturing and caring could be a kind of paternalism.

Knowing something is a bridge to another kind of knowing, which is knowing how, being able (*pouvoir/savoir*) -- to critique the knowledge one started out with. Often it is practice that triggers this process -- some event, experience, dilemma, that defies categorization (disciplining) but insists on being taken into account. To varying degrees, participants were involved in a critical examination of what their practice in Native adult education supposedly was. As Foucauldian subjects they were both docile and resistant, manifesting a kind of schizophrenia where their pedagogical selves were concerned.

While their experiences did change them, or at least pushed the envelope of taken-for-granted assumptions about education, it is questionable whether anything else changed. Recall Maggie's rueful remark: "social change is a bit ambitious, I don't see much that changes, really". Remember too, Pauline's discussion of how the things she and the other instructors "had fought for" (smaller classes of longer duration) were later done away with, in favor of what she described as "stuffing the classes as full as you can get them". In Brenda's case, she learned later that despite her focus on ensuring that her students would be able to meet academic standards, many had not continued their schooling. They valued their education because it enriched their personal lives within their families and communities; they did not see it as a goal to be pursued or a career track.

Pauline, Maggie and Brenda were the three participants who were most outspoken in their criticisms of the system. Coincidentally (?) they were also the three whose contracts had not been renewed by their employers. While educators are encouraged to be critical, some ways of being critical may be

more acceptable than others, and change -- real change -- is seldom if ever welcomed by those to whom the system has granted privilege and power. One of the ways that change is resisted is through the policing of discourse:

Discourse is to be linked with individual desire on the one hand, wanting discourse to be open and unrestricted and institutional constraint on the other dividing what may be said and what must be left unsaid, and insisting on the restraint, control and formalization of discourse. (Tilley, 1990, p.302)

In order to affect change one must first be heard and this means what one says must be understood and deemed credible. Even the most idealized of emancipated subjects will run straight into a brick wall, if they say "what must be left unsaid". What is more the rules of discourse are not like other kinds institutional constraints such as traffic violations or admission requirements involving grade point averages. The rules of discourse, in fact, exist in discourse:

Discourses police themselves, preventing the production of inappropriate or non-disciplinary statements. If you transgress these rules you are no longer an anthropologist, archaeologist, sociologist etc., and you can no longer expect anyone to either read what you write or take you seriously at all. And all this is productive of knowledge? (Tilley, 1990, p. 303)

There is a fine sarcastic edge to Tilley's concluding remark, because of course such practices are not about producing knowledge. Rather they are about controlling it, through the processes of allowing to speak or silencing, credentializing or excluding, and proclaiming one thing to be knowledge and the other not. Educational Discourse is no exception.

II. Power /Knowledge in the Teaching Machine.

Studies need to be conducted on who obtains employment and how, and who does not, who gets grants and who does not, who gets published and who does not, who has praises heaped on them and who does not, why some books are read and others ignored, why some debates take place rather than others. (Tilley, 1990, p. 337)

Educational institutions, including those of adult and higher education such as colleges and universities, are part of the "machinery of power" to which Foucault refers. This is perhaps why Spivak (1993) locates our struggles "in the teaching machine" (p. ix). As well as exploring what is meant by disciplining a subject within a Discourse, we need to look at some of the specific technologies by which this process is accomplished. The following section examines three of these: canonization, naturalization and normalization, and the domestication of difference.

1. Canonization: The canon is a label that has been attached to a body of officially sanctioned knowledge. It is considered to be *the* legitimate knowledge, the kind that one should (properly) teach and learn. Such knowledge is thought of as "having stood the test of time". It grows of course, just as (in the eyes of some) history marches forward, but incrementally and very, very slowly. Great works, like saints, do not ascend overnight.

