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EDUCATION AND THE EDUCATED PERSON: A COMPARISON OF J. KRISHNAMURTI AND R. S. PETERS

BY

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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The overall aim of the thesis is an attempt to clarify Jiddu Krishnamurti's thought and contribution to philosophy of education by means of a comparison with R. S. Peters on a few shared themes. This comparative philosophical inquiry into the notions of education and the educated person undertaken seem necessary as Krishnamurti's educational concepts are presented in his writings with the informality of spontaneous talks and dialogues.

The first three chapters deal with the shared themes, education as initiation, education and the emotions, and freedom and autonomy. The selection of these themes, upon which this investigation proceeds, rests on the premise that they most clearly capture the views of education and the related notions of the educated person as envisaged by Krishnamurti and Peters.

Pedagogical implications for different kinds of schooling which seem to be indicated by the comparative analysis of Krishnamurti's and Peters' perspectives on education, will form the content of chapter four. The discussion will involve reference to key elements in current educational practice relying on ideas both explicit and implicit in the educational writings of the two authors.

The conception of school and society as envisaged by Krishnamurti and Peters, forms the focus of attention of the final chapter. Their differing viewpoints concerning human society have been instrumental in shaping their ideas as to the manner in which formal education should be conceived and structured. Modern schooling as currently conceived and manifested is accepted by Peters and rejected by Krishnamurti. Even as the meaning they give to education is somewhat different, so they refer to different conceptions of society. While Peters speaks in terms of a politically specific type of existing society, Krishnamurti refers to a vision of a larger, politically undefined, planetary society.

There are obvious similarities as well as striking differences between the two authors' ideas relevant to education. In each chapter an attempt has been made to critically assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of their educational ideas. Nonetheless, no attempt has been made to construct a conclusive philosophic assessment as to whether Krishnamurti or Peters is the more critical, or otherwise preferable educational thinker. This seems appropriate since an elucidation of a few shared themes, though providing the groundwork, is in itself inadequate for this larger and different task.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1. EDUCATION AS INITIATION 9

A. Education as Initiation and Education as Freedom from Conditioning 9

Education as Initiation: R. S. Peters 9

The Forms of Knowledge 11

The Intrinsic Worth of Educational Activities 11

The Value of Theoretical Activitiies 12

The Detailed Meaning of "Initiation" 13

The Concern for Truth 14

The Human Condition 16

Education as Freedom from Conditioning: J. Krishnamurti 19

Established Knowledge as Secondary but Necessary 20

Learning in Relation to Established Knowledge 21

Freedom from Conditioning 22

Choiceless Awareness of "What is": Total Attention 23

"Knowing What is" 25

Different Modes of Knowing 26

Truth and "Knowing What is" 27

Education and Self-knowledge 28

The Human Predicament: Consequences of Essentially Relational Being 30

The Task of the Educator: An Alleged Impossibility 31

Self-knowing is not a method 32

B. The Development of the Mind 33
The Development of the Mind: Peters 33
Mind and Consciousness 33
Mind and Shared Inheritance 33
The Differentiation of Awareness 34
Educating as Facilitating the Differentiation of the Mind 34
How Essential is Initiation in the Disciplines to the Development of the Mind 35
The Limitations of the Shared World in Development 35
Education of the Whole Man 36
Education and Transformation 38
The Development of the Mind: Krishnamurti 39
The Place of the Disciplines in Educating 39
Educating and the Centrality of "Knowing What is" 39
Comprehending Life as a Whole 40
The Wholeness of the Individual 41
Wholeness of the Individual: Fragmentation and Integration 42
Conditioning and Fragmentation 43
The Limitations of Reasoned Transformation 44

C. The Intersubjective Content of Education 45
The Moulding and Growth Models of Education 45
The Moulding Model 45
The Growth Model 46
"Intersubjective Content" and "Shared Experience": Peters 47
Critical Thinking and the Disciplines or Forms of Knowledge 49

Moulding Model of Education: Krishnamurti 50
Moulding and Lasting Values 53
Education and the Growth Model 55

D. Comparison and Contrast 57

CHAPTER 2. EDUCATION AND THE EMOTIONS 67

A . Nature of Emotion 67
Peters' View of the Nature of Emotions 67
Emotion, Belief and Appraisal 67
Emotion and its Object 68
Emotion as Passivity 70
Krishnamurti's View of the Nature of Emotion 73
Feeling and Emotion 73
Appraisal and the Object of Emotion 75
Emotion and Conditioned Beliefs 77

B. Education of the Emotions 78

Peters' View of the Education of the Emotions 79
Cognitive and Moral Aspects 79
Control and Canalization 82
The Expression of Emotions 85
Krishnamurti's Notion of the Understanding of the Emotions 85
Specialized and Colloquial Notions of 'Understanding' 86
Krishnamurti's Notion of Understanding 87

"Total Understanding" and the Elimination of Destructive Emotions.... 89

Analysis and the Understanding of Emotions 93

Understanding of Emotions and Children..... 94

C. Comparison and Contrast 95

CHAPTER 3. EDUCATION, FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY.....10 7

A. The Notion of Freedom 107

Peters' Notion of Freedom 107

Freedom as a Social Principle..... 107

Paradox of freedom 109

The Formal and the Actual 110

Man as a chooser 113

Autonomy..... 115

Rational Reflection..... 116

Krishnamurti's Notion of Freedom 119

Freedom as a State of Mind..... 119

Freedom and Choice 122

Negative and Positive Freedom..... 125

Paradox of Freedom 125

Autonomy and Authenticity 126

B. The Development of the Free Man.....129

The Development of the Free Man: Peters 129

Being a Chooser 130

The Development of Autonomy 132
The Influence of Institutions 135
The Development of the Free Man: Krishnamurti 137
Freedom and Order 139
Sensitivity 140
Institutional Arrangements 140

C . Comparison and Contrast 142

CHAPTER 1V. PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 153

A. Pedagogical Implications: Peters 153
The Teacher 153
The Curriculum 158
Methods of Promoting Learning 163
Methods of Evaluating Learning 167
B. Pedagogical Implications - Krishnamurti 168
The Teacher 169
The Curriculum 173
Promotion of Learning 176
Methods of Evaluating Learning 178

C. Comparison and Contrast 179

CHAPTER 5 THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 188

A. The School 189

B. Society 191

BIBLIOGRAPHY 198

INTRODUCTION

In my thesis I propose to bring out any special significance of a selection of Jiddu Krishnamurti's educational concepts with the clarity afforded by a comparison with those of an influential contemporary analytic philosopher of education -- R. S. Peters. My principal concern is to clarify Krishnamurti's thought and contribution to philosophy of education by means of a comparison with R. S. Peters on several shared themes. This comparative approach seems specially warranted in that, unlike R. S. Peters, Krishnamurti's key concepts in education are presented in his writings with the informality of spontaneous talks and dialogues -- of which his books are mostly, in fact, transcripts. Thus, in order to elucidate a systematic structure for Krishnamurti's concepts, the analytic clarity of R. S. Peters' discussions would seem to be a very helpful backdrop .

Before I proceed further it seems helpful to present a brief introductory account of the two thinkers. Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895-1986) is an eminent spiritual and humanist philosopher. He did not present his teachings in the manner of expository lectures, but engaged in the form of discourse and dialogue. For almost fifty years he travelled widely delivering talks to, and engaging in discussions with, mixed audiences of different cultural orientations, and varying intellectual capacities, without any distinction of race, class or creed.

Krishnamurti does not expound a definite philosophy, nor does he preach any doctrine. Troxnell and Snyder, in their Making Sense of Things: An Introduction to Philosophy, offer this explanation:

> That Krishnamurti has remained outside academic philosophy is probably due, in part, to his avoidance of doctrines or systems of thought. This does not mean that nothing he says cannot be made into a doctrine . . . In order to understand what he says one must go beyond his words, since it is only in the awareness of what he is talking about that his words really make sense. And a great many people find what he says directly relevant to their own lives.[1]

Moreover, in his talks he does not propound a definite theme. He speaks on a variety of topics concerning the human condition. His talks are directed at establishing a communion with his listeners. Thus, it would be correct to assert that what he would say in a particular talk is somewhat a joint product of the speaker and the audience. Consequently, it is difficult to find a systematic exposition of a specific theme in his talks and dialogues. Undoubtedly, this presents a formidable task to anyone engaged in the understanding and the intellectual clarification of his ideas.

A point of interest is that almost unwittingly, Krishnamurti seems to have created a terminology of his own. First, he alters the connotation of some words such that simple words convey a deeper significance. For instance, he uses terms such as 'understanding,' 'intelligence' and 'order' with somewhat different connotations than that of the dictionary meanings. Second, to address his ideas more fully he employs terms which he himself has coined, such as "knowing what is" and "choiceless awareness." Appropriately as the study proceeds, these terms will be explicated.

My initial readings of Krishnamurti's published talks, discussions and books were thought-provoking. What I find most challenging is the manner in which he responds to the challenge of our times, emphasizing the psychological causes basic to the present crisis in terms of conflictual relationships between individuals and between nations. He thinks that the solution to the ills of present civilization lies in bringing about a transformation in human consciousness in terms of gaining self-knowledge. According to him, modern schooling is defective in that it lays undue emphasis on the accumulation of knowledge, and the acquisition of degrees, disregarding the value of self-knowledge -- which he conceives as of the utmost importance. Since he regards modern schooling as being defective and highly influential for individual and society, proper education is not surprisingly one of his main concerns. This concern led to the establishment of schools in India, England, U. S. A. and Canada.[2]

Three Krishnamurti Foundations have been set up to collate and disseminate Krishnamurti's teachings. These are the Krishnamurti Foundations of India, America, and England. In a number of countries, including Sri Lanka, information centres have been set up to provide access to Krishnamurti's work.

In the study of his educational ideas, I will also refer to other and wider aspects of his scheme of ideas which I will attempt to explicate. This seems unavoidable due to the somewhat holistic nature of his thought. As the study proceeds it seems possible to detect a definite coherence in his ideas.

Richard Stanley Peters is an influential contemporary analytical philosopher of education. Born in 1919, he attended Clifton College in Bristol and then proceeded to Oxford University to study classics. Subsequently, he gained a Ph.D. in philosophy at Birkbeck College, London. In 1946 he returned to Birkbeck College, becoming lecturer and reader in turn. R. S. Peters succeeded Louis Arnaud Reid in the Chair of Philosophy of Education at the University of London in 1962. He held this Chair until ill-health compelled him to retire in 1983. The University honoured his contributions, making him Emeritus Professor. Peters travelled widely during his tenure of the Chair, and held visiting professorships at Harvard, the University of British Columbia, the Australian National University, and the University of Auckland. In the role of a visiting professor he assisted the development of the discipline of philosophy of education in each of the countries he visited. He was also the Dean of the Faculty of Education at London for many years. Despite his academic and official work, he has been instrumental in producing an enormous number of books and articles, and also delivered public lectures.[3]

It is to his credit that he has done much to establish a new and respected academic branch of philosophic enquiry. He established what was then the largest and presumably the most influential department of philosophy of education in the world.[4] It is an accepted fact that before Peters began his work in philosophy of education, the discipline barely existed in Britain as a distinct and professional area. In fact, no philosopher had

begun to make significant use of contemporary philosophic methods or achievements for the development of educational ideas and principles. According to P. H. Hirst, his closest collaborator, "Richard Peters proved to be the right man, in the right place, at the right time."[5] Similarly, David Cooper refers to Peters' philosophic impact as a "remarkable influence that a single person has come to exercise in his subject -- within only ten years of his own full entry into it." [6]

The study proceeds in the following manner. In relation to the shared themes, in each chapter I will first discuss Peters' views, then Krishnamurti's, and then present a comparative analysis. In the main, this procedure is followed for the following reasons. First, as stated earlier, the analytic clarity of R. S. Peters' discussions seems helpful to elucidate a systematic structure for Krishnamurti's concepts in education. Second, the selected themes of the two authors seem somewhat complex, and in view of this it seems clearer to explicate each author's position separately, prior to a comparison. Relatedly, granting certain similarities, the weight of the dissimilarities between the two thinkers makes such a procedure an obvious and fairly sure way to maintain clarity of exposition.

Chapter one will deal with education as "initiation." It will consist of three sub-sections, namely, education as initiation and education as freedom from conditioning, the development of the mind, and the intersubjective content of education. Peters' notion of education as initiation incorporates both the development of the mind and the intersubjective content of education. For Peters, the initiation into the disciplines is central to education, and crucial to the development of the mind. Krishnamurti thinks that imparting subject-matter knowledge is important for specific kinds of activities, but that the central function of education is to free the child's mind of conditioning influences, as essential for the development of the mind. In relation to the development of the mind I will examine Peters' and Krishnamurti's notion of the 'whole man' and the 'transforming' quality in education.

Peters' view of education as initiation embodies the idea of the intersubjective content and procedures of education, and emphasizes the shared experience of the teacher and learner. They consider the teaching-learning process as a joint venture where both teacher and learner are partners.

Chapter two explores the shared theme "education and the emotions." Here, I will consider Peters' and Krishnamurti's views on the nature of emotion. An attempt will also be made to explicate Peters' notion of the education of the emotions and Krishnamurti's view of the understanding of the emotions.

It is my purpose in chapter three to analyse and explicate Peters' and Krishnamurti's notions of freedom and autonomy. I will also examine the manner in which education could bring about the free autonomous individual as envisaged by them. In general, the diversity of philosophers' views on freedom and autonomy is such that I shall limit my discussion to Peters' and Krishnamurti's examinations of freedom and autonomy.

For a comparative analysis the above themes were selected for the following reasons. First, initiation into the disciplines and freedom from conditioning, emotions, and freedom and autonomy are central to Krishnamurti's and Peters' schemes of thought. Second, these themes seem to suggest wider implications for education in general and for schooling in particular than others which might have been chosen. That is, due to their comprehensive nature they seem to offer a more fruitful scope for a comparative analysis.

It must be mentioned that certain issues are discussed as being central to the above themes. For Peters, the concern for truth, the development of reason and the concern for the human condition are central to the initiation into the disciplines, education of the emotions, and the development of free autonomous individuals. Similarly, freedom from conditioning, "knowing what is" and concern for the human predicament is crucial to Krishnamurti's discussion of education, emotions, and the growth of free, integrated individuals.

The practical implications for different kinds of schooling which seem to be indicated by a comparative examination of Peters' and Krishnamurti's views on education form the content of chapter four. From the stand point of the two authors, the discussion will focus on key elements in current educational practice, such as the role of the teacher, the curriculum, methods of promoting learning and methods of evaluating learning. The discussion will rely partly on actual statements made by Krishnamurti and Peters, and partly on inference from the foregoing discussion.

My intention in chapter five is to focus on the relation of the conceptions of school and society, as envisaged by Peters and Krishnamurti. This serves to highlight a theme of great importance to both thinkers, which up to this point has received only tangential reference. Focus upon it reveals for explicit consideration a contrast of ideas concerning human society which are strongly influential in shaping their hints and suggestions as to the way in which formal education could be conceived and structured, and without which the reasoning for their differing standpoints on schooling would be critically incomplete. In addition, I will also focus my attention on the question whether modern schooling as currently conceived and manifested is accepted or rejected by Peters and Krishnamurti.

In this chapter there will be an attempt to sketch the nature of society as envisaged by Peters and Krishnamurti. The meaning they give to education is somewhat different, and this is related to their conceptions of society.

In each chapter an attempt will be made to evaluate the relative merits of Krishnamurti's and Peters' educational ideas. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt a conclusive philosophic assessment as to whether Peters or Krishnamurti is the more critical, comprehensive or otherwise important educational thinker. Such an assessment, based on the kind of comparative enquiry presented here, would require at least a full-scale argument for one particular world-view rather than another. This is not the purpose of this inquiry.

The examination of the selection of Krishnamurti's educational ideas will be based largely on the following books: Education and the Significance of Life, Krishnamurti on Education, Beginnings of Learning, and the Awakening of Intelligence. Peters' Ethics and Education, The Philosophy of Education, and Psychology and Ethical Development will provide the basis for the presentation of his educational arguments.

Footnotes

[1] Newsletter of the Krishnamurti Foundation of America, Fall/ Winter, 1988, p. 2.

[2] The schools in India managed by the Krishnamurti Foundation of India are the Rishi Valley School, Rajghat Besant School, K. F. I. School in Madras, The Valley School in Bangalore, and the Bal Anand School in Bombay. The Oak Grove School in Ojai, California, and the Brockwood Educational Centre is managed by the Krishnamurti Foundation of America, and the Krishnamurti Foundation of England, respectively. In Victoria, Canada, the former Wolf Lake School has been closed down.

[3] Peter Hobson, "R. S. Peters: A Commentary," in R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1974), p. 458.

[4] Ibid., pp. 458 - 459.

[5] P. H. Hirst, "Richard Peters' s Contribution to the Philosophy of Education," in Education, Values and Mind: Essays for R. S. Peters, ed. D. E. Cooper (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 8.

[6] Ibid., p. 1.

CHAPTER 1

EDUCATION AS INITIATION

A. Education as Initiation and Education as Freedom from Conditioning

In this chapter I will examine Peters' notion of education as "initiation" and Krishnamurti's view of education as freedom from conditioning. In the main, the discussion will follow the general pattern of ideas embodied in Peters' notion of education as initiation. Since Peters' view of education as initiation incorporates the development of the mind and the intersubjective content of education, the chapter will include three sections, namely, education as initiation and education as freedom from conditioning, the development of the mind, and the intersubjective content of education. Within each section Peters' and Krishnamurti's ideas will be explicated, and subsequently a comparative analysis will be attempted at the end of the chapter.

Education as Initiation: R. S. Peters

Peters' concept of education as initiation first appears in Ethics and Education. It incorporates both his view of education and the ideal of the 'educated man.' At the outset I wish to make it clear that Peters' concept of education underwent significant changes throughout his career. He has been receptive to criticism, and in his later writings he has modified his concept of education, widening its scope, and changing some of its earlier emphases. However, in this chapter I will focus more attention on his concept of education as it appears in Ethics and Education, as his earlier writings were the most influential. Nonetheless, I will also periodically take into consideration some important modifications he made later to his concept of education.

In Ethics and Education, Peters describes education as "initiation" into activities and modes of thought and conduct that are worthwhile. A person is initiated into a family of processes which, if successfully engaged in, lead to the accomplishment of being educated.[1] The word 'education' therefore has normative implications.

For Peters, the term 'education' does not pick out a specific type of activity or process. Rather, the term 'education' must lay down criteria to which activities or processes must conform.[2] He enumerates three complex criteria to distinguish education from other developmental processes.

Education is an activity which "transmits" what is considered worthwhile to those who become committed to it. This is the content criterion which involves a desirability condition in education.

To be educated implies that not only should one care about what is worthwhile, but one must possess relevant knowledge and understanding. Such knowledge must not be narrowly specialized, but must involve significant understanding in the form of breadth as well as depth. This is the cognitive perspective criterion of education.

Relatedly, the process of education must involve some voluntary participation on the part of the learner for there to be genuine understanding and caring. This rules out procedures which are considered morally objectionable such as indoctrination and conditioning. This is the procedural criterion of education.[3]

It is important to note that Peters has so far provided us with an analogy rather than a definition of education, or any account of a synthetic nature. He claims that in order to do justice to all three criteria regarding desirable content, breadth of cognitive perspective containing any specialization, and the morality of procedures of education, education has to be described as a process of initiation into worthwhile activities. Here 'initiation' and 'worthwhile' take on substantive meaning very much in connection with the social reality as residing in "public traditions enshrined in the language, concepts, beliefs and rules of a society." The value of education. lies, then, in the fact that it initiates the pupil into "forms of thought and awareness" which are embodied in these traditions, and which have stood the test of time of public scrutiny and discussion.[4]

The Forms of Knowledge

What Peters refers to as "forms of thought and awareness" are, in effect, the Hirstian forms of knowledge. Peters' analysis of education, in effect, meant that anyone concerned with education must accept the forms of knowledge (as characterized, e.g., by Hirst) According to Hirst, knowledge is separable into seven forms each with its distinctive concepts, logical structure, truth criteria and particular techniques and skills for exploring experience. The seven forms of knowledge are mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and fine arts, and philosophy. Hirst considers these forms of knowledge not as mere agglomerations of information but rather as the distinct ways of understanding human experience which humans have created. A form of knowledge is a distinct way in which aspects of experience are structured and organized around the use of accepted public symbols which have acquired public meaning.[5] However, Peters contends that though he was sympathetic to the general approach of the forms of knowledge, he was unhappy about calling some of Hirst's forms, "forms of knowledge." He later referred to them as "modes of experience." [6]

The Intrinsic Worth of Educational Activities

Since the two notions of "initiation" and "worthwhileness" are central to Peters' concept of education further explication is required. As stated by Peters, a "worthwhile activity" is an activity worth pursuing for its own sake, i. e. , it is intrinsically valuable and a serious pursuit for the student. Theoretical activities such as science, literature, history and mathematics are "serious pursuits" and "manifestly different" from games and simple pleasures. Within a curriculum of a school or a university there could be a range of such activities that are worth "passing on." Since all such activities are valuable the individual should be encouraged to select such activities according to ability, aptitude and interest. However, Peters does not deny that such activities must, to some degree, be valued for what is instrumental in them -- for what they can lead to, and gain for, the student and society. But his greater concern, from the point of view of education, is that

they be valued for their intrinsic worth. Therefore, on account of their intrinsic worth people ought to be initiated into them, if it is an educational initiation.[7]

For further clarification of these points an example would be helpful. One can engage in, say, gardening for instrumental reasons. These might include involvement in a hobby, physical exercise, or the desire to maintain a well-kept garden. One can also do gardening because one derives a pleasure in gardening itself. This does not necessarily mean that gardening has, objectively, an intrinsic value, or that it is educationally valuable.

The term education entails "knowledge and understanding." One cannot be considered educated without the acquisition of some type of knowledge and understanding. It is possible to refer to poor education and bad education. But this reference could be made only in relation to the idea of "knowledge and understanding" as built into the concept education.

The Value of Theoretical Activities

In relation to "worthwhile activities" everyone would accept Peters' position that children and adolescents should learn something worthwhile at school and at the university. In developed and developing countries the state incurs heavy expenditure on education based on the assumption that something worthwhile is learnt at school and at the university. However, there would not be total agreement on what activities are considered to be worthwhile, nor would agreement or disagreement be a matter of mere personal bias. If one raises the question of what grounds one should consider in deciding that something is worthwhile, one obviously assumes that justifying reasons for any choice must be given. For example, Peters claims that theoretical activities have a wide-ranging cognitive content, justified in that they not only enrich the quality of life, but relatedly they are concerned in one way or other with truth.[8]

To extend the former example, one cannot say that gardening as an activity has a wide-ranging cognitive content since the skills involved in gardening are practical skills

like weeding, pruning, and manuring. Now these skills do not have a wide-ranging application, spilling over into other areas. Their central connection is simply with gardening. What gardening and other practical skills tell about other dimensions of life is very limited. Activities like history, literary appreciation, and philosophy involve an awareness that can spill over into the illumination of other areas, expanding what is regarded as the meaningful dimensions of life itself. It would then seem fair to say that skills related to gardening would normally enrich the quality of life very little.

The Detailed Meaning of 'Initiation'

The literal meaning of 'initiation' is "beginning." For Peters, education is analogous to initiation only in a more general sense whereby a person is brought inside a "form of thought and awareness." To initiate an individual into the different disciplines or into tribal rites is to bring a person inside the experience of a mode of thought and conduct. But, education is concerned with truth while initiation into tribal rites could involve irrelevant, harmful or frivolous beliefs. Therefore, the analogy is applicable to the more general sense of bringing a person inside a "form of thought and awareness." As J, Soltis claims, initiation is not taken by Peters to be a way of educating, rather it is a concept which provides a way for viewing education within the framework which encapsulates his three criteria.[9]

Peters employs the analogy of initiation very deliberately and it forms the central part of his system.. It seems plausible to contend that Peters' attempts to justify his use of the analogy of initiation are found in such as the following :

> Children . . . start off in the position of the barbarian outside the gates. The problem is to get them inside the citadel of civilization so that they will understand and love what they see when they get there.[10]

> Education consists in experienced people turning the eye of others towards what is essentially independent of persons.[11]

In the first statement, Peters claims that young children, before learning the language, concepts and rules of a society, are similar to pre-literate people. In the second instance Peters says that the elders of a society, whether they be teachers or parents, introduce the children to the language, concepts and beliefs of a society. The uninitiated are initiated by those who have already been initiated. In both instances the word 'initiation' is used in reference to introducing the children to the basic forms of awareness for the culture. According to Dray, Peters appears to mean no more than introducing children to the basic forms of awareness. But much of the time he seems to indicate much more.[12] Peters claims that once a person is initiated into the different disciplines the individual would continue to devote himself to activities constitutive of education.

Another criticism that can be raised in relation to the use of the term 'initiation' is its connection with depth of understanding. Peters specifically states that education as initiation is consistent with the criteria which connect education with some depth of understanding. What is implied here is that once an individual is introduced into the different forms of knowledge, on account of their intrinsic worth the individual is motivated to acquire a deeper understanding of the subject. Obviously, one cannot acquire a deep understanding or a basic understanding of any subject unless one is introduced to it. So that, for instance, a person will usually acquire a deep understanding of science or history only if one learns science or history at school. However, this does not necessarily mean that one acquires a depth of knowledge in science or history merely because one learns these subjects in school. For instance, in spite of schooling a person may still not get any deep understanding of history or science. In this instance the attempt to initiate would be regarded as a failure.

The Concern for Truth

In his earlier writings Peters considers education as initiation primarily for the concern for truth and the development of practical reason. The case for knowledge and understanding is reinforced by the concern for the value of truth which indicates a

condemnation of ignorance, prejudice, error and superstition. He claims the "demands of reason" and the concern for truth are written into human life.[13] Peters follows the traditional meaning of knowledge, such that there is an essential connection between knowledge and truth. To know implies that in some way what is said or thought is true. The individual also has evidence to confirm that what he says or thinks is true. To learn that water boils at 100^0 C and that $2 + 2 = 4$, and to know why, is to know them as facts. Truth is the object of the procedures which lead to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, and the giving of reasons. These procedures are the most effective available route to the truth, even if they sometimes lead us astray. Truth can be arrived at by answering questions, by use of reasons. To find the best answers to questions by the unfettered use of reason one must care for truthfulness, clarity, nonarbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency and the respect for evidence. In Peters' view, objectivity, rationality and critical appraisal are only attained by initiation into the different disciplines.[14] However, in "Education and Justification -- A Reply," Peters also expresses the view that the values surrounding the concern for truth are not the only ones in life, or necessarily of overriding importance, but he considers them as being central to education.[15]

What is implied here is that, for instance, truth is the object involved in the principles of science and the procedures by which they have been arrived at. In history, the respect for evidence, clarity and impartiality denotes, according to Peters, a commitment to truth. An individual's interest in scientific research will open up new avenues for experimentation. Every experiment in some sequential order may bring the person closer to some scientific truth. The possession of such a disposition, and the involvement in scientific activities could well imply a commitment to some scientific truth. In this sense the educated person is not one who acquires information, or memorizes facts, but who has reasonable explanations for the beliefs he holds as true.

However, it is possible to draw counter-examples in this respect. A scientist, for instance, who discloses his evidence of a scientific discovery only to a nation that is willing to pay a high price, is not primarily committed to truth. Similarly, a historian who knowingly interprets historical data with telling bias is not committed to the respect for evidence, and so is not committed to truth. Here, the "scientist" and "historian" might be said to refer most clearly to what the individuals are trained to do, and capable of doing, even if at some point they do not.

Elliott contends that the demand to seek truth is not written into human life, as human life is intelligible without reference to it, and we do not expect everyone to seek truth without limit or consider him in the least irrational if he does not.[16] I agree with Elliott that we do not expect everyone to seek truth without limit. But, I have my reservations when he says that human life is intelligible without reference to it, as rationality is one factor which distinguishes human beings from any other species. It is plausible to say that some people live according to the "demands of reason" and they raise questions about their activities, and what is good for them. Most people do have a concern for what is true or false. But it does not logically follow from this that all individuals and on all occasions assess, revise or follow rules dictated by reason. It is doubtful whether reason is dominant either in education or social life, as feelings and emotions powerfully influence human behaviour. Nonetheless it is hard to see what a serious meaning of education would be without a central concern for truth.

The Human Condition

Peters considers the initiation into various disciplines as the primary educational goal for yet another reason. In his most recent writings he seems to shift from his concern for rational demands to develop the view of the human predicament. His main argument for disciplined knowledge is seen as its importance for being able to cope better with life and the human condition. In "Democratic Values and Educational Aims" Peters says:

> whether an individual is concerned about the plight of others or occupied with fulfilling himself in his personal good, he must have some knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of the human condition.[17]

Again in "Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of its Content," he specifies that a certain type of knowledge is necessary to understand the human condition.

> My argument has been that there is a body of knowledge that is extremely significant, or so relevant to a person in so far as it determines his general beliefs, attitudes and reactions to the general conditions of human life.[18]

In order to truly and precisely answer questions about various aspects of the human condition a mastery of the various disciplines would be considered important. This constitutes for Peters not a new justification of education as initiation, but rather an attempt to furnish a normative argument for the curriculum he favours, in regard to which initiation takes place.

I want to begin to address this question by examining what is meant by the 'human condition.' According to Peters, the three spheres which characterize the human condition are the natural, interpersonal, and socio-political spheres. In the natural sphere the individual should not only be able to understand the natural environment along with the developments in science and technology but also how the human body works. Here Peters' concern is with practical knowledge which does not form a part of any training for any specific job. The knowledge about the interpersonal world is the ability to understand the motives, hopes and aspirations of an individual within the network of social relationships. To comprehend the socio-political sphere is basically to be able to understand the rights and duties of a citizen within a democratic society. As stated by Peters this is a rough and sketchy indication of the types of knowledge and understanding that any individual should possess in order to participate in the forms of life in a democratic society.[19]

Before I proceed to examine the implications of Peters' arguments regarding the human condition, it seems necessary to analyse his general view of the human condition. It appears that his conception of the human condition is somewhat narrow. Since he makes specific mention of situations and forms of life in modern democratic societies, his concern is limited purely to the plight of human beings living in such societies. It is obvious that the situations of citizens in modern democratic societies is not the totality of the human condition. It must apply to all human beings in general, including to those who are not citizens of such societies.

A human condition, according to D. Cooper, is constitutive of situations in which human beings find themselves. An individual who finds himself in a particular situation has to adopt an attitude or a course of action. Understanding a situation which one encounters is to grasp the attitudes and actions which may be called for.[20] Faced with the reality of an incurable disease, being faced with the possibility of an unexpected inheritance of wealth, or being betrayed by a friend: each of these is to be in a situation in the relevant sense. For Peters, the significant knowledge and understanding of the human condition is brought about by being initiated into the different disciplines. The case for knowledge and understanding, and thus, surely, the study of the disciplines, is reinforced by the value of truth, manifested in the importance of the ability of a person to make correct choices in terms of attitudes or actions.

It could be argued that Peters makes far too broad a generalization in this respect. I am in agreement with Peters main premise that the lack of the "basic skills of literacy and numeracy" would greatly affect a person's response to a situation in any of the spheres mentioned above.[21] To function efficiently in modern societies as well as more traditional societies one needs to possess these basic skills.

The main flaw in Peters' argument is his lack of attention to the possibility of counter-examples. First, mere initiation into the different disciplines may not necessarily help a person to cope with every situation one encounters. For instance, say a person is

faced with the possibility of being a victim of an incurable disease. One would expect such a person to be anxious, sad, insecure and melancholic. Even though the person has been initiated into the different disciplines it is not clear that this would at all help him to cope with the situation. Presumably if the person has a good knowledge of medicine it would only increase the hopelessness of the situation.

Cooper persuasively argues this point when he says that the premise that those who are initiated into the various disciplines are in a position to organize their experience about the situations they encounter is perhaps based on a confusion. While acknowledging that there is no limit to what knowledge could tell us about many facets of life, it does not follow that one is being told anything about how one does or experiences these things.[22] Learning about cells, glands, and symptoms, does not make one aware of the actual pain that cancer would inflict, or how to deal with it. Therefore the premise, that all those who are initiated into the different disciplines are in a position to deal with all situations they encounter is by no means obviously true.

However, Peters is not completely wrong in wanting to relate disciplined knowledge to the challenges of the human condition. But he needs to clarify that the initiation must be done so as to increase one's all-round intelligence, in relation to life issues. Sensitivity to every day truths, and how to make them effective in life, requires initiation into the disciplines not for content so much as the art of how to look for the truth one needs, and an adequate sense of the importance of really getting the relevant truth for a situation.

Education as Freedom from Conditioning: J. Krishnamurti

Having examined Peters' notion of education as initiation I will now focus my attention on Krishnamurti's view of education as freedom from conditioning. As the discussion proceeds it will be noted that Krishnamurti's notion of education has significant differences from that of Peters.

In my view the following statement summarizes Krishnamurti's notion of education

> The function of education is to give the student abundant knowledge in the various fields of human endeavour, and at the same time to free his mind from all tradition so that he is able to investigate, to find out, to discover. Otherwise the mind becomes burdened with the machinery of knowledge.[23]

Thus, Krishnamurti thinks that the function of education is two-fold. Education should concern itself with imparting subject-matter knowledge in the different disciplines. But, the function of education is more fundamentally to free the child's mind of all conditioning influences of tradition.

Established Knowledge as Secondary but Necessary

Krishnamurti refers to the knowledge within the different disciplines as historical, biological, linguistic, mathematical, scientific, geographical and physical.[24] In this respect he includes both "knowing that" with respect to established formulated knowledge and "knowing how" in relation to standardized techniques.

In the course of a talk to students at Rishi Valley school he says, "you are living here, being educated in all the various disciplines, in the various branches of knowledge."[25] Here Krishnamurti is referring to the similar "worthwhile activities" or "modes of experience" which Peters thinks children should be initiated into. It must be mentioned that the curriculum arrangements of Krishnamurtian schools reflect the curriculum arrangements of other schools. If this is the case the young are initiated into the language and concepts of a society. Learning a language and conceptualized knowledge is being introduced into a public inheritance. Learning science the child will be learning the concepts of gravity, relativity, and photosynthesis. In mathematics the child will learn the concept of number. Concepts become intelligible only by the use of

language. Just as much as Peters, Krishnamurti thinks that both conceptual and practical knowledge is educationally important.

Learning in Relation to Established Knowledge.

We need to inquire whether Krishnamurti refers to depth and breadth of knowledge. His reference to "abundant knowledge in various subjects" is vague. One may know an abundance of dates of historical events, but may not understand the significance of such events. Again, a child may memorize geographical facts like the height of mountains, and the length of rivers, and may not have grasped the essential relationship between man and his environment which is central to geographical studies. Therefore, the view of "abundant knowledge" does not help us much. Elsewhere he says,

> we should have technically first class teachers to give you right information and help you to cultivate a thorough knowledge of various subjects.[26]

His idea of "thorough knowledge" of various subjects, being somewhat more specific, is more helpful. To know history thoroughly is not just to memorize dates of historical events. For instance, to know that Sri Lanka gained independent status in 1948 is not to have a thorough knowledge of the Independence Movement. To know the Sri Lankan Independence Movement thoroughly is to have a critical awareness of the whole course of the movement, the remote as well as the immediate causes which led to it, and its impact on subsequent Sri Lankan history. However, the term 'thorough knowledge' does not convey the same meaning as depth of knowledge. Depth of knowledge and understanding refers to a grasp of principles underlying a conceptual scheme rather than a knowledge of disjointed facts.

Krishnamurti accepts the fact that the acquisition of a knowledge of the various disciplines is essential, since through them the child comes to know, for their benefit in specific tasks, the concepts and language enshrined in the fund of accumulated knowledge. However, his emphasis is on the instrumental value of such knowledge, as

well as on its intrinsic interest for each individual student. In my view the following statements illustrate this point well.

