# University of Alberta

How Salience of Consistency Norms Affects Individual Differences in

Ambivalent Answering in North Americans

By

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Abstract

Previous studies have found a positive relationship between trait dialecticism and ambivalent answering (Church et al., 2012; Hamamura et al., 2008). The current study explored how this relationship is affected for situational personality tests after manipulating the saliency of consistency norms (inconsistency vs. consistency manipulation), and classifying participants' reactions to the manipulations (Non-Reactance vs. Reactance). The results indicated that (1) Non-reactant participants showed a strong relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering in the inconsistency manipulation, but there was no relationship between the two in the consistency manipulation; and (2) Reactant participants showed a weaker relationship in the inconsistency manipulation, and a strong relationship in the consistency manipulation. In addition to these findings, the results indicated a positive relationship between self-knowledge and ambivalent answering, finding that the inconsistency manipulation significantly attenuates this relationship. Implications for cultural/personality research with experimental manipulations, and how to emphasize individual differences when designing manipulations, are discussed. (150 words)

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How Salience of Consistency Norms Affects Individual Differences in

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As social creatures, we humans are an adaptive species, ever molding,

changing, and aligning ourselves to the necessities of our social contexts

(Schlenker, 1985). The saying is quite correct, when in Rome, we do in fact do

as the Romans do, as following situational norms is necessary and adaptive in our

social lives. Presented with salient roles and contexts, we change ourselves to the

situations at hand, attempting to fulfill the social and cultural contracts indirectly

signed as part of the creation of the relationships we engage in. Should we fail to

honor these contracts, we are penalized, losing standing in our social hierarchies.

Being loud and boisterous may be socially sanctioned and valued within our

raucous group of friends, but probably is inappropriate in the middle of a

professor's lecture. Giving a spontaneous hug to our dear friend is probably a

well appreciated act, but not so much when it comes to a random person on the

street. While we might show general consistency in our actions over time and

within set contexts and roles, the degree and extent to which this is possible

depends heavily on our necessary social constraints. For some of us, this might

mean we are consistent. For others, it might mean we are inconsistent.

In contrast to this reality, North American culture tells an opposing story.

Whereas North Americans implicitly understand the importance of changing in

accordance to situational demands, they are simultaneously culturally pressured to

believe that consistency is a positive and important goal (Suh, 2002). Consistency

norms are so powerful that when North Americans do detect inconsistencies

among their thoughts, feelings, or actions, it leads to paralyzing cognitive dissonance that they are highly motived to resolve by making these inconsistencies behaviorally, cognitively, or affectively consistent (Festinger, 1957). Furthermore, inability to feel consistency can lead to negative outcomes in well-being (Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004; Suh, 2002).

The issue of North Americans' situational and consistent nature is mirrored in historic developments in personality psychology (Fleeson, 2004), becoming clearly salient in the Person-Situation debate that Mischel introduced in the 1960s (Mischel, 1968). At the time, Mischel reviewed several studies in personality psychology, arguing that trait theory, as a clear consistency view of people, had low validity due to trait ratings' low correlations with actual behavior, usually in the .3 to .4 range. He later argued for describing personality in an 'inconsistent' fashion through situational behavior patterns, as these patterns correlate better with actual behaviors (Mischel, 1968; Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002). In response, traditional trait personality researchers held that while correlations between traits and behaviors are low, we can still glean meaningful information about the consistent nature of people and how they generally act from traits. The eventual conclusion to this debate took the middle ground—that while situation profiles best predict short term behavior, traits best predict long term outcomes and general patterns of behavior (Fleeson, 2004). Thus, personality psychology has agreed that we are both inconsistent across situations and consistent in traits. Unfortunately, regardless of this theoretical consensus, consistency is still the preferred path for North Americans'

personalities, with increased situationally inconsistent personality patterns showing negative relationships with well-being (Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997). Interestingly, these negative effects are moderated by a culture concept called dialecticism: People with high dispositional dialecticism suffer less from inconsistent personality patterns than people with low dispositional dialecticism (Boucher, 2010).

Dialecticism is a lay theory of culture, thought to be more common in East Asian cultures through historical Confucian philosophical traditions (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).   It states three basic principles as guidance for life. The Theory of Contradiction: that the world is contradictory, both good and bad, that we can be both right and wrong at the same time; the Theory of Change: that the world is in flux, ever changing; and Holism: that to understand things we must look at the larger picture and that everything in life is related is some way or another (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009). In contrast, North American cultures tend to ascribe to analyticism, rooted in Aristotelian traditions.  These traditions follow three major laws. The Law of Noncontradiction: that a thing is something, and therefore cannot also be something else; the Law of Identity: that if something is something, it must always be so; and the Law of the Excluded Middle: that everything must be either true or not true (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004).  Whereas dialecticism shows acceptance of inconsistency, analyticism by default encourages consistency.

In line with these culture precepts, East Asians, as members of prototypically dialectic cultures, and North Americans, as exemplars of analytic cultures, tend to show quite different answering styles in various types of questionnaires. Whereas North Americans show comparatively more consistent answering, East Asians show more ambivalent (inconsistent) answering. East Asians show their increased ambivalent answering (in comparison to North Americans) with more inconsistent self-descriptions and more self-complexity when asked to describe themselves with ten self-statements (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001), larger absolute differences between endorsed positive and negative items in self-esteem surveys (Hamamura, Heine & Paulhus, 2008), and greater perceived between- and within-situation variation in situational personality tests (Church et al., 2008; Church et al., 2012). These cultural differences have been explained by individual differences in pre-existing dialectic beliefs, with dialecticism mediating ambivalent answering across cultures (Church et al., 2012; Hamamura et al., 2008, Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004).

In summary, we see that East Asians are culturally dialectic, accepting inconsistency and therefore answering more ambivalently (inconsistently), while North Americans are culturally analytic, preferring consistency and answering more consistently (Church et al., 2008; Church et al., 2012; Hamamura et al., 2008; Kanagawa et al., 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). In line with these preferences for consistency and inconsistency, North Americans also show a stronger adverse relationship with inconsistency than East Asians (Boucher 2010; Spencer-Rodgers

et al., 2004; Suh, 2002).  On the other hand, while North Americans hold

consistency as norm, they are also inconsistent, with situationally 'inconsistent'

behavior patterns best predicting their short-term personality related behavior

(Fleeson, 2004; Mischel, 1968; Mischel et al., 2002).