Despite the pervasive sense that it, or something like it, has always been there, the canon did not get named as such until relatively recently. Its power (and this would have delighted Foucault) remained invisible until it was challenged, in a generalized debate that has been going on for nearly two decades:

One side -- call them "essentialists" -- argued that to dilute the core with new works for the sake of including previously unheard voices would be to forsake the values of Western civilization for the standardless-ness of relativism, the tyranny of the social sciences, lightweight trendiness, and a host of related intellectual and political evils. Another, diametrically opposed side -- call them "deconstructionists" -- argued that to preserve the core by excluding contributions to civilization by women, African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans, as if the classical canon were sacred, unchanging and unchangeable would be to denigrate the identities of members of these previously excluded groups and to close off Western civilization from the influences of unorthodox and challenging ideas for the sake of perpetuating sexism, racism, Eurocentrism, closed-mindedness, the tyranny of Truth (with a capital "T") and a host of related intellectual and political evils. (Gutman, 1995, p. 58)

Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether or not Gutman has chosen the most appropriate labels for her two warring factions, the positions she describes are certainly recognizable. What is more, some scholars have caught on to the fact that aspects of this debate are political, and not about cultural content at all:

Enlarging and changing the curriculum is therefore essential, not so much in the name of a broader culture for everyone, as in order to give recognition to the hitherto excluded. (Taylor, 1995, p.258)

Taylor is concerned that, in this process of inclusion (which he considers to be both politically and morally necessary), academic standards will somehow be abandoned. Ironically, his fear exemplifies the most recent incarnation of the "culture vs. education" dichotomy, the same "dilemma" that plagued Native education long before it became an issue for mainstream academia. (This was also a problem for some of the participants. Recall Maggie's statement: "Popular theatre should also be the best theatre.....".) Taylor continues:

...judgements (of equal worth) seem to be implicit in the demand that certain works be included in the canon and in the implication that these works have not been included earlier on only because of prejudice or ill will or the desire to dominate. (Of course the demand for inclusion is *logically* separable from a claim of equal worth. The demand could be: Include these because they are ours even though they may well be inferior. But this is not how the people making the demand talk)...(Taylor, 1995, p. 260, emphasis in text)

The flaw in Taylor's position, from a Foucauldian point of view, is that he assumes some universal measure of excellence as a cultural a priori. We can and do impose measures, but these hardly spring from timeless truths. Rather they are constrained by "the understood practices and assumptions of the institution" (Fish, 1995, p.50). Taylor also fails to consider that as long as minority or subaltern cultures continue to be excluded from the canon, they will (to use Tilley's phrase) "not be taken seriously". In order to win an award -- in this case, the badge of cultural excellence -- one must first be declared eligible to compete. (Taylor's parenthetical, however, is well taken. This is "not how the people making the demand talk".)

Frawley (1987) blends discourse analysis with reproduction theory to further explain how institutions exercise control over the process of acquiring (certain kinds of) knowledge. He refers to Bourdieu's and Passeron's (1977) analysis of symbolic cultural capital to help explain how:

the pedagogic action of school delimits the knowledge which is characteristic of a discursive space by regulating the texts which are included in and excluded from discursive spaces...and thereby separates the legitimate knowledge from the illegitimate knowledge... (Frawley, 1987, p. 174)

(School here refers to all systems of institutionalized teaching and learning.)

Choosing an example from his own field Frawley explains that if one is to be considered a linguist, it is necessary to have read "those texts written by Chomsky" (p. 176), because these are among the texts that have "an authoritative position in the discursive space of linguistics"(p. 176) Of course one is not compelled to do so by force, but refusal will have certain consequences:

One might reject this pedagogic authority. But if one does, one runs the risk of either "not having learned linguistics" or of existing on the "lunatic fringe" of the discipline. In each case, the consequence for the individual is ostracization, or institutionalized powerlessness. Individuals...at the "lunatic fringe" ...might in fact gain power (a so-called scientific revolution) but to gain power they must restructure the textual dependencies and control the reproduction of symbolic capital through instruction. *That is, they must follow the same route as those who originally excluded them.* (Frawley, 1987, p. 177, emphasis added)

This last statement has implications for those who would like to see the canon changed to better reflect the diverse world in which we read, write, think, learn, and live. For one thing, it suggests that there is more involved than simply opposing points of view, it is --as Taylor feared -- an actual power struggle. For another, it reveals the awesome self-protective mechanisms that disciplines such as pedagogy, and institutions such as various sorts of schools (including schools of thought) have at their disposal. They may, eventually, let new knowledge in, but it will be changed, disciplined, made to follow the same rules as its predecessors.

