THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

ROSENAU'S PRE-THEORIES: THE DIEFENBAKER DILEMMA ON NUCLEAR WARHEADS

by

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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine James N. Rosenau's "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" and to apply his framework of foreign policy analysis to the question of acquisition of nuclear warheads by Canada in the period 1957-1963. The overall objective is to find a theoretical framework which will be useful in explaining why a particular foreign policy decision was made or not made.

This is to be a one-country, one-issue study.

The proposition that is to be tested is as follows. If a country is small, with a developed economy and an open polity, and with a penetrated society, then in the status issue-area, the most influential factor in determining a foreign policy will be the systemic variable, the next most influential will be the societal.

It will be seen from the proposition that the concern is with relative potencies of variables, and that of the five that Rosenau identifies, i.e., systemic, role, governmental, societal, and idiosyncratic, two are singled out for scrutiny, the most potent and the second most potent. The other variables are almost entirely ignored from an empirical standpoint.

In order to understand the origin of the hypothesis and some of its theoretical underpinnings, the first task is to explicate Rosenau's conceptual framework, to interpret what he has said, to point out logical inconsistencies, and to explore operationalization of the concepts in the hypothesis.

Then, the domestic political situation and the international setting of the period are examined in an attempt to provide some background to this issue which is to be the test case.

The third chapter concerns itself with the verification of the initial conditions of the proposition and the fourth with the verification of the deductive consequences. The tentative conclusion drawn from an examination of the evidence is that the particular case chosen for study provides a partial disconfirmation of the hypothesis.

In the final chapter, an attempt is made to salvage the hypothesis. While some interesting aspects of the issue do come to the surface in this endeavour, overall, the stratagem is deemed inadequate. The hypothesis is then abandoned and a new one is suggested in its place. Finally, some assessment is made of the utility of Rosenau's theory in the light of insights gained from the study of this one issue in one country. Throughout the paper, note is made of avenues for further thought and inquiry.

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CHAPTER I

EXPLICATION OF THE THEORY

During John Diefenbaker's term of office as prime minister of Canada, an issue arose that was to provoke "one of the stormiest controversies in the nation's history,"[1] and was to promote "[one] of the few great debates on foreign policy in Canadian history."[2] It was an issue which was to command the attention of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as that of the North Atlantic Alliance. It was an issue which was to stir up some Canadians to a high pitch of political activity, an issue which was to cause political parties to agonize over their policies, in some cases almost causing them to fragment in the process. This issue was the acquisition of nuclear warheads by Canada for a series of weapon systems which were to become operational at varying times between 1961 and 1963.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt an evaluation of James N. Rosenau's theory of foreign policy by using this issue of acquisition of nuclear warheads as a specific test case. The issue is viewed in the foreign policy context because "Canadian defence policy derives directly from our foreign policy and is designed to insure national security and the preservation of world peace."[3] The hope is that this case will provide a confirmatory instance of Rosenau's theory so that it may have some immediate utility, that is to aid in explaining and understanding the very issue that is being used as a test case. As a

long range goal it is hoped that as the theory becomes more highly confirmed, it will be found useful in describing and explaining a wide range of foreign policy decisions that have already occurred, and even in predicting which variables will be most significant in particular foreign policy issues in the future.

In making an evaluation of Rosenau's theory, a hypothesis is drawn from the theory and an attempt is made to test this hypothesis within the limits of resources available. "A statement is functioning as a hypothesis if it is taken as a premise,in order that its logical consequences can be examined and compared with facts that can be ascertained by observation."[4] It is the hypothetico-deductive type of argument that is being used in this paper. As it is frequently characterized, the hypothetico-deductive method has the following steps:

1. Setting up a hypothesis.
2. Deducing consequences from the hypothesis.
3. Checking by observation to see whether these consequences are true.
4. Arguing inductively from the truth of the consequences to the truth of the hypothesis.

The basic schema for step 4, which is the goal of the method, is:

If the hypothesis is true, then the prediction is true.

The prediction is true.

Therefore the hypothesis is true.[5]

Wesley Salmon says, however, that the above schema, while an indispensable part of the argument, does not adequately characterize the con-

firmation of scientific hypotheses, and he goes on to expand it by the addition of other premises, and says that to be inductively correct, the hypothetico-deductive method must have the following form:

> The hypothesis has a non-negligible prior probability [meaning that the hypothesis sounds reasonable or plausible, independent of the confirmation in the present instance].
>
> If the hypothesis is true, then the observational prediction is true.
>
> The observational prediction is true.
>
> No other hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the truth of the observational prediction, that is, other hypothesis for which the same observational prediction is a confirmatory instance have lower prior probabilities.
>
> Therefore the hypothesis is true.[6]

He then concludes, "this is an inductively correct form, and it correctly schematizes many important scientific arguments."[7]

If on the other hand the observational prediction is found to be false, what can be said about the argument? "A valid deductive argument, with a false conclusion must have at least one false premise."[8] This argument, a case of denying the consequent, is schematized in the following manner:

> If the hypothesis is true, then the prediction is true (since we are assuming the statements of initial conditions are true).
>
> The prediction is not true.
>
> Therefore, the hypothesis is not true.[9]

A fairly large number of variables will be involved in the initial conditions and the observational predictions of this hypothesis, and the

question arises as to how these variables are to be verified. Where Rosenau suggests operational tests, these will be used, where other researchers have made significant findings, these will be used, and where no guidelines are provided, extensive examination of the information available will be made. While verification with certainty may be difficult, it is intended that at least some rough assessments will be possible.

However, before the hypothesis can be proposed and its logical consequences examined, it is important to have some understanding of the general framework that Rosenau has devised. Rosenau, an American political scientist, is of the opinion that while there is a considerable amount of data on foreign policy formulation, foreign policy analysis is devoid of theory that attempts to bring some order to the mass of findings. As he says in his article in Barry Farrell's Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, "foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations that treat societies as actors subject to stimuli which produce external responses."10

Rosenau does more than lament the lack of theory in the study of foreign policy, he proposes a framework for analysis which he calls a pre-theory of foreign policy. His basic concern is the location of causation in international affairs. Having in mind such agents of causation as human beings, political roles, governmental structures, societal processes and the action of other states, he wants not only to identify the causal factors of particular foreign policies, but also the degree to which each causal factor is operative in a particular

foreign policy situation, i.e., what is the impact of each factor. Rosenau proposes a five dimensional theory of foreign policy and says that the external behaviour of states can be explained by examining five clusters of variables. He first lists these five variables "in order of increasing temporal and spatial distance from the external behaviour for which they serve as sources,. . ."[11] as idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic variables.

The question now arises concerning the target of the forces of these five variables. Rosenau clearly envisions decision-makers in his schema for analyzing the process for foreign policy-making, and he talks about the variables having an influence on these "decision-makers", "officials" and "foreign policy officials."[12] To this point, then, his framework may be represented in the following diagram.

FIGURE I. Variables Arranged in Order of Increasing Temporal and Spatial Distance from Decision-Makers.



What, then, is meant by each of these terms, systemic, idiosyncratic, and so forth? The first, the idiosyncratic, is not an external variable but an internal one. It is something that is within the decision-maker himself, part of his intellectual impedimenta, and includes "values, talents and prior experiences . . ."[13] What Rosenau has in mind seems similar to McClosky's proposal of "personality predispositions"[14] and Brecher's discussion of "'motivation' which embraces psychological, personality, and value factors that influence the actors, enter the process, and affect its outcome."[15]

At the same time, when Rosenau delineates the idiosyncratic variable in terms of the aspects of a decision-maker "that distinguish his foreign policy choices or behavior from those of every other decision-maker,"[16] it is believed that he casts the net too widely. He previously argues that foreign policy choices or foreign policy behavior is the result of a number of variables; now he seems to be saying that foreign policy choices are the result of the idiosyncratic variable.

However, from his extensional definitions, e.g. John Foster Dulles' religious values, Charles De Gaulle's vision of a glorious France, and the political skills of Khrushchev, one gets a better idea of what is meant by idiosyncratic. If idiosyncratic is thought of as the views, feelings, talents, peculiar to a person, then it is taken that Rosenau means that the idiosyncratic variable includes all those intellectual aspects of a decision-maker that distinguish him, not his policy choices, from other decision-makers.

Because idiosyncratic is an internal variable and because every decision-maker will have his own unique idiosyncratic impedimenta, this is a variable, unlike the others, that will be a part of every decision. The extent to which it is important may be gauged by an examination of a large number of decisions to establish if there is a dominant trait that seems to give all decisions, or all decisions in a certain area, a particular bias.

The role variable as a source of foreign policy, according to Rosenau, refers to the position the decision-maker occupies, be it prime minister, foreign minister, under-secretary or ambassador, and so forth. This variable as set out by Rosenau raises a couple of serious questions. Can role be sufficiently distinguished from idiosyncratic and governmental factors to make it a testable variable? Indeed, is role not another way of designating the decision-maker, and if so, is it not a target of the causal factors rather than a factor itself? Admittedly, the role may govern the level of competency for making decisions, but one questions whether it would have an effect on the decision itself.

Interestingly, in a later section of his article Rosenau manipulates the variables in an actual case, that of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in April of 1961. He says:

> Would any President have undertaken to oust the Castro regime upon assuming office in 1961? If so, how much potency should be attributed to such role-derived variables? Suppose everything else about the circumstances of April 1961 were unchanged except that Warren Harding or Richard Nixon occupied the White House; would the invasion have occurred?[17]

It seems that Rosenau, himself, has difficulty in differentiating

role variable from decision-makers on the one hand and the idiosyncratic on the other. When he speaks of John Kennedy, Warren Harding, and Richard Nixon, Rosenau is clearly referring to the idiosyncratic variable, not the "role-derived variables", because the role has remained constant. Questions which would have had meaning here outside of the idiosyncratic context are: How would a President have decided? How would a Foreign Minister have decided? But in attempting to differentiate role from idiosyncratic, the result is that role is made more closely identified with decision-maker. The contention here is that role is the name given to the decision-maker in a particular governmental system in a certain situation.

Concerning governmental variables, Rosenau states that they "refer to those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers."[18] Cabinet vs. presidential government would be one of those aspects of governmental structure. Powers allocated by a constitution would be another.

Michael Brecher subsumes the governmental variable under "political structure" in his framework and says that it "denotes in part the political institutions and constitutional matrix in which authoritative decisions are made."[19]

The societal variable, a broad one indeed, "consists of those nongovernmental aspects of a society which influence its external behavior."[20] Included in this variable are such components as the degree of national unity and homogeneity, major value orientations,

levels of education, and capacity for organization. This variable, which could be likened to the tides in the ocean, might be manifested by such devices as letters to the editor, letters to government officials, editorials, public opinion surveys, and elections. However, judging the strength and direction of this variable could be a major problem.

That cluster of variables which Rosenau groups under the title of systemic would "include any nonhuman aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials."[21] It is important here to realize that he includes under systemic both intra-national nonhuman factors such as geography as well as extra-national factors such as challenges from aggressors and such actions of other states.

Brecher, on the other hand, makes quite a clear distinction between the external and internal environment in his research design,[22] and McClelland makes the same point when he discusses "internal setting" and "external setting".[23] Modelski illuminates the complexity of the problem by detailing some of the factors that might be included under each of the headings of intra- and extra-national components of Rosenau's single category of the systemic variable. To paraphrase Modelski,[24] there are the nonhuman components of internal power input, in which is included the national territory, the fact of its existence, its size, airspace and natural resources; the strategic placement of the territory; the equipment, that is, the buildings, the military hardware, the atomic stockpiles, and so forth; the transportation and communica-

tions facilities; and the industrial complex. He is making the distinction here between nonhuman components and human components of internal power input. In addition, he speaks of the external power inputs, which he describes as a consequence of actions of other states. He includes a variety of enterprises under this heading of external power inputs: diplomatic support, for example, an expression of approval in a press conference at another state's action; diplomatic representations to another state; support of another state's proposal at an international conference such as the United Nations; assistance by another state's organizations, as exemplified by exchange of information by the intelligence agencies of two states or advice from a military staff; support action of individuals and groups in other states, for example, Communist parties all over the world support the foreign policy of the Soviet Union; and finally, receipt of goods and equipment from another state, such as foreign aid and military equipment.

That Rosenau combines, perhaps unwillingly,[25] this plethora of intra- and extra-national factors in one concept will certainly make testing of the variable difficult for there is no guarantee that such factors as type of frontier, strategic location of the state, distance from other states, arable land, natural resources and energy resources will always act in the same direction or with the same potency on decision-makers as will such actions of other states as threats, warnings, acts of force and violence, complaints, protests, accusations, denials, requests, proposals, appeals and refusals.

While Figure I shows the variables in temporal and spatial rela-

tionship to the decision-makers, Rosenau does not mean to imply that the arrangement represents the relative potency of the variables. However, the reasonableness of viewing potencies as a function of the closeness of the variables to the decision-maker makes this proposition appealing, a point that might be worth investigating at a later time. What Rosenau does is to set out a series of conditions under which the five variables may be ranked according to their potency as causal factors of foreign policy. The conditions he deems important are the size of the country, the stage of the economy and the state of the polity. His aim is to classify countries as either large or small on the basis of their geography and physical resources, to classify them as having either a developed or an underdeveloped economy, and as having an open or a closed polity. Although he does provide some guidelines for categorizing a country under the first condition, he leaves the reader to his own devices for deciding whether a country has a developed or underdeveloped economy and an open or a closed polity. While it may be thought that Rosenau is being unduly restrictive in making such rigid distinctions between large and small country, open and closed polity, from his use of the phrase "these three continua . . ."[26] to describe the three conditions, it is quite evident that he sees the classification as a matter of degree. He will later add two more conditions, the degree of penetration of the system and issue area, but for purposes of understanding how the theory is built up, it seems best to introduce these new concepts a step at a time.

Although Rosenau mentions only briefly in a footnote his reasons

FIGURE 2

An Abbreviated Presentation of the Author's Pre-Theory of Foreign Policy, in Which Five Sets of Variables Underlying the External Behavior of Societies Are Ranked According to Their Relative Potencies in Eight Types of Societies.

Geography and physical resources	Large Country				Small Country			
State of the economy	Developed		Underdeveloped		Developed		Underdeveloped	
State of the polity	Open	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Closed
Rankings of the variables	Role Societal Governmental Systemic Idiosyncratic	Role Idiosyncratic Governmental Systemic Societal	Idiosyncratic Role Societal Systemic Governmental	Idiosyncratic Role Governmental Systemic Societal	Role Systemic Societal Governmental Idiosyncratic	Role Systemic Idiosyncratic Governmental Societal	Idiosyncratic Systemic Role Societal Governmental	Idiosyncratic Systemic Role Governmental Societal
Illustrative examples	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	India	Red China	Holland	Czechoslovakia	Kenya	Ghana

for ranking the variables as he does (See Figure 2), it seems worthwhile to explore in a little more detail his rationale for the rankings. Firstly, he links the idiosyncratic and role variables to the state of the economy, the idiosyncratic being of high potency in underdeveloped and role being of high potency in developed countries. He reasons: "the potency of an idiosyncratic factor is assumed to be greater in less developed economies (there being fewer restraints which bureaucracy and large-scale organization impose in more developed economies), . . . for the same reason a role variable is accorded greater potency in more developed economies . . . ."[27] Of the second set of variables he says, "a societal variable is considered to be more potent in open polities than in closed ones (there being a greater need for officials in the latter to heed nongovernmental demands than in the former), and that for the same reason governmental variables are more potent than societal variables in closed polities than in open ones."[28] Of the systemic he says, "the potency of a systemic variable is considered to vary inversely with the size of the country (there being greater resources available to larger countries and thus lesser dependence on the international system than is the case with smaller countries) . . . ."[29]

Rosenau's manner of linking certain variables with certain conditions may be shown in schematic form (See Figure 3.) From this design it is evident that Rosenau sees a special relationship, perhaps an antithesis, between idiosyncratic and role, between governmental and societal. The idea of an antithetic relationship is an interesting one and one that could be explored and perhaps expanded upon at some later time.

FIGURE 3. A Schema Relating Variables to Conditions.

Stage of Development	idiosyncratic	∞	underdeveloped economy
	role	∞	developed economy
State of Polity	governmental	∞	closed polity
	societal	∞	open polity
Size of Country	systemic	∞	small country

A difficulty in Rosenau's ranking of the variables presents itself when one considers at one and the same time three conditions for a country. If one posits a small country with underdeveloped economy and closed polity, not unusual conditions in today's world, then the three variables having greatest potency in influencing foreign policy would seem to be systemic, idiosyncratic and governmental. If the conditions and variables are diagrammed, (See Figure 4), with the conditions forming 3 axes, and the variables plotted against these axes, the variables --governmental, systemic and idiosyncratic-- would seem to be of equal potency (arbitrarily shown as having a potency of 4 on the diagram), yet Rosenau, in Figure 2, for no apparent reason, places the idiosyncratic variable in the position of most potency. If conditions of size, economy and polity are equal, there seems to be no logical reason for elevating one

FIGURE 4

Potency of Variables



of these variables over the other two. As an added consideration, the three variables should, for the conditions proposed, at least be at the top of the list, yet it is seen in looking at Rosenau's grid (Figure 2) that role, a variable of high potency in a developed country, is ranked before governmental, a variable of high potency in a closed polity.

To the basic framework of his theory, Rosenau next adds two more conditions which he says are interrelated. Firstly, he proposes a new kind of political system, the penetrated system, and secondly, he considers the place of issue-areas in the overall structure.

That this is an important addition to the theory is attested by other writers. Benson speaks of Rosenau's "two key concepts of issue areas and penetrated societies."[30] McClelland sees fit to mention one of the concepts in his chapter on "System Analysis" when he says:

> James N. Rosenau has urged that research be directed even more closely than hitherto to specific phenomena. So little is known about the means by which the parts of the international system are maintained, held together, broken apart, and restructured that he believes that such narrowing of attention to detail is warranted. He proposed that the term issue-area be used to specify those sectors of the system where the interactions are thought to be closely interrelated and therefore most profitably studied by systems analysis.[31]

Michael Brecher, et al., describe the additions in this way:

> The Rosenau model also includes two innovative concepts: a "penetrated political system" whose essential trait is the shortage of capabilities which creates dependence and facilitates penetration; and the "issue-area," an intriguing category to delineate types of foreign policy problems and decisions.[32]

In explicating penetrated political system, Rosenau defines it as "one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals."[33]

Rosenau makes the distinction between a penetrated political system in which foreign powers, foreign nationals, formal international organ-

izations, and organized transnational movements operate jointly with members of the ego-state on the one hand and on the other, the international system in which non-members act autonomously, indirectly and non-authoritatively in attempting to influence a state's course of action. He gives as examples of "thoroughgoing penetrated systems" Viet Nam with its American "advisers," occupied Japan after World War II, and the communist bloc countries. He says that the role of American citizens, companies and officials in pre-Castro Cuba, and American officials in Thailand are "significant" examples of penetration.

