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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

AN EMERGING MODEL OF ORGANIZATION
BASED ON THE LITERATURE OF LIBERATION

by

(C)

CLAUDE DEBLOIS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to develop an alternative model of organization based upon a literature that was reflective of a Third World consciousness. It was assumed that such a model would provide an appropriate framework for the analysis and a guide to the practical orientation of First World/Third World development projects.

In order to carry out this task, it was imperative to follow a paradigmatic analytical approach. First, the prevailing Western paradigm and its mechanistic and organismic models underlying the traditional literature of organization were elicited. The review of the literature under this paradigmatic perspective served to aggregate the main concepts of organization into an open-ended conceptual framework from which the liberation model was developed. Secondly, through the clarification of the praxio-dialectical paradigm, the transition between the traditional literature of organization and the literature of liberation was achieved.

The three dimensional conceptual framework, A) a View of Man, B) Man and the World, C) Man's Organizational Action proved to be adequate to develop the liberation model. However, owing to the unique perspective of the Third World literature of liberation, some additional concepts were introduced and discussed.

As the literature of liberation represented, in addition, a philosophy of education and development, a Chapter was devoted to give a brief expose of that philosophy.

Finally, the model was used to discuss in general terms the organizational aspects of Third World/First World development projects.

Concepts like dependency, ~~culture of silence~~, cultural invasion and culture synthesis proved to be particularly relevant to intercultural development projects.

In conclusion, an attempt was made to situate the liberation model and to show its relevance with regard to the on-going theoretical discussions on modern organizations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study was to develop an alternative model of organization based on the "literature of liberation" as articulated by some Third World writers and as representing an emerging Third World consciousness. In order to carry out this primary task, it was necessary to address the related problem of paradigm clarification. The full significance and the implications of the alternative model required that the underlying paradigm of the literature of liberation be elicited. Finally, as representing a Third World view on education and development, the model aims at offering a general framework for the examination of Third World development projects.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

The field of educational administration is only a few decades old. Emerging first in the United States, the study of educational administration has taken hold not only in Canada, Australia and England but is in the process of being recognized world-wide. The first models of organization available to the theorists of educational administration were originally formulated in the context of Western public and business organizations, models which were subsequently applied to the field of educational administration. These models performed an heuristic function and they helped to order and explain organizational

phenomena. More recently these models have come under severe criticism. Above all, the universal applicability of these models is being challenged. Mouzelis (1973:174) has pointed out the ethnocentric character of the present theories of administration empirically grounded on the study of American and English organization. Another serious weakness of these models, according to the same writer, is their lack of historical perspective:

Indeed present organization theory is not only predominantly ethnocentric but a-historical as well. The organizations studied seem to exist in a timeless dimension. Generalization about organizational behavior is inextricably linked with a historically specific social structure and culture. Actually, as in the cross-cultural case, the lack of a broad historical perspective is closely linked to the narrow emphasis of organization theory on the social psychology of individual behavior and on small groups. It must be hoped that a real shift away from the present myopic approach will give to the theory of organizations a more historical character. (1973:175)

Both Techber (1968:20) and Presthus (1967:27) support Mouzelis' conclusion that human institutions remain opaque without the historical, social and cultural background.

The biases of the existing models of organization were also recognized by public administrators working in developing countries in the sixties. Their growing interest in the administrative problems of the developing countries gave rise to the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) which sponsored a series of publications on the concept of development administration (that is, the administration of development programs). One of the most prolific writers of the group, Professor Riggs, was appointed chairman to the CAG in 1960. In his book, Administration in Developing Countries (1964), Riggs developed a prismatic model based on a multi-disciplinary approach. Ultimately his model was an attempt to study administration in transitional (developing)

societies from a more comprehensive base. The work of Riggs and the members of the CA Group points at the same problem: organizations in transitional societies do not work as one would expect them to work -- they do not fit the Western-type models of organizations. In spite of the difficulties at hand, it was hoped that the development of a universally applicable model was possible, as pointed out by Menon's preface to Riggs' book, Ecology of Public Administration (1967):

One of the major difficulties for reformers and planners has been that the administrative concepts and techniques evolved in the context of social, economic and political conditions of Western countries are not as such fully valid and applicable in our area. Though some progress has been made in recent years in building up conceptual administrative themes which are culture-free and of universal application, the comparative study of public administration . . . is still in infancy.

The CA Group was dissolved in the early seventies for lack of support. Among other reasons for the failure of the group was the disillusionment with "Western models (legal, economic, administrative) on the part of both Third World and American scholars" (Balutis, 1973:3). Riggs (1971) himself admitted that "often enough the American doctrine of public administration led to results precisely the opposite of those intended" (72). In the same vein, Illchman (1971) expressed disappointment in the CA Group for its failure "to live up to the promise of discovering through comparative analysis methods and approaches that would be useful in development situations" (5).

One overlooked reason for the limited success of the CA Group might have been the paradigmatic framework which guided their research and provided the acceptable setting within which to develop organizational models. We refer to the pragmatic-positivistic philosophical position which has dominated scientific research in the Western world.

As pointed out by Sharmar (1965:6):

The study of public administration has been deeply influenced by the prevailing fashion in philosophy such as pragmatism and logical positivism. Logical positivism emphasizes logical analysis, experience verification and seeks to keep factual and value judgement apart. It wants to give social sciences the garb of physical sciences (6).

Such concern to provide an objective and value-free account probably led the CAG researchers to overlook or to distort the cultural and value elements involved in the administrative processes of those organizations under study. The consequences of the so-called objective or neutral approaches often serve to "de-focalize" the value dimension or to disguise one's values under a "pseudo-scientific cloak", as Gouldner (1971:104) and Mouzelis (1973:170) have pointed out. Under the cover of scientific objectivity, the models of organization which have been developed within the Western positivistic tradition are permeated with the ideologies and the cultural values of Western societies. Commenting on the basic models of organization of the Western tradition, Gunnell (1969) writes, "No amount of abstraction or development of models based on mechanical or organic analogies could overcome either the inherent bias of such models and the restricted cultural origin of their categories or the tendency towards reification."¹ Bodenheimer (1970:95) has arrived at the same conclusion with regard to the use of the traditional Western paradigm to study the reality of the Third World:

The poverty of Latin American studies is not peculiar to any field, but stems rather from certain very fundamental premises of contemporary American political science and American social science in general.¹ The paradigmatic consensus, which I shall call the "paradigm-surrogate", has been transferred to Latin American studies and has dominated most empirical research in

¹The writer's emphasis.

that area. . . . It has produced a systematically distorted interpretation of the situation in Latin America.

The applicability of Western models to the Third World situation has also been questioned by many educators and educational administrators. More and more people involved in international education and development are raising doubts about the transferability of these education and administrative models to the Third World countries. The UNESCO Report Learning to Be (1973), makes the point that where, in the Third World, educational systems have been copied from foreign models, serious anomalies appear. The Report adds: "The Third World countries have not become aware that these models are adapted neither to their needs nor to their problems" (XIX). Coombs (1968), on the other hand, claims that the needed revolution in education in the Third World countries, "must begin with educational management . . . of which models still remain embedded in industrialized countries" (121).

Kidd (1974), who has recently completed a comprehensive report on the role of education in the development of the Third World nations, writes, "One major criticism there seems to be common agreement; that great care must be taken in applying to developing countries models and experiences derived from Western countries" (29). In a recent issue of the review Canadian and International Education MacKinnon (1975) reaches the same conclusion and questions the wisdom of exporting our rich country model to developing nations (4). The president of the Canadian International Development Agency, Gerin-Lajoie (1971, 1972) expressed similar ideas regarding international aid: "The rich country model of development is being challenged on a global scale" (1972:2). On another occasion, he declared: "I am convinced that by 1980 certain changes will have occurred in the field of

international development . . . and these changes will emerge from the developing countries themselves" (1972:11, 16).

A new approach to the study of organization that has recently attracted the attention of many scholars from various disciplines seems to provide not only new insights into the nature of organizations but also seems to account more adequately for the socio-cultural elements in them. We refer to the phenomenological perspective. From this viewpoint, the reality of the social world is the product of man's (social) consciousness (Berger and Luckmann:1967). Human organizations form an integral part of the social world. They are not entities separate from the people that form the organizations; on the contrary the latter are created through the meaning and purpose people give to their organizational actions. Ultimately, therefore, it is legitimate to see the organization as:

Ideas held in the human mind, sets of beliefs not always compatible -- that people hold about the ways they relate to one another. Within these relationships, people act to realize values, to attain goals important to them (Greenfield, 1973: 560).

This alternative view sees organizations not as structures or entities subjected to universal laws but as "cultural artifacts dependent upon specific meaning and intention of people within them" (Greenfield, 1974: 2). A number of important implications can be drawn from this perspective: first, an attempt to understand organizations from a single set of values, ideas or universal laws is bound to failure. Secondly, since there are no fixed ways for construing the social world, the historical, social and cultural factors from which people construe their social reality and draw the meaning of their actions is a sine qua non condition which must be met if we are to understand why organizations

work the way they do. Finally, the phenomenological view provides an explanation for the failure of Western models when applied to the Third World situation. It is imperative, therefore, to examine critically any model of organization before it is applied to a totally different cultural setting. Furthermore, the approach to model building has to come from the "emic" or the inside perspective in order to capture the social reality as perceived and understood by the people.

APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

The phenomenological approach was identified as the most appropriate method to develop the liberation model on the basis that "consciousness is to behavior what paradigms are for scientific research" (Alves, 1972:65). In other words, the most adequate way to explain man's behavior is to understand the state of his consciousness.

Phenomenology is primarily concerned with the analysis of people's consciousness of their world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:xx; Solomon, 1973:3). As pointed out by Husserl, consciousness is always consciousness of something; one's consciousness is always intentional, directional and structured. Furthermore, it is through the process of consciousness that one gives meaning and value to the outside world and acts accordingly. Social phenomena are therefore intrinsically meaningful. To understand them requires an analysis of the meanings and values of the people involved in these phenomena. To quote Schutz:

For the (phenomenological) scientist, his observation of field, social world, is not essentially structureless. It has particular meaning and relevant structure for human beings living and thinking and acting therein.¹ They have pre-selected and

¹The writer's emphasis.

pre-interpreted this world by a series of common sense constructs which determine their behavior, and define the goal of their actions. . . . (I, 1973:53)

ASSUMPTION

In developing the liberation model, it was assumed that the literature of liberation investigated in the research was reflective of an emerging consciousness in the Third World — a consciousness shaped by centuries of colonialism and neo-colonialism. To the extent that the phenomenological insight is valid, the liberation model should account more adequately for the social, cultural and organizational realities of the Third World as well as the aspirations of its people.

SOURCE OF DATA

The Concept

The concept of liberation seems to be as old as mankind. It has been a source of inspiration throughout the history of man. In the Western tradition, the idea of liberation can be traced back to the Jewish Jubilee which emphasized human, economic, ecological and educational liberation as corollaries of spiritual liberation (Tassenbaum, 1975:11). The same concept is also central to Christian doctrine: the liberation of the people of Israel from Egyptian domination is considered as the prototype of Christian liberation through Christ.

The concept has had a strong impact in the field of education. The idea that education can and must be a liberation has inspired and still inspires many creative teachers and educators. "More and more are inspired by that idea today," claims the UNESCO Report Learning to

Be which cites more than ten examples of educational movements throughout the world based on the concept of liberation (1972:46). Most recently Nyerere, President of Tanzania, stated that "the primary purpose of education is the liberation of man," and that the concept of liberation should guide the development of educational policies in Africa (Nyerere, 1974:46).

The idea of liberation has also been the rallying cry for many nationalist and humanist movements of people who feel oppressed: the "national liberation movements" and the "women's liberation movement" are a few examples.

In the context of development theory, some Third World writers have expressed their preference for the word liberation instead of development. Liberation seems to express better both the hopes of oppressed people and the fullness of a view in which man is seen not as a passive element but as the agent of history. "This humanistic view places the notion of development in a broader context: a vision of history in which humanity takes charge of its own destiny" (Gutierrez, 1970:246). As pointed out by Goulet (1971:6), between "development" and "liberation" lies the battle line of two conflicting interpretations of historical reality and social organization: "The first (Western model) values efficiency and social control above all else, the second (liberation literature) values social justice and the creation of a new man" (6).

BACKGROUND TO THE LITERATURE OF LIBERATION

The literature of liberation relevant to this study is predominantly a Third World literature born out of the experiences and the

reflective consciousness of the people of the developing nations over the past centuries. Three important historical developments and movements of ideas have played a crucial role in the articulation of this literature. These are: the experiences of colonialism and neo-colonialism, the writings of Karl Marx and the Christian teachings.

The long presence and involvement of the Christian churches in the history of Latin America and Africa have had, if not always a positive influence, certainly a profound and lasting one (Cooper, 1966:1; Harlow, 1965:634). The development of a theology of liberation in Latin America is an indication of the Christian influence on that literature.

If the Christian churches have been primarily concerned with the spiritual liberation of man, the Marxist writings have drawn attention to the historical alienation, oppression and exploitation of man by man and have indicated the means to free man from these oppressive conditions. The vocabulary and the method of analysis of the literature of liberation shows a definite Marxist influence.

Last but not least is the traumatic experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism. For the people of the developing nations (as well as for the colonizers) the experience of colonialism was dehumanizing (Memmi, 1972). As Nyerere puts it:

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal, and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution -- a revolution which brings to an end our weakness so that we are never again exploited, oppressed or humiliated. (1968:18)

DELIMITATIONS

The main resources of this study are written materials published by Third World writers from Latin America and Africa. The selected writers represent only one Third World perspective, that is, the liberation perspective.

The works consulted were from Paulo Freire, G. Gutierrez, R.A. Alves, J. Nyerere, F. Fanon, and M. Memmi.

Paulo Freire was born in 1921 in Recife, Brazil, the center of one of the most extreme situations of poverty and underdevelopment in the Third World. Over the years his studies and concern led him to work in the area of philosophy of education and the struggle for the liberation of men and women for the creation of a new world. His methodology has been widely used in literacy campaigns in Brazil, Chile and Tanzania. Recently he served as consultant at Harvard University School of Education. He is now with the World Council of Churches in Geneva as head of its educational division. Freire's works (abbreviated Fr.):

- Fr. A Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
- Fr. B Education for Critical Consciousness.
- Fr. C The Adult Literacy Process as Cultural Action for Freedom.
- Fr. D Cultural Action and Conscientization.
- Fr. E Cultural Action, A Dialectical Analysis.
- Fr. F Education, Liberation and the Church.
- Fr. G Education, Domestication or Liberation.
- Fr. H Real Meaning of Cultural Action.

- Fr. I Cultural Freedom in Latin America.
- Fr. J La educacion y el proceso de cambio.
Education and the Process of Change.
- Fr. K Interview with Paulo Freire.
- Fr. L Conscientization and Liberation; a conversation
with . . .
- Fr. M Education as Cultural Action.
- Fr. N Cahier P. Freire (CUSO).

G. Gutierrez, a Peruvian theologian and social activist, served as theological adviser at the Latin American Bishops Conference at Medellin, Colombia in 1968. His later work A Theology of Liberation is one of the most influential texts of the liberation movement. In September 1975 Gutierrez was special guest speaker at the Detroit Conference on the theology of liberation.

Gutierrez's works (abbreviated Gu.):

- Gu. A A Theology of Liberation.
- Gu. B Notes for a Theology of Liberation.

R.A. Alves, Brazilian scholar, is best known for his books A Theology of Human Hope and Tomorrow's Child. Dr. Alves is head of the Department of Philosophy at the State School of Philosophy, Sao Paulo, Brazil. During 1971, he was visiting Professor of Christian Ethics at Union Theological Seminary, New York city.

Alves' works (abbreviated):

- Alves A A Theology of Human Hope.
- Alves B Tomorrow's Child.
- Alves C Theology and the Liberation of Man.

Julius Nyerere also called Mwalimu (teacher) has guided the destiny of his country, Tanzania, since its independence in 1961. Teacher, philosopher, statesman, President Nyerere has become one of the most respected and influential figures in the Third World for his moderation, moral standing and the creativity of his work. Faithful to his first call, Nyerere has written on the need for a new approach to education and development in Africa.

Nyerere's works (abbreviated Nyere):

Nyere. A Ujamaa. An Essay on Socialism.

Nyere. B Freedom and Development.

Nyere. C Education and Liberation.

Nyere. D Some Aspects of Liberation.

Mwongozo, T.A.N.U. Guideline.

Franz Fanon was born in Martinique in 1925. He became known as a psychoanalyst and social philosopher for his theory that some neuroses are socially generated and for his writings on behalf of the national liberation of colonial peoples. His book The Wretched of the Earth established him as a prophetic figure urging the colonized peoples to purge themselves of their degradation. He died of cancer in 1961.

Fanon's work (abbreviated Fan.):

Fan. A The Wretched of the Earth.

Albert Memmi, author, was born in Tunis in 1920. He studied philosophy at the University of Algiers and the Sorbonne. He taught both in Tunis and in Paris.

Memmi's work (abbreviated Mem.):

Mem. A. The Colonized and the Colonizer.¹

¹See complete references in the bibliographical section.

LIMITATIONS

Although the writer of this thesis has had some experience in the Third World countries, he remains subject to the limitations of a representative of the first World attempting to grasp the view of Third World writers.¹

VALIDITY

The liberation model developed in this thesis is necessarily an interpretative construct. The liberation writers did not address themselves specifically to the problems or organizations. Their work had to be translated into an organizational model. This model remains therefore an interpretation, but a valid interpretation nevertheless.

The validity criteria were assured by the following steps:

- a) Attempts were made to articulate the underlying paradigm of the literature of liberation.
- b) More recent writings of some of these authors in which they clarified some of their original ideas and discarded misinterpretations of their thinking allowed a more accurate interpretation of their works.
- c) It was possible to grasp the essence of the liberation writers' ideas by cross-examining their works.
- d) Finally, a summer trip to Cuernavaca, Mexico, gave an opportunity to discuss some of these ideas with people closely related to the literature of liberation.²

¹The term "Third World" is used to describe the developing nations of Africa, Latin America and Asia; the term "First World" refers to the Western industrialized countries.

²The writer of this thesis was fortunate to have a long discussion with Ivan Illich founder of the Cuernavaca Centre. Although Illich is not considered as a liberation writer, he was closely related to the formulation of that literature at Cuernavaca. In addition Ivan Illich is a personal friend of P. Freire.

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The report of this study will include nine chapters: Chapter I has presented a statement of the problem, its significance and a general overview of how the problem will be addressed.

In Chapter II, a conceptual framework will be developed in three stages:

1. The ideas of model and paradigm will be clarified.
2. The prevailing paradigm of the organizational literature as well as the basic models will be identified.
3. Drawing from the traditional literature and models, some key concepts will be aggregated to form the conceptual framework (open-ended).

The dialectical mode of the literature of liberation suggests a different paradigm than the one underlying the traditional organization literature. Chapter III will attempt to elicit the paradigmatic framework of the literature of liberation.

The conceptual framework will be used to develop an organizational model based on the concept of liberation as propounded by the Third World writers, and consistent with the dialectical paradigm underlying that literature. The development of this model will cover three chapters. Chapter IV will deal with the view of man as proposed in the literature. Chapter V will examine the question of man's orientation in the world. Chapter VI will discuss man's organizational activities.

As the literature of liberation suggests a new approach to development and education, Chapter VII will attempt to clarify the liberation concepts of education and development.

Chapter VIII will be used to draw and analyze the implications of the model for educational development projects.

Chapter IX will contain the summary and conclusions of this study.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

On Paradigms and Models

The reader who is newly introduced to the literature of liberation might find himself uncomfortable with some of the ideas that are articulated therein. Not only does he come across exotic words like conscientization and praxis, but he soon realizes that some of the basic assumptions underlying the literature are somewhat at odds with those he is familiar with. The reader is left with the choice of giving up his reading out of frustration or getting acquainted with the new paradigm and the literature relating to the paradigm.

Since the first publication of Kuhn's influential work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), the term paradigm has been accepted by the scientific community. There is hardly any scientific publication which does not refer to the notion of paradigm one way or another. If the term paradigm has gained general acceptance among scientists, it does not mean that all agree with Kuhn's definition of the concept. Some scientists (especially K. Popper) disagree with the multi-faceted definition of the Kuhnian paradigm. Masterman (1970) has counted 21 variations of meaning. However, it would be misleading to emphasize only the disagreement between Kuhn and Popper. Both agree on some basic aspects of what constitutes a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970:2; Popper, 1970:55). This academic controversy lies beyond the purpose of this study. Kuhn's concept of paradigm serves well the purpose of this study.

Since we contend that the literature of liberation is cast in a different paradigm than the traditional organizational literature, it is imperative to clarify our understanding of paradigm and by so doing, to attempt to bridge the gap between the traditional models of organization and the liberation model that we propose to develop.

A clear understanding of the two paradigms is also required if we want to open a fruitful dialogue among people of different persuasions and to open the way for an appreciation of the nature and functions of the rival paradigm. As pointed out by Scholte (1966:1192), a dialogue is possible only if scholars are:

. . . cognizant of the theoretical assumptions and methodology of each other's paradigms. This productive dialogue is precluded however, if one or both adversaries persist in misunderstanding one another, in molding the precepts of the other's paradigm to suit the purpose of their own assumptions.

Although the concept of paradigm has a relatively short history, the reality that the term attempts to define is very old. Galileo's case can serve as an illustration of a paradigmatic revolution.¹ In Galileo's time the accepted or normal paradigm was based on the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic concept and explanation of the universe. The paradigm stipulated that the earth was the center of the universe and that the sun and the other planets were turning around the stable earth. Furthermore, this vision of the universe was in accord with the biblical description of the universe. Galileo became acquainted with an alternative explanation of heavenly phenomena through the mathematical work of Copernicus. His observations of the sky through the first invented

¹Some would rather call this case pre-paradigmatic, reserving the concept of paradigm for the 20th century concept of science.

telescope confirmed his belief that the earth was turning around the sun. Since the vast majority of the educated people in the Western world, at the time, had been bred in the Ptolemaic tradition, they found it difficult if not impossible to surrender any of the framework of a system which had served mankind for so long. When Galileo's ideas were confronted with the ultimate authorities of the time, the Bible and the Church, he was forced to recant his views. It was argued that there could not be any contradiction between science and the revealed Truth.

Kuhn (1962, 1972) has shown that the scientific enterprise occurs within the boundaries of certain conceptual frameworks which he calls paradigms. The word paradigm, he explains:

. . . stands on one hand, for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as the basis for the solution of the remaining puzzle of normal science (175).

A paradigm possesses therefore an ideological component, that is, an attachment to a world view. It also provides a theoretical framework for addressing certain problems identified as critical from the paradigmatic perspective. Finally, it indicates which research method is most appropriate. Masterman (1970:59) argues that the Kuhnian paradigm is something which can function and guide scientists even when the theory is not there. It also provides the community of scientists with a set of scientific habits and rules (60). For Ornstein (1972:3) "a paradigm is the shared conception of what is possible, the boundaries of acceptable inquiry, the limiting case." Finally, being more global than a hypothesis or a theory, a paradigm according to Shapere (1971) provides a quasi-metaphysical understanding of the nature of things.

The "normal" or accepted paradigm which is constantly in the process of further articulation and refinement, does not remain indefinitely unchallenged. The emergence of a rival paradigm whereby scientists begin to tackle new problems, to look into new places and adopt new instruments announces a scientific revolution. In Kuhn's words: "When paradigms change, the world itself changes" (111).

Masterman (1970) has identified three basic dimensions to the Kuhnian paradigm:

a) The Metaphysical Dimension

In this perspective, a paradigm is referred to as a world view, a set of beliefs (4), a successful metaphysical speculation (17), an organizing principle governing perception itself (120), a new way of seeing (117-21).

b) The Sociological Dimension

"An established paradigm is always shared by a community of scientists and is based on concrete scientific achievements" (10-11). It functions almost as a "set of political institutions" (92/25). Seen sociologically, therefore, paradigm means "research based upon one or more past scientific achievements that some particular community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice" (10).

c) The Construct and Methodological Dimension

In this aspect, a paradigm is an artifact which can be used as a puzzle-solution device, as supplying tools (37/76), as actual instrumentation (59), as scientific procedures and applications (60), as an illustrative analogy (14). In other words, it is a kind of manual of instructions for using the paradigm successfully and a method of interpretation of what it does.

Using Galileo's case as a simple illustration of a paradigm, one can see the three dimensions of the prevailing paradigm. First, (metaphysical), a world view based on past scientific works (Aristotle and Ptolemy). Second, (sociological), a world view which was understood and shared by the majority of the scholars and which had the support of the Church. Finally, (methodological), an idea of what is acceptable as scientific procedures. Galileo's views and methods of inquiry represented a revolutionary paradigm-shift over the prevailing one.

The Prevailing Western Paradigm

As we have mentioned earlier, a Kuhnian paradigm is a set of beliefs, values and techniques shared by a community of practitioners that provides the framework to identify problems and to develop models and solutions to these problems. As can be expected, there are some varieties, emphases and shifts within a dominant paradigm. However, in spite of these internal variations, the practitioners of this paradigm subscribe to common basic premises which constitute the paradigm. It is important at this stage to highlight some of the basic characteristics of the prevailing Western paradigm and to contrast them with those of the dialectical paradigm underlying the literature of liberation.

The prevailing Western paradigm has been referred to as the empirico-analytic paradigm (Sallach, 1973:131), categorical (Albrow, 1974), positivistic (Walsh, 1972), normal or normative (Cicourel and Wilson, 1970; Low and French, 1974), or positive (White, 1973). The early development of this paradigm has been traced back to such writers as Locke, Hume, Comte, Saint Simon (Gouldner, 1970:88; Gronowski, 1965).

The prevailing Western paradigm assumes that social phenomena possess the same characteristics as natural phenomena, that is, social phenomena are, for all analytical purposes, qualitatively the same as natural phenomena. If so, it is logical to apply the techniques of analysis developed in the natural sciences to the social sciences.

In the behavioral sciences, for instance, the same techniques used to study animal behavior are also applied to study human activity. (For an elaborate discussion on this question, see Wilson, 1970:62).

Implied in this approach lies a second assumption with regard to human consciousness. From a Lockean tradition, the human mind is considered as a "tabula rasa" or a passive recipient. Consequently, social phenomena, like natural phenomena possess "no intrinsic meaning structure" (Walsh, 1972:17). The scientist working within this paradigm observes natural and social phenomena in a detached and objective manner and imposes his own scientific interpretation upon them.¹ This is possible because the world to which he addresses himself is intrinsically meaningless.

If natural phenomena do not possess intrinsic meanings other than those imposed upon them by the scientists, neither do they possess intrinsic values. When the same approach is adopted in the study of social phenomena, this essentially human characteristic, valuing, is either eliminated for objectivity's sake or reified (Gouldner, 1970: 333; Mouzelis, 1973:170; Walsh, 1972:61). The positivistic concern for an objective, value-free method of investigation is well documented

¹For an analysis of the epistemologies of positivism, see McHugh, 1970, "On the Failure of Positivism."

(Gouldner, 1970; Bronowski, 1965:55, 1960:123).

The natural science approach to the study of social phenomena leads to some taken-for-granted views about order and change. As pointed out by Walsh (1972:20), the explanations of the natural sciences are concerned with establishing order within the physical world, since order is accepted to be in the nature of things. When the same approach is used to investigate social phenomena, the result is that social order becomes the normal state of affairs, "the taken-for-granted background to the explanation of social activity" (Walsh, 1972:20). In this framework, "the quest is always for the stable element underlying change, so that change may be viewed as a kaleidoscopic repatterning of a limited number of basic units" (Albrow, 1971:184). The connotation of normalcy implied in the notions of stability, equilibrium, status quo, under control, shows the impact of the dominant Western paradigm in the field of social sciences. White (1973:73) and Thompson (1964:93) see an "almost neurotic fixation on control" in the science of administration as originating from this paradigmatic framework.

The research methodology developed within the prevailing Western paradigm is applied indiscriminately to investigate both the natural and the social world. Briefly stated, this methodology implies the formulation of hypotheses, systematic observation, a strong preference for mathematical analysis of data, replication and prediction . . . etc. Assuming that the natural and social world are not essentially different, the social scientist is entitled to follow the same research procedure as the researcher of the natural sciences.

It would seem appropriate at this point to discuss the dialectical

paradigm. However, considering the importance of this paradigm to the understanding of the literature of liberation, a thorough examination will be provided in the next chapter.

The Concept of "Model"

Before the publication of Kuhn's book (1960), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the concept of model embraced the notion of paradigm. Still today, the two concepts are often used interchangeably (Higginson, 1972:89; Moore:1973). Obviously, a model developed within a paradigmatic framework will have a great affinity with the paradigm. While the notion of paradigm is more inclusive and broad in perspective, a model belongs to the third dimension of the Kuhnian paradigm. It is a construct, an artifact, an illustration (pictorial or symbolic) which has an heuristic function. As pointed out by Kuhn (1970), "a paradigm guides research by direct modeling as well as through abstracted rules" (47). In addition, "models have the function to supply the group with preferred or permissible analogies and metaphors" (184).

When men are trying to understand a complex process or system, they elaborate models. Without models, implicit or explicit, there is no real understanding according to Deutsch (1951:185). In the same vein, Meadow argues that every person approaches his problems with the help of models (1972). The use of models in the field of organization and administrative theories is well documented. As pointed out by Mouzelis, "Every theory of organization operates and is based on an implicit or explicit model of human behavior, — of certain conceptions of how people behave in organizational context" (1970:84). Even the field administrator is guided by models in the formulation of his policies.

Decision makers at every level, unconsciously use mental models to choose among policies that will shape our future world. These mental models are, of necessity, very simple when compared with the reality from which they are abstracted (Meadow, 1972:26).

In reviewing the literature of organization we have identified two basic models within the dominant Western paradigm, that is, the mechanistic and the organismic models. These two models have a strong connection with the historical development of western thought. Their influence has been noticed not only in the field of philosophy (Pepper, 1961), but also in the field of sociology (Deutsch, 1951; Buckley, 1967) and anthropology (Preston, 1966).

BASIC MODELS WITHIN THE DOMINANT WESTERN PARADIGM¹

Mechanistic and Organismic Models

The mechanistic models. When faced with the problem of understanding complex processes, or phenomena, men have tended to order their thoughts in terms of pictorial models. The model itself was usually drawn from something in their immediate experience or from the available technology. Once adopted, the models served more or less efficiently to provide simple explanations of the nature of things and to suggest patterns of behavior for unfamiliar situations. As men produced more complex inventions more elaborate models were developed.