Frawley (1987) concludes with an observation, reminiscent of Foucault, on the invisibility of power:

Pedagogic action is the most effective kind of power because its legitimacy is unseen, unquestioned, deferred, and silently accepted by all parties involved. Think of how radical it is for a student to refuse to learn because he believes that his teachers do not know anything -- have no authority to teach him anything; think of how radical it is for a teacher to begin all his lectures by stating, first off, that he is allowed to lecture. (Frawley, 1987, p. 173)

2. Naturalizing and normalizing: Frawley is quite right in thinking that the above, were it to occur would be viewed as extraordinary and eccentric behaviour. Potter & Wetherell (1987) comment on how discourse is used to achieve the consensus necessary for the silent acceptance of "all parties involved" :

Thompson (1984) has pointed out three central ways in which discourse contributes significant ideological consequences. It can be used in the presentation of situations of domination and exploitation as legitimate and proper, to mask the existence of these situations and to reify current social relationships as natural or indeed essential. (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 187)

As pedagogical subjects we develop a kind of selective vision about our surroundings. The institutionalized practices of legitimating, credentializing and excluding that occur daily within educational discourse seem as natural to us -- as much a part of the landscape -- as rocks or trees. Rarely are they foregrounded or problematized, and yet there is a fundamental arbitrariness, concealed behind the foliage of cultural capital, about much that we accept without question. We fail to recognize that these practices have been shaped in particular ways to achieve particular ends and to serve particular interests. We do not acknowledge that they are contingent rather than inevitable. The following passage from Foucault, framed by Tilley's (1990) commentary should make us look twice at the taken-for-granted :

...cultural order is created and sustained through discursive practices. Consider the following passage:

“Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, Pomme treated and cured a hysteric by making her take ‘baths ten or twelve hours a day, for ten whole months’ At the end of this treatment for the dessication of the nervous system and the heat that sustained it, Pomme saw ‘membranous tissues like pieces of damp parchment...peel away with some slight discomfort, and these were passed daily with the urine; the right ureter also peeled away and came out whole in the same way’. The same thing occurred with the intestines, which at another stage, ‘peeled off their internal tunics, which we saw emerge from the rectum. The oesophagus, the arterial trachea, and the tongue also peeled in due course; and the patient had rejected different pieces either by vomiting or by expectoration’ (BC: ix)”

What do we make of this account? Written by a doctor it was intended as a serious description of a pathological condition and its treatment. In such a piece of writing what is to count as observation? And how do we distinguish a true from a false statement? (Tilley, 1990, pp. 290-291)

However bizarre the above passage may seem to us today, at the time it was written it was accepted as both scientific and true. Is this the kind of historical knowledge that defenders of the canon are concerned with protecting? If so, I suspect it would be only as a negative example of that which is “unscientific”; or to show how little they knew Then in contrast to how much we know Now, etc. Otherwise, such oddities would likely be written out of the self-histories of medicine and science. (However, just when the authorities have “got their stories straight” along comes archaeologist Foucault, a troublesome creature who insists on digging up the nuisance grounds of western civilization and resurrecting epistemological embarrassments. Nuisance indeed...!)

Foucault’s project, of course, is to show how relative and consensual all knowledge is. This doesn’t mean it is worthless (*pouvoir/savoir* would not make any sense if this were the case) but it does mean any claims to universal, timeless validity made by present day knowledge-mongers should be viewed with skepticism if not outright suspicion. In fact we should be most suspicious of those things which seem most self-evident, because this

seeming naturalness, if viewed from a different perspective or otherwise problematized, may well turn out to be anything but.

3. The domestication of difference: Let's look back, for a moment, at Frawley's remark about those who wish to change the canon being forced to "follow the same route as those who excluded them"(Frawley, 1987, p. 177) The analogy is to a change of government; granted there are new faces but they are occupying the same chairs and, by and large, doing the same things. Does this mean that "scientific revolutions" are not revolutions but merely coup d'etats? Said (1993) warns against simple substitutions: "The idea that because Plato and Aristotle are ...products of a slave society they should be disqualified is as limited an idea as suggesting that *only* their work, because it was...about elites, should be read today" (pp. 313-314, emphasis in text).

Certainly there are always difficulties involved in reaching a consensus on what to include, but the more serious problem is to untangle the process by which knowledge becomes institutionalized and to come to grips with the implications of this. The "content" of particular knowledges, I would argue, is secondary.

There is a paradox at the heart of certain kinds of inclusive strategies. Affirmative action is an example. While opponents of affirmative action accuse it of privileging group rights over individual rights, what it actually does is selectively advance individual group members and not entire populations. The question becomes whether or not providing certain individuals with passports to elites can benefit the majority, other than symbolically. In fact, even the symbolism is ambiguous; on the one hand you have the figure of the "positive role model" (one educators are particularly susceptible to), but on the other you have the "token" ...woman, black, gay, Native, etc. Others describe the syphoning off of the brightest, most talented and capable members of marginalized groups as "decapitation" (Cockburn, 1995, p. 157).