How do North Americans resolve this contradiction?  How do they react

when they find inconsistent aspects of their personalities at odds with consistency

norms? Prior research investigating dialecticism and ambivalent answering using

situational personality tests avoids this conflict by placing possible situational

inconsistencies as separate, spread out personality judgments (Church et al.,

2012), finding that dialecticism mediates ambivalent answering when consistency

norms are not salient. Would this relationship still hold when consistency norms

came into the equation?  How about when inconsistency became norm?

*Hypotheses*

For my study, I investigated how salience of consistency norms interacts

with the relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering in North

Americans (through European-Canadian participants).  To do this, I made

participants take a situational personality test, while placing participants in

situations that manipulated the salience of consistency norms.  I prepared three

conditions: one with standard personality test instructions (the Control condition,

where consistency norms were implicit), one instructing participants to consider

inconsistency norms in their answering (the Theory of Contradiction condition,

where inconsistency norms were explicit), and one instructing participants to

consider consistency norms in their answering (the Theory of Consistency condition, where consistency norms were explicit).

I hypothesized that the Theory of Contradiction's manipulation of explicit inconsistency norms would support individual differences in inconsistency, showing a strong relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering, and the Theory of Consistency's manipulation of explicit consistency norms would suppress this relationship. I also predicted that the Control condition would, contrary to prior findings (Church et al., 2012), not show a relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering, as consistency norms are made implicitly in my arrangement of the situational personality test. In short, I expected that the conflict of implicit or explicit consistency norms with inconsistency in personality (for the situational personality test) would suppress relationships between dialecticism and ambivalent answering, while acceptance, through explicit inconsistency norms, would support this relationship.

In addition, replicating prior findings showing that inconsistency is positively related to self-knowledge (Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee, & Lehman, 1996; Suh, 2002), I hypothesized that self-knowledge, measured through Self-Consciousness (Sheier & Carver, 1985), would show a positive relationship with ambivalent answering. I also hypothesized that this relationship would be attenuated when norms were in opposition to inconsistency self-knowledge, in the presence of implicit consistency norms in the Control condition, and even more so in the Theory of Consistency condition, where consistency norms are made explicit.

Method

*Participants*

Three hundred seventy-five European Canadians were selected and participated in my study from the University of Alberta. Inclusion criteria were: Having English as a first language, being born in Canada, and having parents of European/European-Canadian descent. Of these, one hundred twenty were randomly selected to the Control condition (59 Male, 61 Female; Ages 19.10±1.86, range=18–29 years), one hundred thirty-one to the Theory of Contradiction condition (69 Male, 62 Female; Ages 19.64±2.65, range=18–41 years), and one hundred twenty-four to the Theory of Consistency condition (63 Male, 61 Female; Ages 18.93±1.44, range=18–27 years).

*Procedure*

Prior to sessions (ranging from 2 weeks to 2 months), participants rated themselves on dialecticism (Dialectic Self Scale; (pre) DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2008) via an online survey system. This survey was taken again during the survey portion of the experiment session (post DSS). The core procedures within the experiment session were administered in a fixed order: 1) Manipulation (or lack of), 2) Trait-Role Personality Test, 3) Surveys, 4) Word checks, 5) Manipulation checks, and 6) Demographics (Figure 1). All questions and stimuli were presented via a custom designed JAVA computer program, with conditions randomly assigned by the program. 1 to 11 participants partook in each session, starting out in a pre-briefing room where experimenters gave general instructions

for use of the computer program before participants were assigned to separate rooms.

*1. Manipulations*

Manipulations in the two experimental conditions consisted of multiple steps. First, a short description of the theory at hand was given (Theory of Contradiction: how the world is contradictory, sunny weather can be good and bad, and people can change over situations; Theory of Consistency: how the world is generally consistent, weather today predicts tomorrow, and people generally behave similarly across situations), after which, examples of the theories at work for two fictitious individuals were provided. Next, a writing task asked participants to apply the presented theory to themselves with respect to situations that participants felt showed their level of "talkativeness" behaviorally. Theory of Contradiction condition participants were asked to provide examples of situations where they were talkative as well as situations where they were not talkative, and Theory of Consistency condition participants were asked to provide situations that showed their consistency in talkativeness. Finally, participants were asked to consider the theory in question for forthcoming surveys judgments while taking into account various situations.  By providing instruction to consider the Theory of Contradiction/Theory of Consistency and also asking participants consider various situations, I attempted to add salience to the fact that inconsistent judgments and explicit norms were simultaneously present. Control condition participants had no reading or writing task and went directly to survey questions

with standard survey instructions. The exact instructions for all conditions are outlined in detail in Appendix A.

*Figure 1:* Outline of experiment order.

Online Survey | Dialecticism Pre-Score (Pre DSS)

Experiment Session

*1*. Manipulation

*2*. Trait-Role Personality Test

*3*. Surveys (including Post DSS)

*4*. Word Checks

*5*. Manipulation Checks

*6*. Demographics

*2. Trait-Role Personality Test*

The personality test was an altered version of the test used by Church et al., (2008). The test measured two of the five dimensions of the Big Five: Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability (Goldberg, 1992). These two dimensions were represented with 8 trait words each, with 9 of the 16 traits being reverse keyed to their respective personality dimensions (r); Conscientiousness: *organized*, *disciplined*, *industrious*, *thrifty*, *sloppy* (r), *careless* (r), *wasteful* (r), and *lazy* (r); Emotional Stability: *relaxed*, *calm*, *self-confident*, *moody* (r), *jealous*

(r), *touchy* (r), *nervous* (r), and *irritable* (r).  Traits were presented in one set

order, alternating words associated with the Conscientiousness and Emotional

Stability dimensions. Participants rated themselves for each trait word over six

roles: with close friends, with parents, with professors, with siblings, with

strangers, and with relatives.  Different from the Church et al., (2008) and Church

et al., (2012) studies, where participants rated themselves on all trait words for

each role at a time, I presented all roles together for each trait word.  By bringing

all roles together my goal was to bring salience to the possibility of them being

inconsistent, while naturally putting it at odds with implicit existing consistency

norms.

*3. Surveys*

All survey items presented in the experiment session were included

together in random order and rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*)

Likert scale.

*Dialecticism*

Dialecticism was measured pre and post experiment with the Dialectic

Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2008; Appendix B).  This scale consists

of 32 items, testing people's tendency to act 'dialectically'.  It has been shown to

have reasonable psychometric properties across various culture groups with

Cronbach's alphas falling within a range of .69 to .87.  Although this measure is

usually rated with a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) Likert scale, Pre

DSS ratings were answered on a 7-point scale and Post DSS ratings were

answered on a 5-point scale. This difference was designed to force participants to maximally reconsider their dialectic beliefs (in accordance to a different Likert scale), and to achieve more accurate estimates of actual post experiment beliefs. All regression analyses use Pre DSS scores, as Post DSS scores could have been influenced by the manipulation. For analyses comparing the two scales, 7-point Pre DSS scores were converted to a 5-point scale[1].