> Knowledge is essential for without it we should begin all over again in certain areas of existence. Knowledge is necessary and science has its place.[27]
>
> Without accumulation of knowledge there would be no continuity of thought, of action.[28]

Freedom from Conditioning

As I noted earlier Krishnamurti considers the "freeing of the mind from tradition" as more fundamental to education. "Freeing the mind from tradition" does not refer to the idea virtually axiomatic in our thinking -- that knowledge liberates. For Krishnamurti, to free the mind from conditioned thinking is necessarily to "free the mind from tradition." This is precisely why he claims that "knowledge is a hindrance, when it becomes a tradition, a belief which guides the mind, the psyche, the inward being." [29]

At this point one must be clear what Krishnamurti means by conditioning. From a psychological point of view the word 'conditioning' has come to refer mainly to the process of shaping behaviour. For example, the presentation of a stimulus can condition an animal to a specific predictable pattern of behaviour. We can condition a dog to salivate at the sound of a bell. Salivating at a sound of a bell is not an expression of intelligence; it is an automatic and an invariant response to a stimulus. However, conditioning is not confined to bringing about specified behaviour patterns. As a belief-forming creature a human being tends to become conditioned, especially in youth, to a set of beliefs, a mode of thinking, a predominant value system, and an overall outlook on self and others. Krishnamurti's emphasis here is on a deep psychological attachment to such a system of values which implies at least but more than just being closed-minded. The idea of conditioning in this sense, is only latent in Krishnamurti's texts and is pivotal to the interpretation of his texts.

It is important to note that when Krishnamurti uses the word 'tradition' he is not referring primarily to traditions in certain areas of conceptual knowledge and traditions in relation to useful techniques. He reiterates that the function of education is to free the mind from tradition and to cultivate knowledge and technique, for he claims that knowledge is undoubtedly useful at one level while at another level positively harmful The knowledge he considers as harmful is that of traditions and beliefs which constitute the individual's inflexible conviction as belonging to a specific racial, religious or cultural group which shapes and conditions the mind to its particular governing pattern. He refers to traditions and beliefs as "collective knowledge, and knowledge of the race . . . of your past generations." 30 He emphasizes that what divides people and creates enmity and strife are not the investigations of science, developments in medicine, engineering and agriculture, but traditions and beliefs which condition the mind to conform to particular patterns.[31]

"Choiceless Awareness " of "What is": "Total Attention"

It is important to note that with reference to freedom from conditioning of the mind Krishnamurti emphasizes a direct or non-interpretive and non-judgemental mode of knowing -- "knowing what is". To "know what is" is a manifestation of the most significant awakening of intelligence, different from "knowing that" and "knowing how" in the meanings common to mainstream philosophy of education. Truth relevant to the transformation of one's life as a whole can only be known by this "choiceless awareness of what is"[32] -- that is, there is no conscious decision regarding the details of what to look for, what details to pay attention to, such as we find in intellectual forms of enquiry. Krishnamurti's implicit epistemology thus involves the postulation of a non-dualistic mode of knowing in which awareness is not governed by conceptual schemes. It is his view that only by means of this can we know reality in the sense of what really is, as it is.

To know and apprehend the truth of any immediate situation as a whole is to be choicelessly aware of it. Fully awakened intelligence is the "choiceless awareness of what is" at any given moment, involving the intuitive discernment of truth.

Intelligence here should not be interpreted in the generally accepted sense. For Krishnamurti, intelligence is the capacity to understand truly and act as one event, with the whole being involved. In intelligence there is the activity of feeling as well as reason, and these are equally and harmoniously felt aspects of one unitary process. Intellect is often understood as thought functioning independently of emotion, where awareness is channelled according to conceptual schema, explicit or otherwise.[33] He argues that unless we approach the understanding of life with intelligence, instead of either disconnected intellect or with emotion alone, no educational or political system would have individuals radically transformed in outlook, so as to begin to reverse the destructive tendencies which throughout history have repeatedly arisen from conflicting belief systems, uncritically transmitted from generation to generation.[34]

In order to explicate "knowing what is" an example would be helpful. For instance, say, I have a misunderstanding with a friend with whom I have had very amicable relations in the past. She and I belong to two different ethnic groups in the generally accepted sense. There is an ongoing ethnic conflict in the country and, influenced by this, we tend to drift apart, each blaming the other. Krishnamurti would say that if I try to see the truth of the situation from my conditioned pattern of thinking, I do <u>not</u> see the truth, as I identify myself with the ethnic conflict. If for a moment I am totally attentive to my situation without the interference of a conditioned idea or belief I will see the situation as it really is, namely, that I am creating the problem with conditioned beliefs. Seeing that, I can drop these beliefs, and cease waiting hopelessly for some change external to me to occur. I avoid the "what is" of my anger and ethnic prejudice if I try to change them into my ideas of "what should be" -- I should be free of anger and prejudice in this particular instance. If I knew how to understand my anger and

prejudice so as to go beyond them, then there would be no need for the original conflict between us and my added internal conflict of what I actually am and what I think I should be. If I can understand what to do with "what is" I will not escape to "what should be." If I do not know what to do with "what is" I hope that by invoking an ideal of "what should be" I can change "what is." But the ideal is a powerless intellectual possibility.

"Knowing What Is"

"Knowing what is" is neither a merely practical activity, nor a merely mental activity. It is a subjective, lived experience in which one's whole being is in the knowing of the truth, and one acts from that. It cannot be referred to as mere intuition. The commonest and clearest example of intuition in a wider sense is ordinary perception. According to Reid, ordinary perception is not confined to the apprehension of one kind of truth. It is the power to see many things together at the same time.[35] For instance, I walk into a sparsely furnished room and in a single instance I take in all items of furniture in it. This could be referred to as a visual perception. Now, "knowing what is" is a type of mental perception. It requires total attention and direct awareness where reason and feelings are harmonized. In this state of complete engagement one cannot remain unchanged by the knowing.

According to Krishnamurti, when one pays total attention to an idea, situation, or thing, one sees clearly and with completeness what is essential to it. I look at the mango tree outside my window with complete attention, and I see the whole beauty of the tree, the outspreading branches, the leaves, the flowers and the wind playing with it. I don't look to conceptually identify it as tree, or a type of tree. The beauty of the tree lies in the wholistic awareness. Again,"total attention" is something different from concentration. Concentration would be awareness limited by choice to a few aspects of a situation, problem or thing.[36] When we do concentrate we do not see the totality. Moreover, the very fact that we need to concentrate attests to our inattention. No one needs to exert concentration towards that in which one is deeply interested. Attention is already there.

Iris Murdoch also refers to a capacity of awareness as "attention," described as "a just and a loving gaze directed at an individual reality." She argues that psychic energy builds up convincingly coherent pictures of the world, but that "attention," as a direct and unwavering awareness of facts can come into being and expose such states of illusion.[37] To explicate further "knowing what is," it could be likened to aesthetic awareness. This comparison is based on the assumption that apprehension of aesthetic values is not possible without the cognitive and the affective domains indivisibly linked together.[38] To know and apprehend the aesthetic value of Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa is to apprehend its intrinsic quality. To refer to the quality of the painting as a totality is not to refer to the colour, a particular line or a particular part of the painting, such as the enigmatic smile. The quality, beauty, will encompass the constituent elements as a whole, without concentration on a part. To know the painting in this way implies that thought is not involved separatively in the process, and that it is also experienced and felt. L. R. Perry claims that "aesthetic appreciation is a cognitive activity, an exercise of enlarged perception leading to a state of expanded awareness."[39] This contrasts with the common belief that aesthetic recognition is the work of the emotional domain, acting separatively.

Different Modes of Knowing

As stated earlier, "knowing what is" is different from 'knowing that" or "knowing how." Knowing that is the propositional knowledge commonly considered to be genuine knowledge. A proposition is true when it states a fact or corresponds with a fact. When we say that something is the case it is to claim the truth of a statement. When I say that snow is white I imply a relation of the statement to the actual fact. The truth of this statement seems independent of my mental state. Apart from the conventional view of knowledge of fact, there are different senses of 'knowing.' We speak of "knowing a person," "knowing a place," "knowing a work of art." All the ways of knowing contain an element of awareness. Moreover, in all the ways of knowing we are aware of the

complex, and intuitively aware of the parts of the complex together.[40] According to Scheffler, the range of the everyday concept of knowledge is very wide. It includes familiarity with things, persons, subjects, competence in diverse learning activities, possession of ostensible truth on matters of fact as well as faith, everyday experience, and alleged certainties of mathematics and metaphysics.[41] Reid argues that if knowledge depended on being able to say justifiably of something that is true, it would leave out huge areas of what we all recognize to be knowledge claims, including the non-propositional knowing on which all statements of knowledge tacitly rest.[42] There is Polanyi's 'tacit' knowledge, where we know more than we can say. We can recognize a face, or a family resemblance without being able to adequately convey that knowledge in statements, however true.[43] According to Polanyi, "the process of formalizing all knowledge to the exclusion of any tacit knowing is self-defeating." [44]

It seems plausible to argue that it is necessary to have different types of knowing. This implies that propositional knowledge alone is not sufficient. Knowledge of what is the case is not a sufficient basis for knowledge of what actually is recognized, or of what ought to be in human relationships and what is valuable in works of art. Of these different types of knowing, Krishnamurti focuses on "knowing what is" as most crucial to the quality of life.

Truth and "Knowing What is"

At this point it seems necessary to clarify the way in which "knowing what is" is related to truth, of which there are different conceptions. It is my understanding that "knowing what is" is primarily a non-propositional understanding, relying on the direct experience of a truth, essential to a situation of which one is aware, involving the attention of the individual as a totality. The separative work of intellect in producing statements implies a comparative isolation of conceptual operations, preventing total engagement in the situation. Krishnamurti refers to truth and falsity in the following

manner: when you see something very clearly as the truth, that truth liberates you. When you see something as false, that false thing drops away.[45]

Education and Self-Knowledge

According to Krishnamurti, the "total attention" of "knowing what is" is most important in relation to self-knowledge. In his view the fundamental defect of modern attempts at education is the lack of emphasis given to self-knowledge as the central or as any aim of education. The specific kind of self-knowledge that Krishnamurti refers to here comes only through the "choiceless awareness" of what is as it is. The presence of the "conditioned mind" inhibits "knowing what is," and this in turn obstructs self-knowledge -- the knowledge of what an individual's self really is, directly recognized by that individual.

In Education and the Significance of Life, Krishnamurti summarizes his viewpoint with a challenging statement in which he explains the importance of self-knowledge as the central aim of the educator.

> The ignorant man is not the unlearned, but he who does not know himself, and the learned man is stupid when he relies on books, on knowledge and authority to give him understanding. Understanding comes only through self-knowledge, which is the awareness of one's total psychological process. Thus education in the true sense is the understanding of one self, for it is within each one of us that the whole of existence is gathered.[46]

In This Matter of Culture, he distinctly emphasizes the link between education and self-knowledge when he says that "to know oneself is the very purpose of all education."[47] In this position, where the "right kind of education" is the understanding of oneself, the ignorant person, concerning what it is most crucial to know, is not ignorant by virtue of a lack of subject-matter learning, but a lack of understanding of himself. Thus the learned person who lacks what Krishnamurti refers to as self-knowledge is considered ignorant in the learning that matters most. His statement that "within each one of us the whole of existence is gathered," is given as the reason for the pre-eminence of

self-knowledge in "right education," but is difficult indeed to explain satisfactorily. It certainly refers to the very nature of human "consciousness" as essentially related with all in the cosmos. Krishnamurti considers the crisis of fragmentation and conflict in the human consciousness as common to all individuals and the source of human/ planetary disorder, confusion and tragedy. Thus, his emphasis is not on external ameliorating plans and movements, but on each individual's transformation to wholeness through self-knowledge.

Self-knowledge for Krishnamurti is knowledge <u>of</u> oneself rather than simply knowledge <u>about</u> oneself. A person could have knowledge about himself, say, for instance, how he looks -- whether he is tall or short, dark or fair. Similarly, he could be aware of personality traits as to whether he is reliable, honourable or kind. The recognition that, e.g. , he can be honourable or kind is not sufficient for a serious claim that "he knows himself," unless this knowledge somehow becomes effective in the character of his daily life as a totality. Such an immediate totality could not itself be grasped in terms of any number of statements of "knowledge about." Hamlyn makes this same point when he says that to have self-knowledge it is not enough to have knowledge about oneself of any kind whatever. Some kinds of knowledge that one may have about oneself seem irrelevant to the question of whether one has self-knowledge proper.[48] In this sense of 'relevant,' the relevant or proper self-knowledge could be seen as a special sub-set of knowledge about the self.

The self-knowledge of importance to Krishnamurti is the self-transformatory understanding of one self <u>as individual</u>. Now, this position could pose a problem. Too much attention to oneself would necessarily lead to bolstering of one's ego. It may lead to self-consciousness in the colloquial sense as Laing describes, implying both an awareness of oneself by oneself and an awareness of oneself as an object of someone else's observation.[49] But, the self-knowledge advocated by Krishnamurti comes through the "choiceless awareness of what is," as it is, regarding the self, without any attempt at

characterization by thought or any other division of consciousness. Self-knowledge comes about only with the transcendence of the perspective of the ego -- the self-constructed tacit theory of the self as the centrally directive entity of the individual. The importance, individually and socially, of this self-knowledge rests on the implied transcendence of the domination of egocentric perspectives. Spontaneous self-attention, therefore, does not refer to the indulgent limitation of one's attention to private mental states, or the ego as defining the individual identity. When I am referring to the ego here as the constructed and largely subconscious conception of one's selfhood, my usage is in accordance with Krishnamurti's works, and must not be confused with Freud's term 'ego.' As to this, there are important differences as well as similarities.

Again, one must consider whether the achievement of self-knowledge is a self-isolating process. As Hamlyn argues, if someone attempts to seek self-knowledge in isolation, he deprives himself of certain possibilities of self-knowledge or knowledge about himself. He cannot get those kinds of information about himself that are usually obtainable only through relationship with others in a variety of social contexts and roles.[50] Similarly, Krishnamurti uses the analogy of relationship as a mirror in which one can find oneself reflected.

The Human Predicament: Consequences of Essentially Relational Being

It is important to note also that Krishnamurti does not subscribe to an atomistic notion of the isolated self. That is, he characterizes the self as existing on account of multiple relationships. Thus self-knowledge depends on the observation of oneself in relationship, not only to human beings, but also to nature, ideas, and things. "One can only know oneself in one's relationship to others."[51] C. Suares argues that Krishnamurti's 'know thyself' is a total process in the sense that it concerns the total human being, and not a part, like the theorizing intellect.[52] Shringy claims that Krishnamurti's advocacy for self-knowledge as the means of solving human problems lies in his concept of life and existence, for he thinks that life is action, and existence is a form of relationship.[53]

As previously stated, in Peters' later writings he refers to the ability of the individual to cope with the human condition. In a somewhat different way, Krishnamurti, too, refers to the human predicament. He perceives the problem of human existence as primarily one of conflict. For Krishnamurti, the situation for the individual and society remains one of crisis The crisis exists primarily within the individual. The individual conflict, by way of the internal relatedness, produces a conflict between the individual and society, and one society and another. Thus, "the inward problem is the world problem." [54]

Inwardly, the individual is a composite of contradictions, conflicts, introjected psychological pressures, racial and religious prejudices. Outwardly, the adaptation to a competitive society creates further conflicts. Therefore, Krishnamurti apprehends the problems of existence as psychological as well as social. Krishnamurti's emphasis on "knowing what is" and self-knowledge as being central to education is not only a reflection of his view of humanness as such, but very much based on his observation of the individual in modern times. To him, such

> self-knowledge is action, immediate, powerful, and concrete, the only one which can bring us out of the confusion. It is urgent, real and practical as leaping into a life-boat at the time of a ship-wreck.[55]

The Task of the Educator: An Alleged Impossibility

Now, assuming one grants the validity of Krishnamurti's thesis that the "primary and fundamental role of the educator, as such, is to bring about the seriousness and beauty of self-knowledge," [56] we still need to ask how the educator could achieve this? In the foregoing discussion it was stated that Krishnamurti's concept of self-knowledge necessarily involves the idea of transcendence of the ego. Now, is not the successful guiding of this a very tall order? How does a child contribute to this? Can a child of twelve or fifteen years transcend the ego? How, to what extent, and over what period of time could the educator be reasonably expected to complete his part in this task which

looks to be perhaps the greatest challenge of learning one could possibly face? Is it unrealistic, as some have suggested? t seems to me that when Krishnamurti refers to self-knowledge as being central to education he is neither expecting or not expecting children to transcend their egos. To be exact he is referring to the practice of self-observation which would lead to transformatory self-knowledge. When asked by a student at Rishi Valley school as to how one could know oneself he says that to know oneself is to watch oneself. To watch oneself is to watch one's gestures, the way one talks, the way one behaves, whether one is hard, cruel, rough or patient. To know oneself is to watch oneself in the mirror of what one is doing, what one is thinking, and what one is feeling.[57] This does not indicate that self-observation is co-terminus with self-knowledge as people reflect upon themselves without transcending their egos. It merely suggests that the practice of self-observation is necessary to the process of attaining self-knowledge.

Now, this does not seem to be such a tall order, and clarifies where the confusion of unrealistic aim crept in. The child could be encouraged to be self-observant, and to experience this with the ease of learning and seeing. When one is observant of one's actions, feelings, and thoughts in the midst of personal life, one comes to know them, just as one comes to know the natural world in sense perception of it. It is attention charged in an unusual direction under encouragement to do so; there seems to be nothing impossible or near impossible about this as a goal.

Self-knowing is not a Method

A common question about such self-observation concerns the "how?" of doing it so as to experience radical change. This involves a misconception of an art (of enquiry) for a technique. The question cannot be answered in terms of a set method -- which clearly distinguishes this self-observation from some traditional religious inward-focussed methods of meditation. It also distinguishes it from the methodical observation of established modes of enquiry, such as in the various sciences. This is another reason

why Krishnamurti does not regard initiation into disciplined modes of experience and enquiry as adequate for "right education." Nonetheless, it is possible to create an environment where a greater self-awareness could occur at the individual level. The creation of such an environment has been the special exploration of those who have been active in forming Krishnamurti schools in several countries. The distinctive features of such an educational environment will be discussed in chapter four.

B. The Development of the Mind

The Development of the Mind: Peters

Mind and Consciousness

Peters considers consciousness as the "hall mark of the mind."[58] The term 'consciousness' here refers to states of mind. The states and the operations of the mind are those of which one is aware in some sense, and this awareness is incapable of being delusive. I think of a person, I remember an incident, I reason out a problem, I feel a pain, I hear a cry. In every instance I am consciously aware that I do so. Thus the development of the mind is the development of the way one thinks, remembers reasons, feels and wills. Educating would seem to be concerned with the development of such mental qualities which constitute the life of the mind.[59]

Mind and Shared Inheritance

For Peters, the development of the mind involves entering a shared inheritance. In Ethics and Education he says,

> A child is born with a consciousness not as yet differentiated into beliefs, purposes and feelings . . . His 'mind' is ruled perhaps by bizarre and formless wishes in which there is no picking out of objects . . . The differentiation of modes of consciousness proceeds pari passu with the development of this (previously absent) mental structure. For they are all related to the types objects and relations in a public world. The objects of consciousness are first and foremost objects in a public

> world that are marked out and differentiated by public language into which the individual is initiated.[60]

Thus the development of the mind is seen as being constitutive of initiation into a shared world of public objects and traditions. Here the development of the mind seems to be essentially intellectual. Unlike Hirst, Peters is not solely interested in the development of the rational mind.[61] In Peters' later writings he refers to the development of other capacities, such as emotions, attitudes and desires in relation to intellectual development.[62]

The Differentiation of Awareness

At first, the child has only an undifferentiated awareness as the child's mind is "ruled by bizarre and formless wishes." Subsequently, with the acquisition of language ability, a mental structure of categories and concepts for picking out distinctive features of objects in the environment develops. Further differentiation develops with the initiation into more specific modes of awareness -- science, mathematics, history, literature, religion, aesthetic awareness, moral and technical forms of thought and action. According to Peters, the educated person is one who has gone through this initiation in sufficient depth and breadth to have developed those virtues which are constitutive of the development of the mind. It is important to note that the achievement of depth and breadth of knowledge and understanding is central to the development of the differentiated mind.[63]

Educating as Facilitating the Differentiation of the Mind

Now, education is a deliberate activity and it must concern itself with the development of the mind. Since the different disciplines are public aspects of the ways in which human experience has become structured they must be the elements round which, to a large extent, the development of mind must take place. One must admit that lack of access to a particular language does represent a limitation in the development of the mind. For example, a feral child would not have access to a public language due to lack of

access to a social world of human contact. As such he would be deprived of any systematic concept-formation, and therefore, of the development of the human mind.

How Essential is Initiation in the Disciplines to the Development of Mind

Peters considers that the disciplines are prior to the development of the mind, and they suggest the development of the mind. The assertion seems to be that the initiation into the different disciplines is the only way for the development of the mind and this seems, problematically, to rule out the possibility that there could be other factors necessary for its development.

Peters' view also seems to rule out the possibility that the development of the mind could occur in other ways. Elliott, for instance, claims that the development of the mind is the development of mental powers and this may and does occur without any study of the systematic disciplines.[64] Scriven, criticizing liberal education makes a strong claim for a "survival curriculum" where he admits that most of the conventional elements in a subject-structured curriculum are not relevant to learning in a society which, under conditions of constant revolutionary change, also exerts pressure on one's survival. Scriven's main argument is that a different kind of knowledge needs to be imparted to develop different qualities of the mind to help the child to survive in and to project a survival attitude into the present day world. Scriven interprets the necessary qualities of the mind as more general skills which enable the child to appraise urgent problematic situations and to be able to communicate with others in a genuinely effective manner. Scriven argues that "to survive in a defensible society," what is needed is "relevant parts of many subjects and not a study of different subjects." [65]

The Limitations of the Shared World in Development

It is plausible to argue that Peters overstates his case when he claims that the child develops solely by entering into the shared world. No doubt he would agree somewhat with Bonnett when he points out the contribution that the child's own nature must make in order to gain access into the shared world.[66] A gifted child would make a far greater

contribution than the normal child to gain access into this shared world. Again, in spite of an initiation into the different disciplines the backward child may not do well in relation to the development of the mind. Therefore, the child's inherent aptitudes and abilities are also factors that must be considered in relation to the development of the mind.

Education of the Whole Man

Peters says that "when educationalists claim that education is of the whole man they are enunciating a conceptual truth. . ." [67] He sees a conceptual connection between "education of the whole man" and the "broad cognitive perspective" or breadth of understanding. For Peters the educated person is one whose learning must "permeate his way off looking at things" rather than be"hived off."[68] This indicates that he is not referring to some sort of 'tunnel vision,' but a perception capable of regarding with a disciplined intelligence any and every aspect of life.

Now, ruling out narrow specialisms is the criterion of cognitive perspective which governs the "education of the whole man." Narrow specialisms pertain to the acquisition of skills related to a narrow field of activity, which can be referred to as training. Peters, however, is not suggesting that the educated man should not be trained. What he is suggesting is that he must be more than just trained. Obviously we would want an educated person to know a great deal not only about one or even a few specific disciplines, but to "see things" within a larger unified framework of ideas.

It is possible to have a limited conception of whatever activity one is doing. That is, one engages in it in isolation from other activities or aspects of one's life. For instance, say a person engaged in scientific research works away at it without "seeing" its connection with other activities. Such a person has a limited conception of what he is doing as he does not see its relevance to other aspects of his life or life in general. "A coherent pattern of life" is possessed only if one's actions, responses and activities are

interconnected, each consistent with and influencing the others, or each being seen in its relevance to the others.

One must admit that Peters notion of 'breadth of understanding' is important, but an objection that can be raised here is that he is not specific. He does not give us an indication of the limits of the breadth of understanding. Should the prospective engineer study history, literature, and philosophy , or art and religion as well? He would say that this is difficult to determine. Or for that matter to what extent should the prospective historian study science, mathematics, literature or philosophy, art, and religion? In fact, Peters says that he has not suggested "positive requirements, but only ruled out narrow specialisms" [69] -- that is, the kind of specialism which excludes all systematic attention to different but related subjects and fields.

Another objection can be raised in relation to Peters' notion of the "education of the whole man." A "broad cognitive perspective" somehow logically involves a man being whole. But I do not see a logical (necessary) connection between having a "broad cognitive (theory, belief system) perspective," and being "whole." Someone could have the "broad cognitive perspective" envisaged by Peters without being "whole." Does a person necessarily become a "whole" person merely by learning a number of disciplines? Is wholistic development merely knowing a lot of facts about different disciplines? Undoubtedly this plays some necessary part, but is hardly sufficient. A historian who confined his way comfortably in important areas of literature, philosophy, art, religion, and science may also be emotionally unstable, and an isolate through social ineptitude. It would seem to be straining the meaning of the phrase to confusion to refer to such a person as a "whole man," in spite of his breadth of understanding. Wholistic development should surely include other unavoidable aspects of personality such as emotional, ethical and social development. One could well raise the question of a spiritual side of development. Though Peters' purely general notion of the "education of the whole man" is laudable, the detailed picture of his view of wholistic development is

lacking in some respects. As the discussion proceeds it will be clear that Krishnamurti's notion of the education of the "whole man" is not lacking in these respects.

Education and Transformation

In respect of knowledge and understanding and the development of the mind what is positively required of an educated man is that his outlook is transformed by what he knows and understands. This understanding surpasses the shallow knowledge of disjointed facts and fits into an overall conceptual scheme. This organization of the understanding of life enhances the ability to "see things" within a "coherent pattern of life."

The notion of the transforming quality suggests that the knowledge and understanding that one has acquired is carried over to other aspects of one's daily living. If what is learnt is restricted to classrooms and the purpose of passing examinations, then one has not acquired a "transformed outlook." What is learnt and understood must influence the way one "sees things." "To travel with a different view," is almost synonymous with transforming one's outlook, which means it is an ongoing process.[70]

I am in agreement with Peters' general description of the transformed outlook, namely, that a person's range of attitudes, actions, and feelings is gradually transformed by the deepening and widening of his understanding and sensitivity. It must be mentioned that the transformed outlook is dependent on the condition of depth and breadth of understanding. Now depth and breadth of understanding may be a necessary condition to understand and "see things" as they are. To use Peters' example, the depth of historical knowledge may not be sufficient to say that a person has transformed his outlook by what he knows. For example, if on a visit to Anuradhapura a person is able to relate his knowledge of Sri Lankan history to what he sees, in Peters' terms he has breadth of understanding, and thereby his outlook is transformed by what he knows.

The problem that one encounters here is that how exactly does one know for certain that such a person's outlook has been transformed, and his understanding and

sensitivity has been deepened and widened. Depth and breadth of knowledge and understanding may be a necessary condition, but may not be a sufficient condition. For instance, Hitler and Eichmann probably had depth and breadth of conceptual understanding as espoused by Peters, but it does not seemed to have deepened and widened their understanding and sensitivity as persons. If it had, the world would not have known the atrocities that were perpetrated involving, e.g. , the extermination of Jews.

It is evident that Peters' notion of transformation is apparently restricted to the intellectual dimension. His notion of 'transformation' is linked to his view of the "whole person." For Peters, the "whole person" is a person with an intellectual unified view of the world (but not an unfragmented person).

The Development of the Mind: Krishnamurti

The Place of the Disciplines in Educating

I mentioned earlier that Krishnamurti gives emphasis to the value of subject-matter knowledge. For the intellectual development of the mind a knowledge of the subjects is considered necessary. As stated earlier the curriculum of the Krishnamurtian schools reflects the subject divisions of state schools. A child must be initiated into the language and necessary concepts of a society. To develop a sharp, clear, analytical mind a properly acquired knowledge of the different subjects is considered necessary. However, unlike Peters, Krishnamurti maintains that the development of the mind cannot be brought about by the systematic acquisition of intellectual knowledge alone.

Educating and the Centrality of 'Knowing What is'

For Krishnamurti, the direct knowing of "what is" is most important for the development of the mind in which intelligence is at its most effective. In this connection he uses the term the "awakening of the mind." In the course of a talk with students at Rishi Valley school, Krishnamurti says:

> what I am interested in . . . is to awaken the mind. . . We say the mind can be kept alive through knowledge and therefore, we pour in knowledge which only dulls the mind. The mind that functions in knowledge is a limited mind. A mind that is extraordinarily, tremendously alive, not only learning from books, memorizing some facts, but also learning how to look, how to listen. . . knowledge will not destroy.[71]

In relation to the above statement the linguistically imprecise and lyrical direct speech in which Krishnamurti has expressed his ideas could easily give rise to a somewhat different interpretation than what is intended. For despite the depth of his thinking, he does not care to write in the style of academic exactitude. His style is more lyrical and passionate.

Comprehending Life as a Whole

Krishnamurti's idea of direct awareness of "what is" is linked to his notion of "comprehension of life as a whole." In his view this is essential for the development of the mind.

Before I proceed further I think it is necessary to explicate what Krishnamurti means by "comprehension of life as a whole." He also refers to this as the meaning of "significance of life." Whether he refers to the idea of the significance of life or "comprehension of life as a whole" he is discussing the real capacity of intelligence to capture by insight what the essence of life is as an organic unity.[72]

A critic may argue that "comprehension of life as a whole" is a sheer impossibility. Krishnamurti might immediately reply that comprehending life as a whole never has the absurd meaning of knowing everything about life. We might try to clarify this point by drawing an example. It is looking at life as you look at a whole face and say, "Oh, its you, Indika!" "Indika" expresses the recognition of the essential truth of what the wholeness of the face amounts to.

As I understand, Krishnamurti points to life at two different levels, these being life as manifested in the conditioned existence and in the unconditioned existence. The

conditioned existence, according to him, is one in which culture, schooling and family influences condition the child in a particular way. The conditioned existence is portrayed as leading to disharmony in human subjectivity and the whole spectrum of relationships -- the tendency to bring about divisive conflicts among people is intrinsic to this state of being. The unconditioned existence is not based on a foundation of inevitably divisive beliefs about separated identity as an individual, or as a group (political, religious, etc.) Krishnamurti's view is that the "comprehension of life as a whole" begins in the individual's direct recognition of the fact that his normal life is conditioned, together with an intuition of the possibility that there could be an unconditioned existence.

The 'Wholeness' of the Individual

Krishnamurti, then, like Peters, refers to the "whole" person and a "transformed outlook." He regards modern schooling as inadequate in not providing sufficient opportunities for wholistic development. Too much emphasis is placed on the intellectual aspect of development particularly in the exclusive attention paid to the teaching of established, formulated subject-matter knowledge.

> The heart of the matter is education, it is the total understanding of man, and not the emphasis on a fragment of his life.[73]

> We are concerned with the total development of each human being, helping him to realize his own highest and fullest capacity, not some fictitious capacity which the educator has in view as a concept or ideal.[74]

His challenge is to be clear whether one wants the total human being and not just the "technological human being." [75] The implication is that what is important is not the development of one type of skilled ability, as in being a scientist, mathematician, or musician, but the significant development of the individual in all its aspects. The "technological human being" is a person proficient in a limited field of technical and professional skills. A schooling which merely helps individuals to be proficient in technical and professional skills is fostering a partial development only. Clearly,

Krishnamurti will not consider such development by itself as education, and urges that if we are concerned with the development of the whole person rather than one-sided development, then our approach to the understanding of, and appropriate activities of education must be different.

Wholeness of the Individual, Fragmentation and Integration

Krishnamurti gives a clear indication that the normal individual is to some extent fragmented. The reasons for this are partly schooling and partly the larger personal environment. In his terminology the integrated person is the whole person. In Life Ahead, Krishnamurti defines 'integration' as related to the whole person:

> To integrate is to bring together, to make complete. If you are integrated, your thoughts, feelings and actions are entirely new moving in the same direction; they are not in contradiction with each other, you are the whole human being without conflict, that is what is implied by integration.[76]

To be integrated, then, is to have unity in thought, feeling and action, in the sense that these aspects of the individual are not active so as to oppose each other. Where, for a particular individual there is no inward conflict, conflict arising in relationship is no longer caused by him as a projection of an inward conflict. Then a major source of human conflict is thus removed.

If there is a lack of integration, then there is "fragmentation" of the self, in the sense that one's thoughts, feelings and actions will be in oppositional activity. This will unavoidably engender and be projected as outward conflict For example, A is envious of B, but he maintains an appearance of friendly relations with B. A here is fragmented, since a fragment or part of him is envious of, and so feels antagonistic towards B, and a part of him wants friendship with B, and so strains unsuccessfully to negate the feeling of envy. The strain of such internal opposition is painful, and the suppression of outward expression of envy is also a kind of suffering. In general, the togetherness of human beings is so fundamentally connected with who and what those individuals are at any

given moment, that any conflict in A, who is relating to B, cannot but find the way into the character of the relation, so that B must feel the reality of the relationship as conflictual. At some point B will respond accordingly to the felt reality of relationship, whatever A tries to make it appear.

When Krishnamurti says that to be integrated there must be unity in one's thoughts, feelings, and actions he provokes many questions. For example, is it possible to have one's thoughts, feelings and actions move in the same direction, and be, say, envious, selfish and acquisitive? I cannot be unified as envious, because envy is painful, and I want pleasure at least as powerfully as I am envious. That is, one's innate desire for pleasure is in tense opposition to one's enviousness. As long as this is so the state of envy must be a fragmented, conflictual state. Therefore, it would seem that integration can only come into being if one's thoughts, feelings, and desires are active together in some way that is not egotistic. A critic may say that a selfish person who has everything he wants, and who wallows in complacency and smug satisfaction, envies no one, and consequently would not experience inner conflicts. Krishnamurti would say that the very fact that he is egotistic would make him a disintegrated person. Thus, the connection between integration and the attitudes we refer to as loving, sensitive, empathetic, compassionate seems to be a necessary one.

Conditioning and Fragmentation

It is Krishnamurti's view that conditioning influences affecting one's view of oneself and of one's world, whether racial or religious prejudices, traditions and social mores, hinder the way one thinks, feels and acts in respect to being a whole person. Moreover, current schooling in no way encourages the understanding of the inherent tendencies which allow conditioning of the mind to normality and consequently does not bring about the integrated individual or the "whole person." The philosopher, Jacob Needleman, expresses a similar idea :

> Through social custom, through education, through indoctrination, through influences of religion, art and family, the individual is made to accept at a very early age that he is an integral whole, persisting through time possessing a real identity and a definite psychic structure. Yet as an adult, he is actually a thousand loosely connected "cysts." As he leaves childhood and affirms this socially conditioned identity he is actually leaving behind the possible growth of his inner structure. The evolution of a true psychic integrity comes to a halt, requiring as it does, the very energy that is now diverted and consumed in upholding the sense of 'I.' The individual becomes a lie that is ingrained in the neural pathways of the organism. He habitually, automatically pretends he is one and whole -- it is demanded of him, and he demands it of himself. Yet in fact he is scattered and multiple.[77]

While Peters has his own notion of the transforming quality of education, Krishnamurti refers to a more radical transformation of the individual person. He refers to this as the "psychological revolution," which means a fundamental change in the human mind brought about by knowing oneself through direct recognition.[78] As explicated, though Peters speaks of a transformed outlook he does not refer to a radical transformation. This is because his view of transformation is restricted to the intellectual dimension. The person with an intellectually unified view will still be a fragmented person. In this instance, the radical transformation that Krishnamurti refers to will be more preferable.

Theodore Roszak, historian and philosopher, makes a similar observation. He argues that there is another sense in which a permanent revolution is exactly what we need, not ` revolution that merely moves geographically over the planet, but one that moves along the depth dimension of human nature.[79]

The Limitations of Reasoned Transformation

It is important to note that there are no agreed criteria which govern the "education of the whole person" or the radical transformation of an individual's outlook. Different philosophers would suggest different criteria as being necessary. These concepts are too universal in scope to be confined to the educational process. For instance, with the

termination of one's formal education we cannot with certainty say, "he is a whole person" or, "his outlook has been transformed." In fact these could perhaps be better expressed as indicating continuous processes. I am not suggesting that educators, as such, should not give serious consideration to such claims, for educators do not wish individuals to be fragmented. What is being suggested is that education can only provide avenues, though powerful ones, for satisfying the necessary requirements for such claims.