The use of mechanistic models can be traced back to the early western literary works. The wheel, for instance, with its simple

¹In this section, the term model is used in a more precise sense than in the literature of organization where the term is often interchangeable for school of thought. In this work, we have distinguished between schools of thought and models. We have argued that the basic schools of thought are variations or elaborations of the basic mechanistic and organismic models.

rotary motion was used as a model of human affairs and human history. The balance with its pair of scales yielded the concept of equilibrium. Later, the development of clock work led to the classical model of a mechanism which was applied to the stars in the system of Newton; the government, in Hobbes' writings; and the human body, in La Mettrie's work Man a Machine (Deutsch, 1951:233). With the rapid advance of physics, mechanics and mathematics in the 17th century, scientists and philosophers turned to an interpretation of man, his mind and society in terms of the same concepts and assumptions. "Man was regarded as a complex machine whose actions and psychic processes could be analyzed in terms of principles of mechanics" (Buckley, 1967:8). Similarly, society was analyzed in terms of social mechanics whose elements were human beings bound together by forces of attraction or repulsion. New versions of the mechanistic model continued to inspire social scientists well into the 20th century (Buckley, 1967; Garfinkel, 1973). The mechanistic model contributed to the formulation of concepts, analogies and metaphors which are still in use by many social scientists and which generally indicate the implicit or explicit model underlying their conceptualization. The most common of these concepts are inertia, forces of attraction, repulsion, movement (routinization), equilibrium, social statics, and field of forces. Since this mechanistic model implied certain assumptions, it also excluded others. For instance, the idea of irreversible change, of growth, of evolution, of history, of novelty and of purpose, all had no place in it (Deutsch, 1951).

The organismic model. The dominance of the mechanistic model was later challenged by the organismic one. Attacks on the inadequacy of mechanistic thinking formed an important part of Burke's and

Rousseau's writings. Their emphasis on wholeness, interrelatedness, and interdependence, growth and evolution was eventually reinforced through the growth of the biological sciences in the 18th and 19th centuries; in short, the concept of organism became the proper model for reality. The organismic model based on the concept of organism reveals a much higher degree of complexity. Unlike the machine model, it follows a life cycle, an evolutionary process of birth, maturity and decay. It has therefore a history, and to a certain extent it behaves as if it has a purpose. The obvious characteristic of interdependent parts that form an organism was analogically applied to society. As pointed out by Hamilton (1974) organicism provided a conception of the world based on a biological model. As to be expected biological analogies were used to indicate the various states of the society of the human organization: such as, birth, maturity of the organization, decay, health, homeostasis or biological equilibrium, need, systems and adaptation (Buckley, 1964:14). The organismic analogy which emphasizes the relationship between the parts and the whole is widely used by the functionalist school of sociology. Although the organismic model has become suspect lately, Back (1971:660) argues that the use of the biological model in the form of the general systems approach can still lead to new perspectives on social stability and change.

No doubt the organismic model has provided valuable insights into the understanding of society and organization. However, as Deutsch (1951) has pointed out, the model leaves no room for consciousness or will. "All qualitative changes in the classical organism were assumed pre-formed from the start (genetically programmed) with no room for the problem of choice or decision" (191).

Both models, the mechanistic and the organismic, are prevailing traditions in the social sciences within the Western paradigm. Both models have their roots in the western scientific tradition where they found not only their inspiration but also many of their concepts. If these models have been so influential in the development of western thoughts, in general, it is only normal to expect their impact in the literature of organization.

Mechanistic and Organismic Models in the Literature of Organization

The mechanistic and organismic models have been identified by philosophers and social scientists as basic world hypotheses or world views within the western intellectual tradition. (See: Pepper, 1961; Deutsch, 1951; Sorokin, 1956; Buckley, 1967.) The influence of these models or perspectives in the literature of organization has also been recognized by many theorists (Perrow, 1973; Burns and Stalker, 1971; Silverman, 1972; Sergiovanni, 1976). In a humorous way, Perrow (1973) reviews the most important organizational schools of thought under these two categories which he calls the forces of darkness (mechanistic) and the forces of light (organismic model). In their analysis of organizational structures, Burns and Stalker (1971) identified "two ideal types of organization, the mechanistic one, adapted to relatively stable conditions, the organismic, adapted to conditions of change" (47). Shepard and Blake (1962), on the other hand, discussed the two models as means to bring about behavioral change through cognitive change. Their article leaves no doubt as to the pervasive influence of the models:

. . . the literature of social process has made widespread use of analogies of static equilibria in mechanical systems, frictional concepts like resistance to change, and of such

reifications as pyramids. The idea of organizations as mechanisms is so pervasive as to have produced its own psychological myths, and ideologically as dominant as to cause aversion to 'organic theories of societies.' [If we accept the concept of organization as a machine] management, then, can conceive of itself as the designers and operators of the machine: it is a matter of pushing certain social buttons (88).

Argyris, responding to Shepard's presentation, argued that both the mechanistic and the organic models can be useful depending on the kinds of decisions at hand (93).

The general mechanistic and organismic models provided the organizational theorists with a framework to study organizations from a very specific perspective. The pervasive influence of these two models in the various schools of thought can be easily detected by the use of analogies and metaphors common to these two models.

In reviewing the main schools of thought in the literature of organization, we will attempt to point out the underlying influence of these models and to indicate how these perspectives guided the theorist in the formulation of the basic concepts of organization.

Scientific management. The mechanistic approach of the scientific management school has been widely commented upon. Taylor and his followers set out to study the relationship between human characteristics and the characteristics of the machine. Having himself an engineering background, his approach to management was that of a mechanical engineer. He believed that there was a natural law (of mechanics) which governed human activities and human production. Once discovered, these scientific principles would assure a smooth process of production. He wrote in 1921: "It became the duty of those on the management's side to deliberately study the character, the nature and the performance of each workman with a view to finding out his

limitations on the one hand, but even more important, his possibilities for development on the other" (Taylor, 1942:50). His assumption about man was that of a rational economic being. Therefore, an adequate pay system geared to the production rate would assure maximum efficiency. His philosophy led him to consider man as an adjunct to the machine in the performance of routine productive tasks. From his mechanistic perspective, planning became the "development of many rules and laws and formulae which replace the judgment of the individual workman" (1912:37).

On many aspects Fayol's work was complementary to Taylor's. He shifted the focus of attention, however, from the workshop to the whole structure of the industrial organization with the same concern for rationality that characterized Taylor's work. He focused on the administrative aspects of organization, convinced that in spite of the great variety of goals and environments there were universal principles of administration that once discovered could be applied to all kinds of organization.

Although Fayol shared the same organizational concern as Taylor, he rejected the latter's use of mechanistic analogies. He preferred the use of the organismic comparison. He referred to organization as a "social organism or a social body (corps social). The part played by man in an organization is analogous to that of the cell in the animal" (1916:19ff). He saw the specialization process as an aspect of the natural order: "As society grows, so new organs develop, destined to replace the single one performing all functions in the primitive state" (1949:20). He expressed the same view with regard to centralization. "Like division of labor, centralization belongs to

the natural order . . . in every organism, animal or social, sensations converge towards the brain or directive part, and from the brain orders are sent out which set all parts of the organism in movement" (32).

Fayol's analytical work, and after him Gulick's and Urwick's, provided administrative concepts which still today form a basis for administrative study and operations.

The influence of Barnard's book, The Functions of the Executive (1938), was crucial in the development of organizational theory. According to Perrow (1972) the book contains the seed of three distinct trends of organizational theory that were to dominate the field for many decades: one was the institutional school (structural-functionalism), another was the decision-making school as represented by Simon and March, and finally, the Human Relations school. Barnard's central idea -- although not a new idea -- was to insist that by their very nature, organizations are cooperative systems, an idea which could be deduced both from the mechanistic or the organismic models. However, Barnard's general approach to organization seems to be closer to the mechanistic model. For instance, within organizations, the group predominates over the individual; the organizations consist of forces and consequently organizational behavior is non-personal in character because it is part of a consciously coordinated force. Efficiency reaches its maximum level when the coordinated forces attain a perfect equilibrium. In his own words, "an organization is a field of personal forces just as an electromagnetic field is a field of electric forces" (75). In fairness to Barnard's rich ideas, it might be preferable to see him as a transitional writer already anticipating the development of the organismic model.

Bureaucracy. The concept of bureaucracy as an ideal form of organization was the result of Weber's work. Although the term itself was not his creation (Albrow, 1970) Weber's description of the bureaucratic organization was to become a type of its own. Weber's goal was to arrive at an ideal type of organization for the purpose of theoretical analysis. To some extent, his concept of an ideal administrative structure was analogous to that of Taylor. For both Taylor and Weber "management or administration meant the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge" (Wren, 321). For both, the machine model typifies the best administrative procedure: "The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. . . . It eliminates from official business love, hatred and purely personal irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation" (Weber, 1959:214-216). For Weber, man was unpredictable and was bound to let passion color his judgment; therefore, a dispassionate, rational machine-like system was the only alternative.

One of the most important contributions of Weber's sociology to the study of organizations was his social analysis of authority which is also the source of power and control. As he pointed out, in the modern state, knowledge and expertise have become the most acceptable source of authority, power and influence.

Human relations school. The human side of the organization had been somewhat overlooked in the above mentioned theoretical schools. It can be argued that their general framework, that is, the machine model, led them to ignore or to downplay the human element of the organization. The human relations movement emerged partly as a reaction

against the mechanistic approach of the scientific management, partly as a result of the growing influence of social psychology. As a criticism against the scientific management school, they argued that Taylor and his followers had oversimplified the organizational mechanism. The machine model of the classical school, in their view, was inadequate to account for all aspects of the organizations since it failed to treat organizations as composed of human-living-beings. The human relations school found in the organismic model the conceptual basis to account for the non-rational, emotional and social facets of organizational behavior. The organismic model implied more complex processes than the machine: not only is a living organism capable of adaptation and development but it also has biological and psychological needs and therefore requires care and attention.

Mayo's early study in medicine pre-disposed him to look at organizations from a biological point of view. Adopting Barnard's point of view he perceived social organizations as essentially cooperative systems. If so, the responsibility of the organizational administration is then to provide a favorable climate for cooperative interaction and to meet the needs of its members. "The social organization of any group must secure for its members first the satisfaction of their material needs, and second, the active cooperation of others in the fulfilment of many and diverse social functions" (1945:53).

Roethlisberger (1959), who was a close associate of Mayo in the Hawthorne research, made ample use of organismic analogies in his writings. In his work, Management and Morale (1959:186), he contends that equilibrium is the administrator's objective when handling

cooperative phenomena. As the physician conceives of ill health or sickness as an organic imbalance of some kind, so should the manager with regard to the organization because "physical health is to the physical organism what morale is to a cooperative system" (192).

The same organismic approach to organization is found in Argyris', Maslow's and McGregor's writings. For these writers man is fundamentally an interpersonal organism (Argyris, 1960:10, 1954/1957) who aspires to maturity and self actualization, and if given proper care and proper organizational conditions, man would fulfill himself in working toward the organizational objectives (McGregor, 1966:15). In his book Intervention Theory and Method, (1970:103) Argyris devotes one chapter to organic research in which he discusses the dimensions of organic and mechanistic research activities. "The thrust of the organic program," he says, "is to minimize as much as possible, dependent and submissive relationships with the subjects" (105).

The contribution of the human relations school to the understanding of organization has been profound and lasting. The organismic framework has helped this school to focus attention on some aspects of the organization which had been overlooked by the mechanistically oriented theorists. Not only did the school formulate and apply new concepts such as informal organization, morale and needs disposition but it also emphasized the importance of such crucial concepts as leadership and communication.

Functionalism and systems theory. The findings of the Hawthorne study drew attention to the impact of non-organizational factors upon the organization proper. To some extent, this discovery was the forerunner to even more productive approaches to the study of organizations:

functionalism and systems theory. These sociological perspectives show strong connections with the organismic model as well as the mechanistic one. Here is the way Silverman (1970) in his book The Theory of Organization introduces these schools of thought:

First, functionalism . . . stressed the similarities between biological and social structures. Social institutions, in much the same way as organisms, have needs of survival and adaptation to their environment which they satisfy by means of a particular pattern of interdependence between their parts. . . . Secondly, General Systems Theory emphasized the similarities of the process occurring in many different types of relationships. Whether one is dealing with a machine, an organism or an organization, it is fruitful to use the idea of a supply of resources (input), a conversion process (throughput), and the production of an object or objects (output) (27).

Using a biological analogy, these perspectives hypothesize that operations of the social system may be likened to those of an organism operating within an environment. Just as the physical environment places requirements upon an organism, so the environmental context within which a social system operates places similar demands upon it.

When analyzing the different characteristics of the open system, Katz and Kahn, in their work The Social Psychology of Organizations (1961), make repeated use of the organismic model to the point of suggesting an almost total acceptance of the organic analogy, while at the same time being aware of the differences between an organization and an organism. Parsons (1967), on the other hand, looked at the social system as a network of interlocking systems and subsystems whose functions are complementary. The organization, according to Parsons, is tied to society by the cultural system. This system:

. . . expressed the moral sentiments as well as the normative expectations of the society, defines the goals of an organization and is at the source of the exercise of the legitimate authority within it (Silverman, 1970:57).

The general framework of the biological analogy (in functionalism and to a lesser extent general systems) provides an explanation of social processes under the headings of survival, adaptation, normal/abnormal, growth, evolution, natural selection, . . . etc. But, as pointed out by Buckley (1967), we have in organismic systems a relatively fixed structure that is normal for a species at a given time -- if the organism fails to adapt, it disintegrates (dies) and fuses into the environment. On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that social systems don't have a fixed normal structure -- on the contrary, human societies and organizations are characterized by continuous change in their structure.

Decision-making school. The in-depth study of the decision-making process in organizations was undertaken by Simon (1957) and March and Simon (1958). They attempted to achieve a synthesis of both the scientific management school and the human relations movement. According to these writers, man is neither as rational as the scientific management theorists suggest nor is he as non-rational as the human relations school implies. Man is only "intendedly rational," therefore, the organization has to lead him -- through various control mechanisms -- to a satisficing decision.

March and Simon's model is close to the mechanistic model. Deutsch (1966) sees their model (along with mathematical models) as an offspring of the classic mechanistic style of thinking. Basically man remains the instrument through which the organization achieves its goals: "The behavior of individuals is the tool with which organization achieves its purposes" (108). Communication plays a key role in the decision-making system. It is, in fact, the basis for organization

decision and control. From a mechanistic viewpoint, it is quite normal to borrow from the field of engineering and cybernetics some of the key concepts of communication. In the same mechanistic perspective, the organization is treated as a system with self-controlling mechanisms such as the thermostat (Mouzelis:141), while the theory of motivation is perceived in terms of equilibrium (Simon and March, 1958: 84).

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In reviewing briefly the main schools of organizational theories, we have attempted to illustrate the pervasive influence of both the mechanistic and organismic models. These models seem to have inspired and, to some extent, guided theorists in the formulation of their organizational concepts.

As we have mentioned earlier, since time immemorial men have tended to organize their thoughts in terms of pictorial or symbolic models. Once adopted, these models "served more or less efficiently to order and correlate men's acquired habits and experiences and to suggest a selection of new guesses and behavior patterns for unfamiliar situations" (Deutsch, 1951:232).

A fully developed model seems to involve three levels of application as the model of the clockwork mechanism indicates: the model was applied to the human body by La Mettrie, author of the book Man A Machine; to describe the stars in the system of Newton; and to the government in the writings of Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu (Deutsch, 1966:26).

Following the same pattern of thought our conceptual framework

will include three dimensions:

1. A view of man or a philosophical understanding of man that provides insights into his motivations, goals, etc.
2. This view of man presupposes a certain attitude vis-à-vis the world and the environment . . . , a mechanistic view of man implies a mechanistic hidden law of nature . . . (time and motion study).
3. It also provides an interpretation and a guide to man's social activities.

The conceptual framework will therefore include the following dimensions:

1. A view of man.
2. An understanding of man's relation with the world.
3. Implications for man's organizational activities.

In reviewing the development of the organizational schools of thought, we have identified some basic concepts of organization which have since become part of the universal language of organization. The integration of these concepts into the three-dimensional framework will give occasion to raise some critical questions with regard to the orientation given to these concepts. In the first dimension -- a view of man -- we have identified three crucial areas for the understanding of man's organizational action: what are the basic assumptions about man? On the basis of these assumptions, what motivates man to action? What goals does he pursue in his (organizational) activities? With regard to the second dimension, two concepts seem to emerge: environment and culture. In this context, what potential development or constraints do environment and culture put upon man's organizational

action? Finally, on the basis of the above assumptions about man, where does the source (extent) of authority come from? Which style of leadership is most appropriate? Which organizing strategy is required? Which kind of decision-making processes is most adequate? What kind of communication pattern is called for?

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. A View of Man
 - Assumptions about man
 - Goals
 - Motivations
2. Man and the World
 - Environment
 - Culture
3. Man's Organizational Action
 - Authority
 - Leadership
 - Organizing
 - Decision-making
 - Communication
 - Change process

Considering the nature of the literature of liberation and foreseeing the possibility of introducing new concepts to the traditional vocabulary of organization, the above conceptual framework will remain open-ended.

CHAPTER III

THE DIALECTICAL PARADIGM¹

As mentioned earlier, a paradigm is a conceptual superstructure that governs the development of science at a given time. Among other functions, an emerging paradigm provides a "new way of seeing" or a new understanding of the (social) reality as well as new tools to examine it. We contend that the dialectical paradigm, better than the traditional Western paradigm, has provided the Third World writers with a perspective better suited for the examination of their social world and the articulation of their human aspirations.

For many readers, the literature of liberation presents some problems of comprehension related to the underlying paradigmatic framework. Concepts such as consciousness, conscientization, and praxis, so central to the liberation literature, presuppose an understanding of the paradigmatic perspective of these writers. It is imperative at this stage to outline the main features of this alternative dialectical paradigm (Albrow, 1974; White, 1973; Markovic, 1975; Hirsch, 1975) also referred to, at times, as critical paradigm (Hirsch, 1975; Sallach, 1973; Schroyer, 1970) or social science paradigm (Walsh, 1972).

Still at an early stage of development and formulation, the dialectical paradigm does not have the complexity and the sophistication

¹For the sake of precision, it would be preferable to name this paradigm praxio-dialectical in order to distinguish it from the dialectical method used in some functionalist schools of sociology which, in our analysis, belongs to the traditional Western paradigm.

of the prevailing Western paradigm. It is not our purpose to provide an exhaustive analysis of the paradigm but rather a brief exposition sufficient to enlighten the literature of liberation.

The elaboration of the dialectical paradigm has been to a large degree the work of Eastern and Western European scholars, namely, the Group Praxis of Yugoslavia and the Frankfurt School known in North America through the works of Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Jurgen Habermas and more recently Trent Schroyer. The paradigm also integrates elements of phenomenology and symbolic interaction.

It should not be inferred that these writers who are in the process of developing an alternative paradigm comprise a homogeneous group. They share, however, a common approach in rejecting the positivistic traditional paradigm for its inadequacies in studying the social world. Furthermore, they attempt to formulate a more adequate paradigmatic framework for examining the special nature of the social world. The dynamics of the social world, they claim, cannot be understood within the natural science (positivistic) paradigm. On the other hand, the dialectical mode is more congenial to the study of the paradoxical nature of the social world (Gurvitch, 1962).

The dialectical framework has deep European roots going back to the Socratic era. It saw its initial formulation at the hands of Plato to reappear later in the works of such Church Fathers as Clement of Alexandria, Origen and St. Augustine. Denied within the medieval synthesis when rejected by Thomas Aquinas, it survived in the concepts of complementarity and polarity utilized by such scholastics as Albertus Magnus and Eckhart's mysticism. It found brief expression in Kant's "dialectic of a radical negation" to reach its modern formulation in

Hegel, Marx and the neo-marxist writers.

The word "dialectic" suggests a mode of thinking as well as a mode of analysis. It claims to be better suited for investigating the reality of the social world. The characteristics of the dialectical approach are based on some basic premises with regard to the social world. First, social reality must be apprehended as a totality, not as an association of parts to be analyzed in isolation; only such an approach can reveal the possibilities of radical change rather than superficial modification of a system. Second, the stable appearance of a social phenomenon is but a moment in its history; this phenomenon can only be understood in the light of its origins and its future possibilities. Third, the change process is best understood in terms of opposite forces and contradictions. Even the thought-process evolves through conceptualization of opposite elements and perception of contradictions. This aspect of the dialectical mode can be observed in the use of opposite concepts for analytical purposes. For instance, liberation can only be fully understood in terms of its opposite, oppression; so is it for development and underdevelopment; subject vs. object . . . and so forth. (Markovic, 1975:24).

A claim to paradigmatic status means necessarily a criticism of the prevailing paradigm. A large amount of the writings originating from the dialectical perspective challenges seriously the dominant positivistic paradigm. Their criticism can be used as the starting point of their paradigmatic claim.

The formative years of the positivistic traditional paradigm go back to the 17th and 18th centuries during which the paradigm grew along with the development of the physical sciences (Kolakowski, 1968:18).

The positivistic approach was later applied in the social sciences, the implicit assumption being that social phenomena, for all analytical purposes, were qualitatively the same as natural phenomena. The dialectical paradigm rejects this position as philosophically untenable on the ground that while the natural sciences are dealing with a world of "objects" the social sciences are concerned with a world of "subjects." Man's world is essentially meaningful and purposeful, that is, constituted by meaning and values. To quote Schutz (I, 1973:6):

The social world has a particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein. They have preselected and preinterpreted this world by a series of commonsense constructs which determine their behavior, define the goal of their actions, the means available for them -- in brief, which help them find their bearing in their natural and socio-cultural environment and to come to terms with it.

The social world, then, is an everyday world experienced and interpreted by its members as an organized universe of meaning. As the two worlds are differently constituted, the transfer of concepts and analytical methods from the natural sciences to the social sciences leads necessarily to oversimplification and distortion as pointed out by Markovic (1975:25):

Le transfert des concepts et des methodes de la science naturelle dans les sciences sociales n'entraîne pas seulement de grossieres simplifications mais également un type spécifique de conformisme:mecanique [mechanistic], non-imaginatif, non-createur.

At the heart of this controversy lie two conflicting views about man. In the positivistic tradition, man is simply a more complex animal whose mind is a passive receptacle, not essentially different, therefore, from that of the animal. In this case, the stimulus response approach is justified to study the rat's behavior, the pigeon's and man's. In the dialectical paradigm, man is viewed as a being of

praxis (Markovic, 1975:5). This is, according to Petrovic (1963:53; 1965:250), what distinguishes man from every other being. He continues:

Man as praxis does not cease to be a biological being any more than the animal as biological being is exempted from physical and chemical laws. But although man has his particular biological nature this nature is not¹ that by which he essentially differs from everything else that exists (53).

As a being of praxis, man is capable of free and creative activities through which he transforms the world and fulfills his human potentialities and those of others. Human praxis is made possible thanks to the special consciousness by which man gives interpretation and meaning to the world. Man's mind is not a passive receptacle, therefore, but rather an active, intentional and structured consciousness -- an interpretative consciousness.

The meaningful character of the social world implies an historical dimension which does not exist in the natural world: The meaning of social institutions and cultural achievements can only be understood and interpreted in their total historical context. The actual form of a social phenomenon is a moment of its existence, the significance of which can only be grasped in terms of its original past and its future promise. As pointed out by Milie (1971:626), the social world "is a historical totality, constantly changing and developing, giving rise to new needs, interests and contradictions as well as the possibilities of their utilization and transcendence." In their insistence on the historicity of each social given, the dialecticians are radically opposed to the positivists (see Popper, 1957).

The meaningful and negotiated character of the social world

¹Writer's emphasis.

gives an internal unity unparalleled in the natural world. As mentioned earlier, the social world is intersubjectively¹ produced by its members and becomes externalized vis-a-vis them. The meaning of each social phenomenon is therefore rooted in the total definition that people give to their social reality. If a fragmentary approach can be justified in the study of the natural (meaningless) world, it is very questionable when applied to the social world. The total social reality which gives meaning to the individual parts is then lost. The social scientist adopting a fragmentary approach is more likely to impose his own interpretation on the isolated piece of reality rather than discovering its full meaning in its relation with the whole. As Adorno (1969:43) puts it:

La totalité sociale ne mène pas une vie autonome au-dessus de ce qu'elle englobe et qui la constitue. Elle se produit et se reproduit à travers ses moments particuliers. Tout comme on ne peut pas détacher ce tout de la vie, de la coopération et des antagonismes de ses éléments, on ne saurait comprendre n'importe quel élément seulement sans son fonctionnement, sans comprendre le tout,² qui trouve son essence dans les mouvements du particulier.

As a world constituted by meaning and values, the axiological dimension of the social world and social activities cannot be brushed aside. As pointed out by Grunberg (1969:102) "In the human realm, values belong to the order of existence itself. They are inherent in all human actions which they substantiate and orient." In the scientific enterprise, the positivists have attempted to reduce the value dimension

¹Intersubjectivity is a key term in the phenomenological explanation of the social world. It refers to the social processes by which an everyday commonsense world is constructed as a universe of meaning.

²Writer's emphasis.

to the phase of problem selection claiming that the scientific analysis itself is value-free as long as one conforms to their scientific method. This claim ignores the fact that all scientific undertakings are social activities and as such, inserted in a value context. From the dialectical point of view, all scientific enterprises are marked by a constant valuation process (Hirsch, 1975:123); Myrdal, 1958, 1969; Bramson, 1960). Put more simply by Freire (1972:30) the value character of scientific research can be clarified by asking the following questions: "Who are those who know by the research? Who are served by this knowledge? With whom does one know? Against whom does one know? And how and why does one want to know. . . .?" The dialectical framework rejects the claim of pure knowledge. Knowledge is always accompanied by a project. As pointed out by Grunberg (1969:110): "Any knowledge, description or classification presupposes an evaluation according to some criteria, a scale of values and is implicitly an axiological act."

In making a paradigmatic claim the praxio-dialecticians propose a new methodological approach to the study of the social world. This new scientific formulation is made necessary not only by the special nature of the social world, but also by the recent development of positivism under modern capitalism and under the scientific materialism of orthodox marxism. In both cases, the conception of science has degenerated into scientism.¹ Whenever scientism permeates a scientific establishment argues Shroyer (1970:210): "it functions as a societal a priori that uncritically permits the extension of an exploitative instrumental rationalization." He continues:

¹Scientism, according to Shroyer (1972:210), is the culmination of the positivist tradition and has become dominant in both established social science of late capitalism and in the scientific materialism of orthodox Marxism.

Scientism contributes to the generation of decision-making whose 'rationality' is instrumental effectiveness and efficiency. Such mechanisms work against a broader mode of rationalization that would maximize the participation and individuation of affected people.

The greatest problem that social theory faces is not whether behaviorism, game theory or systems analysis are theoretically valid, but whether they might not become valid through a self-fulfilling prophecy justified by a technocratic ideology. (212)

The praxio-dialectical paradigm is in complete disaccord with three basic principles of scientism or neo-positivism. These are:

- a) that knowledge is inherently neutral.
- b) that there is a unitary scientific method.
- c) that the standard of certainty and exactness in the physical sciences is the only model for scientific knowledge.¹

We have already discussed the value dimension inherent to all human activities including scientific research. Let it be added that the positivist claim of neutrality and objectivity can only obscure the reality of research serving and justifying a technical control system that increasingly permeates all aspects of social life.

The special nature of the social world as described above demands a research method tailored to its unique characteristics. The scientific approach suggested is that of the hermeneutic-dialectic.²

If in the natural sciences the prime concern is to observe and correlate facts in order to produce empirical knowledge, the social sciences are interested in the interpretation of the communicative cycles of human

¹ For a complete discussion, see Trent Shroyer (1970:210) and D. Walsh (1972:16).

² For a more complete discussion see G. Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience. Vol. II, 1968. Scandinavian University Books.

activities at the historical level; that is, the cycles of experience, expression and understanding which are characteristic of humanity.

Because the social world is socially and historically constructed, the social scientist, unlike the natural scientist dealing with a meaningless world, cannot determine from outside which facts and events, and which aspects of them are relevant to his specific purpose. The social scientist must try to recapture the process of interpretation that enables everyday actors to understand each other; he must get an understanding of the common scheme of reference by which the members of a social group interpret and explain behavior, procedures and settings.

If the natural scientist is constrained by the range of technical control over material processes, in the hermeneutic-dialectic science one is constrained by the historically and socially established conventions that exercise a predefinition of how symbolic communication is understood.

In addition, the reflective character of the emerging paradigm tries to illuminate both human history and the practice of science as historical self-forming processes, and thereby restores to men an awareness of their position as active, yet historically limited, subjects of history. This scientific approach presupposes that all self-conscious agents can become aware of the self-formative processes of society and the self and with this knowledge achieve a historically conditioned liberation. Such scientific methodology implies, therefore, pluralistic and historical conditional dimensions.¹

¹This important aspect of the discussed paradigm was articulated with the help of Dr. H. Garfinkle. These ideas will soon be published in an article titled "The Next Psychology Paradigm."

On the basis of this understanding, it is possible to say that the style of one's behavior reflects, as in a mirror, the structure of his consciousness; or as Alves (1972:66) puts it: consciousness is to behavior what paradigms are for scientific research. The methodological approach of the praxio-dialectical paradigm, therefore, focuses on the consciousness, the meaning, the values and the direct experiences of the people in specific historical situations. The techniques for interpretation rely heavily, then, on the study of common sense language and the clarification of concepts derived from linguistic objectification of life. The most appropriate research methods appear to be the case study, the in-depth interview, and the comparative and historical approach.

On the other hand, the use of statistical analysis is viewed with suspicion since "statistical theory imputes to men certain kinds of rationality which rest on the notion of probability" (Phillipson, 1972: 97). The preoccupation with statistical analysis in social sciences which extends almost to the point of identifying research with statistical analysis shows the failure of positivism to grasp the essential differences between the natural and social worlds. The popularity of "quantrophrenia" and "numerology" in social research, according to Sorokin (1956:174) "is due to a clumsy imitation of the physical sciences."

Based on the understanding of the social world as constituted and sustained by meaning and values in constant negotiation among individuals, change and transformation become a normal social process. The dialectical paradigm carries within itself the constant awareness of change and renewal in such areas as language, theory and society. In the dialectical perspective we find a "vision of the world, of man

and of history which emphasizes development through conflict, through the moving power of human ~~passions~~ which produces wholly unintended results" (Kaufmann, 1965:174; Schneider, 1971:667; Albrow, 1974). It is in this context that the concept of revolution acquires its full meaning. From the praxio-dialectical paradigm, the concept of revolution must be understood as a radical change in the quality of human relations and as a constant process of human liberation. What characterizes a social revolution is not the use of violence or the elimination of a government by a coup d'état; neither is it necessarily the collapse of an economic system. The idea of revolution implies, then, a "depassement" or the transcendence of the limitations of an aging socio, cultural and economic structure that prevents the emergence of a new society and a new man. From this point of view, none of the twentieth century revolutions seems to have reached their objectives according to Markovic (1975:27).