The key to operationalizing this concept seems to be whether the non-members act jointly with members of the ego-state or whether they act autonomously, indirectly, and non-authoritatively. Using this criterion, then, one would suppose that the handing of a diplomatic note to a foreign office by an ambassador would not be an example of penetration, but the representations of a delegation of heads of corporations, half of which are domestic and half multinational, would be an example of penetration.

The question now arises as to why penetration occurs. Rosenau says that "penetrated systems are characterized by a shortage of capabilities on the part of the penetrated society and that an effort to compensate for, or take advantage of, this shortage underlies the participation of non-members in its politics."[34] The shortage he speaks of may be of an economic nature, of a military nature or may stem from a lack of social cohesion. Whatever the deficiency, it seems that the members of the penetrated society look upon the penetration by non-

members as being legitimate.

He also examines the other side of the coin, the situation in which a country has an abundance of a particular commodity. "Just as a society's shortages lead nonmembers to participate in its politics, so does the existence of plenitude serve to attract participation by nonmembers who wish to obtain either financial aid or political support."[35] Penetration in this case occurs because of a desire to influence decisions concerning allocation of the abundant commodity.

Rosenau makes one final point about penetration; it may be all-encompassing, in Rosenau's words "thoroughgoing penetration" in which the attempt is made to influence a large number of a nation's values, or it may be restricted to one narrow aspect, i.e., a single issue, which he calls "significant penetration". Thus he speaks of multi-issue or single-issue penetrated systems.

Rosenau's final condition is that of issue-area. Drawing from research in domestic politics,[36] he maintains that in foreign policy formulation, as well, the nature of the issue will be a crucial factor in deciding how the five variables will affect the foreign policy decision-makers.

He defines issue-area as "a cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which leads the affected or potentially affected to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that they engage in distinctive behaviour designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values."[37]

In posing certain questions, viz., how should the matters that lead to differences of opinion be grouped, at what level of abstraction should they be conceived, and how is the behaviour evoked by one issue-area distinctive from that stimulated by other issue-areas, he creates a simple typology of four issue areas, territorial, status, human resources and non-human resources. By choosing these four, he hopes for a level of abstraction broad enough to cover issues that extend from the local to the international system and yet narrow enough for each to have an identity separate from the others.

If local governments, national governments and the international system are thought of as horizontal systems, as shown in figure 5, then Rosenau envisions issue-areas as being vertical, from the local level through the national to the international level.

FIGURE 5. Horizontal Systems and Vertical Issue-Areas.



He further contemplates that an issue in a particular issue-area could have its genesis at any level and could either be confined to that level or extended to other levels. For example, the portrait on a ten dollar bill is strictly a national issue in Canada whereas the issue of transportation subsidies to wheat producers is of concern to the government of the Province of Saskatchewan, the Canadian Federal Government, as well as to the World Wide Grains Group.

In answering his third question concerning the distinctive behaviour evoked by each issue-area, Rosenau looks at three aspects of behaviour, the number of actors affected, the intensity of motivation to act, and the degree of interaction. He says that "the four issue-areas were derived from an impression that the motives, actions, and interactions of political actors are crucially related to the degree of tangibility of both values which have to be allocated and the means which have to be employed to effect allocation."[38] Although he does not make it explicit, what he appears to be doing is using tangibility of ends and means as an indicator of issue-areas through the common medium of behaviour of the actors.[39] Firstly, the lesser the tangibility of the ends, the more actors there will be affected and active, "(since tangibility involves specificty, and thus the aspirations of a greater number of actors are likely to be encompassed by issues in which intangible goals are at stake)."[40] As an example, more people would be affected by the issue of <u>peace</u> than by the issue of provision of a nuclear generating station for India. Secondly, the greater the tangibility of means, the more the affected actors would be motivated and

persistently active, "(since the rewards and costs to the actor of allocating a particular cluster of values are likely to be clearer the more easily comprehensible are the means necessary to realize the values)."[41] In other words, if money is to be spent, the people concerned will be more intensely interested than if no money is to be spent in achieving a particular foreign policy. Thirdly, he says that "the greater the tangibility of both the ends and means involved in an allocative process, the more the tendency to bargain among the affected actors would increase."[42] He believes that the extent to which actors are ready to bargain is closely associated with the degree of interaction.

By an intuitive process, he then presents a matrix for relating tangibility of means and ends to the four issue areas mentioned (Figure 6). The operational test given for tangibility of means is whether money has to be spent to acquire the values in question, and the measure of tangibility of ends is whether the value can be photographed with a camera.

Rosenau then draws

> specific conclusions about distinctive characteristics of at least two of the issue-areas. On the one hand, the status area, being composed of both intangible ends and means, is likely to evoke more uncompromising political behaviour on the part of more actors than any of the other three; on the other hand, the non-human resources area, being composed of both tangible ends and means, is likely to evoke more bargaining on the part of fewer actors than any of the other areas.[43]

Finally, stressing the importance of the conditions of penetrated political system and issue-area in foreign policy formulation, Rosenau

FIGURE 6. Matrix of Means and Ends in Issue-Areas.



now meshes the two new concepts with his theory (see Figure 7). He says that in penetrated systems the systemic variable will take on added importance and in his revised grid he raises the systemic one place in potency for penetrated systems. In the status issue-area, societal variables are elevated one notch, "because more members of the system are likely to be aroused to make more uncomprising demands,"[43] and for the nonhuman resource issue-area, societal variables are lowered one place in the ranking. Human resource and territorial areas are combined into one category and the ranking of the five variables for the new combined category is left unchanged from the preliminary grid.

FIGURE 7

A Further Elaboration of the Author's Pre-Theory of Foreign Policy, in Which Five Sets Of Variables Underlying the External Behavior of Societies are Ranked According to Their Relative Potencies in Sixteen Types of Societies and Three Types of Issue-Areas.

Large Country																	
Developed Economy									Underdeveloped Economy								
Open Polity						Closed Polity						Open Polity					
Penetrated			Non-Penetrated			Penetrated			Non-Penetrated			Penetrated			Non-Penetrated			Penetrated			Non-Penetrated		
status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas
so	r	r	so	r	r	r	r	r	r	r	r	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i	i
r	sy	so	r	g	so	i	i	i	i	i	i	r	r	r	so	r	r	r	r	r	r	r	r
sy	so	sy	g	so	g	g	g	g	so	g	g	so	sy	sy	r	sy	so	sy	sy	sy	g	g	g
g	g	g	sy	sy	sy	so	sy	sy	g	sy	so	sy	g	so	sy	so	sy	so	g	g	so	sy	sy
i	i	i	i	i	i	sy	so	so	sy	so	sy	g	so	g	g	g	g	g	so	so	sy	so	so
Variables: i=idiosyncratic r=role g=governmental so=societal sy=systemic																	

FIGURE 7 (cont'd)

Small Country																	
Developed Economy									Underdeveloped Economy								
Open Polity					Closed Polity				Open Polity						Closed Polity		
Penetrated			Non-Penetrated			Penetrated			Non-Penetrated			Penetrated			Non-Penetrated		
status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas	status area	nonhuman resource area	other areas
sy	sy	sy	r	r	r	sy	sy	sy	r	r	r	sy	sy	sy	i	i	i	sy	sy	sy	i	i	i
so	r	r	so	sy	sy	r	r	r	sy	sy	sy	i	i	i	sy	sy	sy	i	i	i	sy	sy	sy
r	g	so	sy	g	so	i	i	i	i	i	i	so	r	r	so	r	r	r	r	r	r	r	r
g	so	g	g	so	g	so	g	g	so	g	g	r	g	sso	r	g	so	so	g	g	so	g	g
i	i	i	i	i	i	g	so	so	g	so	so	g	so	g	g	so	g	g	so	so	g	so	so

Variables: i=idiosyncratic r=role g=governmental so=societal sy=systemic

Leading from Rosenau's theory the following hypothesis is proposed.

If a country is small, with a developed economy and an open polity, and with a penetrated political system, then in the status issue-area, the most influential variable acting on the decision-makers to determine foreign policy will be the systemic, the next most influential will be the societal.

Canada is a small country with developed economy and open polity, and with a penetrated political system. The issue of acquisition of nuclear warheads in the period 1957 - 1963 was in the status issue-area.

Therefore, the most influential variable acting on the decision-makers in the decision concerning the acquisition of nuclear warheads was the systemic, the next most influential was the societal variable.

In using the issue of the acquisition by Canada of nuclear warheads for certain weapons during the period 1957 - 1963 as a test of the hypothesis, part of the task will be to verify the initial conditions, i.e., is Canada a small country, does it have a well developed economy and an open polity, is it a penetrated political system; and part of the task will consist of attempting to verify the deductive consequences of the hypothesis. But before these two undertakings are tackled, it would seem beneficial to have some understanding of the larger picture of which the issue of acquisition of nuclear arms by Canada is but a part.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Peyton V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 76.

[2]Richard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs, 1959 to 1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 40.

[3]Ibid., p. 41, quoting the opening statement in the Defence White Papers issued by the Minister of National Defence in both 1959 and 1960.

[4]Wesley C. Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 77.

[5]Ibid., p. 81.

[6]Ibid., p. 85.

[7]Ibid., p. 86.

[8]Ibid., p. 80.

[9]Ibid.

[10]James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. by R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 32.

[11]Ibid., p. 43.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Oliver Benson, "Challenges for Research in International Relations and Comparative Politics," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. by R. Barry Farrell, p. 345.

[15]Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (1969), p. 77, discussing the Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin model.

[16]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 43.

[17]Ibid., p. 45.

[18]Ibid., p. 43.

[19]Brecher, et al., "Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," p. 84.

[20]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 43.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Brecher, et al., "Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," p. 80.

[23]Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 108.

[24]George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), pp. 28-38.

[25]In pointing up the difficulty of measuring the diverse components within the confines of one variable, one can speculate on the reason for Rosenau's combining of outside and inside factors. It is surmised that Rosenau might have been aware himself of the difficulty but because of the circumstances under which the theory was expounded, i.e., at a symposium and with an assigned topic of "internal influences of external behaviour," (Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 27, n.2.) he was trying to do two things, (a) stay within the confines of the topic, and (b) include all of the relevant variables of foreign policy formulation, including the important one of actions of other states. These things he was able to do by gathering intra- and international environment under the vague term of systemic.

[26]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 47.

[27]Ibid., p. 47, n. 45.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Benson, "Challenges for Research in International Relations and Comparative Politics," p. 341.

[31]McClelland, Theory and the International System, p. 97.

[32]Brecher, et al., "Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," p. 79.

[33]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 65.

[34]Ibid., p. 68.

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING

In this paper, only one country, Canada, and one issue, whether or not nuclear warheads should be acquired for certain weapon-systems already decided upon for Canada, have been selected for study. The time period is approximately that of Mr. Diefenbaker's term of office as Prime Minister. In this Chapter, some details of the background to this issue will be examined. To this end, two broad and overlapping categories, the internal and the external setting, will be reviewed.

After more than 20 years in office under Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent, the Liberal government began to show signs of decreptitude in the mid 1950's. During St. Laurent's second administration, one of these signs was the "Pipeline Debate". C. D. Howe's bill to launch the Trans-Canada Pipeline ran into extremely heavy weather in Parliament because of the haste with which the Liberal government rammed it through. The effect of the passage of the bill was to give the Liberals the appearance of arrogance and of disrespect for the rights of Parliament. It also gave the Tory opposition the appearance, if not of a party which would form the next government, at least of a political force to be reckoned with.

It remained for a small-town lawyer from the prairies, John George Diefenbaker, to lead that opposition in a frontal assault on the

government benches. Diefenbaker, of German and Scots extraction, was born in Ontario in 1895 and grew up in Saskatchewan. His studies at the University of Saskatchewan, interrupted by service as a lieutenant in the Canadian Army in England, were completed after he was invalided home in 1917. It is said that he grew up with a deep emotional attachment to Great Britain and a conversely profound suspicion of the United States.[1] First elected to Parliament in 1940, after several unsuccessful attempts at public office at the local, provincial and national levels of government,[2] he tried twice for the leadership of the Conservative party before emerging triumphant from the party's 1956 leadership convention.

The 1957 election, fought between parties led by an aging St. Laurent who went through "only the motions with dignity, fortitude, and little effect"[3] and a Diefenbaker of vitality, vision and volcanic oratory, resulted in a minority government for the Conservatives. Little was said by either party about foreign policy or defence policy during that 1957 campaign,[4] and the Conservatives were eased in with 111 seats to the Liberal's 105. (See Appendix I for results of Canadian General Elections).

Despite the expectation[5] that there would be a large turnover of senior administrative personnel after the defeat of the twenty-two year old Liberal regime, only one person, Maurice Lamontagne, economic adviser in the Privy Council, quit because of the change of government. Although there was no wholesale turnover of staff, there is some suggestion that the new government was suspicious "that the Civil Service might be

too closely tied to the Liberals who had built it up . . ."[6] The Department of External Affairs was especially viewed in this light, the staff being frequently referred to by Mr. Diefenbaker as "the Pearsonalities."[7]

General Charles Foulkes was Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff from 1951 until his retirement in 1960 at which time Air Marshal Frank Miller took over. He was to remain Chairman until 1964.[8]

Under-secretary of State for External Affairs for the period in question was Jules Leger, 1954 to 1958, and Norman Robertson, 1958 to 1964. Norman Robertson had been Ambassador to Washington in the period 1957-58 and was replaced in that position by Arnold Heeney.[9]

St. Laurent stayed on as leader of the opposition until Lester B. Pearson was elected leader of the Liberal Party on January 16, 1958. Pearson, Minister of External Affairs in the St. Laurent Cabinet, had been recruited to the fledgling Department of External Affairs by its administrative head, Dr. O. D. Skelton. He served as assistant to the Canadian High Commissioner in London before the War and was recalled to Ottawa to serve as second in command to Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of External Affairs, in the early war years. In quick succession he was appointed assistant to the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Canadian Ambassador in Washington, and Under-Secretary of External Affairs.

Hutchison claims that Pearson wrote St. Laurent's speech first proposing the free-world alliance, NATO.[10] He had been president of the United Nations General Assembly in 1952-53 and had been invited to

become Secretary-General of NATO. For his part in the formation of a UN peacekeeping force at the time of the "Suez Crisis", Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize by the Norwegian Parliament.

But Pearson the Diplomat was not Pearson the Politician. Within a week of assuming the leadership of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition, by suggesting that the minority Conservative government resign and hand over the reins of office to the Liberals, he had given Diefenbaker the excuse he wanted to go to the people for a majority government, and Parliament was dissolved on February 1, 1958.

In the 1958 election campaign, again, there was very little debate on defence or foreign policy. It was during this campaign that Diefenbaker's strong association with the "common man" was made manifest, and it was also during this campaign that the term charismatic was used to describe him. On March 31st, his party was returned to Parliament with the largest majority ever to be seated to the right of the Speaker's Chair.

Diefenbaker, a former spokesman for the Opposition on External Affairs matters, was his own Minister of External Affairs for three months after the 1957 election, that is, until September 13, 1957. On that date, Sidney Smith, president of the University of Toronto, was sworn in as Minister. He remained in that position until his death on March 17, 1959. Diefenbaker again took over the portfolio until June 4, 1959, at which time he appointed the West Coast M.P., Howard Green, to the post. Green, formerly Minister of Defence Production and Public Works, had been a member of the Commons Standing Committee on External

Affairs from 1949 to 1955.[11]

General George Pearkes, V.C., was Minister of National Defence from the 1957 election until his appointment as Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia in 1960. On October 11, 1960, Douglas Harkness, the Calgary M.P. and former Minister of Agriculture, was made Minister of National Defence. He held that portfolio until his resignation on February 3, 1963, in opposition to Diefenbaker's defence policy. Pierre Sévigny, who had been Associate Minister of Defence since 1959, was made the Acting Minister of National Defence upon Harkness' resignation, but he too resigned, along with Trade and Commerce Minister George Hees, on February 9 in disagreement over Canadian Defence Policy. Gordon Churchill was Minister of National Defence from February to the time the Liberal administration took office in April.

Mr. Diefenbaker's cabinet may be pictured in many ways. There were those in it who had supported him in his various leadership attempts, and there were those who opposed him. There were the "professionals" who had had considerable experience in parliament and the new faces who in 1957 and 1958 had decided to "Follow John". Perhaps the most significant distinction that can be made is between those who advocated fiscal orthodoxy and those who favoured further intervention of the government into the economy. Peter Newman sums up well the cleavages within the cabinet when he says of the Party as a whole:

> As the leader of a Prairie protest movement that managed to become national, the man from Prince Albert transformed the character of Canadian Conservatism. Throughout the Diefenbaker Years - far above the level of public attention and largely obscured by the rush of events - a struggle raged within the Conservative Party between its established elements and the

rude new forces trying permanently to reorient its hierarchy.[12] Besides the cleavages, an added stress put on the cabinet was Mr. Diefenbaker's penchant for sounding out all Ministers and for unanimity in the Cabinet before a decision could be taken. From his vantage point within the cabinet, Pierre Sévigny writes: "I must immediately say that had the Diefenbaker Cabinet made as many decisions as it held discussions, there would have been very little left for our successors to do in the few years to come."[13] Newman says that "extracting unanimity from his colleagues meant that Diefenbaker only rarely had to exercise the decisiveness demanded of an arbiter between stubbornly entrenched disputing factions."[14]

The internal tensions were aggravated particularly by the circumstances of the times. Canada had enjoyed an unprecedented economic boom after the war, with new stimulants being injected from time to time by such events as the discovery of oil in western Canada, involvement in the Korean Conflict, the construction of oil and gas pipelines and the development of uranium and iron ore fields. However, in 1957 the economy was on the decline and "by autumn of that year an unsalable surplus of wheat, timber, paper and minerals were plugging Canada's trade channels, and for the first time since the 'thirties, unemployment was becoming a national problem, with 7.1 per cent of the labour force out of work during the winter of 1957-58."[15] The unemployment figures during the winter of 1961 hovered around 11 per cent of the work force, (See Appendix II for Unemployment Rates) a post-depression peak, and during the winter preceding the 1962 election, they ranged between 8 and

9 per cent. Finance Minister Fleming worked "against the impossible odds of his colleagues' demand for ever more money, and his chief's genial habit of promising new expenditures without consulting him . . . to balance the budget."[16] The 1962 election, fought midst a foreign exchange crisis that saw the dollar pegged at $.92 1/2 U.S., cut huge inroads into Diefenbaker's majority in the House of Commons, but still left him at the helm with 116 seats to the Liberal's 99.