*Self-Consciousness*

I chose the Sheier and Carver (1985) version of the Self-Consciousness (SC) scale (Appendix C). Self-Consciousness has a two factor structure: Private Self-Consciousness assesses people's ability to access and understand their personal feelings (9-items) and Public Self-Consciousness measures people's awareness of their effect on others (7-items). These factors have been shown to have high Cronbach alphas of .75 and .84, respectively.

*4. Word Checks*

I asked participants to rate their understanding of all words used in the trait-role personality test, from 1 to 5. A 1 was "I don't understand at all", a 3 was "I somewhat understand", and a 5 was "I completely understand", such that average ratings below 4 were classified as showing limited understanding of trait words.

*5. Manipulation Checks*

For the manipulation check, I used the mean of two groupings of items

presented in random order at the end of the study in regards to participants' *use of*

*information* for the questionnaire (2-items) and *perception of self-consistency* (3-

items; Appendix D).  An effective Theory of Contradiction manipulation was

classified as raised average values for the use of information items, showing that

participants considered various situations as requested, and lower values for the

perception of self-consistency items showing that the explicit manipulation of

inconsistency norms lead to participants seeing themselves as less consistent. For

the Theory of Consistency, an effective manipulation was classified as more

perceived use of information showing that they followed survey instructions, with

an increase in the perception of self-consistency suggesting that the explicit

manipulation of consistency norms lead to an increase in consistency beliefs.

*Ambivalent Answering Measure*

My measure of ambivalent answering was classified as the variability of

participants' answering across roles in the trait-role questionnaire, also called the

standard deviation index (SD Index; Church et al., 2008; Church et al., 2012)[2].

To calculate this, I took the standard deviation of the six role ratings for each trait

word and averaged these across all trait words for each participant.  Higher values

of the SD Index denote greater ambivalent answering. Validity of this index as an

ambivalent answering measure is supported through convergent results from the

Church et al. (2012) and Hamamura et al. (2008) studies.

Results

*Manipulation Checks*

I applied two one-way ANOVAs to the conditions (Conditions: Control, Theory of Contradiction, and Theory of Consistency), one to the use of information items and one to the perception of self-consistency items. I found a significant main effect of condition for the use of information items, $F(2, 370) = 5.20$, $p = 0.006$, with higher uses of information for the Theory of Consistency and Theory of Contradiction conditions in comparison to the Control condition (Control $M = 3.50$, $SD = .73$, Theory of Contradiction $M = 3.76$, $SD = .62$, Theory of Consistency $M = 3.69$, $SD = .66$). Post-hoc tests showed that Theory of Contradiction participants perceived themselves as using significantly more information than participants in the Control condition ($p = .005$), a similar trend was seen in the Theory of Consistency condition ($p = .062$), with no significant difference between manipulations ($p > .1$). The perception of self-consistency items also showed a trend towards a main effect of condition, $F(2, 370) = 2.76$, $p = 0.064$, with Theory of Contradiction participants perceiving themselves as less consistent than the other two groups (Control $M = 3.26$, $SD = .65$, Theory of Contradiction $M = 3.07$, $SD = .72$, Theory of Consistency $M = 3.22$, $SD = .66$). Post-hoc tests found the difference closest to significance when comparing the Control and the Theory of Contradiction conditions ($p = .068$), with a smaller difference between the Theory of Contradiction and Theory of Consistency ($p = .19$), and the Control and the Theory of Consistency being very similar ($p = .87$).

These results suggest that the Theory of Contradiction manipulation was effective, in that participants perceived themselves as using more information and having less self-consistency as a result of it. On the other hand, results were less clear for the Theory of Consistency manipulation, in that although it forced participants to consider more information, it also lead to a small drop in how much participants perceived they were consistent. The lack of an increase suggests that the manipulation might not have worked as expected.

*Word Checks*

Checking participants' understanding of words, I found that all but two items received average ratings of 4 or above. The two items with ratings below 4 were from the conscientiousness scale: thrifty and industrious, receiving ratings of 3.50 and 2.83, respectively. Although participants were given the chance to skip any question on questionnaires, as it is impossible to ensure validity for these two words, they were dropped from the ambivalent answering SD Index calculation.

*Mean-Level Analyses*

*Ambivalent Answering*

I performed a one-way ANOVA across conditions (Conditions: Control, Theory of Contradiction, and Theory of Consistency) for the SD Index, my marker of ambivalent answering, finding no mean-level main effect of condition ($p > .1$).

*Other Indices*

Also when calculating one-way ANOVAs across conditions (Conditions: Control, Theory of Contradiction, and Theory of Consistency) for pre DSS scores and Self-Consciousness, no significant main effects emerged ($p > .1$). As such, I took this as evidence that the groups show similar properties in terms of overall individual differences, regardless of condition, and that both scales, can be used in subsequent analyses.

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*Regression Analyses*

</div>

*Dialecticism and Ambivalent Answering*

I ran analyses examining the potential interaction between pre DSS and condition (Condition: Control, Theory of Contradiction, and Theory of Consistency) on the prediction of the SD Index. For these analyses, I tested hierarchical linear regression models with the main effects of condition and pre DSS in the first step and the interaction between condition and pre DSS in the second step. The models compared each pairs of conditions (i.e. Control & Theory of Contradiction, Control & Theory of Consistency, and Theory of Contradiction & Theory of Consistency) by dummy coding for the respective comparisons. I found only one significant interaction model, involving the interaction between the Control and the Theory of Contradiction conditions, $b = .12$, $t(246) = 2.40$, $p = .017$. Probing conditions with simple slopes (Figure 2), there was a significant positive relationship in the Theory of Contradiction condition between the DSS and the SD Index, $R^2 = .065$, $b = .091$, $t(130) = 3.01$,

$p = .003$, a lesser positive and non-significant relationship for the Theory of

Consistency condition, $R^2 = .017$, $b = .053$, $t(123) = 1.43$, $p = .16$, and no clear

relationship for the Control condition, $R^2 = .003$, $b = -.024$, $t(119) = -.63$, $p = .53$

(Table 1)[3].

*Figure 2:* Simple slopes using dialecticism (Pre DSS) to predict mean ambivalent

answering (SD Index) for all conditions.