From the analysis of the praxio-dialectical or critical paradigm, it is clear that the paradigm owes very much to Marxist analytical method. It differs radically, however, from the orthodox marxism (Diamat; dialectical materialism) in that it includes the idea of pluralism and democracy as necessary elements for human emancipation and liberation.

SUMMARY STATEMENT

In order to develop the liberation literature of organization it was imperative to clarify the underlying paradigm of the literature of liberation. The paradigmatic clarification also served to make the link between the traditional literature of organization and the liberation model to be developed.

Our analysis of the Kuhnian paradigm led us to identify three main dimensions of a paradigm: the metaphysical, the sociological and the methodological. In our brief examination of the dialectical paradigm, the three dimensions were discussed. With regard to the first dimension, we found that a new world view was put forward, that is, an understanding of the social world as historically, culturally and socially defined and constructed. Moreover, a new concept of man as a being of praxis was also discussed. The second paradigmatic dimension, the sociological aspect, was barely touched. If, in North America, the dialectical paradigm does not yet represent a threat to the dominant paradigm, the scientific community shows growing interest in it as indicated by the number of papers published in scientific journals (see bibliographical section). In Eastern Europe, the paradigm represents already a serious threat to the Establishment. To this effect, we have heard of the closure of the School of Korcula in the Summer 1975 as well as the silencing of the Group Praxis by the Government of Yugoslavia (See Homme et la Societe, No. 35-36, 1975).

Finally, with regard to the third dimension, the dialectical paradigm suggested a research methodology based on the new proposed understanding of man and the social world. The elements of consciousness and language as well as the historical and cultural aspects of the social world became the focus of this methodology.

CHAPTER IV

A VIEW OF MAN

INTRODUCTION

Every organizational theorist or administrator makes assumptions about man. Whether one is aware of these assumptions or not, they nevertheless operate as guides to how one should relate to the superior or the subordinate and how the organization should be structured to suit the nature of man.

The concepts of man which have inspired the theorists of organization have been articulated within the framework of the two identified models of organization: the mechanistic and the organic. The concept of man as a machine was a convenient assumption that served well the purpose of the industrial organizations. The economic incentives were considered as man's main "propeller" or motivator. Moreover, man was assumed as happiest when used as "an interchangeable part of an interchangeable machine making interchangeable parts" (Herzberg, 1966:35). The concept of the economically determined man proved to be unsatisfactory to explain man's behavior in modern organizations. An updated concept of man was put forward. The 'neo-mechanistic man' or the 'instrumental man' was and still is valued above all for his precision, his problem-solving capacity and his rationality. He is an unattached expert who delights in being used efficiently. He competes with the computer in solving problems efficiently and in a value-free manner, that is,

"caring little for who or what is responsible for the input and caring even less for the output other than the fact that it was achieved successfully" (Herzberg, 42). The instrumental man, concludes Herzberg, is a "projection of industry's need to cope with the rationalization process" (42).

The literature of organization offers a second view of man which we would conveniently call the organismic man. The great insight of this tradition, originating in the Hawthorne studies, advances that man has more in common with the organismic world (or animal world) than with the mechanistic world. Man is a creature of comfort, and above all of complex needs (an animal feature), of which the highest is that of self-actualization (an evasive concept difficult to define in reality and which explains very little according to Silverman, 1970:82). The contribution of this model has been to enlarge the concept of man to encompass some sophisticated needs such as the emotional and the social. This model, however, does not pinpoint the essential distinction between the human and the animal world. The concept of man interpreted by the organizational theorists from an industrial perspective, tells only half the story about man's nature. The question as to what the real nature of man is, remains open, argues Herzberg (1966:43).

The literature of liberation offers an alternative concept of man, not created by the interests of the industrial world, but emerging rather from the research in physical, cultural and philosophical anthropology during the last decades: man is more than a sophisticated animal; man is a creative being, a being of praxis.

A VIEW OF MAN

The view of man put forward by the literature of liberation emerges from the contrast between what it is to be animal and what it is to be human. The literature does not deny that man is also an animal, but in order to understand man's full 'humanness', one has to understand the qualitative difference between man and animal.

Both beings are the result of a long evolution; and since the evolutionary process is still at work in nature, one can say that both species are unfinished. However, one essential difference is that man knows that he is unfinished; man alone is conscious of his historical roots and is aware of the possibilities open to him in the future.^a The animal, on the other hand, is essentially a being of adaptation and accommodation. To the extent that the animal's genetic make-up allows for the adjustment to the natural world, the animal species survives.^b Man, however, is not totally determined by his biological needs^d; he can transcend the biological limitations which he shares with the animal world^f; he can refuse to accept the reality as it is and imagine a more human reality, a cultural reality^e. In this process, man adapts nature to himself. While animals are naturalized, man humanizes^c.

The activities of both men and animals are also essentially different; the latter react^h in a singular manner to the stimuli of the physical world. Man, on the other hand, responds to the challenge that the world presents. In giving meaning to the challenge and in responding to it, man creates the domain of culture and history^{g,d}.

In the constant interaction between himself and the world, man recreates himself; man transforms himself. This is not a physical transformation, but rather a spiritual transformation or a transformation of his consciousness¹. Here lie the roots of man's freedom: while the animal is determined from outside, that is from the stimuli which condition his reaction, man manifests his freedom as well as "conquering" his new freedom in proceeding towards his completion or his full 'humanness'^{j,k,m}. Man's freedom is achieved simultaneously with his liberation^{k,m}. Not only is man constantly recreating himself but in his dialectical relationship with the world upon which he acts, he remakes the reality that surrounds him¹. It is true that man is capable of a high degree of adaptation and adjustment but, by his very nature, he is made to transform the world that confronts himⁿ. The social and cultural reality that man has once produced presents then a new challenge to him. In discovering the causes and the weaknesses of his first perception of reality, he is left with the challenge to reconstruct it. The call for a human reconstruction of reality becomes a human and historical task^o.

The task of reconstructing social reality is possible only because man's mind or consciousness is not passive like the animal's mind but active and intentional^q. Man's mind is capable of giving interpretation and meaning to the world. Through a critical posture and deepening consciousness man is led to reexamine his preceding perception and interpretation to envisage a reinterpretation and reconstruction of reality^{r,s}. This process is not a pure intellectual exercise; it is rather the product of a dialectical

movement between action and reflection^t.

This reflective characteristic of man combined with his action on the world by which he transforms the social reality and recreates himself in the same dialectical process, highlights the essential and unique human characteristic, that is, man as creator, as a being of praxis^{p,g,n,h,u,v,t}.

A. VIEW OF MAN

His "unfinishedness":

- a. In contrast to other animals who are unfinished but not historical, men know themselves to be unfinished; they are aware of their incompleteness.
(Fr. A, 72)
 - b. All animals manage to survive by adapting their bodies to nature. Here life accepts the rule of the game, and by becoming expert at it, manages to find itself a space where it can survive. Animals survive by naturalizing themselves.
(Alves. B, 157)
- Whereas animals adapt to the world to survive, men modify the world in order to be more.
(Fr. A, 73)
- c. Animals survive by adapting to nature. Man adapts nature to himself. Animals are naturalized. Man humanizes man.
(Alves. B, 167)
 - d. Man is not only seeking the satisfaction of his biological needs. He looks for meaning.
(Alves. B, 166)
 - e. Animals have never tried to transform reality. They did not create culture, and they survive only by adapting. Man is the only being who refuses to accept reality as it is. This is the uniqueness of human consciousness.
(Alves. B, 125)

- f. The qualitative difference that distinguishes what man does from what animals do, is that man transcends biological determinism and creates out of freedom and imagination.

(Alves. B, 165)

Human action vs. animal behavior:

- g. The main difference between the animal whose activity goes no further than mere production, and man who creates the domain of culture and history through his action on the world, is that the latter only is a being of praxis.

(Fr. I, 168)

- h. Regularity and praxis characterize the human sphere. Regularity, stimulus-response and lack of praxis characterize the animal world.

(Fr. E, 1/7)

Man creates himself:

- i. Through the dialectical process man constructs himself and attains a real awareness of his own being. He liberates himself in the acquisition of genuine freedom which through work transforms the world and educates man.

(Gu. A, x)

Human freedom:

- j. Freedom is not an ideal located outside man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion.

(Fr. A, 31)

His domain of existence is the domain of work; of history, of culture, of values - the domain in which men experience the dialectic between determinism and freedom.

(Fr. D, 451)

- k. The notion of liberation is more exact and all embracing; it emphasizes that man transforms himself by conquering his liberty throughout his existence and his history.

(Gu. A, x)

Man creates reality:

- l. Animals are closed beings... while men even in their original nature are creative beings who constantly transform and remake reality; animals are beings of adaptation, of accommodation.
(Fr. E, 1/7)
- m. Man changes because he is not a monad. He is open. Because he is opened, he is able to respond instead of simply react. To react is within the sphere of the biological. To respond, however, belongs to the sphere of freedom. Man responds because he discovers his world as a message which is addressed to him, as a horizon into which he can project himself. And when he responds the world becomes different. It becomes historical. It ceases to be an isolated sphere of nature; in the same act man becomes historical because he becomes different. Man, after his response, is not the same as he was before.
(Al. A, 3)
- n. Among animals, the process of orientation in the world is nothing more than their adaptation to the world. Through the new praxis, men critically discover the causes for certain perceptions of reality. Thus through the perception of the previous perception of reality, men remake their understanding of reality.
(Fr. E, 1/3)
- o. If men produce social reality (which in the inversion of the praxis turns back upon them and conditions them) then transforming that reality is an historical task, a task of men.
(Fr. A, 36)
- p. Since they experience their unfinishedness not only in their mutual relationships but also in their relationship with the world, men are beings naturally involved in a constant activity of inquiry. Because of this, men are beings of praxis.
(Fr. E, 2/3)
- q. For the mechanistic mind, reality is instead of becoming.... Since the mechanistic mind cannot perceive the dialectization of men-world but rather conceives reality as 'positing', as a given, as a reason in itself, as something which only is, it

necessarily cannot understand education except as an action for the adaptation of men.

So a cognitive mind is, above all, an active mind. Activity, curiosity, and critical posture are fundamental demands of the act of knowing. Intentional consciousness is always consciousness which has an object before it.

(Fr. E, 2/2, 2/3)

- r. Only by developing a permanently critical attitude can men overcome a posture of adjustment in order to become integrated with the spirit of the time.

(Fr. B, 5)

Seul l'homme est capable de se distancer du monde. Seul l'homme peut s'eloigner de l'object pour l'admirer - en objectivant ou en admirant - admirer pris dans un sens philosophique - l'homme est capable d'agir consciemment sur la reality objective.

(Fr. N, 6, 20)

- s. A deepened consciousness of their situation leads men to apprehend that situation as an historical reality susceptible of transformation.

(Fr. A, 73)

- t. Critical consciousness is brought about not through an intellectual effort alone, but through praxis - through the authentic union of action and reflection.

(Fr. D, 473)

- u. Human beings are beings who work and transform the world. They are beings of praxis: of action and reflection. Humans find themselves marked by the results of their own action on it.

(Fr. B, 102)

- v. Liberation is a praxis: the action and reflection of men upon their world in order to transform it.

(Fr. A, 66)

MAN AS HISTORICAL BEING

The heavy reliance on social psychology to understand organizational behavior has led scholars to ignore almost totally the historical dimension of man and man's behavior. The silence on the historical aspect of man, however, has not been absolute. Some organizational theorists have pointed out the needs to deepen our understanding of organizational man by taking into account the historical perspective. Mouzelis (1973:175) writes: "behavior is inextricably linked with a historically specific social structure and culture." In the same vein, Selznick (1957:103) mentions "the need to place the interpretation of organizational behavior in historical perspective." It goes without saying that organizations are historical because man is a historical being.

It must be pointed out that from a positivistic perspective, the historical dimension is irrelevant while, from a dialectical framework, it is an essential characteristic of man and social life.

The concept of liberation includes the idea of "becoming" which, in turn, implies the notion of history. The creative power of man is profoundly rooted in his social history. After all, his praxis (action and reflection) on the world is based on previous historical experiences. Contrary to the animal a-temporal life, man's existence, at any point in time, is the culmination of his historical praxis^w. What gives man's activity a historical dimension is an intentional consciousness that is able to situate this activity in time and to give it a sense of purpose^x. Man's consciousness

is not only shaped by the historical past but it is also conditioned by the concrete social reality of the present. In other words, there exists a relationship between a level of consciousness and the social structure of a society^{x,y}. Finally, to understand man's levels of consciousness one has to be able to comprehend the cultural-historical reality that supports and conditions it^z.

As abstract as this argumentation might appear, it attempts to put across the idea that man's existence is historical because his consciousness that gives meaning to his life and activities is historically constituted. A full understanding of man's activities cannot be arrived at without taking into account his historically structured consciousness.

MAN AS HISTORICAL BEING

w. Man, unlike an animal, not only 'lives' but 'exists' and his existence is historical. If the life of the animal elapses in an a-temporal, heavy, dull, support-environment, man's existence occurs in a world he constantly recreates.

(Fr. I, 166)

x. This critical awareness is not a state reached once and for all, but rather a permanent effort of man who seeks to situate himself in time and space, to exercise his creative potential, and to assume his responsibilities. Awareness is therefore relative to each historical stage of people and of mankind in general.

(Gu. A, 91)

y. Consciousness is historically conditioned by concrete reality even though it is not mere copy of reality. These levels of consciousness are directly related to the structural reality of society, in its constant becoming. These levels ... always correspond to a form of social structure.

(Fr. E, 4/1)

z. To understand the levels of consciousness, we must understand cultural-historical reality as a superstructure in relation to an infrastructure.

(Fr. B, 457)

GOALS

Man's world, or man's domain of existence contrasts sharply with the animal's existence. Whereas the latter is called to adapt to the environment that supports it, the former creates a world of work, history, of culture and values.^a In that process, he humanizes the world and humanizes himself. Since man is directly involved in this process of transformation, through which he is made conscious of his incompleteness, his humanization becomes his ontological and historical vocation, that is, man cannot escape the most dynamic call of his nature: to humanize^b. If it is denied to him, he will not only find himself in a situation of violence and oppression, but he will work incessantly and inquisitively towards his liberation^c. This call to humanize is not an individual call but a call of the species. Men can only achieve this vocation through solidarity with other men. To attempt to achieve it individualistically or at the expense of others can only lead to dehumanization^d.

Man's unique vocation to humanize is necessarily present in all human endeavors. Man cannot escape the dynamic of his nature when engaged in daily activities. Therefore, the goals of any human organization have to be achieved dialectically with the inalienable goal of man's nature: to humanize. If it is not the case, the seeds of disruption and dissonance are inevitably present^e.

GOALS

- a. Man's domain of existence is the domain of work, of history, of culture, of values - the domain in which men experience the dialectic between determinism and freedom.
(Fr. E, 451)
- b. So, as incomplete beings, but conscious of this, as beings who consequently move themselves from their 'here and how', men must have as the objective of their movement, their humanization (which is also their ontological and historical vocation). If humanization is man's vocation, dehumanization which begins with the oppressors' violence, is the negation of such vocation.
(Fr. E, 2/5)
- c. If men are searchers and their ontological vocation is humanization, sooner or later, they perceive the contradiction in which banking education seeks to maintain them, and then engage themselves in the struggle for their liberation.
(Fr. A, 61)
- d. The pursuit of full humanity, however, cannot be carried out in isolation or individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity. Attempting to be more human individualistically, leads to having more egoistically; a form of dehumanization.
(Fr. A, 73)
- e. Man sees the process of transformation as a quest to satisfy the most fundamental human aspirations, liberty, dignity, the possibility of personal fulfillment for all. Or at least he would like the process to be moving toward these goals. He feels that the satisfaction of these aspirations should be the purpose of all organizations and social activities.
(Gu. A, 21)

MOTIVATION

The problem of motivation is central to the literature of organization. This preoccupation is understandable considering that the success of an organization rests to a large extent on the commitment of its members. To this effect, the motivation mechanism has been closely scrutinized - mainly by psychologists - in hope of finding the key to the motivation puzzle.

The idea of the rational economic man was the first attack on this human mystery. This mechanistic solution proved to be too simplistic and was replaced by the notion of social man on the understanding that man was basically motivated by his social needs. Pursuing this idea further, it was found that the reality was more complex: man's motivation was related to a wide hierarchy of needs, from simple needs for survival to that of self-actualization. It was assumed that there was no inherent conflict between the need for self-actualization and the objectives of an organization. Given a chance, man would integrate his own goals with those of the organization. Although these findings proved to be insightful, it was admitted that "man is a more complex individual than rational, social or self-actualizing man" (Schein, 1970:70) and, therefore, the answer to the problem of man's motivation is not complete.

The literature of liberation does not approach the problem of motivation from a strictly organizational point of view. It offers, however, in an indirect way, what we could call a 'theory of motivation'. One has to keep in mind the dialectical mode of thinking of the Liberation writers to grasp their global view of motivation.

Man as a being of praxis, that is of action and reflection, is by his very nature engaged in the historical task of humanizing the world. Only if he can exercise his praxis, and progress toward humanization, can he be truly human^{a,b}. When man is denied the right to exercise his praxis, he is reduced to a role of adaptation. In this case man is oppressed and dehumanized^c. Man's transforming action can either lead to greater humanization or to dehumanization^d; only humanization is, however, his true vocation^e. As a social being, man cannot achieve humanization in isolation but only in union with other men. To pursue one's humanization while denying it to others, or pursuing it at the expense of others, leads necessarily to dehumanization^f.

If this inalienable right to become more human is taken away from man's life and work, he degenerates into a sub-human state and displays passive attitudes. When unaware of the causes of his oppression, he takes a fatalistic stance to explain his condition^{g,n}. In these circumstances, man develops a feeling of being "a thing owned and of use" for others. He develops an attitude of dependence and resignation^{g,i}. Furthermore, the oppressed experiences an inner-conflict between his aspiration to become more human and the fear of the risk involved in his liberation; between the state of passive resignation and dependence to which he has painfully adjusted and the risk of the unknown in being a truly acting and creating person^h. His passive attitude is further reinforced by the constant reminding on the part of the oppressor that he is lazy, incompetent and unproductive. Self-depreciation becomes part of his divided personality^{m,o}.

These characteristics as displayed by the oppressed can lead to despair or cynicism if taken as a given destiny for some men. On the other hand, if they are the product of oppressive structures which dehumanize man, then the struggle for humanization will require the transformation of these structures¹. Once the oppressive order is removed, the negative characteristics of self-depreciation and laziness should disappear^k.

The analysis of the psychology of the oppressed and his lack of motivation bears some resemblance to the bureaucratic pathologies whereby the bureaucrat personalities are reduced to a ritualistic, robot-like behavior (Dyer and Dyer, 1965). On the other hand, the high level of motivation and creativity, noticed in liberating situations, has also been documented (Fromm, 1959:306). The Liberation model seems to provide some solutions to the problem of motivation or non-motivation displayed by man in different situations.

MOTIVATION

- a. Apart from inquiry, apart from the praxis, men cannot be truly human.
(Fr. A, 58)
- b. Any situation in which some men prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence. This movement of inquiry must be directed towards humanization, man's historical vocation.
(Fr. A, 73)
- c. If man is incapable of changing reality, he adjusts himself instead. Adaptation is behavior characteristic of the animal sphere; exhibited by man, it is symptomatic of his dehumanization.
(Fr. B, 4)
- d. The process of transforming the world, which reveals this presence of man, can lead to his humanization as well as his dehumanization, to his growth or his diminution.
(Fr. D, 456)
- e. While both humanization and dehumanization are the real alternative, only the first is man's vocation.
(Fr. A, 28)
- f. No one can be authentically human while he prevents others from being so. Attempting to be more human individualistically, leads to having more egotistically: a form of dehumanization.
(Fr. A, 73)
- g. As long as the oppressed remain unaware of the causes of their conditions they fatalistically accept their exploitation. Within their inauthentic view of the world and of themselves, the oppressed feel like 'things' owned by the oppressor. For the oppressed, at a certain point of their existential experience, to be is not to resemble the oppressor but to be under him, to depend on him. Accordingly, the oppressed are emotionally dependent.
(Fr. A, 51)
- h. The oppressed who have adapted to the structure of domination in which they are immersed, and have become resigned to it, are inhibited from waging the struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of running the risks it requires. The oppressed suffer from the duality which has established itself in their innermost being. They

discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet although they desire authentic existence, they fear it ... the conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or being divided between ejecting the oppressor within or not rejecting him; between solidarity or alienation; between following prescriptions or having choices; between being spectators or actors; between acting or having the illusion of acting through the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in their power to create and recreate, in their power to transform the world.

(Fr. A, 33)

- i. The oppressed have been destroyed precisely because their situation has reduced them to things. In order to regain their humanity they must cease to be things and fight as men.

(Fr. A, 55)

- j. To admit to dehumanization as an historical vocation would lead either to cynicism or total despair. The struggle for humanization, for the emancipation of labor, for the overcoming of alienation, for the affirmation of men as persons would be meaningless. This struggle is possible only because dehumanization, although a concrete historical fact, is not a given destiny but the result of an unjust order that engenders violence in the oppressors, which in turn dehumanizes the oppressed.

(Fr. A, 28)

- k. It is striking, however, to observe how this self-depreciation changes with the first changes in the situation of oppression. I heard a peasant leader say in an Asentamiento meeting: "they used to say we were unproductive because we were lazy and drunkards. All lies. Now that we are respected as men, we are going to show everyone that we were never drunkards or lazy. We were exploited.

(Fr. A, 50)

- l. The truth is that the oppressed are not marginals, are not men living 'outside' society. They have always been inside - inside the structure which made them 'beings for others'. The solution is not to integrate them into the structure of oppression, but to transform that structure so that they can become 'beings for themselves'.

(Fr. A, 61)

m. The oppressors do not perceive their monopoly on having more as a privilege which dehumanizes others and themselves. For them, having more is an inalienable right, a right they acquired through their 'effort' with their 'courage' to take risks. If others do not have more, it is because they are incompetent and lazy, and worst of all is their unjustifiable ingratitude towards the generous gestures of the dominant class.

(Fr. A, 45)

n. Fatalism in the guise of docility is the fruit of an historical and sociological situation, not an essential characteristic of a people's behavior.

(Fr. A, 48)

o. Self-depreciation is another characteristic of the oppressed, which derives from their internalization of the opinion the oppressors hold of them. So often do they hear that they are good for nothing, that they are sick, lazy, and unproductive - that in the end they become convinced of their own unfitness.

(Fr. A, 49)

CHAPTER V

MAN AND THE WORLD

INTRODUCTION

A view of man implies necessarily an epistemology or a way to know the outside world, to organize it and to function within it. The debate over the question whether one knows the world as 'it is' (objectively) or as something in 'one's head' (subjectively) reflects this epistemological preoccupation. The organizational theorists have not escaped this problem, although they might not always see it as a problem.

This problem becomes particularly pertinent if one examines the relationship between the organization proper and the environment that surrounds it. This has become a central question in the more recent literature of organization: how the social and organizational world is constructed and structured and how the various clusters, organizations and dimensions of a society relate to each other. If this preoccupation is almost totally absent from the early organization writings it has gained prominence in the more recent works. This problem, in the traditional literature, has crystallized around two concepts: environment and culture.

In the early literature of organizations, the concern for the environmental impact on organizations is almost non-existent. This is not surprising if one considers the conceptual tools used for the analysis of organizations. The mechanistic model based on the 'machine' concept, offers very few cues to what kind of influence the environment might have on an organization.

After all, the machine, once supplied with energy, remains very much unaffected by the surrounding world. Burns (1973) uses the same analogy in a different context, namely, that the mechanistic type of organization tends to arise in a stable environment, that is, when the environmental encroachment is at minimum level.

The findings of the Hawthorne studies and the development of the organismic model opened the way to considering the influence of the environment on organizations. The biological concepts and terminology were ready-made tools to tackle the problem of relationship between organization and the surrounding environment. Using a biological analogy, it was argued that the operations of an organization are likened to the life of organisms operating within an environment. Just as the physical environment within which an organism operates places requirements upon that organism, so the environmental context within which the organization operates places similar demands upon it. Therefore, social institutions and organizations, in much the same way as organisms, have needs of survival and adaptation to their environment. The use of the systems approach became a useful conceptual tool to explain the interrelatedness between organizations and their environment. As the complexity of the phenomenon unfolded, more and more sub-systems were conceptualized; the idea of culture was finally introduced into the vocabulary of organization. The 'cultural system' which binds people together through shared values, norms and ideology, was used to explain the cohesiveness of human societies and institutions.

Attractive as these conceptualizations might be, they tend to reify social reality if they are treated as external entities endowed with dynamics and a personality of their own. As pointed out by Silverman (1972:134), we reify concepts such as environment and culture if we regard them as having an existence which is separated from, and above, the actions of men. In spite of its limitations, the systems approach has provided valuable insights into the dynamics of organizations. The approach does not preclude, however, the re-examination of the problem from a different angle. This re-examination has already been initiated by the action frame of reference. From this phenomenological perspective, environment is viewed as a source of meaning for the members of an organization. The focus of study becomes then the manner in which the stock of knowledge in a society impinges on organizational behavior and is modified by it (Silverman, 1972).

The liberation writers do not write specifically from an organizational point of view. As can be expected, their approach is broader than the one taken by the traditional organizational writers. The Liberation analysis, however, while suggesting answers to the way man relates to the world and constructs social reality (including organizations), gives new insight into the inter-relatedness of the social world.

MAN'S ORIENTATION IN THE WORLD

All administrative and educational practices imply a .

theoretical stance on the part of the administrator and the educator, whether or not they are aware of it. This stance in turn implies - sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly - an interpretation of the relationship between man and the world.

From the Liberation point of view this relationship is of a unique nature. While other creatures are in the world as part of it, man can establish a distance between himself and the world. He can recognize his distinctive individuality vis-à-vis the world, and enjoy an autonomous life. Man alone can say: "the world around me is not me." To the extent that he perceives this separatedness between himself and the world, he can say "I...." This is possible for man due to the intentional consciousness with which he is endowed.

Animals, on the other hand, are totally submerged in the world that surrounds them. They are unable to 'objectify' themselves and the world. Being deprived of an intentional consciousness, they can only 'be' instead of 'becoming.' For this reason, they cannot have a history in the human sense. At best, they can have a natural history¹ which is, in the final analysis, man's imposed history^b.

The concept of human consciousness is crucial to the understanding of the man-world relationship. The affirmation

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1. The animals are not conscious of their own development. Only man can give meaning to the evolutionary stages of the animal species and, in so doing, provide an historical interpretation.

of this distinctive element or the negation of it leads to completely opposite views regarding this relationship. Two major theoretical positions have emerged from this dilemma: first, the mechanistic objectivism which attributes to man a consciousness not essentially different from the animal consciousness, that is, a consciousness which copies the objective reality. This position, according to the Liberation writers, is conducive to the negation of man by denying him what distinguishes him from the animals: Behaviorism (an influential school of thought in the literature of organization) falls in this theoretical position since it treats man either as a machine (S-R) or man's consciousness as an abstraction. The second position, that of solipsistic idealism, gives so much importance to the human consciousness that it leads to denying the outside world. That exists, in this view, is the subjective product of man's imagination and consciousness.

Both positions fail to comprehend the dialectic of man-world relationship. The analytical framework provided by the mechanistic objectivism, (also called realism) has led to the examination of the organized human life in terms of stratification, programmed tasks, ends built into systems, all combined to assure survival. From these criteria alone, the organized life of the bees and the ants is far superior to the human organizations; these are perfectly adjusted 'normal' beings who follow relentlessly the program built into their biological structure. Their consciousness is a perfect replica of their

social organization, whereas human organizations have to put up with deviant behavior, visionaries, neurotics, recalcitrant behavior, lack of motivation... etc. Either man's organizational abilities are inferior to the animals or the theoretical framework (based on a mechanistic or organismic model) is inadequate to account fully for man's complex behavior^d.

Man's orientation in the world is not based on association of sense images or a blueprint of the outside world, as the objectivist and behaviorist groups claim but rather on the emergence of a consciousness which allows for the formation of thought-language and the exercise of reflective actions. Man's orientation therefore cannot be adequately understood from a purely subjectivist or objectivist point of view. The position adopted by the Liberation writers is that the orientation of man in the world can best be explained if both the subjective and objective elements are accounted for through a dialectical process^e. In other words, man's consciousness is constituted in the dialectic by which a phenomenon is objectified and given interpretation and then this interpretation is further tested through man's action. Man's orientation is the result of this dialectical movement between action and reflection^f.

MAN'S ORIENTATION-IN THE WORLD

- a. Because men are beings not only in but also interacting with the world... which implies the dialectic relationship between man and the world - men constitute themselves as conscious beings - consciousness is possible to the

extent that the world is "not I" for men. The very "not I world" which constitutes my "I" as an intentional consciousness becomes the world of my consciousness.

(Fr. E, 1/5)

b. It is as conscious beings¹ that men are not only in the world but with the world, together with other men. Unlike men animals are simply in the world, incapable of objectifying either themselves or the world. They live a life without time, properly speaking, submerged in life with no possibility of emerging from it, adjusted and adhering to reality.

(Fr. D, 452/453)

c. Mechanistic objectivism is incapable of explaining men and the world since it negates men, as is solipsistic idealism since it negates the world. For mechanistic objectivism, consciousness is merely a 'copy' of reality. For solipsism, the world is reduced to a capricious creation of consciousness. Behaviorism also fails to comprehend the dialectic of men-world relationship. Under the form called mechanistic behaviorism, men are negated because they are seen as machines. The second form, logical behaviorism also negates men since it affirms that men's consciousness is merely an 'abstraction.'

(Fr. D, 454/455)

d. Bees and ants have highly organized forms of social life, with precise division of labor and a very well-defined complex of tasks to be carried out. It would be possible to analyse human society from this angle alone. We could take its organization,¹ stratification, programmed tasks, ends which are built into social systems, and we would have before us the picture of a structure understood from the angle of what it does in order to survive. This has been the most persistent tendency in our social sciences. But this is not the whole truth about the human world. Man is not an improved ant or bee. If we took seriously the claims of realism, ants and bees should be placed ahead of man in the scale of life, for they are perfect realists and pragmatists through and through. There is no deviant behavior among them, no revolutionaries, no visionaries, no rebels or neurotics. They follow relentlessly the program which is built into their biological structure. They are totally adjusted "normal" beings. Their

¹Writer's emphasis.

consciousness is a replica¹ of their social organization. But this is not true for man. If it were a creature whose behavior was tightly programmed by the stimulus-response pattern, and therefore no more than one animal among others, he would find satisfaction in sheer physical survival. But this is not the case.