A second issue that was to plague the Diefenbaker government was that of defence. It became a source of bitter cabinet dissension during the last two years of the Diefenbaker ministry. Although discussed here after the 1962 election, the nuclear arms issue had some of its roots back in the period of the Liberal regime.

As far back as 1940 (Ogdensburg Agreement) defence of Canada and the United States was seen as a joint problem. Post-war forms of cooperation took shape in the winter of 1946-47 when joint navigational and weather stations were constructed in the Canadian Arctic.[17] On February 12, 1947, an agreement of cooperation on defence was announced by the two countries together with the United Kingdom.[18] As the danger from trans-polar nuclear bombers of the Soviet Union increased, thoughts in North American defence circles were turned more to defence against these bombers. In the 1950's three electronic lines were built across North America to warn of Soviet bomber attack.

During the construction of these electronic warning lines, it was suggested several times that a joint command for North American air defence be established.[19] From a military point of view, Canadian

Air Marshal Roy Slemon said in 1955 that such a command seemed "inevitable."[20] Formal talks were begun between Canada and U.S. officials as early as May 14, 1956,[21] concerning a plan for the air defence of the North American Continent, with the United States accepting, in April, 1957, the arrangement that had been worked out. The Liberal government in Canada, however, was reluctant to take any decision before the June, 1957, election.

On assuming office it is said that Mr. Diefenbaker was faced with a situation in which he "had little choice other than to accept the fait accompli."[22] Mr. Pearson maintained that the air defence arrangement had not been considered by the full cabinet of the St. Laurent government:

> Mr. Green: Mr. Speaker, could I ask the leader of the opposition a question? Does he deny that his government had all the arrangements made for NORAD before it went out of office?
>
> Mr. Pearson: I absolutely and categorically deny it, and I defy the honourable gentleman to prove otherwise.[23]

The Conservative government made its decision to participate in a joint international command for North American air defence (NORAD) on the occasion of a visit to Ottawa by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on August 1, 1957.[24] Although there was some attempt, initially, to represent the NORAD agreement as coming under the umbrella of NATO,[25] Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary-General of NATO, denied that NORAD was part of NATO,[26] and the exchange of notes on May 12, 1958,[27] formalizing the arrangement, took place between Canada and the United States only.[28]

The NORAD agreement provided for an integrated command for air

defence of the United States, Canada, and Alaska,with a Commander-in-Chief (CINCNORAD) and Joint Command at Colorado Springs, Colorado. CINCNORAD was to have "operational control over assigned airforces."[29]

Between the time of the initial decision to establish a joint command for the defence of North America against the threat of an attack by manned bombers and the exchange of diplomatic notes formally establishing the command, the Soviet Union launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (August 27, 1957) and put Sputnik I aloft (October 4).[30] These technological advances in weapons carrier systems by the Soviets raised the question of whether anti-bomber defences were now obsolete, and indeed if NORAD itself was not obsolete even before it was officially agreed to.[31] The whole question revolved around the guessing game of how soon the U.S.S.R. would make the switch from long range bombers to inter-continental rockets.

Canada's principal interceptor aircraft during this period was to have been the CF 105 (the Avro Arrow) but when mounting costs and lack of sales to other countries made the program impractical, Mr. Diefenbaker announced on September 23, 1958, the decision to halt production of the aircraft. Since the decision would leave Canada without effective anti-bomber defences, "it [the government] was most anxious to announce that Canada would obtain an alternative and superior weapons system; it therefore concluded an agreement with the Americans to place two squadrons of Bomarc-B missiles at North Bay, Ontario, and La Macaza, Quebec,"[32] The Bomarc--each squadron was to have 28 missiles--was an anti-bomber guided missile. The "B" model differed from the

"A" model in that it was built to carry only a nuclear warhead, a conventional warhead not having been designed for it.[33]

With the obsolescence of the CF-100 and F-86 aircraft (Preston says that the old CF-100's were so slow that they could not overtake the new jets of Trans-Canada Airlines),[34] and with the additional thought that some types of manned interceptor aircraft was still required to deal with the Soviet Bomber threat, the Diefenbaker government made the announcement on June 12, 1961, that it would acquire 64[35] F-101B Voodoos for the Canadian Air Force from the United States (See Appendix III for Summary of Relevant Dates for Weapons Systems). The Voodoos were planes that were already in service in the USAF squadrons and were to be released or diverted to Canada. They had been armed with the nuclear tipped MB-1 Genie missile when in U.S. service, but carried the G.A.R. Falcon missiles, a weapon containing a conventional warhead, when they were delivered to Canada.[36] Although the planes still had some worth with the conventional warhead, it was thought that their efficiency had been seriously cut by the change from the nuclear armament.

Canada had an army brigade and one air squadron stationed with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe. The decision was made in October of 1958 to equip the army brigade with the Lacrosse missile, "the 'full potential' of which could only be realized with nuclear warheads."[37] However, when the Lacrosse tests failed, its development in the United States was halted, and in 1960 the Canadian government decided upon the Honest John system, a

762 mm. rocket and launcher. The Honest John was capable of using either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, but the battery of four artillery rockets Canada's brigade group had in Europe were mounted with sand in their warheads.[38]

In the summer of 1959 the Conservative government accepted a new role, that of "strike reconnaissance", for the air squadron in Europe. This role involved the dropping of nuclear bombs on predetermined targets behind enemy lines. In July of 1959 the government announced plans to buy $450 million worth of CF 104 (Starfighter) aircraft (about 200 planes) for the RCAF in Europe.[39] The Canadian model of the CF 104 was designed specifically for strike reconnaissance and was fitted to carry small nuclear bombs. The first squadron was ready at Zweibrücken in Europe for service by October, 1962.[40]

No discussions were undertaken between the Diefenbaker government and the United States government concerning the equipping of Canadian anti-submarine forces, either afloat or in the air, with nuclear depth charges, and the question did not become part of the controversy.

Although the arrangements for the acquisition of several weapons systems requiring nuclear warheads had been made, the attitude of the government concerning the acquisition of the warheads for the systems seemed to have undergone a change over a period of time. Perhaps this change can be brought out by quoting from a series of speeches. On February 20, 1959, Mr. Diefenbaker said:

> The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examing with the United States government

> questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian Forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian Brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO's defence tasks are also being studied.
>
> We are confident that we shall be able to reach formal agreement with the United States on appropriate means to serve the common objective.
>
> . . . It is our intention to provide Canadian forces with modern and efficient weapons to enable them to fulfill their respective roles.[41]

In the same year Defence Minister Pearkes said: "It is Government policy that Canadian troops should be armed as efficiently and effectively as are troops with which they are co-operating."[42] McLin also reports that General Pearkes stated in a television interview that "the squadrons of the air division in Europe would get nuclear weapons."[43] On January 18, 1960, the Prime Minister stated: "Eventually Canadian forces may require certain nuclear weapons . . ."[44] and on September 20, 1961, "in each of the instruments that we have, the Bomarc and the Voodoos, nuclear weapons could be used."[45] At another time Mr. Diefenbaker said: "We have taken the stand that no decision will be required while progress towards disarmament continues."[46] In the 1963 election campaign, the Prime Minister states:

> Insofar as our interceptors are concerned, we have negotiated and we have been successful and we know that if war comes, there will be available and accessible atomic warheads for the Voodoos in Canada, but before the situation arises, we do not intend to use Canada as a dumping ground for nuclear warheads.[47]

The idea implied here was that the warheads could be kept in the United States and trucked or flown up to Canada should the need arise.

In a letter to the newspapers on February 14, Mr. Harkness denied the feasibility of any arrangement whereby nuclear warheads could be stored in the United States and moved into Canada with sufficient speed to counter a bomber attack.[48]

Concerning the Bomarc-B missile, Mr. Diefenbaker claimed that it could employ either a high explosive or nuclear warhead, and quoted a NORAD press release to support his point, but the press release had referred specifically to the "A" model of the missile. There was no conventional warhead for the "B" model which was the missile that Canada possessed.

Increased attention was focused on the nuclear warheads issue by the Cuba missile crisis of October, 1962. The Prime Minister's announcement of January 18, 1960 that "negotiations are proceeding with the United States in order that the necessary weapons can be made available for Canadian defence units if and when they are required,"[49] was seen as impractical. Firstly, in the event of hostilities, there would not be sufficient time to transfer nuclear warheads from the United States to Canada. This problem was not as acute with Canada's NATO Forces since nuclear stockpiles were already in existence in Europe. Although the logistics aspect of the problem was surmountable in Europe, the political problem was unresolved since the necessary political arrangements had not been made with the United States to transfer nuclear warheads from the stockpiles in Europe to the Canadian forces. Secondly, the movement of nuclear warheads in time of crisis was precisely the wrong time to move such warheads, since such action could be viewed as

provocative, thus adding to the tense situation.

Fuel was added to the controversy by General Lauris Norstad, retiring commander of NATO, when he said at a press conference in Ottawa in January of 1963 that he was of the opinion that Canada had made a commitment to acquire nuclear warheads for her NATO forces.[50] His was but one of a number of instances of outsiders--generals, ambassadors, politicians and governmental officials--interjecting comment into the issue of atomic weapons.

Among Canadian political parties, the New Democratic Party (NDP), while uncertain as to whether Canada had already accepted a nuclear role, were in complete agreement among themselves that Canada must not accept nuclear warheads, either for the NORAD or NATO forces. The Quebec contingent of the Social Credit Movement, under the leadership of Réal Caouette, was opposed to nuclear weapons for both NATO and NORAD forces, while the national leader, Robert Thompson, Member of Parliament for Red Deer, favoured them for the Canadian troops in Europe but opposed having them on Canadian soil.[51]

After considerable vacillation, the Liberals finally came out in favour of acquisition of the warheads. Lester Pearson, at a speech to the York-Scarborough Liberal Association on January 12, 1963, took the position that Canada had accepted commitments concerning nuclear weapons and that these commitments must be met. While accepting these commitments, Canada should, through negotiation, resume a role in which conventional weapons would be used by Canadian forces both in NORAD and in the North Atlantic Alliance.[52]

The Conservative Party's position was somewhat unclear on defence issues as well. At the 1963 annual meeting of the Progressive Conservative Association, a resolution to accept nuclear warheads by the end of 1963 was defeated and the decision was taken "to refer the nuclear issue 'to the Government for its consideration and decision.'"[53]

On January 25, 1963, the Prime Minister in an address to the House of Commons, referred, among other things, to the December, 1962, Nassau meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan:

> I was in Nassau. I formed certain ideas. . . . that there should be no further development of new nuclear powers anywhere in the world; that nuclear weapons as a universal deterrent is a dangerous solution."[54]

The U.S. State Department countered on January 30th by issuing a press release which challenged several of Mr. Diefenbaker's statements in his January 25th speech (See Appendix IV for text of State Department press release).

Defence Minister Harkness issued his own press release "interpreting" Mr. Diefenbaker's January 25th speech to mean that Canada would accept nuclear warheads at an early date (See Appendix V for text of press release of Douglas Harkness) but when he came to the conclusion that his views on acquisition of nuclear warheads could not be reconciled with those of Mr. Diefenbaker he wrote his letter of resignation to the Prime Minister (See Appendix VI for text of letter of resignation of Douglas Harkness).

This cleavage in the Cabinet concerning nuclear warheads went back as far as the time of Mr. Green's appointment to the post of External Affairs in 1959. George Pearkes, the previous Defence

Minister had been as strong an advocate of acceptance as was Harkness. Opposing this view, "there was an almost mystical quality to Mr. Green's abhorrence of the very thought of nuclear ammunition on Canadian soil."[55] Canada had been a member of the preparatory commission for the general disarmament conference in the days of the League of Nations[56] and "a member of practically every forum in which disarmament had been discussed since World War II."[57] On taking over the portfolio of External Affairs, Mr. Green seemed to seize on disarmament as a major policy objective. He became "the most ardent crusader for disarmament among the foreign ministers of the world. Indeed for him disarmament became an obsession."[58] His fear was that by accepting nuclear warheads, Canada would jeopardize her chances of influencing disarmament talks (which had been going on for over a decade and a half by this time) and also would lose standing among the uncommitted nations of the world. It is difficult to say how many cabinet ministers were sympathetic to Mr. Green's point of view and how many to Mr. Harkness's point of view, but it is a matter of record that George Hees and Pierre Sévigny also resigned a few days later in opposition to defence policy.[59]

On February 6, 1963, the Diefenbaker government was defeated in the House on a motion of non-confidence. The motion was upheld by a vote of 142 to 111, with the Liberals, most of the NDP, and all of the Social Credit Members voting against the government. The Liberals suggested in their motion that the Diefenbaker Government should resign because of a lack of leadership, disunity in the cabinet, and indecision in dealing with national and international problems.[60]

A subamendment introduced by the Social Credit Party Leader cited the failure to enunciate a clear policy on national defence and the failure to introduce a budget as reasons for a lack of confidence in the government.[61]

Although NDP leader, Thomas Douglas, described the election that followed as "a referendum on nuclear arms"[62] there were other issues in the campaign including interference in domestic affairs by the United States, Canada's relationship with the U.S., Diefenbaker's leadership, the need for a stable government and the lack of a budget.

One of these issues, that of a deteriorating relationship between Canada and the United States, is singled out for brief mention. It seems that although John Diefenbaker and John Kennedy "got on" well in initial encounters, their friendship cooled during the latter part of the period. "Kennedy thought the Canadian [Diefenbaker] insincere and did not like or trust him".[63] The disagreement between the two over the availability of grain-loaders to move Canadian wheat to China "marked the beginning of the strained relationship between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Kennedy. Mr. Diefenbaker often quoted the president as having said 'When I ask Canada to do something, I expect Canada to do it.'"[64]

In addition, delay over acquisition of nuclear warheads and the signing of the Columbia River Treaty, Canada's opposition to Britain's entering into the European Economic Community, and hesitancy in backing the American president in the Cuban missile crisis probably had a direct

relationship to the situation in which "relations between Messrs. Diefenbaker and Kennedy had become worse, in all probability, than those that had existed between any other pair of Canadian and American leaders."[65]

On the effect of the nuclear debate on the election, Lyon says that

> in the absence of a thorough analysis of voter attitudes in April 1963, it is not possible to give a precise and authoritive estimate of the impact of the nuclear warheads controversy upon the outcome of the general election. However, a survey of the results suggests that the direct impact was probably not very great.[66]

The outcome of the April 8, 1963 election was: Liberals 129 seats, Conservatives 95, Social Credit 24, and NDP 17.

Within a month of Mr. Pearson's taking office as Prime Minister, he announced, after his Hyannis Port talk with President Kennedy, that his government intended to initiate discussions with the United States in order to fulfill Canada's nuclear commitments in NORAD and NATO. On August 16, 1963, he announced that negotiations had been successfully concluded allowing Canada to acquire nuclear weapons for the four weapons systems in question, viz., the Bomarc-B, the Voodoo aircraft, the Honest John rocket and the Starfighter strike reconnaissance aircraft.[67]

While these events were taking place more or less on the domestic scene, it seems relevant to enquire at this point about the panorama of events on the broader stage.

Even from before the time in 1946 when Winston Churchill said at Fulton, Missouri: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent,"[68] it was recognized

that the ties of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West forged during the war years would not endure in the peace. In the postwar period, "for Canada, as for the other Western democracies, the dominating fact was the cold war with its inherent threat to world peace and stability."[69]

By the time of the German surrender, the Soviet Union had already annexed 182,000 square miles of territory inhabited by 24 million people. Shortly after, six Eastern European nations were brought within the Soviet hegemony, with Czechoslovakia the last to go in February, 1948.[70]

With the takeover of Czechoslovakia, new urgency was given to negotiations for a European defence alliance, and on March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. When the need was seen to bring more European nations and also countries of North America into the defence alliance, the idea of an Atlantic alliance evolved and resulted in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty by twelve nations on April 4, 1949. Serious negotiations which brought about the treaty were begun in the summer of 1948 at about the time the Soviet Union began its blockade of Berlin.

It was not envisioned at first that the signing of the treaty would commit Canada to stationing troops in Europe, but with the outbreak of the Korean Conflict in 1950, there was the fear that Communist pressures would be exerted somewhere in Europe as well as in Asia. As a consequence, at a NATO council meeting in September, 1950, the concept of "foreward strategy"[71] was worked out. This strategy, the aim of which was to defend Europe as far to the east as possible, led to

the establishment of an integrated force in Europe, the setting up of a military headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and the appointment of General D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Canada's contribution to the NATO command was a brigade group in Europe, a reserve in Canada, and three squadrons of aircraft in Europe.[72]

The military plans for NATO called for the building up, by 1954, of 96 divisions of men, 9,000 first line aircraft and additional reserve units. However, the goals were unrealistic, considering that Germany had not yet started to rearm,[73] France was fighting a war in Indo-China, Britain had 25 to 30 thousand troops in Malaya suppressing Communist guerrillas, and Canada had no desire to be put into a position where she would have to adopt conscription to raise manpower. Because the forces envisioned never came into being, a search was begun for an alternative that would give NATO an equivalent "punch". That alternative was nuclear weapons, and at the meeting of the NATO council in Paris on December 15-16, 1955, the decision was made to arm the forces of the alliance "with the most advanced--a euphemism for atomic--weapons. This decision was confirmed two years later at a meeting of heads of government of the NATO countries, held in Paris from 16 to 19 December, 1957."[74] Lord Montgomery, Deputy SACEUR, left no doubt of the strategy (military plan MC-70) when he said:

> I want to make it absolutely clear that we in SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer: 'They may possibly be used.' It is very definitely: 'They will be used if we are attacked'.[75]

The concern at this time was for the protection of Europe and this was to be achieved not only by a build-up of NATO nuclear forces, but also by a direct response from the United States. In early 50's at a time when the United States had a superiority in nuclear weapons[76] and the Strategic Air Command to deliver them, the strategy of the U.S. for deterrence, as explained by John Foster Dulles in 1954, was to "retaliate instantly by means and at places of our choosing"[77] if Europe was attacked (the strategy of massive retaliation).