*Table 1:* Regression summaries for simple slope regressions of dialecticism (Pre

DSS) on ambivalent answering (SD Index).

| | Condition | Pre DSS | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | $b$ | $R^2$ |
| | Control | -.024 | .003 |
| SD Index | Theory of Contradiction | .091 | .065** |
| | Theory of Consistency | .129 | .017 |

*\*\*p < .01*

Unpacking these results, I saw expected and unexpected findings. First, the hypothesized relationship for the Theory of Contradiction condition was found as expected, with a significant positive relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering, substantiated with positive manipulation checks. Second, as expected and contrary to Church et al. (2012), there was no relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering in the Control condition. As intended, the simultaneous nature of role ratings in my study (as opposed to the separate role ratings in Church et al. (2012)) was successful in erasing relationships between dialecticism and ambivalent answering. This gives some credence to my hypothesis that consistency norms would interact with inconsistency judgments, interfering with the relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering. However, things were not as clear for the Theory of Consistency condition, with a positive, but non-significant relationship between Pre DSS and ambivalent answering emerging with explicit consistency norms. This unexpected result is corroborated with manipulation checks showing an unexpected slight decrease (instead of the expected increase) in self-perception of consistency in the Consistency condition.

Exploring possible reasons for this unexpected result, I discovered that contrary to the naïve assumption that dialecticism scores show general stability over experiment sessions, pre- and post-experiment dialecticism scores generally showed shifts towards more or less dialectic beliefs over the course of sessions. As manipulations should directly relate to these changes due to the manipulations' high relevance to the construct of dialecticism, I decided to re-run analyses for the

manipulation conditions, splitting the conditions by how participants reacted, through changes from pre- to post-experiment dialecticism scores.

Reactance Analyses

*Classifying Reactance*

To classify reactions to the manipulations, I first subtracted converted pre DSS scores (converted from 7 point to 5 point Likert scores) from post DSS scores. Scores above zero show that a participant experienced a shift towards more dialectic beliefs (an inconsistency shift) through the session and scores below zero show a shift towards less dialectic beliefs (a consistency shift) through the session.  I classified these difference scores by type of shift (i.e. inconsistency shift or consistency shift) and whether these shifts were in accordance to how the manipulations were thought to work. Participants showing shifts in line with expected reactions to manipulations were classified as Non-reactant (i.e. when the Theory of Contradiction manipulation lead to an inconsistent shift or the Theory of Consistency manipulation lead to a consistency shift) and participants showing shifts out of line of expected reactions to manipulations were classified as Reactant (i.e. when the Theory of Contradiction manipulation lead to a consistency shift or the Theory of Consistency manipulation lead to an inconsistency shift).

I found that in general more participants were Non-Reactant than Reactant, with inconsistency shifts being more frequent for the Theory of Contradiction condition and consistency shifts being more frequent for the Theory

of Consistency condition, $X^2(1, N = 244) = 6.55, p = .01$ (Theory of

Contradiction: Non-Reactant (inconsistency shift) group $N = 78$, Reactant

(consistency shift) group $N = 53$; Theory of Consistency: Non-Reactant

(consistency shift) group $N = 70$, Reactant (inconsistency shift) group $N = 54$).

*Theory of Contradiction Reactance Regressions*

I ran subsequent analyses examining the potential interaction between

pre DSS and group (Group: Theory of Contradiction Non-Reactant, Theory of

Contradiction Reactant, and Control (as a baseline)) on the prediction of the SD

Index. For these analyses, I tested hierarchical linear regression models with the

main effects of group and pre DSS in the first step and the interaction between

group and pre DSS in the second step. The models compared each pairs of

conditions (i.e. Control & Theory of Contradiction Non-Reactant, Control &

Theory of Contradiction Reactant, and Theory of Contradiction Non-Reactant &

Theory of Contradiction Reactant) by dummy coding for the respective

comparisons. Of these models, I found only one to be significant, involving the

interaction between the Control condition and the Theory of Contradiction Non-

Reactant group, $b = .17, t(193) = 3.18, p = .002$. Probing the groups with simple

slopes (Figure 3), I found that there was a strong, significant positive relationship

in the Non-Reactant group between pre DSS and the SD Index, $R^2 = .18, b = .14,$

$t(77) = 4.10, p < .001$, and a non-significant positive relationship for the Reactant

group, $R^2 = .026, b = .066, t(52) = 1.19, p = .24$ (Table 2), in comparison to the

non-existing relationship for the Control condition, $R^2 = .003, b = -.024, t(119) =$

$-.63, p = .53$.

*Theory of Consistency Reactance Regressions*

Testing similar interaction models, this time examining the potential interaction between pre DSS and group (Groups: Theory of Consistency Non-Reactant, Theory of Consistency Reactant, and Control (as a baseline)), I found only one interaction model to be significant, involving the interaction between the Control condition and the Theory of Consistency Reactant group, $b = .17$, $t(169) = 2.49$, $p = .013$, although the interaction between the Theory of Consistency Non-Reactant and the Theory of Consistency Reactant groups' slopes was near significant, $b = .15$, $t(185) = 1.90$, $p = .058$. Probing the groups with simple slopes (Figure 4), I found that there was a significant positive relationship in the Theory of Consistency Reactant group between pre DSS and the SD Index, $R^2 = .10$, $b = .15$, $t(69) = 2.46$, $p = .016$, and no relationship for the Theory of Consistency Non-Reactant group, $R^2 = .000$, $b = -.007$, $t(53) = -.142$, $p = .89$ (Table 2), with a similar (no) relationship seen in the Control condition, $R^2 = .003$, $b = -.024$, $t(119) = -.63$, $p = .53$.

This analysis supports that differential reactions *did* happen in response to manipulations—the fact that a (weaker) relationship is seen in the Theory of Consistency condition between dialecticism and ambivalent answering reflects two types of reactions to the manipulation by participants [4]. The smaller Theory of Consistency Reactant group reacted in opposition to the manipulation and shows a significant relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering. This relationship is not seen in the larger Theory of Consistency Non-Reactant group which reacted in line with the manipulation. This group instead shows no

relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering—similar to the

Control condition. These results suggest that explicit consistency norms can and

do suppress individual differences, but only if participants engage those norms,

having a shift towards consistency over the session. Looking at the Theory of

Contradiction condition, I found a positive relationship between dialecticism and

ambivalent answering for both groups, although this relationship is suppressed

and non-significant in Theory of Contradiction-Reactant participants, i.e., those

who showed a consistency shift.