(Alves. B, 161)

- e. The process of man's orientation in the world involves not just the association of sense images, as for animals. It involves above all thought-language; that is, the possibility of the act of knowing through his praxis, by which man transforms reality. For man, this process of orientation in the world can be understood neither as a pure subjective¹ event, nor as an objective or mechanistic one; but only as an event in which subjectivity and objectivity are united.

(Fr. C, 206)

- f. Consciousness is constituted in the dialectic of man's objectification of, and action upon the world. However, consciousness is never a mere reflection of, but a reflection upon material reality.

(Fr. D, 454)

¹Writer's emphasis.

CULTURE

The influence of culture on organizations is now an accepted fact although the research in this area has been rather scanty. As a whole, the organization literature examines the cultural aspects in the context of organizational environment. For instance, in the Homans's model (1950), any social system includes a three-part environment: a physical environment, a cultural environment (the norms, values and goals), and finally the technological environment. Katz and Kahn (1966:52) attribute to the cultural system (again norms, ideology, and values) the function of tying the people into the system "so that they remain within it and carry out their role assignment." For Parsons (1964:79) the value system legitimizes the organization's goal.

The systemic approach adopted by these authors has led to the fragmentation of the social world into systems and sub-systems with the result that the concept of culture had to be reduced to the symbolic domain of values, norms and goals. The Liberation writers have embraced a much richer concept of culture, namely an anthropological concept that includes all aspects of human life.

Man alone in the universe lives a cultural life. Animals do not have cultures - they are satisfied to survive in their physical environment. Man, however, refuses to accept the world

as it is; his dream about a different, improved world haunts him relentlessly. Above all he wants to create a meaningful world, a world that makes sense to him^{a,b}. Culture therefore emerges out of man's vision and action upon the world. This cultural process is possible because man can distance himself from the world while remaining part of it. Thanks to his consciousness, he can reflect upon himself and upon his activities. Man alone is a cultural being^c.

In his relation with the world, man is confronted with the challenge to master reality and to add to the existing world a human dimension by giving temporal meaning to it. In so doing, he creates culture^d.

Man is not imprisoned within a permanent "today." His existence has a past, a present and a future. As he relates to the world, he projects a time-dimension into it. Being a time conscious being, he actively participates in the creation and recreation of the world. The dialectical process by which man relates to the world, in the unique fashion of creating, recreating, responding to challenges and transcending... etc. represents the exclusive human domain, that of history and culture^d.

Not only does man, as a being of praxis, create the domain of culture but he is also conscious of his intervention in the world. In the exercise of man's creative praxis, cultural entities are born. Remnants of the past, artifacts, are often and almost exclusively considered as cultural objects. But

creations like social institutions, organizations, art, science, technology are also part of the same culturally created world^e.

Paradoxically, the world of culture that man has created turns back on him, conditions him and, in a certain way, creates him. In other words, man experiences the cultural world that he has produced as something other than a human product. He is then subjected to the agonizing feeling of being an 'object' deprived of creative freedom. The possibility to grow out of this alienating condition is within his reach, however, to the extent that he is allowed to transcend the limits of his own created world. The organizations of life and work, as creations of the past, have the potential of becoming oppressive, if they are kept unaltered by those who have power and vested interest in the status quo. The groaning for life and creation is then silenced. Only when the existing structures are allowed to suffer radical changes under the creative pressure of man that a qualitatively superior life can emerge^f.

The treatment of culture as a sub-system tends to depersonalize cultural reality. The liberation writers insist that man alone is a cultural being. Without man there would not be any culture. Without a human consciousness that supports and generates cultural realities, human culture, which is man's exclusive domain, would not exist. Finally, man can experience the cultural world as something other than of his own making, that is as an objective, immutable reality. This false perception, when coupled with the impossibility of bringing about an imagined new reality, creates anxiety and alienation.

CULTURE

- a. Culture comes into being as a result of man's refusal to accept the world as it is, and as an expression of his utopian dream of creating an *ordo amoris*.
(Alves. B, 81)
- b. Besides survival, man needs to build a world that makes sense. This is why he created culture.
(Alves. B, 166)
- c. Culture arises as an effect of the transforming action of man, of his work, which acquires this meaning through the dialectic operation of the world's 'admiration' by means of which he separates himself from it in order to remain in and with the world. This is the reason why man, a cultural being, is unique among the becoming ones. He is able to have, not only his own activity, but himself as object of his own consciousness.
(Fr. I, 165)
- d. As men emerge from time, discover temporality, and free themselves from "today," their relations with the world become impregnated with consequence. The normal role of man beings in and with the world is not a passive one. Because they are not limited to the natural (biological) sphere but participate in the creative dimension as well, men can intervene in reality in order to change it. Inheriting acquired experience, creating and recreating, integrating themselves into their context, responding to its challenges, objectifying themselves, discerning, transcending, men enter into the domain which is theirs exclusively - that of history and culture.
As men relate to the world by responding to the challenges of the environment, they begin to dynamize, to master and to humanize reality. They add to it something of their own making, by giving temporal meaning to geographic space, by creating culture.
(Fr. B, 4/5)
- e. The main difference between the animal whose activity goes no further than mere production and man who creates the domain of culture and history through his action on the world, is that the latter is a being of praxis. He is a being who creates and knows it as changer and creator. That man in his permanent

relationship with reality, produces not only material goods, sensible things, and objects but also social institutions, ideologies, art, religions, sciences and technology. While the animal is limited by his support, man is conditioned by the product of his own activity which through the 'inversion of praxis' turns back on him. In this way, culture, the creation of man, in a certain way creates him... It is through creating and being conditioned by his own creation, by creating an object and becoming an object that he finds the great challenge of freedom. Only those beings who live this paradox of creating and being conditioned by their creation are capable of achieving freedom. Alienated, they are able to surpass alienation; oppressed, they are able to struggle for freedom.

(Fr. I, 167)

- f. Society, organization, civilization, culture: these are our limbs, the extensions of our biological structures. They have become oppressive and repressive; they act counter to the groaning of life for freedom and expression. The faster they grow, the greater the repression. This body must be dissolved if life is to have a chance to recreate a new one. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that says the present organization of life must be his fate. New experiments are possible.

(Alves, B, 64/65)

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DEPENDENCY

The study of human organizations from a mechanistic or organismic perspective has led to the examination of social life (and organizations) in terms of systems, system boundaries, interactions between component systems, pyramidal hierarchy... etc., an approach first developed from and well-suited to the nature of the natural world. It was assumed without further re-examination that the mechanistic and organismic perspectives were also adequate to the study of the social world.

The liberation writers argue that the fabric of human society, the social structures, are made of relations between members of a society. Furthermore, these social relations are supported by an historical consciousness. Inversely, these relations condition the social consciousness. For example, the relationship between a lord and his serf presupposes a consciousness of servility and indebtedness vis-a-vis the lord. In turn, the daily exercise of servility conditions the serf's consciousness. The liberation writers use Marxist concepts such as superstructure and infrastructure to explain how the social relations constitute the core and the structure of the social world. These social relations serve as intermediary (that which mediates) between, on the one hand, the infrastructure (that is the productive forces, division of labor...) and on the other, the superstructure (that is the dominant ideologies, culture, major institutions) of a given society^b. Therefore, the social world with its specifically human characteristic of work and

organizations is best analysed in terms of infrastructure and superstructure; the latter overdetermining the infrastructure by injecting its 'myths' upon which men base their interpersonal relationships^c.

This analytical approach to the study of the social world is further applied to the total social reality which includes the First and the Third World. From this analysis emerges the concept of dependency which holds a prominent place in the Third World literature. In the First World-Third World context, the infrastructure of the dependent society becomes totally responsive to the interest of the 'director society.' As the infrastructure of the dependent society responds to the alien superstructure of the Metropolis, it develops the dependency syndromes which are characterized by inauthenticity and silence. 'The dependent society is by definition a silent society'^d in not having a superstructure of its own creation, the dependent society merely repeats what the metropolis says: it imitates the life style and adopts the values of the director society since its social structure is shaped by the dominant society^e. While the Metropolis has a directive character, the dependent society plays a dependent role. As a result of the structurally dependent relationship, the dependent society experiences the ambiguous existence of not being 'for itself' but for someone else, and it experiences the dual feeling of attraction and rejection vis-a-vis the Metropolitan society^f.

The liberation writers never lose sight of the fact that an analysis of the structure of a society or societies, is above all an

analysis of the relation between people, between groups of people, between societies made of people. Their analysis, therefore, is not only valid at the societal level but also at the organizational and personal levels.

SOCIAL RELATIONS, STRUCTURES, DEPENDENCE

a. Structures are not persons or things. They are not buildings. Not even organizations. Structures are global relations, and relations cannot be seen; they are to society what the mind is to the body; the controlling logic of behavior.
(Alves. B, 21)

b. Social structure is not an abstraction; it exists in dialectic between super-and-infrastructures. Failing to understand this dialectic, we will not understand the dialectic of change and permanence as the expression of social structure.
(Fr. D, 458)

There is a mode of consciousness which corresponds to the concrete reality of such dependent societies. It is a consciousness historically conditioned by the social structures.
(Fr. D, 461)

e. It is true that infrastructure, created in the relations by which the work of man transforms the world, gives rise to superstructure. But it is also true that the latter, mediated by men, who introject its myths, turns upon infrastructure and 'over-determines' it. If it were not for the dynamic of these precarious relationships in which men exist and work in the world, we could speak neither of social structures, nor of men, nor of a human world.
(Fr. D, 458)

f. Let us return to the relationship between the metropolitan society and the dependent society as the source of respective ways of being, thinking, and expression. Both the metropolitan society and the dependent society, totalities in themselves, are part of a greater whole, economic, historical, cultural and political context in which their mutual relationships evolve. Though the context in which these societies relate to each other is the same, the quality of the relationship is obviously

different in each case, being determined by the role which each plays in the total context of their interrelation. The action of the metropolitan society upon the dependent society has a directive character, whereas the object society's action, whether it be response or initiative, has a dependent character. The relationships between the dominator and the dominated reflects the greater social context, even when formally personal. Such relationships imply the introjection by the dominated of the cultural myths of the dominator. Similarly, the dependent society introjects the values and life style of the metropolitan society, since the structure of the latter shapes that of the former. This results in the duality of the dependent society, its ambiguity, its being and not being itself, and the ambivalence characteristic of the long experience of dependency, both attracted by and rejecting the metropolitan society.

(Fr. D, 458)

d. The infrastructure of the dependent society is shaped by the director society's will. The resultant superstructure, therefore, reflects the inauthenticity of the infrastructure. The dependent society is by definition a silent society. Its voice is not an authentic voice, but merely an echo of the voice of the metropolis; in every way the metropolis speaks, the dependent society listens.

(Fr. D, 459)

c. The dependent society introjects the values and life-style of the metropolitan society, since the structure of the latter shapes that of the former.

(Fr. D, 458)

CULTURE OF SILENCE

One of the insightful contributions of the liberation writers (especially Freire) to the understanding of the social world has been the articulation of the concept of the "culture of silence" - a phenomenon first experienced and formulated in the Third World context^a. While developed with the Latin American people in mind, the concept has found applications with little modification far beyond the Latin American boundaries. The culture of silence which is characteristic of an oppressor-oppressed situation can easily be applied to colonized-colonizer, boss-worker or teacher-student. It has been described as the matrix of oppression and domination whereby people are "deprived of their words"^b.

In its original context - that of the colonized Third World situation - the culture of silence was a sine qua non condition for the preservation of the colonial domination; colonization could perpetuate itself as long as the colonized were reduced to the passive role of 'being-object' who never raised questions, who never challenged the existing social reality. As the colonial system grew in size and sophistication, so did the culture of silence^d.

The impact of the culture of silence affects all segments of a silenced society. A sense of alienation can be observed in the way people perceive their social reality as well as in their artistic mode of expression. Even their aesthetic taste reflects a sense of alienation (this is apparent in the way they admire alien cultural achievements and degrade their own)^e.

When the majority of the people in a society are denied, by the power elites, the right to participate creatively in the choice and orientation of their own destiny, they are denied the right to be full human beings; then, they retreat into the culture of silence^{f, g}.

In order to understand the phenomenon of the 'culture of silence', one has to grasp the profound significance of the 'word', of the act of saying, of language, in man's existence. The power of the 'word' means the power to give meaning, to create concepts, to communicate, to act with purpose, to transform the world. This is man's true vocation: to be a creative subject, not a passive object. This right to 'say the word' with all its political and social implications is a right which does not belong to an elite group only, or to a social class, or a select club of nations. It is the primordial right of all men^h.

When the culture of silence is superimposed upon a group of people, it gives rise to a special form of consciousness, which, in turn, corresponds to a certain form of being, of thinking, of expressionⁱ. We have already mentioned the alienated artistic expression that emerges from the culture of silence. Other manifestations such as people's self-degrading concepts, irresistible admiration and at the same time hatred for the oppressor, ambition to resemble the oppressor, are various forms of being and thinking that the culture of silence breeds^j.

Finally, the culture of silence can only be understood in terms of its structural relation with the culture of domination, that is, the culture of those who have monopolized the right to speak, to decide, and to create. On a world wide scale, the 'culture

of silence' is born in the type of relationship that exists between the First World and the Third World, between the metropolis and the colonies, between the dominator and the dominated. To understand the Third World consciousness presupposes, therefore, an analysis of the relational phenomenon of dependence which gives birth to the 'culture of silence'^{1,k}.

CULTURE OF SILENCE

- a. The culture of domination, which lives on in the 'culture of silence' was forged during a colonial past of kings and viceroys, Crown representatives, oppression and reproach, of an elitist education not able to free men but able to forbid them the possibility of personal expression.
This 'culture of silence' survived the colonial period and experienced in some countries a formal lull during the wars of independence. It endures today, especially in the extensive Latin American rural areas.
(Fr. I, 171)
- b. The culture of silence is both the effect and cause of the structure of domination in which the colonized societies constitute themselves as closed societies....
(Fr. E, 4/7, 4/8)
- c. The culture of silence, as a necessary condition for the preservation of the colonizing action, becomes an objective reality through the impact of the colonizing society on those who are the colonized objects.
(Fr. E, 4/7)
- d. The more the colonizing elites created and developed the colonial system of economic exploitation (which was founded on the possession of land and of men), the more the culture of silence was expanded.
(Fr. E, 4/9)
- e. So the culture of silence pervades the colonized society. The form of being, not only of the common man, but also

of intellectuals, is alienated. Their vision of the world, their artistic manifestations, their aesthetic 'tastes' are always expressions of the alienation.

(Fr. E, 4/10)

- f. In the 'culture of silence' the masses are mute, that is, they are prohibited from creatively taking part in the transformation of their society and, therefore, prohibited from being.

(Fr. C, 213)

- g. The 'culture of silence', therefore, is one in which only the power elite exercises the right of choosing, of acting, of commanding without the participation of the popular majority. The right of saying the word is exclusively theirs. As I said before, Latin American societies constituted as they were by Portuguese and Spanish colonizing action, were born as silent societies.

(Fr. E, 4/7, 4/8)

- h. In order to clarify what we mean by culture of silence, it is necessary to reflect on the meaning of the act of 'saying' and the philosophical meaning of word. If saying the true word implies transforming the world, in which practice men become men and affirm themselves as beings who constantly create and recreate the world, saying the true word also implies becoming subject and not object. Saying the word is to participate, to create, to decide, to be free. Such an act, indispensable if men are to become men, cannot be the privilege of some men only, or some social classes, or some nations only. It is the primordial right of all men.

(Fr. E, 4/7, 4/8)

- i. This mode of culture (culture of silence) is a superstructural expression which conditions a special form of consciousness. The culture of silence 'overdetermines' the infrastructure in which it originates. Understanding the culture of silence is possible only if it is taken as a totality which is itself part of a greater whole. In this greater whole we must also recognise the culture or cultures which determine the voice of the culture of silence. The culture of silence is born in the relationship between the Third World and the Metropolis. This culture is the result of the structural relation between the dominated and dominators. Thus understanding the culture of silence presupposes an analysis of dependence as a rational phenomenon which gives rise to different

forms of being, of thinking, of expression, those of the culture of silence and those of the culture which 'has a voice.'

(Fr. D, 457)

j.

As I discovered that all colonized people have much in common, I was led to the conclusion that all the oppressed are alike in some ways. Nonetheless, while I was writing this book, I preferred to ignore these conclusions that today I maintain as undeniable.

(Mem. A, ix)

The first attempt of the colonized is to change condition by changing his skin. The first ambition of the colonized is to become equal to that splendid model and to resemble him to the point of disappearing in him.

(Mem. A, 120)

Self-depreciation is another characteristic of the oppressed, which derives from their internalization of the opinion the oppressors hold of them.

(Fr. A, 49)

k.

To understand the levels of consciousness, we must understand cultural-historical reality as a superstructure in relation to an infrastructure.

(Fr. D, 157)

STRUCTURAL CHANGE

If, in the traditional literature of organization, the process of structural change at the societal and organizational level is interpreted in terms of turbulent environment, need for survival and new equilibrium, the same phenomenon, viewed from a liberation perspective, is interpreted as an emerging consciousness combined with a common effort to rearrange the structural relationship among the people of a society or an organization. With the 'prise de conscience' of a situation of dependence and domination, the desire to understand its mechanism, to evaluate its intensity and to escape from it in participating in the liberating process, reflects the profound aspiration for a more human and just society^a.

The understanding of a relationship of dependence with its counterpart, the desire for liberation, always corresponds to an emerging historical consciousness. Although the Liberation writers base their analysis on the Third World situation their approach is valid for any human and organizational situation where the dialectic between dependence and liberation exists or is perceived to exist^d.

Paulo Freire has identified three levels of consciousness in the process of structural transition: semi-transitive consciousness, naive consciousness and critical consciousness, each corresponding to a structural transformation of a society^{c,d,e,f}.

At first, the static character of the 'closed society'¹ is unable to contain indefinitely the new emerging consciousness of the people. Gradually all aspects of the social life are re-examined; the contradictions, previously ignored, begin to surface in the social consciousness and become objects of debate. As the people become more and more demanding, the elite which has a vested interest in the existing structure becomes alarmed. Little by little, the contradictions inherent in the structural relationship of dependence are sharpened: More and more people - even among the elite like the intellectuals and the students - are swayed to the idea of change and get involved in its process^b.

With the change of consciousness at the infrastructure level, cracks in the whole social structure begin to appear, announcing, then, a period of social transition. Under the pressure for change, all aspects of life are likely to be affected, creating a social condition that has been termed 'turbulent environment' by the systems' writers. The obvious sign of a transitional period appears in the murmurs of the masses. They no longer take the social reality for granted. They begin to question the validity of the existing situation which appears to them more

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1. Latin American societies are closed societies characterized by a rigid hierarchical structure; by the lack of internal markets, since their economy is controlled from the outside; by the exportation of raw material and importation of manufactured goods, without a voice in either process; by selective educational systems whose schools are an instrument of maintaining the status quo.

and more oppressive. With the emergence of the popular consciousness, social pressure is exercised on the power elite. Attempts to break from the culture of silence are tentatively made. The passage from semi-transitive to naive consciousness to critical consciousness represents a qualitatively different level of consciousness requiring a structural transformation of a society^{c,d,e,g}. At the critical consciousness level the people are able to problematize the social reality and to participate actively in its transformation^g.

In order to analyse and understand the impact of the 'environment' on organizations, the organizational writers have used the concept of systems to explain the interaction and the links between an organization and the larger social world. The Liberation approach offers an interpretation of the same phenomenon while including an element ignored by the biological perspective of the systems approach, that is, the element of consciousness which exists at the personal and social level. The artificial boundaries created by the systems perspective are transcended. New concepts are used to interpret the dynamics of the social world. On the one hand, the superstructure - the shared culture, values and major institutions, etc. ... - represents the achievements of an historical consciousness. On the other, the work of men, the creative praxis of the individuals through which the new consciousness is formed, challenges the inadequacies of the existence of the superstructure. The understanding of the dialectical process between the superstructure

and the infrastructure indicates the advent of a critical consciousness and, as such, should be part of the educational program^{e,f}.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

- a. Dependence and liberation are correlative terms. An analysis of the situation of dependence leads one to attempt to escape from it. But at the same time participation in the process of liberation allows one to acquire a more concrete living awareness of this situation of domination, to perceive its intensity and to want to understand better its mechanism. This participation likewise highlights the profound aspirations which play a part in the struggle for a more just society.
- (Gu. A, 81)
- b. In the transitional process, the predominantly static character of the 'closed society' gradually yields to a dynamism in all dimensions of social life. Contradictions comes to the surface, provoking conflicts in which the popular consciousness becomes more and more demanding, causing greater and greater alarm on the part of the elites. As the lines of this historical transition become more and more sharply etched, illuminating the contradictions inherent in a dependent society, groups of intellectuals and students who themselves belong to the privileged elite, seek to become engaged in social reality, tending to reject imported schemes and prefabricated solutions.
- (Fr. D, 464)
- c. Under the impact of infrastructural changes which produced the first 'crack' in Latin American societies, they (people) entered the present stage of historical and cultural transition. What is important, nevertheless, is that once the cracks in the structure begin to appear, and once societies enter the period of transition, immediately the first movements of emergence of the hitherto submerged and silent masses begin to manifest themselves.

When the closed society begins to crack, however, the new datum becomes the demanding presence of the masses. Silence is no longer seen as an inalterable given, but as the result of a reality which can and must be transformed.

This historical transition... corresponds to a new phase to popular consciousness, that of 'naive transitivity.' Formally the popular consciousness was semi-transitive, limited to meeting the challenge relative to biological needs. In the process of emerging from silence, the capacity of the popular consciousness expands so that men begin to be able to visualize and distinguish what was not clearly outlined.

(Fr. D, 462)

- d. Although the qualitative difference between the semi-transitive consciousness and the naive transitive consciousness can be explained by the phenomenon of emergence due to structural transformation in society, there is no rigidly defined frontier between historical moments which produce qualitative changes in men's awareness.

The emergence of the popular consciousness implies, if not the overcoming of the culture of silence, at least the presence of the masses in the historical process applying pressure on the power elite.

(Fr. D, 463)

- e. As we have said, the passage of the masses from a semi-transitive to a naive transitive state of consciousness is also the moment of an awakening consciousness on the part of the elites, a decisive moment for the critical consciousness of the progressive groups.

(Fr. D, 465)

- f. The training of men for any occupation (since all occupations occur in time and space) requires the understanding of a) culture as a superstructure which can maintain 'remnants' of the past alive in the substructure undergoing revolutionary transformation and b) the occupation itself as an instrument for the transformation of culture.

(Fr. A, 157)

- g. [Revolutionary Leaders]. . . their role is to seek the most and efficient and viable means of helping the people to move from the levels of semi-transitive or naive transitive consciousness to the level of critical consciousness. This preoccupation which is alone authentically liberating is implicit in the revolutionary project itself. Originating in the

praxis of both the leadership and the rank and file,
every revolutionary project is basically "cultural
action" in the process of becoming "cultural revolution."

CHAPTER VI

MAN'S ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

In developing the liberation model, we have first focused our attention on man himself, his nature and his motivations. In the second section, we have attempted to capture the nature of man's relationship with the world. Finally, on the basis of this understanding, the present section will examine the implications of the first two sections for man's organizational activities.

The development of this model presents an unorthodox approach to the study of organizations. It has been the tradition to examine systematically the functioning of organizations and to deduce a concept of man in accord with the analysis. This traditional approach has had its shortcomings too. As pointed out by Herzberg (1966:43) organizational analysis in the industrial context has by and large created a mythical view of man to serve and justify the needs of modern organizations and industries.

An examination of the anthropological concept of man, first, to arrive at a better understanding of man's organizational activities, could provide insights overlooked by the traditional approach.

LEADERSHIP

With the emergence of the 'human relations' school, the concept of leadership and supervision began to occupy a central

place in the literature of organization. The early findings of the Hawthorne studies showed that a supportive style of leadership was found to create a cooperative group atmosphere and increase satisfaction, while authoritarian leadership was repeatedly associated with poor productivity and morale (Mouzelis, 1973:110).

Other studies of leadership focused their attention on the relationship between personality traits and ability to lead. These attempts to establish consistent relationships, however, have not been very fruitful. More promising in this area was the identification of two leadership dimensions: initiating structure (or task-oriented) and consideration (or people's needs-oriented). The literature establishes that these two dimensions are not exclusive of each other, but the demands of the situation might favor one dimension over the other.

More recently, the literature of organization has emphasized that leadership might be more a function than a personality trait. As such, it is distributed, to some extent, among the members of an organization. In other words, the leader in order to fulfil his functions must bear some relevant relationship to the characteristics, activities and goals of the followers. The study of leadership in the literature of organization has not developed in a vacuum. It bears the marks of a definite western perspective - that concerned with increased efficiency and productivity.

The perspective of the liberation writers is somewhat different. Its main concern is the growth of man. For the Liberation leader, therefore, this perspective of liberation can never be obscured or subordinated to other objectives; they have to be dialectically integrated. In spite of their different perspectives,

both literatures have some points of affinity: both acknowledge the importance of the human dimension; both have recognized the necessary union between the leader and his followers.

The most distinctive characteristic of a revolutionary leader is his unity with the people. This is one of his most important tasks to which he must dedicate his efforts: to realise unity among the oppressed on the one hand, and between himself and the oppressed on the other^a.

This unity must go beyond the superficial appearance of getting along; it is a unity based on community of thoughts, ideas and plans as well as unity of action^{b,c}. Under revolutionary leadership¹, liberation becomes a common goal and a common task^d. Revolutionary leadership implies, therefore, a communion with the people, a sharing of goals, ideas and tasks^{e,f}.

To realize this kind of leadership, certain personality traits are pre-requisite. For instance, the communion between the leaders and the people can only be achieved successfully through a human, loving, empathic, communicative and humble approach^g. The leader must also have confidence in the people, especially in their capacity to participate actively in their liberation. In return, he will enjoy the trust of the people. His confidence must be reflective and experiential, not naive^{h,j}.

Finally, the leader must avoid certain attitudes incompatible with the process of liberation. He must not be arrogant, contemptuous, disrespectful of people and ostentatiousⁱ.

¹ The concept of revolutionary leadership in the Liberation writings refers to a style of leadership in accordance with the liberation process. It has nothing to do with guerilla-type of leadership. (See Chapter III)

The populist leaders with charismatic gifts present some dangers; they seem to achieve unity with the people but only to manipulate them more easily. Although they display a sincere interest in the people, they plan for them not with them, which still leaves the people in a position of dependence. As a perfect manipulator, the populist leader gives the illusion of acting for the people or more subtly, as if the people are acting through him. In the last analysis, the people are treated as objects, not as subjects of their own liberation; they don't participate reflectively in the process of liberation^{k,l}. As a person not committed to the liberation of the people but rather taking advantage of his charismatic gifts to achieve his own ambition, the populist leader is an ambiguous being: he is an oppressor under disguise^m.

The role of the liberation leader involves specific functions all centered on the inescapable objective of liberation. Above all, he must gain the adherence of the people to liberation. He cannot conquer them in order to liberate them surreptitiously, although this alternative might appear attractive and most efficient at first sight^o. The leader must help the people to decide on the right course of action. This supposes that he understands well the demands and aspirations of the people while posing the meaning of these demands as a problemⁿ. His task, therefore, is not to force a direction or a kind of development on the people but rather to explain, to listen, to provide information, to persuade and to help the people to organize themselves^{p,q,r,s}. The back and forth dialogue between the leader and the people is beneficial for both parties: on the one hand, the sophisticated knowledge of the leader is challenged and improved by the empirical knowledge of the people

and the knowledge of the latter becomes more enlightened. The contradictions between the two views are not denied; they are superseded or resolved dialectically for the enrichment of both^{t,u,v}.

The all-embracing function of the liberation leader can be summarized in the word conscientization - a concept that will be explained in greater detail in another part of this thesis. The process of conscientization implies the raising of consciousness by which man in negotiating and acting with other men, unveils and gives meaning to the surrounding reality. Conscientization is not something one possesses individually; it is a social process through which the leader with the people creates the guideline of their action. It is a co-intentional (conscious) process by which leader and people, teacher and students, re-examine critically their reality to recreate it in a common effort^{w,x,y,z}

LEADERSHIP

Unity:

- a. In the dialogical theory the leaders must dedicate themselves to an untiring effort for unity among the oppressed and unity of the leaders with the oppressed in order to achieve liberation.
(Fr. A, 173)
- b. Revolutionary leaders cannot think without the people, nor for the people, but only with the people.
(Fr. A, 126)
- c. The revolution is made neither by the leaders for the people, nor by the people for the leaders, but both acting together in unshakable solidarity.
(Fr. A, 124)

- d. The leader's pursuit of unity is necessarily an attempt to organize the people, requiring witness to the fact that the struggle for liberation is a common task.
(Fr. A, 176)
- e. In dialogical action, at no stage can revolutionary action forego communion with the people.
(Fr. A, 171)
- f. Both cultural action and cultural revolution imply communion between the leaders and the people, as subjects who are transforming reality.
(Fr. A, 52)

Qualities required:

- g. This function (between leaders and people through communion) can exist only if revolutionary action is really human, empathic, loving, communicative and humble in order to be liberating.
(Fr. A, 171)
- h. The trust of the people in the leaders reflects the confidence of the leaders in the people. This confidence should not, however, be naive.
(Fr. A, 169)
- i. For the Tanzanian leader, it must be forbidden to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive. The Tanzanian leader has to be person who respects people, scorns ostentation and is not a tyrant. Kiongozi wa Tanzania kuwa mwenye majivuno, ubadhirifu, dharau au uonevu. Kiongozi wa Tanzania awe mtu anayeheshimu watu, asiwe mpenda makuu; siyo mnyapara, mkaripaji na mwamrishaaji watu.
(Mwongozo wa Tanu, #15)
- j. The leaders must believe in the potentialities of the people, whom they cannot treat as mere objects of their own action; they must believe that the people are capable of participating in the pursuit of liberation.
(Fr. A, 169)

Populist charismatic leadership:

- k. As a form of leadership which exploits the emotions of

the people, manipulation inculcates into the invaded the illusion of action or their acting within the action of the manipulators. In that manipulation encourages 'massification', it categorically contradicts the affirmation by human beings as subjects. Such affirmation can only occur when those who are engaged in transforming action upon reality also make their own choices and decisions.

(Fr. B, 114)

- l. Attempting to liberate the oppressed without their reflective participation in the act of liberation is to treat them as objects which must be saved from a burning building; it is to lead them into the populist pitfall and transform them into masses which can be manipulated.

(Fr. A, 52)

- m. The populist leader ... is an ambiguous being, an "amphibian" who lives in two elements. Shuttling back and forth between the people and the dominant oligarchies, he bears the marks of both groups. Since the populist leader simply manipulates, instead of fighting for authentic popular organization, this type of leader serves the revolution little if at all.