However, the picture changed somewhat when the U.S.S.R. "demonstrated in the May Day parade of 1954 that she possessed long-range and medium range jet bombers comparable to the American B-52 and B-47."[78] The conclusion was drawn that the U.S.S.R. was building a huge strategic air command of her own to strike directly at North America. With such a conclusion, a rethinking of strategy was required.

Pearson, in a speech at Princeton University in 1955, offered a substitute to the strategy of massive retaliation, that of a graduated deterrence or as he called it, "reasonable or measured retaliation."[79] Within a year or so, it became clear that a new policy was being formulated to take the place of the strategy of "massive retaliation," that of the "flexible response."[80] While there was a shift in strategy with regard to NATO, the strategy for North America continued to be that of unrestricted nuclear response.

The strategic situation changed again when in the fall of 1957 the U.S.S.S. began launching earth satellites. The implication of this

technological breakthrough was that she would soon have intercontinental ballistic missiles which no known defence could prevent from devastating North America. This implication was the cause of some concern to United States defence officials.

The U.S.S.R., under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, adopted a particularly belligerent attitude during this period of the so-called "missile gap". Among the initiatives taken, there was the delivery in 1958 of an ultimatum on Berlin demanding the withdrawal of the three western occupying forces within 6 months; the snubbing of the United States President at the Paris Summit Conference at the time of the U-2 incident; the walkout by the Soviet delegates from the Geneva Disarmament Conference in June, 1960; the delivery on June 15, 1961, of a second ultimatum that the allies withdraw from Berlin within a year; the threat of Soviet mobilization on August 7, 1961; the beginning of the Berlin Wall in August of 1961; the resumption of nuclear testing on August 31, 1961; and finally, the positioning of offensive nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba in October of 1962.

Taken together, the domestic and international setting suggest that during this period of rapid technological change and ideological clash, Canada was no longer the "fireproof house far from combustible materials." While "the triumph of peacekeeping at Suez boosted Canadian prestige to a new peak throughout the world,"[81] at about the time of the coming to power of the Conservatives, circumstances were to make it increasingly difficult for Canada to maintain her enviable position. Many of the circumstances were beyond the control of the Canadian

government. The European nations were well on their way to recovery by 1957. Both China and Japan were playing a greater role in the Pacific. The strategic importance of Canada's geography was declining. "Equally important was the revolution in military technology that escalated the cost of sophisticated defence equipment beyond the reach of all but the great powers."[82] The decisions that had to be taken during this period were difficult ones and the factors having relevance were many and complex. Perhaps none were so difficult or so complex as those concerning the acquisition of nuclear warheads.

It is one function of theory to bring order to a confusion of factors.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1963), p. 254.

[2]John Diefenbaker was unsuccessful in the Prince Albert mayoralty race in 1933, in Saskatchewan provincial elections in 1929 and 1938, and in the federal elections of 1925 and 1926.

[3]Bruce Hutchison, Mr. Prime Minister, 1867-1964 (Don Mills: Longmans Canada Limited, 1964), p. 311.

[4]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 52.

[5]During his five years of office, R.B. Bennett, the previous Conservative Prime Minister, had appointed 24 new deputy ministers. (Ibid., p. 61.)

[6]Richard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs, 1959 to 1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 8. Peyton Lyon, Peter Newman, Thomas Van Dusen and Peter Regenstreif make the same point in writing about this period.

[7]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 252.

[8]A.L. Tunnell, The Canadian Who's Who, 1961-1963, IX (Toronto: Trans Canada Press, 1963), pp. 372, 790.

[9]Ibid., pp. 637, 953, 488.

[10]Hutchison, Mr. Prime Minister, p. 360.

[11]Jon. B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 135-136.

[12]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. xiv.

[13]Pierre Sévigny, This Game of Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965), p. 154.

[14]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 92.

[15]Ibid., p. 204.

[16]Hutchison, Mr. Prime Minister, p. 333.

[17]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 10.

[18]Ibid., p. 11. See also, R.J. Sutherland, "A Defence Strategist examines the Realities," in Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?, ed. by J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1969), p. 25.

[19]As early as 1953, General Omar Bradley suggested that such a command be created. (McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 38.)

[20]Ibid., p. 39.

[21]Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 26.

[22]Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 94.

[23]Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 4, 1963, III, p. 3404. See also Debates, May 20, 1958, I, p. 244.

[24]Lloyd, Canada, 1957-59, p. 25.

[25]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 48.

[26]Debates, June 10, 1958, I, p. 1004.

[27]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 48.

[28]Canada, Report of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1958, p. 69.

[29]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 222.

[30]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 347.

[31]However, at a later date, NORAD did take over the operation of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS).

[32]Peyton V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 78.

[33]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 85.

[34]Preston, Canada, 1959-1961, p. 61.

[35]Lyon, Canada 1961-1963, p. 80, reports 64 Voodoos, while McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 100, says that 66 Voodoos were acquired by Canada.

[36]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 133. Although McLin leaves the impression that all Voodoos in the United States Airforce were armed with nuclear warheads, there is some indication that not all of them were so armed.

[37]Ibid., p. 112.

[38]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 341.

[39]Ibid., p. 346.

[40]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 118.

[41]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, p. 81, quoting from Debates, February 20, 1959, p. 1223.

[42]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 137.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Debates, January 25, 1963, pp. 3128-3137, reprinting in Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 121, (Emphasis added.)

[45]Ibid., (Emphasis added.)

[46]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 141, citing Debates, 1962, II, p. 1250.

[47]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, p. 195. (Mr. Diefenbaker's emphasis.)

[48]Douglas Harkness, "The Facts on Nuclear Arms as Harkness Knows Them." Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 15, 1963, p. 7.

[49]Debates, January 18, 1960, I, p. 73.

[50]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, pp. 131-135.

[51]Ibid., p. 192. There is some confusion on where the English-speaking wing of the Social Credit Party stood on this matter for McLin reports that at one time it favoured defensive nuclear weapons, but not the nuclear strike role, while at another time it favoured nuclear arms for Canadian forces in NATO but not in Canada.

[52]"Text of Liberal Leader's Speech on Nuclear Arms for Canada," Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 14, 1963, p. 11.

[53]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, p. 143.

[54]Debates, January 25, 1963, pp. 3128-3137, reprinted in Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 120.

[55]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, p. 118, n. 114.

[56]G.P. de T. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, II (Revised ed.; Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1966), pp. 99-100.

[57]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 147.

[58]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, p. 223.

[59]Newman, in Renegade in Power, p. 368, says that the "anti-Diefenbaker sentiment now polarized in a Cabinet group that included George Hees, Wallace McCutcheon, Leon Balcer, Earnest Halpenny, Davie Fulton, and Pierre Sévigny". Peyton Lyon, in Canada, 1961-63, p. 178, says that "most, if not all of the rebel ministers were pro-nuclear."

[60]Debates, February 4, 1963, III, p. 3409.

[61]Ibid., p. 3414.

[62]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, p. 199.

[63]Ibid., p. 493, quoting Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 343.

[64]Thomas Van Dusen, The Chief (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 39.

[65]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, p. 503.

[66]Ibid., p. 211.

[67]Stanley Westall, "Pact Clears Way for Canada to Get Nuclear Weapons", Globe and Mail (Toronto), August 17, 1963, p. 1.

[68]John Gellner, Canada in NATO (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970), p. 4.

[69]Edgar McInnis, "A Middle Power in the Cold War," in The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs, ed. by Hugh L. Keenleyside (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 145.

[70]Gellner, Canada in NATO, p. 3.

[71]Ibid., p. 22.

[72]Ibid., p. 26.

[73]Germany was brought into the Alliance and permitted to begin rearming on May 5th, 1955.

[74]Gellner, Canada in NATO, p. 44.

[75]Ibid., p. 54.

[76]The U.S.S.R. did not explode its first atomic bomb until September, 1949, but it detonated a hydrogen bomb on August 8th, 1953, only a year and a half after the U.S.A. had exploded its first hydrogen bomb.

[77]Gellner, Canada in NATO, p. 41.

[78]Robert E. Osgood, NATO - The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 112.

[79]Lester B. Pearson, Democracy in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 21.

[80]Gellner, Canada in NATO, p. 60.

[81]Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 93.

[82]Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE CONDITIONS

Rosenau's theory provides the following hypothesis: If a country is small, with a developed economy and an open polity, and with a penetrated political system, then in the status issue-area, the most influential variable acting on the decision-makers to determine foreign policy will be the systemic, the next most influential will be the societal.

The approach will be, first, to identify the decision-makers in this particular issue, then to attempt to confirm the initial conditions, namely, that Canada is a small country, with developed economy and open polity, that the political system is indeed penetrated, that the question of acquisition of nuclear warheads by Canada during the Diefenbaker regime is in the status issue-area. Then the attempt will be made to ascertain the truth of the deductive consequence of the argument, that the factor of greatest potency was the systemic variable and the factor of second most potency was the societal. The examination of initial conditions will be done in this chapter, the examination of the deductive consequence of the hypothesis will be done in the next.

"If a political system can be said to have a centre of gravity, that centre of gravity in Canada is most certainly the cabinet, for the whole weight of the government is concentrated at that point."[1]

Following Dawson's lead, and recognizing the general supervision that Parliament exercises by questioning, debating and voting no-confidence, the first place to look for decision-makers in this issue would seem to be the Cabinet. While it is true in a general way that all ministers are concerned with all policy, certain departments will have more interest in certain issues than will others. For the question of nuclear warheads the departments most closely involved were External Affairs and National Defence, with their respective ministers during the most crucial period of the issue, Howard Green and Douglas Harkness. While one might think of including Pierre Sévigny, because of his position as Associate Minister of National Defence, Sévigny himself called his position a "secondary one"[2] and described his rank as "junior."[3] Others of Cabinet rank who might have had an interest because of the relationship of their departments to Defence and External Affairs are the Minsiter of Trade and Commerce, George Hees, and the Minister of Finance, Donald Fleming.

While all ministers have responsibility for overall policy and several ministers have an interest in foreign and defence matters, a position of pre-eminence is held by one person, the prime minister. "A common description of the position of prime minister and his associates is to say that he is primus inter pares. . . . He cannot be first among his equals for the very excellent reason that he has no equals."[4] Mr. Diefenbaker himself sees the matter of decision-making in this way:

> The responsibility finally rests on the Prime Minister. No one else. He takes the best advice he can get. But decisions on

all vital matters must finally receive his approval."[5] One who was in a position to observe from the inside writes: "John Diefenbaker was very much the full and absolute master in his contacts with his ministers. He dominated the Privy Council with an almost autocratic rule which could be tiring and even exhausting."[6]

Added to the general leadership that the prime minister gives in all matters, is his "special interest in and responsibility for foreign affairs"[7] because of the overriding importance of security of the nation and the modern trend to "personal and summit diplomacy."[8]

Besides these responsibilities that are part and parcel of the position, John Diefenbaker may have had further cause for being particularly interested in external affairs. "Mr. Pearson was a professional diplomat with a world-wide reputation and Mr. Diefenbaker seemed determined to prove that the Conservatives could handle the country's external relations as well as Mr. Pearson had done."[9]

A curious and unresolved question arises in connection with Mr. Diefenbaker's interest in foreign affairs, when the position of Mr. Green is considered. "Occasionally the Prime Minister may have a special colleague whose intimacy makes him a friend and almost a partner in the office. . . . Mr. Diefenbaker appeared to have a special colleague in Howard Green."[10] On the other hand, Preston says: "Mr. Green's closeness to the Prime Minister . . . suggested that Mr. Diefenbaker wanted to keep external affairs in his own hands but that he yielded to public pressure to put a ministerial administrator in charge."[11] Was Mr. Green an influential adviser or was he a stand-in

for Mr. Diefenbaker?

Other sources that Mr. Diefenbaker could draw on for advice were his intimate friends and the civil service.[12] "Only three men--David Walker, Bill Brunt, and Allister Grosart--remained influential advisers throughout the Diefenbaker Years, but their prestige in the personal hierarchy of the Prime Minister's counsellors was paramount."[13]

As to the question of whether Mr. Diefenbaker was relying on the advice of departmental officials, there is conflicting opinion. Preston says that "Mr. Diefenbaker's personality determined that he would make his own foreign policy rather than accepting one tailor-made by professional diplomats;"[14] while Lyon says, "even though suspicious of the civil servants he had inherited from the St. Laurent regime, he most often followed their advice."[15] The danger here is in viewing the civil service as a monolithic structure. It is possible, if one thinks of the divergent views of Howard Green and Douglas Harkness on the nuclear warheads issue, that External officials were counselling one course of action while Defence officials were counselling another.

While retired military officers cannot be equated with Department of National Defence officials, it is interesting to note that even in this narrow-interest group there was a divergence of views. For example, Generals Guy Simonds and W.H.S. Macklin and Wing-Commander John Gellner maintained an anti-nuclear stance, General Charles Foulkes took a pro-nuclear attitude.[16]

After examining the possibilities, the conclusion is that the

Prime Minister was the ultimate decision-maker in the question of acquisition of nuclear warheads. As an added consideration, according to McLin, the original decision to participate in NORAD was apparently taken by Mr. Diefenbaker, he being his own foreign minister at the time, without its formal consideration by either the full cabinet or the cabinet defence committee.[17]

In setting up the hypothesis, it was proposed that Canada is a small country, with a developed economy and an open polity. Rosenau indicates that countries are to be categorized as large or small according to their geographical size and their possession of physical resources (See Figure 2), but in his article, he does not attempt to define developed economy or open polity, except by example.[18]

Marion Alblas, while a student at the University of Alberta, applied Rosenau's theory to the issue of recognition of the Chinese Peoples' Republic by Canada. In her thesis, she posits Canada as a large country[19] on the basis of Rosenau's criteria of geographical size and possession of physical resources, but after having done her research, she found it necessary "to re-examine the validity of positing Canada as a large nation."[20] Besides considering geographical size and possession of resources as criteria for size of country, she examines first the possibility of using population as a criterion for size. While rejecting magnitude of population as the sole determinant for judging size, she leaves the impression that population is, at least, a factor

to be reckoned with. She examines a second possibility for expanding Rosenau's criteria, that arising out of his discussion of the systemic variable. He says that "the potency of a systemic variable is considered to vary inversely with the size of a country (there being greater resources available to large countries and thus less dependence on the international system than is the case with smaller countries)."[21] Alblas draws the conclusion that since Canada is highly dependent on the international system both economically and politically, "Canada cannot logically be a large country."[22] While the circularity of the argument is noted, it is felt that Alblas is essentially correct in her assessment.

When she considers the question of possession as opposed to development of resources, she reasons that the mere possession of resources would not in itself reduce dependence upon the international system and concludes: "There appears to be sufficient justification, then, for positing Canada as a small country."[23]

Alblas reasons that Canada has a developed economy[24] as determined by its Gross National Product, its per capita income, and levels of organization and literacy. In categorizing Canada as having a developed economy she makes the assumption that the degree of development of the economy of the state under scrutiny is being measured against the economies of other states rather than against the potential development of that state.

Using for criteria of open-closed polity such factors as the presence or absence of a constitutional government, the existence of

a free or controlled press, the government's acceptance or suppression of organized opposition, Alblas concludes that Canada has an open polity.[25]

Alblas' study covers roughly the period 1949-1968 and this paper the years 1957-1963. Since size, degree of development of the economy, and type of polity are not the sort of conditions that (a) fluctuate widely within a short time period, or (b) fluctuate without considerable publicity, e.g., as in a revolution, it is taken from Alblas' work, for purposes of examining Rosenau's theory, that Canada is a small country, with a developed economy and an open polity.

Focusing now on the notion of penetration, Rosenau defines a penetrated system as "one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, . . ."[26] The alternative would be actions taken autonomously, indirectly and non-authoritatively. In what circumstances would a society be susceptible to penetration? Rosenau answers this question in terms of capabilities, "penetrated systems are characterized by a shortage of capabilities on the part of the penetrated society and . . . an effort to compensate for, or take advantage of this shortage underlies the participation of non-members in its politics."[27] A nation which is militarily weak or economically underdeveloped would thus be susceptible to penetration.

In addition, Rosenau says that a society may also be susceptible to penetration because it has an <u>abundance</u> of a particular capability. Penetration would be attempted in this case because of a desire to

influence distribution of this abundant capability. For example, the United States, because it allocates a large amount of foreign aid funds, would attract lobbies from countries seeking economic assistance.

Canada in the 1950's and early '60's possessed an abundance of several capabilities. One was her strategic location, situated as she was on the flight path of both Soviet bombers and home-based bombers of the American Strategic Air Command. A second capability somewhat diminished by the late 1950's with Western Europe well on the road to recovery, was the profile of a Great Power in NATO.

> Canada alone of the alliance members who were not in the Standing Group [i.e. Great Powers] had undertaken commitments going beyond that of local defence. . . . That commitment, moreover, was for the provision not merely of reserve forces or intervention forces but for forces on the central front.[28]

With the capabilities mentioned, the two super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are perceived as the nations most likely to attempt penetration of the Canadian political system in order to mobilize support on behalf of their respective goals.

The only known instance of an attempt by the Soviet Union to influence Canadian policy in the matter of nuclear warheads was the diplomatic note delivered on June 14, 1962, by Dr. Amasasp Aroutunian, the Soviet ambassador to Canada, warning Canada of the consequence of acceptance of nuclear weapons.[29] However, since the Soviet Union was acting autonomously rather than jointly with Canadian citizens in the delivery of the note, there is no question of penetration in this instance.

