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LITHUANIA: FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION, 1988 - 1990.

BY

AILEEN ASERON ESPIRITU

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled **Lithuania: From Mobilization to Revolution, 1988-90** submitted by **Aileen A. Espiritu** in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Arts in Soviet and East European Studies.**

David R. Marples

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Professor Oleh Ilnytzkyj

For My Family

Lithuania's declaration of independence was revolutionary. What gave Lithuania the impetus to declare independence on March 11, 1990? What were the processes leading up towards this declaration of independence? This thesis will analyze the path that Lithuania has taken towards mobilization and revolution. It examines the steps that Lithuania took over the fifty years of Soviet rule (1940-90) to lead it to declare independence. In examining this process of mobilization to revolution, we will also look at the manifestations of nationalism and how they have been the catalyst of the mobilization to revolution process.

There are two parts to this paper. The first part is largely descriptive, laying the groundwork for our analysis which is done in the second part of the thesis. Part I is set up as follows: Chapter one gives an overview of the theories of revolution posited by Karl Marx, Chalmers Johnson, Ted Robert Gurr, and Theda Skocpol. This chapter also outlines Tilly's model of mobilization to revolution, emphasizing "revolutionary processes," "revolutionary situations" and "revolutionary outcomes." A discussion of why Tilly's model was chosen over others will be made, as well as a discussion of some of the shortcomings of using this model. The importance of the historical background cannot be overlooked; chapter two, therefore, gives a brief history of Lithuania, providing us with the backdrop necessary for understanding this bid for independence. Having established this, as well as the basis for our analysis, we, then, move to Part II of the paper. Chapter three applies Tilly's paradigm to the Lithuanian case, giving an analysis of recent events in Lithuania. The last chapter concludes the paper, and offers some thoughts on the use of paradigms when analyzing historical events.

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I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. David R. Marples, for his guidance, encouragement and support.

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Introduction

> Expressing the will of the people, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic declares and solemnly proclaims the restoration of the exercise of sovereign powers of the Lithuanian state, which were annulled by an alien power in 1940. From now on Lithuania is once again an independent state.[1]

After fifty years of Soviet rule, the Baltic state of Lithuania asserted its sovereignty and declared independence on March 11, 1990. This declaration of independence was preceded by a long and arduous road. Resistance to and resentment of Soviet rule has always existed in Lithuania, since the ratification of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which led to the annexation of Lithuania in June of 1940,

The events of March 11, 1990 were indeed remarkable. For most observers, they were unexpected. The common wisdom held that if any Soviet republic were to declare independence it would be Ukraine. For example, Bohdan Krawchenko, a leading scholar on the Soviet Union contends that "Soviet leaders are constantly alert to the dangers of unrest among the nations comprising the Soviet Union. Whether national discontent will

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[1] "Declaration of Restoration of Lithuania's Independence," ELTA Information Bulletin, No. 4 (April 1990), 1.

pose a serious challenge to the unity of the U.S.S.R. will largely depend on developments in Ukraine."[1]

Against this common wisdom Lithuania's achievement of independence is a surprise. But, should we have been surprised? What preceded this bold assertion to sovereignty? How can we explain the processes at work as Lithuania maneuvered itself towards a complete break from Moscow? Finally, what conditions were extant to enable Lithuania to declare independence? Through an analysis of these processes and conditions, I show that Lithuania's accomplishment of political sovereignty should not have been unexpected. I demonstrate that there were favourable conditions for the mobilization of collective political action to succeed in the attainment of the goal of independence. moreover, I demonstrate that the achievement of independence is a revolution. Both the mass mobilization of the Lithuanian population and the transfer of sovereignty to the nationalist Lithuanian political elite make Lithuania's declaration of independence revolutionary in both scope and intent.

In explicating Lithuania's drive to independence, this thesis undertakes the following tasks: *First*, I examine the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of revolution; I contend that Charles Tilly's *resource mobilization* model of mobilization to revolution is the most fruitful in explaining Lithuania's quest for

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[1]Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987), xvii.

independence. *Second*, I set the stage for the analysis of Lithuania's drive for independence by providing the historical background of Lithuania's resistance to Soviet rule from its annexation in 1940 to the Gorbachev reforms. *Third*, using Tilly's model of mobilization to revolution, I undertake an analysis of Lithuania's revolutionary drive for self-determination, culminating in the declaration of independence on March 11, 1990. *Fourth*, I conclude by outlining the importance of these events, both historically and theoretically.

In pursuing the tasks of this study, I wish to highlight the primary and secondary sources used. Primary source materials include interviews of Deputy Ministers to the Supreme Soviet representing Lithuania and Estonia, and translations of the Soviet and Lithuanian presses, notably, from the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, the *ELTA* information bulletin, and *Moscow News*. Secondary source materials include, in addition to numerous books, the following salient periodicals: the *Journal of Baltic Studies*, *Report on the USSR* (from *Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe*), *Lituanus*, *The Lithuanian Review*, and *Soviet Analyst*.

Part I

CHAPTER ONE

CONTENDING THEORIES

Theories of dissent, system-breakdown, social movements and revolution have emerged in an attempt to explain the bases of social conflict in the modern era. While each type of theory has its own strengths, revolutionary theory stands alone in its capacity to explain rapid and radical transformations in the political and social institutions of state and society. The struggle for independence by a society is not merely a question of dissent, systemic-breakdown, or social movement; it is fundamentally a question of revolution. The historical precedent of the American Revolution has demonstrated that the struggle for independence and the concomitant transformation state and society are no less than revolutionary. The changes that took place in Lithuania from 1988 to 1990, too, were revolutionary in character. These changes resulted in the overthrow of the *ancien regime*, and its replacement by a democratic state and the emergence of a civil society, enjoying the popular support of the overwhelming majority of Lithuanians. Accordingly, if we are to understand the transformative events which occurred in Lithuania, we must employ a framework of revolution as our tool for analysis.

Although there are a number of theorists who study the phenomenon of revolution, we can identify five approaches which have dominated the study of revolution over the last thirty years:

class conflict (Karl Marx), functionalist-disequilibrium (Chalmers Johnson), relative deprivation (Ted Robert Gurr), statist (Theda Skocpol), and resource mobilization (Charles Tilly). Each of these approaches is discussed below; however, I conclude that Tilly's approach is the most cogent in explaining Lithuania's accomplishment of independence.

Theories of Revolution

Karl Marx. Marx argues that history is driven by the expansion of the forces of production. Each historic period is marked by different levels of forces of production, as well as different corresponding relations of production. As Marx explains,

> The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.[1]

Further, Marx contends that the relations of production gives rise to a dichotomous organization of society into two antagonistic classes: an exploiting class and an exploited class. However, at a certain juncture the exploited class is able to

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[1]Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels, Collected Works 1818 - 1883, volume 16 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), 469.

overthrow the exploiting class and, in so doing, is able to reconstitute the social and political institutions of society. Marx identifies the critical juncture as when the forces of production render the social forces of production obsolete. For Marx, class conflict is the primary conflict in human history and is also the explicum of revolutionary change.

Marx poignantly sums his materialist explanation of revolution in the following passage:

> At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production,.... From forms of development of the reproductive forces these relations turn into their fetters. then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.[1]

The stage for revolution, according to Marx, begins with the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the exploiter and the exploited. The bourgeoisie's evolution from feudal society has simplified society into these two major classes. Marx argues that it is the present day conditions of modernization and industrial development which has led to the ever-growing rift between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As "leaders of whole industrial armies,"[2] the modern bourgeoisie creates modern industry which emphasizes mass production and which serves to alienate the worker from his/her labour. With rapid

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Marx and Engels, Collected Works 1818 - 1883, volume 6, 485.

industrialization comes more efficient ways of production through the use of more sophisticated machinery. As a result, industrialization has led to commerce between and among states, to free trade and thus, to the expansion of power of the bourgeoisie.

With every corresponding change and development of the bourgeoisie comes their growing influence over politics.[1] Marx asserts that as the resources of the bourgeoisie grows so, too, does its influence over politics: " The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."[2]

In order for the bourgeoisie to flourish, however, it must constantly work to improve modes of production in order to maximize production. In so doing, the relations of production must also change and, along with it, the relations of production in society.[3] The society that the bourgeoisie creates is a fast changing, unstable and temporary. In creating global relations based on competition and change through massive expansions and production, the bourgeoisie essentially creates something which it can no longer control. It has become uncontrollable and now works on forces of its own, eventually resulting in chaos through crisis. The bourgeoisie's place in society is threatened by the

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[1]Ibid., 486.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid., 487.

unwieldy capitalist forces it has created, and it, therefore, must either destroy its productive forces, conquer new markets, or exploit more fully existing markets. This is the crisis point which allows the proletariat or the working class to instigate action.

At first, this struggle is not realized or defined, but as industrialization takes root, the proletariat becomes a larger mass able to perceive its strength as a collective. As the proletariat becomes increasingly alienated from its labour, and as competition among the bourgeoisie intensifies, taking its toll on the proletariat, the conflict which result between the two groups, Marx argues, become "more and more the character of collisions between two classes."[1] The proletariat then begins to organize in the form of trade unions. Through these organizations it is able to act collectively to maintain and increase its wages through protest and strike action.

Marx asserts that through these struggles and occasional successes, the union of workers expands, eventually forms a class and then creates a political party. The workers become only stronger as a group and can no longer be ignored.[2]

The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, as Marx envisions it, inevitably develops into a "veiled civil war" which first begins as a national struggle and eventually turns into

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[1]Ibid., 493.
[2]Ibid.

"open revolution."[1] In order to organize this revolutionary fervor, a Communist party is formed within the ranks of the proletariat itself. Marx asserts that there are two key difference between Communist and other parties formed within the proletariat: first, the proletariat is always represented by the Communist party irrespective of nationality; second, the Communist party represents the proletarian movement as a whole, not just as one segment.[2]

Marx's theory of class conflict falls short in explaining revolution. His narrow focus on the the division of society along class lines fails to explain nationalism and nationalist drives toward independence which actually cut across these class lines. Furthermore, Marx's deterministic, monocausal, materialist view of history is demonstrably false. History is made; it does not merely unfold. The agents of history are individual men and women, not material objects. Thus, any explanation of social history which does not view individuals as having a plurality of interests and claims, not just economic ones, must be rejected.

Chalmers Johnson. Chalmers Johnson offers us another point of view about revolution in his work Revolutionary Change (1966). Johnson proposes that revolution is related to the values prevalent in the society. Revolution or social change has the

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[1]Ibid., 494.
[2]Ibid., 496.

utilitarian value of changing the social structure of society towards its value-orientation. These processes of change only occur insofar as a crisis situation is present. Furthermore, revolutionary changes occur because of the loss of legitimacy of those in positions of authority. According to Johnson, "Revolution is not the same thing as social change; it is a form of social change."[1] Johnson argues that there is potential for revolution in all societies but that they can be avoided if this is understood.

Johnson proceeds to explain his ideas on revolution by outlining the basis of society. It is within the context of a social system that revolution can occur. Johnson argues that society is a system which may undergo conditions of stability and instability and consists of "any group of variables arranged to form a whole...and having a particular kind of relationship with each other."[2] The social system operates with both order and conflict as a function. Johnson asserts that it is necessary to have "a model of the social system which synthesizes the coercion theory and the value theory of social integration."[3] If the equilibrium of the state is disturbed or unable to overcome or incorporate these sources of change then a potential for revolution occurs.

A social system functions in a state of equilibrium. Johnson identifies four sources of change: 1) exogenous value changing

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[1]Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 5.
[2]Ibid., 40.
[3]Ibid.

sources; 2) endogenous value changing sources; 3) exogenous environment changing sources; 4) endogenous environment changing sources.[1] If the equilibrium of the state is disturbed or unable to overcome or incorporate these sources of change, then a potential for revolution occurs.

However a disturbance of the system's equilibrium is not enough to cause a revolution. Johnson identifies two underlying causes of revolution. Johnson argues that the leading contributors to a revolution are: first, "power deflation" which leads to the use of force by those in power; and second, the "loss of authority" which occurs when those in power fail to bring the system back into equilibrium, thereby fostering a loss of confidence by their supporters. At this point any use of force on the population carries no legitimacy. Johnson identifies the "immediate or final cause" of revolution as "accelerators." "Accelerators" are the deciding factor in turning "power deflation" and "loss of authority" into revolt and insurrection, thus revolution.[2] They are the "precipitating causes of a revolution" and are alternative ideas or ways of functioning which call into question the leadership of the elite.

Johnson's theory of revolution fails because it discounts the central role of individual actors in a revolution, in favour of the social system. Johnson's functionalist-disequilibrium approach

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[1]Ibid., 66.
[2]Ibid., 94 - 95.

fails because it reifies society as a social system, turning people into puppets. In a functionalist-disequilibrium approach, people do not act, the system does. Johnson discounts the fact that people are thinking beings who lobby, strike, run for office, mobilize, etc. in order to affect fundamental change in society. Thus with the focus on the system and disequilibrium (because of the introduction of new values to which the system must adjust), Johnson cannot explain or the cause of revolutionary disequilibriums, i.e., the cause of revolution. Rather, the cause is dismissed as merely acts of "deviance,"[1] even if those engaging in insurgency are doing so for just causes, such as self-determination. Johnson fails to see that the system may be flawed. He fails to see that the new values being introduced into the system may be for the good of the society and its members.

Ted Robert Gurr. Another contemporary theorist is Ted Robert Gurr, who in his Why Men Rebel (1970) concentrates on the psychological aspects and conditions of violent political action which include guerrilla wars, coups d'etat, rebellions and riots. Gurr concentrates on what he calls "relative deprivation" denoting "the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought'

[1] Anthony Oberschall, "Theories of Social Conflict," Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1979): 303.

and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction."[1] Gurr argues that this leads men to violence.

Gurr proceeds to outline his thesis by asking three basic questions: What are the psychological and social sources of the potential for collective violence? What determines the extent to which that potential is focused on the political system? And what societal conditions affect the magnitude and form, and hence the consequences, of violence?"[2] Gurr argues that there is a dominant "causal sequence in political violence:" "first, the development of discontent; second the politicization of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors."[3]

Gurr emphasizes that relative deprivation plays a key role towards revolution whereby frustration is experienced when a gap develops between those things desired and those things actually received. Frustration and discontent rise as things desired increase but things actually received do not. Gurr argues that certain conditions in society "decrease men's average value position without decreasing their value expectation," and this also leads to discontent.[4] It is with the impetus of intense discontent that it becomes politicized and "the primary effect of normative

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[1]Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 23.
[2]Ibid., 8.
[3]Ibid., 12 - 13.
[4]Ibid., 13.

and utilitarian attitudes toward violence is to focus that potential."[1] The politicization of discontent and its focus towards a utilitarian function preclude the notion that violent action is spontaneous or comes primarily from an angry reflex over deprivation. Gurr contends that violent action is actually planned, then channelled. This ultimately and necessarily leads to revolution.

Gurr's relative deprivation theory suggests that violent action and protest occur because of sudden changes and shifts in the society resulting in the deprivation of its members. If Gurr is correct, then revolutions should be occuring all of the time. Clearly, they do not. Deprivation is obviously not a sufficient condition, if it is even a necessary one. Gurr cannot explain why only some populations which are deprived for a significant length of time mobilize and why others do not. Moreover, it cannot explain when and how a population mobilizes to achieve specific political goals. Thus, it, too, must be rejected.

Theda Skocpol. What is social revolution? Theda Skocpol asserts that it consists of fundamental changes that alter the "state and class structure" of society, which are aided and executed "by class-based revolts from below."[2] Skocpol argues

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[1]Ibid., 14.
[2]Theda Skocpol, States and Revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4.

that revolutions are unique in that they possess two "coincidences" which when combined make revolution: "the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation."[1] Furthermore, in social revolutions, the "basic changes in social structure and in political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion," with class struggle playing a major role.[2]

Skocpol argues that her conception of social revolutions differs from other conceptions of social revolution for two reasons. First, Skocpol proposes that revolutions must be analyzed in their entirety, as a whole, rather than simplified to an analysis of certain events such as coups or rebellions. Second, Skocpol contends that the "*actual change* of state and class structures" is a necessary part of how "social revolution" is to be defined, in contrast to other scholars who include any kind of change in their definition of social revolution. Skocpol argues that there are great differences between successful and failed social revolutions stemming from "different macro-structural and historical contexts."[3] She compares successful and failed social revolutions to elucidate her model, with emphasis on the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions.

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid., 5.
[3]Ibid.

Using these three revolutions as examples, Skocpol finds three phases of revolution common to them: 1) the incapacity of the Old Regime to govern; 2) widespread peasant rebellion; and, 3) attempts by a new elite to consolidate state power.[1] Skocpol argues that the outcomes of these examples of revolution are alike --"a centralized, bureaucratic, and mass-incorporating nation-state with enhanced great-power potential in the international arena."[2] It is by using the French, Russian and Chinese examples of revolution that Skocpol is able to formulate a model for analyzing revolutions.

Theda Skocpol's model of revolution differs strongly, and intentionally so, with other theories of revolution, including that of Marx. By "taking issue with the existing theories of revolution, Skocpol formulates her own conception which consists of three principles of analysis: 1) contrary to existing theories, Skocpol strongly advocates that analysis of revolutions should be approached as "a non-voluntarist, structural perspective on their causes and processes;"[3] 2) while existing theories focus mostly or solely on domestic conflict and state modernization, Skocpol proposes that "social revolutions cannot be explained without systematic reference to *international* structures and world historical developments;"[4] 3) while existing theories consider

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[1]Ibid., 41.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid., 14.
[4]Ibid.

states and society as one or consider "political and state actions" as "representations of socio-economic forces and interests," Skocpol argues that for social revolution to be understood, "it is essential to conceive of states as administrative and coercive organizations -- organizations that are potentially autonomous from...socio-economic interests and structures."[1]

Further, Skocpol argues that revolutions are not created but rather occur. No amount of mobilization, nor mass organization can make a revolution if the "revolutionary crisis" is not there. Those who mobilize for change are those who exploit and capitalize on the revolutionary crisis to effect social change, i.e., revolution. However, Skocpol contends, "in no sense did such vanguards -- let alone vanguards with large, mobilized, and ideologically imbued mass followings -- ever create the revolutionary crisis they exploited."[2]

Skocpol's statist approach must also be rejected as a tool of analysis of Lithuania's revolution because, like Marx's theory of class conflict, it strongly argues that history is determined. She forcefully contends that revolutionary crisis is merely exploited by revolutionary "vanguards" rather than created by them. It must be reiterated that a deterministic view of history is false. Rather, social and political change is affected by a plurality of individuals through common interests and collective actions.

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid., 17.

Charles Tilly. As demonstrated above, the Marxist, functional-equilibrium, relative deprivation and statist approaches to revolution posses major failings which prevent them from serving as tools for analysis of the events in Lithuania. A successful theoretical approach must take into account the rational, goal-oriented and politicized character of mobilization and collective action leading to revolution. It must encompasses the interaction between the individual members of society demanding change and the government which works to keep the status quo. The theoretical approach which can explain Lithuania's revolution must be able to analyze the massive mobilization and collective action that took place in Lithuania, as well as the support for a contender for power and the claims espoused by that contender for power. The approach that most successfully takes account of these factors is Charles Tilly's resource-mobilization theory.

This paradigm serves to explain the initiation, the processes, and the results of collective action. Tilly breaks this down into two major models: the polity model and the mobilization model. According to Tilly, the mobilization model under certain conditions of political and social change, combined with the polity model, culminates in revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. In order to simplify Tilly's model, the major processes of each are defined. What is revolution as Tilly defines it? Where does it fit into a study of Lithuania and its bid for independence?

First, we begin with the polity model. It simply consists of a population, a government, one or more contenders for power, a polity and one or more coalitions. Tilly defines each component of the polity model thusly:

> *Government:* an organization which controls the pricipal concentrated means of coercion within the poplution.
>
> *Contender:* any group which, during some specified period, applies pooled resources to influence teh government. Contenders include *challengers* and *members of the polity*. A *member* is any contender which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the government; a *challenger* is any other contender.
>
> *Polity:* consists of the collective action of the members and the government.
>
> *Coalition:* a tendency of a set of contenders and/or governments to coordinate their collective action.[1]

This model is applied to the population being analyzed. A population and the governments exerting control over that population are identified.

Second, the elements of mobilization will be elucidated. The mobilization model encompasses five variable elements: interests, organization, mobilization, collective action, and opportunity.

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[1]Tilly, 52.