(Fr. A, 147)

Functions:

- n. The leader must on the one hand identify with the people's demands ... while, on the other they must pose the meaning of that very demand as a problem.
- (Fr. A, 185)
- o. The commitment of the revolutionary leaders to the oppressed is at the same time a commitment to freedom. And because of that commitment, the leader cannot attempt to conquer the oppressed, but must achieve their adherence to liberation.
- (Fr. A, 168)
- p. The task of leadership and Government is not to try and force this kind of development, but to explain, encourage and participate.
- (Nyer. A, 131)
- q. A leader will have an opportunity to explain his ideas and to try to persuade the people that they are good; but it must be for the people themselves to accept or reject his suggestions. It does not matter if the discussion takes a long time.

(Nyer. A, 135)

- r. Their field workers (Rural Development Leaders) should be available to help the people to organize themselves, to advise them ...
(Nyere. A, 143)
- s. Leaders cannot do anything for the people. We can only provide the necessary information, guidance and organization for the people to build their own country for themselves. Leaders have to know the reality of our present position and then to show the people how by our own effort, we can change the present poverty into something better.
(Nyer. A, 157)
- t. The more sophisticated knowledge of the leaders is remade in the empirical knowledge of the people while the latter is refined by the former.
(Fr. A, 165)
- u. In cultural synthesis and only in cultural synthesis - it is possible to resolve the contradiction between the world view of the leaders and that of the people, to the enrichment of both.
(Fr. A, 183)
- v. Cultural synthesis does not deny the differences between the two views; it is based on these differences. It does deny the invasion of one by the other, by affirming the undeniable support each gives to the other.
(Fr. A, 183)
- w. Instead of following pre-determined plans, leaders and people, mutually identified, create together the guideline of their action. In this synthesis leaders and people are somehow reborn in new knowledge and action.
(Fr. A, 183)
- x. If the revolutionary leaders manipulate them (people) instead of working towards their conscientization, the very objective of organization (that is liberation) is negated.
(Fr. A, 178)
- y. In the conscientization process the educator has the right, as a person, to have options. What she/he does not have is the right to impose them. To do this is to prescribe these options for others. To prescribe is to manipulate, to manipulate is to reify and to reify is to establish a relationship of domestication.
(Fr. B, 149)


- z. A revolutionary leadership must accordingly practice co-intentional education. Teacher and students (leader and people), co-intent on reality, are both subjects, not only in the task of unveiling that reality, and thereby coming to know it critically, but in the task of re-creating that knowledge. As they attain this knowledge of reality through common reflection and action, they discover themselves as its permanent recreators.

(Fr. A., 56)

COMMUNICATION

Communication is fundamental to human life. It is likely that without communication there would be no human beings as we know them. There would certainly be no common goals, no coordination and no cooperation possible.

With the findings of the Hawthorne studies related to the relationship between formal and informal aspects of organization, communication became a major concern for organization analysts. It was found that the networks of communication within the organization were much more complex than anticipated. It was suggested that a two-way communication system between the top and the bottom of the organization was required to improve organizational performance. Horizontal communication within and among organizational units was also an object of investigation. Findings showed that interaction among peers was also "critical for effective system functioning" (Katz and Kahn, 1966:243), (R.L. Simpson, 1969:188). With the successful development of communication technology, mechanistic models of communication were increasingly used in organizational analysis the simplest and most used being the one developed by Lasswell in 1948. He describes the communication process as follows: "Who says what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect?" (Lasswell, 1948:37).



The use of physical models of communication proved to be popular not only among social scientists (Osgood, Sebeok, 1967:198) but also among educational administrators (Friesen, 1975:229), (Lane, 1967:61). We find the same mechanistic approach in the Decision-Making school in which the concepts borrowed from engineering and cybernetics are used to explain how the decision-making process achieves its goals through a self-steered communication system (Mouzelis, 1973:130).

The Liberation approach to communication is at the opposite pole of the mechanistic way of thinking. The Liberation writers reject the mechanistic models as inappropriate and inadequate to understand human communication since they ignore the element of consciousness and thought-language process.

Man distinguishes himself from all other animals by his intentional consciousness which allows him to separate himself from the world and to establish a relationship with it. Man is a being of relationship, therefore, who creates a world of intersubjectivity and intercommunication^{a,b,c}. Man's very capacity to think relies on the possibility of communicating with other men, as subjects. A man totally isolated from the human world of intersubjectivity and intercommunication would be unable to develop his thinking potential. The world of human beings is then essentially a world of communication through which men negotiate the meanings they give to the world and act to transform it^{d,f}. The way human beings exchange the content of their co-intentional thoughts cannot be adequately represented through mechanistic models.

Freire uses instead the concept of dialogue¹ to describe the kind of communication process which is truly liberating⁸. A close examination of the concept of dialogue as a human phenomenon leads to the concept of word with its two dimensions: reflection and action.

First, a word implies a thought, a reflection, a meaning-given; secondly, it implies a purpose, an intention, an action. For instance, the word "desk" implies a special kind of table (reflection) as well as a purpose, a function. This analysis leads Freire to conclude that to say the word or to name the world, means to transform it (praxis). In other words, the power to give meanings (to name) is the key to control and to transformation. The human dialogue becomes, then, the way men achieve significance as men. Dialogue is an existential necessity for men^{h,1}. True human dialogue, as a communication system, is necessarily of a certain quality. First, it is essentially a two-way exchange. It cannot be a means to silence others or an instrument of domination as it is founded on

¹ Dialogue as a communication system has been contrasted with the mechanistic approach by Molson and Montagu. They write: this essay advances a deliberate provocative thesis: that the field of communication is today more than ever a battleground contested by two opposing conceptual forces: those of monologue and dialogue. The monological approach which defines communication as essentially the transmission and reception of symbolic stimuli (messages) finds its classical formulation in the modern expression of cybernetic, combative game theory once the reference of mass persuasion. The dialogical approach which regards communication as the faith to communion and the ground of self-discovery found its original champion in Socrates and its spokesmen today in such diverse currents of thought as religious existentialism, post-Freudian psychology, and sociological interactionism.

The Human Dialogue. Perspectives on Communication. Ed. F.W. Molson and A. Montagu. Macmillan, 1967.

love, humility and faith in man. In this sense, dialogue is very much a horizontal communication expressing mutual trust among dialoguers^k. Furthermore, dialogue implies not only an exchange of meanings and ideas, but a critical analysis of these meanings, that is, a co-participation in the act of comprehending an object, a situation, or a problem^{l,m,n}.

As can be expected, the pattern of vertical communication within the dialogical mode is of necessity a two-way process. The leader cannot issue messages downward only and claim to act dialogically. On the contrary, a dialogical communication requires that the leader and his subordinates inform each other of their perception of the situation or problems, of the way they comprehend them, and of the kind of action which is called for. Only then does communication become a liberating and educational process^{q,r}.

For the Liberation writers, there is a close connection between consciousness and language the latter being very much the expression of the former. As pointed out by Alves, as man rediscovers and recreates himself, his language changes along with his perception of reality. As for consciousness, therefore, the structure of a language is historically, socially and culturally conditioned. From this point of view, a communication system can only be efficient if it takes these human factors into consideration. The dialogue must be carried out within a linguistic system which is clear to both dialoguers; if that is not the case - as in intercultural communication - a more intense dialogue is needed to arrive at a common perception of reality^{o,r}. To a lesser degree, the same dialogical problem exists among people using more or less

the same linguistic system but who are coming from different strata of the society or levels of government; expert vs. peasant; executives vs. workers ... etc. Here again, effective communication is possible to the extent that the socio-cultural conditions reflected in the language are taken into consideration and dealt with through co-participation^{r,s}.

COMMUNICATION

- a. Man's separatedness from and openness to the world distinguishes him as a being of relationship.
(Fr. B, 3)
- b. Consciousness of, and action upon reality are, therefore, inseparable constituents of the transforming act by which men become beings of relation.
(Fr. D, 453)
- c. Intersubjectivity or intercommunication is the primordial characteristic of this cultural and historical world.
(Fr. B, 136)
- d. Just as there is no such thing as an isolated human being there is also no such thing as isolated thinking. Any act of thinking requires a Subject who thinks, an object which mediates the thinking Subjects, and the communication between the latter, manifested by linguistic signs. Thus the world of human beings is a world of communication. As a conscious being (whose consciousness is one of intentionality towards the world and towards reality), the human being acts, thinks, and speaks on and about this reality, which is the mediation between him and her and other human beings who also act, think and speak.
(Fr. B, 137)
- f. The thinking Subjects cannot think alone. In the act of thinking about the object, she/he cannot think without the co-participation of another subject. This co-participation of the Subjects in the act of thinking is communication.
(Fr. B, 137)

- g. Subjects showing co-intentionality towards the object of their thought, communicate its content to each other. Communication is characterized by the fact that it is dialogue, in that dialogue communicates.
(Fr. B, 138)
- h. As we attempt to analyze dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover something which is the essence of dialogue: the word. But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word, we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed - even in part - the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world.
(Fr. A, 75)
- i. If it is in speaking their words that men, by naming the world, transform it, dialogue imposes itself as the way by which men achieve significance as men. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity.
(Fr. A, 77)
- j. Dialogue is an encounter among men who name the world; therefore, it must not be a situation where some men name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one man by another. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of men.
(Fr. A, 77)
- k. Founding itself upon love¹ for man and the world, humility and faith in man, dialogue becomes a horizontal relationship of which mutual trust between the dialoguers is the logical consequence.
(Fr. A, 79)
- l. Finally, true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking - thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and men and admits of no dichotomy between them - thinking which perceives reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a static entity - thinking which does not separate itself from action....
(Fr. A, 81)

¹Writer's emphasis.

- m. Only dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking. Without dialogue, there is no communication, and without communication, there can be no true education.
(Fr. A, 81)
- n. True communication is not, in my opinion, the exclusive transfer or transmission of knowledge from one Subject to another, but rather his co-participation in the act of comprehending the object. It is communication carried out in a critical way.
(Fr. B, 140)
- o. In the relationship between communication and dialogue the Subjects engaged in dialogue express themselves through a system of linguistic signs. For the act of communication to be successful, there must be accord between the reciprocally communicating Subjects. That is, the verbal expression of one of the Subjects must be perceptible within a frame of reference that is meaningful to the other subject. If this agreement on the linguistic signs used to express the object signified does not exist, there cannot be comprehension between the Subjects, and communication will be impossible. The truth is that there is no separation between comprehension (intelligibility) and communication.
(Fr. B, 138)
- p. Efficient communication requires the Subjects in dialogue to direct their 'entering into' towards the same object. It requires that they express it by means of linguistic signs belonging to a linguistic universe common to both so that they can have a similar comprehension of the object of communication.
(Fr. B, 141)
- q. ...revolutionary leaders do not go to the people in order to bring them a message of 'salvation', but in order to come to know through dialogue with them both their objective situation and their awareness of that situation - the various levels of perception of themselves and of the world in which and with which they exist.
(Fr. A, 84)
- r. It is only with the co-participation of the peasants that communication can work efficiently, and only by means of this communication can agronomists successfully carry out their work.
(Fr. B, 141)

s. When agronomists encounter the first difficulties in their attempt to communicate with the peasants, they do not realize that they are caused by the fact (among others) that the process of communication between human beings cannot ignore totally socio-cultural conditioning. Instead of taking their own conditioning as well as that of the peasants into account they simply conclude that the peasants are incapable of dialogue. From this point to acts of cultural invasion and manipulation is only a step, which has practically been taken.

(Fr. B, 143)

t. Historical language cannot be stabilized. It remains as open-ended as man's consciousness and history. It cannot, therefore, be reduced to a set of mathematical or a-historical symbols. As man rediscovers and recreates himself, thereby redefining his self-understanding and vocation, so language changes. It remains moving as man moves. The appearance of a new language announces, therefore, the coming into being of a new experience, a new self-understanding, a new vocation and consequently a different man and community.

(Alves, A, 4/5)

AUTHORITY

The question of authority is central to the organizational theorists and practitioners. The moment a group of people organize themselves for a purpose, they are immediately confronted with the questions of authority. The manner in which the problem is handled depends very much on the historical conditions and the basic philosophy people hold about man. Unlike most organizational models, the Liberation perspective starts from a definite anthropological view of man. The organizational characteristics are then deduced from their original insights about man.

There are many ways in which a person can become authoritative over other persons. To understand this process we must identify where the locus of authority lies. The traditional literature tells us that authority can be either traditional, charismatic, positional, or based on professional expertise. These various loci of authority have to be seen in a historical perspective. If the traditional authority was unquestionably dominant in the middle-ages, the authority of the expert is favored in modern organizations. This shift of emphasis can only be adequately explained if we assume that a change in people's consciousness has taken place. Recently, new demands were made to enlarge the organizational base of authority. It has been suggested that the locus of authority could be located in all members of an organization, in such a way that it could be shared. The idea of collegial authority is already a step in this direction (Sergiovanni, 1973:170).

Authority is not the same as pure power, even if, at times, the latter is confused with the former. Authority implies the willingness on the part of the subordinate to obey because he consents. In this case authority and freedom are not in conflict but in a dialectical harmony. This is the level of argumentation taken by the Liberation writers. Their position is essentially humanistic, and as such, it is utopian: it projects into the future the vision of what kind of organizational arrangements man is capable of creating in order to meet his human aspirations.

The position adopted by the Liberation writers on authority is based on their understanding of the Liberation process in which man is engaged. This liberating process can be stifled under certain types of authority; to the extent that positional, charismatic or expert authority degenerates into authoritarianism, that is, rests on the denial of freedom for others, then it is an oppressive and inauthentic authority^{a,b}.

On the other hand, the kind of authority the Liberation writers advocate is neither based on a position of weakness nor on a laissez-faire stance. Both license and authoritarianism make true authority impossible; both license and authoritarianism lead to destruction of true freedom^{c,d}.

If authority is merely a delegation of power to somebody without the consent of the people subject to it, or worse, if it is imposed upon them, such authority cannot but degenerate into authoritarianism for those in power and a rebellious attitude on the part of those under it. The practice of consultation of the

people before appointing a person in authority reflects this concern. Time and time again, experience has shown that, in order to function properly, authority must rest on the consent of the majority. It must be on the side of freedom^{e,f}.

One's expertise alone is not sufficient to be the basis of true authority. In the case of education, for instance, the teacher cannot set himself in opposition to the students as if he knows everything while they don't know anything. On the contrary, the locus of his authority lies in the willingness of his students to follow him in a joint search for knowledge^{f,g}.

Authentic authority, therefore, is not mere transfer of power but rather it lies in the delegation and sympathetic adherence on the part of those who become subjected to authority. Only then can authority avoid conflict with freedom, because it has grown into 'freedom-become-authority'^h.

Finally, the organizational setting presents a unique educational situation whereby leaders and people can experience true freedom and authority in their joint efforts to transform the world (praxis)ⁱ.

AUTHORITY

- a. Freedom is not an ideal located outside man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion.

(Fr. A, 31)

- b. Just as authority cannot exist without freedom and vice versa, authoritarianism cannot exist without denying freedom nor license without denying authority.
(Fr. A, 180)
- c. All freedom contains the possibility that under special circumstances (and at different existential levels) it may become authority. Freedom and authority cannot be isolated, but must be considered in relationship to each other.
(Fr. A, 179)
- d. The dialogical theory of action opposes both authoritarianism and license and thereby affirms authority and freedom. There is no freedom without authority but there is also no authority without freedom.
(Fr. A, 179)
- e. If authority is merely transferred from one group to another, or is imposed upon the majority, it degenerates into authoritarianism.
(Fr. A, 179)
- f. In order to function, authority must be on the side of freedom, not against it. Here, no one teaches another nor is anyone self-taught. Men teach each other mediated by the world, by the cognizable object which in banking education are owned by the teacher.
(Fr. A, 67)
- g. Banking education maintains and even stimulates the contradiction through the following attitudes and practices which mirror oppressive society as a whole: the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students.
(Fr. A, 59)
- h. Authentic authority is not affirmed as such by mere transfer of power, but through delegation or in sympathetic adherence. If authority is merely transferred from one group to another, or is imposed upon the majority, it degenerates into authoritarianism. Authority can avoid conflict with freedom only if it is freedom-become-authority.
(Fr. A, 179)

1. In the theory of dialogical action, organization requires authority, so it cannot be authoritarian; it requires freedom, so it cannot be licentious. Organization is rather a highly educational process in which leaders and people together experience true authority and freedom which they then seek to establish in society by transforming the reality which mediates them.

(Fr. A, 180)

DECISION-MAKING

One of the most important activities of the administrator is to engage in the decision-making process. Simon, for example, has said that administration is essentially the process of making decisions.

The different schools of thought have given different treatment to this administrative process. In the Classical School, man was considered as an economic-rational being; therefore, within the logic of self-interest and profit, man was able to make rational decisions. The Human Relations school thought differently. Human behavior was explained predominantly in terms of sentiments, social pressure, personal values and motivations ... and so forth, all, the rationality of man as a decision-maker was severely undermined. Whatever presuppositions about man these schools held, they tended to confine rationality to the top of the organization hierarchy (Mouzelis, 1973:122).

The idea of participative management and decision-making was the object of intensive research in the 60's. As a matter of fact, the challenge to the autocratic philosophy of management began as early as 1920 (Miles, 1974:253). Miles (1974:255) found that while managers appear to have great faith in participative administration, they have serious doubts in their subordinates' capacities to make the right decisions. His human resources model suggests that managers should allow their subordinates to participate not only in routine and insignificant decisions but also in important matters as well. Likert's System 5 argues in favor of a similar

participatory policy (Likert, 1967).

One of the most important analysis of the process of decision-making in organizations was done by March and Simon (1958). They attempted to picture a realistic view of man's limited rationality in the decision-making process. Although man is rational, they say, there are all sorts of limitations which reduce the quality and the quantity of the premises on which he has to base his decisions, the limited amount of knowledge and information available being the most serious limitation of all. Man, therefore, can only be "intendedly" rational; he needs the organization to help him to make the proper decisions. Ultimately, controlled communication systems and indoctrination are devices used to influence the way individual members of the organization make decisions.

The paradigmatic framework underlying the literature of liberation suggests a different approach to man's rationality and power of decision. First, the social world is believed to be socially constructed through praxis. This is possible thanks to the human consciousness which is historically and culturally conditioned. Man's world, therefore, is a world of values and perspectives. When man is confronted with goals to be achieved he does not base his decision on value-free, mathematical facts but on the available information as structured and valued within a perspective. This is the reason why the 'rational' decision of a well-informed army general can be considered absolutely irrational by a pacifist, and vice versa. The quality of information which already presupposes a framework or a perspective becomes then more

important than the quantitative, computer approach to decision-making.

The liberation perspective on the decision-making process is based on the understanding of man as a conscious being as well as a being of praxis. Endowed with these qualities, which are not possessed by any other animal species, man has the decisional locus within himself; man is a being of decision^{a,b}. This is not a characteristic reserved to a few elite men. It is part of being human. As decision-makers, all men together are called to participate, to decide, and to create historical epochs^c. Man's vocation to be a being of decision is further confirmed by his ability to say the word in the Freirian sense, that is, to conceptualize, to give meaning and to act upon creatively. Man grows as a man in relation to his opportunity to decide and to act upon his decision^{d,e,f}. To deprive him of this primordial right is to do him violence or to reduce him to the alienating condition of being manipulated as an object. In these conditions, man regresses into the culture of silence^{g,h}.

The position of the liberation writers with regard to decision-making is clear; it is not an exclusive right reserved to a few, it is the right of all men. To some extent, the anthropological insight of the liberation perspective meets with the experimental findings of Miles, Likert and other organizational theorists: greater participation and responsibility in shared decision-making can only be beneficial to the organization since it allows the individual members to grow and to mature in their

work. On the other hand, the organization theorists who represent, by and large, the power elite and share their perspective, would not go as far as advocating a degree of participation in decision-making that would threaten the power structure in the organization and the society. The Liberation writers are very much conscious of the logic of self-interest guiding the elite group and understandably doubt their real commitment to the shared participation in decision-making for the sake of the people's growth and development^h.

The Liberation writers are committed to decisional power progressing 'bottom up'; the leader's decision being a synthesis of the shared decisional power of the majority. In practice, this implies more decisional power at the grassroots and local levelⁱ. This does not mean that decisions are to be made in the dark. A dialogue must be established between trained and skilled people with the subordinates so that the latter are well informed. People have to receive encouragement, information and help from the centre. But, ultimately, the decision must be theirs^{k,o}.

The Liberation approach shows a commitment to a policy of decentralization of power and decision-making. Such a policy seems to be more in line with a socialist ideology, as pointed out by Nyerere^{l,m}. Underlying the policy of decentralization is the belief that people can be trusted with responsibilities concerning decisions which affect them. Furthermore, there is the conviction that there is no long and lasting development without the development of the people themselves; this can only be achieved

if the people are allowed to be fully human and "becoming", in participative decision-making^{n,o}.

Finally, the Liberation writers express a concern for the modern technique of propaganda and psychological manipulation which - in the industrialized world - undermines not only the power of decision for the majority but even the will to participate in the decision-making process,^p.

Decision-Making

- a. Man, on the contrary (in contrast to animals), is conscious of his activity and of the world in which he lives. He acts in terms of the fulfillment of purposes he proposes to himself and others. He has his decisional locus within himself.
(Fr. I, 165)
- b. By detaching themselves from their surroundings, men transform their environment. They do not merely adapt to it. Humans are consequently beings of decision.
(Fr. B, 111)
- c. As men create, recreate, and decide, historical epochs begin to take shape. And it is by creating, recreating and deciding that men should participate in these epochs.
(Fr. B, 5)
- d. Men are not built in silence, but in word, in work, in action and reflection.
(Fr. A, 76)
- e. If saying the true word implies transforming the world, in which practice men become men and affirm themselves as beings who constantly create and recreate the world, saying the true word also implies becoming subject and not object. Saying the word is to participate, to create, to decide, to be free. Such an act is indispensable if men are to become men.
(Fr. E, 4/8)

- f. Speaking the word is not a true act if it is not at the same time associated with the right of self-expression and world-expression, of creating and recreating, of deciding and choosing and ultimately participating in society's historical process.
(Fr. C, 212)
- g. Any situation in which some prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence. The means used are not important; to alienate men from their own decision-making is to change them into objects.
(Fr. A, 73)
- h. The culture of silence is one in which only the power elites exercise the right of choosing, of action, of commanding without the participation of the popular majority. The right of saying the word is exclusively theirs.
(Fr., E, 4/8)
- i. There must be an efficient and democratic system of local government, so that our people make their own decisions on the things which affect them directly and so they are able to recognize their own control over community decisions and their responsibility for carrying them out.
(Nyere. A, 119)
- k. I hope the agricultural field workers and other skilled and trained people will be offering their advice freely, and doing all they can to encourage Ujamaa villages to adopt modern methods from the start. But the decision¹ must be made by the members, not by any one else, even Area Commissioners or a visiting President.
(Nyere. A, 182)
- l. We have to work out a system which gives more local freedom for both decision and action¹ on matters which are primarily of local impact, within a framework which ensures that the national policies of socialism¹ and self-reliance are followed everywhere.
(Nyere. B, 346)

¹The writer's emphasis.

- m. In addition, if these proposals are worked through properly, the mass of the people will find that it is easier for them to practise self-reliance in their own development, and to take part in decision-making¹ which directly affects them.
(Nyere. B, 346)
- n. Decentralization is based on the principle that more and more people must be trusted with responsibility; that is the whole purpose.
(Nyere. B, 347)
- o. For the really vital element in Decentralization is that we have to drop our present apparent urge to control¹ every thing from the centre. At the centre we can prod, urge and help, but not control. Ultimately, people can only develop themselves.
(Nyere. B, 390)
- p. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of modern man is his domination by the forces of myths and his manipulation by organized advertising, ideological or otherwise. Gradually, even without realizing the loss, he relinquishes his capacity for choice; he is expelled from the orbit of decision¹.
(Fr. B, 6)

¹The writer's emphasis.

ORGANIZING¹

Introduction

Under the dimension 'organizing', we refer to the process by which a group of people coordinate their effort and activities in order to achieve their set goals. This process includes various functions and activities expected from the leaders and the people that form an organization. These activities have been called managerial or administrative functions. We find, in the early literature of organizations, an attempt to delineate as clearly as possible these various activities required for the operation of a modern organization. Fayol (1916), for instance, has identified five elements of administration: organizing, planning, commanding, coordination and controlling. These concepts were later refined and expanded by Gulick (1937), Urwick (1943), and others. These early efforts at analysis of the administrative functions were made chiefly by scholars and executives concerned with business and public administration. Their analysis, therefore, reflected their experience and perspective as executives of large business enterprises. As can be expected, the Liberation writers look at the organizing process from a quite different angle. They do not write from a strictly administrative point of view. It would

¹ Under this heading, we intend to discuss some important administrative functions such as organizing, controlling, and planning.

be therefore unrealistic to demand the same degree of specificity, comprehensiveness and precision in their analysis as one would expect from an organization theorist. They do take a clear position, however, with regard to the nature and the process of organizing. Their discussion focuses mainly on the process of organizing, controlling, planning, and the kind of cooperation and unity requested by their liberation objectives.

Liberating or Oppressive Organizations

The Liberation writers base their analysis of the nature and processes of organization on their anthropological insight that men, in cooperation with other men, have struggled through the ages to liberate themselves in their praxis. Man could never have achieved the degree of liberation and development known today without cooperating and organizing with his fellow men. The most basic force that brought men to cooperate and to organize was their desire to achieve freedom and liberation. In this perspective, organization becomes a highly educational process: it is the means by which the leader and people in a cooperative effort, transform the world while exercising their praxis^a. If the forces to organize are attuned to the dynamics of human process, it serves the ends of liberation^b. This conception of organization is very much embodied in the ideal of democracy: it grows out of the people's hope, aspiration and participation in the transformation of the world. As such, it is expressive of, and instrumental to

life, to human life^c. The moment an organization loses sight of this dynamic human process and diverts and manipulates the organizational effort to attain selfish and short sighted goals (like profit for profit's sake) the organization becomes oppressive. An alienating and dehumanizing element is then introduced in the organizational process^d.

The Liberation writers are very critical of modern organizations. In their view, they have betrayed their basic human function, that is, to be instrumental in man's liberation. They are not expressions of life; on the contrary, the logic of life has been superseded by that of power^e. All creative innovations that challenge the structure of power of these organizations are curtailed or driven underground. Creativity is allowed to express itself to the extent that it enhances the existing power structure^f. It is in the interest of the elite, who benefit from the power that organization gives, not to allow the organizational process to revert to serving life and liberation again. It is, therefore, important for the elite to prevent revolutionary leaders from uniting the people^g.

ORGANIZING

- a. In the theory of dialogical action, organization requires authority, so it cannot be authoritarian; it requires freedom, so it cannot be licentious. Organization is rather a highly educational process in which leaders and people together experience true authority and freedom which they then seek to establish in society by transforming the reality which mediates them.
(Fr. A, 180)

- b. Cultural synthesis serves the ends of organization; organization serves the ends of liberation.
(Fr. A, 185)
- c. The ideal of democracy expresses the belief that for a society to be human, it has to grow out of the people's hope and aspirations. This is why power had to belong to the people. It was a way of affirming that if organization is to be expressive of - and instrumental to - life, then life itself has to remain in power.
(Alves, B, 17)
- d. This is the secret of all utopian visions men are having to-day. They proclaim that social organization as a form of repression and control must be abolished and the earth transformed into a place of human recovery. Man is trying desperately to find ways to deal with the earth so that organization results naturally from the growth of life and experience.
(Alves, B, 104)
- e. In our civilization, organization and freedom are self-excluding concepts. As Dewey remarked: "we live in a world in which there is an immense amount of organization, but it is an external organization, not one of the ordering of a growing experience (Dewey, J., Art as Experience, 1958). Modern organization is not an expression of life. It does not grow out of it, on the contrary, it is imposed, it comes from above. In organization, we do not find life organizing itself, but rather power organizing life. Power is the end, life is a means. The logic of life is superceded by that of power. Persons must become means and functions; the skinner box is the mini model of the macro-world. Thus organization produces repression.
(Alves, B, 16/17)
- f. Creativity is a forbidden act. The organization of our world is essentially sterile and hates anything that could be the seed of regeneration. New life is outside the limits of its space and opposed to its rules; thus the creative act takes place almost underground.
(Alves, B, 67)

8. It would be indeed inconsistent of the dominant elite to allow the revolutionary leaders to organize. The internal unity of the dominant elite, which reinforces and organizes its power, requires that the people be divided.

(Fr. A, 173)

Control and domination

Control has been identified as a key element of modern administration. As Urwick (1943:97) has pointed out, "The conception of control as a principle, and some knowledge of its methods are probably more widespread and generally developed in human undertakings than any other aspect of administration." Thompson (1964:93), on the other hand, sees administration as having an almost neurotic fixation on control. The Liberation writers seem to agree that control in modern organizations has almost reached a level of obsession in some cases (bureaucratic control, for instance). It occupies, they say, a central part of administration because it is one of the most efficient tools of domination. For the oppressor - and they argue that modern organizations, by and large, have become means of oppression - everything, including the human beings, have to be reduced to the status of objects through the process of control. To maintain domination, the use of force is not really necessary; the methods of control are more subtle and insidious: they make sure that the people adhere to the irresistible reality of power served by the organization. They show interest in the way people apprehend and define reality, but it is in order to control the process better and to manipulate it through advanced psychological techniques. In the last analysis, the aspirations for freedom and liberation appear to be an illusion and an unrealizable project^{i,j,k,l}.

Unfortunately for the power structure, the aspiration

for liberation does not die out. If suppressed, it reappears under different faces. People resist; they reject the argument of the inevitability of control. Little by little, dysfunctional elements are introduced into the organization (slowdown, absenteeism) which are usually met with more stringent attempts at controlling them^m. The Liberation writers see this process of control and domination so pervasive through the organized society that, in their view, it has become the dominant theme of our epoch with its dialectic opposite, liberationⁿ.

The Liberation writers do not reject all forms of control, although from their perspective, control is viewed with great suspicion. Their approach suggests a kind of mutual control through shared responsibilities; a happy synthesis between freedom and authority as defined earlier^{o,p}.

Domination and Control

- h. The oppressor's consciousness tends to transform everything surrounding it into an object of domination. The earth, property, production, the creations of men, men themselves, time, everything is reduced to the status of objects at his disposal.
(Fr. A, 44)
- i. Domination is itself objectively divisive. It maintains the oppressed I in a position of 'adhesion' to a reality which seems all powerful and overwhelming and it alienates him by presenting mysterious forces to explain this power.
(Fr. A, 173)
- j. In their passion to dominate, to mold others to their patterns and their way of life, the invaders desire to know how those they have invaded apprehend reality - but only so they can dominate the latter more effectively.
(Fr. A, 150).