Statements such as that made by Lyon: "Unqualified demands to

'Ban the Bomb' are encouraged in the West by the militant communists for pretty obvious reasons,"[30] were fairly common in the period, leading one to question whether an attempt was being made to penetrate Canadian society in this way. To demonstrate that penetration had occurred, one would have to show a direct link between Soviet agents operating in Canada and groups having an interest in the nuclear question. Tracing this linkage would require an examination of the origins, the organization, the officers and the spokesmen of these interest groups--none of which Lyon does. Besides the lack of evidence, other questions arise if the attempt is made to classify Lyon's inference as penetration. Firstly, can a case be classified as penetration if an agent masquerades as a citizen, or is this a case of subversion? Secondly, a distinction should be made between penetration by person and penetration by ideology. Only the former is considered to be genuine penetration since the concept would be distorted beyond recognition by supposing that the U.S.S.R. could penetrate Canada through Marx and Lenin.

In dealing with American penetration of Canada, one line of action would be to show that penetration by that nation was all-encompassing, "thorough-going" as Rosenau calls it. The argument would be that if the U.S. had penetrated Canada in all areas, then deductively it would also have penetrated in the issue of acquisition of nuclear warheads. However, lacking the authoritative generalization from which this conclusion could be drawn, a different tactic will be used. It will be sufficient for purposes of the hypothesis under scrutiny

to demonstrate that penetration did actually occur in the one issue.

Dalton Camp claims: "Never in our history has Canadian public opinion been so resolutely manipulated--by American politicians, American generals, the U.S. State Department, the American Embassy in Ottawa, Newsweek magazine and hosts of accommodating Canadians who jostled one another for room on the nuclear bandwagon."[31] While his opinion may provide some leads, the problem should be looked at systematically and with a clear distinction in mind between penetration on one hand and diplomatic representations and out-and-out interference on the other. The breakdown for analysis to be used here will be NATO, NORAD, the United States government and certain significant members of the U.S. periodical press.

With regard to NATO, the press conference given by Lauris Norstad in Ottawa on January 3, 1963, is a case of involvement which merits examination. General Norstad, who had just retired as NATO commander but was still in the American service, visited Ottawa during a farewell tour of all NATO capitals. He was accompanied to the press conference by Associate Defence Minister Pierre Sévigny, the Minister being out of the country at the time. From his remarks, it seems that Norstad was somewhat reluctant to talk about nuclear warheads:

> Norstad: Can we drop this subject for the moment. I think we are spending too much time on it. Certainly there must be something else interesting Canadians.[32]

However, he expressed the opinion that Canada had made commitments to NATO to acquire nuclear warheads. Air Marshal Frank Miller, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, who also accompanied Norstad to the

conference, supported him in his opinion by stating: "I think you're right on that; quite right on that. . . ."[33] When General Charles Foulkes, then retired, was asked to comment on Norstad's statement, he said: "There's no official secret connected with the fact that Canada made an agreement with NATO."[34]

Here, then, is the case of a high ranking American military officer, who as SACEUR had been commander of Canada's NATO forces as well, flanked by the Associate Defence Minister and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, saying that Canada had made a commitment to acquire nuclear warheads. He is then supported by the general who had been Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff at the time such an agreement would have been made. There seems no doubt that this is a case of a non-member of a national society participating directly and authoritatively, through actions taken with the society's members; in other words, a case of penetration.

It is suggested that this case illustrates the possibility of using, as well, subjective criteria for judging whether or not penetration into a society's affairs had occurred. Rosenau hints at this possibility when he talks about the legitimacy with which direct participation of non-members in a society is viewed.[35] What is the society's reaction to the participation? Of this instance, Lyon says that "many Canadians were shaken by General Norstad's candid testimony on January 3; they found his statement concerning Canada's commitments more credible than the conflicting claims of their own political leaders."[36]

Involvement in Canadian defence affairs by NORAD officials is also considered to be penetration rather than interference for much the same reasons that General Norstad's involvement is considered penetration. The statement of General John Gerhard, CINCNORAD, in North Bay on January 10, 1963, "that the absence of warheads for the Bomarcs constituted 'a chink in the North American polar shield'," [37] would be one such example.

The controversy over the type of warheads available for the "A" and "B" models of the Bomarc presents another interesting aspect of penetration. North American Air Defence Command, in a press release in 1961, stated that the Bomarc missile could be equipped with either high explosive or nuclear warheads. In the 1963 election campaign Mr. Diefenbaker used the press release to "substantiate his claim" [38] that Canada did not have to accept nuclear warheads to make the Bomarc-B operational. Norad officials countered that the 1961 press release had referred to the "A" model, and that no conventional warhead had been developed for the "B" model of the Bomarc. In this instance, NORAD officials were able to penetrate Canadian society because they were part of a joint command, but in addition, they spoke with the authority of experts. While it is only one case, it causes one to ponder the relationship between expertise and ease of penetration. One proposition is that non-members of a society who are experts have more chance of acting jointly, directly and authoritatively in allocation of its values or the mobilization of support than do non-experts.

Actions of the United States government fell into several categories. The "straight-from-the-shoulder"[39] letter from President Kennedy to the Prime Minister urging the prompt acceptance of nuclear warheads was in the nature of a private correspondence and was therefore autonomous rather than joint action, direct but non-authoritative.

The January 30, 1963, press release of the U.S. State Department took issue with Mr. Diefenbaker's January 25 defence speech, especially his comments on the nearness to completion of negotiations to transfer nuclear warheads to Canada and on the ramifications to Canadian defence policy of the agreements reached by President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan at their Nassau meeting. It brought strong condemnation from all political parties in Canada, from the general public and from the press, as well as from the press in the United States. For example, the New York Times stated that "very justly the Department of State is being strongly criticized for one of the most ham-handed, ill-conceived, and undiplomatic employments in the record of U.S. diplomacy."[40] While the press release may have been a case of "intolerable intervention"[41] in Canadian affairs, penetration it was not.

Not so easily categorized are the "basement briefings" at the U.S. embassy in Ottawa during the 1962 election campaign. U.S. Ambassador Livingston Merchant

> was secretly briefing members of the Ottawa press corps against the anti-nuclear-weapons policy of the Diefenbaker government. Nobody who attended those basement sessions will ever forget his earnest logic and 'good sense' approach as he administered the hypodermic."[42]

Lyon suggests that a minor U.S. official was responsible for any involvement that occurred. He also suggests, in this incident, that the involvement came about by chance, with the Ambassador responding to questions put by reporters. According to him, "the nuclear question was beginning to loom large, and the Ambassador was naturally questioned about his government's position."[43] He further suggests that such activity is normal diplomatic practice and could therefore not be construed as interference. However, Patrick Nicholson, an Ottawa journalist, says that it was the Ambassador who gave the briefings and writes that he "was unveiled as the unheralded guest artist of the evening."[44] Nicholson, who appears to have been present, also suggests that there was nothing "chancy" about the meeting when he says, "Mr. C. Kiseylak, a U.S. diplomat at his country's embassy in Ottawa, invited a few carefully chosen Canadian journalists to his home."[45]

While the actions were perhaps not interference, it seems they were taken directly, with an air of legitimacy: "Mr. Lynch has assured me [Peyton Lyon] that Mr. Merchant did nothing that he would not expect a Canadian ambassador to do in similar circumstances,"[46] and in conjunction with the society's members.

Finally to be considered is Defence Secretary McNamara's statement on March 19, 1963, before a House of Representatives subcommittee, that the Bomarc bases "would cause the Soviets to target missiles against them and thereby increase their missile requirements or draw missiles on these Bomarc targets that would otherwise be available for other targets."[47] While Diefenbaker is reported to have said following the statement: "Happy days are here again. McNamara really

put the skids under Pearson,"[48] it probably cannot be classified as penetration. In any event, it tended to push in the opposite direction to the other cases of U.S. involvement in the nuclear warheads issue, giving rise to Mr. Diefenbaker's statement that McNamara was on his side in the controversy.[49]

In assessing the role of the periodical press, two categories will be established: (a) American, with the major example being Newsweek, and (b) Canadian Edition American, including Time and Reader's Digest. Two points will have to be established to show that penetration did occur. Firstly, did the periodical act directly and authoritatively, through actions taken with the society's members? In other words, was the periodical viewed as a legitimate commentator by Canadians? Secondly, did it promote a point of view on the issue of nuclear warheads and/or on Canadian politics of the period?

In the case of Newsweek, with a circulation somewhat below that of Time in Canada, (See Appendix VII for circulation figures) there seems to be some grounds for claiming that it is not looked upon as a "foreign" news-magazine by Canadians as would be the New Statesman, Neue Blatt, or Paris Match. However, to claim that it is viewed as "one of ours" would require a much more exhaustive survey. That Newsweek participated in the Canadian nuclear debate there is no doubt. Lyon cites the September 25, 1961 "Periscope" article,[50] which refers to Kennedy's private letter to Diefenbaker urging prompt acceptance of nuclear warheads, as probably having caused the Canadian Prime Minister to delay even longer in making up his mind about

nuclear warheads.[51] The cover of the February 18, 1963, issue of Newsweek, showed a "satanic" photograph of Mr. Diefenbaker, and in the magazine, there was such copy as:

> Britain's Prime Minister Harold MacMillan can hardly stand the sight of him. . . . He went before Parliament to try to explain away Canada's dilatory refusal to accept U.S. controlled nuclear warheads for the Bomarc-B missiles and Voodoo jet interceptors he had agreed to place in operation for joint defence. . . . He has run the nation like a tantrum-prone country judge. . . . The India-rubber features twist and contort in grotesque gargoylelike grimaces.[52]

Published a few weeks before the 1963 election, it seems an obvious attempt to influence the outcome of that election.

Again using reaction as a subjective gauge of penetration, most politicians condemned the Newsweek attack on Mr. Diefenbaker. "They regarded it as an insult to the country--that no U.S. journal should go so far in attacking the prime minister of a neighbour nation."[53] However, it was also reported: "Among anti-Diefenbaker forces there was also concern that the story would backfire--that it would spark a wave of sympathy for Mr. Diefenbaker which his supporters could turn to his advantage in the campaign ahead."[54]

Did Newsweek penetrate or did it interfere? Weighing the scanty evidence of circulation, uncertainty about attitudes toward the news-magazine and the plain case of its meddling in Canadian politics, it is concluded that here was an instance of possible penetration.

Time, the semi-fortnightly news magazine, has carried a Canadian section since 1944, but until May of 1962 that section was written and edited in New York.[55] It acts directly, authoritatively and jointly, having its "Canadian Edition" published in Montreal. Its comment on

the nuclear weapons issue consisted mainly of publication of anti-government cartoons reprinted from various Canadian daily newspapers,[56] unflattering drawings of Mr. Diefenbaker from an election campaign "colouring-book" put out by the Liberals,[57] and some disparaging remarks about Mr. Diefenbaker's policies:

> Last week as the Cuban crisis ebbed it was dismayingly clear that the test exposed a glaring weakness of post-poned decision and uncertain policy on the Canadian side. . . . The only air defence unit not placed on full alert: The RCAF's Bomarc base at North Bay, Ontario, which without nuclear warheads for its missiles, had nothing to be alert with.[58]

A few weeks later, it was to refer to "John Diefenbaker's now-you-see-it-now-you-don't nuclear policy. . . ."[59]

The Canadian edition of Reader's Digest, is published in Montreal and had a circulation of about a million a month in Canada throughout the period. Having a format differing from Time and Newsweek, it concerned itself mainly with providing background information on the nuclear warheads question and the cold war picture in general. In the period of January, 1958, to March 1963, Reader's Digest published more than 80 articles on different aspects of the cold war situation. There were, for example, articles such as the following:

> "Turkey: The Land Where Russia Stops."
> (The Turks have been fighting the Russians for centuries and they stand ready to fight them again. The most exposed people in the NATO alliance, they are also probably the toughest. An object lesson in self-defence.)[60]
>
> "Stop Being Defeatist About Defence!"
> (Canadians should find reassurance in this double-barreled fact-sheet.)[61]
>
> "Tireless Sentinel For North America"
> (The success of the deterrent hinges on the round-the-clock

> efficiency of the largest, most farflung military force . . . fastest, most potently armed and deadly efficient jet fighter interceptors ever designed . . . NORAD's ground to air Bomarc, which can vaporize an entire bomber formation.)[62]

All of the articles had a similar slant and some were clearly prepared for Canadian readers. In addition, it is interesting that in April of 1963, after a steady run during the preceding five years of articles of the tenor of these noted above, this type of article stopped appearing, and was not to reappear for the remaining months of 1963.[63]

While Reader's Digest did not directly urge Canadians to accept nuclear warheads, the message came across fairly clearly. As a penetrator, Reader's Digest is considered to be particularly insidious because it is able to provide attractively written articles in a magazine at low cost (due to the large U.S. market) and because of the high secondary readership. Those factors in themselves would have little bearing on penetration if it were not for the "legitimacy" with which the magazine is viewed by Canadians.

In summary on the topic of penetration, from the pronouncements of various U.S. generals, the involvement of the U.S. government, including Cabinet Ministers, Departments and personnel of the Foreign Service, together with the survey made of the three periodicals, Newsweek, Time and Reader's Digest, it is concluded that Canada was penetrated in a major way in the issue of acquisition of nuclear warheads by the United States.

The final initial condition is that of issue area. After a cursory study of Rosenau's 2 x 2 matrix for classification of issues

by tangibility of means and ends, it could be supposed that the question of nuclear arms was clearly in the nonhuman resource issue-area. Rosenau uses the questions: Did the policy cost money? Can the results be photographed? to operationalize tangibility of means and ends. Since close to $700 million[64] was being spent for the purchase of the weapons, the means were obviously tangible. Because the product could be photographed--the Bomarc's at North Bay with their needle noses pointing to the sky, the Voodoos lifting off the tarmac at RCAF Station Comox, the Starfighters soaring above pie-wedges of West German fields--it seemed that the ends were tangible as well. With tangible means and tangible ends, the issue would fall within the nonhuman resource issue-area.

However, when Rosenau says that "the value clusters in each area must evoke distinctive motives, actions, and interactions on the part of the affected actors,"[65] one is led to wonder what distinctive motives, actions and interactions might be evident in the question of acquisition of warheads. Composed of both tangible ends and means, he says that the nonhuman resource issue-area is likely to evoke fewer actors and a greater willingness to bargain. With the nuclear warheads issue, one gets the opposite impression, (a) that almost everyone was in on the act, and (b) that they held uncompromising attitudes and were in little mood to bargain. In fact, McLin says, "the anti-nuclear minority was . . . presumed to be prepared to cast its vote on the basis of this issue."[66]

But if the impression is a correct one, then the indication is that the nuclear warheads issue should be placed in the status

issue-area. In support of this indication, a re-examination of ends and means shows that tangibility was not as certain as first thought. The confusion enters when a clear distinction is not made between the delivery system, viz., Bomarc, Voodoo, Starfighter, Honest John, and the nuclear warheads with which the carriers could be armed. Since this paper is concerned with the reasons why certain decisions were taken or not taken with regard to the acquisition of nuclear warheads, two questions should clarify the matter. Firstly, how much were the nuclear warheads to cost Canada? Secondly, what difference would one see in a photograph of a carrier with nuclear warhead to one without? In answer to the first question, while the delivery vehicles might have cost the taxpayer 700 million dollars, the nuclear warheads would cost Canada nothing since Canada was not buying the warheads. In fact, U.S. legislation forbade transfer of ownership of the warheads to another country. "These weapons are manufactured and paid for by the U.S. and are not bought by Canada."[67] In photographing the subject of the controversy, there would be no difference between carriers with fissionable material in the warheads and carriers with sand ballast in the warheads.

However, it is recognized that the matter is not quite as clearcut as it has been made out to be. Rosenau himself says that in determining the issue-area, "the classification of data in terms of the tangibility of ends and means in clearly far more complex."[68] For instance, it would cost money to maintain the warheads and to build nuclear storage facilities. In addition, the warheads, while

atomic, did have some appreciable mass and weight.

It is concluded then that the acquisition of nuclear warheads was an issue mainly in the status issue-area. Indeed, most of the commentators on the topic seem disposed to make some statement on the status aspect of the issue. For example, McLin talks of "Diefenbaker's pique at learning that Canada could not get the same kind of custodial arrangements as Britain had, since existing U.S. legislation made an exception of the British case."[69] Lyon mentions a doubt about

> the implications for national sovereignty of joint control arrangements with the United States--a doubt reinforced by the growing concern about American domination in Canada's economic and cultural realms. A more substantial worry was that Canada, if it accepted nuclear warheads, would lose standing among the uncommitted nations."[70]

Peter Newman says that an independent approach

> showed up most dramatically in the Conservative government's refusal to stop trading with Communist China and Fidel Castro's Cuba despite heavy pressure from the United States. It was also at the root of Howard Green's obsession in keeping American nuclear warheads off Canadian soil."[71]

Richard Preston is most succinct of all: "For the first time Canadians seriously began to consider their role in world affairs."[72]

The conditions that have been discussed in this chapter and which seem to apply to Canada in the question of acquisition of nuclear warheads are small country, developed economy, open polity, penetrated society and status issue-area. Rosenau says that if these conditions prevail, then the variables which will have most potency in acting on the decision-maker to determine this particular foreign policy will be the systemic and societal (See Figure 8.)

FIGURE 8

Partial Representation of Rosenau's Framework Showing Ranking of Variables for Two Issue Areas.

Small Country

Developed Economy

Open Polity

Penetrated Society

Status Issue-Area	Nonhuman Resource Issue-Area
sy	sy
so	r
r	g
g	so
i	i

sy=systemic, so=societal, r=role, g=governmental, i=idiosyncratic

It is interesting to note that had the issue been placed in the non-human resource issue-area, the systemic variable would still have been the most potent, but the societal variable would have been ranked fourth rather than second.

Conditions having been examined in this Chapter, the concern in the next Chapter will be to establish the truth of the deductive consequence of the hypothesis, that the systemic variable was indeed the most potent causal factor and societal was the next most potent.

FOOTNOTES

[1]R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, revised by Norman Ward (5th ed.,; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 168.

[2]Pierre Sévigny, This Game of Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1965), p. 133.

[3]Ibid., p. 158.