C. The Intersubjective Content of Education

The Moulding and Growth Models of Educating

Peters' notion of education as initiation embodies the idea of the intersubjective character of both the content and procedures of education. There are different ways of attempting to initiate others into what is considered worthwhile. There is the more traditional "moulding" model of education and the "growth" model of education. Peters is critical of both. According to him, they both share a common defect -- that of regarding education as an activity where the teacher is a "detached operator" trying to achieve some kind of result in the learner. In Peters' view education as a process of initiation would remedy this defect.[80]

The Moulding Model

The more pervasive traditional model of education is the moulding model. To mould is to shape something to a pattern out of pliable material. For instance, clay or plasticine could be moulded into a variety of forms. This depends on the skill of the person who is doing the moulding and the pliable nature of the clay or plasticine. The moulding view assumes that the child's mind is formless and pliable by external pressure. This involves the traditional assumption that the child's mind is similar to a "tabula rasa" or a clean state on which any content matter could be implanted. Therefore, the teacher attempts to shape it into a particular pre-determined pattern of thought and action.

In order to mould the child's mind the teacher must acquire the assumed expertise to conduct formal lessons in an authoritarian manner. Perhaps the subject-matter is not that all that there is to be known about the subject. But, ostensibly it is all the teacher needs to know. Since, in fact, the student sees little relevance in the material and so resists, formal instruction must be supported by a variety of coercive techniques, such as the use of rigid disciplinary techniques including corporal punishment. Peters has no difficulty arguing persuasively that the moulding model of education is defective from moral and psychological points of view.

The Growth Model

The child-centred movement which conceived of education as a process of growth was a revolt against the moulding view of education. Dearden, for example, points out that the notion of child-centredness is far from clear. According to him there is one sense in which education may be regarded as being child-centred, namely, that it is something which ultimately relies on a special response from the child.

In Emile, Rousseau considered education as a process of growth in which he incorporated the notion of developmental stages. Thus, he saw the importance of adapting the content and methods of teaching to the needs and interests of the child at each developmental stage.[81] In The Education of Man, Froebel depicts education in terms of the unfolding of inner potentialities. He definitely emphasized the importance of adapting what is to be learnt to the child's needs and interests at each developmental stage.[82] More recent theorists in this tradition have included John Dewey, Sir Percy Nunn, Arnold Gesell, and Piaget to some extent.[83]

The growth model of education thus, contrary to the moulding model, incorporates as central the idea of the development of potentialities from within. On this view, what is necessary for the process of growth and hence of education is to encourage the child in the developing of inherent potentialities. The inner potentialities will unfold only if they are sufficiently stimulated in the required manner. This is why growth

theorists speak of a rich learning environment, and tend to favour a horticultural analogy in which the teacher is similar to a gardener. The teacher watches for signs of readiness and provides the appropriate environmental stimulation for the child's spontaneously developing interests and activities. Unlike the moulding model of education, the emphasis here is not on matter or content, but rather on the procedural principles governing the learning activity. Learning through active, self-directed experience has been considered important to safeguard the child's growth according to natural inclination.

Growth theorists often use the term 'self-realization' with reference to growth. Both these terms are rather vague, if not critically ambiguous. The term 'self-realization' is too vague both as to "self" and "realization." For instance, if a person possesses marked sadistic tendencies, would their encouragement in school be educative? Again, speaking about growth, growing alone is not sufficient; one must specify the direction of growth to be encouraged as education. There are an indefinite number of examples of distorted growth. As Peters argues, concepts such as self-realization and growth presuppose standards of value which determine both the sort of self which is worth realizing and the direction of growth.[84] Clearly, considerable justification of these standards is required.

"Inter-subjective Content" and" Shared Experience": Peters

Implied by Peters' "intersubjective content of education" is the shared experience of the teacher and the pupil in the teaching-learning process. In the act of teaching the teacher is not only encouraging the child to learn the content of the different disciplines but encouraging the student to understand the criteria by which such bodies of knowledge have been developed.

Peters' contention is that both the moulding and the growth model lack this aspect of a sharing of experience by both the teacher and pupil. In the moulding model of education the primary educational aim is to "shape the child to conform to some approved

pattern." The content and manner of learning is geared to achieve this aim. The pupil has no opportunity of freedom to inquire into, criticize, or assess what is being taught. Consequently, there is no sharing of experience, and therefore, there is a marked separation between the teacher and pupil. However, as argued by Peters, it is an inescapable fact that the teacher has to select what is worthwhile to encourage in children, but moulding is too brutal a metaphor.[85]

In the growth model of education the child grows according to his natural bent. As Dearden says, what the teacher must do will depend very much on the lead the developing child gives him to follow, and there will be a minimum of intervention.[86] Here again there is no scope for shared experience between the teacher and the pupil. Experience can be shared only if teacher and pupil explore the subject-matter together. Where the primary aim in education is the growth of the child, the specification of subject-matter is considered of negligible or detrimental value, so that we cannot speak in terms of the shared experience of joint exploration of given subject-matter.

Now, the significant fact should be noted that the shared experience involves the idea that to educate is to initiate others into a public, intersubjective, world encapsulated in the language and concepts of a society. And, in particular to encourage others to join in exploring the different disciplines.

Peters regards the task of the teacher at the early stages as somewhat different to the task in the later stages of education. In the early stages the teacher must initiate the students into the different disciplines or "bring them inside the forms of thought and awareness." If there is some sort of compulsory curriculum a critic may say that the individual is being moulded or shaped to some approved pattern. Peters would reply that initiation into the different disciplines does not amount to moulding since the teacher is encouraging the child to differentiate his thinking historically, scientifically and mathematically. Furthermore, Peters could say that to create new desires and stimulate interests the child must be initiated into the different disciplines. And, one way of

initiating children is to utilize existing interests. This seems a fair reply. For instance, if a child in the pre-school stage has a knack of seeing number relationships, the child will not develop this mathematical ability unless he is initiated into a formal study of mathematics. This is not to say that all students will experience similar deepening and broadening of interest, or even mastery of any particular discipline.

According to Peters, at the later stages the child has gained a knowledge of the concepts and modes of exploration. Now the teacher and pupil are co-partners in a shared experience of exploring a common world. The common world is the world of history, the world of literature, of science and mathematics. The difference between the teacher and the pupil is only a matter of degree. As Peters admits the "teacher is simply more familiar with its contours and more skilled in finding and cutting pathways." [87] No doubt, in history the teacher and the pupil will probe the past together, in science both are involved in joint experimentation, in mathematics problems are solved together. Therefore, Peters is correct in suggesting that on this view the teacher is not the "detached operator" of the moulding model of education, or of the growth model. In fact he is a joint operator teaching, inquiring, discussing and experimenting along with the pupil. He no longer considers the aim of educating the pupil as something external to him. The teacher encourages the pupil to learn what he considers as worthwhile and shares in the process. Oakeshott maintains that if the teacher has no confidence in any of the standards of worth written into this inheritance of human achievement, he should not be a teacher as he has nothing to teach.[88] Both the teacher and the pupil give their allegiance to the content of the different disciplines, and the critical procedures by which such established formulated knowledge is assessed, revised and adapted to new developments. This is, of course, the aforementioned intersubjective element.

Critical Thinking and the Disciplines, or Forms of Knowledge

In relation to the intersubjective content of education another aspect that needs to be investigated is Peters' view of critical thinking. A common criticism levelled against

the moulding model of education, according to Peters, is that while subject-matter is handed over no attempt is made to hand over the public procedures or the manner in which they have been accumulated and could be criticized and subsequently revised.[89] For instance, in science the truth of scientific facts will be established by experimentation, in history it would be critical appraisal of source materials, unbiased observation of historical data and so forth. For Peters, critical thinking cannot exist in a vacuum. There must be something definite to be critical about. In this sense there are as many modes of critical thinking as there are disciplines. This means critical thinking can be historical, scientific, literary, moral, philosophical and so forth, and in important respects will not transfer from one discipline to the other.

In order to grasp the specific nature of the problem as affecting any discipline, one needs to master the subject matter of the different disciplines. Here Peters accepts Hirst's thesis that the logical structure of the forms of knowledge or experience constitutes the structure of the mind working with the disciplines. Since the structures are somewhat different, mental abilities, such as critical thought and imagination, which operate within one form are somewhat different from those which operate within any other. On account of the uniqueness of the content and its structure in the form, the same basic mental capacity assumes a difference in the specific applications of its actual functioning. Therefore, Hirst rejects the notion that there is some general way in which mental abilities such as critical thinking or imagination could be developed.[90]

The Moulding Model of Education : Krishnamurti

In his educational writings, Krishnamurti also rejects the moulding model of education. Consider for example the following quotations;

> The right kind of education is not concerned with an ideology . . . it is not based on any system, however carefully thought out; nor is it a means of conditioning the individual in some special manner. Education in the true sense is helping the individual to be mature and free, to flower greatly in love and goodness. That is what we

> should be interested in, and not in shaping the child to some idealistic pattern.[91]
>
> Who are we to decide what man should be? By what right do we seek to mould him according to a particular pattern, learnt from some book or determined by our own ambitions, hopes and fears?[92]
>
> Do you educate the student to conform, to adjust to fit into the system or do you educate him to comprehend, to see very clearly the whole significance of all that and, at the same time, help him to read and write?[93]

When Krishnamurti refers to a "right kind of education" he presupposes that modern schooling in some respects is significantly and fundamentally defective. He thinks that any type of educational activity which moulds, shapes or conditions the child according to some idealistic pattern is harmful. It is opposed to his view that the "right kind of education" should bring about the free, integrated individual. In the first quotation he specifically mentions that the child must be helped "to flower greatly in love and goodness." If education is seen as moulding and shaping the individual according to a pattern delimited by an ideal, then the individual is made to conform to this imposed pattern. Therefore, as he says, "there can be no integration as long as one is pursuing an ideal pattern of action," since the imposed ideal conflicts with the individual's actual interests and tendencies.

An ideal here is an ultimate objective. It is not just a general aim. Such ideals involve specific, complex objectives which are difficult or impossible to realize. Aims on the other hand, can be more or less achieved in practice. This is why we normally speak of utopian ideals but not utopian aims.

The ideals in Krishnamurti's critical discussion of them are a series of values, either national, religious, collective or personal. Education could be, and has been, so construed as to reflect such governing ideals, whether political, religious, cultural, or personal.[94] When the process of education is fundamentally linked to an ideal it neglects the fact or actual happening. Ideals are imposed upon "what is happening" to attempt to

conform it to "what should be"-- the ideal. What is referred to as actually happening is the present state of the individual child. To be more specific in Krishnamurti's terms, 'what is' is distorted in the attempt to conform it to 'what should be,' and constitutes a disintegrative violence. He would say that this is not the way that an educative transformation is effected. Therefore, such ideals corrupt the mind. They are, in addition to being born of questionable ideas, judgements and hopes, themselves conceived out of the drastic limitations of what is already known or thought to be known.

Krishnamurti is thus critical of the moulding model of education for two reasons. To mould is to make an individual conform to a conditioned pattern of thinking, feeling and action. The pattern becomes most important, and the individual is accorded importance only to the extent that he fits the pattern. Secondly, as long as the individual is shaped and moulded according to an ideal there is no encouragement for self-transformatory understanding. Or, in short, he is not in any significant sense, a human individual.

It cannot be denied that when an educational system is guided by a particular political or religious ideal or ideology it moulds the individual according to a pattern of thinking circumscribed by the principles of that particular ideal or ideology. For instance, the overall aim of Soviet education is to make a communist citizen. The curriculum of the Soviet schools at all levels is based on communist principles designed in a way to achieve this primary educational ideal. In this sense, it cannot be denied that the mind of the individual is moulded and hence conditioned according to a particular view point. Similarly, in a religious-oriented educational system, a child may be made to accept certain religious principles with unquestioning obedience. In both instances the child's mind is moulded and conditioned to think in a particular way. Does this mean that the individual has no opportunity to go beyond this conditioned way of thinking? The opportunity may exist, but what is significant is that the child is not encouraged to think in a more critical manner which would be likely to by-pass such principles.

Krishnamurti also emphasizes that moulding or conditioning does not give importance to the actual state of the individual, which, after all, is the only ground for any intelligent transformation. It does not encourage the child to understand and thereby overcome his limitations. Furthermore, the child's desires may conflict with external ideals. In terms of personal ideals, [illegible] desire is not at variance with the ideal, there would be no conflict with the [illegible]ess. If one's inclinations and desires conflict with an imposed and/or [illegible] accepted ideal, pain, disillusionment, frustration, and eventually revolt are bound to occur. For instance, if parents compel a child to study medicine, when the child's inclination is to become a painter for which he has the natural aptitude then the child's desire will conflict with the parent's ideal. Then pain and disillusionment are bound to occur. Again, a teacher who has an ideal for what a pupil should be will tend to try to force the pupil to conform, and in the effort will also tend to ignore what the pupil actually is as that individual. A similar pain and confusion of fragmentation will occur for the pupil. Therefore, Krishnamurti would say that "the right kind of education" (which integrates, rather than fragments) consists in understanding the child as he is, and encouraging him to do so also, without imposing on him an ideal of what we think he should be.[95] Therefore, according to him, the right kind of educator is one who helps the individual child to observe and understand his own conditioning and self-projected values.[96]

Moulding and Lasting Values

In relation to the question of education as a process of moulding and conditioning it seems necessary to discuss Krishnamurti's notion of "lasting values." In the previous statement he specifically says that education in the true sense should help the child to be mature and free, to be able to flower greatly in love and goodness. This is what the educator should be interested in, as opposed to shaping the child according to some idealistic pattern. To be more specific, for Krishnamurti these "lasting values" are goodness, truth, love, compassion, sensitivity and other related values.[97] Values are

considered to be lasting if, and only if, they are essential to the enrichment of total integration in a human life and will always be so if expressed as the dominant guiding principles of a life (that is, they are not imposed upon that life). In any type of human society these lasting values as expressed by individuals make life literally more wholesome for the individual as well as for the society in which they flourish.

At this point it would be helpful to consider two possible objections. Firstly, does Krishnamurti contradict himself by having ideals in the form of lasting values? Secondly, do lasting values in any way mould and condition the individual?

When Krishnamurti speaks of lasting values he is undoubtedly referring to certain ideals in the sense of ideal general values. A lasting value is also an ideal in the sense of a personal guiding principle if we do want the child to "flower greatly in love and goodness." Krishnamurti's poetic licence in not providing formal definitions of his terms, but rather relying on the total context of discussion to bring out their distinctive meaning places a great deal of responsibility on the listener or reader -- which is avowedly his intention. In fact, a careful reading, alert to the total context, indicates that the contradiction is only apparent. A lasting value, while being in one sense an ideal, does not fall into the category of ideals criticized by Krishnamurti -- those which are willed as decisions fitting a plan rather than spontaneously discovered as truth, in sensitive personal insight. An ideal that one rationally strives to conform to is not a lasting value. An ideal of his lasting category is not regarded as a created concept of a supposed perfection, but a truth regarding discovery by direct insight, which carries its own power of transformation. No effort to conform is either appropriate or necessary.

As for the second possible objection, lasting values do not and cannot in any way mould or condition the learner. Krishnamurti categorically asserts that "education should help us to discover lasting values."[98] Inculcation involves a deliberate activity of imposition by an authority figure, whether parent, teacher or an elder. In this sense, though lasting values are representative of the perfection of a life they are not ideas or

concepts to be imparted, but real potentialities discovered spontaneously -- even in the context of guided enquiry.

Education and the Growth Model

It may appear at first that Krishnamurti favours the growth model of education. In his educational writings he uses terms more commonly used by growth theorists such as 'developing capacities,' 'unfolding,' 'right environment,' and 'observation.' At this point we need to consider the following statements.

> Right education should help the student, not only to develop his capacities, but to understand his own highest interest.[99]
>
> To help you to unfold is the function of the school; and if it does not help you to unfold, it is no school at all.[100]
>
> The educator . . . must give all his thought, all his care and affection to the creation of right environment and to the development of understanding, so that when the child grows into maturity he will be capable of dealing intelligently with the human problems that confront him.[101]
>
> The right kind of education is not possible en masse. To study each child requires patience, alertness, and intelligence. To observe the child's tendencies, his aptitudes, temperament, to understand his difficulties, to take into account his heredity . . . all this calls for a swift and a pliable mind, untrammelled by any system or prejudice.[102]

In the first instance, Krishnamurti refers to the development of individual abilities and this can hardly be questioned for education. Similarly, the creation of right environment expressed in the second statement and taking into consideration the significance of individual differences as stated in the fourth statement are educationally crucial. However, the notion of unfolding as expressed in the second statement is questionable. For instance, the unfolding of inherent aggressive potentialities is bound to make the individual an aggressive person. No one would seriously suggest that as an educational environment this is the function of the school. In actual fact, taking all aspects of his discussion into consideration, what Krishnamurti is suggesting is that

education must make provision for the development of the potential of the child as an intelligent individual, where potential refers specifically to all that makes for intelligence and an integrated life. In particular to the self-guidance of potential by discovery of lasting values. Unfolding without qualification is thus rejected by Krishnamurti.

In spite of the fact that he employs terms more commonly used by growth theorists, it seems to be the case that by implication he rejects the growth model of education for the following reasons.

Firstly, it must be admitted that the crucial aspect of Krishnamurti's notion of "right education" is taking account of personhood in educating. Now, this would involve the development of the child's abilities, taking into account of individual differences, observation and creating the 'right environment.' But, he goes further than the growth theorist when he refers with his own special meanings and emphasis, to certain other aspects as being equally necessary for one's educative growth and development. The more significant of these are the ability to know oneself, "to grow as integrated men and women," and "to flower greatly in love and goodness."

Secondly, just as much as Peters, Krishnamurti does not consider the teacher as a mere observer or for that matter a detached operator. My claim here draws on Krishnamurti's notion of the teacher-pupil relationship. He is critical of the traditional hierarchical and basically mechanistic notion of the teacher who knows, and the student who does not know, and therefore, must be taught. His view that the psychological division between the teacher and the student must end, so that they are learning at the same time together, is similar in some respects to what Peters refers to as shared experience, though the overall aim of education is different. He would say that the "educator and the student are both learning through their special relationship with each other."[103]

To Krishnamurti the teacher and student communicate through questioning and counter-questioning -- not only subject-matter but also problems related to the direct

knowing of "what is" in relation to one's experience of life. He emphasises dialogue as an essential approach to understanding and as a mode of teaching. Through discussions, a quality of attention and a freshness of inquiry can replace conformity as the essential prerequisite of learning. It is noteworthy that in the international schools founded by Krishnamurti, this emphasis on enquiry is incorporated into the daily educational atmosphere of the school.

Thirdly, unlike the growth model, the child is encouraged and directed to critically inquire into what is learnt, and thus redirects his own development on the basis of personal insight. As such Krishnamurti sees the need for the development of critical awareness. Not only should the individual be critical about subject-matter knowledge, he must be critical about all the extraneous influences which could condition his mind. He would say that education is a process which encourages inquiry as a way of life resting on direct awareness of one's character of relationship to human beings, nature, ideas and things. Consider, says Krishnamurti,

> 'educate' in the real sense of that word; not to transmit from the teachers to the students some information about mathematics, history or geography, but in the very instruction of these subjects to bring about a change in your mind. Which means that you have to be extraordinarily critical, You have to learn never to accept anything which you yourself do not see clearly.[104]

To develop this critical awareness as he sees it, is to develop the capacity to "know what is."

D. Comparison and Contrast between Peters' notion of Education as Initiation and Krishnamurti's notion of Education as Freedom from Conditioning

Peters considers education as initiation into worthwhile activities. Krishnamurti also thinks that the function of education is in this sense to impart subject-matter

knowledge. But, he thinks that knowing "what is" is more fundamental to the learning enterprise.

For Peters the initiation of the child into public traditions is central to education. Krishnamurti thinks that imparting subject-matter knowledge is important for specific kinds of activities, but the function of education is more fundamentally to free the child's mind of actual conditioning. What is especially pertinent here is that the predominance of the conditioned mind inhibits self-knowledge -- which he does regard as central to education.

Peters considers disciplined knowledge as necessary for the development of practical reason and the ability to cope better with the human condition. For Krishnamurti knowing "what is" rather than subject-matter knowledge is related to the truth of perceived lived situations and the understanding of the human predicament which he perceives as one of conflict.

Peters claims that through initiation into the developed forms of knowledge, the student gains access to the development of the mind. The achievement of a depth and breadth of knowledge and understanding is central to the development of the mind. On the other hand, for Krishnamurti the systematic acquisition of intellectual knowledge is only a necessary ingredient for the development of the mind, but disciplined knowledge alone cannot bring about the development of the mind. Direct knowing of "what is" is more significantly necessary for the "awakening of the mind."

Though Peters and Krishnamurti both agree that properly speaking the educated person implies in some sense the whole person, they differ in the specific nature of the important kind of 'wholeness.' What is required of the whole person is that his outlook is transformed by what he knows. While Peters refers to a transforming quality of education, Krishnamurti refers to a radical transformation of the individual.

For Peters, wholistic development and the transformed outlook is dependent on knowledge and understanding. The broad cognitive perspective achieved by reason and

the concern for truth through depth and breadth of knowledge and understanding transforms the individual. The transforming quality in education enables the individual to 'see' things within a "coherent pattern of life." Krishnamurti regards the whole person as one in whom a total inward transformation has taken place through self-knowledge. Radical transformation is expressed as integration involving the full awakening of intelligence, which itself facilitates the individual's insight into comprehension of life as a whole.

Peters' view of the whole person and the transformed outlook is limited primarily to conceptual and intellectual development. For Krishnamurti, the conceptual perspective is only one element involved in the notion of the whole person and inward transformation, and not one capable of changing all other aspects. The whole person is one who is inwardly transformed, the cognitive and affective aspects of life are integrated by self-awareness, with its 'seeing,' and these in turn inevitably influence the practical aspects. The required 'seeing' in each case is certainly not the same

Peters and Krishnamurti reject both the moulding and the growth models. Clearly, this means that they do not consider the teacher as a detached operator trying to achieve some specific and pre-determined mindset. They both consider the teaching-learning process as a shared experience where both the teacher and the pupil are partners.

According to Peters, since education is primarily the initiation into the public forms of knowledge, the development of critical thinking is important. Both teacher and student critically explore, assess and evaluate the subject-matter of the different disciplines. For Krishnamurti education is not only, nor primarily a process which initiates the child into the different disciplines, but also a process which encourages an inquiry, based on 'critical awareness' into the relationship of oneself to human beings, nature, ideas and things.

Footnotes

[1] "Education as Initiation" is the subject theme of R. S. Peters' inaugural lecture to the Chair of the Philosophy of Education at the University of London Institute of Education, delivered in December 1963. See R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. , 1966), pp. 46-72, R. S. Peters, "Education as Initiation" in Philosophical Analysis and Education, ed. R. D. Archambault (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 87-110.

[2] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 25.

[3] Ibid. , p.45. In Peters' texts "transmission" and "passing on" are phrases only to be properly understood in the light of the notion of 'initiation' -- for they do not refer to any passive reception on the part of the student, but an active reception whereby the individual is initiated in a form of thought and activity.

[4] See Ibid. , pp.49-50.

[5] P. H. Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in P. H. Hirst, Knowledge and the Curriculum (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp.30-46.

[6] See R. S. Peters, "Philosophy of Education", in Educational Theory and its Foundation Disciplines, ed. P. H. Hirst (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 38, and P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters, The Logic of Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 62-66.

[7] R S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 45.

[8] For the details of this discussion see R. S. Peters, "The Justification of Education," in The Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 239-267.

[9] J. Soltis, "Education as Initiation by R. S. Peters," in Studies in Philosophy and Education, Vol. , 5, 1966-1967, p.189.

[10] R. S. Peters, "Education as Initiation," in Philosophical Analysis in Education, ed.

R. D. Archambault, p. 107.

[11] Ibid. , p. 106.

[12] R. S. Peters, J. Woods and W. H. Dray, "Aims of Education -- A Conceptual Inquiry," in The Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters, p. 37.

[13] R. S. Peters, "The Justification of Education", in The Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters, p. 25.

[14] Ibid. , pp. 251-256.

[15] R. S. Peters, "Education and Justification -- A Reply to R. K. Elliott." in Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. xi, July 1977, p. 37.

[16] R. K. Elliott, "Education and Justification" in Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. X1, July, 1977, p.18.

[17] R. S. Peters,"Democratic Values and Educational Aims," in R. S. Peters Essays on Educators (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 43.

[18] R. S. Peters, "Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of its Content," in Education and the Education of Teachers, R. S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 55.

[19] R. S. Peters, Essays on Educators, pp. 43-46.

[20] D. E. Cooper, Authenticity and Learning: Neitzsche's Educational philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 55.

[21] R. S. Peters, Essays on Educators, p. 43.

[22] D. E. Cooper, Authenticity and Learning, p. 58.

[23] J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, ed. D. Rajagopal (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964), p.143.

[24] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1973) p. 28.

[25] Ibid. , p. 29.

[26] J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, p. 142.

[27] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, (New York: Harper and Row Ltd., 1953), p. 66.

[28] J. Krishnamurti, Commentaries on Living, from the Notebooks of J. Krishnamurti, ed. D. Rajagopal (London: Victor Gollancz, 1956), p. 223.

[29] J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, p.143.

[30] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p. 28.

[31] J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, p. 143.

[32] "Choiceless awareness" of "what is" is the central notion in Krishnamurti's scheme of thought. It sums up his thought as no other phrase does.

[33] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, p. 65.

[34] Ibid.

[35] L. A. Reid, Ways of Knowledge and Experience (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. , 1961), p.14.

[36] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p.16.

[37] Iris Murdoch claims that she borrows the term 'attention' from Simon Weil. On the whole she wishes to use the word 'attention' as a suitable word, and a more general term like ' looking' as the neutral word. See Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1985), pp. 34-37.

[38] I accept L. A. Reid's view that in the apprehension of aesthetic values the cognitive and affective domains are linked together. See L. A. Reid, Ways of Understanding and Education, (London: Heinmann Educational Books Ltd. , i986), p. 24.

[39] Quoted in Ibid. , p. 4.

[40] L. A. Reid, Ways of Knowledge and Experience, pp. 13-14.

[41] I. Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), p. 1.

42 L. A. Reid, Ways of Understanding and Education , p. 35

43 Ibid. , pp. 35-36.

44 M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Anchor, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967)), p. 20.

45 J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence, pp. 358-359.

46 J. Krishanmurti, Education and the Significance of Life, p. 17.

47 J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, p.112.

48 D. W. Hamlyn, Perception, Learning and Self (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 244.

49 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self- An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd. , 1960), p. 106.

50 D.W. Hamlyn, Perception, Learning and Self, pp. 257- 258.

51 J. Krishnamurti, The Wholeness of Life (San Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1981), p. 215.

52 C. Suares, Krishnamurti and the Unity of Man (Bombay: Chetana, 1957), p. 8

53 R. K. Shringy, Philosophy of Krishnamurti (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Private Ltd. , 1977), p. 221.

54 Quoted in Andre Neil, Krishnamurti -- The Man in Revolt, (Bombay: Private Ltd. , 1957), p. 67.

55 Quoted in C Suares, Krishnamurti and the Unity of Man, p. 8.

56 Brockwood Park Educational Centre -- A Whole Approach to Education (Alresford: Alresford Ltd. , 1983), p. 6.

57 J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, pp.76-77.

58 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 50.

59 This example is based on an idea expressed by G. Ryle. See G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson & Co. , Ltd. ,1949) p.158.

60 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 49.

[61] Hirst's main concern is with the development of the rational mind. For a detailed discussion see P. H. Hirst, Knowledge and the Curriculum, pp. 30-46.

[62] R. S. Peters, "Democratic Values and Educational Aims," in Essays on Educators, R.S. Peters, p. 33.

[63] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 46-51.

[64] R. K. Elliott, "Education and Human Being 1," in Philosophers discuss Education, ed. S. C. Brown (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. , 1975), p. 50.

[65] M. Scriven, "Education for Survival," in Curriculum and the Cultural Revolution ed. M.Belanger, and D. Purpel (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1972), p.172.

[66] M. Bonnett,"Personal Authenticity and Public Standards: towards the Transcendence of a Dualism," in Education, Values and Mind, Essays for R. S .Peters, ed. D E. Cooper, .pp.116-117.

[67] R. S. Peters, "The Aims of Education -- A Conceptual Inquiry," in The Philosophy of Education, p.19.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p.112.

[72] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, pp. 13-15.

[73] J. Krishnamurti, Beginnings of Learning (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd. , 1978), p. 213.

[74] J. Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, ed. D. Rajagopal (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 9.

[75] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p. 92.

[76] J. Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, p.106.

[77] J. Needleman, "Psychiatry and the Sacred," in On the Way to Self- Knowledge, ed. J. Needleman and D. Lewis (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1976), p.17.

78 J.Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence (London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973), pp. 59-73.

79 T. Roszak, Unfinished Animal (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 229.

80 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 51-53.

81 J. J. Rousseau, Emile, Trans. Barbara Foxley (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. , 1911), p .V11. In particular, the three stages of development mentioned in Rousseau's Emile are purely physical and sensory up to the age of twelve, intellectual from twelve to fifteen, and moral from fifteen upwards.

82 F. Froebel, Education of Man, Trans: W. N. Hailmann (New York: D. Appleton & Co. , 1887), pp. 6-32.

83 R .F. Dearden, "Education as a process of growth", in A Critique of Current Educational Aims, Part 1 of Education and the Development of Reason, ed. R. F. Dearden. P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 64.

84 R.S.Peters, "Education as Initiation," in Philosophical Analysis and Education, ed. R. D. Archambault, p. 99.

85 Ibid. , p. 98. For more comments on both "moulding" and "growth" models of Education see I. Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, Illinois: Charles. C. Thomas, Publishers, 1960), pp. 47-59.

86 R. F. Dearden, "Education as a Process of Growth, in A Critique of Current Educational Aims, Part 1 of Education and the Development of Reason, ed. R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters, p. 65.

87 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 53.

88 M. Oakeshott, " Learning and Teaching," in The Concept of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p.162.

89 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 53-54.

90 See Ibid. , and P. H. Hirst, Knowledge and the Curriculum, pp. 141-147.

91 J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, p. 23.

[92] Ibid.

[93] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p. 90.

[94] J. Krishnamurti, Letters to the Schools (Madras: Krishnamurti Foundation India, 1981), pp. 81-82.

[95] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, pp. 25-26.

[96] Ibid. , p. 29.

[97] The 'lasting values' mentioned here appear in various places in Krishnamurti's writings.

[98] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, p.14 .

[99] Ibid.

[100] J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, ed. D. Rajagopal, p. 94.

[101] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, p. 25.

[102] Ibid. , p. 92.

[103] J. Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, ed. D. Rajagopal, p. 9.

[104] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p.18.

CHAPTER 2

EDUCATION AND THE EMOTIONS

Emotions powerfully affect human behaviour and conduct. Emotions can be expressed in a rational or irrational manner. Emotions themselves and not just their expressions can be irrational. Since education is concerned with the formation of character it must take an interest in the education of the emotions.

It is important to be clear about the nature of emotion before an attempt is made to discuss the notion of the education of the emotions. My concern in this chapter is two-fold. First, I will explicate Peters' and Krishnamurti's views on the nature of emotions. Second, an attempt will be made to explain Peters' notion of the "education of the emotions, " and Krishnamurti's view of "understanding of the emotions" as part of the educational task.

A. The Nature of Emotion

Peters' View of the Nature of Emotions :

Emotion, Belief and Appraisal

Peters considers emotions to be states of mind with a cognitive core. This means that different emotions are differentiated by the different beliefs that go with them. This is why Peters says that an emotion could be referred to as a feeling response to an appraisal of a situation.[1] One appraises a situation based on a belief appropriate to that particular situation. To appraise a situation is to evaluate or assess it. For Peters, a logically necessary condition for the correct application of the word 'emotion' is that some kind of appraisal should be involved. The situation that confronts one must relate to one in a particular way, and this is necessarily based on one's belief. Consequently, the appraisal of a particular situation would evoke a particular emotion appropriate to the resultant belief about the situation. The appraisal of a situation as threatening would

evoke fear, to apprehend it as frustrating would produce anger, and to see it as beneficial would bring forth joy.

Dearden similarly argues that emotions have an inner feeling side to them, and one difficult to describe except by metaphor. To convey what we mean we use hydraulic metaphors like swelling, rising and falling, and burning metaphors like boiling, simmering, flaring up and dying down. Plainly, emotions are not solely a matter of such feelings, as otherwise they would be no different from bodily sensations such as heartburn or indigestion. Whereas bodily sensations have bodily causes which we may or may not be able to discover and remove, emotions are linked to objects and states of affairs which are seen in a certain evaluative light.[2]

Alston correctly asserts that the terms 'appraisal,' 'evaluation' or 'judgement' could be misleading, if they are taken to imply a conscious formulation of a judgement. In all probability one can be frightened by something without having time to consciously assess the situation as dangerous. According to Alston, terms like 'apprehension' or 'recognition' are preferable. The best choice, he thinks, is to employ the term 'perceive' with the understanding that the word is used in a wide sense that is not restricted to sense data alone but can involve belief and intellectual realization as well.[3]

Then, to apprehend a situation one must have a certain belief about the situation. For instance, I come across a poisonous snake crossing my path. Here, I believe that there is a snake across the path. I also perceive the presence of the snake to be threatening. Consequently, I experience an emotion, which is fear. Again I believe a friend has betrayed me. I assess the behaviour of my friend as frustrating. Therefore, I experience an emotion; I feel angry. This is precisely why Peters argues that each emotion encapsulates its own specific kind of appraisal.

Emotion and its Object

Peters, like most philosophers, argues that emotions have objects. A number of names for emotions are attached to states of mind which are essentially intentional

directed, that is, in relation to an object. Emotions are about something; they are not merely states of feeling. They are directed towards the object. One feels an emotion in the way one perceives the object of one's emotion. A conceptual connection exists between a particular emotion and its object. For instance, in the previous example, the object of my fear is the snake, and my fear is directed towards the snake. My fear is not an objectless or nameless fear. The perception of the object evokes fear when I see the situation as threatening. Again, the object of my anger could be an unfaithful friend. I feel angry as I see the situation as a frustrating negation of a principle of loyalty. However, it might be the case that one may sometimes feel angry, sad or joyful, without knowing what one is angry, sad or joyful about.[4] This suggests that one may not be able to specify the object. For example, an assessment of Ranjith's behaviour would lead an onlooker to come to the conclusion that he is angry. He may slam the door, and kick a chair while passing, or speak rudely to someone. However, this does not mean that Ranjith's emotions do not have objects. It might be the case that he is unable to specify the object or objects as the correct object is not immediately obvious, and may be difficult to bring to conscious recognition. He may even mistake the object of such feelings.

Peters argues that "different emotions must involve different appraisals." [5] This could also mean, and explain the fact, that two individuals can appraise or evaluate the same situation in two different ways, resulting in two different emotions. For instance, say x and y are both walking along a railway track. X hears a sound of an approaching train at a sharp bend. He appraises the situation as life-threatening, and trembles with fear. The normal reaction would be for x to attempt to save his life. On the other hand, y has a secret intention of committing suicide, and thus he interprets the threat in a different manner, feeling no fear, and perhaps relief.

However, it is not clear that all emotions are mainly distinguished by the particular beliefs that go with them. Since emotions are complex, Peters would presumably say that an appraisal of a situation could evoke more than one type of emotion. But he is not

specific here, and it needs to be clarified. First, a belief about an appraisal of a situation may give rise to more than one type of emotion. Such a possibility may very well exist. Take the example of a prisoner who is tortured by his captors to elicit valuable information. The appraisal of the situation would normally produce both fear and anger. He believes that his captors would torture him, and he sees the situation as life-threatening. The pain of torture may evoke anger against his captors and fear. Here the person does experience two emotions. It would appear that these are inseparably linked to his beliefs namely, the threats evoke fear, and violation of rights evoke anger. Thus, the possibility that the appraisal of a particular situation could give rise to more than one kind of emotion cannot be ruled out. Second, different beliefs can produce the same emotion. For instance, both belief in violation of rights and criticism of one's religious beliefs can evoke anger.

Emotion as Passivity

Peters also views emotions as a category of passivity. Most of his discussion is based on the assumption that there is no intimate connection between emotion and motivated behaviour.[6] Peters includes views such as that of Magda Arnold who defines 'emotion' as "a felt tendency towards or away from an object" preceded by an appraisal of a situation.[7] But, his account of emotion differs from her notion as he does not suggest an intimate connection between emotion and motivated behaviour.