- k. In antidiological action, manipulation anesthetizes the people and facilitates their domination.
(Fr. A, 178)
- l. Our rationalized organizations makes no room for the most varied discussion of means of control. Shall we condition the mouse by pain or pleasure? Shall we allow him to know that he is being controlled or not? Subliminal technique or open torture? Different means, one function. But freedom; this, the system cannot afford. Freedom is thus declared to be a utopian illusion.
(Alves. B, 105)
- m. The rationalization of control requires that the monopoly of violence be superseded by the monopoly of pleasure. The ultimate organization of control demands that science finds ways of reducing all forms of pleasure to a mode of appropriation functional to the system. Pleasure must be transformed into a commodity.
(Alves. B, 30/31)
- m. The triumph of power is not a simple thing. Slaves rebel against their master, colonized people dream of independence ... Blacks resist whites; women denounce men; youth refuses to obey its elders ... the exploited will not willingly give up their aspirations, and they are not to be convinced by arguments of the inevitability of control. They resist. And by this act they become dysfunctional elements in the organization of power and need to be eliminated in one way or another.
(Alves. B, 23)
- n. I consider the fundamental themes of our epoch to be that of domination - which implies its opposite, the theme of liberation as the objective to be achieved.
(Fr. A, 93)
- o. Organization is rather a highly educational process in which leaders and people together experience true authority and freedom....
(Fr. A, 180)
- p. Authority can avoid conflict with freedom only if it is freedom-become-authority.
(Fr. A, 180)

Organizing

Organizing¹ can be a very liberating process if it is done in a way that men come together to coordinate their activities in order to transform the world. Because of their unique perspective, the Liberation writers emphasize certain aspects of organization almost to the point of being repetitious. The grand project to bring about the new 'world' cannot be achieved individually, they say. It is a social task which can only be accomplished through unity and cooperation. The unity between the leader and the people is especially emphasized^{a,b}. Only then can the necessary cooperation among subjects bring about the liberation and transforming action^{c,d,e}. The emphasis on the word 'subject' as opposed to 'objects' is indicative of the necessary participation of all individuals in the organizing process, regardless of the hierarchical level of function of the people involved^e.

Since the organizational goals can never be fully achieved without the liberating action of the people involved, it is of the utmost importance to take into account the people's view of reality which contains their hopes, their aspirations, their perceptions of reality... etc. By ignoring this subjective side of the organizing process, the leader risks many disillusionments, mistakes and miscalculations^f.

¹The liberation writers' argument here has clear political overtones. The same approach is advocated in all aspects of social life (including the teacher-student relationship). It must be remembered that from the liberation perspective, the social world is not only socially constructed but also politically constructed; everything is political.

The contribution of Nyerere, President of Tanzania, is particularly insightful in this discussion. As opposed to most of the other Liberation writers, here is a leader who does not only speculate and theorize but must confront his own liberation ideas with the daily reality of governing a country. Faithful to the basic thrust of the liberation thinking, Nyerere insists that the people must be helped to organize themselves, so as to achieve the unity and cooperation required for a successful organizational and liberating endeavor. This does not preclude the use of outside experts to establish the organizational structure at the early stage and to train the people in the various activities. The approach that he advocates shows the importance for the leader to believe in the people's capacity to grow, since eventually they must take charge of their own development^h. Such organizational behavior then becomes a daring and loving witness that serves the ends of an organization committed to man's liberationⁱ.

The Liberation leaders recognize the importance of discipline, leadership, organizational objectives, control...and so forth. These functions, however, must not lead to treating people as objects to be used and manipulated, because, then, the very objective of organization - conscientization - is sacrificed for the sake of domination^{j,k}.

Finally, in organizing the content of an educational program, the same attention must be paid to the views, the hopes, and perceptions of the people for whom the program is designed. Only then is the process of conscientization possible. The

development and the coordination of the educational activities must therefore be carried out in consultation with the people¹ involved.

Organizing

- a. Organization is not only directly linked with unity (with the people) but it is a natural development of that unity.
(Fr. A, 176)

- b. For the revolutionary leaders, organization means organizing themselves with the people.
(Fr. A, 178)
- c. Cooperation leads dialogical Subjects to focus their attention on the reality which mediates them and which - posed as a problem - challenges them. The response to that is the action of dialogical subjects upon reality in order to transform it.
(Fr. A, 168)
- d. In the dialogical theory of action, Subjects meet in cooperation in order to transform the world.
(Fr. A, 167)
- e. Cooperation as a characteristic of dialogical action - which occurs only among Subjects (who may however have diverse levels of function and thus responsibilities) - can only be achieved through communication.
(Fr. A, 168)
- f. Revolutionary leaders must avoid organizing themselves apart from the people. They commit many errors and miscalculations by not taking into account something so real as the people's view of the world: a view which explicitly and implicitly contains their concerns, their doubts, their hopes, their way of seeing the leaders, their perception of themselves and the oppressors.
(Fr. A, 184)
- g. The field workers - from the Ministry of Local Government or Rural Development - would be available to help the people to organize themselves.
(Nyere. A, 143)

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Efficiency

The concept of efficiency is briefly discussed by the Liberation writers. They discuss it in the context of the agricultural expert whose mission is to help the peasants to improve their production. From an anti-liberation perspective, efficiency means to get the job done at the lowest cost possible. To dialogue at length with the peasants, to explain to them the 'why' of certain new techniques is a waste of time. They preferably tell the peasants to "do this or that." This, in their minds, is a more efficient way to proceed^a. This narrow concept of efficiency cannot be totally explained by saying it is a personality trait or an individual characteristic. A closer examination will indicate that the concept as defined above is related to a social structure which does not care for the growth or the conscientization of the subordinates as long as the production increases^b.

The demand for efficiency becomes oppressive when it requires that orders from above be carried out precisely and punctually without reflection. From the liberation perspective, on the other hand, efficiency is identified with the power men have to think, to imagine and to risk themselves in creative activities^c.

Efficiency

- a. "Dialogue is not viable. This is because its results are slow, uncertain and long drawn-out." Its slowness,

say others, in spite of the results it may produce, is at odds with the urgent need of the country to stimulate production. Thus, they affirm emphatically, "this time-wasting cannot be justified."

(Fr. B, 117)

- b. What these considerations clearly reveal is that the difficulty of dialogue with peasants does not arise because they are peasants, but comes from the social structure, in that it is "permanent" and oppressive.

(Fr. B, 121)

- c. Efficiency ceases to be identified with the power men have to think, to imagine, to risk themselves in creation, and rather comes to mean carrying out orders from above precisely and punctually.

(Fr. D, 475)

Organization has managed to separate the order of efficiency from the order of the earth, science from the concrete longing of mankind, hands from aspiration. The culture-creating act has thus been made impossible; for as we have seen, culture implies a synthesis of these two orders in such a way that the order of effectiveness functions as a tool and means of expression of the order of the earth.

(Alves, B, 188)

Any delay caused by dialogue - in reality a fictitious delay - means time saved in firmness, in self-confidence, and confidence in others, which anti-dialogue cannot offer.

(Fr. B, 123)

Planning

The Liberation writers do not have a systematic, well developed alternative to the art and the science of planning. Their discussion is situated at the level of a critique while stressing some aspects of the planning process in accord with their liberation philosophy. Their overall reaction to modern planning is rather negative for the simple reason that it seems to serve above all the economic and military power instead of being at the service of man's liberation and growth. It organizes the future in such a way that it guarantees the continuation of the present economic and power structure with, hopefully, some improvement^a. The future, then, is perceived as the extrapolation of the present except for the dysfunctional elements which should be eliminated by the plan. The future that the planners are promising to bring about is, too often, the vision of men in power whose interests will be protected or enhanced by the implementation of the plan^b. Such a future does not leave much choice for those outside the power structure and uninvolved in the planning process. They are confronted with the inevitable future which has eliminated for the majority all room for hope, aspiration and creativity. What is expected from the majority is an effort of adaptation to a future that will be as materially pleasant as possible, but nevertheless a "domesticated, predetermined future"^{d,e}. This approach to planning tends to decrease rather than to increase the range of possible future options. Furthermore, if the various options are examined, it is to make sure that only

those options that will not bring about radical changes in the power structure will be carried out^e. There is probably an additional explanation which accounts for this advocacy of planning as a slightly modified version of the present; there is a risk involved in planning a future as a creative overcoming of the present. A repetition of the present is always less threatening than an uncertain future^b.

The planning process, from a liberation perspective, must fulfill two conditions: first, it cannot be a downward process only, whereby the planners make the decisions at the top and these decisions are forced upon and executed at the lower level. Secondly, the planning process must be the result of a conscientizing dialogue between the planners and those affected by the plan, so that the views of the latter are taken into account in the drawing and implementation of the plan^{g,h}.

In Nyerere's introductory speech to the Second Five Year Plan for Tanzania, we find the same two ideas expressed in operational forms. Socialist development must spring out of the people's initiative; therefore, adequate measures must be taken to guarantee participation at all levels of government, especially local government. Furthermore, the various levels of participation become integral parts of the planning processⁱ.

Planning

- a. It is not my purpose to accuse futurologists of bad faith. But to the extent that science in our civilization is a function of the economic and military powers, it has no alternative. As it

was commissioned to organize space, so it carries the thrust of rationalization to its final consequences: it organizes the future. For the future also is to become a function of present conditions of power.

- b. Future is prospective pragmatism. Its basic assumption is that the shape of the world to come is a result of the present tendencies. Starting from the dominant conditions of power, it projects a future in which they are preserved and enhanced, while at the same time, the dysfunctional elements which now resist it are eliminated. And this implies, besides organization of power on a material basis, the conquest of imagination - so that man will love the future to which he is destined.
- c. But behind its most exciting promises futurology tells me something, almost in a whisper, that makes us shudder: there is no way out. The future is inevitable. It is useless to look for alternatives, and all plans of escape are doomed to failure. All one can do is to accept its inevitability and be ready for the unavoidable adaptive experience.¹ Obviously, the future is not a direct product of man's intention.
(Alves, B, 25/35)
- d. There is no genuine hope in those who intend to make the future repeat their present, nor in those who see the future as something pre-determined. Both have a "domesticated" notion of history: the former because they want to stop time; the latter because they are certain about a future they already know.
(Fr. C, 121)
- e. Some people today study all the possibilities which the future contains, in order to "domesticate" it and keep it in line with the present, which is what they intend to maintain.
(Fr. C, 120-121)
- f. When education is no longer utopian, i.e., when it no longer embodies the dramatic unity of denunciation and annunciation, it is either because the future has no more meaning for men, or because men are afraid to risk living the future as creative overcoming of the present, which has become old. The more likely explanation is generally the latter.
(Fr. C, 220)
- g. Revolutionary leaders often fall for the banking line of planning program content from the top down.
(Fr. A, 83)

¹The writer's emphasis.

- h. Many political and educational plans have failed because their authors designed them according to their own personal views of reality, never once taking into account (except as mere object of their action) the men-in-situation to whom their program was ostensibly directed.

(Fr. A, 83)

- i. Another matter of great importance for the success of this Plan is that there should be an improvement in planning and administration at Regional and local levels. The development of Tanzania cannot be affected from Dar Es Salaam; local initiative, local coordination of Plans, and local democratic control over decisions are also necessary. But whatever the form of organization, it is essential that every Party and Government official at both local and national levels, should regard it as his duty to encourage socialist developments which spring out of of the people's initiative.

(Nyere. B, 103)

Bureaucratic threat

Without discussing all dimensions of bureaucracy as exposed by Weber, the Liberation writers perceive the total bureaucratic reality as a threat to the organizational and liberation endeavor. It happens the moment the people of an organization stop being imaginative, hopeful and creative and slowly relax in to a status quo, repetitive and machine-like routine. It deadens the revolutionary vision, and dominates the people while giving them the illusion of freedom^a.

Only an on-going process of conscientization can counteract the danger of bureaucratization. Only through conscientization can the humanistic and utopian dimension of organization be preserved^{b,c}.

Bureaucratic threat

- a. After the revolutionary reality is inaugurated, conscientization continues to be indispensable. It is a force countering the bureaucracy, which threatens to deaden the revolutionary vision and dominate the people in the very name of their freedom.
(Fr. D, 473)
- b. A popular du moment ou nous parvenons à la conscientisation du project, si nous cessons d'etre utopistes nous bureaucratisons.
(Fr. N, 22)
- c. The moment the new regime hardens into a dominating bureaucracy, the humanist dimension of the struggle is lost and it is no longer possible to speak of liberation.
(Fr. A, 43)

ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION IN INTERCULTURAL SITUATIONS

The idea of "cultural invasion"

The concept of culture holds a central place in the Liberation model. This so because culture is considered as the natural domain of man and the key to the understanding of the liberation process in which man is simultaneously the product and the creator of culture.

Contacts between cultures present some problems. It suffices to look at our own national history to be more than convinced of the fact. The instances of international educational projects turned sour or abruptly terminated bear witness of the difficulties involved in such endeavors. For organizational theorists and even more so for the administrators of intercultural projects, these problems present challenges and demand answers. What is available in terms of analysis is often superficial, dealing merely with cultural variables: in culture A, they do this this way; in culture B they do it that way.

The Liberation writers present an analysis of this problem based on the long contact of their countries with the First World. Their view reflects, therefore, a consciousness shaped through their relationship with the First World during colonization.

In entering into an intercultural relationship, one can

adopt either an antidialogical¹ position which is of an invading nature or a dialogical stance which leads to cultural synthesis. In the case of antidialogical action, people from a given culture "invade" another culture in order to control it, to impose their system of values and finally, by attempting to eliminate the culture of the invaded, they reduce the people to the mere status of objects. When robbed of their own culture, people's creativity and self-expression is inhibited^{a,b,e}.

The cultural invasion can take many forms. In extreme cases, it is literally a physical invasion like the penetration of Africa in the 19th Century. At times it takes more subtle forms; it takes the character of friendship or altruistic help. Inevitably, because it is of an invasion nature, it becomes a form of economic and cultural domination^c. The instruments used to carry out and to maintain the invasion are varied: propaganda, slogans, myths ... and so forth. The myth of 'superior culture' and its right to dominate is frequently heard. The myth of the free world and the superior Western culture as uttered recently by the Rhodesian Prime Minister I. Smith are mere rationalizations to maintain a culture of invasion^e. Whatever the forms it takes, cultural invasion is always an act of conquest and manipulation with the effect that the invaded are left with an illusion of acting through the action of the invaders; the invaded

¹ Antidialogical action explicitly or implicitly aims to preserve within the social structure situations which favor its own agents.

listen or if he dares to say something, it is as an echo or a repetition of the invaders' voice^d.

In the cultural-invasion process, an alien vision of the world is imposed upon them; they begin then to perceive "reality" through the eyes of the invaders; they adopt their values and their life style; they mime the invaders; and worse, they develop a dual personality: on the one hand, they feel a tremendous attraction for the colonizer; on the other they hate him for having taken away their right to participate in their own historical destiny^{f,g,h}. Ultimately, the invaded people are alienated from the spirit of their own culture and from themselves. They become convinced of their intrinsic inferiorityⁱ.

The invading process is operating not only at the social level but also at the personal. The expert (expatriate or not) can be a point in case. If he comes to the people with a mentality of a know-it-all, if he neither listens nor makes an effort to understand the view of the people but imposes his own 'world view' and solutions, he acts antidialogically; he invades the culture of the people. On the other hand, the realization of the inadequacy of his approach might lead him to rethink his educational method and to adopt a dialogical attitude^j.

The idea of "cultural synthesis"

In engaging in the process of dialogical action one attempts to transcend the inevitable contradictions of an inadequate

social structure in order to achieve the liberation of man^k.

In the case of inter-cultural contacts, dialogical action aims at achieving a synthesis of both cultural elements instead of the domination of one by the other. Cultural synthesis is therefore a mode of action for confronting culture itself. People acting dialogically do not approach an alien culture as invaders but as people who want to learn about the culture and the people who have created it^{l,m}.

The first temptation of a cultural invader is to transplant models (see Chapter II) from his own culture to the invaded one and in so doing, to define the alien cultural reality in his own terms. The transposition of models or constructs from a culture to another is unacceptable in the cultural synthesis approach; on the contrary, actors of both cultures are called to analyse critically, as subjects, the cultural reality they are confronted with^{o,n}.

The temptation on the part of Third World people to import models from the First World is also great. For a long time these sophisticated models have stimulated great fascination in the people of the Third World. These were considered as magical formula to solve Third World problems. The experience with these models proved to be illusory and mortifying. The Liberation writers realized that the road to true liberation and development can only be through their own cultural efforts, not in the imitation of other cultures^{p,q}.

The Liberation writers advocate also the dialogical approach to solve the contradiction between the world view of the leader and that

of the people. A leader committed to liberation cannot choose to invade or manipulate the people. Only through cultural synthesis can he achieve the satisfactory compromise for the enrichment of both parties^r.

Antidialogical Action: Cultural Invasion

- a. Any invasion implies an invading Subject. His cultural-historical situation which gives him his vision of the world is the environment from which he starts out. He seeks to penetrate another cultural-historical situation and impose his system of values on its members. The invader reduces the people in the situation he invades to mere objects of his action.
(Fr. B, 113)
- b. In this phenomenon, the invaders penetrate the cultural context of another group, in disrespect of the latter's potentialities; they impose their own view of the world upon those they invade and inhibit the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression.
(Fr. A, 150)
- c. All domination involves invasion - at times physical and overt, at times camouflaged, with the invader assuming the role of a helping friend. In the last analysis, invasion is a form of economic and cultural domination. Invasion may be practiced by a metropolitan society upon a dependent society, or it may be implicit in the domination of one class over another within the same society.
(Fr. A, 150)
- d. The invader acts, the invaded are under the illusion that they are acting through the action of the other; the invader has his say; the invaded, who are forbidden this, listen to what the invader says. The invaded dictates; the invaded patiently accept what is dictated.... Thus, any cultural invasion presupposes conquest, manipulation, and messianism on the part of the invader. It presupposes propaganda which domesticates rather than liberates. Since cultural invasion is an act of conquest per se, it needs further conquest to sustain itself.
(Fr. B, 113)

- e. Propaganda, slogans, myths are the instruments employed by the invader to achieve his objectives: to persuade those invaded that they must be the objects of his action, that they must be the docile prisoners of his conquest. Thus it is incumbent on the invader to destroy the character of the culture which has been invaded, nullify its form, and replace it with the byproducts of the invading culture.
- (Fr. B, 114)
- f. Cultural conquest leads to the cultural inauthenticity of those who are invaded; they begin to respond to the values, the standards, and the goals of the invaders. In their passion to dominate, to mold others to their patterns and their way of life, the invaders desire to know how those they have invaded apprehend reality - but only so they can dominate the latter effectively. In the cultural invasion it is essential that those who are invaded come to see their reality with the outlook of the invaders rather than their own; for the more they mimic the invaders, the more stable the position of the latter becomes.
- (Fr. A, 151)
- g. The first ambition of the colonized is to become equal to that splendid model (colonizer) and to resemble him to the point of disappearing in him.
- (Memmi, A, 120)
- h. The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being removed from history and from the community. The colonized is in no way a subject of history any more. He has forgotten how to participate actively in history and no longer asks to do so.
- (Memmi, A, 91/92)
- i. For the cultural invasion to succeed, it is essential that those invaded become convinced of their intrinsic inferiority. The more invasion is accentuated and those invaded are alienated from the spirit of their own culture and from themselves, the more the latter want to be like the invaders: to walk like them, talk like them.
- (Fr. A, 153)
- j. ... These experts see themselves as promoters of the people. Their programs of action include their own objectives, their own convictions, and their own preoccupations. They do not listen to the people, but instead plan to teach them how to 'cast off laziness which creates underdevelopment'. To these professionals,

it seems absurd to consider the necessity of respecting the 'view of the world' held by the people. The professionals are the ones with a 'world view'. Well-intentioned professionals eventually discover that certain of their educational failures must be ascribed, not to the intrinsic inferiority of the 'simple mind of the people' but to the violence of their own act of invasion. Those who make this discovery face a difficult alternative. To renounce invasion would mean ending their dual status as dominated and dominators. It would mean abandoning all the myths which nourish invasion, and starting to incarnate dialogical action. For this very reason, it would mean to cease being over or inside (as foreigners) in order to be with (as a comrade).
(Fr. A, 154)

Dialogical cultural action: cultural synthesis

- k. Dialogical cultural action... aims at surmounting the antagonistic contradictions of the social structure, thereby achieving the liberation of men.
(Fr. A, 181)
- l. In the cultural synthesis, the actors who come from 'another world' to the world of the people do so not as invaders. They do not come to teach or to transmit or to give anything, but rather to learn, with the people, about the people's world.
(Fr. A, 181)
- m. Cultural synthesis is thus a mode of action for confronting culture itself, as the preserver of the very structures by which it was formed.
(Fr. A, 182)
- n. In cultural synthesis, there are no invaders; hence, there are no imposed models. In their stead, there are actors who critically analyse reality and intervene as Subjects in the historical process.
(Fr. A, 183)
- o. Those who are invaded, whatever their level, rarely go beyond the models which the invaders prescribe for them.
(Fr. A, 183)
- p. It is true that we need a model, and that we want blueprints and examples. For many among us the European model is the most inspiring. We have seen in the preceding pages to

what mortifying set-backs such an imitation has led us. European achievements, European techniques and style ought no longer to tempt us and to throw us off our balance. Let us decide not to imitate Europe, let us try to create the whole man.

(Fanon. A, 253)

- q. Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature. If we want humanity to advance a step further, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries... we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.

(Fanon. A, 255)

- r. In cultural synthesis - and only in cultural synthesis - is it possible to resolve the contradiction between the view of the leaders and that of the people, to the benefit of both. Cultural synthesis does not deny the differences between the two views; indeed, it is based on these differences. It does deny the invasion of one by the other, but affirms the undeniable support each gives to the other.

(Fr. A, 183)

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

The problem of organizational change has appeared relatively late in the literature of organization. This lack of interest in the change process might have been perpetuated by the dominant paradigm guiding organizational studies, whereby the status quo and stability were considered as the natural state of affairs. Within the dominant Western paradigm, the mechanistic and organismic models have attempted to develop a theory of change. In the first case, organization is viewed as a "structure of manipulable parts, each of which is separately modifiable with the view of enhancing the efficiency of the whole" (Gouldner, 1961:394); change then is brought about as planned rearrangement of parts to improve the level of efficiency. In the organismic model, the organizational structures are viewed as, spontaneously and homeostatically maintained while changes in organizational patterns are considered the results of adaptive responses to threats to equilibrium of the system as a whole.

By and large, organizational analysis has tended to concentrate on the external sources of change. Katz and Kahn (1966: 448) for instance, argue that the most potent causes of organizational change come from without. Organizations are seen, then, as seeking to adapt, and the nature of the change is explained as the outcome of an impersonal process through which it attempts to satisfy its needs in the face of a recalcitrant environment.

The major criticism of these "theories of change" is that they do not really explain how change is generated. Parsons himself --

who is one of the most influential advocates of social system - thinking -- has acknowledged openly that a theory of fundamental social change could not be derived from his conceptual scheme (Parsons; 1951:486).

The dialectical paradigm underlying the Liberation model suggests a totally different approach to social change. Instead of being considered as a near anomaly, change is viewed as a dynamic process of the social world - a necessity, therefore, by the very nature of the social world itself.

The change process analysed in the framework of Liberation does not discuss specifically organizational change. Since human organizations, however, are subjected to the same change forces as the societal ones, it seems valid to imply that the same process and the same strategy would also apply to the organizational world.

The Liberation writers make very clear that the origin of change in the social world is to be found in the heart of man: change is a manifestation of man's liberating struggle. As he interacts with the world (reflection and action) not only is the world changing but man himself evolves^{a,b}. This human dynamism is so much part of the nature of man that if forced to adapt instead of participating in efforts to change reality he exhibits signs of alienation and dehumanization^c. This is why the transformation of the world is either a humanizing process or a dehumanizing one. It is dehumanizing if man is reduced to display adaptive behaviors^d.

In order to understand the transforming process at work in the social world (and indirectly in the physical world) one has to scrutinize the role and the power of human consciousness. Human

consciousness is capable of transcending the reality of its own creation. Through deepening consciousness man outgrows the social reality that he has once created. What was created for his humanization is now unable to contain the need for greater humanization, which is man's vocation^{e,f}. This phenomenon has been compared to the rules of a game (Silverman, 1972; Cohen, 1968). At one stage, the rules of a game which were once negotiated do not offer the same creative challenge. Through a deeper understanding, the rules are renegotiated among the actors to bring about a new game with greater challenges.

In discussing the process of change, the Liberation writers make a distinction between modular change and revolutionary change. In the first category, the process of change is understood within the framework of systems or functionalism. As pointed out earlier [Chapter III], these approaches provide an analysis of the social world based on the organismic model. In a biological organism, the functions of the parts work toward the preservation of the whole and the only positive changes are those which guarantee the survival of the organism. When this perspective is applied to the social world, the only kinds of change which are considered positive are those which do not present any challenge to the structure of the society with the result that the only change alternatives left open are those which repeat the present under a modified form or a modular type of change which gives the illusion of change^g. These are the kinds of change that the few powerful people in control of a society (or the metropolitan¹

¹The concept of metropolis, in this context, means the center of power and decision. In the relationship between the Third World and the First World, the metropolitan society represents the colonial power including its power centre, the capital city or the metropolis.

society), assisted by their futurologists, have in store for the future^h.

Such a 'domesticated' approach to change does not leave room either for prophecy and utopian vision or for the possibility that a qualitatively new future can be created. The Liberation writers, therefore, reject a modular kind of change which fails to alleviate oppression, in favor of revolutionary change, change which allows man to give birth to a new qualitatively different society and a new man. Revolutionary change does not mean ugly social upheaval but a permanent and natural transformation of the world required by the very nature of man's praxiological activity^j. The utopian character of this kind of change is obvious. It must be understood, however, that it is not utopian in the sense of being unrealistic but rather utopian in the sense that it strives towards qualitatively different social organization. Its aim is, on the one hand, the destruction of misery, injustice and exploitation, and on the other, the creation of a new man^{k,l}. This kind of change is only possible through the emergence of a new social consciousness and a new relationship among people^m.

The change agent of this revolutionary transformation can hardly be someone whose interests are served by the existing reality, be he an expert or not. Such an elite expert would rarely sacrifice his own interests for the liberation of others, although history has shown that such rare persons have existed^{o,p}. The true change agent in the revolutionary change must be the people themselves in communion with the leader or the expert. In the context of liberation, change

means development and true development cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the people. On the other hand, the role of the leader or the expert is not denied; it is made effective to the extent that his praxis (reflection and action) meets the praxis of the people^{o,q}.

The Liberation approach to change requires a special pedagogy of "denunciation" and "annunciation." In the first moment, the dehumanizing and imperfect situation is analysed critically and stripped of its mythical rationalizations. In the second moment, annunciation forecasts and initiates steps towards a more humanizing order. The principles of this pedagogy, although utopian in character, must rest on science and philosophy: science, then, becomes the instrument to analyse a situation and to discard the myths which support it, while philosophy provides the matrix to guide the efforts in the creation of the new reality^u.

CHANGE STRATEGY

The strange strategy discussed by the Liberation writers emphasizes two aspects of the change process: conscientization and praxis. Revolutionary change cannot exclude either of these elements; both are integral parts of the change process in the social world.

Conscientization is possible because men are conscious beings in a very special way: their consciousness is not a pure reflection of the reality outside, neither is it a world of its own, closed on itself. If it were so, change, in the first case, would only originate from outside man; in the second, a change of consciousness

would automatically bring about a change of reality (pure subjectivism). Human consciousness is the intentional awareness of man by which, in his relation with the world, he can know the world as distinct from himself, and can impose meaning and act upon it. Human consciousness, then, is not a closed static entity but rather an open psychic state is becoming^{a,b,j}.

The conscientization process^c is therefore the awakening of critical awareness, the enlightening process by which man goes beyond his naive perception of reality^{c,d}. As man's consciousness is born in and shaped by a cultural and historical environment which contains necessarily mythical beliefs or taken-for-granted truths (for example, attributing mythical power to technology), man's only path to transcend these myths and to arrive at a clearer perception of reality^d is through conscientization^d. This is more than a simple 'prise de conscience' or a superficial new understanding of reality. Conscientization implies the overcoming of false consciousness with all its social and political ramifications; furthermore, it calls for more critical analysis and constant involvement in the demythologization of reality. This, in addition, cannot be done individually or in isolation; it is a process which can be achieved only through dialogue and in communion with other men^e. This is the reason why monologue, like sermons and lectures, does not achieve a change of consciousness^f.

This leads us to the second phase of the change process: praxis. This is not to say that praxis begins where conscientization ends. Both phases are achieved concurrently and dialectically.

Praxis means not only a reflection but also an intervention in the demythologized reality: it is a political act in the broad sense of the term, not necessarily in the partisan sense. As the social world is socially created and always in the process of negotiation, any intervention in the process is, in the real sense, a political act as well as a creative act^{g,h}.

Peter Berger (1974:176) has described the whole process in these terms:

Conscientization means the entire transformation of the consciousness of the people that would make them understand the political parameters of their existence and the possibilities of changing their situation by political action. Conscientization is a precondition of liberation. People will be able to liberate themselves from social and political oppression only if they first liberate themselves from the pattern of thought imposed by the oppressors.

If man's conscientization and praxis provide an explanation of how social and liberating change is brought about in the social world, it does not mean that the process is limitless. As conscientization and praxis operate within cultural and historical conditions, the process is necessarily subjected to the limitations imposed by these conditions^{j,k}.

The change strategy through conscientization and praxis is truly an educational process committed to the permanent liberation of man. The process becomes then, not a haphazard process for the benefit of a few, but a planned, chosen transformation of the world controlled by and for the benefit of the majority^l.