[4]Dawson, Government of Canada, p. 187.

[5]Thomas A. Hockin, Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1971), p. 185.

[6]Sévigny, Game of Politics, p. 157.

[7]Dawson, Government of Canada, p. 189.

[8]Richard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs, 1959 to 1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 7.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Dawson, Government of Canada, p. 190.

[11]Preston, Canada, 1959-61, p. 6.

[12]The role of Olive, his wife, is not discussed, mainly because of lack of information.

[13]Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963), p. 97. David Walker and William Brunt, both Toronto lawyers, were lifelong friends of Mr. Diefenbaker. Allister Grosart was National Director of the Conservative Party.

[14]Preston, Canada, 1959-61, p. 7.

[15]Peyton V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 7.

[16]Ibid., p. 86.

[17]Jon B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 44.

[18]Other participants at Northwestern Conference on Comparative Politics and International Relations, held at Northwestern University in April, 1964, the symposium at which "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" was presented, did deal with the developed-underdeveloped economy and open-closed policy dichotomies.

[19]Marion Alblas, "Rosenau's Pre-Theory: An Application," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, May 8, 1970), p. 3.

[20]Ibid., p. 134.

[21]James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, p. 47, n. 45.

[22]Alblas, "Rosenau's Pre-Theory," p. 135.

[23]Ibid., (Emphasis added.)

[24]Ibid., p. 4.

[25]Ibid., p. 6, citing Patrick McGowan in "Africa and Non-Alignment: A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy,"International Studies Quarterly, XII (September, 1968), 285-286. In a general way, Marion Alblas also draws on the articles of the other contributors to the Northwestern Conference on Comparative Politics and International Relations in assessing state of polity and stage of development of Canada.

[26]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 65.

[27]Ibid., p. 68.

[28]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 32.

[29]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 113. See also "Text of Soviet Note," Montreal Star, June 15, 1962.

[30]Peyton V. Lyon, The Policy Question: Critical Appraisal of Canada's Role in World Affairs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963), p. 12.

[31]Dalton K. Camp, "Introduction," in Alliances and Illusions, Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question, by Lewis Hertzman, John W. Warnock, and Thomas A. Hockin (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig Ltd., 1969), p. xvii.

[32]J. L. Granatstein, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1969), p. 114.

[33]Ibid., p. 112.

[34]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 160.

[35]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 68.

[36]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 136.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 388.

[39]"The Periscope-Diplomatic Pouch," Newsweek, September 25, 1961, p. 19.

[40]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 170, quoting the New York Times, reprinted in the Globe and Mail, February 6, 1963.

[41]Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision (Don Mills: Longmans Canada Limited, 1968), p. 222.

[42]Charles Lynch, "Conspiracy of Silence," Ottawa Citizen, July 14, 1965, p. 7.

[43]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 507.

[44]Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, p. 223.

[45]Ibid., p. 222.

[46]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 165.

[47]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 165.

[48]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 391.

[49]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63,p. 203.

[50]"The Periscope-Diplomatic Pouch," Newsweek, September 25, 1961, p. 19.

[51]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 102.

[52]"Diefenbaker Falls: Did He Jump or Was He Pushed," Newsweek, February 18, 1963, pp. 33-36.

[53]"Politicians of All Stripes Condemn Magazine Attack on Diefenbaker," Globe and Mail (Toronto) February 14, 1963, p. 4.

[54]Ibid.

[55]"A Letter from the Publisher, Bernhard M. Auer," Time, April 19, 1963, p. 11.

[56]Time, March 9, 1962, p. 4.

[57]Time, March 15, 1963, p. 12.

[58]"Defence," Time, November 9, 1962, p. 19.

[59]"On a Nuclear Brink," Time, February 8, 1963, p. 7.

[60]"Turkey: The Land Where Russia Stops," Reader's Digest, June, 1958, p. 59.

[61]"Stop Being Defeatist About Defence," Reader's Digest, July,1960, p. 248.

[62]"Tireless Sentinel For North America," Reader's Digest, October, 1960, p. 174.

[63]Except for one article in November, "The Cold War Isn't Over," Reader's Digest, November, 1963, pp. 30-33.

[64]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 120.

[65]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 85.

[66]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 144.

[67]General Charles Foulkes, "A Soldier's View of Defence, 1961," in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. by J.L. Granatstein, p. 110. (General Foulkes' emphasis.)

[68]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 87, n. 102.

[69]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 142.

[70]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 77.

[71]Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 256.

[72]Preston, Canada, 1959-61, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEDUCTIVE CONSEQUENCE

In searching for evidence to confirm or disconfirm Rosenau's claim that, under the conditions he has specified, the systemic variable was the most potent in the issue of acquisition of nuclear warheads and societal was the next most potent, the plan will be to exploit any anomalies which might be found in the situation. The argument, which will take the form of denying the consequent, will be as follows. If the systemic variable was the most potent in the circumstances, as Rosenau claims it to be, then Mr. Diefenbaker would have accepted nuclear warheads for the carriers already possessed by Canada. Mr. Diefenbaker did not accept nuclear warheads, therefore the systemic variable was not the most potent. There is, however, one proviso which must be attached since nothing in the above argument, nor indeed in Rosenau's theory, specifies whether the variable is acting in a positive or in a negative direction. For a sound argument, it is specified that the variable must have been exerting a force which was in favour of a decision to accept nuclear warheads. The aim here, then, is to show that even when the systemic variable was acting in a positive direction, i.e., towards acceptance, the result was still negative, i.e. no decision was made to accept nuclear warheads.

Of the five variables mentioned in the theory as having an

influence on the decision-makers in the formulation of foreign policy, Rosenau singles out the systemic as being the most potent. Systemic means

> any nonhuman aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials. Geographic 'realities' and ideological challenges from potential aggressors are obvious examples of systemic variables.[1]

Since Rosenau stipulates that it includes any nonhuman aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad, two areas will have to be examined, (a) the nonhuman aspects of Canada's external environment, and (b) actions occurring abroad.

With the category being so broad, there arises the possibility that different components classified under systemic may exert influence in opposite directions, necessitating the balancing of positive components off against negative ones. (The use of the terms "positive" and "negative" in this paper does not imply any normative judgment.) However, each component in the category of systemic will be discussed, a rough assessment will be made of the direction of its influence and finally an overall assessment of the direction of influence of the systemic factor as a whole will be attempted. The systemic variable will be examined under three headings, intra-national environment, international environment and "mixed component." The third category includes those elements that do not fit neatly into the first two categories.

Considering first the intra-national environment, Rosenau's "geographic realities" suggest examination of Canada's proximity to

the United States, her location between the two super-powers, and her location in the North Atlantic polygon.[2]

Did Canada's proximity to the United States tend to exert a positive influence towards acceptance of nuclear warheads? On the one hand proximity does not necessarily work towards identical policies since Mexico, equally close to the U.S., did not find herself faced with a decision concerning nuclear warheads. However, reference to Mexico illustrates another aspect of the pressures operating on Canada. Positioned between the two super-powers, Canada was left in a precarious position from the point of view of security after World War II. From the alternatives open to her, the decision was made almost reflexively to support the United States in the Cold War. It is difficult to say if Canada's decision to work closely with her neighbour to the south in matters of defence was the result of geographic proximity or of more complex social and historical factors. Mr. Diefenbaker is of the opinion that it was a result of the former: "Under the irresistible dictates of geography, the defence of North America has become a joint enterprise of both Canada and the United States."[3] Mr. Diefenbaker's opinion suggests an additional question: How close is close? There is the possibility that geographic contiguity is closer than mere proximity, especially in the polar context.

To demonstrate the complexity of the problem, close proximity could have two entirely opposite effects. On the one hand, it could influence a country to view defence as a joint problem to be met by integration of forces, standardization of equipment, and so forth.

On the other, it could induce a country to see less need to maintain costly defensive forces. An attack on Canada would look very much like the early stages of an attack upon the U.S. itself. Therefore the U.S. deterrent

> deters attack on Canadian territory precisely to the same extent that it deters attack upon the United States itself. . . . Canada is perhaps the only country in the world which could not be brought under atomic attack without provoking massive retaliation by the United States.[4]

Even if it was conceded that geographic contiguity, of itself, influenced Canada to work closely with the United States, it would be premature to say that contiguity compelled Canada to go the whole route in nuclear defence.

Location in the North Atlantic triangle and more broadly in the North Atlantic polygon was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for support of the Atlantic Alliance, as shown by Spain and Turkey. However, this location probably disposed Canada to throw her lot in with the west, but again did not dictate the degree of support.

A component of the systemic variable that is not suggested by the term "geographic realities" is the inventory of military hardware already possessed by a country. Yet it is an intra-national, nonhuman aspect of the environment. By June, 1961, decisions had been made by the Canadian government to acquire about $700 million worth of nuclear delivery systems.[5] All of these systems were to be operational by late 1962 or early 1963 (See Appendix III for summary of relevant dates.) Possession alone would tend to be a positive influence in the decision to acquire the warheads because of the logic of maximizing

capabilities. This argument was used by Mr. Pearson in referring to the Bomarc missiles: "Either we wish to use a weapon which will not achieve its full potential, and that is a strange basis for military policy, or we decided in February, 1959, to acquire the nuclear warhead without which the full potential would not be possible."[6]

International environment was the next broad category suggested for detailed study of the systemic variable. Aspects of this category which will be examined include the influence of the United States and the other NATO allies, the influence of the uncommitted nations and the question of disarmament, the influence of the USSR and the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. The question of international comity will also be touched upon.

An attempt is made to have us believe that the United States was indifferent to Canada's decision regarding acceptance of nuclear warheads. Lyon was of the opinion that "the Americans could have accommodated themselves to a clear decision by Ottawa to withdraw from its commitments which required nuclear ammunition"[7] and Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated: "Whether Canada wishes to arrange with the United States to have nuclear weapons available for Canadian Forces is a matter for Canada to decide."[8]

However, the evidence suggests that, indeed, the United States did apply considerable pressure to have the Diefenbaker government make a decision in favour of nuclear warheads. At the head-of-state level, while there is nothing in the public record, there are indications that pressure was put on Mr. Diefenbaker by President Kennedy. The oppor-

tunity was there, since it is reported that for some time after Diefenbaker's first meeting with Kennedy they communicated quite frequently by telephone and private letter.[9] Both Le Devoir and the Winnipeg Free Press report that the President had written Mr. Diefenbaker urging the prompt acceptance of nuclear warheads.[10]

As well, the public record is still silent on whether U.S. Ambassadors Merchant or Butterworth made representations to the Diefenbaker government on behalf of the government of the United States concerning the acceptance of atomic warheads. However, Ambassador Merchant's briefing sessions with members of the press gallery, already discussed under the heading of penetration, are to be noted.

At the departmental level, the State Department's press release of January 30, 1963, has been cited as a significant example of the United States attempting to influence Canadian policy. For example, T.C. Douglas thought the press release "sought to put pressure on the Canadian people to adopt a policy with which I disagree."[11]

The press release challenged certain remarks made by Mr. Diefenbaker in his House of Commons speech, yet Lyon suggests "that it sought to tell Canada what to do was unsupported by a reading of the text."[12] While the press release did not tell Canada what to do, a reading of the text (See text of press release in Appendix IV) discloses that the Department adroitly exploited several other components which go to make up the systemic variable, which in themselves were a positive influence toward a decision to accept nuclear warheads. It mentions, for example, the incongruity of weapons without ammunition

or with inferior ammunition, the possession of nuclear warheads by other NATO allies, the Canadian commitment to NATO by way of the strike-reconnaissance aircraft, the continuing threat of the Soviet bomber fleet, the fallacy of the "expanding nuclear club" argument.

Perhaps, in this instance, Tommy Douglas was closer to the mark than was Peyton Lyon. One way of influencing a rational friend is through rational argument.

At lower levels, there were less subtle examples of attempts to influence Canada's decision. NORAD has already been discussed under penetration, in which category it is believed to fall. In other instances, Lyon reports Clive Baxter of the Financial Post as saying the Americans had already rejected a Canadian request for more Voodoos: "As one senior U.S. officer put it: 'We might as well dump them in the Atlantic Ocean as send them up to Canada'."[13] Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon is reported to have said that "Canada should be told either to acquire U.S. nuclear warheads or the United States would withdraw its nuclear deterrent power from protection of Canadian territory."[14] Perhaps the most overt attempt to influence the decision was the Newsweek coverphoto and article, "Diefenbaker Falls: Did He Jump or Was He Pushed" of February 18, 1963, already discussed under penetration. To the degree that the Newsweek article is not penetration, it is a case falling within the category of systemic variable.[15]

From statements by Mr. Diefenbaker; "Does anyone tell me that the United States. . . would retaliate because we failed to adopt a suggestion that they offered?"[16] and by Alvin Hamilton; "I say this to

our friends across the border: 'Don't push us around, chum',"[17] it is evident the government felt that some pressure was being applied.

The Soviet Union's attempt to influence Canada's decision, this time in a negative direction, was straightforward, consisting of a note delivered just prior to the 1962 election by the Soviet Ambassador. The note said in part: "If measures on location of nuclear weapons on Canadian territory have been taken on the part of Canada, the U.S.S.R. government would be forced to draw out of it a proper conclusion with the aim of guaranteeing the security of the Soviet Union."[18]

The Canadian government refused the note saying that it constituted interference in the affairs of Canada.

The North Atlantic Alliance is part of Canada's international external environment and with regard to nuclear weapons there are indications that the desire was for Canada to accept. The decision was taken in December of 1955 by the NATO council to arm the forces of the alliance with atomic weapons. A meeting of heads of government of the NATO countries in December, 1957, confirmed the decision and expanded it to allow for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in Europe for use by the alliance.[19] General Norstad's press conference of January, 1963, a case of penetration, leaves no one in doubt as to the attitude of NATO's military commander:

> Question: General, do you consider that Canada has committed itself to provide its Starfighter squadrons in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons?
>
> Norstad: My answer to that is "Yes". . . . We established a NATO requirement for a certain number of strike squadrons. This includes tactical atomic strike squadrons and Canada committed some of its force to meet this NATO established

> requirement. And this we depend upon. . . . We are depending upon Canada to produce some of the tactical atomic strike forces.[20]

Norstad was in Ottawa at the time not only to appear at press conferences but also to confer with officials. His press conference indicates what was discussed in private:

> Question: Does this mean that there is an existing bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States?
>
> Norstad: No, No, I don't think this exists. . . . I'm advocating the signing of this bilateral agreement, both here and in the United States.[21]

Pressure was exerted on the Canadian parliamentarians who attended the conference of NATO parliamentarians in Paris in November, 1962:

> Having listened to the grievances of the senior military officers, both in NATO and at Canadian bases, about the failure of the Diefenbaker government to implement agreed plans, they returned home resolved to force the issue to a head. Mr. Paul Hellyer had a forty-minute private meeting with General Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander, which confirmed his doubts not only about the government's policy but about that of his own party.[22]

The other NATO allies, if not directly, at least implicitly by their own acceptance of nuclear weapons, could be considered a force in favour of nuclear warheads.[23] Preston alludes to this point when he talks about the possibility of Canada's isolation in NATO if she continued to hold out on nuclear warheads.[24]

A more abstract but still positive influence in the systemic area is one that is often referred to as comity of nations. "It is a truism to say that no international interest is more vital than the observance of good faith between states."[25] The question here is

whether Canada had actually made commitments to NATO and to the United States concerning acquisition of nuclear warheads. Mr. Diefenbaker was the Prime Minister at the time of the signing of the agreement at the NATO heads of government meeting in December, 1957, to establish nuclear stockpiles in Europe. Of this signing, General Foulkes is quoted as saying: "This acceptance was understood by the military staff of NATO as an indication that Canada would acquire nuclear weapons for its forces in Europe."[26] This indication was strengthened by Mr. Diefenbaker's decision subsequent to General Norstad's visit to Ottawa in 1959, to accept a strike-reconnaissance role--by definition, nuclear--for the RCAF in NATO. But was there a written agreement? Again from the press conference, it does not appear so:

> Question: General, did you say that you believe that Canada has committed this Starfighter group to tactical weapons?
>
> Norstad: No doubt - I know that they have committed the Starfighters, yes.
>
> Question: Could you say that this commitment is given in writing anywhere?
>
> Norstad: I don't know the answer to that one. The commitment, certainly, to provide the units is in writing as has been repeated on several occasions and I cannot specifically recall where it states whether they are going to be atomic or not.[27]

The question here is to what extent are informal agreements (verbal agreements and so forth) between friendly states considered to be binding agreements.

In considering commitments with regard to Bomarc, the Canadian Ambassador's note, which forms part of the NORAD agreement, says in part:

> The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improvements in the means of effecting their delivery, and the requirements of the air defence control systems demand rapid decisions to keep pace with the speed and tempo of technological developments. . . . It was essential, therefore, to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including the weapons. . . . which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defence plan approved in advance by national authorities.[28]

Defence Minister George Pearkes, desirous that any new air defence system should operate far enough to the north to protect Canada's populous areas, "took the political initiative by asking that some of the Bomarcs be placed in Canada."[29] The Bomarc "B" was strictly a nuclear missile.

Components of the international environment which may have encouraged the government to shelve the decision to "go nuclear" include the Cuban missile crisis, the attitude of the uncommitted nations and the question of disarmament.

It has been said that Canada could hardly accept nuclear warheads after the U.S.S.R. had been forced to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Cuba in October, 1962.[30] However, the offensive nature of the missiles in Cuba, with a range of three to four thousand miles, as opposed to the defensive nature of Canada's anti-bomber weapons, would seem to distinguish the two situations.[31]

The bearing that nuclear warheads had on Canada's relationship to the uncommitted nations and on Canada's efforts to promote disarmament are difficult questions to handle. Certainly, Mr. Green's perception of the importance of these two factors as reasons for not acquiring the warheads are of great significance, although outside the

scope of this paper. Looking at the matter objectively rather than through Mr. Green's perceptions, the opinion has been expressed that Canada's reluctance to make a decision to acquire nuclear arms might have damaged her efforts to promote disarmament and to retain the respect of the uncommitted nations. Douglas Le Pan, a former Assistant Under-Secretary in the Department of External Affairs,contested

> the claim that Canada would be able to do more to influence the uncommitted nations and promote disarmament if it refused nuclear arms: "This argument overestimates our position in the world. I think it underestimates the degree to which our influence with the uncommitted countries depends on the influence which we are still believed to have in Washington and London."[32]

Lyon also quotes the historian, Frank Underhill, as saying:

> If we Canadians want to have any meaningful influence in the world, the people whom we must first try to influence are the Americans, the British, and the West Europeans. [This means living] up to to the obligations we have already undertaken.[33]

In considering the mixed elements in the systemic variable, i.e., those which neither fall clearly within the intra- or the international realm, the strategy of deterrence and the state of technology will be examined.