1) Interests. The simplified definition Tilly gives in that interests are the "shared advantages and disadvantages" that are attributed to the population because of contact with other populations.[1] Thus, interests, according to Tilly, fluctuate with the changing needs of the population and/or segment of the population. Tilly suggests two ways of predicting interests within the context of collective action: "(1) treat the relations of production as predictors of the interests people will pursue on the average and in the long run, but, (2) rely, as much as possible, on people's own articulation of their interests as an explanation of their behavior in the short run."[2]

2) Organization. Organization is defined as the "extent of common identity and unifying structure" of those in the population. The process of organization would mean strengthening this common identity and unifying structure.[3] It follows also that the stronger the common identity and structure, the more organized that group would be.[4] The measure of the group's commitment to their common goals and interests, i.e., the group's inclusiveness" may be made by determining the extent of organization of the group. The more organized the group is, the more inclusive and therefore, the more possibility there is for mobilization and the success of mobilization.

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[1] Ibid., 54.
[2] Ibid., 61.
[3] Ibid., 54.
[4] Ibid., 63.

3) Mobilization. This is defined as the magnitude of resources that the contender controls. The process of mobilization would, then, be the "increase in resources or in the degree of collective control."[1] Mobilization also marks the group's transition from a passive to a participatory one within the political arena. It must be emphasized that this increase in control over resources is essential for mobilization to occur. In the absence of mobilization through collective control of resources, the group cannot become a contender for power.[2]

iv) Collective Action. Simply stated, collective action is "the extent of a contender's joint action in pursuit of common ends; as a process, the joint action itself."[3] The previous variables we have discussed above determine the extent of the group's collective action. In defining collective action, Tilly draws on the paradigms espoused by Albert O. Hirschman and Mancur Olson, and defined by Mill. Mill defines collective action as intricately linked to the "production of collective goods," the ideal of which are "inclusive and indivisible."[4] In his work, Exit, Voice and Loyalty,[5] Hirschman suggests that dissatisfaction by clients with the performance of a corporate actor may be expressed by leaving (*exit*), by vocalizing discontent (*voice*), or by remaning with the corporation even with

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[1]Ibid., 54.
[2]Ibid., 78.
[3]Ibid., 55.
[4]Ibid., 85.
[5]Ibid, 27 and 70-71. See Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.)

its flaws (*loyalty*), with each having its own factor of risk. As a framework for collective action, Hirschman's work illustrates the processes involved in choosing collective action to express dissatisfaction over a decline in a corporation by its clients. The exchange for this collective action being the receipt of collective goods. Olson expands upon this and argues that a "collective good is a good that once supplied to one member of the group cannot be witheld from any members of the group, even those who did not contribute to the cost of obtaining it."[1] Tilly also asserts that these inclusive and indivisible collective goods would be available to every member of the group. Therefore, "action is collective to the extent that it produces inclusive, indivisible goods."[2]

v) Opportunity. This fifth variable encompasses the "population's interests and the current state of the world around it."[3] Opportunity has three elements, according to Tilly: power, repression and opportunity/threat. Power is defined as a group's interest is favoured over those of other groups through interaction with those groups.[4] Conversely, loss of power would mean a loss of favour. Repression applies to the "cost of collective action to the contender" as it deals with other groups. Opportunity/threat is double-sided in that it refers to both the contender's likelihood of attaining its interests because of the weakness of other groups

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[1]Oberschall, 307.
[2]Tilly, 85.
[3]Ibid., 55.
[4]Ibid.

(including the government) or the contender's unlikelihood of attaining its interests because of the threats of other groups (including the government).[1]

When the polity and mobilization models are combined, they culminate in revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. Upon giving us an understanding of mobilization and the variables necessary for mobilization to exist, Tilly proceeds to break down the concept of revolution into "revolutionary situations" and "revolutionary outcomes." He argues that debate about revolutions likely result in these two characteristics of revolution. They encompasse the "three proximate causes of multiple sovereignty," which define revolutionary situations. They are: 1) alternative claims to power; 2) the commitment to these claims by a significant part of the population; 3) the incapacity of the government to suppress the claims for power and/or the support for those claims.[2]

Tilly argues that the "critical signs of a revolutionary situation, in this perspective, are signs of the emergence of an alternative polity."[3] Furthermore, whether or not these are precipitated by immiseration, rising discontent, value conflict, frustration or relative deprivation," the most important element to watch for in a possible revolutionary situation is "the commitment

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid., 200.
[3] Ibid.

of a significant part of the population, regardless of their motives, to exclusive alternative claims to the control of the government currently exerted by the members of the polity."[1]

Tilly strongly challenges the notion that mobilization is sudden or that it is preceded by immiseration.[2] However, Tilly makes an important assertion that sudden mobilization diminishes the chances "for incremental challenging, testing and coalition formation which belong to the routine acquisition of power, and concentrates the attendant collective violence in a short period of time."[3]

In order to understand fully the elements present in revolutionary situations, it is necessary to define and explain them in greater depth:

1) Alternatives to Existing Polity.

The importance of this criterion is emphasized by describing the alternative claim to the existing polity to be "exclusive," meaning that it must be one strong alternative claim to the existing polity. This is what gives it its strength and its ability to challenge the government. It is the only way that these alternative groups are able to realize their goals through fomenting a revolutionary situation.

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[1]Ibid., 201 - 202.
[2]Ibid., 201.
[3]Ibid., 201 - 202.

Tilly argues that it is not important that we know how these contenders came about, and that indeed they have been there all along. It is rather more important to ask when these contenders mobilize. Two types of groups may be identified as emerging from these alternative claims to power: 1) The creation and thriving of groups which offer different views and different visions from that of the polity in power. These views are not only different, but incompatible with those of the government. These groups, according to Tilly, are characterized by the fact that they are "true radicals, true reactionaries, anarchists, preachers of theocracy, monists of almost every persuasion;"[1] 2) The second is changing the contender's aims of maintaining the polity's power, to aims which undermine and eventually topple those currently in power.

2) Acceptance of Alternative Claims.

The second element is the support of a significant segment of the population for the contenders of power. The development of this element depends largely on the dynamics of the contenders for power. This commitment to alternative claims for power expands through: a) the further mobilization of the contenders involved; and b) the acceptance of those claims by other individuals or groups.[2] How can this expansion be explained?

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[1]Ibid., 203.
[2]Ibid., 204.

Would the explanations for expansion be the same as for contraction or commitment? Is contraction and expansion solely based on attitudes? Scholars such as Ted Robert Gurr concentrate on this psychological aspect of mobilization.

Tilly, however, turns to the actions of the government in order to explain the change and expansion of the commitment to alternative claims. Tilly classifies them as follows: a) sudden failure of the government to meet certain obligations which were provided previously such as social welfare, employment, medical care, access to justice, etc; and, b) a rapid or an unexpected rise in the demands for resources by the government such as taxes, military conscription, etc.

What the community sees as unreasonable demands is turned into protest against those demands. The increase in demands by the government becomes unacceptable to the community and any opposition to these demands become acceptable or "legitimate." Tilly argues that this transfer of legitimacy to an opposing voice can occur in an unforeseen manner, especially if opposing voices act quickly to stop any threat to its position as contender for power.[1]

Tilly characterizes this as "defensive mobilization." He argues that it is the most unstable and "volatile" trait of a revolutionary situation. "Defensive mobilization" is not merely the pent up anger of individuals towards hardship or a knee-jerk

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[1]Ibid., 206.

reaction to deprivation, rather, it is much more developed. It depends upon " the preexisting structure of power and solidarity within the population experiencing the threat,"[1] and it is not easily classified as "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary" but is dependent on the coalitions that the contenders form. The volatility of defensive mobilization stems from the fact that it occurs rapidly and the "new" coalitions for power can suddenly create a significant commitment to an alternative polity.[2]

This begs the question of whether a contraction in lifestyle followed by improvement for an extended period of time really leads to a revolutionary situation. The problem lies in measuring these contractions and expansions. For the sake of argument, let us say that sharp contractions followed by long expansions do result in revolutionary situations; it would be valuable to hypothesize on how the government and the contender would interact. Tilly argues that during a time of expansion of resources, the government is quite secure, and makes promises to redistribute resources to new contenders. The polity is more willing to admit challengers because that cost relative to the present membership is not as great when resources are expanding.

Once the resources contract, the government is then faced with commitment it may not be able to fulfill. Having given away too many rights and resources to members of the polity as well as

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid.

to contenders, Tilly suggests that the government has two ways of maintaining its power: a) the government could increase that pressure on the weaker parts of the population in order to meet its demands for resources for reallocations: or b) the government could renege on the commitments made to the less inflammatory parts of the opposition.[1] In this situation of long expansions followed by sudden contractions, no matter what the government does, the situation will lead to defensive mobilization and, thus, to a revolutionary situation. Tilly further argues that the relationship between the "widening of the expectation - achievement gap" and a revolutionary situation is dependent on the dynamic interactions between the contenders and the government during the expansion phase of the relationship.[2]

When does a revolutionary situation begin? In order to have a revolutionary situation, multiple sovereignty must be present. It is produced when contenders are prohibited by the government from exerting power over any segment of society. A revolutionary situation ensues when the alternative claimants give directives, contrary to the government's, but honoured by those who are not members of the contending group. This occurs as "a result of duress or deception as well as of conversion to the cause.

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[1]Ibid., 207.
[2]Ibid.

A mixture of duress, deception and conversion will often do the job."[1]

It is at this moment that the survival of a revolutionary situation is determined by how well organized the contenders are and what structures they have in place to maintain this hold on power. It is the "conspiratorial organization" which is the most efficient at capitalizing on "the opportunity of the committed to calculate the right moment to strike against the government."[2] Furthermore, the proliferation of support for the revolutionary opposition is facilitated by the government's incapacity to fulfill its responsibilities, or its betrayal of its citizens by repealing their rights.

3) Government Inaction.

The third condition present in revolutionary situation is "the incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of government to suppress the alternative coalition or the commitment to its claims."[3] This occurs because of three possibilities: "i) the sheer inefficiency of the available means of coercion; ii) the inefficiency in applying the means; and, iii) the inhibitions to their application."[4] The occurrence of this inefficiency, Tilly argues, comes from the alternative coalition's possession of most the

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[1]Ibid., 208.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid., 209.
[4]Ibid.

coercive resources. This shift stems from various causes such as war, coalitions between members of the government and members of the revolutionary coalition, or the participation, in the coalition, of a new contender with plenty of coercive resources."[1] Further problems arise for the government when those contending for power establish their coercive resources away from the centres of control.

With these three elements of the polity model in place, **multiple sovereignty begins.** At this point, the contenders for power compete for "ultimate sovereignty,"[2] and "(W)hen only one polity exerting exclusive control over the government remains, and no rivals are successfully pressing their claims - however that happens - the revolutionary situation has ended."[3] The way is clear for a revolutionary outcome.

Tilly suggests that the balance or imbalance of the possession of coercive resources strongly affects the actions of the contenders for power. If the balance of the coercive means lies in the polity's hands, then the revolutionary coalition can merely stage small rebellions; however, if the balance of the coercive means lie in the coalition's hands, then the government becomes virtually powerless.

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Skocpol, States and Revolutions, 16.
[3]Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 192-193.

In order for a revolutionary outcome to exist, all of these factors must be present. The above elements within a revolutionary situation create a revolutionary outcome. Specifically these "proximate causes of significant transfers of power," according to Tilly are: "(1) the presence of a revolutionary situation: multiple sovereignty; (2) revolutionary coalitions between challengers and members of the polity; (3) control of substantial force by the revolutionary coalition."[1]

Why did the Soviets allow Lithuania to get away from complete control by the CPSU? Why was Sajudis allowed to form? How was it possible that they were able to succeed while other groups, even the CPL could not? Why were there only feeble attempts at stopping the Lithuanian overtures towards full independence, in contrast with hard line policies in Armenia and Azerbaizhan? How did a national group so small in number gain autonomy from such a great colonial empire?

Tilly provides a very detailed rendering of the continuum of mobilization to revolution; and within this continuum, the importance of the necessary elements in a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome are made apparent in the case of Lithuania. The revolution in Lithuania did not just happen. Political actors organized and mobilized in order to articulate their interests and claims to the government in power. The transition of Sajudis into contender for was possible because of massive and

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[1]Ibid., 212.

legitimate support afforded it by the population - a population which has arguably been mobilizing since 1940.

Tilly does not claim that events can be wholly predictable because of certain elements, but rather he suggests that through his paradigm, certain details of an event may be noticed and taken into account. The continuum of mobilization to revolution is flexible enough that it allows for certain nuances among different manifestations of revolution. Moreover, because Tilly's model involves many elements that are necessary and conjunctural for a revolution to have taken place, the social scientist using Tilly's model could decide at any time whether the case being studied is only a manifestation of interest articulation or mobilization or revolutionary situation or revolution. Tilly does not suggest that we plug events into a certain scientific formula in order to obtain an answer that we want, as Hirschman warns. Rather, Tilly suggests that we consider certain elements of mobilization to revolution in order to explain certain historical events which may or may not have elements of the revolutionary process. This can only be decided once the historical events have been examined.

Tilly's theory encompasses the goal of sovereignty advanced by the contenders for power. The ultimate goal of the contender for power in Tilly's model is sovereignty. **A historical event can only be classified as a revolution if the previous government is replaced by the contender for power which forms its own government.** The majority of

Lithuanians had opposed their forcible annexation into the Soviet fold in 1940. Lithuanians defined themselves as Lithuanians colonized by an imperial power, from whom they would someday gain independence.

Tilly's model of mobilization to revolution does present us with some problems. The most common criticism levelled against Tilly's model is that it ignores the social-psychological aspects present in collective action and mobilization. Oberschall writes, "Psychological gratification from participating in a collective effort, or from personal commitment to a cause, must surely have some bearing on recruitment and participation." He also argues that the model does not answer "why certain cases rather than others enlist greater enthusiasm and loyalty, and why some movements are able to provide more satisfaction to joiners than others."[1] Another review of Tilly's work makes criticisms along the same lines, stating that this reluctatance to "make systematic use of any social-psychological concepts,...restricts the scope and detracts from the rigor of analysis."[2] The resource-mobilization model that Tilly expounds relies heavily on rational goals and actions, which, according to Oberschall places "strong passion, group consciousness, ideological appeal, and appeals to solidarity in group conflict" in second place. I would argue, however, that these

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[1]Oberschall, 307.
[2]Edward N. Muller, "Book Reviews: Political Theory and Methodology," The American Political Science Review 74 (1980):1073.

elements are encompassed in the elements of the mobilization model that Tilly outlines. The social scientist or scholar is responsible for defining these elements --to emphasize them or to not to emphasize them in the analysis they propose to do. In itself, this is not an inherent limitation of the resource-mobilizaion model.

William K. Carroll espouses similar arguments about Tilly's framework regarding the rational-choice model of resource-mobilization theory "that reduces movement praxis to a mere means toward predefined goals, while encouraging a tendency to attribute greater unity and homogeneity to movement organizations that actually exists."[1] While Carroll views this rational and goal oriented character of Tilly's framework as a detriment to analysis, I argue that this is what sets Tilly's approach apart from other studies of revolution: it treats collective action and mobilization not as mere sentiments of nationalism, but rather as political expressions.

The vying for power between Lithuania and Moscow must be viewed politically. Nationalism and calls for democracy have been the tools that the Lithuanian National Front has used to gain power in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, and eventually , to forward its independence bid. The contribution that Charles

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[1]William K. Carrol, "Introduction: Social Movements and Counter Hegemony in a Canadian Context," in Organizing Dissent, William K. Carroll, ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1992), 7.

Tilly's[1] model brings to the analysis of Lithuania's break from the U.S.S.R. is that it allows us to do a systematic study of the processes of mobilization and revolution. It must be underscored that Tilly's model is a tool, not a substitute for analysis.

While the use of paradigms and the discipline of comparative studies in the social sciences is widely accepted, there are opponents of the use of paradigms for the advancing the studies of historical events. Some of these criticisms stem from Albert O. Hirschman's "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding,"[2] published in 1970 and the first chapter of Herbert Blumer's Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method entitled "The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism," published in 1969.[3]

Hirschman has chosen two doctoral dissertations which were subsequently published. One (John Womack's Zapata and the Mexican Revolution) chooses to "tell" about the Mexican Revolution, while the other (James L. Payne's Pattern of Conflict in Colombia) sets out a framework of analysis for Colombian conflicts.

Hirschman sees very little good in the paradigm-oriented study of Payne's and only praise for the narrative story telling technique of Womack's. Hirschman major criticisms of the

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[1]Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978).

[2]Albert O. Hirschman,"The Search for a Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics 22 (April 1970): 329 -343.

[3] Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969).

paradigmatic approach are its narrowed view of historical events because of the use of a paradigm, its tendencies to stereotype certain societies and polities within a set paradigm, a tendency of the use of paradigms to treat events or societies as scientific experiment and furthermore, paradigms promote "action arousing gloomy vision."

According to Hirschman, the study using a paradigm proved to be unsympathetic and contemptuous of Colombians and their politics, while the narrative approach revealed that the second researcher and writer "fell in love" with the Zapatistas and Mexico. The outcome of this examination was that the use of a paradigm created "frustration as a result ... in which one paradigm is made to spawn 34 hypothesis,"[1] and in contrast "understanding as a result of one book without the shadow of a paradigm."[2]

Predictably, Hirschman favours Womack's non-paradigmatic approach against Payne's paradigmatic approach. His major criticisms of Payne's approach is that it does not explain the "very wide swings of Colombian politics."[3] Moreover, because of the use of a paradigm, Payne had resorted to "stereotyping" the Colombian experience because he had already set the blueprint for how these actors would behave and make decisions in their social and political environments. Hirschman's impression is that this

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[1]Hirschman, 331.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid, 332.

has led to the researcher's distaste, perhaps even disdain for the society and politics that he has studied. Because Payne has begun by categorizing Colombian politics as "vicious" and whose incentives were status oriented, this lends nothing to our understanding of the Colombian political system.[1]

The superior approach, as Hirschman regards it, is Womack's narrative approach which relies heavily on history without attempting to re-write it or revise it in order to fit historical events into paradigms. Furthermore, Womack's style of analysis allows him to have "autonomy of the actors whose deeds he recounts."[2] Hirschman contends that the cognitive style that Payne uses, with the heavy emphasis on models and paradigms, serves only to make social and political events experimental objects, precluding the predictability of events and actions.

Hirschman argues further that paradigms somehow foster "action arousing gloomy vision," which suggests that in the case of Latin America, for example, statistical projections have doomed them to repeat their mistakes unless they act to fundamentally change the societal structures.[3] Hirschman would have us believe that social scientists who use paradigms to analyze certain political, economic and/or social organization, incite the population

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[1]Ibid, 332-333.
[2]Ibid, 335.
[3]Ibid, 336.

or the rulers to institute fundamental changes to the regime. He rejects what he interprets as the constraining character of the use of paradigms. A counter-argument to Hirschman's is that paradigms need not be an either/or situation. It need not be a choice between "disaster or one particular road to success."[1] I would argue that there may be several different roads to success or failure in instituting major and revolutionary changes to a political, social or economic structure, and the social scientist must take these variables which may change its theories about certain structures or events. I would agree with Hirschman when he states that those who search "for large-scale social change must be possessed ... by 'the passion for what is possible' rather than rely on what has been certified as probable by factor analysis."[2] However, I would not rule out the use of models and paradigms as an aid to understanding and conceptualizing historical events and their impact on the society in question. As Hirschman himself admits, in regards to socio-economic analysis, that "without models, paradigms, ideal types, and similar abstractions we cannot even begin to think." It is how we use them that decides if the analysis is valid.

Herbert Blumer would agree with Hirschman's assessment of how paradigms and models have corrupted inquiry into historical events and how they have transpired. Blumer goes to

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[1]Ibid, 337.
[2]Ibid, 343.

great lengths to explain his coined phrase "symbolic interactionism," but this summary highlights only the pertinent points.

Symbolic interactionism, as Blumer defines it, is grounded in three basic elements. First, "human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them." Second, the meaning to such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows. Third,"these meanings are handled in and modified through an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters."[1]

Blumer asserts that the import of things for people is central in itself,[2] and that "meaning" plays a key role in why people behave the way they do and make the decisions that they make. Moreover, Blumer argues that meaning is not found in the composition of the thing nor in psychology of the person for whom the thing has meaning, rather meaning arises from "the process of interaction between people."[3] Another important element of symbolic interactionism is that "human group life is necessarily a formative process and not a mere arena for the expression of pre-existing factors."[4] It may be concluded that, because of the importance of human group life and interactions between human

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[1]Blumer, , 2.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid, 4.
[4]Ibid, 10.

beings, events are unpredictable. Events that happen in society are shaped and changed continuously by human interactions and communication.