It is paradoxical that man who creates the social world

finds himself experiencing it as something other than his own creation (Berger, 1967:61). Man's thoughts and activities are always threatened by the 'inversion of praxis'. Man is threatened to become totally conditioned by the culture he has created. As man rejects the cultural myths of the superstructure (culture, ideology) a new social structure or a new mode of relation among the people begins to emerge which, in turn, supports the new consciousness. This new qualitatively different mode of relation is probably the most obvious indication of the occurrence of a liberating change^{m,n}.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

- a. Man becomes what he is through the history of his relations with his environment. He is not, therefore, simply a being in the world; he comes into being with the world. (Alves. A, 3)
- b. Man changes because he is not a monad. He is opened. Because he is opened, he is able to respond instead of simply react. To react is within the sphere of the biological. To respond, however, belongs to the sphere of freedom. Man responds because he discovers his world as a message which is addressed to him as a horizon into which he can project himself. And when he responds, the world becomes different. It becomes historical. It ceases to be an isolated sphere of nature in the same act that man becomes historical because he becomes different. Man, after his response, is not the same as he was before. (Alves. A, 4)
- c. If man is incapable of changing reality, he adjusts himself instead. Adaptation is behavior characteristic of the animal sphere; exhibited by man, it is symptomatic of his dehumanization. Throughout history men have attempted to overcome the factors which make them accommodate or adjust, in struggle - constantly threatened by oppression - to attain their full humanization. (Fr. B, 5)

- d. The process of transforming the world, which reveals the presence of man, can lead to his humanization as well as his dehumanization, to his growth or diminution.
(Fr. D, 456)
- e. This humanism refuses both despair and naive optimism, and is thus hopefully critical. Its critical hope rests on an equally critical belief, the belief that human beings can make and remake things, that they can transform the world. A belief then that human beings, by making and remaking things and transforming the world, can transcend the situation in which their state of being is almost a state of non-being, and go on to a state of being, in search of becoming more fully human.
(Fr. B, 144)
- f. A deepened consciousness of their situation leads men to apprehend that situation as an historical reality susceptible of transformation.
(Fr. A, 73)

[Kinds of Change]

- g. So if we ask pragmatism to tell us how it sees history taking place, we will get an answer quite similar to sociological functionalism. Functionalism sees society as if we are an organism. In the organism limbs, organs and systems are all functions of a greater whole. It is the whole that determines what functions are needed and what operations must be performed. The various parts are no more than means to an ultimate end, which is the preservation of the whole. Applied to society, this principle asserts that the form of a system is the limit of its possibilities. The system sees to it that only changes which contribute to its perpetuation shall survive. For all practical purposes, pragmatism and functionalism identify the social system with reality. What moves society then is the dynamics of the system and not our intentions. This is why social analysis must be concerned with observable objective consequences and never with the subjective dispositions. In functionalism, the ultimacy of social structures remains untouched while internal changes take place. Creative imagination is displaced and modular imagination takes its place.
(Alves. A, 53)
- h. If there is any anguish in director societies hidden beneath the cover of their cold technology it springs from their desperate determination that their metropolitan status be preserved in the future... that is why there is no genuine hope in those who intend to make the future repeat the present, nor in those who see the future as something

predetermined. Both have a "domesticated" notion of history: the former because they want to stop time, the latter because they are certain about a future they already know.

(Fr. C, 221)

- i. Futurology wants to describe how the future will be. It remains strictly within the limits of the reality principle. Prophecy and utopia, on the contrary, see the future as a task. They want to make room for the possible as opposed to a passive acquiescence in the present actual state of affairs. It is symbolic thought which overcomes the natural inertia of man and endows him with a new ability, the ability constantly to reshape his human universe. Man has the unique possibility of using his past as a tool for the creation of a qualitatively new future. It has the power to go beyond itself and give birth to something that did not exist before.

(Alves. B, 116/168)

- j. Because men are historical beings, incomplete and conscious of being incomplete, revolution is as natural and permanent a human dimension as is education. Only a mechanistic mentality holds that education can cease at a certain point, or that revolution can be halted when it attains power. To be authentic, revolution must be a continuous event. Otherwise, it will cease to be revolution, and will become sclerotic bureaucracy.

(Fr. D, 476)

- k. A true revolutionary project, on the other hand, to which the utopian dimension is natural, is a process in which the people assume the role of subject in the precarious adventure of transforming and recreating the world.

(Fr. D, 468)

- l. It is important to keep in mind that beyond - or rather through - the struggle against misery, injustice, and exploitation, the goal is the creation of a new man.

(Gu. A, 146)

- m. Utopia must necessarily lead to a commitment to support the emergence of a new social consciousness and new relationships among people.

(Gu. A, 234)

[Change Agents]

- o. Authentic revolution attempts to transform the reality

which begets this dehumanizing state of affairs. Those¹ whose interests are served by that reality cannot carry out this transformation; it must be achieved by the tyrannized, with their leaders. This truth, however, must become radically consequential, that is, the leader must incarnate it through communion with the people. In this communion both groups grow together and the leaders instead of being simply self appointed, are installed or authenticated in their praxis with the praxis of the people.
(Fr. A, 124)

- p. It would be inconsistent of the dominant elite to allow the revolutionary leaders to organize.
(Fr. A, 173)
- q. People cannot be developed; they can only develop themselves ... Development of the people can only be effected by the people.
(Nyere. B, 60)

[Pedagogy of Change]

- r. For this reason, denunciation and annunciation in this utopian pedagogy are not meant to be empty words, but historical commitment. Denunciation of a dehumanizing situation today increasingly demands precise scientific understanding of that situation. Likewise, the annunciation of its transformation increasingly requires a theory of transforming action.
(Fr. C, 220)
- s. Utopia necessarily means a denunciation of the existing order. Its deficiencies are to a large extent the reason for the emergence of a utopia. The reputation of a dehumanizing situation is an unavoidable aspect of utopia... But utopia is also an annunciation of what is not yet but will be: it is the forecast of a different order of things, a new society.
(Gu. A, 233)
- t. Our pedagogy cannot do without a vision of man and of the world. It formulates a scientific humanist conception which finds its expression in a dialogical praxis in which the teachers and learners together, in the act of analyzing a dehumanizing reality, denounce it while announcing its transformation in the name of the liberation of man.
(Fr. C, 220)

¹Writer's emphasis.

- u. Science is the indispensable instrument for denouncing the myths created by the Right, and philosophy is the matrix of the proclamation of a new reality. Science and philosophy together provide the principles of action for conscientization.

(Fr. D, 472)

CHANGE STRATEGY

- a. Conscientization is not a magical charm for revolutionaries, but a basic dimension of their reflective action. If men were not 'conscious bodies' capable of acting and perceiving, of knowing and of recreating, if they were not conscious of themselves and the world, the idea of conscientization would make no sense - but then neither would the idea of revolution.

(Fr. D, 476)

- b. The word conscientization has its origin in the word "conscious". Understanding the process and practice of conscientization is, therefore, closely connected with the understanding one has of consciousness in its relationship with the world. If I adopt an idealistic position, I separate consciousness from reality and I subject the latter to the former, as if reality were the result of consciousness and thus, the change of reality comes about through a change of consciousness. If I adopt a mechanistic position (positivism) I also dichotomize consciousness and reality and I take consciousness as a mirror which reflects reality. In both these cases there is denial of conscientization. It is important that in the conscientization process the uncovering of social reality be grasped not as something 'which is' but as something which is becoming, as something which is in the making.

(Fr. F, 14)


- c. Conscientization represents the development of the awakening of critical awareness. It will not appear as a natural by product of even major economic changes, but must grow out of a critical educational effort based on favorable historical conditions.

(Fr. B, 19)

Background AwarenessConsciousness:

Perceived objects

- a) singled out in themselves
 b) not singled out



Taken from Husserl, Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. (Fr. H, 216/17)

- d. Conscientization is the instrument for ejecting the cultural myths which remain in the people despite the new reality. Further, it is a force countering the bureaucracy, which threatens to deaden the revolutionary vision and dominate the people in the very name of their freedom. Finally, conscientization is a defense against another threat, that of the potential mythification of the technology which the new society requires to transform its backward infrastructures. Since men's consciousness is conditioned by reality, conscientization is first of all the effort to enlighten men about the obstacles preventing them from a clear perception of reality.
 (Fr. D, 476)
- e. Conscientization is a joint project in that it takes place in a man among other men, men united by their action and by their reflection upon that action and upon the world. Conscientization is more than a simple 'prise de conscience', while it implies overcoming "false consciousness", overcoming, that is, a semi-intransitive or naive consciousness, it implies further the critical insertion of the conscientized person into a demythologized reality.
 (Fr. D, 471)
- f. Consciousness is not change by lessons, lectures and eloquent sermons but by action of human beings on the world. Consciousness does not arbitrarily create reality as they thought in the old days of subjective idealism.
 (Fr. F, 34)
- g. Conscientization... must be a critical attempt to reveal reality, not just alienating small talk. It must be related to political involvement.¹ There is no conscientization if the result is not the conscious action of the oppressed as exploited social class struggling for liberation. What is more, no one conscientizes anyone else. The educator and the people together conscientize themselves thanks to the dialectical movement which relates critical

¹Writer's emphasis.

reflection on past action to the continuing struggle.
(Fr. F, 37)

- h. One cannot change consciousness outside of praxis. But it must be emphasized that the praxis by which consciousness is changed is not only action but reflection and action. Thus there is unity between practice and theory in which both are constructed, shaped and reshaped in constant movement from practice to theory.
(Fr. F, 36)
- i. Conscientization, which is identified with cultural action for freedom, is the process by which, in the subject-object relationship, the subject finds the ability to grasp, in critical terms, the dialectic unity between self and object. That is why we reaffirm that there is no conscientization outside of praxis, outside theory-practice, reflection-action unity.
(Fr. L, 396/7)
- j. Praxis is not blind action, deprived of intention or finality. It is action and reflection. Men and women are human beings because they are historically constituted¹ as beings of praxis and in the process they have become capable of transforming the world - of giving it meaning.
(Fr. L, 396/7)
- k. Conscientization cannot escape from the limits which historic reality imposes on it, that is to say, the effort of conscientization is not possible with a mistrust of historical viability.
(Fr. L, 396/8)
- l. Education must be an instrument of transforming action, as a political praxis at the service of permanent human liberation. This does not happen only in the consciousness of people but presupposes a radical change of structures, in which process consciousness will itself be transformed.
(Fr. F, 46)
- m. While culture, qua superstructure may influence or change the infrastructure (through the mediation of men, who by introjecting cultural myths, become alienated), the transformation of the infrastructure, nevertheless, remains incapable of bringing about, ipso facto, a superstructural modification. Thus, the process of de-alienation must be a total process. The radical transformation of the

¹Writer's emphasis.

infrastructure not only involves an attempt at the extrojection of cultural myths whose continued existence prejudices the exercise of that praxis demanded by the new reality in transformation, but it also includes the imperative to avoid the formation of new introjectable cultural myths.

This means in effect "surprising" culture in the dialectical moment of the "inversion of praxis" through the problematization of its "overdetermining" power, in order to render it less powerful. It is precisely this phenomenon which gives cultural action its liberation character.

(Fr. H, 216/2-3)

n. There is no other road to humanization, but authentic transformation of the dehumanizing structure.

(Fr. A, 181)

CHAPTER VII

A VIEW OF EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

As stated earlier, the purpose of this study was to develop an alternative model of organization based on a literature that was reflective of an emerging Third World consciousness. It was assumed that such a model would respond more adequately to the social, cultural and organizational realities of the Third World.

As the literature of liberation embodies, in addition, a Third World view of education and development, the liberation model of organization is believed to offer an appropriate framework for the examination and the practical orientation of First World/Third World development projects. It is therefore imperative at this point to clarify this philosophy of education and development as articulated in the literature of liberation.

ON EDUCATION

The liberation perspective puts forward a philosophy of education and development which is based on and consistent with its understanding of the nature of man and man as he relates to the world. Central to this view is the insight that man is an incomplete historical being in the process of humanization. And in this very natural and permanent process lies the roots of education^{a,b}.

By (ontological) vocation, man is called to free himself from all obstacles in the way to his humanization. These obstacles can take many forms; in sum, all that man has created in terms of knowledge, customs . . . etc., which turn against him to condition him or to limit

further growth (inversion of praxis) can be considered as obstacles to his humanization. It is in this perspective that education can become a liberation^c.

The banking approach to education whereby knowledge is almost considered as definite, immutable and transferable as bank money is rejected by the liberation perspective as inadequate and oppressive. Implicit in this banking approach is the assumption that man is essentially adaptable and manageable and that man's consciousness is passive and in the "attente" of being filled. This mechanistic and static view which forms the basis of the banking approach leads necessarily to treatment of men not as autonomous subjects but as objects^d. As expressed by Nyerere, such an educational approach puts men at the service of the economic forces rather than the economic forces at the service of man. As a result, students and professionals acquire the "object" mentality; they come to consider themselves as marketable tools or commodities^e.

The banking approach to education is, from the liberation perspective, alienating and oppressive because it stifles man's creative power^f. In considering man's consciousness as active and intentional, the liberation perspective defines education as essentially an act of cognition, not a transfer of information. The problem-posing approach therefore corresponds more adequately to the creative and reflective character of man. Furthermore, it is more in accord with man's vocation to transform the world in the human dialectic of reflection and action (praxis). The liberation writers go as far as saying that man becomes more authentically human when involved in this critical process of inquiry^g.

As man's world is socially defined and constructed [see Chapter III] the critical approach of the problem-posing education acknowledges the phenomenological character of the social world and at the same time permits a better understanding of the process of transformation as well as man's role in this process. Education then becomes a critical analysis of a problematic reality^h.

Finally, this educational approach not only points at the changing character of man's world but also acknowledges man's historical dimension in this transforming processⁱ.

In the liberation perspective, education is considered as part of the humanizing process. It is in the full sense a social praxis. If education, as a liberating praxis, contributes to the humanization of man as well as to his creative and transforming action upon the world, it can also serve his domestication as in the case of banking education. This is why the liberation writers declare emphatically that there is no such a thing as neutral education. Education can either serve the liberation of man or his domination. All facets of the educational process including the administration of education are therefore political acts (not in the partisan sense necessarily) because they are oriented toward the redefinition and recreation of the social reality for the liberation or the domestication of man^j. Although in practice the dividing line between an education for liberation and an education for domestication is not easily drawn^k, an educational system primarily oriented towards the

¹It must be remembered that the argument is carried out within a dialectical mode of thinking whereby the movement of ideas progresses in the confrontation of opposites.

status quo, and dedicated to the maintenance of a system with the task of adapting the new generation to the existing situation follows a domesticating approach^k.

Role of Educators

Educational practice implies a theoretical stance on the part of the educator and vice versa, the theoretical stance guides the educational practice. If one works from a banking concept of education the role of the educator is to regulate the way the world enters into the students or is understood by them. From the liberating perspective, the role of the educator is reassessed in terms of the liberation theoretical stance. Education becomes a social process requiring the active participation of all those concerned. Both the teachers and the students become subjects of the educational process, avoiding then the excesses of authoritarianism or intellectualism of the banking approach [authoritarianism, to the extent that the teachers' authority rest on the ignorance of the learners; intellectualism, to the extent that the teachers tend to withdraw to an ivory tower of knowledge in order to maintain their authority]. In problem-posing education, the educator with the educatees move towards a new way of thinkingⁿ. Knowledge emerges in the inquisitive presence of subjects confronted with the world. In this framework, knowledge demands constant re-examination. It implies invention and re-invention as it is applied to the various existential situations of the parties involved^o. In sum, new knowledge is created in the synthesis between the educator's maximally systematized knowing and the learner's minimally systematized knowing. The role of the educator is to pose

problems and to guide the learners in their critical analysis of their social reality.

A dialogical approach is essential to problem-posing education. Knowledge is not transferred from one person to another, but emerges rather in the dialogical relationship between the educator and the learner. Knowledge is built in the co-examination of the relation between man and the world as well as it perfects itself in the problematization of these relations¹.

If in the banking approach to education the role of the educator seems to lose some of its importance with the development of advanced technology, it is in the dialogical approach that its full significance and its essential place in liberating education is affirmed.

Educational Administration

The organization model developed in the previous chapters is firmly grounded in the educational philosophy of the liberation perspective. Both the organizational model and the educational approach rest on an understanding of man as a being of praxis. For that reason, both the organizational model and problem-posing education are truly humanistic since they acknowledge man's central place in the creation and transformation of the social reality. In addition, the liberation model of organization--as opposed to the other existing models--brings the administrative process well within the educational process. Instead of creating an artificial gap between these two aspects of human activities, the model provides an integration of administration and education that raises the field of educational administration to a new level of synthesis.

On education

- a. In contrast to the other animals who are unfinished but not historical, men know themselves to be unfinished; they are aware of their incompleteness. In this incompleteness and in this awareness lie the very roots of education as an exclusively human manifestation.

(Fr. A, 72)

- b. Because men are historical beings, incomplete and conscious of being incomplete, revolution is as natural and permanent as education is.

(Fr. D, 476)

- c. The primary purpose of education is the liberation of man. A man can be physically free from restraint and still be unfree if his mind is restricted by habits and attitudes which limit his humanity. Education has to liberate the African from the habit of submitting to circumstances which reduce his dignity as if they were immutable.

(Nyere. C, 47)

- d. In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing.

It is not surprising that the banking concept of education regards men as adaptable and manageable beings.

Implicit in the banking concept is the assumption of a dichotomy between man and the world.

In this view, man is not a conscious being; he is rather the possessor of a consciousness; an empty mind passively open to the reception of deposits of reality from the world outside. Based on a mechanistic, static, naturalistic, specialized view of consciousness, banking education transforms students into receiving objects. It attempts to control thinking and action; it leads men to adjust to the world, and inhibits their creative power.

(Fr. A, 58/60/62/64)

- e. The purpose of education is not to turn out technicians who can be used as instruments in the expansion of the economy. It is to turn out men and women who have the technical knowledge and ability to expand the economy for the benefit of man in society. What I am trying to do is to make a serious distinction between a system of education which makes liberated men and women who are skilful users of tools, and a system of education which turns men and women into tools.

I would like to be quite sure that our educational institutions are not going to end up as factories turning out marketable commodities. I want them to enlarge men and women, not convert them into efficient instruments for the production of modern gadgets.

There are professional men who say 'my market value is higher than the salary I am receiving in Tanzania'. . . . Their education has turned [these people] into objects--it is as objects or commodities that they have been taught to regard themselves and others.

(Nyere. C, 47/48/49)

- f. Whereas banking education anesthetizes and inhibits creative power, problem-posing education involves a constant unveiling of reality. The former attempts to maintain the submersion of consciousness; the latter strives for the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality.

(Fr. A, 68)

g. Liberation education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information.

(Fr. A, 67)

Problem-posing education bases itself on creativity and stimulates true reflection and action upon reality, thereby responding to the vocation of men as beings who are authentic only when engaged in inquiry and creative transformation.

(Fr. A, 71)

- h. In problem-posing education, men develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves. They come to see the world not as a static reality but as a reality in process, in transformation (71). Posing reality as a problem . . . means critical and of a problematic reality.

(Fr. A, 168)

- i. In sum: banking theory and practice, as immobilizing and fixating forces, fail to acknowledge men as historical beings; problem-posing theory and practice take man's historicity as their starting point.

(Fr. A, 71)

- j. We tend to ignore or to obscure the role of education, which, in that it is a social praxis, will always be in the service either of domestication of men or of their liberation. The inevitable choice we have to make: education as a domesticating praxis and education as a liberating praxis. It is fundamental for us to know that when we work on the content of the educational curriculum, when we discuss methods and processes, when we plan, when we draw up educational policies, we are engaged in political acts which imply an ideological choice. Neutral education cannot, in fact, exist.

(Fr. G, 174)

- k. When education is oriented toward the preservation [of a system]-- and educators are not always aware of it--it is obvious that its task is to adapt new generations to the social system it serves, which can and must be reformed and modernized, but which will never be radically transformed.

(Fr. G, 175)

Role of educators

- l. It follows logically from the banking notion of consciousness that the educator's role is to regulate the way the world enters into the students.

(Fr. A, 62)

- m. Problem-posing education, as a humanist and liberating praxis, posits as fundamental that men subjected to domestication must fight for their emancipation. To that end, it enables teachers and students to become subjects to the educational process by overcoming authoritarianism and alienating intellectualism.

(Fr. A, 74)

The role of the educator is not to "fill" . . . it is rather to attempt to move towards a new way of thinking in both educator and educatee, through the dialogical relationships between both.

(Fr. B, 125)

- o. Knowledge necessitates the curious presence of Subjects confronted with the world. It requires their transforming action on reality. It demands a constant searching. It implies invention and reinvention.

(Fr. B, 101)

- p. In fact, when we consider education in general, as an act of knowing, we are advocating a synthesis between the educator's maximally systematized knowing and the learner's minimally systematized knowing--a synthesis achieved in dialogue. The educator's role is to propose problems about the codified existential situation in order to help the learners arrive at a more and more critical view of their reality.

(Fr. C, 217)

- q. Knowledge is not "extended" from those who consider that they know to those who consider that they do not know. Knowledge is built up in the relations between human beings and the world, relations of transformation, and perfects itself in the critical problematization of these relations.

(Fr. B, 125)

- r. If education is dialogical, it is clear that the role of the teacher is important, whatever the situation. As s/he dialogues with the pupils, s/he must draw their attention to points that are unclear, or naive, always looking at them problematically.

(Fr. B, 125)

ON DEVELOPMENT

Many years of experience with the Western approach to development have left Third World countries more than perplexed.¹ African prophets such as Fanon reject outright the blind imitation of the European model of development^a. This approach has been coined by the Third World writers as developmentalism, meaning a timid and ineffective effort at transforming the Third World countries^a. Based on a narrow concept of development as synonymous with economic growth as well as a concept of man as essentially an economic and consumer being, the developmentalist approach seems to be unable to provide a strategy to pull the Third World countries out of underdevelopment^b.

The liberation writers suggest, rather, a more comprehensive understanding of development as a global social process including the ethical, social, political and cultural aspects of man's life. This view, in addition, is accompanied by a new consciousness of man's historical vocation. Man begins to see himself as a creative subject whose emancipation is related to social change. The word liberation therefore seems to express better the kind of development specific to man^{c,d,e}. In this perspective the ultimate objective is not so much an emulation of the Western societies but rather the creation of a new social order and a new man.²

¹ There is clear indication that the traditional approach to development has not succeeded in narrowing the gap between the First and Third World countries. On the contrary, there is evidence that the gap is widening. (See Pearson, 1970; Jalee, 1976.)

² The economic implications of this choice have been analysed by Samir Amin in recent publications (see bibliography). He writes: "... the problems of underdevelopment can only be definitely overcome within a radically changed world system, a global socialist society." (Samir, 1974:19)

In the liberation perspective the most important aspect of development is the people themselves, not, as in the traditional approach, progress in technological and economic fields. As the liberation writers emphasize, only people are able to develop^{c,f}. The necessary condition for real development is the same for individuals and societies. Fundamentally, only (individuals and) a society that is "being for itself" is able to develop. Societies that are in a position of dependence cannot develop in the liberation sense^g. Here the liberation writers introduce a new criterion to assess the level of development of a society. This criterion is whether a society is "being for itself" rather than the index of "per capita income"^h.

Only a society that has achieved a degree of independence or "being for itself" is able to choose, to decide and to plan its own growth. It is in this self-determined process that a society really develops. Only then are the members of this society becoming subjects of the liberating process rather than objects of development. This implies therefore that the locus of decision resides at the heart of the developing society and not outside itselfⁱ.

If in the traditional sense development has often been identified with modernization, the liberation writers see the need to make a distinction between the two: "if every development implies modernization, not every modernization is development"^j. To the extent that the modernizing forces are dictated from outside the developing society itself with the result of making the society more and more dependent, then it becomes anti-development. This is so because the modernizing process is not only controlled from outside but is also oriented towards the economic and ideological interests of the

Metropolis, that is, the controlling society^{1,k}. Usually this kind of modernization leads to anti-development actions such as the restriction of cultural freedom, the maintenance of the status quo through controlled education, the attempt to limit as much as possible the participation and involvement of the people in the modernizing process and finally the making of the modernization process into a new myth that enslaves man rather than liberates him¹.

The liberation writers do not object to technological progress; on the contrary they see it in the true perspective of liberation, as one of the greatest expressions of man's creative power, and as providing new instruments for man's emancipation. On the other hand, they warn of the danger inherent in accepting technology as a new myth to dominate and oppress man. Even the so-called "human relations" techniques are seen as advanced methods to domesticate man for the sake of greater productivity regardless of man's aspiration for self-fulfilment and liberation.

The danger of turning technology into a new divinity is probably greater in underdeveloped countries than in the industrialized ones and this myth, if maintained, can easily serve the objectives of dominationⁿ. The liberation perspective which acknowledges on the one hand the need for technical aid to developing countries and on the other the danger of mystifying technology for the purpose of domination proposes the following lengthy strategy: Technical aid must go beyond the simple technical instruction which limits itself to how to apply technology. The curriculum of instruction must rather take as a point of departure the state of consciousness of the instructees (generative theme). In the case of the peasants, the instruction must take into

account the cultural background which explains the peasants' technical empirical methods and through a cultural synthesis, bring the peasants' consciousness and action to a new level of understanding^O. This approach is truly humanistic in that it starts from the existential conditions of life and progresses through reflection and action (praxis) towards a critical comprehension of the new applied technology^P.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we have discussed some of the most important points of the philosophy of education and development as proposed by the liberation writers.

The liberating character of problem-posing education rests on the concept of man as a conscious and reflective being. Endowed with an intentional consciousness man is constantly invited to re-interpret the world while involved in transforming it. The philosophy of development they are proposing also maintains the relationship between man's transforming action upon the world and man's vocation to transform himself in the same process. If man is left out of this process, then it becomes developmentalism: a form of oppression.

Having clarified these concepts, it becomes easier to grasp the full significance of the liberation model when applied to the analysis of development projects.

On development

- a. It is true that we need a model, and that we want blueprints and examples. For many among us the European model is the most inspiring. We have seen in the preceding pages to what mortifying set-backs such an imitation has led us. European achievements, European techniques and European style ought no longer to tempt us and to throw us off our balance. Let us decide not to imitate Europe, let us try to create the whole man.

(Fan. A, 253)

- b. Developmentalism thus came to be synonymous with reformism and modernization, that is to say, synonymous with timid measures, really ineffective in the long run and counterproductive to achieve real transformation. The poor countries are becoming ever more clearly aware that their underdevelopment is only the by-product of the development of other countries. Moreover, they are realizing that their own development will come about only with a struggle to break the domination of the rich countries.

(Gu. A, 26)

- c. Men, among the uncompleted beings, are the only ones which develop. As historical, autobiographical "beings for themselves" their transformation (development) occurs in their own existential time, never outside it. Men who are submitted to concrete conditions of oppression in which they become alienated "beings for another" are not able to develop authentically. Deprived of their own power of decision, which is located in the oppressor, they follow the prescriptions of the latter.

(Fan. A, 159)

- d. Seeing development as a global social process involves of necessity, ethical values, and that implies ultimately a concept of what man is. This humanistic view places the notion of development in a broader context: a historical vision, in which humanity takes charge of its own destiny. But that involves a change of perspective, which we prefer to call liberation.

(Gu. B, 246)

- e. Liberation, therefore, seems to express better both the hopes of the oppressed peoples and the fulness of a view in which man is seen not as a passive element, but as agent of history. More profoundly, to see history as a process of man's liberation places the issue of desired social changes in a dynamic context.

(Gu. B, 247)

f. From our point of view, technological and economic transformations of the underdeveloped societies are not, in themselves, development, even though such transformations might result in a higher level of welfare. In fact, for an underdeveloped society to be developing, it must be the source of its own decisions about change. Without this condition, society will be merely modernized. The mere modernization of the structures does not give a society the characteristic of "being for itself."

(Fr. E, 4/5)

g. If we consider society as a being, it is obvious that only a society which is a "being for itself" can develop. Societies which are dual, "reflex", invaded and dependent on the metropolitan society cannot develop because they are alienated.

(Fr. A, 160)

h. In order to determine whether or not a society is developing, one must be beyond criteria based on indices of "per capita" income . . .—as well as those which concentrate on the study of gross income. The basic, elementary criterion is whether or not the society is a "being for itself." If it is not, the other criteria indicate modernization rather than development.

(Fr. A, 160)

i. Development is the task of a subject and not of an object. This implies the possibility of choosing, of deciding, of planning, and only beings for themselves are able to exercise such action. Development has its point of departure in the very "heart" of society regardless of their relations with other societies, whereas modernization has its starting point outside the modernizing society. Because of this, modernization meets not only the economic interests of the manipulating societies, but also their ideological interests.

(Fr. E 4/6)

j. Development is achieved only when the locus of decision for the transformations suffered by a being is found within and not outside of him.

(Fr. I, 172)

k. If every development implies modernization, not every modernization is development.

(Fr. E, 4/5)

l. Since this mechanical development attempts to identify its modernizing action with development, it is important that I distinguish between the two: Modernization of a purely mechanical,

automatic and manipulative type has the center of decision for change not in the area undergoing transformation but outside it. The society in transformation is not the subject of its own transformation.

(Fr. B, 130)

- m. The option for modernization as against development implies the restriction of cultural freedom as well as the use of methods and of techniques through which the access to culture would apparently be controlled. It implies an education for the maintenance of the status quo, preserving the non-participation of the people in whatever the process in any field; an education which, instead of unfolding reality, mystifies it and consequently, dominates and adapts man.

(Fr. I, 173)

- n. Let it be clear, however, that technological development must be one of the concerns of the revolutionary project. It would be simplistic to attribute responsibility for these deviations to technology in itself. Critically viewed, technology is nothing more or less than a natural phase of the creative process which engaged man from the moment he forged his first tool and began to transform the world for its humanization. Considering that technology is not only necessary but part of man's natural development, the question facing revolutionaries is now to avoid technology's mythical deviations. The techniques of "human relations" are not the answer, for in the final analysis, they are only another way of domesticating and alienating men further in the service of greater productivity.

(Fr. D, 475)

- o. Technology thus ceases to be perceived by men as one of the greatest expressions of their creative power and becomes instead a species of new divinity to which they create a cult of worship.

(Fr. D, 475)

Technical aid which is indispensable in any sphere, is valid when its curriculum, which grows out of the search for generative themes of the people, goes beyond pure technical instruction.

(Fr. B, 160)

- p. In the non-mechanical concept the new is born from the old through the creative transformation emerging from advanced technology combined with the empirical methods of the peasants. This means that it is impossible to ignore the cultural background which explains the technical-empirical methods of the peasants. It is on this cultural foundation--from which their forms of behavior and their perception of reality are comprised--that all those who have some responsibility for the process of agrarian reform must base their work.

(Fr. B, 130)

- q. Technological aid, of which proficiency capacitation is a part, can only exist in action and reflection, and in the critical comprehension of the implications of method. Technical proficiency capacitation as distinct from the training of animals can never be dissociated from the existential condition of the life of the peasants, from their cultural viewpoint or from their magic beliefs. It must begin at the level at which they are, and not at the level at which the agronomist reckons they should be.

(Fr. B, 160)

CHAPTER VIII

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS¹

Introduction

The liberation model of organizations as developed in the previous chapters has far reaching implications for educational development projects.¹ These implications, however, will be of a general nature due to the philosophical and theoretical character of this study. Nevertheless, it is our belief that the model can provide a useful framework for the examination of educational development projects while at the same time serving as a guide for the practical orientation of such projects.