Where the knowledges themselves are concerned, there is also a doubleness. Is the process one of inclusion or appropriation? While inclusion in a canon legitimates, it may also lead to a kind of (mis)representation in which outsiders are confronted by "their" knowledge in an estranged and alienated form. What was once central to their identities is now intellectual property, to be processed, packaged and sold back to them (literally as well as figuratively, through such things as tuition fees). Hill

(1995) makes the distinction between “fugitive” and “codified” knowledge, and argues that when the two collide (he is talking specifically about environmental controversies) the latter moves to suppress, disqualify and delegitimize the former. While I think Hill’s distinction is valid, and the terms “fugitive” and “codified” well-chosen and evocative, again it is the ways in which fugitive knowledges *become* codified that we need to look at, and what is, or is not, lost in the translation.

Spivak (1993) uses the idea of “strategic essentialism” to drive a wedge between difference and “discourses that are produced from sites of influence and power” (p. 4), while cautioning that “the strategic use of essentialism can turn into an alibi for proselytizing academic essentialisms...rather than matching the trick to the situation” (p. 4). The ready acceptance and even popularization of the works of such essentialist feminists as Gilligan(1982), Chodorow(1989) and Elenky, et. al.(1986) as opposed to critiques of their works (Lather, 1991; Fraser & Nicholson, 1990) attests to the wisdom of Spivak’s warning. Nevertheless she is right to call for a strategy of some kind in the face of moves to divest difference of its rhetorical force. Examples from the transcripts come to mind. I have already discussed how formulations such as “We’re all ethnocentric”, “ I think I probably am a racist”, someone was “a *real* racist” work to displace, diffuse and generally downplay racism. This can get in the way of figuring out what has to change and how to go about changing it.

I think also of an article by Ann Berlak on antiracist pedagogy that was (in my view) remarkable for the way that it homogenized, flattened and “essentially declawed” (Hart, 1990, p. 126) the notion of difference. Statements such as “when my father was drunk he used to beat me” and “I never want to hear an adult say, ‘You’re too young to understand’” were juxtaposed and (in effect) given equal weight (Berlak, 1994, p. 43). The list of “groups that are oppressed in our society” was expanded to include “those who have been children” (p. 43). It turns out that we’re all oppressed (which is tantamount to saying no one is) but some of us have managed to grow out of it. (Whoever said “biology was not destiny”....)

Granted it is impossible to set forth hard and fast rules about who is or is not oppressed, or assign weights and measures to something that is about quality rather than quantity. On the other hand I suspect that if my great grandparents had been slaves, if they had walked the Trail of Tears or been

butchered by Cortez, I would be less than happy with Berlak's pedagogy. If I was poor it would be a non-issue; I simply would not have made it into her college classroom. If nothing else, this example reminds us that there are instances where a little of the "strategic essentialism" Spivak refers to might bring the discussion back down to earth.

For decades critics on the left have remarked on the amazing ability of this socioeconomic system to neutralize, by means of partial or symbolic accommodation, anything that might seriously threaten its hegemony. Such concepts as repressive tolerance (Marcuse, 1965) manufactured consent (Chomsky, 1992) and co-optation (public domain of the New Left and the counterculture) are all more-or-less plausible attempts at showing how this process works. More recently, Toni Morrison has commented that "the master narrative [can] make any number of adjustments to keep itself in tact" (Morrison, 1992, p. 51; cited in Schick, 1995, p. 284) These critiques have one thing in common; they all question the extent to which social and cultural differences can become "institutionalized" and still retain their insurgency.

III. Conclusion:

We've seen how the large-D Discourses of Pedagogy and Difference map out the terrain and establish the positions from which we may or may not speak. Foucault (1977) has argued that within Discourses such as education (pedagogy) power works invisibly to reshape us into "docile bodies" who willingly take charge of our own supervision and ensure our own conformity to the rules of whatever Discipline we have been subjected to. In short, "the constructed space (of Discourse) helps produce certain forms of action and agency rather than others" (Tilley, 1990, p.339). As well, there is the danger that an "explosion of marginality studies" (Spivak, 1993, p. ix) within academic and educational discourse, while it may work to decentre these discourses, may also mean changes to the studies themselves:

A caution emerges out of my conviction that, as the margin or "outside" enters an institution or teaching machine, what *kind* of teaching machine it enters will determine its contours.