The strategy of deterrence seems to be a force in favour of acceptance of the warheads. The deterrence concept depended on fully armed, ready-to-shoot weapons being in place to discourage the enemy from ever starting his attack. An alternative that was sometime mentioned was that because of proximity to the United States, the warheads could be stored south of the border and be brought up in time of need. However, Douglas Harkness stated:

> Suggestions that nuclear warheads could be stored outside Canada have been made, but I have heard no practical scheme yet which would make it possible to move them to Canada and fit them on the Bomarc and CF-101 in the time that would be required to meet an attack. . . . There would certainly be no time to start trucking up nuclear warheads to the Bomarc bases.[34]

The strategy of deterrence did not demand that Canada be part of the deterrent force, but once Canada had opted to play a role by virtue of its decision to acquire the vehicles, it would seem that the pressure was there to accept the warheads.

The state of technology as a factor centered on whether the Bomarcs and Voodoos were obsolete because of advances in Soviet rocketry.[35] Since both were anti-bomber defences, the question was whether the U.S.S.R. would launch an attack in the early 1960's by bomber or by intercontinental ballistic missile. In 1958-59, intelligence estimates stressed the threat of Soviet ICBM's but by 1960-61 these estimates "were revised again to take account of the Soviet Union's failure to shift emphasis from bombers to missiles as early or as quickly as had been anticipated".[36]

Lyon quotes Defence Minister Harkness as saying in September, 1961:

> "The present situation is that we are confronted with a bomber threat." The development of the "stand-off bomber, the air-to-surface missile carried by a bomber, has undoubtedly considerably prolonged the useful life of bombers."[37]

Again in 1963 Harkness stated: "No one underestimates the increased threat of long-range missiles, but it must be recognized that manned bombers remain the important element in the strategic nuclear force

maintained by the Communists and at the present time, bombers would deliver the main weight of any nuclear attack on this continent."[38]

Of the problem and the period, Conant says:

> While this need [interception of manned bombers] may seem in the 1960's to be overshadowed by the lengthening threat of long range missiles, it is clear even now that the Soviet Union is making every effort to improve and prolong the use of its long range bomber force. . . . At the Tushino air show of July 1961, Soviet Bombers of the TU-20 (Bear) and TU-16 (Badger) types, as well as two new types (Bounder and Beauty) of supersonic design were displayed armed with air-to-surface weapons. . . . Hostile manned aircraft will present a serious threat throughout the next decade.[39]

The press release, previously mentioned, of the U.S. State Department said in part: "The Soviet bomber fleet will remain at least throughout the decade a significant element in the Soviet strike force."[40]

Figures of the Institute of Strategic Studies of London seem to lend support to these statements. Its estimates[41] of Soviet air strength for 1962-63 put the number of Bear (TU-20) long range bombers at 70; the number of Badger (TU-16) medium range bombers, capable of making a one way strike on the United States, at 1,000. Although its estimates did not include a figure for the Bison (Myasishchev 500) long range bombers, extrapolation of U.S. intelligence figures would set the number at about 200. The Institute of Strategic Studies also estimated the number of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles for that period at between 50 and 100.

From the technical point of view, there is the additional question of "cooking" incoming nuclear warheads. Conventional ammunition would simply bring down a bomber, allowing its nuclear payload,

equipped with a dead-man fuse, to explode at ground level inside Canadian territory. Lyon quotes General Kuter as contending that nuclear warheads on anti-bomber defences would have the advantage of not only destroying the bomber but also of "cooking" its bomb load and thus rendering the load harmless to Canadians below.[42] However, Lyon also reports that there was considerable disagreement over the scientific aspects of this question, and McLin says that "one of the most spirited episodes of these 1963 hearings [Sauve Committee Proceedings] occurred when the existence of this "cooking" phenomenon was questioned by a group of physicists from the University of Alberta."[43]

In summary, an attempt has been made in the preceding pages to survey the systemic variable with the objective of showing that in a general way it did exert pressure on Canada to accept nuclear warheads. Despite the difficulties of adding influences "for" and influences "against" and obtaining a plus or minus sum, the assessment is made that the systemic variable was strongly positive in attempting to influence Canada's decision to acquire nuclear warheads. The forces mainly responsible for this positive influence are to be found in all three of the sub-categories of the systemic variable--the intranational, the international, and the mixed component. These forces include the predispositions arising out of geography in conjunction with other factors outside the systemic variable; the dissonance of an arsenal of weapons without ammunition; the vested interest held by the United States in the issue, as expressed by its President, its State Department, its top-ranking military officers, and various members of

its periodical press; the stake in the issue held by NATO, as expressed by its military leaders and implied by several of the alliance members; the impression, vague but persistent, that some type of commitment had been made by Canada to accept nuclear warheads; and finally, the knowledge that the Soviet Union had not abandoned her bomber forces.

Despite this strong positive pressure, Mr. Diefenbaker did not make the decision to accept nuclear warheads.

As was done with the systemic variable, it will be argued that if the societal was the second most potent variable under the initial conditions set out by Rosenau, then Mr. Diefenbaker would have made a decision that reflected the direction of influence of the societal variable. The question then, is one of discovering the direction of influence of the societal variable.

Rosenau speaks of the societal variable as a cluster of components consisting of those "non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its external behaviour."[44] Some of these components he groups under societal are the major value orientations of a society, its degree of national unity, and the extent of its industrialization. As can be visualized, the societal variable is as broad and as equivocal as the systemic was found to be. Unfortunately, Rosenau does not operationalize his concept of the societal variable.

From his example in the case of the Bay of Pigs invasion in which he asks: "Would the America of the roaring twenties, the depression, or the McCarthy era have 'permitted,' 'encouraged,' or otherwise become involved in a refugee-mounted invasion?"[45] it appears he is thinking

in terms of attitudes of the public. Since he clearly sees this variable acting on the decision-makers, it is hardly likely that he is thinking of deep psychological measurements. It is more probable he has in mind some indicator which is rather conspicuous and which is expressed of its own accord, day in and day out. It is supposed that this indicator would be a composite produced by such factors as basic beliefs, values, and motives of members of the society. The question remains: What would constitute an adequate operationalization of the societal variable? While the problem is understood, the answer to that problem cannot be presented at this time.

However, some insights into the complexity of the problem may be gained by a discussion of only a couple of attitudes that were evident at the time of the nuclear warheads issue, firstly, the attitudes as expressed by opinion polls, and secondly, the attitudes as expressed by ad hoc interest groups.

Several measurements and observations were made of public opinion on the question of nuclear warheads during the period. These samplings include the following: a Canadian Peace Research Institute(CPRI) survey done in the first two weeks of November, 1962; the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) surveys, a number of which were conducted from 1961 to 1963; the work of Samuel Lubell, an American analyst of public opinion, who spent five weeks in Canada sampling the public during the 1963 election campaign; and minor sources, mainly subjective, consisting of estimates of the public mood made by various political observers.

In conducting its survey, the Canadian Peace Research Institute had a broad interest in the attitudes of Canadians towards such questions as peace and war, defence and disarmament. The question in the survey that has the most bearing on this study is number eighteen: Which of the following statements comes closest to the way you yourself feel about Canada and atomic weapons?[46] (See Appendix VIII for the response to this question.)

Paul and Laulicht have interpreted the results to mean that in November, 1962, sixty-one percent of Canadians were in favour of nuclear arms, "including those in favour with qualifications," and thirty-one percent were opposed.[47]

Of the CPRI study, Lyon says that while conducted with care, its results appear to have been influenced by the proximity of the interviews to the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962. In addition, he says that the results of the CPRI interviews with elite groups are less reliable than the sampling of mass opinion.[48]

The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion also conducted surveys during this time. (See Appendix IX for results of CIPO surveys.) The question generally asked by the CIPO was: Just from what you know or have heard, in your opinion, should Canada's armed forces be armed with nuclear weapons or not? About 61% of those asked were of the opinion in September, 1961, that Canada's forces should be armed with nuclear weapons, while 31% were of the opinion that they should not be so armed; about 60% were in favour and 32% opposed in December, 1962; and about 53% were in favour and 32% opposed in June, 1963 (the per-

centages for 1962 and 1963 for those in favour include those in favour with qualifications).

Samuel Lubell, sampling during the 1963 election campaign, found that 60% of the voters whom he interviewed "thought Canada should accept nuclear warheads, while only 24% were opposed. The remaining 16% could not decide."[49]

Of the political observers making rough estimates, Thomas Van Dusen, in discussing Pearson's Scarborough speech, says that "there is no question . ... they [the Liberals in opposition] were acting at least partly in response to public feeling about the necessity of some form of nuclear defence brought about by the Cuban crisis."[50]

The indications are that that which is generally called "public opinion" was favourable to the acceptance of nuclear weapons. But did Mr. Diefenbaker know what this public opinion was? It seems highly likely that he did, for Allister Grosart, who was said to be in constant touch with Mr. Diefenbaker on political questions,[51] certainly knew: "Senator Allister Grosart, outgoing national party director, in an address to the Canadian University Press conference here Friday, made a pointed reference to the fact that recent public opinion polls indicated 54% of Canadians favour the acquisition of nuclear warheads."[52]

Turning to the ad hoc interest groups, it is apparent that "public opinion" did not adequately express their view on the issue of nuclear warheads.[53] Generally their efforts were aimed at obtaining a decision from the government to refuse nuclear warheads for the

four weapons systems in question. The Voice of Women (VOW), established in 1960, became "a determined pressure group against nuclear weapons."[54] The October 31, 1962, meeting between Mr. Green and a delegation of the VOW was headlined in the Globe and Mail as follows: "300 Irate VOW Delegates Demand Canada Voice Stand on Arms."

The other important ad hoc groups were the Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards, formed in 1958 and later called the Canadian Committee for Survival, and the Combined Universities Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, "begun in 1959 in direct response to the government's Bomarc decision, and later affiliated with the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament."[55] These two groups participated in a 72 hour anti-nuclear demonstration on Ottawa's Parliament Hill in October 1961 and concluded the demonstration with the presentation to the Prime Minister of a petition of 141,000 signatures. The Combined Universities group also participated in petitions to the government from faculty members at several Canadian universities. On November 8, 1962, members of the Committee for Survival "demonstrated at the National War Memorial and presented a brief to the Prime Minister."[56]

These groups may have been small in number, but from the activities described, they seem to have been especially active, persistent and vocal. Again, there is no doubt that Mr. Diefenbaker was aware of their stand on the issue.

If society's attitudes can be measured in terms of public opinion polls, then, in not making the decision to acquire nuclear

warheads, Mr. Diefenbaker "discounted"[57] the societal variable. If he discounted the societal variable, then this part of Rosenau's hypothesis is disconfirmed. However, if he was influenced by the societal variable as expressed by ad hoc interest groups (as well as the other groups mentioned in the footnote), then one would be tempted to say that this part of the hypothesis is confirmed. It will be recalled, though, that Rosenau specifies that the societal variable ranks second in potency for the conditions particular to this issue. Should it not, then, be given top ranking in view of the alleged influence of the ad hoc interest groups?

The whole problem with attempting to confirm or disconfirm this part of the hypothesis comes back to the inability, at this time, of operationalizing the concept of societal variable. If the two components just described, i.e., public opinion and ad hoc interest groups, are to be contained within one variable, then any adequate operationalization will have to be elastic enough to contain these divergent views, yet be precise enough to indicate the direction in which the societal variable is acting in any particular issue.

In concluding on the topic of deductive consequences, the intention was to utilize anomalies found in the situation and to employ arguments of the form of denying the consequent. It is believed that such an anomaly was found with regard to the systemic variable and that its part of the hypothesis is disconfirmed. However, when it came to the societal variable, it was found that because of an inability to operationalize the concept, no statement could be made about the

direction of action of the variable. Since this statement could not be made, no conclusion can be drawn on its part of the hypothesis.

FOOTNOTES

[1]James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. by R. Barry Farrel (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 43.

[2]Such geographic realities as topography, climate and access to the sea, while falling within the category of systemic, are not examined in this paper since they seem to have minimal bearing on the issue being discussed. The Rosenau variable, described as systemic, observes the fact that there is a difference between intra-national geographic environment and geographic relationship to other states. As well, geographic relationship seems in a different class from actions of other states. For convenience, geographic relationship is included in the category of intra-national environment.

[3]Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 20, 1959, II, p. 1223.

[4]James Eayrs, Northern Approaches, Canada and the Search for Peace (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1961), p. 40.

[5]Gellner puts the figure at $1 billion for the CF 104 program alone. (John Gellner, Canada in NATO [Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970], p. 56.)

[6]Jon B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 139.

[7]Peyton V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 76.

[8]Ibid., p. 109.

[9]Ibid., p. 493.

[10]"Washington pousse Ottawa à s'équiper d'armes nucléaires," Le Devoir (Montreal), 20 Septembre, 1961, p. 1; and "U.S. Puts Pressure on Dief," Winnipeg Free Press, September 20, 1961, p. 15.

[11]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 165.

[12]Ibid., p. 169.

[13]Ibid., p. 122.

[14]"Morse Assails Canada Stand," Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 11, 1963, p. 2. It is interesting to speculate on whether Senator Morse realized that he was talking through his hat.

[15]The same thing could also be said of Reader's Digest.

[16]Debates, February 4, 1963, p. 3439.

[17]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 197.

[18]Ibid., p. 113.

[19]Gellner, Canada in NATO, p. 44.

[20]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 131.

[21]Ibid., p. 134.

[22]Ibid., p. 126-27.

[23]Lyon reports that by January, 1961, the United States had concluded agreements with five of the NATO allies for joint control of nuclear weapons. (Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 99.)

[24]Richard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs, 1959 to 1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 192.

[25]J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 331.

[26]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 134.

[27]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 132.

[28]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 222.

[29]Ibid., p. 86.

[30]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 118.

[31]A similarity of situation is to be noted, though, when one considers the strike-reconnaissance aircraft in Europe.

[32]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 208.

[33]Ibid., p. 209.

[34]Douglas Harkness, "The Facts of Nuclear Arms as Harkness Knows Them," Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 15, 1963, p. 7.

[35]A similar question could be asked of the Starfighter strike-reconnaissance aircraft in Europe with the development of a less vulnerable deterrent--nuclear powered submarines armed with Polaris

missiles.

[36]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 101.

[37]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 99, quoting Douglas Harkness.

[38]Douglas Harkness, "The Facts of Nuclear Arms as Harkness Knows Them," Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 15, 1963, p. 7.

[39]Melvin Conant, The Long Polar Watch (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 137-38.

[40]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 158.

[41]Edgar M. Bottome, The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of Military and Political Policy (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1971), p. 233.

[42]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 95, n. 38.

[43]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 132, n. 40.

[44]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 43.

[45]Ibid., p. 46.

[46]John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, In Your Opinion, I (Clarkson, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1963), p. 84.

[47]Ibid., p. 58.

[48]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 535, n. 1.

[49]Ibid., p. 89.

[50]Thomas Van Dusen, The Chief (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 44.

[51]Newman says that Allister Grosart had breakfast with Mr. Diefenbaker at the P.M.'s residence twice a week at which time the two discussed policy matters. (Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 160.)

[52]Walter Gray, "Ottawa Nuclear Arms Stand Expected Early in New Year," Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 1, 1963, p. 1.

[53]Besides the opposition shown by the ad hoc interest groups, it is claimed that the Prime Minister's mail was running overwhelmingly against acceptance of nuclear warheads (Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 90.) As can be seen from the results of the CPRI poll, the union leaders sampled were not favourably disposed to atomic weapons. A CIPO poll

taken in March 1963 showed French Canadians 37% Yes, and 42.5% No, (Ibid., p. 541.) As well, Lyon reports that the Canadian press was almost uniformly in opposition to acceptance of nuclear warheads, major examples being the Star, the Globe and Mail, La Presse, Le Devoir and Maclean's. (Ibid., p. 87.)

[54]Lyon, Canada, 1961-63, p. 88.

[55]McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 144.

[56]Lyon, Canada, 1961-1963, p. 119.

[57]In the same way that stockbrokers are said to "discount" the news.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Since the case selected for study seems to provide, at least, a partial disconfirmation of Rosenau's hypothesis, two courses of action seem to suggest themselves. Firstly, one could fight a rearguard action to save the hypothesis. Secondly, the hypothesis could be abandoned altogether and a new one proposed in its place.

In order to maintain the hypothesis in the face of a disconfirmatory instance, one of several manoeuvres may be used:[1]

(a) reject one of the statements of initial conditions,

(b) propose an ad hoc hypothesis to supplement the main hypothesis,

(c) decide that the observational prediction came true after all.

Given the under-developed state of Rosenau's theory, especially its lack of operationalization of such concepts as size of country, type of polity, degree of development, it might seem that the surest way to sustain the hypothesis would be to launch an attack on initial conditions. However,one feels confident that placing Canada towards the "small" end of the large-small country continuum, that placing Canada towards the "open" end of the open-closed polity continuum, and at the "developed" end of the developed-underdeveloped economy continuum is essentially correct even though operationalization of

these concepts was not very precise. By a process of induction by enumeration, one is confident in saying that Canada was penetrated by the United States in the issue of acquisition of nuclear arms. What would seem to be Rosenau's most successful attempt at operationalizing a concept is that of issue-area, and one feels that indeed acquisition of nuclear warheads was more an issue of status than of human resources, nonhuman resources, or of territory.

To deny one of the initial conditions merely to save the hypothesis would seem to be unwarranted in this case, not only because of a confidence in the conditions, but also because of the logical inconsistencies in the theory that were discussed earlier.