Blumer's quarrel is with those who choose to analyze social and psychological sciences with the use of models and paradigms. His understanding of theories and paradigms is that certain events in the empirical world are plugged into formulas and equations in order to come out with an answer or a perceived outcome. He writes, "to coerce the research and thus to bend the resulting analytical depictions of the empirical world to suit their form,...is actually social philosophizing."[1] In order not to fall into this trap of applying the physical sciences to the study of the empirical world, Blumer suggests that the focus in the study must be "human group life" and in order to study and understand it, one must "get close to this life to know what is going on in it."[2] Further, in order to give a true account of this social world, the empirical quality of it must be respected.

As a counterargument to this discussion, I call again on Charles Tilly. In his work From Mobilization to Revolution, Tilly asserts that history and what it give the social scientist cannot be emphasized enough. He writes that history aids the social scientist in creating "more adequate models of power struggles....It permits us to follow multiple groups and their relations over substantial

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[1]Ibid, 34.
[2]Ibid, 38.

blocks of time. Collective action, contention, and struggles for political power are especially likely to leave their traces in the historian's raw materials."[1] Tilly also writes that history is not only a rich source of information but "matters for its own sake."[2] With this abundance of information, the social scientist is able to analyze and understand historical events in through differing themes, whether it is through the study of collective action and revolution, or through the leadership of an individual and his/her influence over events in history.

Tilly does not advocate that scholars take the information that history gives to manipulate and distort it in order to prove a theory or fit a paradigm. However, it is important to form theories of why and how events occur in a given society. It is by forming theories and the use of the comparative method that questions such as these may be answered. The purpose of using a model is not to incite revolution or structural changes for a given society, polity or economy, or to create solutions for social, political, or economic problems but rather to "clarify the conditions under which they become salient."[3]

Chapter one expounded on the foundation of our analysis. We outlined the main theories of revolution as espoused by Marx (class conflict), Johnson (functional-disequilibrium), Gurr (relative

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[1]Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution , 231.
[2]Tilly, "Ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union," Theory and Society 20: 569- 580.
[3]Ibid.

deprivation), Skocpol's (statist) and Tilly (resource-mobilization). In so doing, we reject Marx and Skocpol's models because of their determinist and materialist approach to history, their disregard of men and women as individual actors who affect change We reject Johnson's theory because of his reification of society as a social system and his contention that people are merely automatons of that system. Gurr's approach is also rejected because its emphasis on relative deprivation cannot explain when and how populations mobilize to achieve political goals. We accept Tilly's resource-mobilization model because of its superiority in being able to explain the massive mobilization and collective action that characterizes revolution. Tilly's approach places the individual actors who mobilize toward self-determination in central roles

Chapter Two

The Background

With each leadership succession in the Soviet Union came economic reforms. After Stalin's death, the successive leaderships attempted to make the economy more efficient and more productive; with each came hopes that economic reform would also mean societal reform, including less repressive rule especially with regards to the republics and nationality rights. This chapter examines Lithuania's history under Soviet rule and investigates the economic reforms instituted by the respective leaderships and the effects they had on the expression of dissent and of nationalism in Lithuania from 1940 to the late 1980's.

This chapter is organized as follows: 1) a brief history of Lithuania prior to its incorporation into the Soviet Union, and the opposition to that incorporation; 2) a historical account of reforms attempted by the central government and the manifestations of dissent in Lithuania in the midst of these reforms; and 3) a short background on the effects of Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost' on dissent in Lithuania which led, most importantly, to the formation of Sajudis.

History- Lithuania, Prior to Incorporation into the USSR.

The native populations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were subjected to invasions in the late twelfth and throughout the thirteenth century. The Teutonic Knights took the lands of the Baltic Prussians to the southeast of the Baltic. To the north, the Danes conquered Estonia and German merchants occupied the mouth of the river Daugava.[1] By 1201, the Riga bishopric was established and land was being controlled by the Orders of the Brothers of the Swords, which was a counterpart of the Teutonic Knights.[2]

The conquest of Estonia and Latvia was swift, taking place within a decade. The indigenous population was conquered and Christianized. In 1346, the Danes sold their part of Estonia to the Order. The vanquished were thus, "reduced to an ethnic character, which remained politically dormant until the age of modern nationalism."[3]

The inaccessibility of the area to either the Brothers of the Sword, or to the Germans, or to the Danes allowed the indigenous population to strengthen its resolve against invaders, particularly against the Brothers of the Sword. It was led by the native chief

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[1]V. Stanley Vardys and Romuald J. Misiunas, The Baltic States in Peace and War, 1917-1945 (University Park, Pennsylvania and London: The Pennsylvania University Press,1978), 2.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.

Mindaugas, was defeated, and resulted in the tribe's alliance with the Teutonic Order. Wanting peace, the shrewed Mindaugas converted to Latin Christianity to avert the German invaders and to integrate into the more prosperous Western Europe. He was crowned king by Pope Innocent IV. The most important outcome to Mindaugas' rule was his creation of the Lithuanian State,[1] which lasted despite his brutal assassination by political opponents in 1263 and Lithuanian's reversion to paganism.

By the fourteenth century, the strength of the Lithuanian State was becoming more apparent. With successive capable leaderships, Lithuania was able to fend off attacks by the Teutonic Order, while taking the opportunity to occupy large tracts of the former Kievan State, as a result of the fall of the Tatar power.[2] The massive area occupied by Lithuania at this time became a battleground between those who practised Latin and Orthodox traditions. The conflict was settled in 1386 when the Great Prince Jogaila married Jadwiga, the heiress of Poland, and his accession to the Polish throne on the condition that he impose the Latin faith on his Lithuanian people. This union between the two houses lasted until 1569. It was strengthened throughout this time by conquests of land, and a major victory over the Teutonic Order by an army made up of Lithuanians, Poles East Slavs, and Tatars. This union had a great deal of influence in Lithuania, which resulted in

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[1]Ibid., 3.
[2]Ibid.

"the Christianization of Lithuania according to the Latin Rite and the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility."[1] Despite this influence, however, Lithuania was also enserfed.

The roots of Baltic relations with Russia go back to the mid-eighteenth century. This region was seen then, and still today, as the most economically developed of all the regions colonized by Imperial Russia and subsequently annexed by the Soviet Union.[2] Because of the attractive potential of the Baltics to develop, the attempt to integrate Russian culture into the Baltics came early on. "The policy of Russification pursued by the Tsarist government, particularly in the latter part of the century was aimed primarily at the old local elites and thus unwittingly facilitated the emergence of the indigenous peasant nations."[3]

The struggle between the Baltic nobility and the Baltic peasantry allowed Russia to exert great influence over the Baltics. The rule of Alexander I saw attempts to abolish serfdom in Estonia and Latvia, which came to no avail until 1819 when "personal emancipation had been effected."[4] Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, peasants were gradually given more rights--

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Richard Shryock,"Indigenous Economic Managers," in Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 86.

[3]Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940-1980 (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 5.

[4]Ibid.

the most important of which was the right to ownership of land which they had hitherto been forced to lease from the nobles.

Emancipation of the peasants in Lithuania, as in the Russian Empire came only in 1861. It was at this time that Lithuania's "national renaissance" emerged.[1] The years before and after the emancipation of the peasants were marked by uprisings and revolts. Russianization of the Polish nobility was paramount at first, but as revolts by the Lithuanian peasants became more common; "...Russianization also hit the national renaissance. In 1865 the publication of Lithuanian books in the Latin alphabet was prohibited, a measure that was not repealed until 1904."[2] The Catholic Church was also targeted. Proselytizing by the Russian Orthodox Church took place in the rural areas, with the Catholic Church's rights restricted to the point where in 1894 Roman Catholics could not hold administrative positions.[3] Throughout the seminal events of 1988-90, the association of the Catholic Church with nationalism persisted.

While Estonia and Latvia were undergoing rapid industrialization and thus, urbanization, Lithuania remained predominantly agrarian. The ethnic Lithuanian majority was concentrated in agricultural industry of Lithuania, therefore, "by the turn of the century, there was virtually no middle class or

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[1]Vardys and Misiunas, The Baltic States in Peace and War, 6.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.

proletariat."[1] The growing Lithuanian population, coupled with the anti-Russian sentiments, led many Lithuanians to emigrate to the West, particularly the United States and Canada.[2] Misiunas and Taagepera indicate that around the beginning of the First World war, one out of three Lithuanians lived in North America.[3]

The heady and tumultuous days of the 1905 revolution in Russia affected the Baltic States greatly. In Estonia and Latvia, demonstrations and strikes were held calling for autonomy from Russia. They also demanded freedom of the press and assembly. In order to suppress the uprisings the imperial government resorted to killings, arrests and exiles. The situation in Lithuania was not as extreme, and was largely confined to the rural areas. The protests were aimed at educators and at the Orthodox clergy. They took on a magnified existence when a National Congress (with 2000 delegates) met in December 1905, and resolved to seek "autonomy, a centralized administration for the ethnic Lithuanian region of the Russian Empire, and the use of the Lithuanian language in administration."[4] Although this was a threat to imperial Russia, Lithuania was treated less harshly because the Stolypin reform sought to make the peasant class into a more

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[1]Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940 - 1980, 7.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid.

prestigious rural class. The peasants, undoubtedly, benefited from these reforms.[1]

The Revolution of 1905 brought in an era of relaxation and enabled national consciousness to develop, even removing the restrictions on the press. This was to affect Lithuanian national consciousness greatly. By the time of the Russian Revolution of 1917, agrarian reforms were complete and the Balts "were able to concern themselves with their spiritual and intellectual emancipation."[2] Lithuania declared its independence on February 24, 1918 amidst the turmoil of the newly created Soviet Russia and the near defeat of the German empire.[3] The transition from dependence to independence was a strenuous one, however, as attempts by Russia, Poland and Germany to exert their hegemony over Lithuania and the Baltics as whole, and as the Civil War in the new Soviet state ensued. Only after Germany was defeated was Lithuania able to create an administrative system and assemble a defensive mechanism against Russia's Red Army. Lithuania also had to deal with Poland and its desire to form a Polish-Lithuanian union.[4] This turned into conflict and led to the delayed recognition of Lithuania as an independent state by the West, and thus delayed its way towards nation-building.

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[1]Ibid., 8.
[2]Georg Von Rauch, The Baltic States (1970), 8.
[3]Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940 - 1980, 8.
[4]Vardys and Misiunas, The Baltic States in Peace and War, 9.

The task of nation-building and the concomitant development of its own social, economic and political systems proved to be problematic for Lithuania as it had to contend with the question of land reform and the actual expropriation of the landowner's estates. Reprieve only came to the Baltics when in 1920, "all three Baltic countries concluded peace treaties with the Soviet state.... Russian claims to sovereignty over their territories were renounced in perpetuity."[1] Land reform in Lithuania was not as widespread as its northern neighbours. In the end, the Lithuanian nobility was given a greater share than it had previously. Economic organization became a key component of social and economic reform as "Economies which had suffered during the years of war needed adaptation to new international circumstances. And new constitutional structures had to be devised for an independent state life."[2] Furthermore, Baltic independence meant the loss of the Russian market which was difficult at first, but the Balts were able to acquire other forms of income as they sought to develop other industries. The central aim, however, was to build an export-oriented economy, taking full advantage of their access to Western markets through the Baltic Sea. This would be based on "agricultural products and specializing in meat poultry, and dairy products,"[3] with England

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[1]Ibid., 9.
[2]Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940 - 1980, 10.
[3]Ibid.

and Germany as its largest market. These economic decisions were made in order to benefit the newly independent landowners "who emerged as the principal component in the socio-economic structure of the three states."[1]

The gains that Lithuania had made from the time of independence were great. Without resorting to Stalinist methods of industrialization and collectivization of agriculture, Lithuania had developed its economy to the point where the standard of living was higher than in Soviet Russia. The average worker also received higher wages than his/her Soviet counterpart. Industrialization in Lithuania also took on more of a Lithuanian character, with the influence of its history and the West evident in the culture and outlook of the society.[2]

The political systems that emerged in the three Baltic states were liberal democracies. This, however was short-lived as each failed to sustain such a system because they did not have the "economic, social and political culture and structure needed to support it."[3] Authoritarianism eventually replaced this attempt at liberal democracy. For the most part they tried to maintain neutrality within international politics, and tended to form alliances with each other, as exemplified by the Estonian-Latvian

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[1]Ibid., 13-14.
[2]See V. Stanley Vardys, "The Role of the Baltic Republics in Soviet Society," in The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the U.S.S.R. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 147-74.
[3]Vardys and Misiunas, The Baltic States in Peace and War, 10.

defence alliance of 1923 and then the Baltic entente of 1934, which included Lithuania.[1] In 1926, Lithuania was forced to sign a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union, and then later with Germany in 1939 with the ratification of the Act of March. Lithuania was compelled to sign these treaties in an attempt to minimize the influence of both on their territories.[2]

The growing "authoritarian-nationalist" character of the Baltic states and the rise of Hitler in the mid-1930's compelled the Jewish minorities within these states to join the Communist party. Furthermore, participation by a great percentage of the Jewish minority in the Communist party in Lithuania contributed to its proliferation.[3]

The Stalin Period - Incorporation into the USSR

Despite the efforts to maintain independence, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August 1939 between Nazi Germany and the USSR paved the way for the loss of Baltic independence.[4] The "secret protocols" were the division of the Baltic territory between Germany and Soviet Russia. Lithuania was assigned to German control, while Latvia and Estonia would be under Soviet rule. This was amended, however, after the takeover

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[1]Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 15.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Alexander Shtromas, "The Baltic States," in The Last Empire ed. Robert Conquest (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 185.
[4]Ibid.

of Poland in the fall of 1939, bringing Lithuania into Soviet control too.[1] Indeed, in the summer of 1940 Stalin took power in the Baltics. They would undergo Stalinist industrialization and partial collectivization of agriculture, destroying the Baltic character of their economies that they had created during their short-lived independence.

Even at this time, however, Lithuanians sought to organize and mobilize against the Soviet regime. Here we see the first shoots of the continuum of mobilization to revolution as outlined by Tilly. The organization and mobilization of the forces in order to expel Soviet troops from its territory fits into the first part of Tilly's model - mobilization. Indeed, throughout the fifty years of Soviet rule, manifestations of "mobilization," illustrated in the first half of Tilly's model, abound in the interactions between the population and the Communist power in Lithuania. Colonel Kazys Skirpa, who was then the Ambassador to Germany, organized the resistance group the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) "uniting all noncommunist segments of the Lithuanian political spectrum."[2] Skirpa orchestrated the activities of the LAF from Berlin. Operation of the resistance and insurgency activities began on November 17, 1940, and by June of the following year, the LAF numbered 36,000. Resistance in Lithuania was well developed by 1941, with the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) forming a Provisional

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Alexander Shtromas, "The Baltic States," 187.

Government by August of that year. The LAF requested Lithuanian independence, but was strongly reprimanded by Hitler, whereby the LAF leader was deported to Dachau in September. The LAF's right-wing counterpart, the Lithuanian Nationalist Party, was also curtailed in its attempts to regain independence.

Any resistance to the German occupation was restricted to the underground. Alexander Shtromas also contends that the underground resistance movement in Lithuania was much larger than what membership in the LAF suggested. Independent resistance movements not aligned with the LAF and the Germans may have numbered twice as many as participation in the June 1941 combat numbered 100,000.[1] This resistance movement was extremely successful in rooting out the Soviet military with the help of the Germans.[2] This clearly illustrates the magnitude of the resources that the contender controlled during this resistance movement. Analyzed in the context of Tilly's paradigm, the formation of the LAF marked the transition from a passive to a participatory role in the political arena.

Reprieve from Soviet occupation came with the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22,1941. Although Lithuania was able to form its own Provisional Government shortly after the Soviets were removed from Lithuania by the Germans, it was soon made clear that German rule would prevail. German refusal to

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid.

recognize Lithuania's quest for independence, combined with forced mobilization of the population for the German war effort, spurred the formation of major opposition groups.[1] While these events signalled an end to the gains made by the LAF, Lithuanians resolved to organize. With the foundation of common identity[2] among them, Lithuanians opposed the German occupation. Underground presses which renounced both Soviet and German overtures towards the Baltic states were formed. A Lithuanian underground newspaper, *Nepriklausoma Lietuva* called for anti-German action such as the "sabotaging of German occupation measures and of keeping alive an organized national political body capable of representing each nation's interest during the post-war settlement."[3] Moreover, Lithuania placed its hopes on the West to liberate it from occupation.

The impact on the Jewish population in Lithuania was no less than devastating. A force of one thousand men organized by the Germans (Einsatzgruppe A) was ordered to exterminate the Jews in the Baltic states.[4] The Jewish population in Lithuania, before the outbreak of the Second World War, is estimated at over 200,000[5] and an estimated 170,000 were exterminated by the Nazis under German occupation in Lithuania.[6]

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[1]Misiunas and Taagepera, 62-63.
[2]Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 42.
[3]Misiunas and Taagepera, 63.
[4]Ibid., 58-59.
[5]Ibid., 61.
[6]Ibid.

Misiunas and Taagepera assert that the resistance movement in Lithuania during the Second World War was notably represented by the Catholic Lietuviu Frontas (Lithuanian Front) and the Laisves Kovotoju Sajunga (Union of Freedom Fighters). Both groups saw some success, publishing their respective clandestine newspapers and keeping communication lines with the West open. The Union of Freedom Fighters was even able to establish an underground radio station.[1] The two groups united in 1943 forming the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania. In 1944, the resistance was severely paralyzed when one of its couriers was apprehended by the Gestapo, leading to arrests of other members of the Supreme Committee. The Supreme Committee was completely dismantled soon after the Soviets again took power in 1944.

In June 1946, the United Democratic Resistance (Bendras Demokratinis Pasipriesinimo Sajudis) was formed in order to coordinate the activities of the resistance groups in Lithuania, both political and military.[2] The unity and strength of the UDRM was questionable, however, as factional strife ensued between the armed and political resistance. Disagreements over the pursuit of independence and the conduct of the resistance movement threatened to weaken the union.

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[1]Ibid., 54.
[2]Thomas Remeikis, Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania: 1945 - 1980, (Chicago: Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980), 54.

The rift between the passive and armed resistance became wider as those who opted for passive resistance were seen as capitulating to the Soviet regime. Those who chose political resistance "were to some extent in a position to legalize themselves and adapt to the new order, while the men under arms had no reasonable alternative to active struggle."[1] There were other concerns which served to weaken the resistance movement. Remeikis suggests that the top leadership of the UDRM had been infiltrated by the Soviets. This led to the paralysis of the movement by 1948.

Simultaneously, the armed group began forming an exclusively partisan resistance movement; and in February 1949, a new group was formed calling itself Lietuvos Laives Kovu Sajudis (Movement for the Freedom Struggle of Lithuania--MFSL). The MFSL resisted sovietization. It "issued orders to liquidate collective farm organizers and conduct propaganda against collectivization. The organization took the form of an army including ranks up to general."[2] The insurgency groups were unrelenting and immovable from their political position. This only served to harden the Soviets against them, and led to excessive violence from both sides. Furthermore, this conflict between the partisans (which numbered a total of as much as 100,000

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[1]Ibid., 56.
[2]Ibid.

throughout the period of the partisan movement)[1] and the Soviets placed the Lithuanian population in the middle of a crossfire.

The hopes and aspirations of the resistance movement in Lithuania were high. While some of their objectives were idealistic, and this only served to fuel their resolve. Their belief that independence from the Soviet state would come about through a short armed struggle led them to form one centralized resistance movement after another. Remeikis suggests that because this was so, the resistance movement "acted in many respects as a counter government."[2] Victor Nakas also contends that the resistance movement "slowed the pace of industrialization," which would prove to be an advantage to Lithuania's demographic make-up as the agrarian economy limited the influx of immigrant workers from Russia, unlike other Soviet republics which underwent massive industrialization.[3] Although the organization of the resistance movement appeared to be strong enough for mobilization to take root, it is clear that the German forces were too formidable for any massive mobilization to have taken place. Furthermore the wartime situation may have also contributed to the failure of the resistance movement to organize sufficiently to affect a situation of mobilization.[4] Another reason

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[1] Shtromas, "The Baltic States," 189.

[2] Ibid., 58.

[3] Victor Nakas, "National Oppression in Lithuania," in Religion in Communist Dominated Areas, (RCDA) XXIII (nos. 4,5,6, 1984): 85 - 88.