Therefore the struggle continues, in different ways, after the infiltration. (Spivak, 1993, p. ix, emphasis in text)

* Morrison's use of "in tact" (vs. "intact") I assume is a deliberate play on language and not a textual error.

Chapter VII

Minerva's Bird

I. Implications for Cross-cultural Adult Education

While European controlled Native education has gone on for more than two centuries, our problematizing of the issues discussed in this thesis has occurred relatively recently. Unfortunately, however critical we may be of past practices, there is absolutely no reason to assume that history will judge us differently. Foucault (1973) and Geertz (1984) warn us that things we perceive as normal and natural from the vantage point of our particular place and time, will likely to be viewed as bizarre elsewhere and in the future. Perhaps one of the first things those of us involved in Native education should do is stop thinking that we necessarily know what we are doing.

This may be easier said than done, especially when knowledge (and teaching and learning) is our business, and we are possessed with a healthy curiosity. The urge to find out about, and by doing so, control -- *pouvoir/savoir* -- is a strong one. Respect is far more important than understanding, but is it possible to have one without the other? I hope so, because in all likelihood our understandings will continue to be limited. I do know that personally I would rather encounter a traveller from another galaxy (if it courteously refrained from taking my land or telling me all about myself) than be scrutinized by an anthropologist in a paper head band!

In spite of our sporadic claims to authority, educators are products as well as agents of "the teaching machine" (Spivak, 1993, p. ix). The interview data revealed some of the ways in which we are both constrained and empowered by a shared-- and institutionally perpetuated -- notion of what a teacher should be and do, and why education is important. The starting point for my research was a series of questions about how the participants perceived their role(s). In reality the research did not deal with perceptions but rather with participants' discourse: what they said (and how they talked) about their experiences teaching Native adults. While there was a considerable range of experience, talk tended to orbit around recurring themes and shared preoccupations. I interpreted this as indicative of the ways that large-D Discourse (the conventions of a discipline such as education) circumscribes what we can --acceptably and intelligibly--say about our work.

It turned out that roles were in part shaped by educational models (specifically liberal education, Rogerian humanism, and critical pedagogy) but institutional constraints and the (context-specific) circumstances of various educational settings also had an effect. Participants expressed frustrations over situations in which they felt caught in the middle. I ascribed this to a tension between their constitution as pedagogical subjects (through Educational Discourse) and real world conflicts and problems.

One of the more interesting aspects of the data, something I noticed relatively early on in my analysis, was that all participants had “pictures in their heads” of what it meant to be a teacher. To a greater or lesser extent, these pictures informed their practices, including their ways of relating to their students. I found this fascinating, since these were all *adult* educators, only one of whom had had training and experience as a public school teacher. In our discussions of adult education, we tend to talk about the students’ prior educational experiences; rarely do we discuss the baggage that instructors themselves may be carrying, the invisible scars of our own institutionalization. We look at (examine?) our students, but the gaze is not reciprocal. Usually it is the educator’s point of view that is privileged.

Participants saw many connexions between pedagogical practices and perceptions of difference, and it would be repetitious to list them all here. In general they were ambivalent about difference, torn between the desire to recognize it and their fear of acting in ways that might be construed as patronizing or paternalistic. One participant, at once arguing against racism, for fairness, and against special education programs for Native people, stated that “They just want to be treated like everybody else.” While it’s an admirable sentiment, the phrase “like everybody else” is one that masks a lot. Arguably, Native people should not be treated like everybody else (translation: like white people) because they aren’t. By that measure they will always be less. They should however be given the same rights, privileges and respect as everybody else, but as Indians. The choice should not be between identity and equity, yet that is precisely the choice that some argue education has tried to impose. Special education programs should be looked at carefully to determine if they liberate students or ghettoize them.³

³ Worse still, does the former (liberation) with its authority claim to “do for” others, end up implying the latter?