Peters distinguishes emotion from motives as being essentially passive, though both are the result of evaluating or appraising a situation. He contends that emotions and motives are distinct because emotions connect appraisals with "things that come over us" while motives connect appraisals with action.[8] In experiencing an emotion the individual is more or less affected by the emotion. The emotion takes him, as it were, by surprise, as it "overwhelms" him. He is necessarily excited, disturbed or upset by it. However, this does not mean, argues Peters, that because emotions are passive and motives directly shape actions, they are produced by different appraisals. In fact, an emotion and a motive

may be the result of the same appraisal.[9] Nonetheless, because experiencing emotion, as such, involves the subject as passive, says Peters, the only actions produced by emotions are involuntary, "for our knees knock, we tremble, we sweat, we blush." [10] To draw an example, Peters would differentiate fear as an emotion from fear as a motive. Say x comes across a ferocious dog, and the fear that x experiences overwhelms him. Possibly the fear would make him inactive so as to be rooted to the spot or involuntarily shiver with fear, though in fact he sees the situation as threatening. Here, according to Peters, fear refers to emotion, on account of the subject's passivity in relation to it -- he did not will it into being, and cannot cancel its effect at will. X could also run away from the impending danger, become frightened; then fear refers to a motive for action. In both instances x sees the dog as a danger and a threat to him. On such grounds, Peters maintains that the same appraisal evoked two distinct events namely, fear as an emotion and fear as a motive.

Peters further argues that the widely held view that emotions and actions are necessarily connected is based on a confusion. To justify his claim he says that "one cannot act in an appropriate way out of wonder or grief; one is overwhelmed by them."[11] Dunlop claims that such a contention is simply false. Quoting an example, Dunlop says that one can very well cancel an evening's engagement when one hears of a death of a friend.[12] His point is that the action cannot be accounted for without reference to the emotion. It must be stated that Peters discounts mourning rituals as they cannot be referred to as "appropriate action." In Peters' opinion "appropriate action" must involve taking means to a desired end.[13] It seems most likely, however, that the cancelling of an evening's engagement here should be referred to as appropriate action rather than as a mourning ritual, as a ritual is a pattern of actions and gestures already laid out by custom and followed. In this case the funeral would be the ritual, and staying home because one does not feel up to enjoyment is the appropriate action.

On occasion one can act in an appropriate way even out of wonder, and awe. For instance, when I see the Niagara Falls for the first time it may undeniably elicit a sense of wonder. I deliberately stop further activity in order to perceive the different features and be attentive to them. The wholistic visual image, the coherent whole -- that is Niagara Falls - would lead me to shun all distractions in the appreciation of its immense beauty. This, I believe, is to act in an appropriate way which even in Peters' sense is action which can be interpreted as a "means to an end."

Some writers contend that emotions are active phenomena. It is interesting to note that Solomon's definition of emotions excludes the element of passivity. He thinks emotions are "hasty judgements" and since we make them, they become activities and therefore voluntary, so that emotions are chosen.[14] His emphasis on the active element in emotions excludes any kind of passivity. However, Solomon's view does not seem to explain situations where we speak of people being "paralysed by fear," "trembling and quivering with anger," or "squirming with guilt." It seems to me that emotional experience necessarily includes a passive element as well as an active component.

Though Peters seems to be correct in maintaining that emotions are essentially connected with passivity, it also seems to be the case that there is a component of activity in both the concept of and the experience of emotion. By this I mean that emotions can make people active as well as involving the subject as passive in the experiencing of them. Recent work emphasizes that experiencing an emotion is partly an active affair. It involves attention paid to selected features, interpretation of perceived features of one's situation, and making judgement of value.[15]

According to Peters, to experience an emotion is often to be overwhelmed by it, and this is not desirable as in certain types of appraisal it tends to "warp and cloud one's perception and judgement."[16] This in fact is stipulative, and cannot be generalized to every situation of emotional experience. To take an example, Priyani, say, who is not closely associated with Sriyani, has helped her in a particular difficult situation. As is to

be expected, Sriyani will have a sense of gratitude to Priyani. The feeling of gratitude that Sriyani experiences may overwhelm her for a while, as Priyani is not one of her closest friends. At the same time she perceives ways in which her friend has helped her, appreciates such help, and makes a value judgement which consequently leads her to feel and probably express gratitude to Priyani.

In the above example, the evaluative component of the emotion of feeling gratitude can be referred to as an active component of the emotion. By evaluation I do not refer to the initial appraisal of the situation, in Peters' terms. By evaluation I refer to the subsequent judgement of value that Sriyani makes in relation to the emotion of feeling grateful. This evaluative component forms a part of the emotional experience of what it is to be grateful and is not just linked to the initial appraisal of the situation.

Hepburn contends that to experience a particular emotion involves not only a perception of facts of the situation, but also an evaluation of facts. According to him the cognitive elements and the evaluative elements can be brought together in the notion of "seeing as." He would say that to feel apprehensiveness is to see such and such as possibly dangerous.[17]

John White argues that emotions have an active and passive side to them. He claims that the term 'emotion', unlike 'feeling,' is something of a technical term devised by philosophers and psychologists, and, so has a less secure place than, say, 'feeling' in ordinary language. He argues that even if we concede to Peters that the word 'emotion' is used to connote passivity, it would only be a point about the usage of the word. In his view it does not justify the more substantive claim that emotions themselves are passive phenomena.[18]

Krishnamurti's View of the Nature of Emotion

Feeling and Emotion

It is important to note that Krishnamurti, unlike Peters, does not furnish a theory

of emotion. In his educational writings, talks, and discussions he uses the terms 'emotions, feelings,' 'passions,' and 'sentiments' more or less interchangeably to refer to emotion words like 'fear,' 'anger,' 'envy,' 'jealousy,' 'pride,' and 'wonder.'

My concern here is to elucidate Krishnamurti's view of the nature of emotions. At this point, I think it is necessary to note that when he uses the word 'feelings' he is often referring to emotions such as anger, fear, jealousy and envy. To quote an example, he says,"when we have a feeling we name it. . . We say it is pleasurable or painful. When we are angry we give that feeling a name, we call it anger."[19] I am not suggesting that he sees the words 'feeling' and 'emotion' as being co-extensive as he distinctly says at one point that feeling is crucially different from emotion and sentimentality.[20] Moreover, he occasionally refers to feeling as distinct from emotion when he refers to such feelings as, e.g. , the "feeling of separation." [21] However, his usage could be criticized since he often uses the term 'feeling' to refer to emotion and vice-versa. It is apparent that 'feeling' and 'emotion' are not synonymous as viewed in mainstream philosophy of education. In fact, feelings can be distinguished from emotions. Therefore it seems appropriate to clarify the terms, however briefly.

It is common usage that 'feelings' refers to bodily sensations, and 'emotions' to a state of mind brought about by a perception of a situation. A person can feel angry without a necessary reason for feeling angry. Such a feeling or sensation may simply be induced by an administration of a drug, and does not need to have "directedness towards" specific objects or events, as in the case of an emotion, characterized as a subjective reaction to or from. "I feel angry" simply means I am angry. But, my feeling of anger does not need an evocative object or event as reference, in the terms of the previous discussion. To have a feeling of anger as an emotion, there are other requirements. Merely to say "I am angry" does not adequately describe it as emotional. It requires more information, such as "what I am angry about."[22]

An emotion is not just a feeling. Consequently, one cannot identify an emotion merely by its being felt. If emotion could be identified merely by its feeling it would not be possible to make a distinction between emotions which have similar feelings. For instance, the feelings associated with envy and jeolousy do not differ much, and these in fact do not distinguish envy from jeolousy.[23]

Nonetheless, emotions involve feeling. For instance, I cannot regret not being able to help a friend without feeling anything about it. However, there are writers who claim that it is possible to have an emotion which does not involve characteristic sensation or feeling. Pitcher claims that when a person's attention is strongly diverted to other matters, he might have an emotion without the sensations or feelings that normally go with it.

> A young man P, is being interviewed for an important job and he is extremely anxious to make a good impression. One of the interviewers, Q, makes an insulting remark to P, and thereafter an observer might detect an icy tone creeping into P's voice when he addresses Q, although there are no signs of anger. The iciness is not intentional, however, in fact P is so intent on following the conversation and on creating a good impression that he is not aware of it; and he is too engrossed to experience any feelings of anger. I think we might say, under these circumstances, that P was nevertheless angry with Q.[24]

It would perhaps be clearer if Pitcher said that P <u>was</u> angry but not <u>consciously</u> aware of it, or at least did not at the time have the anger in <u>focal</u> consciousness. With this qualification the account seems true to experience. We have emotions not consciously felt, but which affect us.

<u>Appraisal and the Object of Emotion</u>

Having distinguished between feeling and emotion, it seems appropriate now to support the claim that when Krishnamurti uses the term 'feelings' he is often referring to emotions. In <u>The Impossible Question</u>, he draws an example to illustrate fear as an emotion. He says that in wild parts of India, Africa or America, one may meet a bear, tiger or snake. When one comes across a snake there is only instant physical response,

e.g. , you run away, you sweat or try to do something about it; this is a conditioned response as we have been told for generations we must be careful of snakes and other wild animals. To protect oneself from danger is an intelligent action.[25]

Elsewhere he says one is angry if one is physically assaulted or something of value is taken away from one.[26] Again, he says that jealousy implies dissatisfaction with oneself and envy with others. To be discontented with oneself is the very beginning of envy. One wants to be like someone else who has more knowledge, more power, and a better position in relation to material goods than oneself.[27]

Though Krishnamurti sometimes uses the words 'feeling' and 'emotion' interchangeably, it is evident that in the above examples he is referring to fear, anger, jealousy and envy as emotions in the generally accepted sense. In each situation fear, anger, jealousy and envy are portrayed as a subjective feeling response to an appraisal of a situation. Furthermore, the appraisal and the response are inseparably linked.

To justify my claim I think that further explication is necessary. It is evident that he considers emotions as being object-directed. In the first example, the perception of the snake -- the object -- led to the understanding of the situation as a threat to physical safety, and consequently evoked fear (if it did). Elsewhere when he states that "fear is not an abstraction but it exists in relation to something,"[28] he is specifically stating that emotions have evocative objects. In the second example, of assault, the assessment of the situation as painful evoked anger against the agent who is responsible for the act. In the third example jealousy and envy were also object-directed involving power, knowledge, material goods, etc.

Krishnamurti also refers to emotions that at first appear to have no objects. He speaks of "psychological fears" which he thinks are "created by the psychological complexity of thought." [29] These, according to him, are different from fears based on objective events. Such "psychological fears" arise from the thoughts of the future, the unknown, failure to achieve, loneliness, and of an occurrence of a future illness.[30] Now

fear of the unknown and fear of the imagined future may not necessarily be examples of emotions without objects. It may be the case that evocative objects cannot usually or easily be clearly identified due to their abstractness, complexity and escape from conscious purview.

Emotion and Conditioned Beliefs

With regard to an appraisal of a situation it appears that Krishnamurti would say that emotions are normally linked to conditioned appraisals of situations. The individual would appraise the situation as threatening, frustrating, or joyful in the way one is conditioned to appraise situations. It would seem that Krishnamurti regards fear, anger, jealousy, and other emotions as conditioned responses to conditioned appraisals of situations. According to him, "a feeling is not beautiful or ugly, it is just feeling. But we look at it through our religious and social conditioning and give it a label. We say it is a good or bad feeling, so we distort or destroy it." [31]

However, as stated earlier, Krishnamurti is not of the opinion that a conditioned feeling response to a conditioned appraisal of a situation is always incorrect. Though we are conditioned to be afraid of snakes and wild animals, employing such beliefs to protect oneself from danger involves intelligent and appropriate action. But, in relation to emotions, like jealousy, envy, and pride, he thinks that the individual apprehends a situation from a conditioned comparative point of view, as one is here conditioned to compare oneself with another. It is when one compares oneself with another that one is dissatisfied with oneself. Krishnamurti would say comparison brought about by ambition and the desire for more leads to animosity between individuals, as those who do not succeed will be envious of others. He says that "envy arises through measurement. I have little and you have more, or I am dull and you are clever. I have a low position and you have a high position . . . so, through comparison, through measurement this envy arises." [32]

However, it seems unlikely that individuals apprehend situations in a conditioned manner in relation to each and every type of emotion. This is particularly so with emotions such as wonder and grief. For example, the sight of the Grand Canyon would evoke a sense of wonder which is a naturally sensitive reaction rather than a conditioned response. A conditioned belief would not by itself produce the experience of wonder. Wonder is a feeling arising from spontaneous sensitivity. Again, the death of a close friend would give rise to grief which would be a naturally sensitive reaction to loss of what is precious and not a situation specific to a conditioned emotion.

Hepburn argues that there is an important distinction to be made between conditioned and unconditioned emotional response. He speaks of emotions which are blurred so as to become "emotional clichés." These, according to Hepburn, are determined or conditioned by popular culture. He argues that people are more or less conditioned to feel or react to certain situations emotionally in some generalized manner. This restricts the range of our emotions to a lowest common denominator of human response to generalized human situations. When emotions are conditioned by popular culture, the naturally individual responses become what Hepburn calls the "greeting card stereotype." [33]

In sum, perhaps the most distinctive feature of Krishnamurti's discussion of emotion is his emphasis on the way it can so easily become a conditioned or pre-determined response, implying the danger of feeling and action which is somewhat mechanical -- unintelligent.

B. Education of the Emotions

Education of the emotions involves a recognition and development of appropriate ways of expressing one's emotions. An "emotional" person is maladjusted and often irrational. Such a person hampers his own self-development and his effectiveness in relating to others.[34] Since, as has been argued, emotions are linked to objects and states

of affairs which are seen in a certain evaluative light (and so open to further understanding) they are said to be educable.[35] We could call a person emotionally educated or not depending partially, though importantly, on the manner in which an individual expresses his emotions. Educating the emotions may take different forms such as understanding, transforming, controlling, suppressing, or sublimating. The following inquiry aims to discover which of these Peters and Krishnamurti focus upon, why, and the strength of their positions.

Peters' View of the Education of the Emotions

Cognitive and Moral Aspects

Peters does think in terms of educating the emotions. His view of education of the emotions is closely linked to his notion of "education as initiation." Since, in his view, education involves the initiation into worthwhile activities, basically involving the development of knowledge and understanding, education must consist in bringing these passive states, through their cognitive element, under the control of the truth of reason.[36] This is considered important as otherwise emotions could disrupt the life of reason, thus leaving one open to the danger of reacting confusedly in crucial situations in life.

According to Peters, there is a two-fold task in educating the emotions, which in effect involves two inter-connected aspects of the same process. There is the development of appropriate appraisals, and the control and "canalization" of passivity.[37]

Peters' notion of the development of appraisals and associated beliefs is that it is largely a cognitive endeavour. Since emotions are differentiated by the different beliefs that go with them they are considered as being cognitive. As such, to change an emotion is necessarily to bring about a cognitive change in the belief which encapsulates that emotion. For instance, to relieve a child of a fear of moths is to help the child discover that moths are harmless or even attractive. Therefore, education of the emotions involves an intellectual grasp of the basis of appraisal in emotions. Such an understanding of the

emotions, Peters maintains, is brought about by being initiated into the forms of knowledge.

In order to bring in a justification for the development of criteria for appropriate appraisals, Peters argues that "education of the emotions is inescapably a moral matter."[38] This view is based on the belief that emotions and motives could be regarded as virtues as well as vices. For instance, benevolence and pity could be regarded as virtues and jealousy and envy as vices. This indicates that they are either in agreement or in conflict with fundamental moral principles, such as concern for truth, respect for persons, and consideration for people's interests. He contends that the development of appropriate appraisals would lead pupils out of error and towards the all-important concern for truth. This is precisely why Peters thinks that those who are concerned with the education of the emotions must necessarily approach this task from a moral standpoint.[39]

An obvious element in Peters' view of the development of appropriate appraisals is to ensure that a major part of pupils' emotions are true to the facts of situations and not based on "false or irrelevant beliefs."[40] When an appraisal of a situation involves a belief which is based on prejudice, superstition, or misconception of facts, then the particular emotion is said to be based on false belief. More often one evaluates a situation in an unreflective way. Say, for instance, both Nimal and Kamal intend to participate in a swimming competition. Though both have almost equal chances of winning the competition, Kamal is secretly jealous of Nimal, believing Nimal to be superior, and this affects their relationship and the pleasure of participation. Eventually Kamal proves to be the winner. As such his appraisal of the situation was based on a false belief, namely, that Nimal's participation in the competition would threaten his chance of winning.

Peters also claims that certain appraisals can be represented as being derived from unconscious beliefs. Such beliefs could in some cases be false beliefs. Quoting Freud, he says in such instances it might be the case that the individual is not aware of his beliefs.[41] Say, for example, a child is threatened to be severely punished by the father if caught

playing truant, and this belief has been repressed. In later life the child encounters difficulty in dealing with all or most authority figures due to the repressed generalization to a false belief -- a belief which is also logically irrelevant in regard to persons other than the father. The child's later fear of any authority figures as such is thus an irrational emotion.

Peters quite reasonably asserts that one type of the education of the emotions that has to be attempted is to eliminate false and irrelevant beliefs since they increase the likelihood of a person being emotionally unstable or maladjusted. This may well hamper one's own development, and also seriously affect one's inter-personal relationships.

Mary Warnock accepts Peters' concern about elimination of false beliefs. However, she seems to think that such tidying up of false beliefs does not always work. She is not suggesting that such a course of action is ineffective. Her premise is that changing a belief does not always or necessarily change an emotion.[42] This seems to me to be a fair criticism. It may be the case that an individual understands the cause and the nature of an irrational emotion, but may still feel the same way when later faced with the similar situation. To be more explicit, the individual's appraisal of the situation would be more or less similar, evoking the same type of emotion.

Furthermore, Mary Warnock says that if we are given the "horrors" or "creeps" by something, it is hard to eliminate them by reason.[43] This is importantly true. It would in fact be pointless to tell a person who is engaged in exploring a cave not be frightened. The mere fact of a bat flapping its wings could give one the creeps evoking fear. These examples, however, do not indicate that education of the emotions should not concern itself with the elimination of false and irrelevant beliefs, nor that reasoning does not help in understanding an emotion, or that one cannot make an emotion more reasonable.

Peters advocates the technique of "re-education" for certain irrational conduct and appraisals which are represented as being derived from unconscious beliefs. If the person is helped to recall facts relating to false beliefs, this would be one method of the re-

education of the emotions. To quote the former example, the boy who had an irrational fear of authority figures would be helped to recall what he believes about his father, and whether it was true or not, and that it was not invariably true of authority figures who reminded him of his father.

Furthermore, in the development of appropriate appraisals children should be helped to recognize and react to emotions in themselves and others on a continuing basis. They must be brought to perceive emotions which actually exist. For instance, one must not too hastily assume jealousy in a person, when he may not be jealous at all. Peters would say that the concern for truth will lead them to reveal more of their true emotions to others.

Control and Canalization

The second related way of educating the emotions is the control and the "canalization" of emotional expression. To control an emotion is to prevent the expression of one's emotions from becoming chaotic. To canalize an emotion is to change the form of expression of an emotion into a more acceptable manner.

According to Peters, the development of appropriate appraisals, "is made doubly difficult because of the countervailing influence of more primitive wild types of appraisal that warp and cloud perception and judgement, and abet self-deception and insecurity."[44] For Peters there is a conceptual connection between education and the development of reason; so education of the emotions, just as much as the study of science or history, must concern itself with the pursuit of truth. To suggest that certain appraisals are primitive is to indicate that they are either not within the reach of reason, or cannot be brought under the sway of reason. Therefore, the only possible explanation, according to Peters, is to bring such emotions under control. Say, for instance, a child who has an irrational fear of moths may be able to eliminate that fear following an explanation that moths are harmless creatures. However, it would be more difficult to dispel a more deep-seated fear, such as

fear of darkness, or fear of heights. In such cases, Peters would say that education of the emotions would take the form of control.

But control of the emotions does not necessarily take the form of education. For example, emotions can be altered through conditioning or administration of drugs. However, Peters assures us that such a method is only acceptable to neutralize an existing condition which would enable a more positive educational technique to get a firmer grip.[45]

I suspect that Peters' view of the control of emotions has two implications. The first relates to the distorted use of the term 'education.' It is inappropriate or ironic to say that we are educating someone when in fact what is being attempted is either controlling or suppressing emotions.[46] Secondly, a technique such as conditioning or administration of drugs suggests a "training of the emotions" rather than the "education of the emotions." Elsewhere, Peters distinguishes between educating and training the emotions as different activities. However, conditioning and the administration of drugs which Peters considers as techniques involved in the "educating of the emotions" seem to indicate a mere "training of the emotions." This, in Peters' own terms, is a contradiction. To be more explicit, according to Peters, training suggests "the acquisition of appropriate appraisals and habits of response in limited conventional situations and lacks wider cognitive implications of education."[47] Moreover, he says that in the training of the emotions what is important is that a person should not give way to emotion or should express the emotion in an appropriate way. Peters specifically states that what he is interested is in the "education of the emotions" rather than "training of the emotions."[48] But, conditioning and the administration of drugs, in Peters own terms, "lack wider cognitive implications," and sees to it "that a person should not give way to emotion or should express the emotion in an appropriate way."

The second approach which Peters suggests is that used by Freud and advocated by Spinoza, namely that of bringing a person to have some kind of insight into the source of his irrationalities. This would be the method of psycho-analysis.[49]

Another approach, argues Peters, is that envisaged by Spinoza -- that of using an emotion to control an emotion. The most effective way of loosening the hold on us of more primitive emotions, claims Peters, is to develop what Koestler calls "self-transcending emotions." Such self- transcending emotions include notably love, a sense of justice and a concern for truth.[50]

Now, Peters gives us a reason for this. According to Peters, we interpret the world in a self-referential way; as such we see the world and others through our own hopes, fears, and wishes. He thinks that this cannot be remedied even with a better understanding of ourselves. Nonetheless, in his view, the development of "self-transcending emotions" could loosen the hold on us of more primitive ones, particularly in so far as they are self-referential.[51]

Furthermore, since an appraisal of a situation could give rise to a motive for action as well as an emotion, one can attempt to control the subjective intensity of an emotion by the development of appropriate action patterns. Instead of writhing with sympathy and fuming with moral indignation one can be motivated by sympathy or moral indignation to act in appropriate ways.[52] For instance, instead of being overwhelmed by sympathy for the tornado victims one is acting in an appropriate way morally and for the dissipation of such emotion when one assists in such a situation. Presumably, instead of fuming with moral indignation at a student who has bullied another student it would be more appropriate to help him to identify the ill-effects of his conduct. Peters insists that the educator could not evoke <u>any</u> type of motive to counter more primitive ones but rather should evoke "positive sentiments such as respect, benevolence, and the sense of justice."[53] Furthermore, regarding certain generalized appraisals children should not only

be made to understand that certain things are wrong or good, but they must also be led to see the reasons for or against such courses of action.[54]

The Expression of Emotions

In relation to the control and canalization of passivity the manner in which emotions are expressed becomes a relevant factor. Peters would say that the expression of emotions through speech or symbolic gesture, including the forms of art, is a form of canalization. To resort to such a course of action is to prevent oneself from being dominated by extreme emotional passivity. A canalized form of emotional expression, according to Peters, could be an intermediate situation between being affected by a passive state specific to an appraisal and a drastic form of action, which may seem to be associated with such an emotion.[55] A person without a way of canalizing emotion would quiver with hate and boil with anger to such intensity as to be led to damaging and even murderous actions. How could one canalize murderous hate and anger? Modern clinical psychology, e.g. , gets the person to imagine a pillow or punching bag to be the hated person, and to pound it until one is exhausted. Then one can regard it all in a balanced way.

Furthermore, instead of squirming with moral indignation it is possible to express one's emotion in a piece of satirical writing or in the composition of a poem. The technique of sublimation, according to Peters would be relevant here.[56] To sublimate an emotion is to direct emotional expression into avenues which would be personally meaningful as well as socially acceptable.

Krishnamurti's Notion of the Understanding of the Emotions

Krishnamurti speaks in terms of the understanding of the emotions,[57] rather than of the education of the emotions. To understand an emotion is a way of educating an emotion. When one understands an emotion, one becomes aware of it, its causes, its implications, its sensations, and its relation to one's subjective life as a whole. However,

there are different and somewhat opposing conceptions of what is meant by 'understanding,' partially involving the familiar difference of degrees of understanding, as usually signified by the metaphors of depth, breadth, etc.

Specialized and Colloquial Notions of 'Understanding'

Before going into the nature and analysis of Krishnamurti's conception of understanding it seems necessary, for the clarity afforded by comparison and contrast, to examine the term 'understanding' in the more specific context of educational discussions, and the more general context of ordinary usage. In fact, the uses of the term 'understanding' in these domains are significantly different from Krishnamurti's.

Now, the term 'understanding' as used in educational discussions is usually closely connected with and often almost synonymous with knowledge.' Here the use of the term 'knowledge' refers to that which is generally regarded as true and which can be expressed in some propositional form. According to Hamlyn, to understand anything is to have knowledge about it in some respect.[58] However, this does not suggest that the verbs 'to know' and 'to understand' are co-terminus. In fact, the term 'understanding' has a wider application than the term 'knowledge.' There could be a whole understanding of a body of knowledge. To understand the theory of relativity is to understand it thoroughly, whereas to know the theory of relativity is to have some knowledge about it which may not necessarily be at significant depth.

The term 'to understand' is also used in a familiar colloquial sense, where one understands something as being the case which has been told by a believable authority. Here there is also some evidence appearing to justify what is being told. I understand that "there will be scattered flurries tonight." "I understand that all the libraries will be closed today." 'Understanding' as used by Krishnamurti, however, particularly as used in connection with the awareness directed towards emotion, is not synonymous with having the aforementioned knowledge or information.

Krishnamurti's Notion of Understanding

For Krishnamurti, to understand an emotion is to understand it totally and give complete "attention" to it at the moment one feels it -- be it anger, fear, envy, jealousy or pleasure, for example. The awareness of this special "attention" directed to immediately felt anger, fear, jealousy, envy or any type of negative emotion can lead to the transformative understanding of the particular emotion.[59] Now, this total understanding involves not only the direct "attention" of observing the emotion presently occurring, and its roots in appraisals and beliefs, but seeing its relation to the complex self-identity conception he refers to as the ego.

In Life Ahead, he says that to understand is to see the truth of something directly without any barrier of words, prejudices or motives.[60] For Krishnamurti, understanding is not an intellectual process of assessing the truth value and explanatory power of statements. It crucially involves a primarily non-propositional aspect of intelligence implying the awareness or direct perception of "what is." The "what is" of the causes of an emotion has to be understood in this way. Later a particular person may wish to communicate this in propositional form. The former necessarily implies what he calls the "awakening of intelligence." The term 'understanding' we are told, involves in a unified activity of both reason and feeling.[61] Krishnamurti says:

> You can understand totally (not intellectually, there is no such thing as understanding intellectually, there is only understanding totally). You can understand totally and it is like looking at that sunset with your eyes, with your nerves; it is then you understand. And to understand jealousy, envy. . . (to understand them and give your complete attention at the moment anything happens, at the moment you feel envious, angry, jealous or feel dishonest with yourself), then, if you understand that . . . you can inquire what has brought his about.[62]

To outline briefly, rationality as using reason is not a concept susceptible to a simple definition. In its most general sense it is the ability to perceive and understand a situation.[63] One not only perceives a situation in a particular way, one can give good reasons for perceiving it in that particular way. The feeling component may be interpreted according to Susan Langer as a living process becoming aware of itself.[64] Feeling is the immediate awareness, from the "inside" of conscious human experience. Reid's general theme about feeling is that it is an inseparable part of everything that happens in the conscious life of the individual including cognition.[65]

I think that an example would be helpful here. One can look at a sunset with "total attention." There will be good reasons for perceiving the sunset as being immensely beautiful. These would be its brightness, the splash of colours, its particular arrangement, and its peaceful nature. The perception of these features would involve the reason component. One also experiences a sense of beauty, a feeling that pervades one's whole being, or that which permeates oneself. This sensation would constitute the feeling component. One does not say, "hey, this is a fantastic sunset," and not feel anything about it. Neither can one feel the sense of beauty and not recognize why it can be considered as being beautiful.

Even if we grant the validity of Krishnamurti's conception of understanding as being inclusive of reason and feeling, and as being non-propositional, we still need to ask a further question. Within his conception of understanding are feelings controlled by strict reason? Does this involve a conflict at some point between reason and feelings, or is there a harmony between reason and feelings?

In this respect it is important to note that not only does understanding involve reason and feeling, but they are also harmonized. This means feelings are neither controlled by strict reason, nor are they at any point in conflict with each other. It seems to me that Reid's characterization of the apprehension of aesthetic and moral values comes closer to Krishnamurti's conception of understanding. Reid argues that the

apprehension of aesthetic and moral values is not possible without the cognitive and the affective indivisibly unified and fused together, or working together as one.[66]

In a somewhat similar manner Krishnamurti would say that understanding of an emotion is not merely an intellectual grasp or assessment of one's emotion, but a single process involving both reason and feeling. Moreover, understanding an emotion is a complex process. One does not only become aware of the appraisal of the situation, one personally observes the nature, roots, structure and physical manifestations of each emotion. (Much of this, if wished, could be put into propositional form.) It must be remembered that Krishnamurti's explicit concern is more with certain kinds of negative emotions. Therefore, to understand fear, anger, jealousy or envy is not only to see how these emotions are caused, but also to understand directly the whole structure and roots of one's emotions at the time one subjectively experiences them. Krishnamurti expresses his ideas in the following manner :

> Now when you look at this whole phenomenon of fear,or at the various forms of fear, physical and psychological,with all their divisions, in all their varieties, when you see the whole structure of fear, what is the root of it all? Unless I discover the root of it, I shall go on manipulating the parts, modifying the parts. So I must find the root of it . . . Be sure for yourself, what is the root of it, discover it, unfold it, look at it." [67]

"Total Understanding" and the Elimination of Destructive Emotions

In the above statement Krishnamurti suggests that, like fear, each emotion has its own structure. Then, understanding fear is not simply understanding what fear is, but understanding fear as it is, to understand the roots and the structure of fear as immediately present for the individual.. However, it may be the case that a critic may say that it is not all that simple. Even if an individual understands fear as it is, one may still be frightened. It seems clear that Krishnamurti would say that there has not been total understanding,

since this brings about a spontaneous transformation. Accordingly, he would say that fear could be eliminated if there was total understanding of the confused structure supporting fear.

An obvious element in Krishnamurti's view of understanding of the emotions, is to understand them in the context of an understanding of one's conditioning. He claims that one cannot understand an emotion when one looks at it through knowledge as a system of concepts. Here again he is referring to destructive emotions, particularly "psychological fears."

> Why can't I look at that fear? Why do I have to have concepts at all? And do not concepts prevent me from looking at that fear . . . So concepts are a barrier; they act as a barrier which prevent you from looking. [68]

In another instance he says,

> we look at everything through concepts. Right? Concepts, beliefs, ideas, knowledge or experience or what appeals to us . . . Now, are they of any value? Being on an abstract level, conceptual, have they any value?. . . Have concepts any significance in that sense, in relationship? [69]

Now Krishnamurti distinctly says that the intervention of concepts is detrimental to the understanding of emotions. Is Krishnamurti exaggerating here? How do concepts prevent one from appraising a situation as frustrating or fearful? Again, how does a concept become a barrier? What does he mean by the question, "why do I have to have concepts at all?"

One wants to say that concepts are necessary. As Pring puts it, to have a concept is to have a principle of unity in one's experience.[70] What makes a concept intelligible is language. A concept is a tool of thought. To have a concept of red is to be able to bring experiences together because of some features that these experiences have in common. A child at a certain age will be able to identify the colour red in different items. Here the quality red is the unifying factor. To have a concept of ball is to see a common feature in a range of otherwise distinct experiences. In this example, the common feature will be

the use to which different objects are put. To acquire concepts is to acquire the capacity to think, and to acquire different kinds of concepts is to acquire the power to think effectively.[71] Conceptual development is the development of the ability to clarify, identify and discriminate things in terms of a class to which they seem to belong. Without this discriminatory power the world would be apprehended as a hazy jumble of objects and events.

It is difficult to imagine how concepts could be a barrier to the understanding of an emotion. Say, for instance, while on a safari one meets a tiger. Since the tiger is a ferocious animal and one sees the situation as dangerous it normally evokes fear. This means that the object of the emotion is conceptualized. One thinks of the situation as dangerous since one knows the complex concept tiger, such that it is a ferocious animal and "to be feared." If one comes across a cat, despite the somewhat physical similarity in miniature form, one does not fear it, for one knows the concept cat, such that the cat is not a dangerous animal.

It is obvious that Krishnamurti uses the term 'concept' rather loosely for which he could be criticized. When he asks the question, "whether it is necessary to have concepts at all," his reference is to certain kinds of concepts, and not concepts in general. One would want to say that his reference is not to concepts such as red, house, number, or photosynthesis. His reference is to concepts such as god, religion, nationalism, and social class.[72] Instead of referring to concepts in a general sense he should have mentioned the specific concepts he is against. What Krishnamurti considers as being detrimental are concepts which condition (in his special sense of the term) the individual to the habit of a particular pattern of thinking. His premise is that one cannot totally understand emotions when one is conditioned to think in a particular way. As envisaged by him in a modern society emotions such as fear, envy or jealousy arise out of conditioned comparisons. Therefore, these emotions cannot be understood so as to be freed from

them without ceasing comparison and the accompanying conditioning to have more, to be like someone else, etc. He specifically says,

> I am jealous . . . That is a fact. I see that in my life . . . I am jealous of the man who has more, more of worldly goods and of intellect. -- I am envious. I know how envy comes. It comes through comparison . . . Now can I live with that, understand it, not have concepts about it? [73]

A somewhat similar view regarding the education of the emotions is put forward by Nietszche. According to Nietszche, an education of the emotions threatens emotional capacity.[74] Both Nietzsche's and Krishnamurti's view differ from the prevailing accepted view that it is through knowledge that emotional attitudes are best shaped. Nietzsche's view is best grasped in connection with two metaphors borrowed from a long tradition of German thought. First the metaphor of knowledge as destructive and dissolving, and second, the metaphor of knowledge as placing a veil or screen between the individual and his world. The screen metaphor is expressed in his remark in the following manner

> Whoever let concepts, opinions, past events, books enter between himself and things will never see things for the first time.[75]

In summary, at this point we can perhaps regard Krishnamurti's transformative understanding of emotion as being impossible if the individual brings conditioned concepts to bear on a situation, so that a meaning which is unnecessary is imposed. For example, <u>fear</u> of a tiger, in addition to knowing the tiger is potentially dangerous, will arise if one has uncritically accepted the false belief to which one has become conditioned that tigers will <u>always</u> try to kill, and that, therefore, no other reaction than fear is possible or appropriate. Similarly, if one is conditioned to believe that one must be better than others, or have what they have, then jealousy and envy <u>will</u> arise. Being aware of one's conditioning, and its arbitrariness, thus becomes crucial in freeing oneself of such emotions.