[4] Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 54.

for the failure of the resistance movement to advance further on the continuum of mobilization to revolution towards independence is that, while they organized and mobilized protest and violence, there may not have been the sufficient collective action necessary as many factional groups formed without a cohesive element (such as Sajudis).

The partisan movement lasted until the middle of 1952. Beset by conflicts amongst themselves, the unequal struggle between the movement and the Soviet regime, and the disillusionment at the lack of support from the West, the partisans ceased operations. What did not end, however, was the lasting influence of the partisan war and the insurgency movement of 1940 on the national consciousness of Lithuania.[1] Lithuanians used this national consciousness to hold on to the dream of independence and would sometimes show its discontent for the polity in sporadic demonstrations and riots, and in sustained samizdat activity.

This history of resistance provides great strength to Lithuanian nationalism. Shortly after the March 11 declaration of independence, *Lituanus* declared that "...Lithuanian resistance remains a significant reminder of the national will to survive, and a powerful impetus in the ongoing political thrust for

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[1]Ibid., 63.

independence."[1] Danute S. Harmon further asserts that, while the resistance movement was crushed in 1952, resistance to Soviet rule continued.

Resistance in Lithuania was also characterized by its ties to the Catholic Church. The Church became a vehicle through which the population could gather and act collectively, giving strength to the resistance. This solidarity provided by the Catholic Church perseveres today. Religion was also to play a major role in resistance after the war. "Catholic parishes represented a grass-roots institution encompassing the majority of the population. The Soviet threat to their existence in itself fostered resistance."[2] Furthermore, until Lithuania's declaration of independence in 1990, nationalism in Lithuania could not be defined without giving substantial credit to the Catholic Church, which fought unrelentlessly for national self-determination and freedom of religion.

The Khrushchev Era

In March 1953, soon after the partisan war in Lithuania ended, Stalin died, bringing in a new era in the Soviet Union. Immediately after his death, a sense of uncertainty dominated the social and political order in the Soviet Union. This gave the

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[1] Danute S. Harmon, "Lithuania: An Overview of a Struggle for National Survival," Lituanus 36 (no. 2, Summer 1990): 15-29.

[2] Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 82.

Lithuanian Communist Party the opportunity to quickly dissociate itself from the Moscow apparatchiki and move to nativize the party and non-party personnel.[1] This was possible because of "an effort on the part of Beria to curry favour among the national republic leaderships."[2] Even after Beria's fall, the nativization continued, although at a slower pace. This would provide a great advantage to Lithuanian reformers as Lithuanian nationalism mixed with Catholicism strengthened the anti-Soviet feelings and calls for independence. Non-Lithuanian cadres were replaced by Lithuanian nationals. Remeikis argues that the reasons for their replacement were rooted in their incompetence and their inability to speak Lithuanian.[3]

In 1956, Khrushchev introduced the *sovnarkhoz* (regional economic councils) reforms which would pave the way for more liberal policies towards the republican economies, giving them more input into economic decision-making. While there seemed to be an expansion of the republic's roles in the economy, Khrushchev stressed the unity and interdependence of the Soviet state. He saw it as a "melting pot" to which the various nationalities of the Soviet Union would voluntarily renounce their national identities to become Soviet people.[4] The decentralization of the economy, and the overall de-Stalinization of the society, however, led the

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[1]Ibid., 127.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Remeikis, 78.
[4]Ibid.

republics and their respective dominant nationalities to attempt to move further away from the Soviet model and from the central government, attempting to stamp their own national identities on the leadership and government of their respective republics.

The necessity for economic reform overrode the regime's need to have central control over the economy. As a result, the country was "divided into regional economic councils or *sovnarkhozy* ... to which were directly subordinated the larger industrial and building enterprises, while local industry remained under local, mainly oblast' and city Soviets."[1]

What did these reforms mean for the Baltics? The biggest criticisms against the *sovnarkhoz* reform in the Soviet Union, especially by Khrushchev's opponents, was its tendency toward regionalism and uneven economic development. However, the *sovnarkhoz* reforms gave the three Baltic republics more power over their industries, with each republic becoming a "unit of economic administration."[2] In the Baltics, some of the Union-republic industrial ministries were turned into sectors of the republican *sovnarkhozy*.

Lithuania was the Baltic republic which benefitted the most from the *sovnarkhoz* reforms, because it had been spared the intensive industrialization efforts and collectivization by the centre. Lithuania was then able to delegate more responsibility to

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[1]Ibid., 75.
[2]Ibid.

the local planners; and allowing "the dispersal of industrial projects within the republic in such a way as to maximize local natural and labour resources."[1] Even within the closely linked Baltic Republics, regional differences were apparent. The minor shift towards a more consumer oriented economy allowed the Lithuanians to use their own labour resources in order to create a unique economy, whereby the necessity for an influx of labour from other republics was minimal, unlike Latvia and Estonia which had to import labour, particularly from the RSFSR.

The *sovnarkhoz* reforms were a failure especially for the underdeveloped regions of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet regime itself because it served to further emphasize the inequalities in wealth and development among the regions. Dellenbrant contends that

> It is noteworthy that regional differences increased during the Sovnarkhoz period, i.e., when regional interests tended to carry more weight. During this period, plans were able to give broader consideration to the interest of the particular regions with which they were concerned, so that a region's premises for economic growth assumed a greater relevance in planning. Since both natural resources and labor are unequally distributed, it is hardly surprising that regional variations increased during this period.[2]

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[1]Ibid., 180.

[2]Jan Ake Dellenbrant, The Soviet Regional Dilemma, (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1986), 49-50.

This would only serve to intensify the arguments made by Lithuania and the other Baltic republics that they should be able to govern themselves, as they saw the fruits of their labour being taken from their republics and distributed to the less-developed areas of the Soviet Union.

While *sovnarkhoz* reforms brought about a relative liberalization of the economy, they also brought about the liberalization of culture and the arts. Cultural expression and links with the west would become a vital part of Lithuanian society. Literature and works of art moved away from the Stalinist dictum of "socialist realism," becoming more Lithuanian in character.

Liberalization was far from total, however, with artists and writers censoring their own material, and walking the fine line between state censorship and acceptability. Remeikis suggests that the "creative individual had to make compromises; his art was inevitably at least partly deformed by ideological dogmas and the intervention of the censor. He was, however, convinced that he is indispensable to national survival and that indeed his political superiors sought to and did provide him with the optimal conditions for the realization of the mission.[1] Liberal policies during Khrushchev's rule had provided some gains for Lithuania, but did not curb Soviet attempts at Russification; the youth were required to join the communist youth organizations, the Pioneers

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[1]Remeikis, Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania: 1945 - 1980, 91.

and the Komsomol.[1] Russification of the youth was most aggressively pursued through the education system as the decline of education on Lithuanian history and language was becoming dangerous to Lithuanian national consciousness. Moreover, Russification strongly enforced atheism, which was a complete affront to Lithuanian culture which was deeply rooted in Catholicism. The persecution of priests, clergy and believers did not abate, but dissent by believers continued and intensified through the late 1960s and the 1970s.

The *sovnarkhoz* reforms were short lived. By 1962 recentralization had begun. In the Baltics, "power production, construction and fisheries were subordinated to supra-republic *sovnarkhozy*." [2] While most of the *sovnarkhozy* were still under republican control up to 1964, and a certain degree of autonomy still existed for them, this all changed in 1965 with the implementation of the Brezhnev and Kosygin reforms.

The Brezhnev Period

The fall of Khrushchev in 1964 paved the way for the new reforms of Brezhnev and Kosygin. The reforms "consisted of three basic measures: an administrative reform reinstituting the ministerial system, a complete overhaul of the enterprise incentive

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[1]V. Stanley Vardys, "Soviet Colonialism in the Baltic States, 1940-65," in The Baltic Review, No. 29, June 1965): 11-27.

[2]Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 180.

system, and price reform."[1] In the area of administrative reform, there would be a return to the highly centralized bureaucracy rejected by Khrushchev. The recentralization of power was one of the most important aspects of the 1965 reforms. This meant that the regional planning authorities were divested of their power, which was given to twenty-three newly created industrial ministries; state committees were given more authority as well.[2]

The economic system created by the Brezhnev and Kosygin reforms did not work. In the latter years of Brezhnev's rule, its reversion to centralization served to stagnate the economic development of the Soviet Union, having created an administrative bureaucracy which rivalled that created by Stalin. Two more small-scale reforms were implemented in 1973 and in 1979, supposedly improving upon the reforms of 1965. The aim of the 1973 reform was to lessen influence of the administrative hierarchy in industry and to make the system more efficient by further centralization. Brezhnev knew that he was dealing with what had become a formidable bureaucracy, yet the changes his administration had made in cutting away the administrative hierarchy was a very impractical one. The 1979 reforms were far more comprehensive, although not as comprehensive as those in 1965. The decree of 1979 stated that reforms demand "stable

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[1]Ed A. Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1988), 230.
[2]Ibid.

norms linking enterprise performance to bonus funds, stable plans, and the use of gross output and the spread of khozraschet (economic self-management) conditions up the hierarchy."[1]

The reforms of 1979 aimed to make central economic planning more efficient by concentrating resources at the centre in order to deal with national and regional problems, and by disallowing local influence over planning. There were new criteria established in order to determine the priorities "among various sectors and various regions especially with regard to the distribution of investment funds."[2] These changes were in response to republican complaints.

The most important change for regional economics was that the reform emphasized the strengthening of territorial planning. *Gosplan*, then, would have to give greater consideration to regional and territorial needs. Under the 1979 reforms, the republic Council of Ministers was able to participate in planning and would be informed of the activities of the regional all-union enterprises. Moreover, the Council of Ministers would be able to participate in the plans for union managed enterprises, whose plan indicators would then be incorporated into the republic's plan for development.[3]

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[1]Ibid., 25.
[2]Dellenbrant, The Soviet Regional Dilemma, 99.
[3]Ibid., 100.

While material resources and labour reserves would be coordinated by *Gosplan* and other central officials, territorial production would be monitored in conjunction with the republic Council of Ministers would "then serve as a statistical basis for territorial distribution of output."[1] It is evident that the 1979 reforms were concerned with accommodating the needs of the territories and the regions, yet without yielding to the needs of the various national republics. For example, provisions for the economic development of Siberia and the Far East were emphasized. The question of labour resources with respect to territories was also addressed with the republic and local administrative authorities deciding on the territorial distribution of work.[2]

By giving more responsibility to the republican and local authorities, a better communications network was to be established between the all-union enterprises and the republican Council of Ministers. The republics would have greater input in the decision making process concerning development programmes. Clearly, greater attention was given to the needs of the republics in an attempt not so much to benefit them, but to enhance the communication between the centre and the periphery, thereby, theoretically making the system more efficient and giving more control to the government in Moscow.

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid.

While the Brezhnev leadership served only to further bureaucratize the administrative system of the U.S.S.R., especially in the economic sphere, dissent in Lithuania flourished. From 1968 onwards, the cultural activity gained new ground in Lithuania. This was partly sanctioned by the Communist leadership of First Secretary Antanas Snieckus, whose top-level connections in Moscow allowed him to avoid repression by the centre. The most explosive manifestations of dissent to come out of Lithuania came in the form of *samizdat*. Organization of dissent in Lithuania reflects the attempt by the majority of Lithuanians to gain sovereignty and establish self-rule.

Again, dissent and expression of nationalist sentiments in Lithuania were firmly rooted in Catholicism. Misiunas and Taagepera assert that "Roman Catholicism provided a core for the national opposition, and the issue of religious discrimination attracted widespread attention."[1] More visible forms of dissent by the Catholic Church were the petitions to the Soviet authorities and the Church hierarchy, which were first seen in 1968.[2] These petitions asked for the basic rights espoused in the Soviet Constitution. Seeing this as a possible threat, priests were prosecuted for educating children on Christianity.[3] This would not stop the Church from organizing several other petitions. Three

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[1]Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 243.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.

years later, another petition asking for religious rights was signed by 17,054 individuals and sent to Brezhnev through UN Secretary Kurt Waldheim.[1] Other petitions would be organized despite pressure from the KGB and the authorities in Moscow. The Church and nationalism, however were not enough for Lithuanians to effectively mobilize against the regime. The coercive forces of the polity in power were too formidable a force for Lithuanians to overcome. Yet, interest articulation and organization were achieved in the dissident activity. Attempts to move beyond this stage in the continuum were rare, and often resulted in the heavy use of force by the regime.

In 1972 *The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* saw its first publication; its format was copied from the Russian samizdat publication *The Chronicle of Current Events*. *The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* would prove to be a vital link between Lithuania and the West, with "sixty-one consecutive issues" reaching the West by May 1984.[2] Damusis argues that 1972 was "the turning point for the Lithuanian human rights movement."[3] It was on May 14 of this year that Romas Kalanta burned himself to death protesting the Soviet occupation of Lithuania. This sparked a riotous protest in Kaunas with

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[1]Ibid., 244.
[2]Ginte B. Damusis, "Persecution of the Catholic Church in Lithuania," RCDA, 70-72.
[3]Ibid.

demonstrators "demanding national and religious freedom."[1] This ended in a confrontation between the demonstrators and the police.

The *Chronicle* was instrumental in reporting and disseminating information to the West about harassment and persecution of priests, nuns and believers. Hoping for support from the West, especially the Church in Rome, the publishers of the *Chronicle* were relentless in their efforts throughout the 1970s and gained momentum at the beginning of the 1980s. Injected with new confidence with the election of a Polish priest to the Papacy in 1978, "...religiously oriented dissent in Lithuania seemed to be moving somewhat in the direction of greater confrontation with the regime."[2] It was in 1978 that the existence of the Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Catholics was announced at a news conference in Moscow. Attempts to move beyond organization and towards mobilization became more frequent from the mid- to late- 1970s. Dissident and environmental groups would mobilize and demonstrate, but the movement towards opportunity on the continuum was slow, and movement towards revolutionary situation impossible.

Other groups started to form. The Lithuanian Helsinki Group was one of them, hoping that the 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki Accords would monitor human rights abuses instigated by

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 246.

the regime. Although dissidents were skeptical that the Accord would amount to any significant changes, they were convinced by their Moscow counterparts that, at least, it could be a springboard from which they could claim their rights at the domestic and international levels. The Helsinki Group in Lithuania was represented by individuals from various organizations, from prosecuted dissidents to priests to poets.[1] Tomas Venclova, Viktoras Petkus, and Eitan Finkelstein were members of the Helsinki Group. Clandestine groups also existed, such as the Lithuanian Revolutionary Liberation Front, and the National People's Front; but because pressure from the authorities and arrests and prosecutions, many of these clandestine groups folded or postponed their activities.

In the late 1970s, new publications started to emerge, such as *Ausra* (Dawn); it concentrated on issues of human rights, and cultural, social and economic issues.[2] Furthermore, *Ausra* was "a magazine with an avowed emphasis on spiritual values and cultural progress and indispensable for preservation of a Lithuanian national character. The implicit feeling in its advocacy of nonviolent resistance was that the Lithuanian nation will survive if it manages to maintain a cultural superiority over its oppressors."[3] Other samizdat publications appeared with such

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[1]Irene Welch, "Nationalism and Lithuanian Dissent," Lituanus 29 (no. 1, 1983): 49.
[2]Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 248.
[3]Ibid.

titles as *The Herald of Freedom* and *The Little Dawn.*[1] Samizdat publications remained the most effective form of dissent.

In the early 1980s, the Solidarity movement in Poland gave Lithuanians further hope for national independence or at least very basic human rights. With most of Lithuania able to receive Polish television, the regime countered these influences by surreptitiously injecting anti-Polish propaganda into the republic.[2]

Previous to Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985, dissent in Lithuania continued and even intensified. The environmental movement vocalized its dissatisfaction in 1983-84 with the opening of the Ignalina power plant. It boasted of being the world's largest nuclear power station with a projected output capacity of 6,000 megawatts and would supply electrical power to two other republics, Belorussia and Latvia.[3] The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is of the same graphite-moderated type as the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, but is based on 1500 megawatt reactors compared to only 1000 megawatt at Chernobyl.[4] The protests, while not yet having the history of the Chernobyl disaster to support their complaints, were founded on the argument that the plant did not have cooling towers in the

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[1]Welch, "Nationalism and Lithuanian Dissent," 53.

[2]Romuald J. Misiunas, "The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sovereignty," in The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, ed. Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 204-28.

[3]Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, "The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1980-1986," in the Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. XX (no. 1, Spring 1989), 65-88.

[4]See Energetika SSSR, 1981 - 1985 godakh (Moscow, 1981): 135-47.

event of a malfunction and that raising the average temperatures of nearby Lake Druksai to 30 degrees Celsius would be detrimental to the ecosystem of the lake and area.[1] Ignalina started operations in early 1984.

Also in the sphere of ecology, the membership for the environmental group The Lithuanian Nature Protection Association increased to 320,000 in 1983 from 20,000 members in 1971. Accused of being a nationalist platform rather than one for the protection of the environment, the group was constantly besieged with harassment from the government. Environmental activists were sent to prison and others died under suspicious circumstances.[2]

Religious activities continued with celebrations of Lithuanian historical religious leaders, such as the 500th anniversary of St. Casimir's death in 1984. St. Casimir was a Lithuanian prince, and who became Lithuania's patron saint. In 1987, the 600th anniversary of Lithuanian Christianization was also celebrated inside and outside Lithuania. Pope John Paul II was invited each time to commemorate the celebrations, but both times he was forbidden to enter Lithuania by the Soviet regime.[3]

With Yurii Andropov's rise to power in 1983 came a crackdown on dissident activity in Lithuania. For the first time

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[1]Misiunas and Taagepera, "The Baltic States, 1980 - 1986,"
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.

since 1971, Catholic clergy were arrested and the authorities targeted the most vocal members of the Catholic Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Believers. The crackdown on dissent also encompassed the underground seminary and threatened to reduce the number of seminarians entering the official seminary.[1] Again the polity in power used its coercive forces to quash any manifestations of mobilization.

The Gorbachev Reforms

It is obvious that the implementation of the 1979 reforms was not sufficient to bring about efficiency and further modernization and industrialization, evidenced by the new proposals added in 1981, whereby much consideration was accorded to the local soviets, the republican Supreme Soviets and those below them. Even more pointed is the fact that the leaderships of Andropov and later Gorbachev concentrated mainly on sweeping economic reforms. A strong impetus for major economic reform was evident in the early 1980s and was activated in Gorbachev's all-encompassing reforms, from 1986 - 1991. The concentration of these reforms lay not only with the economy, but also with the political system and the society in general.

As Hewett notes, the Gorbachev reforms were the first attempts since the *sovnarkhoz* reforms to "radically redistribute

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[1]Ibid.

rights and responsibilities between the ministries and lower levels of the economic hierarchy."[1] According to the Gorbachev economic reforms, the enterprises would have had greater say and would have made decisions at their level in areas such as "output and input mix, customers and suppliers, the structure of wages and bonuses, and the magnitude of capital investments."[2] This new responsibility given the enterprises was a two edged sword. While they had a degree of autonomy as to their respective enterprises, they were also faced with the prospect of competing with other enterprises--a notion not welcomed by many managers and workers.

Another very important feature of the reforms was their divesting of responsibilities to the various levels of ministries. The branch ministries, according to Hewett, would have been controlled by the ministerial-level bodies, therefore, ideally, eliminating the duplication of production in an attempt to bring about more efficiency within the enterprises and the economic system as a whole.

The essence of the reform of the information system in the Soviet economic system concentrated on the control of the economy, through indirect instruments of control. The Gorbachev regime found that the coordination between enterprises and within enterprises was non-existent, therefore Gorbachev found it

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[1]Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency, 326.
[2]Ibid.

imperative to improve the communication lines between and among enterprises by instituting the norms of the five-year plan, the *goszakazy* and control figures (*kontrolnyie tsifry*).

The reforms aimed to enhance the decision-making role of the enterprises whereby more competitive and profit-oriented decisions would be made for the interests of the enterprises. The reform of the incentive system would have also served to radically reform the enterprises, the workers therein and their respective ministries.

Khosrazchet and *samofinasirovanie* would have ensured that the enterprises would benefit more directly from their productivity, and that the workers themselves would reap the benefits of a successful and efficient enterprise. This was an attractive prospect for the enterprise as well as the workers because the value of their work was to have a price relative to and in competition with other enterprises.[1]

The emphasis of the Gorbachev reforms suggested that more power in decision making in the economic sphere was given to the enterprises, to the ministries and ultimately to the republics. Both perestroika and glasnost' facilitated these reforms. Indeed, in the last two years of the 1980s, we saw more national unrest in Lithuania than in the whole reign of Brezhnev. While Gorbachev may have been enthusiastic about his own reforms and hastened the process of reform at each plenum and

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[1]Ibid.

conference (at least in speech-making), it seemed that he, as well as the entire regime were reluctant to give the various nationalities the decision-making powers within the political sphere of their republics.