Whether or not one accepts its Jungian premises, Otherness is a powerful allegory and history attends to its truth. In practice a romantic fascination with the marked, the exotic, the mysterious, the Other-- can blind us to less striking realities. What about the large population of urban Natives? Because they are less visible (to us) are they somehow less Indian? Many of them are still poor, still marginalized, still victims of racism (Shorten, 1991) yet we deny them the cachet of "identity". The danger is we may focus so much on what we think of as culture that we forget about the actual people. Who is an Indian is a question that continues to be discussed and debated within Native communities. Perhaps, as Young (1995) suggests, the rest of us should simply leave it to them.

This is further complicated by the ubiquitous nature of racism, which is neither "in the past and far away" nor the sole preserve of bigots however much we might like to believe that it is. Nor is it any accident that both Kalantzis (1988) and van Dijk (1993) take aim at educational and academic discourse (the latter through an analysis of secondary education curriculum and university textbooks). The interviews confirmed my suspicion that cross-cultural educators are constantly haunted by the spectre of Eurocentrism and the fear of being branded a racist.

This fear makes us vulnerable to another danger, that of cultural relativism. Rather than succumbing to cultural relativism, cross-cultural educators need to destabilize this view of culture and make visible the internal fault lines that hegemony works to conceal. Both the fascination with the exotic and cultural relativism are manifestations of binary thinking, a tendency that was foreshadowed as problematic in Chapter I. Young (1995) suggests that what we need is a less oppositional and more relational understanding of difference:

The categorical opposition of groups essentializes them, repressing the differences within groups. In this way the definition of difference as exclusion actually denies difference....Essentializing difference expresses a fear of specificity and a fear of making permeable the categorical border between oneself and others....The alternative to...difference as opposition is an understanding of difference as relational rather than defined by substantive categories and attributes....Difference thus emerges not as a description of the attributes of a group, but as a

function of the relations between groups and the interaction of groups with institutions" (Young, 1995, pp. 208-209)

The implication of all the above for cross-cultural adult educators is that we need to constantly question our own taken-for-granted assumptions about such categories as culture and difference, and even the process of categorization itself. (Some of the participants did talk about having gone through this sort of critically reflexive and introspective process.) As well, we need to be prepared to challenge and critique the canon of cross-cultural education, including handed-down claims about difference being a problem in educational settings (a problem for who? different from what?) and blanket assertions about Native learning styles (a good example of the "defining by substantive categories and attributes" that Young mentions).

While definitions of culture are the prerogative of anthropologists, attention must also be paid to how the term culture is actually used in discourse. The way we talk about culture can mask racism and mystify issues that are better understood as political. Those of us so marked can choose to unite around any one of our gender, race, class, etc. temporarily suppressing all of the others, but this "strategic essentialism" (Spivak, 1993) is political not cultural. It is even more political when the choice is forced upon us by a discriminatory targeting which "plucks out some aspect and presents it as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying other parts of the self" (Lorde, 1995, p. 196).

My research raised other questions that are more specific and concrete. The following is a summary of shared concerns:

1. If, as has been argued by participants in this study, there is a pyramid effect to educational achievement, then K12 retention and success rates are an issue for adult educators, since the needs of the student population will in part be determined by their educational background (or lack thereof). This is born out by studies done on adult education (Thomas, 1988) which show that the more education an individual acquires the more likely she or he is to continue taking courses in the future. A comparable study might be done on Native post-secondary students.
2. While some participants described negative treatment at the hands of their Native employers, all expressed support in principle for "Native control of education". References were also made to well-run programs (both examples

cited were managed by different band consortia). Paquette (1989) suggests that some of the negative politics that participants encountered (nepotism, family feuds, etc.) might be avoided if, instead of equating Native control with local control, concerned educators and Native people look at broader organizations. This might be an effective means of limiting the power of individual band administrations. Whether this idea would gain any support (especially now, in an era of "small is beautiful" and charter schools) is another matter. Perhaps such a broad-based approach could start with complete Native control (and a major reorganization) of Northlands School Division. Maggie spoke eloquently on the topic of Native-controlled education:

I'm hopeful about this, perhaps naively....I think it's not because Native people are going to be way, way better at it...there's all kinds of potential screw-ups there, and most people who are struggling to find a way to work with communities, their kids and their adults, to figure out--I mean what's the job? You're trying to figure out how to be a human being. That's your job. You're trying to put certain things together to figure out how to survive and how you can learn what it is to be a human being. I don't think Native people have got a monopoly on how to get it perfect, but they have to try. And I don't think what we're doing in the mainstream culture is very perfect, I've got a lot of problems with the [education] system....I don't think it's solved here, so let somebody with another idea take a whack at it. And I don't mean "let" them. I mean encourage it, support it....I don't mean abandon Native people...