*Figure 3:* Simple slopes using dialecticism (Pre DSS) to predict mean ambivalent

answering (SD Index) for Theory of Contradiction Non-Reactant (inconsistency

shift) and Reactant (consistency shift) groups, in comparison to the Control

condition.

*Figure 4:* Simple slopes using dialecticism (Pre DSS) to predict mean ambivalent answering (SD Index) for Theory of Consistency Non-Reactant (consistency shift) and Reactant (inconsistency shift) groups in comparison to the Control condition.



*Table 2:* Regression summaries for simple slope regressions of dialecticism (Pre DSS) on ambivalent answering (SD Index) for Reactant and Non-Reactant groups for the Theory of Contradiction and the Theory of Consistency conditions.

| Group | Theory of Contradiction | | Theory of Consistency | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $b$ | $R^2$ | $b$ | $R^2$ |
| Non-Reactant | .14 | .18** | -.007 | .00 |
| Reactant | .066 | .026 | .15 | .10* |

$** p < .01, * p < .05$

*Self-Consciousness and Ambivalent Answering*

For my final analysis, I examined the potential interaction between self-knowledge, through Self-Consciousness (SC), and condition (Condition: Control, Theory of Contradiction, and Theory of Consistency) on the prediction of the SD Index. For these analyses, I tested hierarchical linear regression models with the main effects of condition and SC in the first step and the interaction between the two in the second step. The models compared each pairs of conditions (i.e. Control & Theory of Contradiction, Control & Theory of Consistency, and Theory of Contradiction & Theory of Consistency) by dummy coding for the respective comparisons. I found one interaction model significant, involving the interaction between the Theory of Contradiction and Theory of Consistency conditions, $b = .13$, $t(250) = 2.14$, $p = .033$. Breaking down the regressions into simple slopes (Figure 5), all turned out significant, with the Theory of Contradiction condition showing the best prediction of the SD Index with SC, followed by the Control condition, with a large drop for the Theory of Consistency (Control $R^2 = .135$, $b = .20$, $t(119) = 4.28$, $p < .001$; Theory of Contradiction $R^2 = .186$, $b = .24$, $t(119) = 5.47$, $p < .001$; Theory of Consistency $R^2 = .050$, $b = .10$, $t(119) = 2.55$, $p = .012$; Table 3). Furthermore, directly comparing the correlations against each other for the hypothesized relationships (Theory of Contradiction > Control > Theory of Consistency), I found that only the difference between the Theory of Contradiction and Theory of Consistency was significant ($p = .034$). These relationships support my hypothesis—that relationships between Self-Consciousness and ambivalent answering are present

and significant for all conditions, being strongest for the Theory of Contradiction condition, slightly (but not significantly) weaker for the Control condition, and significantly weaker for the Theory of Consistency condition.

*Figure 5*: Simple slopes using Self-Consciousness (SC) to predict mean ambivalent answering (SD Index) for all conditions.



*Table 3:* Regression summaries for simple slope regressions of Self-Consciousness (SC) on ambivalent answering (SD Index).

| | Condition | SC | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | $b$ | $R^2$ |
| SD Index | Control | .20 | .14** |
| | Theory of Contradiction | .24 | .19** |
| | Theory of Consistency | .10 | .050* |

*$**p < .01, *p < .05$*

Discussion

Testing my hypotheses, initial evidence showed mixed findings in relation to dialecticisms' relationship with ambivalent answering for the three conditions. On one hand, changing the format of the situational personality test from that of the Church et al. (2012) study to bring salience to the possibility of participants being inconsistent, while naturally putting this inconsistency at odds with implicit existing consistency norms, erased the relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering in the Control condition. On the other hand, the Theory of Consistency condition's presentation of explicit consistency norms unexpectedly did not lead to similar effects. Instead, both instructing participants to consider inconsistency or consistency norms, seemed to strengthen the relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering, albeit more so when explicit inconsistency norms were presented in the Theory of Contradiction condition.

However, when further exploring the manipulations with pre and post dialecticism scores, I found that two patterns (Reactant vs. Non-Reactant) surfaced when focusing on participants' reactions to the manipulations. While significantly more participants were Non-Reactant, reacting in line with how manipulations were expected to work (e.g. showing a shift towards inconsistency beliefs after the Theory of Contradiction manipulation and a shift towards consistency beliefs after the Theory of Consistency manipulation), many people reacted in opposite, unexpected Reactant patterns. For the Theory of Contradiction condition, the expected relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering developed when participants showed Non-Reactance

(inconsistency shifts). This relationship was still present, but greatly weakened when participants were Reactant (consistency shifts). For the Theory of Consistency condition, the expected lack of relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering showed when participants were Non-Reactant (consistency shift), but a significant relationship between dialecticism and ambivalent answering developed when participants were Reactant (inconsistency shift). Thus, my hypotheses in regards to manipulations' relationships between dialecticism and ambivalent answering *were* supported, but only when participants showed Non-reactant reactions. Furthermore, these analyses make clear a more nuanced pattern of responses to manipulations. Regardless of manipulation type, experiencing a consistency shift *weakens* relationships between dialecticism and ambivalent answering, and experiencing an inconsistency shift *strengthens* these relationships.

In addition to these findings, self-knowledge and ambivalent answering also showed expected relationships. Whereas significant relationships between self-knowledge and ambivalent answering were present in all conditions, this relationship was attenuated in the Control condition where implicit consistency norms were present, and greatly attenuated in the Theory of Consistency condition (and significantly less than the Theory of Contradiction condition) where explicit consistency norms were present. Replicating past studies, these results show that self-knowledge plays an important role in knowing inconsistent behavior (Campbell et al., 1996; Suh, 2002), but *also*, that having this knowledge is less useful when consistency norms become increasingly salient.

To interpret these results as a whole, I go back to the early days of social psychology when Lewin (1935) supported a model giving importance to both the person, the situation, and the interaction between the two. He essentially argued that while individual differences in personality are important, overarching situational contingencies can erase or alter these individual differences. The main situational constraint in my study is the salience of norms of consistency. On the surface, the order of salience of consistency norms should be (from least to most): the Theory of Contradiction condition, the Control condition, and the Theory of Consistency condition. However, the individual comes into the equation and we see a differential reaction to these offered manipulations, with participants perceiving the least consistency constraints on their selves (e.g. showing an increase in inconsistent self-beliefs through an inconsistent shift) also showing the strongest relationships between pre-existing dialectic self-beliefs and dialectic, ambivalent answering behavior. This is in stark contrast to individuals who perceived the most consistency constraints (e.g. showing an increase in consistent self-beliefs through an inconsistent shift), which show weakened relationships between dialectic self-beliefs and dialectic behavior. Self-knowledge shows a similar pattern, with individual differences in self-knowledge being least predictive of dialectic behaviors when consistency norms are most salient.