The Gorbachev reforms gave the reform-minded sectors of the Lithuanian population the opportunity to articulate demands, to organize and mobilize, and to progress along the mobilization to revolution continuum. Not since the Baltics were annexed in the early days of World War II have they so vocally demanded the right to govern their own territory. The Baltics wanted to be able to make political, economic and social decisions about their respective societies.

> For us, the most urgent aspect of the restructuring and democratization of society and an indispensable condition of its successful development is a return to the Leninist concept of free union of sovereign Soviet republics and the complete, unconditional renunciation of the Stalinist plan of "automization,". ...we consider it necessary in the political field, while maintaining complete unity in the country's foreign and defence policy, the guarantor of which should be the CPSU, to ensure the effective sovereignty of the republics with respect to their natural and social resources, the use of which is permissible only with the republic's consent and on terms agreed upon it....[1]

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[1]Latvian Writers Address to the 19th All-Union Party Conference. "Latvians, Estonians Seek Greater Autonomy," Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) XL (no. 25, July 20,1988): 1-4.

The sentiments expressed by the Latvian writers were also prevalent among the Estonians and the Lithuanians, who vocalized their desire for autonomy. The Lithuanians were able to advance their claims much further than the southern republics of Armenia and Georgia, before heavy-handed measures were imposed by the Gorbachev regime. The Balts, unlike the southern republics, played their political hand in prudent and moderate fashion. A political game of wills was played out with the Gorbachev regime. Surprisingly, with the Baltic case, there was a degree of dialogue, albeit initially unsuccessful for the Baltics as evidenced by the November 1988 constitutional crisis.

As we have seen, the Gorbachev proposals for decentralization of some of the economic decision-making did not satisfy the Lithuanian agenda of complete independence. They were concerned not only with token economic decision-making powers, but also with the power to govern their republics as a Lithuanian nation-state. Furthermore, the insistence by the regime on enforcing the central role of the Party for the good of the state nullified the democratizing and decentralizing reforms of perestroika. The expression by the Lithuanians that they wanted independence and the realization that "opportunity" was there, moved them closer toward making a revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome a real possibility.

The dissatisfaction with the regime and the hollow promises of perestroika and glasnost' were transformed into

fevered massive demonstrations in the summer of 1988, which also saw the formation of the Lithuanian Restructuring Movement or Sajudis.

Part II

CHAPTER THREE

MOBILIZATION, REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY OUTCOMES

Any successful struggle for independence will be successful only if the following conditions are present: the expression of interest by a population, its capacity to organize and act together in order to fulfill those interests and the possibilities to affect rapid and radical change through legitimate support by the population. It is argued that these conditions existed in Lithuania. With the expression of interest which began with the insurgency movement in 1940, the Lithuanian population acting together clandestinely through samizdat activity then through open protest, seizing the opportunity to mobilize and affect revolutionary change in Lithuania were the keys to its independence. Employing Tilly's framework we proceed to analyze the events in Lithuania through the following stages: 1) mobilization; 2) revolutionary situations and; 3) revolutionary outcomes.

Through an analysis of these parts, I demonstrate the superiority of the resource-mobilization approach over the competing paradigms outlined in chapter one. Because resource-mobilization theory regards participants in mobilization and collective action as rational, organized "individuals or groups

developing strategies in pursuit of their interests,"[1] it is successful in analyzing the achievement of independence in Lithuania in 1990. Moreover, the mobilizers and collective actors function in the political arena, and are regarded as political forces in the resource-mobilization framework. At the core of the resource-mobilization theory is the analysis of the interaction between the state and the collective actors, emphasizing the importance of people as thinking, independent and rational beings acting towards specific political goals.

Mobilization

1) Interests. *Interest articulation* is the first step towards independence because it establishes the process for mobilization: In the process toward sovereignty, interest sets the agenda for how sovereignty is to be pursued. Interests, depending on what they are and what they demand from the government, also determine the relationship between the polity and the challengers. If the demands are perceived as too great by the government, then repression would be applied. If, on the other hand, the interests expressed favoured the position of the government, then there is facilitation of these interests.

The irony of this articulation of interest in Lithuania, which eventually led to the declaration of independence, is that it was

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[1]Eduardo Canel, "New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization : The Need for Integration," in Organizing Dissent (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1992), 24.

made possible by the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev. Under his leadership, calls for glasnost' and perestroika were seized by reform minded individuals throughout the Baltics. Tilly's definition of *interests*, suggests that they fluctuate with the changing population. However, in the Lithuanian case, one may argue that the interests of the majority of the population remained constant throughout its history under Soviet rule, underscored by Lithuania's relentless opposition to Soviet rule since its annexation in 1940 and supported demographics (1980 Lithuania was 80.1 % Lithuanian in ethnicity[1]).

Dissent and the articulation of interests contrary to Moscow's agenda had been mounting since the 1950's, rooted in a tradition of a strong and formidable insurgency movement during the Second World War and a partisan movement that lasted until the early 1950s. Articulation of interest through collective action became a real option after the 1987 anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which ended with the central authorities calling the demonstrations "democracy," and in support of its restructuring policies.[2] This, at best, baffled the authorities in Lithuania who began to harass and threaten the participants demonstrating against the signing of the Pact. However, they did

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[1]Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940 - 1980, 272 -73.

[2]Alfred Erich Senn, Lithuania Awakening (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 21.

not have the will to punish or enforce any of their threats.[1] No significant, open and sustained gatherings took place until policy changes at the central levels finally took hold in Lithuania in the spring of 1988. Any movement towards any sort of reform was blocked by a Communist leadership that was set in its ways. In August 1987, murmurings were heard from the underground group, the Lithuanian Freedom League, protesting the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The gathering was small, with many who sympathized and knew of the gathering fearing that it had been organized by the security forces, Saugumas, to flush out dissidents.[2]

There were several organizations wanting to voice their interests, concerns and proposals. To gain an understanding of the interactions among groups and the interests which they espoused, it is necessary to give a cursory look at those involved. The groups that will be examined are: The Lithuanian Freedom League, Yedinstvo (Unity), the Catholic Church, the CPL, and Sajudis.

The Lithuanian Freedom League. The League started as an underground movement in the mid-1970s; it had not been heard from for almost a decade until its gathering at the Adam Mickiewicz monument on August 23, 1987, to demonstrate against the Nazi-Stalin Pact, and in 1988 it forced Songaila to allow public discussion of Stalin's atrocities by organizing a gathering held on

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[1]ibid.
[2]ibid., 20.

May 22, 1988 to commemorate the 1947 deportations of Lithuanians from their homeland.[1] The membership in the Freedom League differed radically from that of Sajudis, made up mostly of "former political prisoners and former partisans of the 19[illegible] period. Some Catholic clergymen are also active in its le[illegible]ship. Its core support comes from former dissidents, political prisoners, partisans and deportees."[2] The goals of the League remained the same since its founding, simply "to promote consciousness and, second, to promote uncompromisingly the idea of independence."[3]

Vardys argues that the Freedom League played a major role in radicalizing the goals of Sajudis.[4] Senn agrees with this assessment also.[5] While Sajudis agreed with the League's goal of independence, it did not approve its tactics of confrontation, opting instead for talks and negotiations supported by democratic means.

Vienybe-Yedinstvo-Jednosc. In reaction to the resurgence of Lithuanian nationalism, Yedinstvo (Unity) was formed. It claimed to represent the minorities living in Lithuania, but it was mainly its Russian and Polish membership which vocalized their interests. While Yedinstvo advocated reform through perestroika, its idea of accomplishing this followed squarely the very strict and

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[1]V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics," (July - August 1989): 58.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.
[4]ibid.
[5]Alfred Erich Senn, Toward Lithuanian Independence: Algirdas Brazauskas and the CPL," Problems of Communism (March - April 1990): 25.

conservative mandate of the CPL, espoused during the early days of the mass demonstrations.

It feared that the resurgence of Lithuanian nationalism would only serve to deprive them of the privileges that the Russians enjoyed. They were particularly opposed to making Lithuanian the official language of the republic. Made up of workers and mostly immigrants from the Russian republic, Yedinstvo threatened to strike and not pay CPL dues if the decree on making Lithuanian the official language of Lithuania was not revoked. The demonstration Yedinstvo organized was attended by approximately 80,000 people, but their demands were not met because other minority groups, from the Jewish associations to the Ukrainian community to the German associations, asserted that Yedinstvo was nothing more than the expression of "Russian chauvinism,"[1] and consequently supported Sajudis' radical reform platforms. The decree on Lithuanian as the official language stood, and the influence of Yedinstvo quickly diminished.

The Catholic Church. The Catholic Church has always been one of the most influential institutions in Lithuania, arguably even more so under atheistic Soviet rule. As we have already learned, the Church has remained a symbol of nationhood in Lithuania. Despite opposition from the Soviet regime, "the Church stayed close to the people, identified itself with the population's spiritual, social and cultural needs, and thereby survived. It also warranted

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[1]Ibid., 59.

respect as Lithuania's only surviving national institution and has served as a trustee for national traditions."[1]

Nevertheless, the Church chose to stay out of Lithuanian politics initially. It was only with the encouragement of Sajudis that the Church became more and more vocal. The Church was invited to open their rallies with masses and places were reserved for members of the clergy at Sajudis' founding meeting in October 1988.[2] The interests of the Catholic Church were in keeping with the interests of Sajudis, but in addition, the Church suggested that Lithuania be able to choose its own form of government, that the Church itself be given autonomy in keeping with canon law, and the Council on Religious Affairs be abolished.[3]

The two major contenders for power, even at the very beginning of the demonstrations in the summer of 1988, were the Communist Party of Lithuania and the Sajudis. Let us look first at the CPL.

The CPL. The CPL was at first floundering in its reaction to the popular demonstrations in the summer of 1988. It was slow to take up the banner of glasnost' and perestroika. The main reasons, suggests Vardys, were that the leaders of the CPL were no more than party apparatchiks, and that a certain amount of cynicism and skepticism regarding reform processes were firmly

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[1]Ibid., 60.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.

ingrained in the Party members. Moreover, it was commonplace that the regional Parties lagged behind in accepting the reforms proposed by Gorbachev. The hard-line communist stand on glasnost' and perestroika only changed when CPL leader Ringaudas Songaila was replaced by Algirdas Brazauskas on October 20, 1988. Alfred Erich Senn suggests that Moscow had much to do with this change of leadership.

> The manner in which Brazauskas succeeded Ringaudas Songaila on October 20, 1988 as first secretary of the CPL constituted nothing less than a revolution. To be sure, Moscow seemed to be exercising control: as Songaila's position crumbled, Moscow sent observers to participate in the discussions concerning succession; and even before being designated as the new leader, Brazauskas had to make a ritual journey to Moscow to obtain Mikhail Gorbachev's nihil obstat. The traditional forms, however, did not represent the new forces active in the land. The Communist Party of Lithuania in fact took a giant step along the road that led eventually to its declaration of independence.[1]

Indeed, it was Moscow which encouraged the reformers of Lithuania and the other Baltic republics to continue with the reform policies as expounded by Mikhail Gorbachev. At this time, the power brokers in Moscow saw this kind of activity as the essential elements for forwarding perestroika, even if the reform movement in Lithuania adopted nationalistic overtones.

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[1]Alfred Erich Senn, "Toward Lithuanian Independence: Algirdas Brazauskas and the CPL," (March - April 1990): 21.

While the CPL agreed with some of the reforms that other groups espoused, such as amendments of to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and protesting the participation of Lithuanians in the Soviet military, it was still somewhat loyal to the U.S.S.R., advocating "republican sovereignty" rather than total independence from the Soviet Union.[1] These interests would change gradually as competition between the CPL and Sajudis intensified.

Sajudis. The aims of Sajudis were at first to comply with Moscow's calls for glasnost' and perestroika. Sajudis became an umbrella group for the demands and interests of such groups as writers, artists, the Church and even members of the Communist Party of Lithuania. At its inception, half of the members of Sajudis were Party members. The Sajudis leadership justified this by contending "that they wanted to encourage the party leadership to accept the imperatives of perestroika, and they provided important channels for communication with authorities in Lithuania."[2] While it would seem that the idea of having so many different groups under one banner promotes factionalism and disunity, the opposite was true for Sajudis. It proved to be an advantage for them to take the moderate stand, in the early days, whereby different groups would be represented, working towards Lithuanian reform and restructuring.

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[1]Ibid., 22.
[2]Alfred Erich Senn, Lithuania Awakening, 70.

The ability of Sajudis to organize and mobilize support for its interests allowed it to advance further along the process of mobilization than any of the other groups articulating interest. Sajudis shrewdly played its cards, working at first to implement Moscow's policies of glasnost' and perestroika as well as supporting calls for economic self-management (khozraschet), and then changing the platform, according to the people's will and support, to encompass Lithuanian national and language rights, and then eventually, Lithuanian political independence.

2) Organization. The more organized a group is, the more inclusive it is, and therefore, the more possibility there is for mobilization and the success of mobilization. Tilly defines organization as the "extent of common identity and unifying structure" of those in the population. Organization is crucial because it serves to strengthen the common identity and unifying structure of the contenders for power. The progression towards this stage in Tilly's mobilization model may be clearly seen in the key players vying for the support of the Lithuanian population. While Yedinstvo, the Freedom League and the environmental movement voiced their interests, the CPL and Sajudis became the two major contenders for power as they attempted to organize their forces in order to bring the Lithuanian people to support their respective sides. The competition between the two contenders for power would be won by the one which could most

effectively organize and mobilize the population to support its claims and to what extent the population identified with these claims. The identification with the group and the commitment to it determines how organized the group is, and therefore, determines the possibility for mobilization and its success.

What is most interesting is that, far from being two polarized groups, the CPL and Sajudis basically espoused the same interests as the 1989 elections drew near. The starkest difference between the two contenders for power, and certainly most important one, was the CPL's connection to the central powers in Moscow, and thereby, its strong stance against political independence for any republic in the Union. This would prove to be a hindrance for the CPL as they found it difficult to gain support from a significant segment of the population once multiple sovereignty was established.

The major flaw in the CPL was its lack of a unifying structure with which to effect organization. The CPL had much to compensate for as it tried to compete with Sajudis' popularity, to satisfy the Lithuanian people who wanted independence, and to placate the central authorities in Moscow. Even the change in leadership to someone seen as a reformer and someone who received tremendous popular support in Lithuania failed to take significant support away from Sajudis. Within it there were those who wanted to remain in close association with Moscow and, more strongly, those who wanted to break away from Moscow and once

again establish an independent Communist Party as it had been before World War II.

Brazauskas was himself playing both sides of the debate, supporting "Sajudis' program of making Lithuania the official language of the republic, and endorsing the plan to make traditional Lithuanian symbols, such as the tricolor flag, the official symbols of the republic."[1] The CPL Supreme Soviet legislated this on November 18, 1988. Moreover, Brazauskas supported economic self-management and made this clear to the central government in Moscow. However, he was not forthcoming in support of complete Lithuanian independence, and chose instead a slower pace for working towards "sovereignty," even insisting on using terminology existing within the Soviet Constitution.[2] As was evident at the time, the atmosphere stirred up by mass demonstrations and calls for Lithuanian national independence reflected the interests of the population - a population which was more and more eagerly advancing towards a declaration of independence.

While the CPL struggled to form a unified mandate for reform, Sajudis, on the other hand, proved to be quite well organized and widely supported by the population. As Sajudis developed the movement towards reform, it found more and more support amongst various segments of the population. The

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[1]Ibid, Problems of Communism: 22.
[2]Ibid.

organizers of Sajudis were quite careful to adhere to the principles of democracy and to attract representatives from various intellectual groups. One criticism targeted against them, however, was the lack of representation from the working class. Despite this, Sajudis was able to unify successfully the people of Lithuania. During the summer of 1988, it was writers, musicians and academics who were the administrators of the Sajudis platform, and in its grassroots membership "it was the youth who carried Sajudis' message through Lithuania in June and July. ...The younger section of the Initiative Group ... spoke the requisite language for communication."[1]

Having at one time been regarded as apathetic and largely apolitical, the youth of Lithuania proved most supportive of the reforms and the Lithuanian nationalism that went along with it. Sajudis arranged more demonstrations as its group gained strength. It also began a newsletter, *Sajudsio zinios* (Sajudis News), to establish a way of effectively and massively disseminating information. On August 8, 1988, Arvydas Juozaitis became its official editor.

The more organized the group, the more inclusive of other claims, and as a result, the more the possibility for mobilization. As Sajudis evolved, it became more and more accessible to different types of groups, and its program for reform became more and more its own rather than Moscow's. As Martha Brill Olcott

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[1]Ibid., Lithuania Awakening, 72.

writes, "While its initial program claimed to advance the cause of perestroika, Sajudis' ideas went well beyond the scope of what was being debated in party reforms."[1]

Indeed, again at its constitutional congress in October 1988, Sajudis members indicated to journalists that "Members of the initiative group expressed their attitude toward the political and economic independence of the republic, about the most acceptable model for the construction of socialism as well as about what institutions guarantee the irreversibility of the democratization process."[2] Clearly, Sajudis was playing both sides of the game; however, it was a prudent move because it was able to mobilize the Lithuanian people to support its reform program.

3) Mobilization. *Mobilization* means having accumulated a sufficient amount of resources in order to forward one's claims. The increase in the control over resources is essential for mobilization to occur. . What is the magnitude of resources that the contender (in this case Sajudis) controls? The appeal of Sajudis was widespread. Although initially there was much uncertainty in Lithuania about what the Gorbachev reforms truly meant, mobilization in Lithuania took on massive proportions.

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[1]Martha Brill Olcott, "The Lithuanian Crisis," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1990): 33.

[2]Sovetskaya Litva (Vilnius), (October 22-25, 1988). A translation of this appears in Soviet Report JPRS-UPA-88-061 (December 28, 1988): 48.

Mobilization is clearly present in the events of the Summer and Autumn of 1988. By the summer of 1988, the general population found courage to gather and protest against the Soviet system. Mass meetings, public events and demonstrations were held to convey Sajudis' reform program and to cultivate support for these programs. This was not easily done, however. Sajudis, at first, floundered as to how to mobilize support. Its tenuous position in May and June of 1988 made Sajudis cautious about calling mass meetings and demonstrations. What pushed them into action was the Freedom League which was quite unabashed about demonstrating with the pre-Soviet tricolour flag. The environmental group, the Greens, was also influential in organizing mass meetings for its cause, calling Lithuanians to protest the Ignalina Atomic Energy Station that contains RBMK nuclear reactors similar to those of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. In a way, these protest groups served to pave the way for open demonstrations to take place in Lithuania, particularly Vilnius. The demonstration called by the Freedom League on June 14, 1988 to commemorate the deportation of Lithuanians in 1941 overshadowed a simultaneous meeting called by Sajudis, at which less than half of Sajudis members attended. Most were at the demonstration called by the League at Gediminas Square, which had an estimated attendance of 6,000.

Shortly after this, however, Sajudis members went to Estonia to attempt to exchange ideas with the Popular Front in that

republic. They learned the value and "power"[1] of mass gatherings, and henceforth arranged demonstrations much more boldly. On June 21, Sajudis organized a demonstration outside the Supreme Soviet building protesting the press ban on Sajudis' activities.[2] Lithuanians mobilized in force, as each new demonstration grew in numbers to tens of thousands of participants. Three days later, Sajudis held a send-off for the delegates to the 19th All-Union Conference in Moscow; it was attended by 50,000 people.[3] The speakers at the demonstrations protested the "secret elections" of the delegates to the Conference by the CPL Central Committee. Moreover,

> Sajudis also called upon the conference to "secure guarantees" for the democratization of the party and the government, approve policies for the protection of the environment, establish republic citizenship, regulate immigration into the republic, declare Lithuanian the official language of the republic, guarantee autonomous development of republic education and culture, reestablish constitutional courts at the all-Union and republic levels, and ensure opportunities for "direct" republic relations with foreign countries.[4]

The mass movements to follow became more and more forthright taking on a character quite distinct from that of the Freedom

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[1]Senn, Lithuania Awakening, 78.

[2]"Lithuania: Chronology of Sajudis," Lituanus 36, no. 2: 85.