3. Participants' most vehement criticisms were of the education system per se, as well as specific programs and institutions. They felt that programs for Native adults were often badly planned and poorly thought out, and there was a lack of "fit" between the demands of the university or college and realities (educational and otherwise) confronting many Native students. While academic standards have to be maintained by degree granting institutions, there is no reason (other than budget priorities and lack of political will) for inflexible schedules, lack of support services such as adequate tutoring and daycare, etc. Native adult and higher education

programs should not be -- in Pauline's words-- "systems for perpetuating failure".

4. Vocationalism has got to go. As Brenda so aptly put it, Native people want to be allowed "to do the smart work". In Chapter I I talked about how our education system has a long -- but hardly honourable -- history of shunting Indians into vocational-style programming. While training programs should certainly be available, Native people must have more say about how educational resources are allocated. How much should be invested in job training (i.e. relative to academic education), and what kinds of programs should these be? As another participant (Melissa) observed there should be some connection between training and both the availability of jobs and the needs (defined as the collective priorities) of the community.

5. Charges of paternalism have been levelled at Native education since the days of social Darwinism and "Great White Fathers" (or in Queen Victoria's case, "Mothers") and some participants felt it was still a problem. While treating non-whites like children is no longer socially acceptable, we may still entertain lower expectations, make excuses for, or refuse to criticize those whom we feel have been disadvantaged. As Maggie pointed out "this can be a kind of racism". Adult education has traditionally and with good reason, viewed paternalism as an issue (recall Knowles'(1984) neologism "andragogy", an attempt to free adult education from the paternalistic connotations of pedagogy). Also, while there is nothing inherently paternalistic about vocational education, Foucault would suggest we look at who it has been practiced on (Natives, people who score lower on standardized tests, the poor) if we wish to see it revealed for what it is.

Most of the above are topics that have been identified and discussed by educators ad infinitum over the course of the last twenty-five years. This may be partly why participants also expressed a general agreement that there are limits to what education can do. Some issues have to be recognized as political and economic rather than educational whether they surface in the classroom, the community, the nation-state, or at the level of global relationships. Native self government may be as important to the future of education in Native communities as anything else. (But what will self-government actually mean at a time when transnational financial interests

are doing their best to make all governments --other than that of the market-
- redundant?)

The fact remains that if (as in Pauline's example) less than twenty years ago recognizing cultural difference translated in practice to Native high school students being denied the opportunity to learn math, then despite our assumptions -- that we've progressed, that we know vast amounts more than did the priests, nuns and Indian agents --where Native education is concerned we are "yet to get the question right" (Urion, 1991, p.1).

II. Conclusion

Now you know how it feels to have somebody else decide what's good for you....(Tom Jackson as Peter Kenedi, *North of Sixty*, CBC Television)

When I began my research I expected to talk about epistemology rather than pedagogy. I had overlooked what I now know -- that institutionalized knowledge can't be disentangled from the web of power. There can be no pedagogy, in the traditional sense, without the binary opposition of knowledge/nonknowledge. Pedagogy becomes the instrument for the reproduction and maintenance of officially sanctioned knowledge; epistemology may draw the line; but pedagogy polices it. If cross-cultural educators can be described as border workers (Haig-Brown,1992) I wonder if it is because we work between cultures or because we patrol the boundaries of knowledge, checking to see that everyone's papers are in order....

Is pedagogy ever positive? (Is beating the donkey with a stick ever good for it?) Can education be emancipatory as some have suggested when "it is impossible to think, write, learn or discover beyond an epistemic framework" (Tilley, 1990, p. 291). This research forced me to confront the realization that I don't know the answer to these questions. Perhaps that's not such a bad thing:

If Foucault can, as he wishes, leave us with a feeling that we simply do not know what to do, perhaps he has achieved what he can only hope to do: to make us think harder, more critically, more intensely, more self-reflexively....(Tilley, 1990, p.328)

What can we do? What would Foucault's pessimistic activism (Barker, 1993), which sounds very much like running-on-the-spot with long faces, consist of in practice? Constant critique is required, but this is not a stance that is especially conducive to getting things done.