Analysis and the Understanding of Emotions

De Nicola sees understanding of the emotions as one possible way to educate the emotions. His view of understanding the emotions ranges from simple introspection to sustained psycho-analysis where one sorts out and identifies one's feelings, the appraisals they manifest, and their true objects. He also argues that when we understand our emotions they no longer have the power to overcome us and such self- knowledge is desirable because it promotes self-control.[76]

Now, it is necessary to emphasize that Krishnamurti's notion of the understanding of the emotions does not entail analysis in the form of introspection or psycho-analysis as advocated by Freud and the psychiatrists. He does not deny that one can inquire analytically. Under analysis it is possible to unravel bit by bit and come upon the nature, the structure, and the cause and effect of emotional strife. His premise is that it is not the way out. It is also possible, says Krishnamurti, to perceive instantly the root cause of the emotional conflict. He thinks that direct perception is more fruitful than analysis. It is his premise that if one understands the analytical process one would become aware of its shortcomings and direct the energy given to analysis in a different direction.[77] So for him the whole process of analysis, whether it is introspective or intellectual, is totally wrong in terms of the following discussion. However, he does not rule out its necessity for those who are somewhat, or greatly, unbalanced.[78]

Krishnamurti sees two defects in the analytical process. Firstly, analysis implies the existence of a self that is analysed and a self that participates in the analysis. This means there is a division between the analyser and that which is being analysed.[79] Krishnamurti presumably would say that the division between the analyser and analysed would hinder total "attention." In Krishnamurti's understanding of "what is" there is no separation of the analyser and the analysed. It is essential to Krishnamurti that one can see "what is" without having the desire to alter what one sees. The whole conditioning of society is based on the idea of effort as a process of altering "what is." This is often true

in the use of the psychological systems stemming from, e.g. , Freud, Jung, or behaviour therapy, which, under the name of "seeing," encourage an effort to be different, rather than to be aware instantly of "what is," as it is, and allowing that to bring its own kind of change.[80]

Secondly, Krishnamurti, thinks that the success of analysis depends on the accuracy of analysis. If at any one point the analyser is not able to analyse accurately his conclusions will impede subsequent analysis.[81] What he is suggesting is that if the analyser makes a wrong move he consequently builds a false edifice of thought. This would impede subsequent analysis. With self-knowledge based on direct awareness, there is no edifice of thinking, analysis or otherwise, to go wrong.

Understanding of Emotions and Children

Now, assuming one grants the validity of Krishnamurti's approach to the understanding of the emotions we still need to ask how does this relate to children? It may be the case, as Dunlop suggests, that with regard to feelings of discontent or restlessness the right way to discover what it is that we are unconsciously affected by is to let the desire or affect come to the surface of consciousness of its own accord.[82] One could possibly suggest that an adult is capable of this activity on the whole, but not a child. When we speak about the education of the emotions our main concern is with children. In this respect it seems impossible to think that a child will be able to understand the roots, and the structure of his fear of darkness, or for that matter of authority figures. Therefore, I suspect that Krishnamurti's view of understanding the emotions, implying "total attention," is beyond the capability of a child. However, one can see the groundwork for this being laid in childhood, as a gradual guiding of the child towards the appropriate modes of awareness.

C. Comparison and Contrast: The Nature of Emotion, Education of the Emotions and Understanding of the Emotions

As stated earlier, Peters thinks an emotion can be understood as a feeling response to an appraisal of a situation. Since the individual has certain beliefs about the situation, emotions are said to be cognitive in character. Peters also maintains that emotions are differentiated by the beliefs that go with them.

Again, according to Peters, emotions and motives are distinct in terms of passivity and activity, though they incorporate the same appraisal. However, it is not clear to me that the aspect of passivity in emotion is its most distinctive feature, when one considers the energy of emotion overflowing into expression and action.

Krishnamurti by implication, agrees with Peters that an emotion can be described as a feeling response to a situation. He also thinks that emotions are cognitive as they are linked to beliefs about situations. However, unlike Peters, he does not, in his discussions, refer to any important distinction between emotions and motives in terms of activity and passivity.

Krishnamurti draws attention to the importance of the way that cultural traditions, and social mores condition people to appraise and feel about situations in a particular and routine way. Nonetheless, he does not seem to be critical of every type of conditioned appraisal. He specifically says that responses to appraisals of situations, which involve the individual's physical safety, though involving conditioned beliefs, could be referred to as intelligent appraisal and action.

We cannot rule out the possibility that, by implication, Peters would not approve of certain kinds of conditioned appraisals. As stated earlier, by the initiation into the forms of knowledge the individual is initiated into the "language, beliefs and concepts of of a society." In this sense, beliefs are handed down by initiating the young into the forms of knowledge. It must be emphasized that Peters is not referring to beliefs based

on superstition, blind faith, or ugly values like unremitting vengeance. It might be the case that in relation to physical safety he would say that people might well evaluate situations in a conditioned manner. But he would not agree that for jealousy, envy or hate, people should evaluate situations with conditioned beliefs. Krishnamurti makes too broad a generalization when he implies that in the case of all emotions we are conditioned to evaluate situations in a particular way. As I argued earlier it is not true to say that certain emotions like wonder and grief are necessarily socially and culturally conditioned.

It is important to note that in Peters' idea of the development of appropriate appraisals as a part of the education of the emotions there is the all-pervasive principle of respect for truth. Since education suggests the initiation of people into what is worthwhile involving knowledge and understanding it implies the concern for truth and reason. Education of the emotions is a matter of bringing emotions under the sway of reason, which also implies a concern for truth. In a somewhat different manner Krishnamurti's view of the understanding of the emotions also implies a central concern for truth. His concern for truth, however, involves immediate "attention" to the presently felt emotions and their roots, not, primarily, to a conceptual adjustment of beliefs .

Any similarity between Krishnamurti's idea of the awareness of a special "attention" directed to immediately felt emotions and Peters' view of the reasoned change of emotional response through elimination of false and irrelevant beliefs seems to be superficial only. For Peters, the development of appropriate appraisals through reason necessarily involves a change in beliefs. As I argued earlier, a change in a belief at the "intellectual" level does not necessarily change the emotion. It seems to me that Krishnamurti's idea of the direct perception of the roots and structure of an emotion is more convincing for the elimination of an irrational emotion. But, I suspect that a child, unlike an adult, will not be able to understand the roots and structure of one's emotions.

In relation to the education of the emotions, Peters also speaks of the control and canalization of emotional expression. Only emotions which are irrational and those which cannot be brought under the sway of reason should be controlled or canalized, as otherwise they confound our judgements. As I argued earlier, controlling an emotion cannot be referred to as "educating an emotion." Again, controlling the emotions is a way of "training the emotions," which Peters rejects, and cannot be referred to as a way of educating the emotions. Krishnamurti would disagree with Peters on the control and canalization of emotional expression. He questions in the following manner.

> Can you face it? -- not try to overcome fear, jealousy, this or that, but actually look at it without any sense of wanting to change , conquer it, control it, just to observe it totally and give your attention to it.[83]

With reference to passion he says,

> so we are very careful to canalise it, to build a hedge around it through philosophical concepts and ideals.[84]

According to Krishnamurti, emotions confound our judgements because we have not observed them totally -- not given our total attention to their causes and their nature. Krishnamurti would further say that to control and canalize an emotion is to force oneself to fit a particular social ideal which will give rise to further emotional conflict. To suppress or control an emotion is not to see the emotion as it is. For example, A is secretly jealous of B, but outwardly she attempts to be friendly towards B. The state of being jealous of B and the attempt to maintain friendly relations with B would produce an emotional conflict within A. It is probable that if she deeply understood the cause of her jealousy of B, instead of suppressing, that is, controlling it, this would eradicate the bases of emotional conflict within A, and between A and B.

A critic might say that the negative approach of suppressing or controlling undesirable emotions such as hatred, envy or unwarranted anger seems permissible and rational. But, anger merely suppressed would seem to harm an individual, and may later

erupt in destructive forms.[85] Dearden argues that instead of suppressing such emotions, or even merely developing appropriate habits for dealing with situations that give rise to them, a better approach would be the development of understanding. He contends that understanding may even dissipate such feelings.[86]

Since Krishnamurti would not approve of the control and canalization of emotions, he presumably would not approve of the "re-education" that Peters prescribes. He would reject the use of non-educational techniques such as conditioning and the administration of drugs. He would also argue against the effectiveness of psychoanalysis except for those who are prone to severe psychotic disorders.

The third approach that Peters advocates is the invocation of "self- transcending emotions," such as love and the respect for truth, which would lessen the hold on us of more primitive emotions. Since we interpret the world in a self-referential way, Peters says even a better understanding of ourselves will not be entirely effective in counteracting negative emotions. In a somewhat similar manner Krishnamurti implies that with love we can transcend negative emotions. In Krishnamurti on Education, he speaks of such love in the following manner :

> With most of us love is possessiveness. Where there is jealousy, envy, it breeds hatred. Love can only exist and flower when there is no hate, no envy, no ambition. Without love, life is like a barren earth, arid, hard, brutal. But the moment there is affection it is like the earth which blossoms with water, with rain, and beauty. [87]

In Education and the Significance of Life, he says,

> only love can bring about the understanding of another, where there is love there is instantaneous communion with the other, on the same level and at the same time.[88]

It is important to note that not only does Krishnamurti think that love as an emotion could transcend negative emotions he also considers love to be a state of being in which one attends with one's self as a totality.

Moreover, Krishnamurti would agree with Peters that we interpret the world in a self-referential way. But he would disagree with Peters on the point that this could not be remedied by a better understanding of ourselves. While admitting that negative emotions could at best be eliminated by self-understanding, he also sees the significance of transcending negative emotions through love and compassion.

In relation to the expression of certain emotions Peters would approve of a person learning to canalize such emotions through speech and symbolic gesture. In his opinion sublimation has obvious relevance here. Krishnamurti, on other hand, would argue against sublimation as an insensitivity to oneself, and as leaving the root cause untouched. He makes the following comment about desire, which is applicable to emotions :

> we are concerned with desire and understanding of it, not the brutalising factor of suppressing, avoiding or sublimating.[89]

On the whole it could be argued that Peters gives to the emotions too peripheral a place in human life. In the main what he seems to convey is that emotions tend to disrupt a life guided by reason, and, as such, they should be brought under the control of reason. It must be admitted that emotions do often interfere with the way we reason and perceive situations. They may lead to hasty action which may be regretted later. However, to regard emotion too much under its aspect of disrupting the effectiveness of reason is to portray it as being somewhat annoyingly peripheral rather than being at the heart of human life in some kind of mutually enhancing balance with reason. Such a balance would imply a life rich with feeling and not lived irrationally.

Now, Krishnamurti's view of the understanding of the emotions as presently occurring, goes further than appraisals and beliefs peculiar to a given situation, to the complex self-identity conception he refers to as "ego." The nature and the pattern of one's emotional life is viewed as integrated with the centre of one's life, and it is this that self-observation must discover. This is all a part of education, primarily aiming at self-

integration and the development of the whole man. Krishnamurti would not consider a rational (intellectual) examination of beliefs underlying emotions as effective for a radical transformation of the emotional life -- for the root cause of conflict in it, the "ego", is still intact. The direct perception of immediately felt fear, jealousy, envy or any other negative emotion would lead to the total understanding of what one is. In this sense, he considers emotions as being at the heart of one's life and their understanding as being of central importance to the quality of one's life as a whole.

In my view, both Peters and Krishnamurti seem to ignore a necessary element in the education and the understanding of the emotions. It might be the case that certain negative emotions may be necessary as being relevant to certain situations. Anxiety and indignation may at times be necessary and need to be encouraged. A child who is repeatedly careless in crossing roads must be made to feel anxious about potentially dangerous consequences. This is not to suggest that <u>being aware</u> of potential danger is ineffective without anxiety. If one is aware of a busy street, and so crosses carefully it is not necessary to be anxious about being run over. But children who are over-negligent must be made to feel <u>anxious</u> about possible dangers. Again, it seems permissible to make children feel indignant about situations which involve violation of rights or occurrence of injustice. As such, the education of the emotions should not necessarily eliminate some negative emotions in an indiscriminate manner.

Footnotes

[1] R. S. Peters,"The Education of the Emotions," in R. S Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. , 1974), p. 175.

[2] R. F. Dearden, The Philosophy of Primary Education. An introduction. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 81.

[3] W. Alston, "Emotion and Feeling," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing. , Inc. , and the Free Press, 1967), p. 481.

[4] F. Dunlop, "The Education of the Emotions," in Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1984, p. 250.

[5] R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development. p.175

[6] Ibid. , pp. 177-179.

[7] Peters admits that his account of emotion owes a great deal to Magda Arnold. But it differs from her account in not postulating a conceptual connection between emotion and action. See R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development, p. 181.

[8] Ibid. , p. 178.

[9] Ibid. , p. 179

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] F. Dunlop, The Education of Feeling and Emotion (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 14.

[13] R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development, pp.179-181.

[14] R. C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice," in Explaining Emotions, ed. A. M. Rorty (London: University of California Press, 1980), p. 276.

[15] For more details see R. W. Hepburn "The Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion," in Education and Reason Part 3 of Education and Development of

Reason, ed. R. F. Deardon, P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 95 and J. White," The Education of the Emotions," in Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. , 18, No. , 2, 1984, pp. 238-239.

16 R. S. Peters, Pyschology and Ethical Development, p. 188.

17 R. W. Hepburn, "The Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion," in Education and Reason Part 3 of Education and Development of Reason, ed. R. F Dearden, P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, p. 95.

18 J. White, "The Education of the Emotions," in Journal of Philosophy of Education , p. 238.

19 J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, p. 82.

20 J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence, p.188.

21 J. Krishnamurti, The Urgency of Change, ed. Mary Lutyens (NewYork: Perrenial Library, 1977), pp. 86-87.

22 The explanation of this point is based on an example drawn from R. C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice," in Explaining Emotions, ed. A. M. Rorty, pp. 252-253.

23 Debra Shogan, Care and Moral Motivation (Toronto: OISE Press, 1988), p. 36.

24 G. Pitcher, "Emotions," in Education and Reason, Part 2 of Education and the Development of Reason, ed. R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, p. 230.

25 In this example, Krishnamurti suggests that a conditioned belief can lead to an intelligent action. The statement is correct in a general sense but not in an analytic sense. An intelligent action cannot come out of a conditioned belief. But, an intelligent action can involve (among other things) a conditioned belief. The conditioned belief that "snakes are dangerous", and the perception of the presence of the snake can lead to an instantaneous assessment that one is in danger, and to protect oneself one must jump. Such an action is intelligent though it involved a conditioned belief. A conditioned belief can also involve an unintelligent action. Say, for example the perception of the presence

of the snake, and the belief that snakes are dangerous may even lead one to be unwary. If one does not move away and protect oneself, one could be poisoned. Here the conditioned belief involved an unintelligent action. See J. Krishnamurti, The Impossible Question (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd. , 1978), p. 52.

[26] J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, ed. D. Rajagopal, p. 61.

[27] Ibid. , p. 29.

[28] J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence, p. 201.

[29] Ibid. , p. 349.

[30] Ibid. , p. 348.

[31] J. Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, p. 22.

[32] J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence, p. 235.

[33] R. W. Hepburn, "Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion," in Education and Reason, Part 3 of Education and the Development Reason, ed. R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, p. 96.

[34] D. R. De Nicola, "The Education of the Emotions," in Philosophy of Education Society, 1971, p. 213.

[35] R. F. Dearden, The Philosophy of Primary Education, p. 81.

[36] R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development, pp. 182-183.

[37] Ibid. , p.182.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid. , p. 183.

[40] Ibid. , p. 184.

[41] See Ibid. , p. 185. Here Peters seems to accept Freud's contention that a person could be a victim of false beliefs. In the area of irrational conduct Freud and his followers have devised a technique better known as re-education.

[42] Mary Warnock, "The Education of the Emotions," in Education, Values and Mind, ed. D. E. Cooper, p.180.

[43] Ibid.

[44] R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development, p. 188.

[45] Ibid.

[46] D. R. De Nicola, "The Education of the Emotions," in Philosophy of Education Society, p. 214.

[47] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 33.

[48] Ibid.

[49] R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development, p.188.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., pp. 188-189.

[52] Ibid. p. 189.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., pp. 189-190.

[55] Ibid., p.190.

[56] Ibid.

[57] J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, p.104.

[58] D. W. Hamlyn, Perception, Learning and the Self, p.163.

[59] J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence, p. 201.

[60] J. Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, p.119.

[61] J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence, pp. 364-369.

[62] Ibid., p. 201.

[63] Morwenna Griffiths, "Emotions and Education," in Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1984, p. 225.

[64] L. R. Reid, Ways of Understanding and Education, p.17.

[65] Ibid. , p.18.

[66] See Ibid. , p. 24. Here I refer to Reid's characerization of the apprehension of aesthetic and moral values where the cognitive and the affective domains are linked together as being similar to Krishnamurti's conception of understanding. In chaper one I referred to the same comparison in relation to my explanation of " knowing what is." Understanding is the action of "knowing what is" which is intelligence.

[67] J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence, p. 441.

[68] Ibid. , p. 231.

[69] Ibid. , pp. 225-226.

[70] R. Pring, Knowledge and Schooling (London: Open Books,1976), p. 11.

[71] Ibid. , p.10.

[72] J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence, pp. 230-231.

[73] Ibid. , p. 235.

[74] D. E. Cooper, Authenticity and Learning, p. 65.

[75] Quoted in Ibid.

[76] D. De Nicola, "Education of the Emotions," in Philosophy of Education Society, p. 214.

[77] J. Krishnamurti, The Impossible Question, p. 32.

[78] J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of the Intelligence, p. 64.

[79] J. Krishnamurti, The Impossible Question, p. 33.

[80] J. Needleman, The New Religions (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), p.151.

[81] J. Krishnamurti, The Impossible Question, p. 33.

[82] F. Dunlop,"Education of the Emotions," in Journal of Philosophy of Educaton, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 250.

[83] J. Krishnamurti, The Awakening of Intelligence , p. 360.

[84] Ibid. , p.198.

[85] F. N. Walker, "Emotional Development, Critical Thought and the Purpose of Schooling," paper submitted to the North West Philosophy of Education Society, Fall 1980, p. 4.

[86] R. S. Dearden, The Philosophy of Primary Education, p. 83.

[87] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p. 80.

[88] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life , pp. 23-24.

[89] J. Krishnamurti, Letters to the Schools, p. 52.

CHAPTER 3

EDUCATION, FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY

It is my purpose in this chapter to explicate Peters' and Krishnamurti's notions of freedom, and examine the manner in which education could conceivably bring about the development of the free autonomous individual as envisaged by them. I then attempt a comparative evaluation of the views presented by Peters and Krishnamurti. It will be my primary purpose to become more clear about the ideas presented by these two authors rather than undertake a comprehensive inquiry into the concepts of freedom and autonomy.

A. The Notion of Freedom

Peters' Notion of Freedom

Peters' analysis of freedom first appears in Ethics and Education. Later in his essay on "Freedom and the Development of the Free Man," he attempts an analysis of freedom based on the distinctions worked out by Stanley Benn and William Weinstein. Here, he explicates his notion of freedom and autonomy in education, and attempts to show how freedom as an educational ideal could be fostered by an institutional environment like that of a school.[1] His analysis of freedom involves a conceptual and an instrumental connection between freedom and the development of the free individual.

Freedom as a social principle

According to Peters, to say that a person is not free to do something is to suggest that there is an impediment or constraint preventing a person from doing what one wants to do. This indicates that either somebody or something is preventing a person from doing what he chooses to do.[2] However, until we have indicated what it is that a person wants to do and what kind of constraint or impediment is present, we have not conveyed much information. The word 'free' can be given precise meaning only in relation to the

context in which it is used. The constraint imposed on what a person might want to do is often only implicit in the context. As argued by Peters, the context makes it clear as to how the term is applied.[3] The statement that "Ramesh is ill" conveys some definite information. On the other hand, to say that "Ramesh is free" does not convey any definite information. It is necessary to refer to the context and the kind of constraint from which he is free or not free. If Ramesh is kidnapped, obviously his freedom of movement would be restricted which would close up his options. If Ramesh is living in a country which has an authoritarian regime, he would be subjected to a variety of personal and social pressures through a system of laws and regulations. This indicates that the word 'free' is a context-dependent word. The restriction of an individual's freedom occurs within a specific context.[4]

Peters' view that there could be different applications of the notion of freedom also seems plausible. Peters claims that different people have different wants, and there could be diverse ways of restricting the options available to a person.[5] For instance, say, x belongs to a radical political party and he is prevented by his associates from attending public political meetings of any other party. Y wants to publish an article criticizing an aspect of governmental policy. Z aspires to contest as a party candidate at an election. It might be the case that x is prevented from attending the public meeting by his associates. Again, due to press censorship y may be prevented from publishing his article. Since z does not receive party nomination, he is unable to contest the election as a party candidate. Now, what is common to x, y and z is that they are not free to do what they want. However, their wants are different and they are constrained in doing what they want in different ways. X, y and z are conscious of the constraints. Peters claims that the question of freedom arises when there is some consciousness of constraint. To be more explicit the question of freedom arises when the individual is aware of the constraints and the constraints seem unjustified. This is precisely why there is less talk of freedom in spheres where it is difficult to interfere with others or in spheres of indifference.[6] For

instance, there are no movements for the freedom to daydream, stare at the ceiling or blow bubbles.

Paradox of Freedom

Peters' conception of freedom as a social principle involves the idea of what Popper referred to as the paradox of freedom. Popper explains the paradox of freedom in the following manner.

> Freedom . . . defeats itself if unlimited. Unlimited means that a strong man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his freedom. This is why we demand that the state should limit freedom to a certain extent, so that everyone's freedom is protected by law. Nobody should be at the mercy of others, but all should have a right to be protected by the state.[7]

For Peters, the notion of freedom as a social principle does not mean the acceptance of constraints. According to Peters, it is a general empirical fact that the acceptance of some forms of constraint by all is necessary to avoid more grievous forms of constraint by others. This indicates that everyone would be free in certain much wanted areas if everyone else conformed to some general framework of rules and regulations, which would prevent people from interfering with others.[8] For instance, say Mohan causes grievous hurt to Rohan. Now, Mohan's offence is punishable by law. If there was no prevalent system of law, Mohan's action would not seem to be an offence. To be more explicit, Mohan's unlimited freedom would restrict Rohan's freedom to live without such constraints. This is what Peters means by "too much of freedom leads to too little." [9]

Peters argues that laws are not made primarily for those who are capable of moral restraint, but for those who do not adhere to such a code of conduct.[10] I think that the existence of a set of laws is a necessary safeguard, but it does not necessarily deter an individual from restricting the freedom of another individual. Moral restraint is also an important factor. To cite the former example, the knowledge that causing grievous hurt to Rohan, and restricting his freedom is punishable by law did not deter Mohan from committing the offence. Perhaps if he had a deep awareness that it is morally wrong to

harm another individual he may have refrained from committing the offence. I am not suggesting that a set of regulations would not act as a deterrent. It would, as an offence is made punishable by law. I am only suggesting that in certain circumstances it would not be a sufficient safeguard. Moral restraint may also be a necessary additional factor.

According to Peters, this paradox of freedom is extremely relevant to the school situation. It cannot be denied that the lack of the operation of a set of disciplinary rules and the operation of minimum conditions of order in a classroom would be detrimental not only to the freedom of the child, but also to the actual learning situation. If there were no disciplinary constraints the bully and the aggressive child may constrain the freedom of the child who is physically weak or otherwise unwilling to resort to force.

The Formal and the Actual

In relation to the paradox of freedom Peters claims that discrepancies can exist between "actual freedom" and "formal freedom." Actual freedom is a state where one is free from external constraints to do what one wants, and this freedom is usable. A usable freedom is freedom to do something effectively with choice. With formal freedom, though the individual is free from external constraints, he is unable to use such freedom. This means the freedom is unusable.[11]

Peters says "formal freedom" could take different forms based on situational differences. First, in some instances though legal safeguards guarantee freedom, people do not use their freedom to do certain things which they normally can do, due e.g. , to public opinion or religious pressure. For example, though the law does not prohibit sending a child to a denominational school a parent may refrain from doing so because the action would single the child out for intolerant attitudes. Second, a different type of situation arises where an individual is free to do something, but is unable to do what he wants to do because of lack of money or ill-health. For instance, a parent is free to send his child to a prestigious school, but may be unable to do so due to lack of sufficient money.

Though Peters categorizes the first situation as one of formal freedom it seems to be one of actual freedom. Here the freedom is usable, but the parent chooses not to use it, i. e. , he chooses not to send the child to the denominational school which professes a different faith. Peters might argue that if the cost of acting freely here is extremely high in terms of social rejection, in effect it is less misleading to categorize it as formal freedom. However, the second situation indicated by Peters can be categorized under formal freedom. The parent who is unable to send the child to the prestigious school due to lack of money is free in a formal sense but not in an actual sense as his freedom is unusable.

When Peters says that freedom is only absent in an actual sense where others in fact stop a person from doing what he wants,[12] his focus is simply on actual freedom. He does not seem to dismiss formal freedom as meaningless. Situations in which only formal freedom occurs, says Peters, could be condemned on grounds of social injustice and not necessarily on the supposed absence of actual freedom.

It could be argued that the above view in a way contradicts Peters notion of formal freedom. It seems to suggest that social constraints and the absence of freedom are unrelated. Now formal freedom can be present even when an individual is not able to use his freedom in spite of legal safeguards. It is my view that formal freedom has no value. If extraneous factors which restrict an individual's freedom are not removed it would amount to the absence of freedom. Say, for instance, the parent who was legally free to send his child to the prestigious school is in a sense unfree to send him due to financial constraints. This suggests that unusable freedom may be of no value. Peters' view that formal freedom cannot be condemned for the alleged absence of freedom is at least interestingly contentious. Isaiah Berlin, too, makes a distinction between freedom and the conditions under which freedom becomes usable. He contends that freedom which is unusable is worthless.[13]

In Ethics and Education, Peters claims that he is defending a concept of freedom. I think it would be more appropriate to refer to it as a particular conception of freedom rather than a concept of freedom because there can be different conceptions of freedom.

Following this terminology, it seems plausible to say that when Peters refers to the mundane conception of freedom his reference is to "negative" freedom. Peters also maintains that "positive" freedom is important, but also claims that the introduction of the notion of positive freedom is sometimes unnecessary and misleading.[14]

At this point it seems necessary to explicate the terms 'negative freedom' and 'positive freedom.' However, my concern here will be to explicate these two terms only so far as necessary to elucidate Peters' and Krishnamurti's views on the notion of freedom.

Many philosophers and writers contend that there are two concepts or ideals of freedom, one positive and the other negative. Negative freedom is referred to as freedom from constraints. One may be free of all constraints to do x, and still not be able to do x. To explicate this point further, for instance, say, Sanjaya is selected to play in the school rugger team in the annual rugger encounter with a another school. Here Sanjaya is 'free from' all external constraints to participate in the annual school encounter as he has been selected by the School Sports Board. On the eve of the match if he falls ill he would not be able to participate in the match due to ill health. Hence 'positive freedom' is something other than the absence of constraints.

Writers also refer to negative freedom as 'freedom from' and positive freedom as 'freedom to.' Feinberg, like most modern writers, argues that 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' are not two distinct kinds of freedom but aspects of the same concept. According to Feinberg, freedom from doing x means one is free to do x, and conversely if one is free to do x nothing prevents him from doing x. He concludes that in this way 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' are logically linked because there is no special positive 'freedom to' which is not also 'freedom from.' [15]

It seems plausible to view negative freedom and positive freedom as related aspects of the same concept rather than two distinct concepts. However, in relation to the freedom of individuals, all instances of freedom may not include both positive and negative aspects. Positive freedom or 'freedom to' do something implies that one is 'free from' whatever might impede actually doing it. But negative 'freedom from' something does not necessarily imply the positive 'freedom to' do anything.[16] To exemplify the former point, Sanjaya was 'free to' play in the match if he did not fall ill (positive freedom). He was 'free from' constraints preventing participation in the match since he was selected by the School Sports Board (negative freedom). But though he was 'free from' constraints preventing him playing in the match (negative freedom), he was not 'free to' play due to ill-health (positive freedom).

It could be surmised that Peters' view of the paradox of freedom, and also his notion of actual freedom encapsulates the idea of negative freedom. In the paradox of freedom we saw how a more levelling constraint counteracts the effect of another constraint. When Peters says that freedom does not mean the acceptance of constraints, he seems to imply two things. First, the more levelling constraint is the legal constraint which acts as a legal safeguard. The legal safeguard not only protects the freedom of the individual but also ensures freedom of others. Second, when one is free from external constraints such as interference from others one is free to do things in a general sense. In addition, logically, one is free to do something if one is free from external constraints. As stated earlier, Peters' view of actual freedom also indicates the absence of freedom. Freedom is absent in an actual sense only if others in fact prevent a person from doing what he wants. Therefore, Peters' notion of the mundane conception of freedom is primarily negative in character.

Man as a Chooser

Peters uses the notion of "man as a chooser" as a link between freedom as a social principle and the educational ideal of the free man. His analysis of freedom as a social

principle presupposses the notion of the individual as possessing the capacity for choice. If a person is to be free in the sense of being a chooser both objective and subjective conditions of choice must be satisfied.[17]

The objective condition of choice is the ability to choose between the acceptance or non-acceptance of the imposition of rules, sanctions or threats. The subjective condition of choice is the ability to reason in a manner relevant to the situation. Elsewhere he refers to it as practical reason. Subjective conditions of choice relevant to a situation include the person's ability to perceive different choices that are available, the capability to weigh the pros and cons of the alternatives before one, the ability to change or modify beliefs in the face of evidence, and the capability of translating decisions into appropriate actions. According to Peters, drug-addicts, alcholics, paranoiacs or hysterics would not be able to satisfy these necessary conditions.[18]

Peters' analysis of the objective conditions shows that even in spheres where people are not free to do as they want, there is a connection between authority and choice. According to Peters, if we adhere to a set of rules it does not necessarily amount to obeying a command. If Preethi joins a voluntary club or association, she consents voluntarily to abide by the rules and regulations of this particular club. As long as Preethi is a member of the club, the rules and regulations of the club as administered by its officials constitute an authority to which she is subject. But, Preethi is free to choose to leave the club. This means Preethi is free to choose either to be a member of the club and abide by its rules, or leave the club and divest herself of its authority. In spheres where one is less committed, one has the option of rejecting a system as binding. Say, for instance, Deepthi is playing basket ball; her freedom to play basket ball is limited by the rules of the game and by the decisions of the referee or she could choose not to play basket ball.

In a school situation a student may not be free to do most things. But, according to Peters, he could still have a narrow range of choice. Chaminda could break a

disciplinary rule, but still he would know that he would be punished if it was discovered. Say, Duminda is a drug addict and is psychologically weak. He is pressurized by a gang-leader to commit petty thefts. Now, Duminda cannot be called a chooser as he is psychologically weak due to his drug-addiction. Hence he is not able to overcome the threats of the gang-leader.

Now, Preethi and Deepthi were able to choose whether to accept rules or not. Though Chaminda's range of choice was limited, nonetheless he was able to make a choice. Their ability to make a choice depended on the fact that they were able to deal with both the objective and the subjective conditions of choice. On the other hand, Duminda cannot be called a chooser as both the subjective conditions of choice such as the ability to reason as well as the objective conditions necessary for choice such as the ability to resist the authority of the gang-leader were not fulfilled.

The discussion of choice under the aspects of subjective and objective conditions takes us to Peters' conception of autonomy.

Autonomy

According to Peters, if an individual as a being of choice is to develop an ideal type of character in which being free is predominant, the criteria for calling a person autonomous are required. As stated earlier, if a person is to be free in the sense of being a chooser, both objective and subjective conditions of choice must be satisfied. Therefore he would say that the individual should choose what he is to become.[19]

At this point, it seems necessary to analyse Peters' notion of autonomy. In The Logic of Education, Peters and Hirst contend that autonomy is one of the "ideals of personal development generally." [20] They claim that such an ideal is only attainable by people who have reached a certain level of cognitive development. To them 'autonomy' means "following rules that one has accepted for oneself." [21]

Now, this means that the individual is free to choose the rules that he accepts for himself rather than be dictated to by others. Nonetheless, given the definition, a critic

may say that a criminal can also be an autonomous person. Say, for instance, a criminal decides to follow a rule that he would engage in thieving once a week. One cannot deny that the criminal chooses and follows a rule that he has accepted for himself. But the question arises, "is he autonomous?" From Peters' and Hirst's point of view the criminal is autonomous. I presume that Peters and Hirst would not agree that autonomy is a sufficient condition of the good life. They would probably say that though autonomy is desirable, it is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of the good life. My concern here is that both Peters and Hirst dismiss autonomy too quickly for adequate clarity about such points.

In Peters' essay on "Freedom and the Development of the Free Man," he attempts to analyse the notion of autonomy further. Here he says that his "emphasis is on autonomy as well as on authenticity." [22] He claims that there is a gradation of conditions implicit in the idea of autonomy such as authenticity, rational reflection and strength of will.

Peters characterizes authenticity in terms of the popular notion of "doing one's own thing." The authentic person is one who adopts a code or way of life that is one's own as distinct from one dictated by others. The rules which he adheres to are not just those that are laid down by tradition or authority. [23] However, the autonomous person would accept certain rules set by tradition or authority only after a prior evaluation of such rules. He would not just conform to them. Clearly, for Peters being autonomous is more than being authentic. The autonomous person is also the authentic person. But the authentic person is not necessarily an autonomous person.

Rational reflection

Peters claims that the role of rational criticism is central to autonomy. Consequently, the individual accepts or rejects rules on the basis of reasons. Such rules of conduct are subjected to critical examination based on principles such as those of impartiality and respect for persons. This is the Kantian conception of autonomy. [24] It is

important to note that Peters' notion of education as initiation is tied up with his view of autonomy. The initiation of children into the established disciplines is expected to equip the children with the ability of rational thought and criticism. Presumably the autonomous person would base his judgments on rules of evidence, and of relevance that their studies in the different disciplines have taught them. Peters' notion of liberal education is based on the belief that it is of crucial importance that the individual should "choose what he is to become."

Being autonomous, according to Peters, also requires strength of will. To have strength of will is to have the courage and the determination to select a way of life and adhere to it in the face of counter-inclinations, such as persuasion, ridicule, punishment, and bribes.[25]

It is important to note that Peters' conception of the individual as a free agent of choice is consistent with his view of autonomy. This does not necessarily indicate that a person who is free is necessarily autonomous. I will explicate this point later. To come back to the earlier point, choice becomes a crucial factor in autonomy. As stated earlier, both the objective conditions and the subjective conditions of choice are relevant to autonomy and authenticity. If to be authentic is to be able "to select a code or way of life that is one's own as distinct from one dictated by others," it necessitates choice based on the ability to reflect rationally in a manner relevant to the situation. Therefore, the individual who is free to choose is an autonomous person. However, there seems to be a point which has been overlooked by Peters. He considers authenticity and rational reflection as gradations of conditions implicit in the notion of autonomy rather than overlapping virtues.[26] To consider authenticity and rational reflection as seemingly separate is to indicate that rational reflection is not necessarily present in the idea of authenticity. Clearly, to adopt a way of life that is in fact distinctly one's own is to presuppose rational reflection, since the relevant 'owning' here is achieved by the recognition of, and rational selection from, alternatives.

It is important to note that for Peters there is a conceptual gap between freedom and autonomy. Freedom is not a sufficient condition for saying that a person is autonomous in some respect. As we saw earlier, autonomy requires among other things the fulfillment of the objective as well as the subjective conditions of choice. For instance, say, a drug addict would be free but not autonomous as he would lack the ability for self-direction and rational choice. He may lack the ability to reason as to whether or not to accept rules or sanctions. Even a prisoner, having been institutionalized for a long period of time, though free he may lack the ability to make relevant choices. Therefore, for Peters, freedom is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for being autonomous. To be a fully autonomous person one must not only be free, but must also be able to choose and adopt a way of life that is distinctly one's own -- one that is not dictated by others.

On the other hand, the child-centered theorists often seem to consider freedom as being a sufficient condition for a person to be autonomous. This means that the removal of external constraints would be tantamount to creating autonomy. As such for the child-centered theorists there is no conceptual gap between freedom and autonomy.

Michael Bonnett contends that Peters' reference to autonomy as "doing one's own thing," though correct leaves much unsaid. He thinks that in particular the reference does not highlight the element of personal responsibility which is centrally definitive of "doing one's own thing." According to Bonnett, what is crucial to both autonomy and authenticity is that one's thoughts and actions are in some sense an expression of one's true self. He lays emphasis on the ownership of choice and the significant element of self-origination. The conditions of autonomous actions for him are that one rationally chooses for oneself between options, but centrally it requires one's choices are one's own.[27]

I agree with Bonnett that Peters' reference to authenticity as "doing one's own thing" seems vague and leaves much unexplained. In his essay entitled "Subjectivity and

Standards," Peters claims that "no value attaches to naked ownership . . . in estimating anything rationally, identity is as irrelevant as time or place." [28] Though not incorrect with regard to mere identity, identity can include personal responsibility, and for Peters, in his discussion of authenticity, personal responsibility seems to be somewhat neglected and subordinated to the value of rational standards.