[3]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 61. ELTA Information Bulletin (New York City, N.Y. and Washington, D.C.), (August 1988), no. 8: 9. Ibid, Lituanus, 86, and Senn, Lithuania Awakening, p. 79, assert that 20,000 people attended.

[4]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 61.

League and the Party. Moderate policies, which attempted to balance the central government's call for perestroika and Lithuanians' call for independence, were adopted in the mobilization of the population.

As Sajudis became stronger and gained more and more support, it also organized more demonstrations and meetings. Through the second half of 1988 Sajudis called on the population to protest against the restrictions on their demonstrations and mass meetings, organized a bicycle tour throughout the republic to promote the work of Sajudis, as well as a Rock Music March to eight Lithuanian cities. One of the largest rallies, and an example of mobilization organized by Sajudis was on August 23, 1988, at Vingis Park in Vilnius, to protest the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact forty-nine years earlier. According to the Congress Bulletin published in *Lituanus*, 250,000 people attended the demonstration.[1] On September 3, Sajudis along with ecological groups from its neighbouring Baltic republics staged a joining of hands stretching across the Baltics to protest environmental damage caused by Soviet industrialization policies. The Lithuanian participation was estimated at 100,000. Another ecology demonstration was staged on September 16-17 whereby the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant was surrounded in order to protest its expansion. Two hundred thousand people participated.

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[1]Ibid, Lituanus, 87.

4) Collective Action. *Collective action* is a "joint action" which leads to common goals, and towards the "production of collective goods" from which the entire society benefits. In this regard, the more inclusive the *collective action*, the more successful. Sajudis had clearly learned the lessons of *mobilization* well. The most remarkable aspect of many of these gatherings was that they were not exclusive to its own members. On the contrary, Sajudis invited leaders and members of other groups to attend and participate in many of their organized demonstrations, from environmental groups to the CPL. This proved to be a strong example of *collective action*. What, at first, was a clever way of protecting the movement became a rallying call for all segments of society to participate in the reform process, inadvertently giving Sajudis the support and the membership it needed. Indeed, the impact that Sajudis had on the CPL and its members emphasizes the transition of Sajudis into a player in the political arena. It advanced its claims and eventually obtained recognition not only from the population, but also attention from the central government and the press. Sajudis had accomplished an important part of its goals, not only for itself as a movement, but also for itself as a representative of the people.

Moscow was clearly getting nervous about the events in Lithuania. Growing apprehension about the demonstrations and the display of national allegiance in the Baltics prompted Gorbachev to send his CPSU Central Committee Secretary

Alexander Yakovlev (one of the architects of reform) to Latvia and Lithuania. Being a promoter of glasnost', Yakovlev was of no help at all to the CPL. Instead, Yakovlev championed the cause of glasnost' and perestroika, and indicated a degree of sympathy for the resurgence of nationalism. He "condemned the excessive centralization of the past and the thoughtless behaviour of the ministries and departments in Moscow that had acted -- and were continuing to act-- without regard for the effect of their actions on interethnic relations."[1] Yakovlev called on members of the CPL to lead the changes and reforms, and to somehow seize the power of the nationalist elements in Lithuania and channel them towards the aims of perestroika and glasnost'.[2] Vardys argues that this "last admonition required the CPL's co-optation of national traditions," whereby it legislated "co-equal" status for the Lithuanian anthem and flag, on August 18.[3] Two days later, changes to the education curriculum added Lithuanian geography and history in school, as well as permission to study in the Lithuanian language, and thus stemmed the formidable tide of Russification. Also arising from Yakovlev's visit was the firing of the conservative editor-in-chief of *Tiesa*, the CPL newspaper, which Sajudis contended gave adverse slanted reporting of Sajudis

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[1]Ann Sheehy, "Alexandr Yakovlev Discusses Nationality Issues," RL 395/88 (August 31, 1988): In 1989, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin was renamed Report on the USSR.

[2]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 79.

[3]Ibid.

activities. The CPL also lifted a broadcasting ban on the activities of Sajudis, gaining the advantage that the CPL had from the start - access to the broadcast media which was tightly controlled. This was a major accomplishment for Sajudis and its supporters.

By late summer of 1988, lines drawn among reform-oriented groups became more and more blurred as Sajudis began to act more and more as an umbrella organization for all groups that wanted representation under its banner. The major common denominator amongst them was that they advanced more favourable policies towards Lithuanian culture, education, language and politics. The important factor of demographics, namely, that Lithuania is over 80 percent Lithuanian, was instrumental in the success of mobilization and collective action. As Sajudis' voice became more accepted by Lithuanian society, its actions bore fruit and indeed produced, as Tilly would argue, "inclusive and indivisible goods" which were available to all members - Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians alike - as more and more freedoms were afforded the population.

5.) Opportunity. What set Lithuania apart from other republics in the U.S.S.R. was that Lithuania so astutely and strategically took advantage of the reforms that Gorbachev initiated. *Opportunity* is the interests expressed by the population and the possibility for the fulfillment of those interests. The fifth and last variable of the *mobilization* model is *opportunity*

which consists of three elements: power, repression and *opportunity/threat*. Clearly, with regard to power, Sajudis' interests were favoured overwhelmingly by a large segment of the population. The fact that they, in effect, swallowed up other groups expressing similar interests shows the strength of Sajudis relative to other groups vying to be heard in Lithuania at this time. Conversely, the power and influence in Sajudis' hands meant the loss of power for the other contending groups, notably the Communist Party of Lithuania.

At this stage of development of Sajudis (the latter part of 1988 and early 1989) the "cost of collective action" to them was minimal. While they staged many demonstrations to bolster their interests and claims, it is quite clear that they were able to organize and mobilize tens of thousands of people very successfully and with few, if any, violent incidents. Repression of mobilization was nonexistent, with only meek warnings from the central government in Moscow, and from the CPL, that complete secession from the Soviet Union would not be tolerated.

This brings us to *opportunity/threat* which refers to the contender's likelihood of attaining or not attaining their interests, contingent on threats from other groups including the government. Clearly, *opportunity* was on Sajudis' side. With the support of the CPSU and the CPL, Sajudis was able to attain much of what it set out to do - from introducing the Lithuanian language in schools and in the parliament, to halting the expansion of the Ignalina

power plant, to giving recognition to the Catholic Church in Lithuania. The political will to stop any of the interests and claims that Sajudis had was absent, and would not have been tolerated by a mobilized and politicized population. What occurred instead was the acceptance by those in power of the changes which had taken place in Lithuania in 1988 and 1989. The Lithuanian political scene changed dramatically from a passive and frightened one to a very active one in a matter of months.

What does the mobilization model tell us about the events in Lithuania? It tells us that organization, mobilization and collective action are crucial and important elements in the quest for independence. The analysis of the events in Lithuania thus far suggests that the mobilization effort was not class based, and that indeed those who supported Sajudis were people from all backgrounds and classes.

Moreover, that the success of mobilization effort in Lithuania was organized by independent thinking individuals who wanted to affect deep changes in the society suggests that they were not merely automatons gone awry, nor were they just deviants attempting to rattle the establishment. Rather, they were well organized individuals and groups that had goals and mandates which were supported by a large majority of the population, contrary to the contention that collective action consists of the formation of ad hoc groups.

It may also be concluded that no widespread peasant rebellion occurred in Lithuania's revolution of 1990. On the contrary, the revolution was initiated by members of the intellectual class and supported by varying groups based in urban and rural centres.

This brings us to the second part of Charles Tilly's model of revolution--revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. The *polity* model, which identifies the key players in the society, combined with the *mobilization* model culminates in *revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes.*

Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes.

As already elucidated above, the summer of 1988 was a time of activity, of "awakening"[1] for Lithuania. The Lithuanians' overwhelming support for perestroika and glasnost' was unequalled. The spring and summer of 1988 also resulted in the formation of the Lithuanian Restructuring Movement, or Sajudis. A revolutionary situation is present when there is the "emergence of an alternative polity" which has the commitment by a significant segment of the population and "the incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the government to suppress the alternative coalition or the commitment to its claims."[2]

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[1]Senn, Lithuania Awakening.
[2]Tilly, 209.

To review briefly, the summary of Tilly's framework of Revolutionary Situations, we reiterate the conditions of **multiple sovereignty** necessary for the understanding of this part of the model. They are: i) alternative claims to power; ii) the commitment to these claims by a significant part of the population; iii) the incapacity of the government to suppress the claims for power and/or the support for those claims. We have already hinted at some of the elements of multiple sovereignty, but it is valuable to delve more specifically into the history and make-up of the main contender for power - Sajudis.

1)Alternatives to existing polity. It must be emphasized that the enormous success of this rapid development of mobilization and collective action, and subsequently, Sajudis' becoming a contender for power would not have been possible without the deep **historical** and legal arguments for self-rule in Lithuania. The *mobilization* experienced by Lithuania in the latter half of 1988 was remarkable. It set the stage for other organizations and groups to express their demands and claims and eventually led to the support of one *alternative claim* to power. When did Sajudis become the one strong alternative claim to the existing polity? The seeds of the claim were inextricably sown in the fall and winter of 1988, but it occurred as early as late July 1988 when "Sajudis challenged the party's vanguard role."[1]

[1]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 63.

Shortly afterward Yakovlev was dispatched to Lithuania, forcing the CPL to acknowledge and fulfill demands expressed by the Lithuanian people under the banner of Sajudis. Clearly, there is the expected overlapping of the mobilization and polity models.

To illustrate how Sajudis inextricably established itself as the only alternative to the government in power, the events from the formation of Sajudis in the Spring of 1988 leading to the Founding Congress and then the decisive events of the 1989 elections are elucidated.

The Formation of Sajudis. The formation of Sajudis originated from concerns expressed by the Lithuanian Writer's Union in the Spring of 1988. The writers were particularly concerned about the "parlous future of the Lithuanian language and national culture."[1] They also questioned the Kremlin's policies on the ecology, citing environmental problems affecting water, land and air. Moreover, in April 1988, the Union "called for Lithuania to be made the official language of the republic, for the restructuring of the school curriculum so as to use Lithuanian history as the foundation for the teaching of all history, and for greater public discussion of any further large-scale industrial development within the republic."[2] This was particularly important for Lithuania, whose basis for dissent and opposition was rooted in its forcible annexation in 1940. A month later, in a

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[1]Senn, Lithuania Awakening, 56.
[2]Ibid.

meeting with Estonian Front members who had advanced their program of perestroika and glasnost' further than any republic, Lithuanian intellectuals were spurred into action, becoming quite enthusiastic about participating in the Nineteenth Party Conference in Moscow. The CPSU itself had encouraged participation from republican party groups, inviting them to submit nominations for delegates to the conference which was to take place at the end of June. The intellectuals were met with disappointment, however, as the Central Committee of the CPL chose only a handful of reform-minded delegates in a closed and secret session. The intelligentsia accused the CPL Central Committee of being undemocratic and of resorting to old methods.[1]

This further prompted the reformers to call for a plan of action. Inspired by the Estonian model, the Lithuanian intelligentsia resolved to act upon its new-found call to action by joining forces with the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, headed by Eduardas Vilkas, which proposed changes to the Lithuanian constitution. A meeting was arranged to discuss ideas and ways to advance perestroika. A group of reform-minded individuals consisting of "party and non-party intellectuals (from the Academy of Sciences)" met "to consolidate all segments of the society for implementing perestroika in Lithuania."[2] On May 23, 1988, this group formed a commission which would propose

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 56.

changes to the Lithuanian Republic's constitution so that it would include the principles of perestroika, democratization and glasnost'. On June 3, an initiative group formed which consisted of thirty-six scholars and intellectuals "to organize a movement for the support of perestroika." Half of this group belonged to the Communist Party which, Vardys argues, illustrates that there was a split in the ruling party, and second, that there was disaffection among the Lithuanian nomenklatura.[1] The group named itself the Lithuanian Reconstruction Movement (Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sajudis).

The strength of this new group lay in its unified goal of supporting perestroika and of seizing the central government's mandate to reform Soviet society by promoting democracy and improving the Soviet economy through economic self-management (*khozraschet*) by the republics. This, however, was contrary to the Communist Party of Lithuania's direction at the time. As Vardys asserts, the CPL was worried that its primary role in the Lithuanian society would be usurped . For the most part, the CPL felt threatened because some of its members were excluded from meetings held by Sajudis. This signalled the beginning of the adversarial role of Sajudis in relation to the CPL. The irony was that Sajudis' goals coincided with those of Gorbachev. At its Constituent Congress in October 1988, Sajudis held a news conference whereby, "It reiterated that the Movement

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[1]Ibid.

is not a party and not an opposition but rather a mass movement and that the Movement supports the party line of restructuring."[1] This created an odd triangle which pitted Sajudis and the CPSU against the CPL, then the CPL and the CPSU against Sajudis and later, Sajudis and the CPL against the CPSU.

The animosity between the CPL and Sajudis at this time illustrates the vying for power indicative of the competing interests between them. The rivalry between the members of the polity and the contenders for the control of the government is at the crux of this first proximate cause of multiple sovereignty, which also says that the "mobilization of a revolutionary mass describes the rapid appearance of a new challenger."[2] The appearance of Sajudis was certainly rapid but it was rooted in the long-time quest for freedom and self-determination. Lithuania was one of the wealthier republics in the Soviet Union, supporting the claim that mobilization does not necessarily have to be "sudden" nor "come from immiseration."[3] While 1988 brought to the surface the pent-up anger and anti-Soviet feelings of the population, they had always been there, and the Lithuanian people had on many other occasions been spurred to mobilize, albeit unsuccessfully. A combination of Gorbachev's reform policies

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[1]"Sajudis Initiative Group Opening Press Conference," Sovetskaya Litva (Vilnius, October 22, 1988):1, translated in the Soviet Report, JPRS-UPA-88-061 (December 28, 1988): 48.
[2]Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 201.
[3]Ibid.

(which cannot be underestimated) and the Lithuanians' seizure of this opportunity to promote progressive reforms created Sajudis.

Sajudis' beginnings were modest at best: it took moderate stands on issues and carefully aligned itself with the calls for reform from Moscow, undoubtedly to avoid any repressions that could transpire if the centre felt threatened. What pushed Sajudis towards more radical thinking, towards the goal of sovereignty and then independence, was the significant support it developed among the Lithuanian people, and also the doubts and criticisms levelled at it by groups such as the Freedom League, which accused it of being merely a pawn of Moscow. Vardys suggests that this radicalization of Sajudis took place because of intense, "fierce and competitive interplay with the CPL."[1] In a very short period of time, its mass meetings grew in numbers from 500 to 5,000 and then to 250,000. Sajudis soon found itself in the forefront of reforms and the representative voice for the Lithuanian people.

The Founding Congress. Its success was very evident at its founding Congress to which it had invited many disparate groups - from the CPL to a representative of the Armenian National Front to the chair of the Jewish Community of the Lithuanian Cultural Fund. The Congress welcomed various segments of the population in order to discuss different points of view on the restructuring of Lithuania with the central concern being "The Question of National

[1]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 57.

Self-Awareness in Lithuania."[1] Strategically, Sajudis' inclusionary policies served it well, gathering more and more support from varying segments of society, including supporters from national minorities, particularly the Poles.

The Founding Congress truly marked Sajudis' transition as a major political force in Lithuania, supported by a majority of Lithuanians and establishing itself as the only alternative to the Communist government. The Congress also gave Sajudis a global forum to which it communicated its concerns and mandates for reform. The press coverage boasted of major broadcast and print media from the *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, ITN* (Great Britain), the *New York Times,* to the *Financial Times.* This link with the West became a significant factor for Sajudis and its interplay with conservative forces emanating from the core of power in Moscow.

While allowing Algirdas Brazauskas (the CPL Secretary) to speak, and acknowledging the great role that Gorbachev played in the changes occurring, Sajudis reiterated its desire and will to reform Lithuania by Lithuanian standards. Emphasis was placed on the importance of Lithuanian history in Lithuania's future development. The speech by the Lithuanian poet Yustinas Martsinkyavuchyus stated,

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[1]"1st Day's Session Reported," Sovetskaya Litva (Vilnius, October 23, 1988): 1,4, translated in Report: Soviet Union, JPRS-UPA-88-061 (December 28, 1988): 48-50.

> The Lithuanian movement for Restructuring has formed and established itself as a democratic movement of all the people, which arises from our history, from the depths of the remote and recent past and from the finest traditions of national life. We have finally realized that woe to those peoples whose memory is silent or speaks falsely, whose language and spirit pushed to the side of life are lamentably and hopelessly fading, whose sovereignty and state independence are mercilessly crushed by large socialist monopolies, by unprecedented centralization of economic, political and cultural spheres.[1]

Sajudis' commitment to freedom and sovereignty, while carefully adhering to the programs of perestroika and glasnost' initiated by Gorbachev, was meant to soothe fears of the central government. Sajudis was also committed to "Western-style guarantee of civil rights, eradication of Stalinism, research and reporting on the crimes of the Stalin period." Furthermore, Sajudis indicated interest in becoming part of Europe's nuclear-free, neutral zone.[2] Four-and-a-half months after forming, the confidence and the strong political will among Lithuanians was already well-entrenched.

The Congress also brought to the surface many of the sentiments for the national symbols and the history of Lithuania, underlining the significance of having a large majority of Lithuanians living in the republic and how this was one of the

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid.

major elements to the development of Sajudis and its success. Sajudis' popularity was further solidified when the Vilnius cathedral was given back to the Catholic Church. Although the return was the result of a CPL decree, the credit went to Sajudis, which had invited the Church to participate in the conference and which had included masses and prayers in this very emotional conference.

During this Founding Congress, the CC CPSU had published the proposed changes to the constitution and election rules. Sajudis reacted by sending a telegram to Gorbachev on November 2, asking for a postponement of ratification of the proposed amendments.[1] On November 8, an emergency meeting was called by the Baltic popular fronts in order to discuss the Kremlin's proposals for changes to the Soviet Constitution (1977). It was evident from the outset that the Baltic popular fronts were already strongly opposed to the planned changes, fearing that they would negatively affect their hopes for democratization and republican self-rule. The major objections put forth by the Balts were:

> First, the proposed amendments to the constitution are seen as removing the formal right of the union republics to secede from the Soviet Union. Second, it is charged that they will tighten Moscow's control over the republics rather than expand their powers,...making it impossible, for instance, to implement the principles of republican cost-accounting. Third, the representation of the union republics in the supreme body of power wil decline in relative terms, and the allocation of

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[1]Ibid.

seats in the new, smaller Council of Nationalities,... will shift power to the Russian republic. [1]

According to Sheehy, the Baltic Front's fears were well-founded. While the Soviet Constitution required changes to accommodate changes in the Soviet Parliament, with the power being transformed form the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Congress of People's Deputies, Sheehy suggests that the central authorities in Moscow took this opportunity to reduce the rights of the republics and to renege on the promise to expand power to the republics.[2]

From the Baltic Popular Front's meeting emerged a joint statement which denounced the changes to the Soviet Constitution and drafted election laws, and called for their exclusion from the Supreme Soviet agenda of November 29.[3] Sajudis' members appeared on television to request signatures opposing the draft changes, and almost two million signatures were collected. Kazimieras Motieka of Sajudis argued that the changes would further centralize power within the Union and also "criticized the planned electoral procedures which limit the influence of local and regional groups," and restricted the democratic process by giving the central organs the final word on candidate selections.[4]

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[1]Ann Sheehy,"Republican Rights and the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (RL) 497/88: 1-5.
[2]Ibid.
[3]"Balts Oppose Kremlin's Plans for Constitutional Changes," ELTA Bulletin (Washington, D.C.) No. 11: 3-4.
[4]Ibid.