There are many reasons that make this model a more suitable guide to educational development endeavor than the Western organizational models which underlie current practice in educational development. First, we have pointed out in Chapter 1 the apparent failure of such models when applied to Third World situations. There seems to be a high degree of consensus among those who have worked on such projects that these models are inadequate. Moreover, there seems to be, among the same experts, a growing conviction that more effective models will eventually emerge from the Third World people themselves. This idea is quite in accord with the dialectical paradigm which claims that the social world is socially and historically constructed and interpreted.

¹By educational development projects we understand any joint venture between First World and Third World countries with the purpose to bring people involved to a higher level of consciousness and praxis.

One would then expect the Third World people to provide a more accurate theoretical understanding of their own world. In a different context, Nyerere (1965:95) has expressed a similar belief: "Tanzanians are sufficiently interested to develop Tanzania in the interests of Tanzania, and only Tanzanians can say what those interests are."¹

In developing the model we assumed that the liberation literature reflected a Third World consciousness formed in the relationship of dependency during the colonial and neo-colonial period. This consciousness has inevitably many shades of gray according to the historical and social conditions of each country. It remains valid, however, to speak of a Third World consciousness due to the similarity of the experiences of these countries with the First World. In the preface of his book The Colonized and the Colonizer (1972:ix) Memmi admits to having arrived at the same conclusion:

As I discovered that all colonized people have much in common, I was led to the conclusion that all oppressed are alike in some ways. Nonetheless, while I was writing this book, I preferred to ignore these conclusions that today I maintain as undeniable. So many different persons saw themselves in this portrait that it became impossible to pretend that it was mine alone or only that of colonized Tunisians or even North Africans (ix).

At the present time, the Third World is experiencing a period of rapid social change. The "prise de conscience" of their colonized status has led them to make radical choices; among them is the strong desire to achieve self-determination and self-reliance. These hopes are often encapsulated in mottos or slogans such as "Uhuru na maendeleo" (freedom and development) and "Uhuru na Kazi" (freedom and work). More often these aspirations are articulated in the mode of liberation.

¹The writer's emphasis.

Peter Berger has devoted two of his latest books, The Homeless Mind² (1973) and The Pyramids of Sacrifice (1974), to the question of modernization and development in the Third World. He was forced to recognize that the liberation mode has become dominant among educated people in the Third World.

The different theories seeking to explain the faces of wealth and poverty of nations may today be broadly divided into competing paradigms or models of theoretical understanding. Each paradigm has what may be called "clue concepts" or key explanatory categories: modernization theorists already give themselves away by the very term "modern" and "economic growth." The other camp employs "clue concepts" such as dependency, neo-colonialism and liberation.

Among intellectuals in the countries commonly called Third World, regardless of the ideologies or policies followed by their governments, the Marxist (liberation) paradigm has become dominant (13/15).

To the extent that the developing nations are committed to the ideal of liberation the strategy open to them remains very similar, as Freire's comments indicate:

We have spoken of challenge facing Latin America in this period of historical transition. We believe that other areas of the Third World are no exception to what we have described, though each will present its own particular nuances; if the paths they follow are to lead to liberation they cannot by-pass cultural action for conscientization. (Fr. D, 472)

Finally, the literature of liberation which formed the basis of the model developed in the previous chapters has put forward a philosophy of education that represents a challenge to western educators. More important, however, than the academic interest that surrounds this "liberating" education is the fact that this educational approach was born and articulated in the context and the experience of

² This book was written in the summer of 1971 at Cuernavaca, Mexico.

the Third World. The liberation writers are proposing an alternative theory of development that contrasts sharply with the purely economic approach of the western tradition. They are telling us that there is more to development than the increase of per capita income. Their own experience with colonialism in its various forms has brought them to realize that the human factor cannot be ignored in the process of development; in other words, real development must be achieved in the liberation of the people, not by simply raising the standard of living of a select group.

In sum, the liberation model represents a Third World answer to many educational and developmental problems facing the developing nations today. The voice of these writers complements and enriches our Western, too often one-sided, view.

Dimension I: A View of Man

The liberation perspective suggests a complex view of man: man as endowed with a consciousness historically structured as well as a being of praxis. This anthropological insight has far reaching implications for development projects. In the instance of people of the Third World participating with First World people in an educational venture, we have people whose consciousness has been structured in two different historical and social settings; we have people who have different frames of reference with regard to accepted behavior, human relations, conception of work and achievement. If this problem is not recognized for what it is, it becomes a source of constant frustration and misunderstanding. These conflicts of perception and interpretation could be alleviated, however, if both parties would take the time to

investigate and understand the logic of the "other world of consciousness." The starting point would be the historical dimension which has crucial importance in a person's interpretation of his world and in the formation of his consciousness.

The consciousness factor has also some bearing on the participation or involvement of people in modern organizations. These modern organizations with their bureaucratic features have evolved along with a certain type of consciousness.³ To act in modern organizations requires not only specific skills but also a very specific structure of consciousness. These skills (action) and this consciousness (reflection) must be acquired in a learning process that is arduous and slow. As long as the people have not internalized the structures of consciousness on which a certain type of bureaucracy depends, the pattern of work and behavior will be meaningless, haphazard and unreliable. The attempt to transplant a type of modern organization without taking into account the social consciousness that supports it, is likely to bring disappointing results. Similarly, the Third World students who come to our western universities to study "modern" techniques of administration or "modern" types of organizations should be made aware of the "consciousness requirements" (social and cultural) for the functioning of these administrative or organizational types.

The above argument leads us to consider man as a being of praxis. As we have discussed in Chapter IV, human praxis refers to the creative power of man: more specifically to the dialectical link

³See Berger, The Homeless Mind, Chapter 5.

between man's reflection and action through which he transforms himself and the world. Put differently, man, by vocation, defines and creates social reality. The ultimate objective of development projects aims precisely at a more enlightened and effective praxis. In order to achieve this objective, the knowledge, the techniques and the methods learned from one social and cultural milieu (at a western university, for instance) would have to be recreated and reinvented to become true praxis in another milieu. This is so because the formulation of knowledge or techniques is part of the definition and the interpretation of a given social reality. It required a reinvention or a reformulation in practice to become effective praxiological action in a different socio-cultural milieu.

Dimension II: Man and the World

The second dimension of the liberation model, Man and the World, has two concepts particularly relevant to development projects: dependency and "culture of silence." Although both concepts were formulated in the Third World context, their application extends far beyond the Third World context.

[Dependency]

The concept of dependency refers to the type of relationship between the peoples of the First and the Third World which developed during colonial times and survived in neo-colonialism. In this kind of relationship, the director society (also called the metropolis or the mother country, *la mere patrie*) dictates while the dependent society repeats what was ordered. It imitates the life style and adopts the

values and patterns of behavior of the director society. The dependency phenomenon has become part of the Third World consciousness. In some countries this phenomenon has been sharpened by political discussion and action. We have seen in Tanzania a rejection of western values and paraphernalia (the ban on the mini-skirt) in favor of a return to traditional values. In other countries we find the same preoccupation without action being taken in the cultural field. The dependency relationship has left in the Third World consciousness many syndromes reflected in a kind of dual feeling: on the one hand a passionate attraction for westerners and their achievements, and on the other, a hatred for the threat these achievements represent to the genuine desire for authenticity. Memmi (1972:x) has felt this dual feeling himself: "How could he (colonized) hate the colonizers and yet admire them so passionately? I too felt this admiration in spite of myself."

A development project involving First World and Third World people would necessarily operate under the umbrella of the conscious reality of dependency. These development projects, mainly financed by First World countries, have not been totally disinterested in their objectives. On the contrary, they have had in many cases¹ long-term objectives to preserve the relationship of dependency; it is quite easy to understand, therefore, the suspicion or uneasiness in the rapport between the First World/Third World at all levels.

It is probably at the governmental level that suspicion is most acute in development projects. The fear--perceived or real--of domination

¹D. Goulet and M. Hudson, The Myth of Aid: The Hidden Agenda of the Development Reports. IDOC books, 1970.

often leads to misunderstanding, misinterpretation and hurried actions. The events leading to the termination of the Tanzanian Project (1974) at the University of Alberta could be interpreted in these terms. This uneasiness is also felt at the personal level: over-sensitivity with regard to paternalism or any attempt to create a relationship of dependence at the personal level; over-reaction or excessive requests on the part of those who feel dominated, etc. In our view the answer to some of these problems could be resolved by adopting a liberation approach. It would be to the advantage of those involved in such projects to acquaint themselves with the view of man as a being of praxis and to develop a sensitivity with regard to the unhealthy social climate resulting from a dependent relationship.

[Culture of Silence]

The relationship of dependency as analysed above gives rise to another phenomenon which is likely to affect development projects; that is, the culture of silence. As described in Chapter V, a culture of silence takes roots where people are deprived of their "words", of their right to participate in decisions which affect them. Development projects involving First World and Third World participants are often good situations to observe the perpetuation of the culture of silence. Cases whereby development projects are initiated, planned, and designed by First World experts and then offered to developing nations are not unheard of. In the final analysis, these projects benefit the developed nations more than the developing ones.

The symptoms of the culture of silence can also be aggravated if the hidden policy of the project is to sell a package formula uncritically examined (which had often doubtful results in the First

World) to solve Third World development problems. Any education program in which a theoretical construct or model becomes a magical formula for the Third World breeds a culture of silence. It breeds an attitude of passivity and self-depreciation as well as an exaggerated admiration for the problem-solving capacities of our industrialized world.

There is little hope that the vicious circle of the culture of silence can be broken as long as relationships of dependency exist. In the case of development projects, a policy and an administration on the line of the liberation model would go a long way towards breaking this vicious circle. A project on the liberation mode would require an equal participation in the planning and implementation of all phases of the project. Moreover, the educational program would have to foster the active participation of the students in the critical analysis of the educational content of the program.

Dimension III: Man's Organizational Activities

One of the initial thrusts of this study was to develop a model or organization which was reflective of the consciousness and the aspirations of Third World people. It was assumed that the model would provide a more inclusive framework as well as a more effective guide to the organization and administration of development projects.

[Leadership]

Due to the special nature of development projects involving First World and Third World people, a 'liberation type of leadership

It is difficult to imagine on a world-wide scale considering the present world economic system. However, recent negotiations between First World and Third World countries can be seen as a hopeful initiation in this direction. We refer to the 'International Monetary Fund' meeting in Nairobi, 1976.

seems to be called for. This leadership, as discussed earlier, emphasizes above all communication with the subordinates and sharing of goals and ideas. This approach is of great importance in the functioning of a project, considering the disparities of world views (or state of consciousness) of the people involved. This type of leadership also provides the kind of flexibility to achieve the compromises and the synthesis needed among the different parties involved to bring the project to a successful conclusion. The kind of leadership displayed in the Tanzania Project (1974:54, 103) was probably responsible for the many successes of the project.

[Communication]

Intercultural communication has always been a subject of interest for organizers and administrators. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the success of an enterprise depends to a great extent on mutual comprehension based on adequate communication. This is true for any human enterprise but even more so for development projects involving people from varied cultural backgrounds. The systems of communication available range from the mechanistic to the dialogical. The former (mechanistic) ignores totally the elements of consciousness, thought-language and interpretation processes in human communication. Such a mechanistic mentality can easily lead to frustration, or accusations of bad faith and ignorance in the event of communication failure.¹ The dialogical communication model, on the other hand, establishes the necessary link between human communication, on the one hand, and human

¹ Having worked in inter-cultural settings for many years, the author of this thesis has seen such occurrences many times.

growth and human liberation, on the other. Development projects pursuing liberating objectives are bound to give the proper attention to human dialogue in all phases of the project. In practice, this approach ~~implies not only trust and openness in relationships, but also two-way communication (vertical and horizontal) at all levels of the project organization.~~ Only then does the development project become a learning experience, even in its administrative aspects.

Finally, the dialogical approach emphasizes the close connection between consciousness and language as well as the impact of a linguistic system on human perception and understanding. These insights into human communication point to the advantage of learning or knowing the "other" linguistic system to assure a positive and liberating communication between the various cultural groups. Since the success of First World-Third World projects depends to a great extent on effective communication, the dialogical implications of the liberation model should be taken into consideration.

[Decision-making]

One of the most forceful implications of the liberation model refers to the importance of decision-making in the process of conscientization and human maturation. As men are beings of decision their growth and their praxis depends on the possibility and opportunity to make decisions. A development project committed to liberation objectives has to respect the individual's right to make decisions and should give itself a structure which permits this right to be exercised. This could mean the participation of the students involved in the formulation and development of educational program content. Often, the people responsible for the educational program pretend to know better than the

Third World students what is relevant and useful for Third World countries. This attitude fails to comprehend that the world view (consciousness) of the students is the best guide to what is relevant or irrelevant to their country. As pointed out by Freire (1970A:84):

One cannot expect positive results from an educational or political action program which fails to respect the particular view of the world held by the people. Such a program constitutes cultural invasion, good intentions notwithstanding.

The participatory decision-making policy also implies a commitment to decentralization of power. The center has to become sensitive to the needs at the periphery. This is particularly relevant to development projects which involve different levels of government. Too often the smooth operation of a development project is undermined by what seem to be arbitrary decisions at higher levels of government. The Tanzanian Project at the University of Alberta is a point in case (Shoeneberger and Odynak, 1974: 111). The repeated interference of the Canadian government in the project created an atmosphere of insecurity and alienation. These encroachments were, to a great extent, responsible for the early termination of the Project.

[Culture]

The liberation model offers elements of solution to many inter-cultural problems inherent to development projects. First of all; the model recognizes that culture is the natural domain of man. Culture holds the key to the meaning people give to their world. To ignore this important dimension of man's life is to condemn ourselves to misinterpretation and misunderstanding. Educational development projects cannot overlook the cultural background of the people involved in them; on the contrary, it should be an important element in the



clarification of the objectives of the project itself.¹

Two approaches are open to those responsible for a project.

In the first option, one can adopt a strategy akin to "cultural invasion."

The objective of this paternalistic approach is to sell or to impose surreptitiously the dominant (western) culture. Implicit in this approach is the conviction that one's culture is superior to the other; that sooner or later one's values have to be adopted by the others because of their more civilized nature. In sum, cultural invasion aims at assuring a relationship of dominance; it is the colonization of the mind. As a result, the invaded people are alienated from the spirit of their own culture and from themselves. They become convinced of their intrinsic cultural inferiority; they hope to rid themselves of this inferiority complex by imitating the other culture.

The impact of this approach is bound to create alienating and dysfunctional behavior. The highly emotional reaction displayed by some students towards a project or the attempts of many Third World students to remain in the First World after their studies could be analysed in terms of cultural invasion.

Along the same line of thought it seems necessary to re-assess the value of development projects for Third World students hosted in the First World. It seems necessary also to pose as a problem the educational content of development projects. As discussed earlier, the great temptation is to transplant models and analysis from one culture to the other without realizing that, in doing so, one is defining the

¹We assume here that the main objectives of the projects consist of meeting whatever needs a developing country has expressed.

the social reality of the alien culture in his own terms--a subtle form of cultural invasion. If the Third World students are not aware of this danger they are likely to force these analyses or models upon their own societies which have little in common with the reality assumed by these models.

The positive approach suggested by the liberation perspective is referred to as cultural synthesis. In this perspective, the actors of the different cultures are called to analyse critically, as subjects, the cultural reality they are confronted with. Culture is then considered not in terms of superior or more advanced, but as the rich expression of man's creative power. The investigation of the people's thematic universe (or the meaning they give to their world) constitutes the starting point of action as cultural synthesis. Only in this approach can a climate of creativity be fostered; only then are the people hopeful and ready to risk experimentation. In the case of cultural synthesis there are no prescribed models (from the First World), but rather the formulation of models (together) as they emerge from the social and cultural life of the people themselves. As pointed out by Freire (A, 183):

Those who are invaded (in cultural invasion) whatever their level, rarely go beyond the models which the invaders prescribe for them. In cultural synthesis there are no invaders, hence there are no imposed models. In their stead, there are actors who critically analyse reality (never separating this analysis from action) and intervene as subjects in the historical process.

The "cultural synthesis" approach is not only relevant to the program content or research projects but also to the interpersonal relationships between people of various cultures since these relationships are guided by (consciously or unconsciously) symbolic models. (See Chapter II)

The idea of "cultural synthesis" suggests that those responsible for a development project must take into account something as real as the people's view of the world: a view which explicitly and implicitly contains their concerns, their doubts, their hopes, their way of seeing authority, their perceptions of themselves and others, their fatalism or rebellious reactions.

This approach does not deny the possible contradiction between the leader's view and that of the people (or students). Neither does cultural synthesis suggest that the leader must acquiesce necessarily to their demands. Cultural synthesis requires first that the leader familiarize and identify himself with the people's demands (this supposes that he has a clear perception of the people's world view). Secondly, that he pose the meaning of that very demand as a problem to be critically examined. In this regard, one could bring the example of Third World students in a development project demanding additional money from their leader in their official speeches at yearly celebrations. Such a demand in their cultural world of the extended family is a traditional component of official allocutions which are also used as occasions to remind the leader of his responsibilities towards his subjects. The demand of the Third World students in this case was received with shock by those who ignored the cultural background (world view) of the students. In addition, the opportunity to achieve a cultural synthesis was missed by not posing the meaning of that very demand as a problem to be jointly analysed.

Concluding Note

The special significance of the liberation model for development

projects lies in the fact that the literature of liberation embodies a Third World view of education and development. Both fields are expressions and achievements of man as a being of praxis. Both fields are the ultimate manifestation of man's power of self-transformation and man's power to transform the world. The liberation writers have provided, through the concept of praxis, a compelling theoretical understanding of man's most important creative achievements, education and development.

All development projects have an educational component. Moreover, a development project always implies the examination of some aspect of social reality with the purpose of improving it. Problem-posing education suggests a respectful and humble approach to the examination of the way people construct their social reality. It progresses then towards a critical analysis of this reality in order to discard the myths on the way to a greater humanization of the world. Furthermore, the approach accounts for the most important factor in the process of change, that is, human consciousness. Problem-posing education seems to meet adequately the objectives of international development projects.

The philosophy of development advocated by the liberation writers emphasizes an aspect often neglected by international development projects concerned exclusively with the transmission of an expertise or a technology. We refer to the human factor in development: man alone can develop. If this dimension is left out there is a possibility that the project effort might lead to developmentalism: an ineffective effort with a great potential for oppression. Development as a liberation reminds those responsible for development projects that

real development is a global social process including the ethical, social, political and cultural aspects of man's life.

Finally, the objectives of development projects are self-defeated, in the point of view of liberation, if they do not lead the Third World countries to "become for itself," that is, to achieve a larger degree of self-sufficiency. Paradoxically, the development project must aim not at perpetuating itself, but at becoming obsolete.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

The present study sought to develop an alternative model of organization based on the literature of liberation as articulated by some Third World writers. The study used as prime resources, documents written by Freire, Gutierrez, Alves, Nyerere, Fanon and Memmi. The first three authors wrote from the Latin American continent; the latter three from Africa.

In order to carry out this study, it was necessary to address the related problem of paradigm clarification. First, the underlying paradigm of the traditional literature of organization was briefly discussed as well as the two basic models (mechanistic and organismic) related to this paradigmatic framework. A short overview of the traditional literature of organization showed the pervasive influence of the two models in the literature. Finally, the basic concepts emerging from these two models were aggregated to form the conceptual framework from which the liberation model was developed. The conceptual framework was left open-ended in order to include concepts unique to the liberation perspective. Eventually, concepts such as conscientization, praxis, culture of silence and cultural synthesis were added to appropriate dimensions of the model. The unique perspective of the literature of liberation required, in addition, that the underlying praxio-dialectical paradigm be elicited. It was found that the paradigm provided a new understanding of the social world as

well as a new approach for examining it. The clarification of the paradigm served also the purpose of establishing a link between the traditional literature of organization and the liberation model that was developed.

The liberation model was developed within a three-dimensional framework: A) A View of Man; B) Man and the World; and C) Man's Organizational Actions. In the first dimension, the model revealed a view of man as endowed with a consciousness historically and culturally structured. Because of this characteristic of human consciousness, the concept of man as a being of praxis was put forward. The concept implied that man is not only capable of giving meaning and constructing social reality but also through deepened understanding, he is capable of transforming the created reality. It was pointed out that this process of humanization through social transformation is at work in all human endeavors including man's organizational efforts. The second dimension, Man and the World, addressed itself to how man constructs and relates to social reality. In the traditional literature of organization the discussion of these phenomena turns around two concepts: environment and culture. The original treatment under these two concepts proved to be too restrictive. The liberation perspective required enlargement of the discussion to other aspects of social reality such as man's orientation in the world, social structure and the phenomena of dependency and culture of silence.

In the third and most important dimension of the model, man's organizational activities were discussed. As the liberation writers were not addressing themselves specifically to the problems of organization, their discussions did not cover at length all aspects

of organization and administration. Their analysis, however, showed that these organizational phenomena could be fruitfully interpreted from the humanistic perspective of liberation. Here again the model introduced new concepts such as cultural invasion and cultural synthesis which served as elements of solution to the problems of intercultural administration.

Since the literature of liberation is representative of a Third World philosophy of development and education, Chapter VII was devoted to the clarification of this philosophy. The chapter attempted to bring to light the close connection between the philosophy of education and the model of organization. It was hoped that this effort would show the possibility of conceptualizing administration from an educational point of view (achieving then a true synthesis of education and administration) rather than treating educational administration as an illegitimate child of business or public administration. Chapter VII served also a transitional purpose. Through the brief elaboration it provided of the philosophy of development put forward by the Third World liberation writers, the chapter led to the implications of the model for development projects. The proposed philosophy of development advocated the need for a concept of development that goes much beyond the economic field. It also emphasized the importance of self-determination in the true process of development.

It was assumed in the early part of this thesis that the liberation literature was reflective of a Third World consciousness born in the relationship of dependency under colonialism and neo-colonialism. In reaction to this skewed relationship, the liberation writers proposed a philosophy of development in accord with their human

aspirations. The model of organization based on this liberation philosophy of development served therefore to provide a general framework for the analysis of development projects involving First World and Third World parties.

Each dimension of the model provided insights into the dynamics of international development situations. In addition each pointed to appropriate courses of action in the practical orientation of these projects. Particularly relevant to such projects were the concepts of dependency, culture of silence and cultural synthesis.

Conceptual Framework - Final Stage

A. A View of Man

A View of man

Man as an historical being

Goals

Motivation

B. Man and the World

Man's orientation in the world

Culture

Social structure and dependency

Culture of silence

Structural changes

C. Man's Organizational Activities

Leadership

Communication

Authority

Decision making

Organizing

control and domination

organizing

efficiency

bureaucratic threat

planning

Organizational action in intercultural situations

the idea of "cultural invasion"

the idea of "cultural synthesis"

Organizational change

IMPLICATIONS

The original purpose of this study was to develop a model of organization more sensitive to the dynamics of Third World/First World organizational situations. The implications of the model, however, reach far beyond the boundaries of development projects. The liberation model advances provocative insights and suggestions for our so-called modern organizations. The liberation writers, while speaking first for their own situations and experience, have something valid to say for all organized human beings regardless of their origin. The first implication of this model, therefore, is to recognize the contribution of the Third World writers to our understanding of man and man's organizational activities. It is no longer necessary to pretend that we, in the First World, have magical solutions for all organizational problems. It seems even more appropriate to recognize that some elements of solution to our own human problems might originate in the Third World.

There are important implications arising from the concepts of paradigm and model, and from the praxio-dialectical paradigm discussed in Chapter III. We have seen that a paradigm provides a theoretical framework for addressing certain problems identified as critical from the paradigmatic perspective. The theoretical framework rests on certain philosophical assumptions with regard to the nature of the world under investigation. In addition, the same theoretical framework indicates which research method is most appropriate to investigate the identified problematic phenomena. A traditional paradigm begins to age when all the angles possible under the paradigmatic perspective have been covered with the result that more and more sophisticated

research is carried out with less and less return. The paradigm then seems to have exhausted its potential. The habit and the security of a thoroughly investigated paradigmatic framework often prevents many researchers from breaking loose from the prevailing paradigm.

Parallel to this phenomenon one can observe the emergence of a rival paradigm. What is happening, then is a shift at the base; the philosophical assumptions supporting the traditional paradigm are replaced by a different world view. As pointed out by Kuhn (1970:111), "When paradigms change, the world itself changes with them." The Kuhnian concept of paradigm suggests that scientific progress does not occur in a linear fashion but through qualitative jumps or paradigmatic revolutions. The conclusions of this study suggest that such a revolution is taking place in the social sciences, and while the administrative sciences are known to be conservative by nature, there would be unexpected gain in venturing into the new paradigm. The trend towards more and more sophisticated research with the prospect of less and less substantial results might then be reversed.

The discussion of paradigms within this study suggests, in addition, that there should be a return to more philosophical reflection about what administrators and theorists do. At present, philosophical reflection in the field of administration is at a low ebb. It seems that this reflection would be most fruitful in the area of praxis of administration as initiated in this study. As discussed earlier, praxis refers to this dialectic between man's reflection and action, between theory and practice. It is a common saying that the administrator in the fire of action has not much time for theoretical reflection; he is guided, they say, by his practical common sense and

his experience. The argument on paradigms and models presented in this study suggests that man always acts on the basis of symbolic models consciously or unconsciously formulated. These models provide a personal theoretical synthesis (necessarily simple and imperfect) that guides one's action. The reference to intuitive action points to this unconscious framework that one relies on. Since these models are reinforced by actions we would go as far as suggesting that they contribute to habit formation (well documented by stimulus-response research). Administrative studies in the alternative paradigm we are proposing would explore the dialectic between administrators' (conscious or unconscious) models and their daily administrative activities; they would attempt to clarify and to improve these models and furthermore, would analyse the social structure as it conditions the consciousness and praxiological activities of administrators.

As to the research method, the praxio-dialectical paradigm points to the fact that all scientific enterprises are social activities and they are marked by a valuation process; that the historical and cultural dimensions cannot be ignored in the scientific investigation of the social world. In practice one would not be satisfied with the design of administrative formulæ, techniques or "theories" that work for all seasons. One would also be confronted with the task of answering the question with regard to who benefits from the techniques; for whom and at the expense of whom are these techniques designed; in which cultural and historical conditions are these theories and techniques valid.

Argyris (1973:9), in his recent book On Organizations of the Future, sees one cause (among others) of organizational deterioration

stemming from the "oversimplified view of man assumed by traditional organizational designs." The concept of man as a being of praxis presents a new challenge for organizational theorists. The power of the concept does not stem from the fact that it adds a new dimension to the long list of concepts of man. The strength of the concept lies in its all-embracing character. Man as a being of praxis includes economic man; above all it points to the fact that man can create an economic system and then respond to it; man as praxis refers to man's power to create social relations and social structures and to respond to them. Even more, man as praxis implies that he can become alienated by what he has created and is capable of transcending what he has created in order to achieve a greater humanization and liberation. (We would argue that the concept of self-actualization is close to this latter aspect of praxis but organismic in perspective). The concept of praxis calls for a re-examination and a re-interpretation of all organizational and administrative functions from a humanistic perspective. Such humanistic administration cannot emerge from the narrow concept of man as proposed in the traditional literature of organization since these proposed concepts have arisen from the "logic and profit" pursued by business organizations. The efforts of Sergiovanni (1971) to compile a humanistic administration out of these models has been partly successful. A true humanistic administration must arise from a concept of man which captures the essence of "human-ness" in all its facets.

The liberation model of organization, although utopian in character, has many points of affinity with the findings of the traditional theorists of organization. The liberation model and

writers such as Argyris (1956, 1960, 1973) and Maslow (1970) recognize the crucial importance of human growth in the functioning of organizations. Both the model and these writers see the need for change in the direction of increasing people's opportunity for self-control (Ford, 1969; Herzberg, 1966), participative leadership, sharing of power and control (Argyris, 1972:40; Likert, 1967), and decentralization (Schon, 1971). The liberation model goes much further, however. It suggests that these changes have to be understood in the context of humanization. Furthermore, it implies that these attempts will only be partly successful if they are not accompanied by a rearrangement of the social and the political reality¹ along with a process of conscientization. The model points definitely toward a new form of organization within a new social order. There are indications that these developments will take place along the line of what is already emerging in different parts of the world in the form of co-management and auto-management. (See Learning to Be, 1972:89-90); Grand'Maison, 1975:237; Grandstedt, 1975:3; Thibaud, 1975:3; and Thibaud, 1975:163.)

From a traditional paradigmatic perspective there is little cause to object to the transfer of models of organization from business to school settings. As mentioned earlier, the first models available to the theorists of educational administration were originally formulated in the context of Western public and business organizations and subsequently applied to the field of educational administration. This is still a common practice. Moreover, the consensus among the theoreticians

¹The model indicates that such political rearrangement would be along socialist lines.

with regard to the validity of such transfer provided the final justification for this approach. (This is what was referred to earlier as the sociological aspect of a paradigm.) It was argued that "Schools, after all, are organizations" (Kelsey, 1974). This study suggests that such theoretical constructs reflect necessarily a perspective. For instance, the models of organization originating from the business field reflect the logic of profit-making inherent to those organizations. When applied to a school setting, these constructs are likely to bring in a vision alien to the educational process and inevitably to affect it. The way a school is run influences what is happening in the classroom.

The liberation model, on the other hand, is rooted in a philosophy of education. It reflects a logic of growth which is what schools are about. It points to the growth process involved in the exercise of administration; that is, it shows that administration can become a liberating effort for those involved in the running of schools. Finally, the model offers an integration of education and administration that brings the field of educational administration to a new level of synthesis. By constantly looking to business administration for inspiration, educational administration theorists not only fail to develop a field of administration that stands on its own right but also they miss the opportunity to develop, from their educational perspective, elements of solutions to human problems inherent to all organizations.

Implications for Further Studies

This study raised the possibility of developing a mode of administration based on the liberation philosophy of education. To this end, the liberation model needs to be operationalized and tested

empirically.

As the liberation writers do not address themselves specifically to the problems of organization and administration, they provided unequal treatment to the various dimensions of organization. A more detailed examination of all facets of organization could be carried out within the liberation perspective.

There should be an examination of how the framework of the praxio-dialectical paradigm discussed in this study could open new horizons to the field of organization and administration.

CONCLUSION

This model is definitely utopian in character. It does not describe so much what is but rather what is becoming. Above all, the liberation model suggests an orientation towards which the social world and social organizations are evolving. In his book On Organizations of the Future Argyris (1972:23) makes the remark that:

Much research on organizational behavior is excellent for describing the status quo. To the extent that it is used by practitioners as guides for future action, then, this knowledge also becomes a force in maintaining the status quo.

It is in this context that the liberation model provides an alternative model, not to reinforce the status quo, but to transcend it. This study is only a tentative step in a new direction. In the true spirit of praxiology, this study calls for a re-interpretation and a re-invention in the liberation sense.

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