Perhaps knowing what not to do is a beginning. We should not expect a specific theory or model to provide us with all the answers, since:

[the]"multiplicity of knowledges...cannot be made to 'make sense' -- they cannot be known, in terms of the single master discourse of an educational project's curriculum or theoretical framework. (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 321)

Furthermore, we should not attempt to compare cultures until we have examined our own, "with the care and attention anthropologists have paid to the foreign and the strange" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p.106). Above all, we should refuse "the indignity and misguidedness of speaking for others" (McNay, 1992, p. 191).

If all this not knowing seems unsettling, we can (again) take heart from the words of Elizabeth Ellsworth who reminds us that "far more frightening" than not knowing are the kinds of knowing in which:

Objects, nature and "Others" are seen to be known or ultimately knowable, in the sense of being "defined, delineated, captured, understood, explained and diagnosed" at a level of determination never accorded to the knower herself or himself. (Ellsworth, 1989, pp. 320-321)

We should never, ever assume we know other people better than they know themselves, simply because they've been the object of our studies.

I personally believe that radical change of some kind is absolutely necessary, but it is equally necessary to accomplish this without "recreating a model of oppression" (Te Hennepe, 1992, p.233). Audre Lorde's much-quoted warning that "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house" (Lorde, 1995, p. 198) should be heeded by those of us who are trying to do education differently. But it is also important to remember that the "master's house" can tolerate a lot in the way of renovations and still remain fundamentally intact. Cosmetic changes (a "facelift") may even be welcomed. "By all means cover up those cracks in the foundation -- but leave by the service entrance when you are done."

Achieving real change will be difficult --and will be resisted-- but it is important to remember that schools, universities, all institutions of social control are themselves social artifacts. What we have made we can unmake:

There's an optimism that consists in saying that things couldn't be better. My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints....(Foucault, cited in Barker, 1993, p. 80)

Much of this thesis has been an attempt to "overburden existing forms of dominant discourses with their own ambiguities in order to create a space in which it is possible to do otherwise"(Irigaray, quoted in Lather, 1991, p. 153). Critique is not just a preliminary to doing something, it *is* doing something. It may be that the single best thing non-Natives who are involved in Native education can do is make that space and then get out of the way. In the meantime change has happened and will continue to happen, in part because of our efforts, in part (I suspect) despite them. This is also a good thing.

My writing of the research lacks a sense of closure, since I can't lay claim to the tidy knowledge that, having slashed my way through a wilderness of data, I now possess all the answers. I can however leave you with some final words from Foucault -- on pedagogy and difference:

dialectics does not liberate differences; it guarantees, on the contrary, that they can always be recaptured....Is it necessary to recall the unchanging pedagogical origin of dialectics? The ritual in which it is activated, which causes the endless rebirth of the aporia of being and non-being, is the humble classroom interrogation, the student's fictive dialogue: "This is red; that is not red. At this moment, it is light outside. No, now it is dark." In the twilight of an October sky, Minerva's bird flies close to the ground: "Write it down, write it down," it croaks, "tomorrow morning it will no longer be dark." (Foucault, 1977, p. 185)

Let's hope so....

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Appendix

A: Original Research Question

How do non-Native adult educators who work with Native students, and whose concept of education is based on a Western European view of knowledge, perceive their role?

1. What theoretical models of education do they consciously espouse?
2. What tacit assumptions or normative cultural values do their attitudes reflect?
3. What evidence is there of critical reflexivity i.e., to what extent are the foundations of their practice examined or questioned?
4. What are the similarities and differences between their view of knowledge, and that embodied in Native epistemologies, as articulated by Native scholars and educators ?
5. What are some implications of the above for cross-cultural education?

Appendix

B: Participant Responses

Grant's Comments:

I think that at pages 66 and 67 you have read more into my disclaimers (or think that there is a deeper motivation for them) than I think is actually the case. The reason I use this type of formulation is that I try as much as possible not to pretend to possess knowledge or experience that I just don't have. In the two instances I have not had much contact at all with the social processes in small communities...nor have I had many dealings with Inuit. Given this lack of direct contact, I did not want to "do the poseur thing" and report to you as personal knowledge ideas that I think are correct, but on the basis of what other people have said about their experiences and observations. Thus I'm not trying to distance myself from the content of what I say but rather trying to reflect the sense in which I know it and my sensitivity about not being myself an authority on the subject. I'm not in any sense offended by what you've written, but I hope that my comment may encourage you to think about what I think I was trying to say.