These effects attest well to Lewin's (1935) model, with the situation (e.g. salience of norms of consistency) interacting with individual differences (e.g. self-knowledge and dialecticism)—the situation erasing individual propensities when consistency norms are strongest, with individual differences becoming clearer as

these norms are increasingly shed. These results also give light to an ironic aspect of the North American situation. On the one hand, North Americans are taught to be individualist and express their unique individual natures (Triandis, 2001). On the other hand, they are taught to endorse consistency through analyticism (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), making it difficult to express aspects of their individuality.

Notably, these findings add to a growing body of research showing that individual differences do in fact play an important role in how experimental manipulations affect individuals' responses to the manipulations (Alter & Kwan, 2009; Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008; Scherer & Lambert, 2009). First off, these findings give credence to the notion that manipulations are not all experienced the same way and may result in reactions against manipulations, which I labelled Reactance, or reactions in line with manipulations, which I labelled Non-Reactance (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008; Scherer & Lambert, 2009). The unique aspect of my design is that I identify these groups through constructs that I directly manipulate and measure through self-report scores taken both pre- and post- experiment. Including such relevant pre/post measures seems prudent for future studies involving manipulations as these reactions can be used to better explain individual differences in reactions to manipulation conditions. In particular, pre-post measures might be appropriate for priming studies, as priming studies sometimes show small effects (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Such results may be attributable to the fact that some individuals might be showing reactance to priming manipulations, resulting in the attenuation of strength of results and constraining the replicability of priming findings.

My findings also give light to the fact that rather than groups of individuals experiencing similar changes due to manipulations, manipulations may also affect how individual differences measures, relate to variables of interest. Previous findings using the Ying-Yang symbol to prime dialectic behavior also showed similar manipulation effects to the current study (Alter & Kwan, 2009), that individual differences in experience lead to differential relationships with behaviors, depending on the experimental conditions. In the case of Alter & Kwan, they found that a positive relationship between dialectic behavior and time spent abroad emerged only when participants were primed with Ying-Yang symbols (possibly related to participants' development of a cross-cultural meta-perspective). Future studies involving manipulations should also measure theoretically relevant individual differences to better understand how the individual plays in various manipulations.

While a current strength of this study is that the manipulations were explicit with the purpose of allowing individual differences and reactions, and this helped us to better understand a nuanced view of how perceived norms of consistency interact with individuals, future studies should also test less explicit manipulations. Particularly, we should test whether or not such effects can still be elicited when not explicitly stated, but instead elicited implicitly through priming. While consistency may be expressed explicitly in some situations, real-life pressures to be consistent are often unspoken and purely situational in nature. Furthermore, by making the manipulation less complex through priming, we would avoid unnecessary noise that was likely added by having a manipulation

with multiple parts—with each part allowing possible different types of/reasons for reactance. Finally, as individualist and analytic main-stream North American cultural beliefs seem to be at odds with each other in our results, future studies should also measure individualism to see if individualism levels predict peoples' compliance with consistency norms.

In conclusion, I found evidence that consistency norms play an important role in individual differences in ambivalent answering in North Americans. Whereas dialecticism strongly predicts ambivalent answering in situations where norms lead people to take inconsistency to heart and experience inconsistency shifts, these individual differences are suppressed in situations where people take to consistency norms and experience consistency shifts (as well as when consistency norms are implicit), with self-knowledge's predictive nature of ambivalent answering showing similar effects, being progressively suppressed as consistency norms become increasingly salient. These findings are important for the field of cultural and personality psychology as they show that while individual differences can be important predictors of behavior, unexpectedly salient cultural norms may also be at play, greatly affecting these relationships.

Footnotes

[1] For the conversion, assumptions for my study's analyses were revisited.  For my analyses, I assume that Likert scales can be treated as interval data and parametric statistics used.   These assumptions have a long history, starting from the very conception of the Likert scale (Likert, 1932), and are still very often present in modern research using survey instruments (Norman, 2010).  However, these assumptions have been well debated (Anderson, 1961; Jamieson, 2004; Knapp, 1990; Norman, 2010), with some arguing that Likert scales are in fact ordinal and should be analyzed with non-parametric statistics as doing otherwise increases your chance of "coming to the wrong conclusion" (Jamieson, 2004; Norman, 2010). Others argue that while classifying Likert scales as being interval-scaled may be technically incorrect, parametric statistics are very robust, such that even "with small sample sizes, with unequal variances, and with non-normal distributions, (you need not) fear of coming to the wrong conclusion" (Anderson, 1961; Norman, 2010).  Norman (2010) further argues that Jamieson, while technically correct in his statement that you increase chances for error with parametric statistics, this statement fails to tell you how much your chance of error is increased, which is minimal.  These arguments in mind, I made the decision to maximize sample sizes to minimize (already small) possible errors and use parametric statistics.  To be consistent with this decision, I also assume interval scale properties in the conversion. To convert the 7-point scale to 5-points, the interval scale property of equal distance between points is taken into account and the 1 and 7 points of the 7-point Likert are set to 1 and 5, and 2 through 6

calculated as equidistant points between the end 1 and 5 points for each individual Likert rating. Scores are then averaged across converted individual ratings to give converted mean values for the scale.

[2] In addition to calculating the SD-Index as a measure of ambivalent answering, I also did analyses involving moderacy, the tendency to answer towards the middle, as prior research has found a negative relationship between moderacy and dialecticism (Hamamura et al., 2008). Moderacy was classified in these analyses through an original measure based on the distance of trait words from the Likert center point, which I call the center deviation index (CD Index). To calculate the CD Index, I took the absolute value of the difference of the mean of the six role ratings on each individual trait word from the center point on the Likert scale (3 on a scale of 1 to 5), averaging over all trait words. Lower values for the CD Index denote higher moderacy tendencies.