The ensuing reaction from Moscow was to send three members of the Politburo to the Baltic republics in order to discipline the opposition. The popular fronts were warned that should they continue this flagrant insubordination, it would only be detrimental to them.[1] However, the visit from the Politburo member, Nikolai Slyunkov, was certainly detrimental to the relationship between Sajudis and the CPL. Vardys contends that the event marked the rift between the two sides, which had up to this point been willing to work with, or at least tolerate each other. The split occurred even though Brazauskas had agreed with Sajudis about the unfairness of the constitutional changes that were being proposed. Slyunkov's verbal threats intensified the anti-Soviet sentiments and made the popular fronts even more determined to be heard.[2]

A reflection of the new thinking in the Soviet Union and the persistent opposition, amendments to the draft changes to the USSR Constitution were tailored to meet Baltic demands.[3] The law on secession was left alone and "does not give the new USSR Congress of People's Deputies the right to veto demands for secession," which the Balts interpreted in the draft law.[4] As a concession to the Baltic complaints of further centralization of

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Sheehy, "The Final Text of the Law on Amendments to the Constitution: Republican Rights," RL 553/88: 1-7.

power in the draft law, "the final text of the law improves the representation of non-Russian republics in the Council of Nationalities (Article 111) and ensure their representation in the new USSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight (Article 125)."[1] Furthermore, the republics will also have " the right to protest against the laws the other acts of all-Union state and public organizations," including on declarations of martial law or of states of emergency, whereby "the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of a republic affected now has to be consulted before a decision is taken...The republics themselves will also be involved in any special forms of administration that might be introduced."[2] It appeared that the relationship between the Baltic republics and the Kremlin had progressed to a new level of negotiations, or at least, a "two way street," rather than just diktat from Moscow. In fact, however, the compromises and concessions that the central authorities made to the final draft on constitutional changes fell short of Baltic demands. While Estonia's Supreme Soviet declared independence, Lithuania's Sajudis was maneuvering to convince the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to declare the laws of Lithuania independent from those of the Soviet Union. Yet this did not take place; Sajudis' anger rose, and its rift with the CPL widened. Instead, Sajudis declared a symbolic "moral independence" for Lithuania. Brazauskas was immediately summoned to Moscow and

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[1]Ibib.
[2]Ibid.

sternly warned that any moves towards independence would only be harmful for Lithuania.[1]

Even with the success of the founding congress, the movement had to keep fighting for its claims and interests to be acknowledged. Sajudis' energies would now focus on the CPL and Brazauskas as its main rivals and as agents of the central powers in Moscow. Sajudis had reached a turning point in its short existence. Emerging as an effective political force with a clearer mandate and method placed Sajudis in a very strong position vis-a-vis the CPL, which was beginning to worry about the March 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies. Brazauskas knew that the CPL would face a difficult contest, prompting him to concede many of the demands of Sajudis and the Lithuanian people. For the first time, the CPL was campaigning for its political survival. Brazauskas attempted to gain more support by declaring Christmas a legal holiday, by forging ties with the Catholic Church, by reforming the education system to promote national values, traditions and language, and by making Lithuania's independence day, February 16, an official and legal holiday.[2] However, these gestures were seen as merely symbolic, and Sajudis' popularity continued to rise, while that of the CPL fell.

Sajudis, with tacit support from the population, intensified its activities with new fervor, and real hope that independence

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[1]Ibid, ELTA Bulletin (no. 11, November 1988: 3-4.
[2]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 70.

might be possible after all. Despite criticisms and accusations from *Pravda* and warnings from the Kremlin , the Lithuanian people continued to hold strikes and rallies. Sajudis boldly stated its desire for an independent state, emphasizing that it was the only way that Lithuanian culture and nationhood would survive. In the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Roundtable on Inter-ethnic, Center- Republic Relations held in mid-February 1989, Romuald Ozolas, a council member of the Sajudis Diet, argued that "The conflict between the center and the republics ... is the result of the lack of any state system among the latter. ... The right to have a state system is the natural right of a nation, the expression of its social mind. And the very posing of the question of the possibility of resolving the national question from the center is, by its nature, imperial."[1]

The 1989 Elections. The elections to the new Congress of People's Deputies dominated the Lithuanian political scene in the early months of 1989 were; they were marked by a heightened competition between Sajudis and the CPL. While Lithuania was solidifying its base of support amongst the Lithuanian people by moving closer towards complete independence, the CPL was forced to distance itself from the CPSU in Moscow. It tried to move closer to the platform espoused by Sajudis to establish a base of support. This competition led Sajudis to demand more and more from the

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[1]"Academy of Sciences Roundtable on Interethnic, Center-Republic Relations," Report: Soviet Union, JPRS_UPA-89-024 (April 17, 1989): 75.

government in the name of its supporters, leading the CPL to enact and promise certain measures to gain support from the people and, to a certain extent, to appease Sajudis. For example, on January 26, the CPL announced publicly that it would work for perestroika and all that was necessary for reform. At this point , however, the CPL was still very careful not to antagonize Moscow. It took a very moderate stand declaring that it was against the "anti-socialist" mandates as well as the conservatives thwarting the efforts towards reform. This was only to be expected since the CPL was not about to condemn itself to political suicide by denouncing communism. For the most part, this only served to disenfranchise the Party even more. While Brazauskas was a very popular figure among Lithuanians, they did not feel that the Party was doing enough for them in fulfilling the promise of perestroika and glasnost'--meaning self-government and national expression.

This particular problem experienced by the CPL relates to Tilly's contention that as a result of some unfulfilled expectations and needs, an alternative claim to power is formed and strengthened. Multiple sovereignty has begun and so has a revolutionary situation. As Tilly says, assessing more positively when a revolutionary situation has occurred may not be as easy at it seems. While all polities in power may experience opposition from many segments of society, from "national minorities" to

"vigilantes" to "religious groups," these dissenting voices in themselves do not amount to a revolutionary situation."[1]

> The question however is whether some significant part of the subject population honors the claim. The revolutionary moment arrives when previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves confronted with strictly incompatible demands from the government and form an alternative body claiming control over the government, or claiming to *be* the government...and those previously acquiescent people obey the alternative body[2]

While it may be argued that Sajudis already had a "significant" amount of support early in its mobilization effort, concrete proof of this established Sajudis as an alternative body of power, once it claimed overwhelming victory in the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Lithuania. The CPL lost badly to Sajudis. The elections to the People's Deputies were to elect ten deputies from territorial electoral districts and thirty-two deputies from national territorial electoral districts.[3] Moreover, the electorate was given "the opportunity to express its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the policies and personnel of Lithuania's Communist Party and the Lithuanian Restructuring

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[1]Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 192.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Saulius Girnius, "Elections for the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Lithuania," Report on the USSR 1 (no. 13, March 31, 1989): 26.

Movement."[1] Sajudis entered a candidate for each positon. Having won three by-elections to the Supreme Soviet in January and February, Sajudis was optimistic about the possibilities for victories in many of the districts. Early in the campaign, the CPL worried about the strong competition forged by Sajudis candidates. Sajudis' access to the media was restricted; the more radical groups such as the Lithuanian Freedom League, the Helsinki Group and the Christian Democratic Party worked to stop Sajudis from running in the elections believing that if it did, it would mean recognition and acceptance of Soviet rule in Lithuania.[2] Nevertheless, Sajudis was able to overcome these hindrances and indeed gain more support as the alternative to the CPL. Its popularity was so widespread that on February 28, in a strategic move, Sajudis withdrew its candidates running against the CPL First Secretary Brazauskas and Second Secretary Vladimir Berezov. It was feared that defeat for Brazauskas would mean the loss of a moderate force in the Party and a moderate voice for Lithuania in Moscow.

Although the elections were held on Easter Sunday, the Catholic population would not be kept away, with 82.5 percent of those eligible voting.[3] Of the forty-two electoral districts, Sajudis

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 71.
[3]Ibid.

won 31, defeating the CPL candidates soundly.[1] On April 9, the runoff elections were held in those eight districts in Lithuania, in which no clear winners had been chosen and gave Sajudis five more seats.[2]

2) Acceptance of Alternative Claims

The acceptance of alternative claims evolves because of the government's failure "to meet certain obligations which were provided previously" and "a rapid or unexpected rise in the demands for resources by the government."[3] The election of March 26 was a major victory for Sajudis. It received official and tacit approval from a majority of the Lithuanian population giving Sajudis 36 out of 42 districts.[4] In the Lithuanian case, these unreasonable demands by the government had existed since its annexation in 1940. The demands expressed by the Soviet Union on Lithuania were always unacceptable to the majority of Lithuanians but it was the liberalization policies of Gorbachev that gave Lithuania the opportunity to finally express its interests in a significant manner. Indeed the significance of this expression of

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[1]Salius Girnius,"Sajudis Candidates Sweep Elections in Lithuania," Report onthe USSR, 1 (no. 15, April 14,1989): 29-31.

[2]Saulius Girnius, "Preliminary Results of Runoff Elections in Lithuania," Report on the USSR 1 (no. 17, April 28, 1989):23-24.

[3]Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 192.

[4]Salius Girnius,"Sajudis Candidates Sweep Elections in Lithuania," Report onthe USSR, 1 (no. 15, April 14,1989): 29-31.

interest led to a "coalition between a rapidly mobilized group and the established contenders for power,"[1] which, in turn, led to "a significant commitment to an alternative polity."[2] In the age of Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost', the promise was the restructuring of society and economy, openness in journalism and information. While Sajudis opportunely used this for its own ends, it was not enough for them. Its members and their supporters could not accept the limits imposed upon them by the CPL and the central government, especially since they were being encouraged to use democratization and liberalization in order to restructure Soviet society. When Sajudis and the mobilized population took up this challenge and went beyond that, it was clear that Gorbachev's promise of perestroika fell far short of what Lithuanians sought for themselves.

The line between the rise of alternative claims to the polity and the acceptance of those claims is blurred, and there is obviously an overlap between them "since the veering of an already-mobilized contender toward exclusive alternative claims to control of the government simultaneously reestablishes that claim and produces commitment to them."[3] Keeping this in mind, the sweep of the election by Sajudis candidates was further confirmation of the commitment of a significant segment of the

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid., 204.

population to an alternative polity. This particular achievement is the logical marker in the historical progression of Lithuania's drive for independence. This would give Sajudis the real power in Lithuania to strengthen and expand its claims and demands. Because Lithuania existed basically as a colony of the Soviet Empire, the dimension of contending with the central powers in Moscow remained a very real obstacle for Sajudis. The central power was not about to honour the Sajudis victory and grant Lithuania complete independence. The Sajudis victory signified that it would now have the power and the resources to deal with Moscow more directly and on an equal footing. Sajudis was no longer just a movement.

Nationalism was a key factor in Sajudis' victory. Indeed, the *ELTA Bulletin* reporting on the election victory may have spoken for Lithuanians and Sajudis when it said, "The elections in Lithuania can be viewed as a national referendum on vital issues affecting the nation. The Lithuanian people have given strong support for the movement for independence and have clearly rejected the communist ideology and Soviet Russian colonialism."[1] This certainly was not the view from Moscow. Rather a greater emphasis was placed on the "leading role" of the Party. The CPL, however, was not so rigid. Recognizing that the results expressed

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[1]"Sajudis' Stunning Election Victory," ELTA Bulletin (Washington, D.C.) No. 4: 7-8.

the will of the people, they sought to work with Sajudis rather than to oppose them.

Soon after the elections, Sajudis requested a meeting with Gorbachev, which was denied. Instead, Gorbachev's deputy Anatoly Lukyanov met with Sajudis to discuss its concerns such as media disinformation about events in Lithuania, the legality of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the slow pace of reform and the Soviet model of socialism.[1] Again, Sajudis encountered opposition to its mandate for reform. Lukyanov was more concerned that it recognize the party's leading role and advised Lithuanians to concentrate on economic problems, suggesting "Moscow's principles for economic self-management as a guide for action."[2] It seemed that the patronizing and patriarchal tone of Moscow toward Lithuania had not been eliminated even though Sajudis now had a legitimate claim to power.

This would change, however, as Brazauskas used his influence in Moscow to obtain concessions for some of Sajudis' demands. On May 11, a Politburo meeting took place in Moscow at which the issues of economic self-management and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were placed on the agenda. A week later, the Lithuanian Presidium of the Supreme Soviet would consider the constitutional amendments to Articles 11, 31, 37 and 70 of the Lithuanian constitution. These amendments and a declaration of

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[1]Vardys, Problems of Communism, 72.
[2]Ibid.

parliamentary independence were demanded by Sajudis six months earlier. The amendments to the Articles "which state that laws and legal acts passed by the USSR would only be implemented if they were subsequently ratified by the republic's Supreme Soviet,"[1] opened the way for Sajudis to declare Lithuanian independence, following that of Estonia in November 1988. For Lithuania, the amendments meant that they "...established separate Lithuanian citizenship and stated that Lithuanian citizens were entitled to all the social, economic, political and personal freedoms described in the Lithuanian constitution and other Lithuanian laws as well as those included in universally accepted international legal conventions."[2] Furthermore, the amendments stated that the natural resources and man-made assets in Lithuania would be under the Lithuanian republic's jurisdiction and control. The most empowering of these changes were the amendments to and ratification of Article 70, which stated that laws of the USSR would only be adopted after gaining approval from Lithuania's Supreme Soviet. Lithuania's relationship with the central powers in Moscow would now only be defined by treaties mutually agreed upon by both parties.[3] These were major changes which had deep and far-reaching

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[1]Saulius Girnius, "Lithuania Declares its Sovereignty," Report on the USSR 1 (no. 22, June 2, 1989): 13- 14.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Dzintra Bungs, "A Comparison of the Baltic Declaration of Sovereignty," Report on the USSR 1 (no. 37, September 15, 1989): 13-16.

implications as Sajudis continued to push towards independence. Its main target now was the imposition upon Lithuania of the secret protocols of the Moloto-Ribbentropp Pact. Sajudis wanted the effects of the protocols to be withdrawn, meaning the withdrawal of the Soviets from Lithuanian politics, economics, society and territory.

The central concerns of Sajudis and the Lithuanian government was to have Moscow admit that the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR was steeped in illegalities and should be rescinded. Moscow preferred to evade the questions surrounding the Pact but the Sajudis leadership as well as the CPL were insistent on filling in the blank spots. The Baltic delegation to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies was finally able to place the issue of the Pact on the agenda. On May 31, Brazauskas introduced the issue and asked that the blank spots regarding the Pact be revealed by the Kremlin. This was punctuated the following day by Estonian Deputy Igor Grazin who revealed the contents of the Secret protocols to the Congress.[1] Opposition from Gorbachev was rooted in his skepticism at the authenticity of the microfilm of the original copy which was destroyed during the Second World War. He particularly called into question Molotov's signature which was in Latin rather than Cyrillic script.[2] This was

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[1]"Baltic Delegates Force Stalin-Hitler Pact on Agenda," ELTA Bulletin (no. 6, June 1989): 4-6.
[2]Ibid.

countered by Baltic, U.S. and West German officials who confirmed the authenticity of the microfilm.[1] After much debate, Gorbachev agreed to the formation of a commission to examine the secret protocols. There was controversy here as well as the composition of the committee was debated by Baltic and Russian delegates.

On the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on August 23, 1989, the Baltic republics staged a massive demonstration called the Baltic Way. Over one million people participated by linking hands across the Baltics in protest against the Pact. The Sajudis dominated Parliament also called a meeting in which they issued a "statement of independence." The preamble to the statement said that "Lithuania ... has never reconciled itself to its illegal situation and has never abandoned its goal of reestablishing an independent state."[2]

As Sajudis confidently and aggressively asserted its claims, the CPL attempted to keep up and the CPSU continued to issue statements against Sajudis and its "renegade course of reform," accusing it of inciting unrest in their republic and lending to the break-up of the Soviet Union.[3] These signs of intolerance from Moscow led members to speculate whether they were just warnings or if they were a prelude to a major crack-down. Their evaluations of the criticisms ranged from the optimistic view that

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Saulius Girnius, "'Sajudis ' Parliament Statement on Independence ," Report on the USSR 1(no. 37, September 15, 1989): 17-18.

[3]"Chronology of Seminal Events," Lituanus 36 No. 2: 31- 44.

it was "intended to be a warning rather than as a signal of imminent repression," to others who feared that it could mean a regression towards repression and the banning of Sajudis altogether.[1] This did not stop Sajudis, however as it became a stronger political force in Lithuania, they evolved towards a strong democratic organization preparing to eventually take power.[2]

Further evidence of the acceptance of Sajudis by a majority of the Lithuanian population as the alternative claimant to power were surveys done in May, August and October. In May, Vytautas Landsbergis, the leader of Sajudis, was rated (on a scale of -100 to +100) at +81 and Sajudis at +78. Brazauskas received +84, but the CPL received only + 22. In October, when asked which party they would vote for, 48 percent of the respondents supported Sajudis, 19 percent the CPL, 8 percent the Christian Democratic Party and 7 percent the Greens Party.[3] Sajudis' influence over the Lithuanian people was unparalleled. The only claim accepted by a majority of the population was the complete independence of Lithuania from the Soviet Union. This clearly made both Moscow and the CPL nervous. Moscow reacted by posturing and making threats, while the CPL reacted by declaring claims similar to those of Sajudis. As Olcott states, "the political fate of all involved in Lithuania seemed

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[1]Kestutis Girnius, "Reaction in Lithuania to CPSU Central Committee Statement," Report on the USSR 1 (no. 33, September 22, 1989): 23-25.

[2]Saulius Girnius, "Lithuania: Year in Review," Report on the USSR 1 (no. 52, December 29, 1989): 23-26.

[3]Ibid, "Sociological Survey in Lithuania," Report on the USSR 1 (no. 41, November 10, 1989): 24- 26.

to ride on support for the republic's autonomy."[1] This was demonstrated forcefully when 9000 CPL members renounced their memberships between November 1989 and January 1990. The slipping popularity led it to break away form the CPSU on December 20, in an attempt to establish legitimate support.[2]

In response to the split, Gorbachev made a visit to Lithuania. His purpose was immediately obvious as he emphasized that secession would be an unacceptable option, and repeated the oft stated reasons of why Lithuania should not seek independence. At the forefront of these reasons was a claim that it would harm Lithuania economically. He stated that industrial and resource development in Lithuania was a result only of Soviet assistance, and that the Lithuanians were romanticizing the notion of independence and freedom, rather than thinking about "practical politics."[3]

Sajudis' reaction to Gorbachev's visit was hostile, suggesting that Gorbachev's intent was to "trap" Lithuanians into being co-opted into the "creation of a mechanism for secession."[4] Landsbergis argued that acceptance of Gorbachev's mechanism for secession would mean Lithuania's acceptance of being part of the

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[1]Martha Brill Olcott, "The Lithuanian Crisis," 36.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ann Sheehy, " Gorbachev's arguments Cut Little Ice with Lithuanians," Report on the USSR 12 (no. 6, February 9, 1990): 34.

[4]Saulius Girnius, "Gorbachev's Visit to Lithuania," Report on the USSR 2 (no. 4,January 26, 1990): 6.

Soviet Union.[1] There was also fear that the mechanism was really an excuse for a further delay of independence. While the Deputy Minister Romuald Ozolas conceded that secession, realistically speaking, had to take place gradually, he "... did not trust Gorbachev to deal fairly with the Lithuanians...and accused him of trying to play different nationalities against one another in an effort to discredit independence movements in the Baltics and the Caucasus as well."[2]

All of these moves helped to solidify support for Sajudis, as once again they handily won a majority of seats in the elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on February 24, 1990. The CPL and Brazauskas were relegated to the role of opposition,[3] although it too rode on the mandate of independence, indicating that it was too late for the Party in Lithuania to salvage its popularity and also indicating the people's disenchantment with communism and its policies. When all votes were finally tallied, Sajudis had captured 75 percent of the seats in the legislature.

Sajudis won in the February and March elections of 1990 because it promised to immediately declare independence from the Soviet Union. Indeed, as soon as it could, on March 10, the Supreme Soviet met and a day later "elected a president, changed the name of the nation and declared an independent republic."[4]

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Olcott, "The Lithuanian Crisis," 37.
[3]Senn, Problems of Communism, 28.
[4]Olcott, 40.

Olcott suggests that the decision to declare independence was well-timed and reflected the mistrust of Gorbachev. Lithuania knew that Gorbachev was about to create a new Presidential office in Moscow with new powers, including "the ability to declare a state of emergency in any republic....More important, it withdrew from the Union before Gorbachev had announced the new law on secession."[1]

In order to circumvent the anticipated ill effects of this, the Lithuanian Parliament, dominated by Sajudis, ratified the "Act on Restoring the Independence of the Lithuanian State" by a vote of 124 - 0.[2] Vytautas Landsbergis was elected leader of the Parliament, defeating Algirdas Brazauskas by receiving 91 votes out of 124. The Parliament also renamed the Lithuanian S.S.R., the Republic of Lithuania. The declaration of independence was not a surprise to the central government. Just a few days earlier, it had threatened that if Lithuania seceded, it would have to repay the investments made by the Soviet Union on Lithuania.[3]

With multiple sovereignty now firmly in place, and revolutionary situation well developed, the next stage on the continuum seems within reach. But a revolutionary outcome is contingent on governmental inaction.

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Linas Kucinskas, "Lithuania's Independence; The Litmus Test for Democracy in the U.S.S.R.," Lituanus 37 (no. 3, 1991): 16.
[3]Ibid.