The hypothesis could be saved by the addition of an ad hoc hypothesis, and although one tends to be skeptical about this procedure to save a hypothesis, there are good historical precedents for such a move. An auxiliary hypothesis of this type might take the form:

> If the decision-makers do not bend to the influence of the most potent variables (in this case systemic and societal) acting upon them in the determination of a policy, then such tensions will be created in a government that the decision-makers themselves will be destroyed.

This ad hoc hypothesis would seem to save the original hypothesis in light of the February, 1963, defeat of the Conservative government in the House of Commons, the subsequent election and the coming to power of Lester Pearson and the Liberals. However, it would have to be shown that the tensions that were produced were predominantly the result of this particular issue and that the subsequent defeat at the polls of the Conservative government was also the result of this issue. There

is considerable evidence to suggest that this was not the case. The non-confidence motions introduced by opposition party leaders mention a variety of complaints ranging from lack of leadership and failure to make a clear statement on national defence to failing to introduce a budget. Concerning the election that followed, Lyon suggests that the impact of the nuclear warheads controversy was not very great.[2] In support, he cites the open-ended question asked in the March, 1963, Gallup survey: "What do you feel is the greatest single problem facing Canada today?", and the answers given:[3]

Unemployment	34%
Economy of the country	9
Financial situation, too much debt	4
Need for majority government, leadership	9
Nuclear arms situation	15
National defence	2
Relations with the U.S.	2
International situation	3
Other	7
Don't know	15

When one considers the opportunities to extend the life of the regime that were passed up, for example, the Social Credit offer of cooperation and the time-buying device of adjournment of Parliament upon the death of Chief Justice Kerwin, one wonders whether Mr. Diefenbaker was not destroyed by his own self rather than by any of the issues that swirled about him at the time.

To take the third alternative as a way of saving the hypothesis, i.e., concluding that the observation sentence really did come true after all, would require the postulation of a concept of negative potency. That is, the stronger the pressures of the systemic variable,

the more the Prime Minister resisted. However, this alternative would seem to skirt the issue, for it still does not answer the "why" of Mr. Diefenbaker's resistance.

This alternative may be used with less difficulty when one considers the societal part of the hypothesis. One could conclude that Mr. Diefenbaker actually was influenced by the societal variable. According to Nicholson:

> He [Diefenbaker] was impressed by the substantial and increasing and very moral indignation against nuclear weapons, expressed by the Canadian public. The 'Ban-the-Bomb' movement was well organized and active, achieving an image greater than its reality. Its lobby inevitably influenced a politician as sensitive as Mr. Diefenbaker to an apparent widespread popular demand, as represented by delegations and especially by the steady stream of letters and telegrams arriving at his office.[4]

Of interest here is another aspect of the problem that has barely been touched upon in the paper, and that is Mr. Diefenbaker's perception of events. In a political career stretching back nearly a third of a century, had he formed the impression--a sort of rule of thumb--that a good reading of the public mood could be gained from letters that people wrote to him? Did he feel that public opinion, as expressed by the polls, was lagging behind the opinion of the leaders of Canadian society, as expressed by the ad hoc interest groups, and would soon catch up? Not even in his idiosyncratic variable does Rosenau seem to envision problems of this nature.

The other course of action, that of abandoning the old hypothesis, is suggested by Salmon, who also says:

> An apparent disconfirmation of a hypothesis is not satisfactorily dealt with until we have good grounds for

> making a correct prediction. If the hypothesis is rejected, it must be replaced by a hypothesis for which there is other evidence.[5]

Salmon's view is from the broad perspective. While it is recognized that research is a continuous process, i.e., proposing a hypothesis, disconfirming that hypothesis, proposing a new hypothesis, disconfirming that hypothesis, and so on, this paper must terminate before the total process works itself out. The general outline of a new hypothesis will simply be indicated.

In order to propose a hypothesis for which there is other evidence, one would have to identify the variables which <u>were</u> most potent in the case selected for study. No attempt has been made to identify these variables in the paper. However, of the three remaining, viz., role, governmental and idiosyncratic, role has already been discounted as being a spurious variable. This leaves the governmental and idiosyncratic variables as prime candidates, assuming that Rosenau's categorization exhausts all possibilities. In introducing his five variables, Rosenau begins by listing them "in order of increasing temporal and spatial distance from the external behaviours for which they serve as sources . . . as idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic."[6] What is suggested here is that influence bears a direct relationship to the "temporal and spatial distance" of the variables from the decision-makers, and thus idiosyncratic and governmental may be, in theory as well as in fact, the most potent variables in the determination of foreign policy.

In concluding, firstly, it is to be noted that the case chosen for study is essentially a non-decision, and while non-decisions often

make for important and interesting issues, they do not lend themselves particularly well to analysis. For one thing, one never knows what might have been the outcome had events been allowed to continue another week, another month, or another year. For another, one does not know when the non-decision is being made and thus which forces are in play immediately prior to the occurrence. In addition, whereas a decision takes a definite act of the will, a non-decision may be an act of the will or simply a result of inertia.

It is also noted that the case chosen presents not just one issue but at least four issues, a point that certainly was not appreciated when the study was begun. For instance, there was the issue of acquiring nuclear warheads for the Bomarc, a defensive weapon, as opposed to the issue of acquiring nuclear warheads for the Starfighter, an offensive weapon. There was the issue of nuclear arms on Canadian soil contrasted with the issue of nuclear warheads in the employ of Canadian forces on European soil, the issue of acquiring nuclear warheads for Bomarc, a weapon that was absolutely useless without its nuclear warhead, as opposed to the acquisition of nuclear warheads for the Voodoo, a vehicle which had some usefulness with its conventional armament.

Adding to the difficulty was the attempt to work with two variables at one time. It would have been quite sufficient for the hypothesis to have dealt with only the systemic variable, and would have allowed for a more concentrated study of that variable. However,

the concern was felt that by concentrating on only one variable (a) the theory would not be given a thorough workout, and (b) the issue would be viewed so narrowly that a general understanding of it would be missed.

To come finally to Rosenau's theory, it was found to be of considerable assistance in providing a framework for analysis. It helped to organize the material, to categorize it and to reduce it to more or less manageable proportions. It helped also to standardize the variables and conditions so that the findings of other workers could be utilized. In Rosenau's words, it "renders the raw materials comparable."[7] Perhaps more importantly, it focuses on the problem of identifying the causal variables in the formulation of foreign policy.

However, it is maintained that there are several shortcomings to the theory. The problem of whether the variables are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive has already been referred to. The difficulty of operationalizing the concepts has been a problem throughout the paper. There seems to be some confusion in Rosenau's own mind about types of concepts available for his use. He implies that we are at such an early stage in theorizing about foreign policy formation that about all we can do at the present time is to gauge relative potencies of the various causal factors. This concern for the inability to quantify potencies seems to be his main reason for referring to his framework as a pre-theory rather than as a theory. He says, "to be theoretical in nature the rankings would have to specify <u>how much</u> more potent each set of variables is than those below it on each scale."[8]

In striving for quantitative concepts in foreign policy analysis, he may be reaching for the impossible in social science. Indeed even in the so-called "hard-sciences" comparative concepts have their place. So throughout this paper, the result of Rosenau's labours has been referred to as theory rather than pre-theory.

Recognizing that Rosenau has made a contribution in positing the categories for countries, the concepts of penetration and issue-area, and in delineating causal factors in the formulation of foreign policy, it is thought that the various rankings that he gives to the variables under differing conditions were poorly thought out. Perhaps this is not too surprising when it is seen that what should have been the major arguments of his theory, those which give each variable its particular rank, are contained in one footnote.[9]

To be fair, Rosenau recognizes that modification and elaboration of his framework may be necessary, and if, as he says, "foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations that treat societies as actors subject to stimuli which produce external responses,"[10] then he has contributed a more-or-less testable generalization, in itself a valuable contribution to foreign policy analysis.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Weslay C. Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 80.

[2]Peyton V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 211.

[3]Ibid., p. 213.

[4]Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision (Don Mills: Longmans Canada Limited,1968), p. 208.

[5]Salmon, Logic, p. 81.

[6]James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. by R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 43.

[7]Ibid., p. 40.

[8]Ibid., p. 47.

[9]See footnote 45 in Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 47, for these arguments.

[10]Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories," p. 32.

APPENDIX I

Canadian Federal Election Results: 1949-1963, Showing Seats and Percent of Popular Vote[1]

Election Year	Total Seats House of Commons	Conservative		Liberal		CCF-NDP		Social Credit		Other	
		Seats	% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats	% Vote
1949	262	41	30%	193	49%	13	13%	10	4%	5	4%
1953	265	51	31%	171	49%	23	11%	15	5%	5	4%
1957	265	112	39%	105	41%	25	11%	19	7%	4	2%
1958	265	208	54%	49	34%	8	9%	-	2%	-	1%
1962	265	116	37%	100	37%	19	14%	30	12%	-	-
1963	265	95	33%	129	42%	17	13%	24	12%	-	-

[1]Adapted from Hugh G. Thorburn, Party Politics in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967), p. 225.

APPENDIX II

Total Unemployment Rates for Canada (unadjusted)
By Month, 1954-1964[1]

Year	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
1954	5.8	6.4	6.5	6.1	4.2	3.5	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.5	4.2	4.9
1955	7.2	7.4	7.7	6.2	4.0	3.0	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.7	3.1	3.9
1956	5.6	6.1	5.7	4.8	3.0	2.2	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.5	3.6
1957	5.7	6.1	6.5	5.7	3.5	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.5	3.7	5.2	7.0
1958	9.7	10.1	10.6	9.1	6.3	5.5	4.9	5.0	4.6	5.3	6.1	7.6
1959	9.5	9.3	9.1	7.6	5.7	3.9	3.7	4.0	3.6	4.0	5.0	6.5
1960	8.8	9.6	9.7	8.8	6.5	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.0	5.6	6.6	8.2
1961	10.8	11.2	11.0	9.6	6.9	5.6	5.2	4.8	4.7	4.8	5.3	6.3
1962	8.5	9.1	8.7	7.4	5.1	4.4	4.5	4.1	3.9	4.3	5.2	6.3
1963	8.3	8.4	8.4	7.0	5.2	4.5	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.9	4.4	5.1
1964	6.9	7.0	6.8	5.9	4.2	4.0	3.7	3.4	3.1	3.7	3.7	4.1

[1]Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, (Catalogue No. 71-201) Seasonally Adjusted Labour Force Statistics, January, 1954-December, 1970, Ottawa, 1970.

APPENDIX III

Summary of relevant dates for weapons systems

Weapon System	Date decision taken to acquire	Date delivered
Bomarc missile	September 23, 1958	February 1, 1962, RCAF took over North Bay Bomarc Base
Lacrosse Artillery Rocket	October 3, 1958	Weapon abandoned after U.S. tests failed
Starfighter Aircraft	July 2, 1959	October, 1962
Honest John Artillery Rocket	March 29, 1960	Early 1962
Voodoo Aircraft	June 12, 1961	July, 1961

APPENDIX IV

Press Release No. 59 of the U.S. Department of State on United States and Canadian Negotiations regarding Nuclear Weapons, 30 January, 1963.[1]

The Department has received a number of inquiries concerning the disclosure during a recent debate in the Canadian House of Commons regarding negotiations over the past two or three months between the United States and Canadian Governments relating to nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces.

In 1958 the Canadian Government decided to adopt the Bomarc-B weapons system. Accordingly two Bomarc-B squadrons were deployed to Canada where they would serve the double purpose of protecting Montreal and Toronto as well as the U.S. deterrent force. The Bomarc-B was not designed to carry any conventional warhead. The matter of making available a nuclear warhead for it and for other nuclear-capable weapons systems acquired by Canada has been the subject of inconclusive discussions between the two Governments. The installation of the two Bomarc-B batteries in Canada without nuclear warheads was completed in 1962.

In addition to the Bomarc-B, a similar problem exists with respect to the modern supersonic jet interceptor with which the RCAF has been provided. Without nuclear air defence warheads, they operate at far less than their full potential effectiveness.

Shortly after the Cuban crisis in October 1962, the Canadian Government proposed confidential discussions concerning circumstances under which there might be provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces in Canada and Europe. These discussions have been exploratory in nature; the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense.

The discussions between the two Governments have also involved possible arrangements for the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian NATO forces in Europe, similar to the arrangements which the United States has made with many of our other NATO allies.

During the debate in the House of Commons various references were made to recent discussions at Nassau. The agreements made at Nassau

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[1] "Text of State Department Statement", Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 31, 1963, p. 8.

have been fully published. They raise no question of the appropriateness of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in fulfilling their NATO or NORAD obligations.

Reference was also made in the debate to the need of NATO for increased conventional forces. A flexible and balanced defense requires increased conventional forces, but conventional forces are not an alternative to effective NATO or NORAD defense arrangements using nuclear-capable weapons systems. NORAD is designed to defend the North American continent against air attack. The Soviet bomber fleet will remain at least throughout this decade a significant element in the Soviet strike force. An effective continental defense against this common threat is necessary.

The provision of nuclear weapons to Canadian forces would not involve an expansion of independent nuclear capability, or an increase in the "nuclear club". As in the case of other allies, custody of U.S. nuclear weapons would remain with the United States. Joint control fully consistent with national sovereignty can be worked out to cover the use of such weapons by Canadian forces.

APPENDIX V

Press Release of Douglas Harkness,
Minister of National Defence,
January 28, 1963.[1]

I was surprised and disappointed by the interpretation put on the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on defence by some of the newspaper reports I have read. Headlines that the nuclear weapons carriers we have secured are to be scrapped and nuclear arms decisions avoided, are completely incorrect.

In the speech nearly all the varying theories and ideas which have been put forward on nuclear arms were mentioned, but the definite policy of the Government is contained in a few paragraphs which appear in the right-hand column on page 3136 of Hansard for January 25th. Those paragraphs state a definite policy for the acquisition of nuclear arms in these terms:

First, our obligations to equip certain weapons systems with nuclear arms are reiterated, together with the determination to honour those obligations.

Second, that the strike-reconnaissance role of the F-104's has been placed in some doubt by the recent Nassau declaration, as well as other developments in the defence field; thus it is necessary for Canada to seek, on the part of NATO, a clarification of her role in NATO defence plans and dispositions; this clarification to be provided when the NATO Ministerial Meeting is held in Canada next May. Should NATO reaffirm for Canada a role involving nuclear weapons, Canada will equip her NATO forces to discharge her obligation.

Third, so far as NORAD is concerned, Canada has been negotiating with the United States for the past two to three months in order that nuclear warheads will be made available for our two squadrons of Bomarcs and for the F-101 interceptor squadrons. These negotiations will be continued in order to reach a satisfactory agreement. I believe such an agreement can be arrived at in the near future.

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[1] "Harkness Statement Text" Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 31, 1963, p. 8.

APPENDIX VI

Letter of Resignation from Cabinet of Douglas Harkness, Minister of National Defence.[1]

My Dear Prime Minister:

For over two years you have been aware that I believed nuclear warheads should be supplied to the four weapons systems we have acquired which are adapted to their use. Throughout this period I believed that they would be authorized at the appropriate time.

During the past two weeks particularly, I have made absolutely clear what I considered the minimum position I could accept, and several times have offered to resign unless it was agreed to.

It has become quite obvious during the last few days that your views and mine as to the course we should pursue for the acquisition of weapons for our armed forces are not capable of reconciliation. Thus it is with a great deal of regret that I now find I must tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence.

Until the last few weeks I enjoyed my five and a half years as a member of your Government and trust I have made some contribution to it and to Canada.

Yours regretfully,

DOUGLAS S. HARKNESS

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[1]"Harkness' Letter to Prime Minister" Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 5, 1963, p. 8.

APPENDIX VII

Canadian Circulation Figures for Certain Periodicals, 1955-1963[1]

Year / Magazine	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Time (Canadian Edition)	179,674	195,437	206,988	223,073	247,175	258,299
Reader's Digest	992,661	993,431	989,256	1,050,109	1,179,873	1,190,682
Newsweek[2]	144,000	156,000	166,000	178,000	198,000	207,000
Maclean's	543,924	573,975	519,575	515,577	522,316	534,751
Saturday Night	78,296	77,839	75,319	76,202	76,334	---

[1]William F. McCallister, ed., Directory of Newspaper and Periodicals (Philadelphia: N.W. Ayer and Son, Inc., annual volumes).

[2]Since Newsweek does not publish a separate Canadian edition, McCallister's Directory does not provide figures for its circulation in Canada. The Manager of the magazine department of Provincial News Company, 14615 - 124 Ave., Edmonton, Alberta, the wholesale distributor for both Time and Newsweek in north-central Alberta, estimates that in 1972, the over-the-counter sales of Newsweek is about 80 percent that of Time in his area of distribution. The circulation figures here are approximated on that basis.

APPENDIX VIII

Canadian Peace Research Institute Survey, November, 1962.
(Response to Question 18)[1]

Q.18. Which one of the following statements comes closest to the way you yourself feel about Canada and atomic weapons?	National Sample of Voters n = 1,000	National Sample of Teenagers n = 150	Financial Contributors to CPRI n = 190	Businessmen n = 48	Union Leaders n = 48	Political Leaders n = 48
Our armed forces both in Canada and Europe should have atomic weapons, only in Canada, or only in Europe.	41%	50%	26%	56%	31%	33%
None of our forces, either in Europe or Canada, should have atomic weapons.	17	17	42	6	54	38
Emergency now--get them now.[2]	20	16	4	17	0	0
Not an emergency now, so don't get them.	14	12	21	6	9	29
No opinion response.	8	5	7	15	6	0

[1]John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, In Your Opinion, I (Clarkson, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1963), p. 84.

[2]All subjects who chose categories 3 and 4 ("emergency now" and "not an emergency now") consist of people who on the first question chose response (e) namely: "We should have atomic weapons for our use if we need them, but they should remain in the U.S. until an emergency."

APPENDIX IX

Results of Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Surveys

Question: Just from what you know or have heard, in your opinion, should Canada's armed forces be armed with nuclear weapons or not?

September, 1961[1]		December, 1962[2]		June, 1963[3]	
Yes Should	61.5%	Yes	54	Yes	49
No Should not	30.5%	No	32	No	32
No Opinion	8.0%	Qualified	6	Qualified	4
		Undecided	8	Undecided	15

[1]Peyton V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 538.

[2]John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, In Your Opinion, I (Clarkson, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1963), p. 57.

[3]Ibid.

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