[3] I also ran analyses examining the potential interaction between pre DSS and condition (Condition: Control, Theory of Contradiction, and Theory of Consistency) on the prediction of the CD Index. For these analyses, I tested hierarchical linear regression models with the main effects of condition and pre DSS in the first step and the interaction between condition and pre DSS in the second step. The models compared each pairs of conditions (i.e. Control & Theory of Contradiction, Control & Theory of Consistency, and Theory of Contradiction & Theory of Consistency) by dummy coding for the respective comparisons. I found no significant interactions; however, collapsing the three conditions, I found the combined model significant, $R^2$ = .065, $b$ = -.131, $t(130)$ =

-5.11, $p < .001$, showing a positive relationship between dialecticism and moderacy (and a negative relationship with the CD Index). Furthermore, examining simple correlations between the SD Index and the CD Index for the three conditions, I found that the two are negatively related such that people with higher ambivalent answering (greater SD Indexes) also tend to show greater moderacy (lower CD Indexes; Control $r = -.234$, $p = .01$; Theory of Contradiction $r = -.414$, $p < .001$; Theory of Consistency $r = -.348$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, directly comparing the correlations for the conditions, I found no significant differences in correlations ($p > .1$). These results replicate prior findings showing a relationship between dialecticism and moderacy (Hamamura et al., 2008), as well as showing intensified situational answering styles for participants with high dialecticism scores. Those participants that tend to answer ambivalently (e.g. high SD Indexes), also tend to answer more moderately (e.g. low CD Indexes).

[4] Analyzing CD Index scores for all groups (Reactance and Non-Reactance) between the two manipulations in comparison to the Control, no further significant differences emerged. Regardless of condition or group, dialecticism is positively related to moderacy (and negatively related to the CD Index). Furthermore, regardless of condition or group, participants with higher ambivalent answering (greater SD Indexes) tend to show greater moderacy (lower CD Indexes).

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Appendix A: Manipulation and Control Instructions

Theory of Contradiction condition

Reading:

Please read the following carefully, considering how the theory and the given

examples apply to your own life.

The Theory of Contradiction

The theory of contraction states that while persons and situations may

seem to be one thing or another, they are actually very complex and may actually

contradict themselves, for example, while a sunny day may seem good at first, it

might also be bad in that it's hot, and because it's sunny you are more likely to get

sunburnt.  It also states that while a person may be one thing or do one thing in

one situation, they may contradict this in another.  For example, a person may be

nervous in a test, but it is perfectly natural for them to be relaxed in another, like

when they are on the beach.  While it is called the theory of contradiction, it does

not rule out the possibility that persons and situations may not be contradictory in

some aspects.  Instead it emphasizes that persons and situations are usually very

complex in nature.

A couple examples of this theory in work:

Take my friend Mike as one example of the above theory.  Mike is a very

hard-working man.  Every day he studies hard, resulting in a perfect 4.0 GPA.

When teachers ask him questions in class, he always answers quickly and

correctly because he is so well prepared.  While he is very hard-working, he also

spends enough time to take breaks and experience life.  He puts just as much effort into his friends and relationships, whom are all very satisfied with the time and effort he gives them.  While he is not always working hard at everything, he has a very good balance in his life and most people that know him acknowledge him for his diligent nature.

Take my friend Judith as another example.  Judith is seen as a very friendly and kind woman to her friends.  When she goes out with her friends, she goes out of her way to make sure that everyone is having fun and has all of their needs met.  If her friends have a problem, she is always there first to help out, whether they need a helping hand or just someone to talk to.  On the other hand, Judith is not as helpful when dealing with other people.  In the classroom, she's rather shy, such that when teachers ask for volunteers to help out, she never raises her hand.  On the street, when she sees someone in need of help, she just walks on by without doing anything.  When someone makes her angry, she ignores them for days on end, talking behind their backs to voice her grievances.  While she is generally thought to be a kind woman by her friends, many of her actions suggest otherwise.

Questions/writing:

Please list some situations where you were and were not talkative, explaining why you acted this way in these situations. You have 7 minutes for this task, so please be as complete as possible when you explain why you acted in these ways. In line with the theory of contradiction, please try to think of examples of where you acted talkative and where you did not.

Survey instructions:

Keeping in mind what you learned about the theory of contradiction, that you may or may not act consistently in various situations and roles, please answer the following questionnaires. As you answer, please consider various situations where you acted one way or another for the given statements before answering. (As before, think of a rating of 5 as finding strong, consistent evidence that you generally act as the statement states, the middle ratings being that you found evidence of a mix of situations where you sometimes act this way and not, and a 1 being that you found consistent evidence of your not acting this way.)

Theory of Consistency condition

Reading:

Please read the following carefully, considering how the theory and the given examples apply to your own life.

The Theory of Consistency

The theory of consistency states that while persons and situations may seem to be very contradictory, they are actually very simple and consistent in nature and generally continue this reality across situations. For example, if the weather is doing nice today, this is then the best available predictor of the future of the weather (besides the weatherman). It also states that past behavior for a person in one situation is a good predictor of their behavior in future situations.

For example, if a person shows good nature in class, they are likely to be kind in other situations, like when they pass a person in need on the street.  While it is called the theory of consistency, it does not rule out the possibility that persons and situations may not be consistent in some aspects.  Instead it emphasizes that snapshots of persons and situations tend to good predictors of future events, and that people and situations are generally consistent.

A couple examples of this theory in work:

Take my friend Mike as one example of the above theory.  Mike is a very hard-working man.  Every day he studies hard, resulting in a perfect 4.0 GPA.  When teachers ask him questions in class, he always answers quickly and correctly because he is so well prepared.  While he is very hard-working, he also spends enough time to take breaks and experience life.  He puts just as much effort into his friends and relationships, whom are all very satisfied with the time and effort he gives them, although he does hold back if he has other obligations/preferences.  While he is not always working hard at everything, he is generally hard-working and most people that know him acknowledge him for his diligent nature.

Take my friend Judith as another example.  Judith is seen as a very friendly and kind woman to her friends.  When she goes out with her friends, she goes out of her way to make sure that everyone is having fun and has all of their needs met.  If her friends have a problem, she is always there first to help out, whether they need a helping hand or just someone to talk to.  Things don't stop there.  In the classroom, she's the first to volunteer when teachers ask for

volunteers to help out, always raising her hand without hesitation. On the street, when she sees someone in need of help, she immediately stops, giving as much effort as possible to those persons in need. Even when someone makes her angry, she does her best to resolve the situation quickly and make the situation comfortable. People that meet Judith agree that she is a very kind woman. .

Writing:

Please list some situations that are good examples of how you describe your level of talkativeness, explaining why you acted this way in these situations. You have 7 minutes for this task, so please be as complete as possible when you explain why you acted in these ways. In line with the theory of consistency, please try to think of examples that show your consistency in how talkative you see yourself.