Krishnamurti's Notion of Freedom

To propose to set the individual free is a fine declaration of purpose for any philosopher, but not a particularly original one. Socio-political philosophers from Rousseau to Mill and Marx, Existentialists from Kierkegaard to Sartre have proposed a similar purpose to that declared by Krishnamurti.[29] However, Krishnamurti's idea of freedom seems somewhat radical by comparison with any one of them.

Freedom as a State of Mind

Krishnamurti defines freedom in the following manner :

> Freedom is a state of mind, and not freedom from something.[30]

> Freedom is not from something or avoidance of constraint.. Freedom has no opposite, it is of itself per se.[31]

When Krishnamurti speaks about freedom he refers to a special state of mind rather than to any social or legal freedom involving specific principles, rules and actions. To say that freedom is not the avoidance of constraints is not a comment about external constraints that negate freedom of action. Rather, the possibility of certain internal constraints is the primary concern, as the following statements indicate.

> Freedom implies the total abnegation and denial of all inward psychological authority.[32]

> To be free is not merely to do what you like, or break away from outward circumstances which bind you, but to understand the whole problem of dependence. [33]

Now, the notion that any form of authority constrains the freedom of the individual is clear enough. But, in the generally accepted sense authority is something imposed from outside. This could include constraints imposed on the individual by an authoritarian regime, an authoritarian leader or the authority of law. The constraints imposed by an authoritarian regime or authoritarian leader could curb the individual's freedom of speech, freedom of association, or freedom to vote. Legal constraints could prevent people from acting according to their wishes. Now, these could be referred to as external constraints, having being decided by others, but nevertheless exerting a constraining influence on the individual's freedom of expression.

According to Krishnamurti, the "inward psychological authority" is the accumulated effects of the process of conditioning which begins in one's infancy. In Life Ahead, he says that,

> from early childhood our minds are conditioned by words, phrases, by established attitudes and prejudices . . . The minds of most older people are fixed, they are set like clay in a mould, and it is very difficult to break through the mould. This moulding of the mind is its conditioning.[34]

Knowledge and experience which one acquires, as well as beliefs, traditions and social mores constitute, says Krishnamurti, the "inward psychological authority." Thus it is a self-internalized constraint which may dictate our behaviour and thinking, and even determine what we feel, see and in general, experience. The individual comes to believe an uncritically accepted outlook as true and right, and also to believe that it is his own correct assessment of things. As Holroyd suggests, this is not an entirely unfamiliar concept. Modern psychological and sociological studies have shown clearly that techniques of conditioning, "thought reform" and "behaviour engineering" can bring about an inward authority which directs one's thinking and behaviour to the extent one imagines one is exercising one's free will.[35] One can no longer see or conceive how things could be otherwise.

Krishnamurti contends that freedom is not "freedom from something." Elsewhere he refers to "freedom from the known." It may be mentioned that one of his books is entitled Freedom from the Known. If freedom is not "freedom from something" it does not seem possible that one could speak about "freedom from the known," as the word 'know' indicates knowledge of something. For example, when I say, "I know that the French Revolution took place in 1789," I am indicating my knowledge of something. It does not seem possible to say in a general sense that one knows nothing. Do these two statements involve Krishnamurti in a contradiction? The position needs explication to find out.

Now, "freedom from something" refers to freedom from one particular thing. This would mean freedom from certain internal constraints such as fear, anxiety, oppression, sorrow, pain or any other conditioned judgement, belief, or value. For Krishnamurti freedom means complete inner freedom of the mind. "To be free from something is only a reaction which will become another form of conformity."[36] For instance, say one gives up one's security of uncritical adherence to a particular religious dogma taken on authority. If one adopts the security of another religious dogma, one would be substituting one form of conditioning for another. Even if one does not adopt another explicit and established belief system, there could be many more conditioned beliefs and judgments which would obstruct the inner freedom of the individual.

Now, "freedom from the known" encompasses an agglomerate of constraints, which according to Krishnamurti negates the inner freedom of the mind. The known constitutes some types of acquired knowledge, experience, traditions, beliefs, values and social mores. For Krishnamurti, the known brings about the total conditioning of the mind. "Freedom from something" will not bring about total freedom. But, "freedom from the known" is said to imply complete inner freedom of the mind as the total negation of conditioning. This seems to resolve what seemed to be a contradiction involved in the statements "freedom from something" and "freedom from the known."

At this point, it seems necessary to explicate as to how one could be free of everything known. Let me explain. As stated earlier, freedom of the mind is experienced in moments of "knowing what is." In chapter one I compared "knowing what is" to aesthetic awareness. If I look at the Mona Lisa portrait, and if I am totally attentive to it, undoubtedly I would appreciate its immense beauty. But, if I am comparing it with paintings I had known earlier I would be apprending it from the basis of my prior knowledge about art. This means I am deflected by thinking about it, not totally attentive to it -- what it is, just as it is, before me. As I understand it, since freedom of the mind is in moments of "knowing what is" the individual must in these moments be free from prior knowledge, and therefore, prior conditioning.

Freedom and Choice

It is apparent that freedom for Krishnamurti does not refer to a state of feeling free to do anything one likes to do. If it was so it would involve the notion of choice. Choice implies the availability of a range of options, and the ability to select from amongst this range of options. But, for Krishnamurti the most important kind of freedom is an internal matter, where in fact, there is no question of making a choice. In Letters to the Schools, he asks the question "is freedom choice at all?"[37]

For Krishnamurti, the "sense of freedom" comes with the "choiceless awareness of what is" which he regards as the essence of "intelligence." He says "real freedom is not something to be acquired, it is the outcome of intelligence." [38] As stated earlier, Krishnamurti's notion of freedom encapsulates the ideas of attention and love. This attention is total, not partial. He refers to attention as looking and seeing. In the seeing there is beauty and love. For Krishnamurti, being free inwardly is to be totally attentive and choicelessly aware of "what is." Therefore, by previously stated arguments, the free individual can only be one who understands all the ways of the self.

It must be emphasized that choice requires the working of the will. We are accustomed to using the will to control our actions. For example, one says, "I must do

this" or "I must not do that." According to Krishnamurti, to will is to resist. Will is the assertion of one part of the self against another, the "me" (as a complex conception of the self) independent of "what is." Desire and, therefore choice are somewhat manifested in the working of the will. Action resulting from the working of the will, according to Krishnamurti, conforms to a formula, concept, ideal or a pattern, and in this conforming or controlling there is conflict. Choice would involve conflict. If an individual knows what to do, it would not entail choice, and therefore no conflict. When one does not know what to do there is the need for choice, resulting in conflict. Freedom for Krishnamurti is thus not a conflictual state, since no choice is involved. In the "choiceless awareness of what is" there is no resistance in the form of the will, as there is no interference of one's conditioning, and no response of the "me" -- wanting to control thought, feeling and action according to a pattern. Freedom of the mind results when the will, and therefore deliberated choice does not operate at all. Then there is a unity of awareness and action which is instantaneous. Here there is no room for conflict. For example, say, I am walking through a forest. Suddenly there is an explosive crack, and a huge tree above is falling. I see the tree falling and I am aware of it. I sense no choice and therefore there is no conflict. I don't think or say "should I move , or should I not move?" If I do not move the tree is going to hit me. I see the tree falling and I move and the seeing and the action are instantaneous. I do not first see, and through a conscious rational decision I move. To see is to move immediately, and the seeing is the movement.[39]

The above example refers to physical danger and it only explains what it is to be "choicelessly aware" of something. It does not explain how inner freedom of the mind which involves "total attention" results. It is possible that there are psychological dangers that are just as real as a tree falling. Presumably the individual does not see clearly and consequently does not move away from them. One's vision is clouded by conditioning,

by fear, and one does not directly perceive the psychological danger. As such one does not see the urgency to move from it.

In order to explain "choiceless awareness" which results in the freedom of the mind I quote an example referred to in chapter one, where I made an attempt to explain "knowing what is." The example refers to a deepening of a misunderstanding with a friend (who belongs to another ethnic group) on account of the ongoing ethnic conflict in the country. In this particular situation if my vision is not clouded by conditioning, and if I am truly attentive to the situation, I will see the situation as it is, namely, that I am viewing the problem with conditioned beliefs. To see the truth of the situation is to be "choicelessly aware" of the psychological danger and move from it. If I see clearly, will and choice will not operate here, and hence there is no conflict. In this moment of correct vision as envisaged by Krishnamurti, freedom of the mind would occur, and that which causes striving, effort, and conflict spontaneously drops away.

Iris Murdoch's view of freedom which encapsulates the idea of attention seems to be somewhat similar to Krishnamurti's view. She claims to offer a more satisfactory account of human freedom than the existentialists. She also refers to the idea of attention as looking. Murdoch contends that if one attends properly one will not have choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at. For Murdoch the proper human goal is freedom from fantasy -- the realism of compassion. What she refers to as fantasy is blinding self-centered aims and images. These form a system of energy most of which is often called the will or willing. She contends that being attentive to reality which is inspired by, and consists of love counteracts this system. According to Murdoch, freedom is not the exercise of the will, but rather the experience of correct vision. Appropriate vision itself brings about appropriate action. It is apparent that Murdoch like Krishnamurti, refers to the inner freedom of the mind. Likewise freedom does not come about by the operation of the will, or by choice. Her notion of freedom similarly encapsulates the ideas of attention, love, and action.[40]

Negative and Positive Freedom

Krishnamurti, like Peters, does not refer to freedom being either negative or positive. However, in his discussion of freedom it is possible to discern the two related aspects of freedom. When he refers to "freedom from the known" he is using our ordinary concept of negative freedom. Here he refers to an agglomerate of constraints, and not just one particular kind of constraint.. "Freedom from the known" leads one to be free to be authentically oneself. Free to be authentic could be the positive dimension of freedom. For Krishnamurti, the point of freedom is to be authentically oneself. Therefore, it could be contended that he favours a kind of positive freedom. The negative dimension of freedom necessarily plays a part. One can be free to be authentically oneself only if one becomes free from the known in any particular moment of intelligent expression of oneself.

The Paradox of Freedom

Krishnamurti's notion of freedom seems to involve a certain kind of paradox. It might be argued that this idea of the paradox of freedom is somewhat different to the paradox of freedom explained by Popper and discussed by Peters. According to Krishnamurti, if one says "I am free, then one is not free." [41] This statement needs explanation as it seems to involve Krishnamurti in a contradiction. How could one come to the conclusion that one is free, and yet not be free? Could a prisoner who is released conclude that he is free, and yet, by virtue of that, not be free? Presumably not. In the case of the prisoner certain external constraints restricted his freedom. With the removal of external constraints he is free. Since Krishnamurti refers to freedom as a state of mind, involving high sensitivity to the uniqueness of the moment, his premise is that one cannot have a preconceived notion of freedom. For Krishnamurti, freedom is freedom from all conditioning. It is virtually a quality of the mind and has to be experienced. His point is that to have a preconceived notion of freedom is to strive to achieve that freedom, and that is referred to when one says, "I am free." According to him, when one tries to

achieve freedom as delimited by an idea of it there is a conflict, since the individual is simultaneously aware of the difference between his actual state and a theoretical ideal state, and in Krishnamurti's terms where there is such conflict, one is not free. Therefore, the statement that when one says "one is free" one is not free is seemingly paradoxical and does not involve a contradiction.

Autonomy and Authenticity

Unlike Peters, Krishnamurti does not use the word 'autonomy'. Nonetheless the idea of autonomy is implicit in his idea of self-knowledge. It could be contended that the free autonomous individual, for Krishnamurti, is one who enjoys total freedom, with the implied freedom from the dictates of the ego-centre. One is autonomous to the extent one is self-knowing.

Moreover, though Krishnamurti does not use the word 'autonomy' he refers to conformity which can be contrasted with autonomy. What is meant by conformity is a passive adjustment to the requirements of one's culture. To conform here is to follow a way of life that is dictated by others or set down by tradition or authority. To conform is not being autonomous. According to Krishnamurti, in a modern society the individual is not only conditioned, but conditioning induces conformity. Conformity begins in childhood through home and school life, and the impact of society. He contends that by "conforming we become mere imitators, cogs in a cruel social machine." [42] Such conformity is essentially group conformity. David Reisman, in his book The Lonely Crowd, speaks of modern society as other-directed, group-oriented, organization-structured culture.[43] The other-directed man of whom Reisman speaks is similar to the conforming individual to whom Krishnamurti refers. The other-directed man, according to Reisman, who is characteristic of our own times is brought up in such a way that he has no "inner gyroscope", but rather a "psychological radar set" extremely sensitive to signals from his own age group.[44]

Though Krishnamurti's reference to authenticity is occasional, this idea of authenticity is very much implicit in his writings. He seems to equate freedom with authenticity as knowing or directly perceiving the "what is." In The Awakening of Intelligence , he says, "when you find out for yourself, it will be authentic, real, true, not dependent on any . . . psychologist, any analyst." [45] Real freedom and authenticity, according to him, exists only in the moments of such knowing or seeing. One is authentic to the extent one sees and knows the "what is" afresh in each moment. As stated earlier, "knowing what is" is not dependent on certain types of prior knowledge and experience acquired. To rely on acquired knowledge is to know or see something from a conditioned point of view. Such knowing or seeing would be inauthentic according to him.

For Krishnamurti, authenticity does not, in the normal sense, involve choice. There is no struggle of trying to do A, rather than B. Since authenticity is being "choicelessly aware of what is," there is no necessity for reasoned choice.

For the existentialists, authenticity means the awareness of one's freedom -- that one chooses what one is. This awareness, unlike Krishnamurti's view, is necessarily related to choice. Choice implies awareness on the part of the chooser. One cannot by definition, choose and yet be unaware of that choosing.[46] Suppose a person finds himself in a certain situation and chooses a particular course of action which we shall indicate as A. Later, one of his friends inquires why he did not choose another course of action B. If the person tells his friend that he never thought of the course of action designated B, he was not choosing between A and B, and he was unaware of choosing at all. For the existentialists choice implies awareness on the part of the chooser, and selecting from alternatives in a state of awareness of them. Unless an individual is aware of his act of choosing (and takes responsibility for that), he is not acting as a free individual. This awareness is essential to authenticity. The authentic person is the individual who is not only free, but also knows it. He knows that he is the author of his own life and must be

held responsible for the values on behalf of which he has chosen to live, and these values can never be justified by referring to something or somebody outside himself.[47] It is apparent that although for the existentialists authenticity is related to the awareness of one's freedom, and this freedom necessitates choice, for Krishnamurti authenticity is freedom of awareness, such that the awareness and any action involved is "choiceless."

In sum, it is apparent that for Krishnamurti in order to achieve freedom one must transcend one's conditioning. Is this possible? Many would admit that it is not conceivable to transcend one's cultural conditioning totally. Mary Midgely argues that we tend to think of ourselves as prisoners of our culture, as being limited by it, "indoctrinated," or "brainwashed" into accepting its values -- or again, conditioned. She thinks that aspiring to be free from any culture is in one way like trying to be skinless. A culture is a way of awakening our faculties. There is no prison; what one cannot do is, namely, be nobody, and nowhere.[48]

However, it seems a laudable position to transcend the crucial conditioned beliefs of one's culture. A critic may say that it cannot be done totally. If this is so, is Krishnamurti really giving us an ideal of freedom that one must strive to achieve? In this sense, would seeking freedom result in conflict in Krishnamurti's own terms? If so a critic may say that Krishnamurti's position would not be entirely consistent.

It must be mentioned that nowhere does Krishnamurti say that we should strive to achieve freedom, though he considers freedom of the mind to be ultimately important. I agree that the notion of overcoming one's conditioning totally is a difficult one. But there is an important lesson to be learnt here. One needs to be critical of one's upbringing in order to be free. In principle, if some conditioning can be "let go," it may be possible that all conditioning can. In fact, the massive evidence that we cannot with certainty point to anyone as totally free of conditioning does not prove it is impossible, or not worthwhile attempting, or that some degree of achievement is not worth attaining.

B. The Development of the Free Man

The Development of the Free Man: Peters

To speak of freedom in a social context, and the "development of the free man," is to suggest a connection between the two. Since Peters is concerned to tell us how a kind of institutional environment can help to bring about freedom as a character trait, he has in mind a connection of an instrumental kind. He claims that in education we are concerned with more than the capacity for exercising choice. The greater concern is with the idea of personal autonomy which is the development of some of the potentialities implicit in the notion of man as a chooser.[49]

It is important to note that, for Peters, to speak about the development of the free person is to have in mind a process of learning. This means one learns to become a chooser as a part of being an autonomous person.[50] Learning to become an autonomous person requires freedom and autonomy as a definite educational ideal. Peters uses the word 'learn' in a specific sense where a change in attitude and behaviour occurs as a result of past experience. This is not the general concept of learning used by most psychologists who use the word 'learn' to refer to a change in behaviour which is not purely the product of maturation.[51] What is central to learning in Peters' specific sense is that a learner understands the content and assimilates it. The extent to which he makes it his own depends on the mental development of the individual at any given particular stage. This is related not only to the content, but to the way in which the content is conceived.

In relation to the notion of a person becoming a chooser and the development of autonomy, Peters seems to accept Piaget's and Kohlberg's general claim that just as much as mental development, moral development occurs in stages. The understanding of certain categorical concepts such as thinghood, means-to-an-end and causality mark the

stages in the mental development of an individual. A categorical concept or an organizing notion unifies a number of a variety of previously discovered experiences. For example, a child will grasp the concept of a thing, and would learn to recognize a variety of things such as bats, balls, bottles and so forth when the distinctive features have being pointed out to them. To see something as a means-to-an-end is to see the connection between doing something and obtaining a desired outcome.[52] The concept of causality enables one to understand the relation between cause and effect, or between certain co-related events or phenomena.[53] Such conceptual understanding limits the extent to which one learns certain things at a certain stage. A framework of such concepts is considered necessary for rational thought and choice. Kohlberg argues that such an understanding cannot be imparted by specific teaching, as it emerges in an interaction between a mind, which has the potential for organizing and selecting phenomena, and an environment, which has different features to be discovered.[54] In order to provide cognitive stimulation the child must be provided with an environment of diversified objects and encouraged to learn. Now, as argued by Peters, what is crucial to the educational development of the free person is learning the forms of understanding which are considered necessary for rational thought and choice.

Being a Chooser

Peters claims that the subjective conditions of choice, such as being able to weigh the pros and cons of alternatives and to act in the light of such deliberations, presuppose that the individual can think in terms of taking a means to an end. This seems plausible, as taking a means to an end necessarily involves choice. To plan for a rewarding end one needs to ascertain in some sense the consequences before hand.

Peters sees Kohlberg's idea of cognitive stimulation as a factor in the development of the free person. Peters is critical of Kohlberg's distinction between teaching and cognitive stimulation.[55] Nevertheless this does not concern us here. What is important is

the idea of seeing cognitive stimulation as a factor in the development of the free person. Peters' concern is more with the role of social influence as a factor in such stimulation. This is basically , as Peters acknowledges, the view of the psychologists of the Freudian persuasion who see certain types of socialization as a determining factor in the development of, or failure to develop, a categorical apparatus essential to the individual's ability to make relevant choices.[56] A psychopath, for instance, could not be able to make relevant choices as he would be more attuned to seek immediate gratification. This could result from a lack of a clear perception of reality. It is generally agreed that psychopathic conditions could be related to traumatic rejection in early childhood.

Furthermore, Peters claims that unreasonable rather than irrational people have a limited development of the capacity to be a chooser. An unreasonable person, according to Peters, is a person who has reasons for what he does, though the reasons are somewhat weak. They tend to pay little attention to the reasons of others, for example. To suggest that a person's behaviour is irrational is at least to indicate that in some sense a person deviates from standards of correct behaviour, though in fact he has knowledge of the point of such rules. With reference to being a chooser, Peters refers to being unreasonable rather than irrational, as unreasonable has a social dimension which is not implicit in irrationality.[57] It must be remembered that in relation to cognitive stimulation Peters is concerned with the role of social influences.

Capacities for choice can also be impaired by more conscious techniques which are combined together in brain washing. Such techniques reduce a person to acute anxiety to the point of a breakdown of resistance. There is then a passive acceptance of imposed beliefs, and the person becomes more or less conditioned rather than a chooser.[58]

In order to justify Peters' arguments about considerations which relate to the subjective conditions definitive of becoming a chooser, he refers to studies in child-

rearing practices. It has been revealed that children with the ability of rational choice are said to come from homes where there is parental (empathetic) acceptance of children together with a consistent attitude towards the following of rules of behaviour.[59] It is plausible that an accepting, rather than a rejecting, attitude would undoubtedly enhance a child's confidence in others and in himself. The consistency and the predictability of the social environment would be conducive to children's confidence and growth in making rational choices.

The Development of Autonomy

In relation to the development of autonomy just as much as for becoming a chooser, Peters bases his arguments on Piaget's and Kohlberg's general claim that children pass through various stages in their conception of rules independently of the content of rules. This indicates that there are some general issues connected with the development of autonomy which concern rational reflection and authenticity.

Concerning rational reflection and also authenticity Peters considers two important points. First, the ability to make relevant choices as to accept or reject rules must be viewed in relation to the developmental stage which the individual child has reached. Second, assuming that the child has reached the relevant stage where a necessary choice could be made, the type of social influences to which the child is exposed may encourage or hinder his emergence into the autonomous stage.

At this point, it seems necessary to mention Kohlberg's and Piaget's stages of moral development. Kohlberg identifies six moral judgement stages, two stages occurring at each of three distinct levels -- the pre-conventional, conventional, and the post-conventional. At first, children adhere to rules primarily to avoid punishment and obtain rewards. They then pass on to a stage in which they regard rules as something which should be accepted, and which emanate from the collective will of the group. In the final level, that of autonomy, children become aware that rules could be criticized, or

rejected based on reasons. Rational reflection on rules is said to emerge only at the final level of moral development.[60] Kohlberg seems to have expanded Piaget's three stages of egocentric, transcendental and autonomous morality into six stages.[61]

Though Peters accepts Kohlberg's and Piaget's general claim that children pass through certain stages in moral development, he makes some criticisms concerning specific issues. However, such criticisms do not have a direct bearing on the general issue that moral development occurs in stages. Therefore, it does not concern us here.

As far as rational reflection is concerned the ability to make relevant choices whether to accept or reject rules must be viewed in conjunction with the stage of moral development the child has reached. The child must first understand the significance of an externally imposed rule. He must first appreciate the conformity to such rules which emerges only in the second developmental stage of morality. In Peters' view it is only then that acceptance or rejection of rules would become meaningful to the child. Unless a child learns rule-conformity at a prior age, accepting or rejecting rules would not involve a conflict situation. For him, character formation would only arise out of conflict situations. This is precisely why he thinks that progressive educators have not given much thought to the second level of development. They in fact expect the child to make relevant choices at an age when such an ability has not been fully developed. In Peters' opinion public schools seem to cater well to the development of autonomy. Peters claims that public schools encourage team spirit for all students based on rule-conformity while at the same time making provision for the exercise of some degree of autonomy for the more senior students.[62] It seems to be the case that public schools lay more emphasis on rule-conformity, and provision for the exercise of some degree of autonomy is made available only to a few bright students, and not to all students. However, later in his paper Peters subscribes to this view.

Secondly, Peters refers to research studies which indicate the impact of social influences that would encourage or retard the development of autonomy in relation to the extent of cognitive stimulation available. For instance, children who come from middle class homes are more exposed to instances of cognitive stimulation than those who come from working-class homes. There is a greater possibility for a child of a middle class home to reach the autonomous stage where rules of behaviour are accepted on rational reflection. Furthermore, Peters refers to investigations carried out by Bruner and his associates. Based on their investigations they conclude that in traditionalist societies there is rigid conformity to group norms, and consequently children are not encouraged to be autonomous.[63] This indicates that children of such societies are prevented from reaching the final level of moral development. Therefore, certain types of child-rearing practices and types of socialization may encourage or hinder the development of autonomy.

Moreover, Peters claims that children's attitude to rules need not necessarily be the product of "vague social pressure," but could be perpetrated by conscious techniques such as indoctrination. He uses the word 'vague' in relation to child-rearing practices. Indoctrination could be viewed as rigorously imposed social pressure, involving the passing on of fixed beliefs in a way which encourages passive acceptance of such beliefs. For example, in a Soviet school students' abilities to choose are not impaired, but they are not encouraged to question the validity of their political beliefs, which in Peters' view is a failure to develop autonomy of the individual.

When Peters refers to authenticity, which is an aspect of autonomy, he is referring to certain forms of reasoning which governs one's life. The acceptance of rules must be backed by authentically based principles. In following a rule, a person acts according to a certain principle. In acting according to a certain principle, a person upholds certain reasons for doing some things rather than others.[64] For instance, say, A follows a rule

that he should help the tornado victims. In accordance with his decision he makes a generous contribution to the distress fund. Here, the principle which gave meaning to A's code of conduct is sensitivity to the suffering of others. A decides to help the victims rather than be indifferent or insensitive to the suffering of others. In this particular instance A's decision to help the victims is the outcome of a certain reasoning which makes him aware that helping the victims was more appropriate than being unhelpful. Such reasoning was supported by the principle of sensitivity to the suffering of others.

Presumably, very young children will not be able to understand reasons for doing things which are backed by authentically based principles. In fact Peters thinks that there must be some kind of cognitive stimulation in the environment. He suggests that an atmosphere of discussion and criticism would be helpful. The crucial point he makes here is that rules can be presented in a non-authoritarian way before children are capable of accepting them for reasons given. However, he is not suggesting that parents and teachers ought not to insist on certain forms of conduct which the children may not accept readily.[65]

The Influence of Institutions.

Peters considers that freedom as an educational ideal -- the development of autonomy -- can be fostered by a certain kind of institutional environment. Though he sees the connection between freedom, as a characteristic of an institution and "learning to be a free man" he is not suggesting a major change in the existing institution of schooling as with the progressive educators. What he attempts to find out is how an institution such as a secondary school with its prevailing attitude towards rules could contribute towards the autonomous development of children.[66] It is apparent from the earlier discussion that he considers rule-conformity at a prior age to be necessary for the later autonomous development of children. Therefore, his suggestions relate to a change in the spirit with which such rules are applied.

In this respect what Peters considers as being central is the "general atmosphere of discussion" which would prevail in a school. He seems to draw a distinction between an arbitrarily imposed system of rules, and one in which there is an awareness on the part of children of reasons for following rules. It seems plausible that if children come to know the reasons for the implementation of rules they could be motivated in an autonomous way to follow rules. On the other hand in a school system where rules are arbitrarily imposed, the children will be compelled rather than autonomous in following rules. From the point of view of the kind of motivation used, Peters thinks that much could be done by the example set by both teachers and senior students.[67]

A curriculum which provides a basis for choice is said to be an obvious help. In this respect Peters makes special mention of literature and history.[68] Presumably, unlike the science-based and mathematics-based subjects, the subject-matter of literature and history seem to offer more scope for different interpretations. The fact that some subject-matter offers more scope for differences in interpretation would allow it to lay more significant foundation for making choices. This ability to make relevant choices could be extended to other spheres of life. Moreover, there is another reason which could be assumed to lead Peters to think that subjects like literature and history could be helpful in this respect. As mentioned earlier the subjective conditions of choice or the ability to reason are considered more definitive of becoming a chooser. In the development of autonomy therefore, literature , drama and history seem to afford more opportunity "to weigh the pros and cons of alternatives and to act in the light of such deliberations." It might be argued that literature, drama, and history, etc, might help people to become more vividly aware of the situations in which they are placed as human beings, enlarge their range of choice and provide information to make choices better informed.[69] However, he qualifies this by pointing to the importance of how the subject is conceived and taught.[70]

In relation to institutional arrangements, Peters thinks that schools where the control system is not out of alignment with stages of development seem appropriate. Institutional arrangements of this sort may not bring about major discrepancies within the system. Sometimes there could be a conflict between expectations of the control system of a school and teacher expectations. If a school lays emphasis on rule-conformity alone which characterizes the earlier stage of development, teachers who strive to encourage a more developed attitude would be faced with a difficult task. Schools which only cater for the final level of autonomous development seem inadequate in terms of the development of autonomous individuals. As Kohlberg has mentioned, many adolescents are still only at the pre-moral level. In this sense, to cater only for the final level of development is to refrain from providing adequate opportunities for the earlier stages of development. Progressive schools on the other hand, according to Peters, ignore the central role which the second stage of morality plays in moral development as they lay emphasis on children making their own decisions. Therefore, in Peters' view, public schools at their best have approximated to this.

The Development of the Free Man: Krishnamurti

In relation to the development of the free person Krishnamurti's basic premise is that modern schooling as constituted does not help to bring about the free autonomous individual. He thinks that modern schooling lays emphasis on the accumulation of knowledge and the acquisition of degrees, and does not help the individual towards freedom and integration. He confronts all this with what he calls the "right kind of education," to help the child to "grow in freedom." [71]

In Krishnamurtian terms the development of the free autonomous individual would necessarily imply the achievement of inner freedom. Even though this could be a worthy educational goal in theory, nonetheless in practice it is problematic. Holroyd

asserts that Krishnamurti suggests a criterion of freedom that is probably impossible to attain for any but a rare few.[72] Whether this is so obviously needs examination. Krishnamurti, however, assures us that, "the mind must reveal itself spontaneously to itself, and this is not given only to a few, nor is it an impossibility."[73] In spite of his assurance it is certainly difficult to comprehend how schooling can significantly foster this inner freedom of the mind for the many. However, his concern to allow the child to "grow in freedom" is so worthy that its practical difficulties should not be seen as adequate grounds for dismissing careful consideration of it.

In section one, I showed that, for Krishnamurti, freedom does not involve choice and the free individual is the authentic, and also the autonomous, individual. As I understand this in relation to education what is central to the development of the free person is this idea of "growing in freedom." What is implied is that schooling should encourage and provide the necessary learning environment to enable the child to "grow in freedom." An instrumental connection seems to be implicit in the notions of "growing in freedom" and the "right kind of education." For to have the "right kind of education" <u>is</u> to "grow in freedom."

The notion of "right kind of education" or "right education" does not refer to any specific curricular arrangements. As stated earlier, the curricular arrangements of the Krishnamurtian schools reflect those of the state schools. Rather it is indicative of a general approach to education, and a right kind of educational environment as being considered necessary.

Apart from imparting subject-matter knowledge, "right education" involves freedom from conditioning. This is what is implied in helping the child to "grow in freedom." It involves inquiring deeply into, and thereby transcending, the influences which condition the mind. Presumably Krishnamurti's assumption would be that if the child at the secondary level is encouraged to inquire into the influences which condition

the mind there is the possibility that the individual may be able to achieve inner freedom later. However this may be, what is central to this type of schooling is the fact that the child learns in the midst of orderly living not to conform and adjust, but on the contrary to see clearly the significance of not being conditioned.[74]

Freedom and Order

Moreover, as suggested, the notion of "growing in freedom" seems to involve the idea of order. Krishnamurti claims that, "freedom does not exist without order. The two go together. If you cannot have order, you cannot have freedom. The two are inseparable." [75] This idea of order must be viewed in relation to Krishnamurti's conception of freedom. According to him, order comes about by being thoughtful, watchful and considerate.[76] This means that if one is not sufficiently thoughtful, watchful or considerate there is less order and more confusion in one's life. For example, if A comes invariably late to class, he is invariably creating disorder as he would be disturbing the teacher and also his class-mates. If he is thoughtful and considerate he would not make it a practice to be late. This means there would be some order in his life issuing spontaneously from such sensitivity.

For Krishnamurti, order does not refer to any external imposition of discipline or conformity to rules. He says that "order is not something planned or adhered to." This is not to suggest that routine arrangements or efficient organization of a place are considered unnecessary. In fact he thinks that efficient institutional arrangements are very necessary.[77] Since this efficiency is not an end in itself it should not be confused with freedom from conflict which is order. However, to say that "order is not something planned or adhered to" seems inappropriate as the generic sense of the word 'order' is to regulate. As I understand this, Krishnamurti uses the word 'order' in a more specific sense. Instead of saying that in the generic sense the word does not mean something "planned or adhered to," it would have been more appropriate if he said he is using the

word 'order' in a specific sense. In this specific sense order implies bringing order to one's life by being mindful, watchful and considerate. His premise is that order within each individual would contribute to outward orderliness.

Sensitivity

It must be mentioned that for Krishnamurti, freedom and authenticity involve sensitivity. Sensitivity does not refer to a mere personal reaction. He categorically says that "a personal reaction does not indicate sensitivity."[78] For instance, a person can be sensitive to the sufferings of a loved one, but not to the sufferings of others. He would undoubtedly refer to this as a "personal reaction." For Krishnamurti there is no partial sensitivity for it issues from, or expresses, the state of one's whole being as a whole, one's totality of consciousness.[79] One cannot be sensitive in one area of one's life, and not in another, and to try to bring this about leads to conflict. As mentioned earlier, being free, and being authentic, cannot co-exist with a conflictual state. To refer to the former example, if one appears sensitive to the sufferings of a loved one but not sensitive to the sufferings of an acquaintance it will involve conflict. Interests of "mine" and "not-mine" are in fact being expressed, and are the root of insensitivity and conflict. This is precisely why Krishnamurti says that "sensitivity means being sensitive to everything around one, to the plants, to the animals, the trees, the waters of the river and also to the moods of the people around." [80] Moreover, one can and must be sensitive to one's own insensitivity, whenever it manifests itself.

Institutional Arrangements

Krishnamurti thinks that an institutional environment which could help the child to grow in freedom must be very carefully thought out. The institutional set-up must provide opportunities for learning as well as living, where the two complement each other. For the appropriate organization of such a school the necessary guide-lines are not to be enforced by reward or punishment, for the desired order comes as a natural result of

respect. It is assumed that such order arises from respect for teacher, one another and school as a whole.[81] On this view right order and right relationship are one process.

Since learning to be attentive helps the child to "grow in freedom" the school must provide opportunities for this. The Krishnamurtian schools take great pains to provide a quiet and a harmonious atmosphere. In fact a certain time is set aside each day, so that children could experience the quality of awareness. The common practice in these schools is to allow children to sit together quietly for a short period of time listening to a piece of music, a poem, or to some reading.

It is also important to note that dialogue is an essential part of the learning and teaching intended to encourage the child to "grow in freedom." Thus, open enquiry replaces conformity as the basis of educational learning. The concern of the staff is to provide an environment in which students feel free and in which the teachers help them to explore and question freely. With the older students, teachers investigate serious questions of living. Particular emphasis is concentrated on the understanding of self-centered behaviour.[82]

The role of the educator here is undoubtedly quite different from the norm. This is basically why Krishnamurti says that the "educator must be educated." [83] In relation to this, Krishnamurti emphasizes two points. First, the teacher must be aware of his conditioning. What this means is that if the teacher is influenced by his own conditioning he may not be able to help the child to free himself from certain crippling tendencies created by him directly and his environment indirectly. In order to investigate and explore the problems of life the teacher must be able to transcend the influences that condition him.. According to Krishnamurti, "the right kind of educator must be aware of all these tendencies in order to help his students to be free, not only from his authority but also from their self-enclosing pursuits." [84] Elsewhere he reiterates "it is very important for teachers to set about unconditioning themselves, and also to help the children to be

free of conditioning . . . the teacher must encourage the children not thoughtlessly to accept, but to investigate, to question.[85]

Second, if the child is to "grow in freedom" it is essential that the teacher should not impose his authority on the child. What is crucial to such thinking is that whether in passing on of subject-matter knowledge or deeper questions of living, the teacher should not impose his ideas in such a manner so as to expect mindless conformity. Passive acceptance of ideas would amount to conformity. To help the child to "grow in freedom" the teaching-learning process should be a quest where both the teacher and the learner are communicating with each other in the critical exchange of ideas. At this point I wish to mention that more will be said on dialogue as a method of teaching, and the role of the teacher in chapter four.

C. Comparison and Contrast: Notion of Freedom and the Development of the Free Person

It is apparent that Krishnamurti's notion of freedom is different from Peters' conception of freedom. For Peters, freedom is a social and a legal concept, though his concept of the free or autonomous person has a psychological dimension as well. This is the generally accepted view of the freedom of the individual to do certain things. When Krishnamurti speaks about freedom he refers to a special state of mind rather than to any social and legal freedom. This I believe is the fundamental difference between the two conceptions of freedom. However, it is possible to attempt a comparison of sorts as both conceptions of freedom encapsulate some common features. But, these common features are conceived differently.