3) Governmental Inaction

The last element of a revolutionary situation is governmental inaction, which is the "incapacity or unwillingness of the agent of government to suppress the alternative coalition of the commitment to its claims."[1] Attempts by the central powers in Moscow to suppress the mobilization, collective action and the drive towards Lithuanian independence have been relatively minimal. I have already illustrated some manifestations of this, as Sajudis has had to assert claims and the support for those claims against the hollow criticisms and threats from the CPL and the central power in Moscow. The inaction of the government may be best described as an "inhibition to apply the means of coercion" in order to regain control of the polity. The most overt sign of this was the fact that the Government made concessions to Sajudis and the Lithuanian people were, allowing Sajudis to run in the elections to the Peoples Congress in the Spring of 1989 and again in the Spring of 1990, which eventually culminated in the declaration independence from Soviet rule.

Why was there the incapacity by the government to act against this loss of power? It may be argued that what caused this incapacity or inhibition to exert force against the contender for power was the democratization and restructuring process that Gorbachev unleashed. This was the opening that the majority of Lithuanians had been working towards since they were annexed in

[1]Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 209.

1940. With the survival of the Soviet Union contingent on reform, Gorbachev could not appear to be a hard-liner to his newly-found allies in the West. The paradox is that the reforms sweeping across the USSR got away from Gorbachev's control, thus taking different forms as the different republics of the Soviet Union lent their own signature as to how it should take place.

Even the CPL was taken by surprise, as its popularity was slipping away. Caught in the middle, between the express way of reform of Sajudis and the slow train of reform in Moscow, Brazauskas and the CPL were at a loss as to how to act. They attempted to please both sides, but in the end pleased no one and could not even hold on to power.

It appeared as if the one alternative claimant to power had finally achieved sovereignty as Tilly's continuum of mobilization to revolution suggests.

Soon afterwards, a **blockade** on Lithuania was imposed. While this certainly frustrated the aims of Sajudis, they were not moved from their position. Political posturing was the rule of the day as Moscow demanded that Lithuania rescind its declaration of independence. Tanks were sent into the streets of Vilnius but they proved to be scare tactics. Sajudis and its leader held firm to its resolve not to be bullied by Moscow and a "war of nerves" ensued.[1] Sajudis was quite willing to negotiate with Gorbachev,

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[1]"Lithuania: 'War of Nerves' Gets Under Way," CDSP XLII (no. 12, April 25, 1990): 1-3.

but he held firm to his position that Lithuania must change its mind about independence. With the pressure of the blockade, their unpreparedness for it and the threat of the use of force against them, the Lithuanian Parliament was forced to "put a moratorium on the declaration of independence for one hundred days if Moscow would end its economic blockade and if negotiations between Moscow and Vilnius would start."[1] Landsbergis indicated that the moratorium was declared in order to avoid violence and to continue with the peaceful road to independence, even if sovereignty had to be postponed. Negotiations were to begin in November 1990, but the Soviets did not attend, and in the end the negotiations never took place.

While it is clear that the Soviet Union attempted to exert hegemony over Lithuania even after independence was declared, I would strongly argue that political sovereignty was achieved in Lithuania on March 11, 1990. Indeed while Gorbachev was issuing ultimatums for Lithuania to rescind its declaration of independence, Sajudis was already referring to the Soviet Union as another country.[2] Even with the blockade imposed on April 19, 1990, and the coercive measures to round-up defectors from the Soviet military, Sajudis continued its resolve to negotiate independence from the U.S.S.R. if it was not willing to accept the declaration of independence. Even the fact that the Soviets indeed

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[1] Linas Kucinskas, "Lithuania's Independence; The Litmus Test for Democracy in the U.S.S.R.," 37.
[2] Ibid., 23.

imposed a blockade on Lithuania suggests its standing as an independent state; afterall, a blockade cannot be imposed on one's own territory.

In an interview with Sajudis member Eduardas Vilkas on May 4,1990,[1] it was unquestionably evident that Lithuania considered itself independent from Moscow and acted as such. The new government in Lithuania had already, at that time, expressed hopes of creating a convertible currency. While this was indeed an ambitious endeavor, it illustrated the mindset of Sajudis and its strong belief that it had formed a legitimate government representing a majority of Lithuanians, and therefore, had a government de jure.

Sajudis had achieved political sovereignty, and thus a revolution, because it had overthrown the old polity (a mammoth task in the context of Soviet politics) and exerted "exclusive control over the government," and acted as the government in power. Sajudis conducted their functions as the government in power, although the government in Moscow refused to acknowledge it. Lithuania had become an independent state in the classical definition of the "state" as Max Weber defines it: "A compulsory political association with continuous organization (*politischer*

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[1]Deputy Minister Eduardas Vilkas, interview by author, Notes, Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario, May 4, 1990. I was fortunate enough to have met and interviewed Sajudis member Eduardas Vilkas and Estonian Popular Front member Igor Grazin at the conference "The 'Nationalities Question' in the Soviet Union: An International Conference" organized by the Waterloo - Laurier Centre for Soviet Studies held from May 2 - 5,1990 at the University of Waterloo, Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario.

Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a 'state' if and in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order."[1] The Sajudis dominated Lithuanian parliament organized groups to guard the borders and to establish order amongst the chaos brought on by the Soviet blockade. The refusal of young men to register for the Soviet military because of their national allegiance to Lithuania, and Sajudis' support for them, further proves the independence of Lithuania.[2] They attempted to conduct negotiations with Moscow as an independent country, but the blockade and persistent coercion from Gorbachev led Sajudis to enact a one hundred day moratorium on the declaration of independence so that serious negotiations could begin with Moscow.

The Soviets' promises of negotiations never materialized however, but by the late fall of 1990, Lithuania had successfully forged ties with republics in the Soviet Union, most notably Russia. On August 15, an economic agreement was signed between Russia

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[1]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London: Collier-Macmillan,1947), 154. See "Gen. Varrenikov Comments on Nocturnal Troop Movements in Vilnius; He Notes Republic Interior Minister's Refusal to Enforce Soviet Laws;" CDSP xlii (no. 13, 1990), 7.

[2]Vytautas Landsbergis, "Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania on the call-up of Citizens of the Republic of Lithuania into the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces," CDSP xlii (no. 15, 1990), 13-14.

and Lithuania. Lithuania also established ties with other republics, oblasts, cities and industries in order to barter and trade goods.[1]

Ties with the West also illustrate the political sovereignty that Lithuania had achieved. Lithuania actively and aggressively pursued inclusion into the international community. Leaders of Western nations such as Britain visited Lithuania, while Lithuanian leaders visited such Western European countries as Denmark and Sweden in an attempt to forge links with these Western nations, to gain diplomatic recognition and, eventually, to be able to participate in the United Nations. Early in 1991, before the August coup attempt, the United States shipped medical supplies directly to the Baltic States and Ukraine. This deliberate bypass of the central authorities indicate a shift in the policies of the U.S.,[2] which was loath to undermine Gorbachev's policies but which could not overlook the legitimacy of the Sajudis government.

One contender power supported by a majority of the population and the incapacity of the government to suppress contenders sets the stage for a revolutionary outcome. The inclusion of members of the Communist Party of Lithuania and members of other contending groups strengthened the revolutionary process in Lithuania and allowed Sajudis to accumulate resources (through the support of the majority of

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[1]Riina Kionka, "After the Blockade: The Baltic States versus Moscow" Soviet Analyst 19 (no. 17, August 29,1990): 5-6.

[2]Walter C. Clements, Jr., Baltic Independence and Russian Empire (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 330.

Lithuanians) in order to declare independence. *Revolutionary outcome* indicates a "significant transfer[s] of power"[1] which was achieved by Sajudis and Lithuania on March 11, 1990.

The foregoing has underscored the importance of independent actors and their rational quest for independence in the success of revolution. This success was also possible because of the support of a significant segment of the population and the incapacity of the old regime to suppress mobilization and collective action. The examination of these events in Lithuania illustrates that an analysis concentrating on the conflict between different classes is irrelevant and so, too, is the analysis regarding people as just pawns in the society in which they live. The support enjoyed by Sajudis cannot be analyzed simply as spontaneous and unplanned. This examination called attention to the impact of the international situation in the success of the revolution in Lithuania by pressuring the Soviets to use restraint in handling the Lithuanian revolutionary movement; however, this was just one of the many elements in the success of the Lithuanian revolution. The necessity of the support for the mandate set forth by the contender for power indicates that revolution is not accidental nor coincidental, and that goals are set and support is earned in order to advance change.

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[1]Ibid., 212.

Conclusion

In concluding this thesis, we go back to the beginning and ask again what is revolution as Tilly defines it? Where does this fit into a study of Lithuania and its bid for independence. The foregoing discussion has tried to answer these key questions and to analyze the events in Lithuania with the use of Tilly's paradigm of mobilization and revolution. Simply, revolutionary outcome is the significant transfer of power from the government to the one contender for power.

The continuum of the spectrum by which Tilly's model my be illustrated explains events in Lithuania from as early as 1940 with the mobilization, and collective action of the LAF. Manifestations of interest articulation and collective action peppered Soviet Lithuania until 1988, when sustained and massive mobilization and demonstrations began. Resistance movement, which lasted until the middle of 1952, the sustained resistance of the Catholic Church and its role as the root of national opposition, the attempt at economic self-management in the Krushchev era, the proliferation of samizdat material were all manifestations of interest articulation and organization. The demonstrations and riots following the self-immolation of Romas Kalanta, the creation and proliferation of clandestine groups which had ties to other dissident organizations in the rest of the Soviet Union, illustrate that mobilization and collective action were at

work. The formation of environmental movements in the mid- to late- 1970s are also examples of interest articulation, organization, collective action and opportunity. Dissent activity in Lithuania, which has been analyzed in the context of Tilly's model, gained more and more momentum in the beginning of the 1980s. Lithuania sought to forge alliances with the West by publishing samizdat information and through ties with Lithuanian expatriates in the United States and Western Europe, an expression of interest and opportunity.

By the 1987, Lithuanians, whether they knew it or not, were getting ready for massive mobilizations by organizing and acting collectively to advance their interests. The reform policies of perestroika and glasnost were the *opportunity* that they were waiting for. The depth of discontent with the Soviet regime became readily apparent in the spring and summer of 1988 as Lithuanians gathered and protested for a quicker pace in reforms and then eventually independence.

Out of this *mobilization* and *collective action*, Sajudis was created. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1988, Sajudis succeeded in winning support from the Lithuanian population. Their demonstrations grew in number from 50,000 to 250,000 within three months. By the time of their founding congress in late October, support for Sajudis solidified. A *revolutionary situation* had begun. As an alternative claimant to power, Sajudis demanded that their *interests* be heard and implemented.

Multiple sovereignty was established in Lithuania and Sajudis progressed on the continuum to a *revolutionary situation.*

While the polity in power was able, to curtail some of their demands, they were not able to suppress popular support for Sajudis. This acceptance of alternative claims by the subject population firmly established Sajudis as the "exclusive" alternative to the existing polity. Gorbachev's promises of economic prosperity through economic reform did not materialize, therefore expanding the commitment by the population to the alternative claims espoused by Sajudis. The government's calls for patience and perseverance, while foodstuffs and goods were becoming more and more scarce, were regarded as unreasonable by the Lithuanian people who only demanded further and faster reforms of the economy and the society.

Throughout the second half of 1988 and through most of 1989, Sajudis' activities were allowed to proceed. Initially, the Soviet regime encouraged the demonstrations and mobilization, believing that this activity would advance economic reform not only in Lithuania but the whole Soviet Union. While talk of independence by Sajudis leaders received firm reprimands from the centre, Sajudis gained legitimate power as it won the elections in March of 1989. Sajudis won a majority of seats in the elections, proving that they had indeed gained the tacit support of a majority of Lithuanians. Sajudis was firmly in place as the exclusive alternative claimant to power in Lithuania. This gave

Sajudis the confidence to act as the leader of Lithuania, even though the CPSU was still flexing its strength in regards to complete independence. Sajudis appeared on its way towards a revolutionary outcome. By the following year, anticipating the changes in secession law and the power that Gorbachev would accord himself, Sajudis, with the support of the majority of Lithuanians, declared independence.

It was at this time that the central government chose to act decisively. A blockade against Lithuania was instigated, cutting it off from sources of fuel and food. While Sajudis tried to negotiate, Gorbachev stood firm in rejecting their demands for secession. Appeals and threats made by the Soviet government carried no force and were unheeded by the Lithuanians. Invitations to form a new Union Treaty were also ignored by Sajudis. This incapacity of the Soviet regime to decisively act against Lithuanian demands for independence is the last stage in Tilly's model of revolution. While armed force was used against civilians in Vilnius on January 13, 1991 by the Soviet Black Berets, it only proved to be detrimental to the Soviet government. Denials from Gorbachev that he new anything about the violent crackdown were not to be believed and, once again, the government was incapable of deterring Sajudis and Lithuanians from their course of independence. By this time the legitimacy of the regime and power that its coercive forces could muster had little effect on this headlong course. Sajudis and Lithuanians would not be deterred

by the massacre; instead they seemed to be strengthened by it, as they gained support from the international arena as well as Russians in Russia. With Gorbachev's international reputation and popularity, and conversely his waning popularity in the Soviet Union on the balance, Sajudis gained the upper hand. Furthermore, Sajudis' circumvention of the Soviet government in forging ties with other republics, most notably Russia, placed them in an advantageous position.

In rejecting the theories espoused by Marx, Johnson, Gurr and Skocpol, and in accepting Tilly's model of mobilization to revolution, a more thorough and thoughtful analysis of Lithuania's history and the lessons learned from it has been rendered. The contending theories of revolution cannot sufficiently explain the Lithuanian people's "interests, organization, mobilization, repression/facilitation, power and opportunity/threat;" nor could they explain the stage in the continuum of mobilization to revolution encompassing revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes.

The analysis of the events in Lithuania has been effectively done with the use of Tilly's paradigm of mobilization to revolution. What lessons can we learn from Tilly's model and how it was applied in the Lithuanian case? The most important lessons learned are: 1) the importance of the continuum of mobilization to revolution and its timely progression; 2) the importance of the interrelationship between/among the polity and the contenders

for power 3) the importance of the exclusive contender for power and how it shapes the organization of interest articulation and mobilization, and eventually, how it conducts itself once political sovereignty has been achieved.

The Lithuanian case illustrates that the elements of the mobilization and revolution models all play an important role in the process towards revolution, which in the end, Tilly defines as the political sovereignty of the contender for power, meaning a complete transfer of power. As the elements of revolution (created by those striving for sovereignty) act in conjunction and progress towards the revolutionary actors' goal of independence, a revolutionary outcome is attained.

The importance of this continuum is solely for the social scientist and his/her study of revolution. The actors of a revolution are certainly not aware of the processes of the model. It is merely an explanation of how the process of revolution evolves, and in the Lithuanian case, Tilly's paradigm fits. It gives an approach to studying revolutions that gives import to massive mobilization, to the polity in power, to contenders for power, to demands for sovereignty, and to the relationships amongst contenders, their supporters and to those from whom sovereignty must be taken.

Tilly's model gives importance to the relationship between the contenders for power and the government. The Lithuanian case showed that the relationship among Sajudis, the CPL and the

Soviet government in Moscow played a significant and important role in the process towards revolutions. These players were the keys to the process, their decisions, decrees, mandates and platforms either helped or hurt them in the political and social spheres.

Another player that must not be overlooked is the majority of of the Lithuanian people who supported reforms and the goal of independence. They were not just pawns in the process, as Johnson's functional disequilibrium theory suggests. Additionally, the organization of this support in mass rallies and mass elections suggest that revolutionary or violent action was not sudden or just arising out of discontent, as Gurr contends. The organized massive support for the alternative claims to the existing polity was central to the development of a revolutionary situation which eventually developed into a revolutionary outcome as Sajudis took power.

The mobilization and collective action in Lithuania indicate that the organization cut across class lines and therefore, Marx's theory of class conflict would not work in analyzing the events in Lithuania. Additionally, because of the sophisticated relationship among the contenders for power, the CPL and the CPSU, as well as the impact of perestroika and glasnost', we learned that revolutions are not monocausal as Marx argues. Rather, revolutions happen because of many factors which are created and manipulated by the contenders for power and their relationship with the old regime.

The strict adherence of Sajudis to the democratic process to advance their independence precludes their establishment of a liberal democratic, civil society, governed by a legitimate power. This contradicts Skocpol's conclusion that from revolutions arise a highly bureaucratic and centralized state with "enhanced great-power potential in the international arena."[1] This is clearly not what Sajudis and the majority of Lithuanians aimed for in their revolution. They instead sought the freedom to governed themselves as a people through democratic means.

Finally, the importance of the leadership of Sajudis must be discussed. As Sajudis progressed to become the organizer of mobilization to the only alternative to the communist leadership, it led Lithuania toward revolution. Sajudis developed into a highly organized and politicized group, that gathered unsurpassed support from a significant segment of the population. While Marx and Skocpol argue that revolutions just happen, and that in history it is inevitable, the events in Lithuania disprove this. Sajudis and Lithuanians made their revolution happen.

The question of national independence is central to the politics of humankind and their social relations. In the universal picture, the building of sovereign communities in which people can govern themselves has been an enduring phenomenon in our history. Understanding and analyzing this recurring theme of the

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[1]Skocpol, 41.

quest for independence and self-government, is therefore, essential.

Why is it important to study the events in Lithuania leading to its declaration of independence? When Lithuania declared independence in March 1990, it was a surprise to almost everyone, except Lithuanians. Why Lithuania? Why not Ukraine or Estonia or Moldavia? In studying this phenomenon of independence, we have asked how it was accomplished and what conditions were required for independence to be achieved? What do people do to affect these changes and how do they organize themselves toward this end? These valuable questions were answered in the foregoing thesis. It is highly insightful for the study of other states such as Croatia, Moldova and East Timor to determine the elements essential for a revolution to happen, because, indeed, there are certain similarities in how change and revolution are effected. There are similarities in how contenders for power organize, initiate collective action and win the support of a significant segment of the population. Tilly's model of mobilization to revolution serves to set universal parameters in which these quests for independence and revolutions are analyzed.

Postscript

Early in January 1991, the Soviets indicated that they would dispatch elite military troops to aid in the draft in Lithuania. This was immediately seen by Landsbergis as the preparation for violent action.[1] Indeed on the weekend of January 13, Soviet Black Beret troops violently took over the Lithuanian press centre and the television broadcast centre which was surrounded by civilians attempting to peacefully halt its takeover. Fourteen civilians were killed. Lithuanian protest resulted in denials from Gorbachev, Interior minister Pugo and Defence Minister Yazov that they had any foreknowledge of the massacre.

It failed to destroy the revolutionary independence forces in Lithuania. Not only that, but the Soviets, in the end, were the losers. The violence against the Balts only served to further delegitime their power and to alienate them from the people. An article in Soviet Analyst states, "President Gorbachev may win the battle he started by sending paratroops and 'Black Berets' on to the streets of the Baltic states, though even that is not yet certain thanks to the hugely disciplined and dignified response of the citizens of Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn; he has now assuredly lost the war."[2] This war between the states of Lithuania and the Soviet

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[1]Ibid., 38.
[2]"The Evil Empire Strikes Back,' Soviet Analyst 20 (no. 2, January 23, 1991):1.

Union was already won by Lithuania a year earlier when they declared independence on March 11, 1990.

Action against Sajudis and its supporters by Soviet troops may appear to have strengthened the conservative forces in Lithuania, but in fact the opposite was true. Committees on "national salvation/local party leaderships" only commanded limited support. The strength of Sajudis and support for independence was again proved on February 9 (just four weeks after the massacre) when a plebiscite was held in which 90 percent of those voting supported independence.[1]

While Sajudis and its supporters did not physically have the coercive resources to fight the Soviets, what it did have was a majority of Lithuanians' acceptance of the alternative claims it was advancing and therefore a sufficient amount of resources in order to mobilize and legitimately claim independence. This proved to be much more powerful in keeping Lithuania on the path towards complete sovereignty, and stated firmly that the government was inefficient in quelling any bids for independence.

The complete collapse of the Soviet Union, signalled by the August 1991 coup attempt, gave Lithuania and other former Soviet republics the opportunity to negotiate diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, without having to endure the insensitivities of the imperial, communist Soviet regime. The collapse of the

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[1]Eighty-four percent of eligible voters participated in the plebiscite. Linas Kucinskas, "Lithuania's Independence; The Litmus Test for Democracy in the U.S.S.R., 48"

U.S.S.R signalled the initial shift in relations between Russia and Lithuania from an acrimonious one to a harmonious one.

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