Survey instructions:

Keeping in mind what you learned about the theory of consistency, that people generally show consistency across various situations and roles, please answer the following questionnaires. As you answer, please consider various situations where you acted one way or another for the given statements before answering. (As before, think of a rating of 5 as finding strong, consistent evidence that you generally act as the statement states, the middle ratings being that you found evidence of a mix of situations where you sometimes act this way and not, and a 1 being that you found consistent evidence of your not acting this way.)

Control condition

Survey instructions:

Please answer the following questionnaires.  As you answer, please consider various situations where you acted one way or another for the given statements before answering. As before, think of a rating of 5 as finding strong, consistent evidence that you generally act as the statement states, the middle ratings being that you found evidence of a mix of situations where you sometimes act this way and not, and a 1 being that you found consistent evidence of your not acting this way.

Appendix B: Dialectic Self-Scale (DSS)

Dialectical Self Scale

Please rate the following statements on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

1---------------2---------------3--------------4--------------5---------------6------------7

Strongly disagree                     Neither                     Strongly agree

1.      I always try to be the same around my family as I am around my friends (reversed).

2.      When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with both.

3.      I believe my habits are hard to change (reversed).

4.      I believe my personality will stay the same all of my life. (reversed)

5.      I often change the way I am, depending on who I am with.

6       I often find that things will contradict each other.

7       If I've made up my mind about something, I stick to it. (reversed)

8       I have a definite set of beliefs, which guide my behavior at all times. (reversed)

9       I have a strong sense of who I am and don't change my views when others disagree with me. (reversed)

10      The way I behave usually has more to do with immediate circumstances than with my personal preferences.

11    My outward behaviors reflect my true thoughts and feelings. (reversed)

12    I sometimes believe two things that contradict each other.

13    I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change under different

      contexts.

14    I find that my values and beliefs will change depending on who I am with.

15    My world is full of contradictions that cannot be resolved.

16    I am constantly changing and am different from one time to the next.

17    I usually behave according to my principles. (reversed)

18    I prefer to compromise than to hold on to a set of beliefs.

19    I can never know for certain that any one thing is true.

20    If there are two opposing sides to an argument, they can not both be right.

      (reversed)

21    My core beliefs don't change much over time. (reversed)

22    Believing two things that contradict each other is illogical. (reversed)

23    I sometimes find that I am a different person by the evening than I was in

      the morning.

24    I find that if I look hard enough, I can figure out which side of a

      controversial issue is right. (reversed)

25    For most important issues, there is one right answer. (reversed)

26    I find that my world is relatively stable and consistent. (reversed)

27    When two sides disagree, the truth is always somewhere in the middle.

28    When I am solving a problem, I focus on finding the truth. (reversed)

29    If I think I am right, I am willing to fight to the end (reversed).

30    I have a hard time making up my mind about controversial issues.

31    When two of my friends disagree, I usually have a hard time deciding which of them is right.

32    There are always two sides to everything, depending on how you look at it.

Contradiction (e.g., "When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with both")

| 2 | | When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with both |
|----|---|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| 6 | | I often find that things will contradict each other. |
| 12 | | I sometimes believe two things that contradict each other. |
| 15 | | My world is full of contradictions that cannot be resolved. |
| 19 | | I can never know for certain that any one thing is true |
| 20 | R | If there are two opposing sides to an argument, they can not both be right. |
| 22 | R | Believing two things that contradict each other is illogical. (reversed) |

| 24 | R | I find that if I look hard enough, I can figure out which side of a controversial issue is right. (reversed) |
| 25 | R | For most important issues, there is one right answer. (reversed) |
| 27 | | When two sides disagree, the truth is always somewhere in the middle. |
| 28 | R | When I am solving a problem, I focus on finding the truth  (reversed)  . |
| 30 | | I have a hard time making up my mind about controversial issues. |
| 31 | | When two of my friends disagree, I usually have a hard time deciding which of them is right. |
| 32 | | There are always two sides to everything, depending on how you look at it. |

Cognitive Change (e.g., "I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change under different contexts")

| 4 | R | I believe my personality will stay the same all of my life. (reversed) |
| 8 | R | I have a definite set of beliefs, which guide my behavior at all times. (reversed) |
| 9 | R | I have a strong sense of who I am and don't change my views when others disagree with me. (reversed) |

| 13 | | I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change under different contexts. |
|----|---|---|
| 14 | | I find that my values and beliefs will change depending on who I am with. |
| 16 | | I am constantly changing and am different from one time to the next. |
| 18 | | I prefer to compromise than to hold on to a set of beliefs. |
| 21 | R | My core beliefs don't change much over time. (reversed) |
| 26 | R | I find that my world is relatively stable and consistent. (reversed) |
| 29 | R | If I think I am right, I am willing to fight to the end (reversed). |

Behavioral Change (e.g., "I often change the way I am, depending on who I am with")

| 1 | R | I always try to be the same around my family as I am around my friends (reversed). |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | R | I believe my habits are hard to change (reversed). |
| 5 | | I often change the way I am, depending on who I am with. |
| 7 | R | If I've made up my mind about something, I stick to it. (reversed) |
| 10 | | The way I behave usually has more to do with immediate circumstances than with my personal preferences. |

| 11 | R | My outward behaviors reflect my true thoughts and feelings. (reversed) |
|---|---|---|
| 17 | R | I usually behave according to my principles. (reversed) |
| 23 | | I sometimes find that I am a different person by the evening than I was in the morning. |

Appendix C: Self-Consciousness (SC)

Private self-consciousness

1. I'm always trying to figure myself out.

2. I think about myself a lot.

3. I often daydream about myself.

4. I never take a hard look at myself.     (Reversed)

5. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.

6. I'm constantly thinking about my reasons for doing things.

7. I sometimes step back (in my mind) in order to examine myself from a distance.

8. I'm quick to notice changes in my mood.

9. I know the way my mind works when I work through a problem.

Public self-consciousness

10. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.

11. I care a lot about how I present myself to others.

12. I'm self-conscious about the way I look.

13. I usually worry about making a good impression.

14. Before I leave my house, I check how I look.

15. I'm concerned about what other people think of me.

16. I'm usually aware of my appearance.

Appendix D: Manipulation Check Items

Use of Information Items

1.  In today's surveys, I considered various situations associated with the statements before rating myself on them.

2.  I used a considerable amount of information before rating myself on the the various statements in the surveys.

Perception of Self-Consistency Items

1.  I am generally very consistent in my behaviours.

2.  I am generally very consistent across situations in how I act.

3.  Inconsistency in my past behaviours influenced how I rated myself on the statements today.      (Reversed)