Peters speaks of freedom as the absence of constraints. By implication Krishnamurti also refers to the absence of constraints. While Peters speaks of certain external constraints which restrict an individual's social and legal freedom, Krishnamurti

refers to an agglomerate of internal constraints, such as the "inward psychological authority," which curbs the individual's freedom of the mind.

Peters' notion of the paradox of freedom designates that the acceptance of some forms of constraint by all is necessary to avoid more grievous forms of constraints by some others. Here freedom as a social principle involves the idea of the freedom of the individual. For Krishnamurti, on the other hand, the idea of the paradox of freedom is linked to the inner freedom of the individual. To have a pre-conceived notion of freedom is not to be free. The sense of freedom must be experienced and not delimited by an idea. To strive to achieve freedom according to Krishnamurti, would cause conflict, and freedom is precisely a state without inner conflict.

Peters considers the free autonomous individual as one who accepts rules of conduct on rational choice. The authenticity which Peters describes as the ability to adopt as one's own a way of life is a basic condition of autonomy. Being autonomous is more than being authentic. The autonomous person also requires a strength of will to resist counter-inclinations.

For Krishnamurti, there is no conceptual gap between freedom and autonomy. He refers to authenticity rather than autonomy. It could be contended that his emphasis on self-knowledge and his dislike of conformity implies autonomy. The free autonomous individual is one who enjoys total self-knowledge. Freedom comes with the "choiceless awareness of what is," where one does not will or struggle to uphold a rational choice. For Krishnamurti, being free is necessarily being authentic. Therefore, unlike Peters, there is no conceptual gap between freedom and autonomy and authenticity.

Both Peters and Krishnamurti pursue the connection between freedom as a notion and the educational development of the free person. While Peters speaks of the development of the free person in relation to freedom as a social principle, Krishnamurti

refers to the development of the free person in relation to the inner freedom of the individual.

For Peters, to speak about the development of a free autonomous person is to have in mind a process of learning. Krishnamurti speaks in terms of "growing in freedom" rather than learning to be free and autonomous.

Peters gives us a very systematic account of how one learns to be free and autonomous. His conclusions are based on the findings of both psychological and sociological studies, particularly those of Piaget and Kohlberg. Peters takes into consideration their general thesis that conceptual development and moral development occur in stages.

In relation to becoming a chooser and the development of autonomy, at certain stages of conceptual development children learn certain forms of understanding which are considered necessary for rational thought and choice. Therefore, the development of autonomy seems to be closely related to the forms of understanding, namely the curriculum. In relation to the development of autonomy, namely, rational reflection and authenticity, the ability to make relevant choices as in the acceptance or rejection of rules must be seen in relation to stages of development. In terms of authenticity Peters emphasizes that the acceptance of rules must be backed by authentically based principles.

As regards Krishnamurti's conception of freedom it is difficult to understand how schooling can develop this inner freedom of the mind of children in the secondary school stage. Here we consider his notion of "growing in freedom." He is some what vague as he does not indicate whether such a development can be accomplished in stages as Peters does. According to him, only a "right kind of education," and a right kind of educational environment would help the children to "grow in freedom." His basic assumption is that "right education" would enable the child to be free from the conditioning influences. Therefore, as for Peters the development of freedom and autonomy is not directly related

to the different forms of understanding. It is more a matter of teaching styles and the social environment of the school.

Both Peters and Krishnamurti consider social influences as either encouraging or hampering the development of the free autonomous individual. With Peters, certain child-rearing practices or conscious techniques such as brainwashing or indoctrination hamper the development of the free individual. In a somewhat similar manner for Krishnamurti conditioning influences would hamper the process of "growing in freedom." In fact, "growing in freedom" necessarily means the transcending of the influences that condition one.

In Peters' view the child must first appreciate the value of conformity to rules, which can emerge only in the second developmental stage of morality indicated by him. It is only then that the acceptance or rejection of rules become meaningful to the child. Peters would say that unless a child learns rule-conformity at an earlier age, accepting or rejecting rules later could not involve conflict-situations (seeing alternatives to choose from), and character formation arises out of such conflict situations. This is because for Peters, the freedom and autonomy implicit in "character formation" necessarily involve choice.

At first, though Krishnamurti's idea of order seems to bear a similarity to Peters' idea of rule-conformity it is only a superficial similarity. For Krishnamurti, the most desirable order does not indicate any external imposition of discipline or conformity to rules. For the effective organization of a school though certain guide-lines are considered necessary they are not enforced by reward and punishment.. The encouraged order comes about by being attentive to everything around one, and the attentiveness is encouraged by dialogue over any issues arising. It involves respect for the teacher, for one another, and the school as a whole. This stems from Krishnamurti's notion of freedom which does not involve deliberated choice in the usual sense.

Peters and Krishnamurti both agree that a certain kind of institutional environment can help to bring about the development of the free individual. However, the manner of development and the type of institutional set-up differs according to the two conceptions of freedom. The type of institutional set-up they both refer to is mainly the secondary school. But, again the type of secondary school they envisage is different. Peters thinks that public schools at their best help to develop the free autonomous individual. On the other hand, Krishnamurti seems to favour small independent schools in place of a state system of education. Peters is not suggesting a major change in the institutional set-up. His concern is to find out how an institution such as a secondary school with its prevailing attitude towards rules could modify itself so as to contribute towards the development of autonomous students. Peters stresses the motivational factor, and his suggestions relate to a change in the spirit of application of such rules The changes that Krishnamurti envisages in independent schools are changes in the overall approach to education.

Both Peters and Krishnamurti consider that a general atmosphere of discussion should prevail in the school. Peters claims that through discussion the children should come to know the reasons for the implementation of rules rather than imposing a system of rules in an arbitrary manner. For Krishnamurti, "growing in freedom" necessarily requires the child to inquire, question, and explore not only the notion of order (in a Krishnamurtian sense) but also questions of living and self-centered behaviour.

Since being a chooser is regarded as central to the development of the free person, Peters is of the opinion that a curriculum which provides a basis for choice would be helpful. He makes special mention of subjects like literature and history. Since Krishnamurti's ultimate concern is with the achievement of inner freedom he thinks that the child should learn to be attentive and watchful over the whole range of his experience, academic and otherwise. This is precisely why he suggests that a school should provide a

quiet and harmonious environment. Furthermore, he contends that the role of the educator is different from that of the norm. He is more a guide to deeply intelligent living as a whole.

Footnotes

1 R. S. Peters, "Freedom and the Development of the Free Man," in Educational Judgements, ed. J. Doyle (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 120.

2 Ibid.

3 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 183.

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5 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 183.

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7 K. Popper, Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 2, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 124.

8 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 187.

9 Ibid. , p.186.

10 Ibid.

11 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p.188.

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13 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. liv.

14 R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 191.

15 J. Feinberg, "The Idea of a Free Man," in Educational Judgements, ed. J. Doyle, pp. 146-147.

16 E. Callan, Autonomy and Schooling, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill University Press, 1988), pp.10-11.

17 R. S. Peters, "Freedom and the Development of the Free Man," in Educational Judgments, ed. J. Doyle, pp. 121-122.

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[19] R. S. Peters, "Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of its Content," in Education and the Education of Teachers, p. 62.

[20] P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, The Logic of Education, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 53.

[21] Ibid. , p. 32.

[22] R. S. Peters, "Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of its Content," in Education and the Education of Teachers, p. 63.

[23] R. S. Peters, "Freedom and the Development of the Free Man," in Educational Judgments, ed. J. Doyle, p. 123.

[24] Ibid. , p. 124.

[25] Ibid. , pp. 124-125.

[26] A. S. Kaufman, like Peters, thinks that authenticity is not the whole of autonomy. But unlike Peters, he contends that an autonomous person is one who possesses two independent overlapping virtues -- authenticity and rationality. On the other hand, D. Cooper refers to authenticity and not autonomy. He thinks that authenticity and autonomy are not two distinct educational goals. His preference for authenticity reflects the less central place he allocates to rational reflection and criticism. See A. S. Kaufman, "Comments on Frankena's, The Concept of Education Today," in Educational Judgments, ed. J. Doyle, p. 47, and D. E. Cooper, Authenticity and Learning, pp. 20- 21.

[27] M. Bonnett, "Personal Authenticity and Public Standards: Towards a Transcendence of a Dualism, " in Education, Values and Mind, ed. D. E. Cooper, pp. 121-122.

[28] R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development, p. 428.

[29] S. Holroyd, The Quest of the Quiet Mind, (Wellinborough: The Aquarian Press, 1980), p. 39.

[30] J. Krishnamurti, Freedom from the Known, ed. Mary Lutyens, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1969), p. 68.

31 J. Krishnamurti, Letters to the Schools, p. 31.

32 J. Krishnamurti, The Impossible Question, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1972), p. 21.

33 J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, ed. D. Rajagopal, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964), p. 24..

34 J. Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, p. 48.

35 S. Holroyd, The Quest of the Quiet Mind, p. 41.

36 J. Krishnamurti, Freedom from the Known, p. 60.

37 J. Krishnamurti, Letters to the Schools, Vol. 2.(Wassenaar: Mirananda, 1985), p.55.

38 J. Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, p. 53.

39 This example is taken from J. Kramer, The Passionate Mind, (Millbrae, California: Celestial Arts, 1974), p. 25.

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43 D. Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University, 1950), p. 18.

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48 Mary Midgeley, Beast and Man (Brighton: Harvester, 1979), pp. 290- 291.

49 R. S. Peters, "Freedom and the Develop ıent of the Free Man," in Educational Judgments, ed. J. Doyle. p. 125.

50 Ibid. , p.126.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield: G & C Miriam Company, 1967), p. 134.

[54] R. S. Peters, "Freedom and the Development of the Free Man," in Educational Judgments, ed. J. Doyle, p.126.

[55] Ibid. , pp. 127-128.

[56] Ibid. , p. 127.

[57] Ibid. , p. 128.

[58] Ibid. , p. 129.

[59] R. S. Peters, Moral Development and Moral Education (London: George Allen & Unwin 1981), p. 150

[60] R. S. Peters "Freedom and the Development of the Free Man," in Educational Judgments, ed. J. Doyle, pp. 132-133.

[61] Ibid. , pp. 132-133.

[62] Ibid. , p. 132.

[63] Ibid. , p. 131.

[64] Ibid. , p. 133.

[65] Ibid. , p. 134.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] R. S. Peters, "Education and Human Development," in Education and Reason Part 3 of Education and the Development of Reason, ed. R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, p. 129.

[70] Ibid.

71 J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, p. 31.

72 S. Holroyd, The Quest of the Quiet Mind, p. 41.

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CHAPTER 4

PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

This chapter will deal with the more striking implications for different kinds of schooling which seem to be indicated by the comparative analysis of Krishnamurti's and Peters' views on education in so far as they involve initiation into standard forms of knowledge, education of the emotions, and the development of freedom and autonomy. The discussion will relate to key elements in current educational practice from a Krishnamurtian and a Peterite standpoint. The discussion will include the key elements of 1) the teacher, 2) the curriculum, 3) methods of promoting learning, and 4) methods of evaluating learning.

With regard to pedogogical implications, in the main, the discussion will relate to the central themes involving Krishnamurti's and Peters' views on education in so far as they involve initiation into the different disciplines, the emotions, and freedom and autonomy. It is important to note that Peters' view of education as initiation which indicates the development of knowledge and understanding involves the concern for truth and the development of practical reason. Being initiated into the forms of knowledge, the individual is encouraged to develop a concern for truth. Education of the emotions involves bringing the emotions and their passive states under the control of reason. Similarly, initiation into the established disciplines is expected to equip the child with the ability of rational thought and criticism. Krishnamurti's conception of education which centrally involves self-knowledge also indicates a concern for truth. Since "knowing what is" is primarily dependent on the direct experience of a truth, the self-knowing person understands his emotions and is more liable to achieve freedom of the mind.

A. Pedagogical implications: R. S. Peters

The Teacher

According to Peters, the teacher's main function is to transmit or pass on

information. This is particularly why he says that "education means among other things passing on a great deal of information."[1] But, he is quite clear about the content and the manner in which such information is transmitted. For Peters, the content that is transmitted is not of a non-selective nature. For instance, a teacher may well transmit false beliefs, or irrelevant practices. What is being transmitted is what is considered worthwhile. Such content which is of value is selected by the teacher. Admittedly, Peters says that

> education is best described as passing on of information, skills, traditions which are necessary to intelligent behaviour within a society, together with those of higher order skills and traditions which are necessary for assessing, criticizing, and modifying such rules and skills when necessary.[2]

It must be mentioned that in making the above statement Peters is making a distinction between education and teaching activities. Though teaching is a complex activity, educating is not. Educating does not pick out any distinctive activity, rather it intimates that other activities such as teaching, instructing, or training satisfy certain criteria. In relation to teaching activities it seems possible to transmit something harmful or pernicious; for instance, A could teach the art of forgery or methods of torture to B. This implies that A in a sense has taught something harmful to B. Thus, though B has effectively mastered the art of forgery and methods of torture, it is not possible to seriously assert that A has educated B. As argued by Peters, to educate someone implies not only that some sort of achievement has been made but also that achievement must be worthwhile in a sense at least including what is ethical. Furthermore, as stated by Peters, the achievements of a teacher as such may be morally neutral or pernicious whereas those of an educator cannot be.[3] Presumably this is why Peters prefers to use the term 'educator' rather than 'teacher,' as the educator would transmit only something of established and accepted value to the student. He says that "the main function of the educator is to pass on the priceless human heritage."[4]

With reference to the point at issue, Peters makes a distinction between 'education as initiation' used in a more general sense and 'education as initiation' used in a specific sense. To compare education with initiation in a general sense is to convey the suggestion of being placed "on the inside of a form of thought and awareness." 'Education' in a more specific sense implies not only that something worthwhile has been passed on, but it has also led to the development of knowledge and understanding. 'Initiation' could also mean passing on of information which cannot be considered in general as worthwhile -- such as devil-worship.[5]

It is important to note that though the educator passes on information he is not a mere instructor. This is not to suggest that the Peterite educator does not instruct, but it indicates that he does not merely instruct. As Peters claims, to simply instruct is quite compatible with the authoritarian exposition of "inert ideas."[6] Whitehead was similarly critical of what he called "inert ideas" and emphasized the importance of acquiring knowledge which is related to interest.[7] The terms 'instructor' and 'teacher' are frequently used interchangeably, but instruction and teaching are not to be identified. Teaching is a far more inclusive term.

Moreover, the Peterite educator is not just one who trains his students. This is particularly so as training suggests the development of a specific limited skill carefully reproduced. The central feature of teaching seems to be that it focuses on the display of intelligence. Training seems to aim less at the display of intelligence.[8] The teacher, according to Peters, is one who unites the processes of instructing and training by the overall intention of getting students not only to acquire knowledge, skills and modes of conduct, but to acquire them in a manner which involves understanding and evaluation of the rationale underlying them.[9] Here Peters seems to view teaching as an intentional activity in a specific sense involving moral considerations. Teaching as an intentional activity can also be viewed in a generic sense as a family of related activities. In this generic sense, activities as diverse as lecturing, demonstrating, instructing, reasoning,

indoctr: ıating and conditioning may well be done with the intention of getting someone else to learn something. The in ·ntion that someone learns something is an essential condition for an activity to be a teaching activity.[10]

In Peters' terms the teacher's concern is not only with the value of the content that is passed on, but also the manner with which it is done. What is passed on has to be accomplished in a morally unobjectionable manner. This clearly rules out any attempt to condition or indoctrinate the student.[11] There must be a connection between teaching and the giving of reasons on the part of the teacher together with the activity expected on the part of the learner. Peters claims that teachers must not only pass on information; they must also pass on the critical ability. They must positively encourage their pupils to find out for themselves whether what they are taught is true and of value. This essentially requires the giving of reasons. Peters argues that children must not simply be taught things. They must be initiated into a tradition of experiment and critical discussion.[12]

Israel Scheffler likewise argues that,

> to teach in the standard sense, is at some points at least to submit oneself to the understanding and independent judgment of the pupil, to his demand for reasons, to his sense of what constitutes an adequate explanation . . . Teaching involves further that, if we try to get the student to believe that such and such is the case, we try also to get him to believe it for reasons, that, within the limits of his capacity to grasp, are our reasons. Teaching in this way, requires us to reveal our reasons to the student and, by so doing, to submit them to his evaluation and criticism.[13]

In the main, though the educator's social function is passing on information, skills and preparing children for different jobs, his function is not limited to this task alone The educator should not and cannot disregard other things that go to make the "whole man." He cannot forget that children may become unhappy, neurotic, unbalanced or isolated from peer groups. He must give due recognition to the development of the "whole man."[14] In fact, his major task is educating the child rather than just training and instructing him.

Regarding the whole person, the Peterite educator cannot disregard the education of the emotions. Just as much as passing on of subject-matter knowledge he must have a similar concern for truth. He cannot ignore the educator's role in the development of appropriate appraisals. For instance, he must show reasons as to why children should dispel less deep-seated false or irrelevant beliefs. Moreover, the educator could help children to recognize and react reasonably to emotions in themselves and others. To counter more harmful emotions the educator uses only positive sentiments such as respect for persons, benevolence and the sense of justice. With regard to certain generalized appraisals, the children not only learn that a certain course of action is right or wrong, but children are led to see the reasons for or against such a course of action.

Likewise in relation to the development of freedom and autonomy the educator's greater concern is to motivate children to follow necessary and sensible rules in the earlier stages. Rather than impose rules in an arbitrary manner, the teacher will attempt to make children aware of the reasons for following rules with the intention that they could be equipped to accept or reject rules at a later stage when capable of refined assessment.

Peters' notion of education as initiation involves a specific relationship between the educator and the student. As stated earlier the educator is not a "detached operator" in the different senses of either the child-centred teacher or the more traditional teacher. The special relationship between teacher and student here is one based on "shared experience." They are partners in the educative process. As to be expected the teacher has a better understanding of subject-matter knowledge. Nonetheless, they both owe a common allegiance to the content of the different disciplines and the critical procedures by which established knowledge is assessed revised and criticized and used. Both investigate, and explore the different subject domains together. It must be mentioned that the stress here is on impersonal standards to which teacher and student owe their allegiance. Nonetheless, this does not indicate that the nature of personal relationships is not taken into account.

Peters considers that the ability to form and maintain personal relationships is essential to the teaching-learning process. It seems necessary to define the term 'personal relationships' as to how it is distinct or related to 'role-relationship' and 'personal relations.' A role-relationship is one in which a particular role demands a person to act in a particular way. For instance, whatever a teacher is expected to do at least he is expected to teach. Now, to talk of a teacher's personal relations with his students is to require information from the students as to whether the teacher is friendly, kind or unkind, and whether they like him or dislike him. 'Relationship' suggests something more structured that grows up between people concerned, and in which there is some element of reciprocity. This arises out of the initiative of the individuals concerned and not from some role or convention.[15]

What is specific to a teacher's relationship with his pupils is a firm basis of love and trust. Actual learning and development could be hindered by the lack of love and confidence. The development of personal relationships, as central to the educative process, cannot be considered incompatible with the role of the teacher in the development of knowledge and understanding.

The Curriculum

The accepted conception of the curriculum in formal schooling is that of a body of knowledge organized and graded to suit students at different age levels. It may be the case that within this broad spectrum of knowledge certain subject areas will take precedence in relation to some others. In its broadest sense the curriculum forms the content of education. It is this content that the teacher transmits or passes on to the student.

The curriculum is subordinate to that at which the teacher wishes to aim in so far as the student's learning is concerned. The teacher transmits the content with this in view.

The notion of education as initiation determines the content of the curriculum. In chapter one we mentioned that, for Peters, the concern for rational demands shifted to a

concern for the human condition. This did not indicate that rational demands mattered less. It merely meant that Peters brought in a normative argument for the type of curriculum he favours. The belief that there is a body of knowledge which brings forth varying degrees of understanding which are relevant to a person in so far as it determines his general beliefs, attitudes and responses to the general conditions of human life did not bring forth new curriculum proposals. Rather what was attempted was to provide a normative argument for "education as initiation" into the different disciplines.

Since education involves initiation into worthwhile activities the curriculum will consist of such worthwhile activities. Presumably such a curriculum would be a worthwhile curriculum. It seems necessary, says Peters, to consider Herbert Spencer's question of what knowledge is of most worth.[16] I must emphasize that my concern here is not to inquire into Peters' transcendental justification of curriculum activities. Such an inquiry is neither appropriate nor necessary here. What is required is to explicate the implications of curriculum content in so far as they relate to education as initiation, emotions, and freedom and autonomy.

Peters has attempted to show that a broad range of activities are worthwhile in themselves, and therefore, worth passing on. In the main, the curriculum should consist of a range of theoretical activities. These would include science, mathematics, history, literature, art, religion and philosophy. These subjects-areas represent the main "modes of experience."

Though Peters' emphasis is on theoretical activities he does not disregard the inclusion of practical subjects in the curriculum. Even in Ethics and Education, he refers to carpentry and cooking as activities that are worth passing on.[17] In Education and the Education of Teachers, he refers to medicine, engineering and tool-making.[18] More recently in Educational Theory and its Foundation Disciplines he lends emphasis to the idea of the inclusion of practical subjects in the curriculum when he claims that Hirst's attempt to answer the most fundamental questions about the curriculum as a whole

largely by reference to "forms of knowledge" is limited in its approach. He is critical of Hirst when he comments that Hirst has been concerned with liberal education, and not with vocational and practical subjects.[19]

It is important to note that Peters is not suggesting a sort of compulsory common curriculum as J. P. White does. Peters' emphasis is on a broad range of activities encouraged with a principle of options. Since all such activities are worth passing on, the individual is free to choose some according to ability, aptitude and interest. J. P. White, on the other hand, suggests a compulsory common curriculum and a range of available options. The compulsory common curriculum, it is argued, should consist of activities where the student is initially brought to engage in them under the insistent guidance of the teacher.[20]

The notion of education as initiation and his curriculum proposals, taken in conjunction, seems to exibit certain implications. Firstly, being educated implies a commitment to what is valuable and valued, and to the pursuit of truth. As stated earlier, curriculum activities have an intrinsic value as well as an instrumental value such as finding a job or socialization. His greater concern is that curriculum activities be valued for their intrinsic worth. To a certain extent, to be educated suggests having developed a non-instrumental attitude -- to be disposed to engage in activities such as science, weaving, cookery, for what there is in them as distinct from what they may lead on to or bring about. What is central to this is the development of an absorbing interest and a spontaneous liking for such activities.

It is important to note that Peters makes no distinction such as between theoretical activities being pursued for their intrinsic worth and practical activities for their instrumental value. According to Peters, both theoretical and practical activities can be pursued for their own sakes. He sees no reason why a practical activity such as engineering should not be pursued with a similar sense of enjoyment in its intrinsic value. Though practical activities are undertaken more to satisfy some extrinsic need,

Peters sees no necessity that they be undertaken only or primarily with an instrumental attitude.[21] This is precisely why in "Democratic Values and Educational Aims," Peters claims that the role of practical knowledge in education is not to be a part of training for a particular job.[22] It cannot be denied that practical activities will have additional value if they are based on theoretical understanding rather than being a mere skill or know-how.[23]

Furthermore, the different subject-areas are said to develop differentiated modes of awareness such as scientific, mathematical, historical, aesthetic, moral, interpersonal, and philosophical. The different modes of awareness develop a depth and breadth of knowledge and understanding which implies the fact of being educated. Prior to this, in the early stages the emphasis is on the development of a basic structure of concepts and the development of the basic skills of reading, writing and number so that the range of experience could be extended and expression communicated.[24]

Moreover, the broad range of curriculum activities that Peters advocates is suggestive of all-round understanding. According to Peters, to emphasize narrow specialization is to bring forth trained scientists, historians or artists. Since the educator's main concern is the "education of the whole man," being just trained would not fulfil his purpose, as the trained historian, scientist or artist is not necessarily an educated person in the full sense. Peters would say that it is difficult to determine to what extent the different forms of awareness should be developed to count as being educated. However, a curriculum within which there is a broad range of subjects operated on the principle of options, while "ruling out narrow specialisms" would enable the individual to gain an 'all-round understanding' which befits the "whole man."

It is pertinent to ask the question whether it is desirable for a person to obtain a mass of disjointed information from a number of disciplines. What seems desirable is that different types of understanding should interpenetrate in spheres of knowledge which are relevant to the general conditions of human life in respect to its quality. What is expected is that an individual should acquire necessary elements of different

conceptual schemes and an understanding of principles which would structure a person's outlook and help him to organize experience in different ways, so that he would be able to think and communicate critically and imaginatively.[25]

At this point it seems necessary to inquire how the content of the curriculum would affect the education of the emotions. In chapter two it was discussed how emotions are cognitive in character and to change an emotion is to bring about a cognitive change in the belief that underlies that emotion. It is Peters' contention that a curriculum that consists of worthwhile activities would be helpful in educating the emotions. Such a curriculum would enable the development of knowledge and understanding. Such an all-round understanding is linked to the concern for truth and standards connected with its pursuit, such as relevance, clarity and impartiality. In developing more appropriate appraisals, and canalizing or bringing more primitive sentiments under the sway of reason the educator must be attentive to this concern for truth. Therefore, in Peters' view, a curriculum with a broad range of worthwhile activities seems effective in performing the task of educating the emotions.

In Peters' view a curriculum which provides the basis for the development of different forms of awareness seems helpful for the development of freedom and autonomy. Since Peters' emphasis is on autonomy and authenticity, the individual accepts a code of conduct which is manifestly his own. As to be expected the stress is on the development of reason in achieving autonomy and authenticity. As demonstrated by Peters, the development of the free man is not necessarily hindered by instruction from the educator or by public traditions. It is more to the point to say that the development of the free man cannot be explained without reference to educational and social transactions. What is central to this is the development of the critical ability in the individual so that he can accept or reject rules on the basis of good reasons.

As observed earlier a curriculum which provides a basis of choice seems to be of help. In this respect literature and history seem to offer more scope for laying the

foundation for making wise choices. In particular literature and history seem to afford more opportunity "to weigh the pros and cons of alternatives and to act in the light of such deliberations." Elsewhere Peters claims that the individual's capacity for choice must be enlarged by information, imagination and critical thought. Unless the individual is put in the way of relevant studies in literature, history, geography, and sections of natural and social sciences, he may be handicapped in respect of many of the choices which he may have to make.[26] In sum, a curriculum with a broad range of worthwhile activities would be crucial to the development of reason, and provides a more enriched basis of choice -- both factors being considered for the development of the free man.

Methods of Promoting Learning

In organized education teachers use different methods to bring about learning. These include instruction, discussion, and learning by experience. The method more predominantly employed in modern schooling is the instruction method where an attempt is made to transmit information to a large number of students at the same time. Teachers also use a combination of such methods to bring about learning.

It seems necessary to mention the fact that an attempt is made here to consider the methods of promoting learning in separation from curriculum content of education. This is mainly done for the purpose of clarity. Peters categorically states that the educational process cannot be conceived as one in which there is absolute separation between content and procedure or matter and manner. What is made clear is that no distinction is made between the means and the end of education. This implies that to talk about aims of education is also to draw attention to principles involved in the types of procedures. Peters refers to these as 'procedural principles.' [27]

To talk about an aim of an activity is to indicate a structuring of an activity in a particular direction of achievement. Procedures are processes with rules built into them.[28] For example, if A aims at learning to swim well he must take swimming lessons, practice swimming and master swimming skills. This implies that A's activity is

structured in a particular way. It is not possible to say that A aims at learning to swim if he only practices basket-ball. Learning to swim implies certain rules built into the process or procedures of swimming.

Now, what is crucial to education, according to Peters, is that procedural principles can also be regarded as a matter of content involving aims. To be more explicit, education involves the fusion of content and procedures. Say, for instance, we take self-realization as an aim of education. This brings up the question of the type of procedure and the content of education involved. While respecting each individual's right to develop in his own way, the educator would not allow or condone any aggressive tendencies to be developed. To aim at self-realization is also to take into consideration procedural principles which in turn takes into account the content of education. Self-realization necessarily requires a broad range of activities which are thought to be desirable from which the individual could select some according to his ability and interest. However, no educator would advocate bingo or billiards on the curriculum. Therefore Peters' premise is that content or matter of education and procedures or manner, while conceptually distinguishable, cannot be considered as being separate.[29]

One cannot deny that initiation into the different disciplines would require instruction as an essential technique in imparting information. This seems to account for Peters' statement that to acquire a body of knowledge instruction and explanation are as essential as first-hand experience. He further claims that the common dislike of 'instruction' is primarily associated with getting children to sit down in rows and tell them things which may be beyond their powers of understanding.[30] Oakeshott likewise argues that "teaching has a component of information. The teacher as an instructor is the deliberate conveyer of information to the pupil." [31]

Peters would argue that what is passed on through instruction is significantly worthwhile. Besides the educator is not merely instructing. There may be at least some minimal comprehension on the part of the learners as they know what they are learning

and may grasp the standards which they are expected to attain. Since the development of reason and pursuit of truth are primary objectives the educator allows for the development of the critical ability in the student. Therefore, though the educator instructs as a part of the teaching activity he must not be guilty of indoctrinating. To prevent understanding and knowledge at any point would be anti-educational. Indoctrination, unlike conditioning, is expressly concerned with the passing on of doctrines and these have to be understood and assented to in some way. But, it cannot be considered as a process of education, as it does not involve respect for the learner's reasoned judgment. Snook, however, argues that if "education involves the transmission of what is held to be worthwhile, the line between it and indoctrination will be a fine one." [32]

For Peters, what is crucial in developing a liberal attitude of mind is the manner in which any course is presented rather than its matter. This conviction rests on his belief that both science and arts subjects can be passed on by liberal or illiberal procedures. He claims that literature and science can both be treated as inert subjects, and, as it were, stamped into student. Or they can be treated as living disciplines of critical thought and of imagination.[33]

Another reason as to why the Peterite educator cannot be accused of being authoritarian is his interest in discussion and explanation as methods for bringing about an ability to discuss and explain on the part of the student. Obviously, discussion and explanation cannot be operated without the active participation of the learner. Moreover, the inter-subjective element which calls for "sharing of experience" indicates joint participation of the educator and the learner in the learning process, which as a matter of fact may provide more scope for discussion.

It could be argued that apart from passing on of subject-matter knowledge, and instruction, discussion and explanation as teaching techniques seem applicable to the education of the emotions and development of the free person. As regards the development of appropriate appraisals the educator may discuss and explain the necessity

to eliminate false and irrelevant beliefs. As for the development of autonomy, wnere young children are concerned the Peterite educator would present rules in a non-authoritarian manner as they are not capable of accepting them for reasons given. This does not mean that the teacher does not insist on certain forms of conduct which the children may not accept readily. The older children will be given explanations for the acceptance of rules, which will be backed by reasons. The educator would consider an atmosphere of discussion and criticism as being helpful for this purpose.

A discussion which involves methods that promote learning seems incomplete without reference to the motivational factor. Besides, Peters identifies motivation as being a cardinal factor in education. This is particularly so in relation to education as initiation. In this respect the factor of motivation is crucial for two reasons. First, the educator has to be alive to the fact that students would face difficulties in mastering subject-matter knowledge. Second, competing mass-media influences may very well distract students from this worthy task.[34] Therefore, in order to master subject-matter knowledge which is considered difficult, and counteract extraneous influences, motivation becomes a central factor in education.

It is possible to divide motivational factors as being intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic factors are of two different kinds -- general and specific. The general ones which are confirmed by psychological investigations include many things. Children desire to discover things, explore the environment, desire to manipulate things, and achieve a sense of mastery. Peters' premise is that these tendencies in themselves would not be educationally significant. For example, the desire to manipulate things and achieve a sense of mastery could be done in an undesirable way. What is suggested is that if these tendencies are yoked to worthwhile activities they would prove to be a powerful source of motivation. Accordingly, when what is educationally important coincides with interest the motivational problem is solved. The teacher's responsibility is

to encourage interest in what is worthwhile. Otherwise students may get their interest from other sources which may be opposed to education.[35]

Now what is crucial to initiation into worthwhile activities is intrinsic motivation in the specific sense. Though in his later writings Peters speaks of instrumental values, the essence of being educated is to be intrinsically motivated to pursue curriculum activities for their intrinsic worth. To pursue science is not only to discover scientific truths, but also taking a delight in devising procedures for the discovery of natural laws. Therefore the educator's task is to get children to understand worthwhile activities so that they will explore them for the ends which are intrinsic to them. Intrinsic motivation is the characteristic of an educated person, as such.

However the educator does not consider extrinsic motivation as of no value. In the early stages the educator may consider it helpful to have some external motivation in the form of rewards.

Methods of Evaluating Learning

In organized education it is customary for the teacher to evaluate the student. Evaluation can be undertaken with different ends in view. A student may be assessed at regular intervals to get an idea about his attainment at some specific time. This is normally done to assess a student's continuous progress in his learning. A student could also be evaluated to assess his achievement for selective purposes.

The most commonly used method of evaluating the student is by examinations or tests. As the case may be, these tests are administered to a class, a school, or group of schools. A test is administered on the basis of the principle of uniformity be it a grade level or an age level. To be more explicit, the content matter of the test is relevant to the age or grade level of the student. What is being evaluated is knowledge, understanding and retention of subject-matter as seen relevant to a particular age or grade level.

The initiation into the different subjects and the emphasis on their intrinsic worth would require the educator of Peters' persuasion to regard examinations as being

appropriate. Moreover, the stress on knowledge and understanding would no doubt require the educator to evaluate the student at regular intervals. Peters categorically states that examinations serve a useful function other than that of selection.[36] They act as tests of attainment and as incentives. The important point that is made here is that in an attainment rest the progress demonstrated by a student would act as an incentive to further studies.

The educator must be alive to the fact that the main function of examinations as an evaluative instrument is not purely selective. Elsewhere Peters claims that "examinations can also serve important educational purposes." [37] Undue emphasis should not be placed on the selective function of examinations. Peters' reference here is to selective examinations which the students face at the end of the secondary stage of education. An examination geared curriculum is neither educational in itself nor does it provide an appropriate core for educational activities. This indicates that certain students require a more practical approach. The educator rejects the situation in which he finds himself caught when he is forced to use his expertise in order to get students through examinations rather than in the cause of education. [38]

The educator in Peters' sense is equally concerned with individual abilities of student. Since the school is concerned with individual children as well as with what is worthwhile the educator would prefer a curriculum which is not too closely geared to examinations. Since the educator is interested in children as well as in subjects he would attempt to arrange courses in such a way that the coat of worthwhile activities is cut according to individual aptitude.[39]

B. Pedagogical Implications: Krishnamurti

My intention here is to consider the practical implications of Krishnamurti's notion of education as freedom from conditioning, understanding of the emotions, and

the development of the free person. The previous structure of discussion under the headings of "The Teacher," "The Curriculum," and "The School" will be followed.

The Teacher

The role and the function of the teacher cannot be explained without reference to Krishnamurti's notion of education. In fact, his notion of education determines the role and the function of the teacher. In chapter one it was mentioned that the function of education as envisaged by Krishnamurti is two-fold. While accepting the fact that education involves the transmission of subject-matter knowledge, more fundamentally the function of education is to free the child's mind of conditioning influences. Accordingly, the function of the educator is not only to impart information but also to help the child to free his mind from conditioning influences.

The Krishnamurtian educator thinks that passing on of knowledge and skills is a part of his function, as he is concerned with the instrumental value of such knowledge. The statements that "knowledge should be imparted so that the student may be employed," and the stress on "learning a technique" emphasize the instrumental value of such knowledge. This is not to suggest that the teacher disregards the intrinsic value of the different disciplines. Krishnamurti would say that the teacher should help the student in such a way that the student loves his studies for themselves, which brings out the intrinsic value of such knowledge.

More importantly, to help the child to be free from conditioning influences requires a great deal of insight on the part of the educator. This is particularly so since the generally accepted overall aim in schooling has been the transmission of knowledge. The Krishnamurtian educator has to be aware that education means much more than this. Krishnamurti has made it clear that,

> education is not merely the stuffing of the mind with information, but helping of the student to understand without fear this great complexity of life.[40]

> What we mean by education is to be able to experience life and not merely learn a technique which is surely only a part of life.[41]

Thus the role of the teacher as educator is here undoubtedly quite different from the norm. The right kind of educator is not merely a transmitter of knowledge or a giver of information, even in the more laudable sense of "initiation." In fact, he has to perform a more complex function.

The educator must be concerned with the "whole person" and "holistic development." He is not engaged in training a person in some specific skill. This would be a limited activity, and opposed to wholistic development. The whole person in Krishnamurtian terms is the integrated person. If education means the development of the whole person the educator requires a heightened awareness and understanding of the student. In this sense, if the educator's concern was limited to the mere imparting of subject-matter knowledge in the different disciplines he would not be educating the student "rightly" in the Krishnamurtian sense. To educate rightly is to bring about wholistic development of the student. Krishnamurti stresses that,

> the function of the teacher is to help the student not only to gather information about various subjects but primarily to be complete human beings.[42]

Apart from the content of learning, the educator is concerned about the manner of his teaching. His attitude towards teaching and to the expected response from the student both contribute to this. Certainly, the teacher may instruct, point out, or inform but would do so without being authoritarian. Since he is opposed to imposition of beliefs or dogmas or any form of coercion or compulsion, he would practice morally acceptable ways of teaching.

Certain categorical statements made by Krishnamurti make it clear that Krishnamurti is opposed to any form of indoctrination. For example, "implicit in right education is the cultivation of freedom and intelligence," [43] and "conformity and

obedience has no place in right education."[44] When Krishnamurti says that "right education is not concerned with any ideology,"[45] and "to dominate is to use another for self-gratification," [46] he clearly indicates that he is opposed to the imposition of beliefs or dogmas, and the uncritical acceptance of such beliefs or dogmas. The Krishnamurtian educator would, on the contrary, encourage children to investigate, question and inquire rather than accept anything thoughtlessly.

It is important to note that the Krishnamurtian teacher does not disregard emotional education. He sees the necessity for the student to understand emotion, and by so doing let go, negative emotions such as fear, anger, envy and jealousy. In a talk to teachers at Rishi Valley School, Krishnamurti throws a challenge to them in this manner: "how would you as an educator tackle the problem of eradication of fear in the student?[47] Accordingly, the educator would encourage the child to understand the reasons for fear, anger, envy or jealousy rather than give explanations about such emotions.

Likewise, the educator must be alive to the problem of freedom. He has a responsibility to provide the right kind of environment to enable the child to "grow in freedom." His primary responsibility as regards freedom is to help the child to inquire deeply and thoughtfully into the influences that condition one's mind -- that is, which destroy its freedom.

The Krishnamurtian approach to education requires a special relationship between teacher and student. There seems to be a departure from the traditional approach between teacher and the taught. The traditional approach is basically hierarchical in which there is an authoritarian division between teacher and student. The special rapport between teacher and student in the Krishnamurtian approach is dependent on definite factors which need to be discussed.

Basically the educator's approach to the teaching-learning process involves the realization that in the very nature of teaching and learning there is humility. This

humility exists only if the educator views the teaching-learning process as an inseparable unity so that he is teaching and also learning. The process is not viewed as one in which only the teacher is teaching and the student learning. Thus the usual sharp division between the teacher and the student is somewhat blurred into one where both are learning together.[48]

What is crucial to this view of the teaching-learning process and which, in fact, explains it further is the emphasis on dialogue and the spirit of enquiry. The teacher attempts to invigorate and extend the student's own inquiry in joint dialogue. Both teacher and student are exploring together whether it be subject-matter in history, science, of literature or the deeper questions related to the quality of living. Overemphasis on the instruction approach tends to reduce the interrelationship to the point where the teacher is imparting and the student is receiving. The essence of the Krishnamurtian approach, on the other hand, involves the idea of learning together, even when the teacher gives crucial direction to this process.

Moreover, the idea of attention seems basic to this special relationship between teacher and student. When the teacher and student are both exploring together, they are both attending to the same thing and to each other. Therefore, they are both very alert. This quality of attention is distinctive in the Krishnamurtian sense of the teacher and the student learning together.

The idea of "educating the educator" (in the Krishnamurtian sense) seems to have implications for schooling. To educate the educator is one of the prime requisites of Krishnamurti's "right kind of education." He reiterates that if "it is important to have the right kind of education," it is crucial that "the educator must be rightly educated." [49]

Since Krishnamurti's notion of education involves "freedom from conditioning," the educator must be aware of his own conditioning if he is to teach children to be free from conditioning. "So it is very important for the teachers to set about unconditioning themselves, and also help the children to be free of conditioning." [50] In the course of a

discussion with teachers at Brockwood Park School, Krishnamurti says, "if I was a teacher here, I would be greatly concerned how to bring about this unconditioning in myself and the student."[51] Since the educator is already somewhat crystalized in a system of thought and pattern of action, to educate the educator, though fundamental, may be a difficult undertaking. However, it has critical implications for schooling in a Krishnamurtian sense.

Sydney. J. Harris, in an essay entitled, "Authentic Teachers," expresses a somewhat similar view to that of Krishnamurti. He says,

> Knowledge is not enough, technique is not enough, mere experience is not enough. This is the mystery at the heart of the teaching process and the same mystery is at the heart of the healing process. Each is an art more than a science or skill, and the art is the ability to 'tune into' the others wave length.' And this ability is not possessed by those who have failed to come to terms with their own individuated person, no matter what other talents they possess. Until they have liberated themselves (not completely but mostly) from what is artificial and inauthentic within themselves, they cannot communicate with, counsel, or control others.[52]

While agreeing with Harris about being authentic, Krishnamurti would probably take issue with him on the idea of control. He considers control or domination of any sort would negate the idea of "growing in freedom."

The Curriculum

The curriculum of the Krishnamurtian schools reflects the key issues in Krishnamurti's notion of education. Since a function of education is imparting of subject-matter knowledge the curriculum is composed of subject-areas as conceived in current schooling. The manner in which subject knowledge is imparted, the educator's approach to the teaching-learning process, and the nature of the learning environment are geared to the importance of self-observation for freeing oneself from conditioning influences. This is made explicit in the following extracts from Krishnamurtian school brochures. The brochure of the school at Brockwood Park, England states :

> Although the academic work of the school is regarded as important and is pursued in a serious way, it is not the main point of what is done at Brockwood Park. The deeper purpose of the centre is to enable students and staff to explore, in every phase of their life together, the implications of all that Krishnamurti has said in his talks and discussions and in his many books, particularly in regard to the coming into being of the sense of the 'me,' with all its separativeness and self-centred activity.[53]

A pamphlet of the Oak Grove School, Ojai, California states that :

> In addition to top flight schooling . . . it is the school's purpose to develop whole people. Not just to open minds -- but to open eyes, and ears and hearts.[54]

Since knowledge of different disciplines are considered important the curriculum of Krishnamurti schools consists of different subjects, and while reflecting regional differences it has a common range of subjects of a comprehensive nature. The curriculum of the primary school aims for mastery of basic skills and numeracy skills. Students also engage in comprehensive studies of the physical, biological and social worlds they inhabit. The high school curriculum consists of language literature, mathematics, sciences, social sciences, art, drama, music, ceramics, physical education, yoga and gardening. In relation to language and literature, English and foreign languages are included in the curriculum in schools at Brockwood Park and Ojai. Regional Indian languages and English are taught in schools managed by the Krishnamurti Foundation of India. In some schools there are facilities for electronics, engineering, drawing, and photography.[55]

It must be emphasized that in Krishnamurti's approach to education the value of subject-matter learning would seem to depend very much on what he refers to as "doing what one deeply loves to do." Krishnamurti says that,

> right education is to help you to find out for yourself, what you really, with all your heart, love to do. It does not matter what it is, whether it is to cook or to be a gardener, but it is something in which you have put your mind, your heart . . . And this school should be a place where you are helped to find out for yourself through discussion, through

> listening, through silence to find out, right through your life, what you really love to do.[56]

A broad range of subjects with their interest and importance clearly displayed helps the student to find activities which the student "deeply loves to do." Undoubtedly the inclusion of both theoretical and practical subjects in the curriculum would be helpful in this sense.

The manner in which subject-matter is jointly considered is expected to help free the mind from conditioning influences, for to

> educate in the real sense of the word is not just to transmit some information about subjects, but in the very instruction of these is to bring about a change in one's mind.[57]

In the very teaching of subject-matter knowledge the child is encouraged to be extraordinarily critical. The educator is of the opinion, apart from its other obvious value, that this critical inquiring attitude would help the student to see his own conditioning. Furthermore, teaching the student how to be of a quiet mind so as to attend totally is basic to everything that goes on in school. Moreover, a harmonious learning environment is thought conducive to such attention. Since all Krishnamurtian schools are residential, the daily program of activity includes a specific time where teachers and children are encouraged to enjoy this quietness of mind.

As far as the understanding of the emotions is concerned, set curriculum content seems to have no direct impact. "Knowing what is" is relevant to the understanding of the emotions. Since emotions have to be understood, learning to be attentive and to be self-observant are most relevant here.

Likewise in relation to the development of freedom and autonomy, curriculum content seems to have no direct relevance. In the Krishnamurtian sense the child learns to "grow in freedom" with a right educational approach and within a right kind of educational environment as a whole.

Promotion of Learning

I have used the term 'promotion of learning' rather than 'methods of promoting learning' as the Krishnamurtian educator would be reluctant to use any pre-determined methods in a rigid way. This would be to view the teaching-learning process as mechanical and predictable -- a technique, not an art. Presumably the "right educator" would say that human beings, including school children, are not mechanical beings.

This does not suggest that the educator does not at times instruct, point out, or discuss. It merely indicates that at the beginning of each lesson the educator does not have a pre-planned method such as whether to instruct, discuss, or demonstrate, from which he will not diverge. To think in terms of an unalterable specific method is to disregard new developments of each fresh moment. The educator would be more prone to act in a spontaneous way appropriate to each new feature as it arises. Presumably the educator would not have a detailed idea what he would be doing in the next moment. It would depend on the way the subject is probed, and the manner in which the learning is progressing.

It is evident that the Krishnamurtian educator would oppose continuous mass instruction. On the contrary, the educator and the student would explore the subject themes together in joint participation, whether it be a theme in history or science, or deeper questions of responsible living.

> As it happens, the subject never arises. Later, maybe after class or during a walk, it could be discussed, a mutual exploration by teacher and students, probing the subject without the overtones of preaching or punishment . . . Everyone is here to learn, and that demands careful, affectionate enquiry into everything from algebra problems to hurt feelings.[58]

A lesson may take the form of discussion, instruction, exploration or other forms of inquiry. The Krishnamurtian educator gives a great deal of emphasis to dialogue. The teacher and student are co-partners, co-investigators in a joint venture. The teacher and

student communicate through questioning, and counter-questioning till the depths of the problem are exposed and understanding occurs, bringing with it clarity of perception and thought. In general, the students are encouraged to examine their attitude to "people, ideas, things and nature."

To draw a similarity, Paulo Freire uses the dialogue approach in adult education programs. The Brazilian peasants whom Friere recognized as submerged in the "culture of silence" were thought (and found) capable of looking critically and freshly at the world in a dialogical encounter. The "problem-posing method" which he devised in place of the traditional "banking concept of education" uses dialogue as an approach in adult literacy programs. Freire's students were not docile listeners, but critical co-investigators in the "unveiling of reality." [59]

Another aspect of the relevance of dialogic enquiry is with regard to the understanding of emotions and for the purpose of "growing in freedom."

A point of importance is that the Krishnamurtian teacher would not attempt to promote learning by reward or punishment. The significant reason for this is the fact that it diverts the student's attention from the meaning and satisfaction of the learning itself. Reward and punishment are generally expressed as forms of extrinsic motivation. To motivate the child to work without reward, punishment and comparison is the intention of the school.[60] Here, the educator's concern is with intrinsic motivation where the student's interest and alertness, which invigorates him to probe and explore the subject in hand, is primarily focused on that subject itself and the enquiry around it. Reward and punishment are unnecessary under such conditions.

Besides, using punishment on a child in the hope of motivating him would be considered an unsound way of attempting to promote learning. Punishment constitutes a form of violence. It would undoubtedly create fear in the child's mind. As far as understanding of the emotions is concerned Krishnamurti lays great emphasis on the eradication of fear. Moreover, fear of any form would greatly undermine the child's

capacity to "grow in freedom." Consequently, the educator would neither approve nor employ punishment as a way of promoting learning.

Methods of Evaluating Learning

The overall aim of Krishnamurtian education governs the educator's approach to the evaluation of learning. While providing a thorough academic education the overall aim requires the development of a new quality of mind regarding life as a whole, and the bringing into being of a new approach to the relationships of living, particularly as this requires self-awareness. As such the educator does not lay undue emphasis on academic achievement to the exclusion of the more fundamental aim. Thus the educator must have this balance in mind in his approach to the evaluation of learning.

The assessment of learning is done in an informal as well as in a formal manner. Since "right education" necessarily requires a careful study of each child's abilities, inclinations and dispositions, the educator "evaluates skills and achievement of the students through observation and occasional tests." [61]

Informal evaluation is a matter of everyday observation of the way children act and respond in lived situations. This helps the educator to get a very definite impression of children's behaviour. To ensure that the impression gained is accurate, and in order that the observation may have greater direction, the educator may even retain anecdotal records of children's behaviour.

Formal evaluation is carried out through the administering of occasional tests. These tests are more of a diagnostic nature rather than for the purpose of placement, or selection for grades. As such, the educator considers that undue emphasis in the form of testing too easily leads to the development of the competitive spirit among children. He is of opinion that such competition may generate comparison and eventually conflict. Evaluation in Krishnamurtian schools is more or less individualized. Its chief concern is with the growth which the student has made rather than with comparing one student with others in his class. Competition can result in discouragement and frustration for the slow

student and may develop smugness in the bright student. Krishnamurti categorically states that,

> The way of education so far has been to cultivate competition and thereby sustain conflict.[62]

And he asks.

> how will you help the student to create a new quality of mind in which the monstrosity of competition has no part.[63]

It is important to note that the evaluation of students' achievement and skills are discussed with students so that they can develop an objective sense of their capabilities.[64] This may well serve as a guide to the students in terms of self-evaluation. Furthermore, the educator keeps parents informed through written reports and personal conferences about students' academic development and interaction with peers and staff.[65]

C. Comparison and Contrast between Peters and Krishnamurti: Pedagogical Implications

Peters and Krishnamurti both prefer to use the term 'educator' since educating an individual has wider and more specific implications than teaching. Since the Peterite educator interprets education centrally as initiation into the different disciplines, an important function is to transmit information. While accepting the instrumental value of such knowledge, his greater concern is that subject-matter knowledge be valued for its intrinsic worth. He is also aware that such knowledge is essential for the education of the emotions and the development of freedom and autonomy. The Krishnamurtian educator would partly agree with the educator in Peters terms that subject-matter knowledge is necessary, but would emphasize that it is not the only function. Freedom from conditioning, the Krishnamurtian educator considers, is a more fundamental function. While Peters emphasizes the intrinsic value of the subject per se, Krishnamurti would stress the intrinsic interest in the subject for each student in the process of learning while also emphasizing its instrumental value. Peters sees subject study (as initiation) as crucial to intelligence, Krishnamurti sees self-understanding (to clear awareness to be

able to see "what is") as crucial to intelligence. From Krishnamurti's perspective, Peters' notion of intelligence is limited to what can be achieved by thinking and related will power.

Freedom from conditioning is also considered essential for the understanding of emotions and the development of inner freedom. Both freedom and autonomy are concerned with wholistic development.

Both types of educators would agree that subject-matter must be passed on in a morally unobjectionable manner so as not to restrict the student's independent judgment. While the Peterite educator considers the development of the ability to critically explore, assess and evaluate the subject-matter of the different disciplines, the Krishnamurtian educator would be concerned with the development of critical awareness based on inquiry not only into the different disciplines but also into the whole spectrum of relationship of the individual to other human beings, to nature, to things and to ideas.

Both would agree that there is a special relationship required between the educator and the educatee. This special relationship is basically dependent on the shared experience of the educator and the student. In Peters' terms the shared experience results from the commitment that both the educator and the student owe to the content of the different disciplines and the procedures by which established knowledge is revised and criticized. Both the educator and the student investigate and explore the different subject domains together. Moreover, the educator considers that a firm basis of love and trust is central to the educative process. Similarly the Krishnamurtian educator accepts the fact that a firm basis of love and trust is an essential requirement for successful learning. Here the shared experience seem to involve a somewhat closer relationship than that of the former. The Krishnamurtian educator and the student are both in a sense learning together. This idea of learning together and the joint inquiry through dialogue into subject-matter knowledge and the deeper questions of relational living as a whole require additional qualities of relationship.

The curriculums indicated by Peters and Krishnamurti are both suggestive of a broad range of activities, operated on a principle of options rather than compulsorily pursued. Both theoretical and practical activities are included. From Peters' point of view these activities will be pursued mainly for their intrinsic value as well as for their instrumental value. Krishnamurti would no doubt emphasize the intrinsic interest in the subject for each particular child, while acknowledging their instrumental value for specific types of tasks. While for Peters a curriculum comprised of a broad range of subjects operated on a principle of options would enable the student to select subjects according to his ability, aptitude and interest, for Krishnamurti it would also be to enable the student to find what he "deeply loves to do."

From Peters' point of view a curriculum which consists of worthwhile activities would be helpful in educating the emotions and the development of freedom and autonomy. The concern for truth brought about by the initiation into the different disciplines would not only encourage the development of appropriate appraisals but control and canalize more primitive emotions. As for the development of the free individual the critical ability developed by the initiation into the different disciplines would help the individual to accept or reject rules on the basis of reason thereby allowing informed and rational choices. On the other hand, for Krishnamurti the knowledge of different subjects does not have direct relevance to the understanding of emotions and the development of inner freedom. Self-observation is necessary for the understanding of emotions and the development of the free person.

In relation to the methods of promoting learning the educator in Peters' terms would consider instruction as a necessary procedure as a body of knowledge has to be acquired. Nonetheless, he is not merely instructing, as the emphasis on critical thought and imagination necessitates the use of other teaching activities such as discussion and explanation. In relation to the education of the emotions and the development of freedom and autonomy discussion and explanation seem particularly relevant.

In contrast, the Krishnamurtian educator may not follow pre-determined methods. This is not to indicate that he does not at times instruct or discuss. As the lesson progresses new developments could arise, and to have a pre-planned method is to disregard these novel features. To emphasize a method is not to take into account the learning environment and interests of children. A lesson may take the form of exploration and instruction. Here freedom in form and content of dialogue is crucial to the teaching-learning process. Not only subject-matter knowledge but deeper questions of living are investigated through dialogue.

In spite of the intrinsic value of subject-matter, the Peterite educator thinks children need to be motivated to learn as they would entail difficulties in mastering subject-matter knowledge. The essence of being educated is to be intrinsically motivated to pursue worthwhile activities. In a somewhat similar manner the Krishnamurtian educator would say that the child must be intrinsically motivated to pursue subjects that he "deeply loves to do." However, unlike the Peterite educator he is not suggesting that subjects have an intrinsic value of their own.

As for extrinsic motivation the educator in Peters' terms would say that extrinsic motivation in the form of rewards may be necessary. The Krishnamurtian educator on the other hand would not approve of extrinsic motivation in the form of reward and punishment. Punishment would evoke fear in the child's mind, and giving of rewards may generate competition among students, and in general, learning in the wrong way for the wrong reasons. Also, to do x for a reward, or out of fear, is <u>not</u> to do it for the love of it, for the sense of <u>its</u> interest and importance.

As far as formal methods of evaluating learning are concerned the Peterite educator considers that examinations perform a useful function whether they be selective tests or attainment tests. Nonetheless since a curriculum must give equal consideration to the development of individual abilities as well as to what is considered worthwhile the educator thinks that the curriculum should not be too closely geared to examinations.

The Krishnamurtian educator thinks that some formal evaluation of some part of the learning is necessary. Therefore, understanding of the subject-matter is evaluated on the basis of occasional diagnostic tests and observation. However, he thinks that undue emphasis on tests would bring about competition, and competition would lead to comparison and conflict, and in general, the encouragement of the very conditioning education is supposed to diminish or eradicate.

Footnotes

[1] R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1959), p. 109.

[2] Ibid. , p. 127.

[3] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 40.

[4] R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, p. 97.

[5] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 55.

[6] Ibid. , p. 40.

[7] A. N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), p. 52.

[8] T. F. Green, The Activities of Teaching (New york: McGraw- Hill Book Company, 1971), pp. 24-25.

[9] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 39-40.

[10] A. T. Pearson, The Teacher: Theory and Practice in Teacher Education, New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 64-66. It should be noted that Peters references to teaching cited on page 154 fit the generic sense of teaching better than the specific sense used here.

[11] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 41.

[12] R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, p.103.

[13] I. Scheffler, The Language of Education, (Illinois: Charles. C. Thomas, 1960), pp. 57.

[14] R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, p. 88.

[15] P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, The Logic of Education, pp. 94-99.

[16] R. S. Peters, "Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of its Content," in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers, p. 59.

[17] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 144.

[18] R. S. Peters, "Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of its Content," in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers, pp. 51-52.

[19] R. S. Peters, "Philosophy of Education," in Educational Theory and its Foundation Disciplines, ed. P. H. Hirst, p. 47.

[20] J. P. White, Towards a Compulsory Curriculum, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 27-31.

[21] R. S. Peters, "The Meaning of Quality in Education," in R. S. Peters Education and the Education of Teachers, p. 28.

[22] R. S. Peters, "Democratic Values and Educational Aims," in Essays on Educators, p. 44.

[23] R. S. Peters, "The Meaning of Quality in Education," in R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers, p. 28.

[24] Ibid. , p. 29.

[25] Ibid. , p. 60.

[26] Ibid. , p. 80.

[27] Ibid. , p. 24.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] R. S. Peters, "What is an Educational Process," in The Concept of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 16.

[31] M. Oakeshott, "Learning and Teaching," in The Concept of Education, ed. R. S. Peters, p. 170.

[32] I. Snook,"The Concept of Conscientization in Paulo Freire's Philosophy of Education," New Education, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1981, p. 39.

[33] R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education, p. 89

[34] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 61.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid. , p. 85.

[37] P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, The Logic of Education, p. 109.

[38] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 86-87.

[39] Ibid. , p. 87.

[40] J. Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, p. 148.

[41] Quoted in A. J. G. Methorst-Kuiper, Krishnamurti (Bombay: Chetana Ltd. , 1975), p. 65.

[42] J. Krishnamurti, Letters to the Schools, p. 83.

[43] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, p. 33.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid. , p. 23.

[46] Ibid. , p. 48.

[47] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p. 131.

[48] Ibid. , p. 9.

[49] J. Krishnamurti, This Matter of Culture, p. 212.

[50] J. K Krishnamurti, Life Ahead, p. 50.

[51] J. Krishnamurti, Beginnings of Learning, p. 196.

[52] S. J. Harris, "Authentic Teachers," in The New Idea in Education , ed. by J. A. Battle and R. L. Shannon (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968) p. 17.

[53] Brockwood Park Educational Centre, brochure, p. 2.

[54] Ojai, Oak Grove School, brochure, p. 2.

[55] Brockwood Park Educational Centre, statement, p. 1.

[56] . Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p. 76.

[57] Ibid. , p. 18.

[58] Ojai, Oak Grove School, brochure, p. 2.

[59] P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Trans. Myra. B. Ramos (New York: The Continuum Publishing Corporation, 1983), pp. 67-68.

[60] Rajghat Besant School, Krishnamurti Foundation India, information leaflet, p. 2.

[61] Ojai, Oak Grove School, Fact sheet, p. 2.

[62] J. K Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p.74.

[63] J. Krishnamurti, Krishnamurti on Education, p.127.

[64] Ojai, Oak Grove School, Fact sheet, p. 2.

[65] Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY

In this chapter I will indicate the conception of school and the related conception of society as envisaged by Peters and Krishnamurti. Just as much as an educational philosophy involves a particular meaning of 'education,' so it also involves a particular view of society.

The particular meaning of education adopted is basically related to a particular idea of the "educated person." Since the educated person is very much the outcome of the formal educational process it seems necessary to indicate the nature of the school, the agency most commonly thought to develop the educated person. The school is a social unit, a microcosm within the larger society. Hence a particular concept of school presupposses in one way or another the character of and criticism of the society in which it flourishes. As Dewey asserts,

> what the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely . . . All that society has accomplished for itself is put, through the agency of the school, at the disposal of its future members. All its better thoughts of itself it hopes to realize through the new possibilities thus opened to its future self. Here individualism and socialism are at one.[1]

In discussing the school it seems specially appropriate to take into account the broader social viewpoint.

For Peters, the concern for truth and the development of reason, and also the concern for the human condition, is central to his view of the nature of the school and society. In a somewhat different way for Krishnamurti, the concern for truth, as involving "knowing what is," as crucial to the understanding of the human predicament, underlies his vision of the nature of school and society.

The School

The school is a unit of organized education. The conception of a school as a unit of organized education is dependent on its characteristics such as teacher styles, curricular arrangements, methods of promoting learning, methods of evaluating learning and student attendance. In chapter four the above characteristics were discussed so that my central concern here will be to inquire whether modern schooling as currently conceived is accepted or rejected by Peters and Krishnamurti, and why.

In relation to Peters' views as previously discussed it is apparent that there is no rejection of many of the key characteristics of current public schooling. While not disregarding the inclusion of certain practical subjects, the initiation into the established disciplines highlights his emphasis on liberal education. State ownership of education indicates the acceptance of compulsory education laws. Competition among members of society is revealed in his view of examinations. His notion of the intersubjective element suggests his belief in a professional cadre of teachers. Nonetheless, Peters does suggest certain modifications in terms of new emphases in relation to the characteristics of a school. Particular reference is made to methods of teaching which are clearly moral, the intention of the teacher, and a more flexible exercise of school regulations.

It is Peters' premise that the school has to take careful account of what is in the interest of the state as well as the individual children. This means that the processes of schooling must partly be concerned with things that are of instrumental value, but partly adapting to what is and can be felt to be worthwhile to children who vary a great deal in intent and ability. While acknowledging that the subsidiary tasks of the school should not be lost sight of, the essence should be education.[2] Education necessarily involves the initiation of children into what is arguably worthwhile, as without such education they would be incapable of informed, critical valuation and choice.[3]

Peters also emphasizes that the school must be concerned with the different aspects of the achievements initiated at different levels of development. If teachers in

elementary schools lose sight of what they consider necessary for the development of an educated person, they are bound to have a "truncated" concept of their task.[4]

Since the educated person is the outcome of the educational process, schools should cater to this primary educational objective, whether it concerns the initiation into worthwhile activities, education of the emotions, or development of freedom and autonomy. Peters sees no reason why these cannot be achieved within the framework of public schooling system as currently conceived. Neither does he suggest radical proposals. What has emerged is a rethinking which has brought about new emphases. Teacher awareness of what is expected and the teacher's approach to teaching seem to be the prime considerations.

Krishnamurti is not in favour of a state system of schooling as it is likely to shape the individual according to a monolithic pre-determined pattern. He favours small independent schools since he believes that "nothing of fundamental value can be accomplished through mass instruction." [5]

His assumption that a mass system of schooling may not help the individual to transform himself is based on the assumption that less attention is devoted to the individual as uniquely manifested. He contends that in smaller schools and within smaller classes, there will be greater scope for more individual attention, and "there is hope for the integrated individual which small schools can hope to bring about." [6]

As would be expected the integrated self-knowing person is the intended outcome of the educational process. Krishnamurti's emphasis is on personal growth, psychological well-being, co-operation and dialogue. Among other things, in terms of education as freedom from conditioning, understanding of emotions, and development of freedom and autonomy the Krishnamurtian schools attempt to exemplify this primary educational goal. Krishnamurti advocates independent schools as he thinks that the overall aim of education as conceived by him cannot be significantly achieved within the context of modern public schooling.

It is evident that Krishnamurti is making a claim for a "right kind of education," a new type of school, and a right kind of educator. It is apparent that the school's key characteristics as currently conceived are rejected. Nonetheless, unlike e. g., Ivan Illich, Everett Reimer, John Holt and Paul Goodman,[7] Krishnamurti does not advocate "deschooling." What is suggested is that the modern school as presently conceived is replaced by one which is different. Therefore, Krishnamurti's plea is not one for deschooling, but rather for reschooling.

Society

As related to Peters' and Krishnamurti's educational ideas, my purpose in this section is primarily to sketch the nature of society as envisaged by them. Since my attempt here is somewhat speculative I do not wish to draw any conclusions as to whether Krishnamurti or Peters is the more critical, deep, or otherwise more important educational thinker. This tentativeness seems appropriate since an examination of a few shared themes seems inadequate to arrive at a justifiably conclusive view on the above aspects. Moreover, this is not the purpose of this inquiry. If a choice is to be made it comes down to a choice of world view, as their conceptions of social life permeates every aspect of their educational ideas. I leave the choice to the reader.

Peters' discussion of education in relation to initiation into the disciplines, emotions, and freedom and autonomy indicates his emphasis on rational morality. Consequently, he seems to favour a liberal democratic society. Such a society provides the institutional framework for concrete safeguards for public expression of opinion within which substantive solutions can be sought for political and moral problems. Though authority is necessary, it must be constituted in such a way that it does not unduly oppress the individual, but guarantees his freedom of voting, freedom of association, and freedom of expression.[8] Furthermore, statements such as, "civilized men do not grow up overnight like mushrooms; they become civilized by being brought up by

others who are civilized," [9] the child or student is in the "position of the barbarian outside the gates," and "if something is valuable, it is valuable,"[10] to quote a few examples, refer to his overall acceptance and respect for the Western intellectual heritage.

My attempt to speculate on the nature of society as envisaged by Peters needs some reflection on the meaning he gives to 'education.' Some contemporary writers have been critical of Peters' view of education. For instance, Adelstein has accused Peters of being elitist in his attitudes.[11] I am not sure of this. Peters' later emphasis on the human condition does not appear to me to savour of elitism, though in fact it is limited in conception as his specific reference is to citizens in a democratic society. However, within such societies he is not advocating the special forms of thought and awareness for a select few. In fact, he is suggesting the same forms of thought and awareness, though quite different content, for all. Moreover, the search for knowledge and truth seems liberal in its essence and involving a concern for all.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that in relation to depth of knowledge Peters is defending a specific concept of education. Both O'Hear[12] and Adelstein,[13] as eminent critics of Peters' work, agree that he is defending a specific concept of education. In Educational Theory and its Foundation Disciplines, Peters himself admits that his concept of education is a specific one. He accepts the fact that he was trying to extract too much from a concept of education which is more indeterminate than he used to think.[14] In spite of these shortcomings, he maintains that the basic thesis that a democratic way of life based on discussion and the use of practical reason which presupposes the principles of impartiality, respect for a person's freedom, and consideration of interests, is still defensible.[15]

It cannot be denied that in relation to the nature of society Peters' views suggest a defence of the basic status quo, or present ideal. When he says that "the test of time has given us the solid institutions we know and these should not be tampered with,"[16] and "social reality resides in the impersonal content and procedures which are enshrined in

public traditions," Peters is defending a specific type of society. According to Adelstein, Peters' "writings rationalize the socializing, adaptive functions of education, justifying the authoritarian status quo."[17] The social reality seems to lie outside its members. The social becomes something which individuals are not born into and into which they must gain entry in fairly specific ways. Peters does not go beyond the existing social reality, but starts and ends with the justification of the status quo. In this sense, Peters' attitude is conservative.

Krishnamurti, on the other hand, is advocating a quite different type of society. He seems to have little concern for maintaining established social institutions and established traditions. His emphasis is on profound co-operation among members, enhanced by dialogue and based on an intuitive morality involving his "lasting values." This is a society arising from a radical transformation within the individual, and thus, leads to a transformation in relationship between individuals, groups, and communities. His vision is of a society where there is no competition, no acquisitiveness and no conflict among members. Nonetheless, in immediate practical terms, he would be glad of any significant degree of movement away from them.

Krishnamurti is emphatic that a radical overall change in society requires a radical transformation of the individual. In recent decades there have been political and social upheavals of unprecedented dimensions, world wars and revolutions which have led to the perpetration of atrocities and a destruction of human dignity and life. Much has been written about new societies, brave new worlds, utopias and total revolutions. If, as Dewey asserts, "all that society has accomplished for itself is put through the agency of the school, at the disposal of its future members," how do we explain the ethnic and religious conflicts, global wars, and the destruction of human life and dignity? One pauses to ponder whether there is not something badly wanting in modern schooling as currently conceived. It must be admitted but for a very few the total transformation of the individual has not been seriously considered as a prime requisite for removal of the very

roots of social conflict. It seems plausible that even if a major transformation of society is attempted, if the individual is still so ego-centered, so ruthlessly ambitious and acquisitive, the same pattern in a somewhat different form will emerge to poison any new organization. Therefore, to start with the roots of discord, in the individual, seems to be a better approach towards a lastingly harmonious way of living.

Krishnamurti's view of education, with its emphasis on self-knowledge, is not separable from his view of the transformed individual and transformed society. According to him, if one does not understand oneself, merely changing the outer, which is the projection of the inner, has no significance whatsoever -- that is, there cannot be any root alteration or modification of society so long as individuals do not understand themselves and their essential, and so profoundly influential relationship to others. It is a forceful argument that in interpersonal relationships individual human traits and characteristics become manifest. Human societies are complexes of specific relationships of individuals and it is in the discord of our relationships, that we can see how things in general have gone wrong. A radical transformation in the individual would be reflected in a person's attitudes and conduct in the whole spectrum of his or her relationships.

Frydman contends that Krishnamurti never addresses himself to the masses; his work is entirely with the individual, on the assumption that when all goes well with the individual society takes its proper shape.[18] I suspect that Frydman has misinterpreted Krishnamurti here. Krishnamurti is equally concerned with both individual and society. His premise is that a radical transformation within the individual must precede any radical transformation of society. His emphasis is on the location of the roots of individual and social discord and disharmony. Phrases such as "you are the world,"[19] and the "inward problem is the world problem," testify to this standpoint.

It would be an understatement to say that Krishnamurti, unlike Peters does not defend the status quo. He starts from fundamental criticisms of the status quo and wishes to move away to a new society, a new world order. He is not speaking of a specific type

of society as Peters does but a larger planetary human society, a new culture which will be free from divisive national, religious and economic differences. For him, "culture is universal. True culture is infinite, it does not belong to any one society, to any one nation, to any one religion." [20]

Footnotes

[1]John.Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, School and Society, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 7.

[2] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 74

[3] Ibid. , p. 75.

[4] Ibid.

[5] J. Krishnamurti, Education and the Significance of Life, p. 86.

[6] Ibid. , p. 86.

[7] See e. g. Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, (New York: Harrow Books, 1970), Everett Reimer, The School is Dead, (New York: Penguin Books Ltd. , 1971), Paul Goodman, Compulsory Miseducation, (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), John Holt, Freedom and Beyond, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. , Inc. , 1972).

[8] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 296-301.

[9] P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, The Logic of Education, p. 115.

[10] R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 75.

[11] D. Adelstein, "The Philosophy of Education or The Wisdom and Wit of R. S. Peters," in Counter Course A Handbook for Course Criticism (London: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 137.

[12] A. O' Hear, Education Society and Human Nature, (London: Methuen and Co. , Ltd. , 1977), p. 38.

[13] Quoted in M. Smith, The Underground and Education, (London: Methuen and Co. , Ltd. , 1977), p. 3

[14] R. S. Peters, "The Philosophy of Education," in Educational Theory and its Foundation Disciplines, ed. P. H. Hirst, p. 37.

[15] Ibid. , p. 37.

[16] Quoted in D. Adelstein, "The Philosophy of Education or the Wisdom and Wit of R. S. Peters," in Counter Course, A Handbook for Course Criticism ed. T. Pateman , p. 129

[17] Ibid. , p. 137.

[18] M. Frydman, "Truthfulness," in The Mind of Krishnamurti, ed. Luis. S. R. Vas, (Bombay : Jaico Publishing House, 1973), p. 219.

[19] J. Krishnamurti, Beyond Violence, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. , 1973), p. 136.

[20] Quoted in R. K. Shringy, Philosophy of J. Krishnamurti, p. 327.

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