

# **Objectives**

While the objective of science is to provide explanations, that of engineering is to provide performance. Performance of engineering systems cannot be provided independent of human involvement and the functioning of social organizations.

Human error can obviously overwhelm an otherwise effectively operating system and risk analysis that ignores or understates human involvement in geotechnical practice borders on naivety. Even corruption is not unknown.


#### Value Added Component


The value added component of geotechnical engineering is closely linked to performance assurance.


When it goes wrong the penalties are severe for all involved. The fundamental premise of this lecture is that the complexity of performance assurance has been underestimated. This requires broad recognition. The application of comprehensive risk management tools provide the only way forward and deserve appropriate rewards when applied correctly. Risk management can only be successful if critical sources of uncertainty are understood.


	of Prediction (L	
Prediction Type	<u>When Made</u>	<u>Results at Time</u> of Prediction
A	Before Event	
В	During Event	May be known or unknown
С	After Event	May be known or unknown


Accuracy of Prediction (% actual)	Quality Class
95 - 105% (within ± 5%)	Excellent
85-95% or 105-115% (within ± 15%)	Good
75-85% or 115-125% (within ± 25%)	Fair
50-75% or 125-150% (within ± 50%)	Poor
<50° or > 105%	Bad














































## **Structured Soils**


Fissures and joints offer exercise an overwhelming influence on the geotechnical behaviour of a soil mass. They are commonly associated with stiff to hard clays and soft rocks.


Indeed, they are so common in these deposits that the burden on site investigation should be to prove their absence if they are to be ignored.


Moreover soft fissured clays also exist. Fissuring can also be aggravated by construction processes.































#### Commentary


Many geotechnical environments involve clay seams. The two examples here represent diverse origins, from deposition of volcanic ash in Upper Cretaceous marine sediments to secondary accumulation at rock head in saprolites.


Clay seams affect all geotechnical properties and when they are reduced to residual strength, they dominate stability.


Unsuccessful performance on a number of projects can be attributed to inadequate understanding of the presence of clay seams, inadequate site investigation and logging techniques and inadequate geomechanical characterization.
































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
A large number of materials are disposed to flow liquefaction. They range from quick-clays, recent marine silts, loose sandy gravels, poorly compacted decomposed granite fill and other loose fills, to loose sands, both natural and mine tailings. It has been known for along time that flow liquefaction can be triggered by both undrained and drained processes. However, a basic understanding of this initiation is more recent.


The observational method is limited in its capacity to eliminate flow liquefaction. Warning of the onset is often minimal and the phenomenon is brittle. As emphasized by Martin and McRoberts (1999), reliance on traditional effective stress approaches to design can be dangerous.





































# Commentary

Human factors as a major cause of geotechnical failure have been discussed, among others, by Peck (1973) and Sowers (1991). Li and Lee (1991) provide an extended discussion noting that human error, inadequate supervision, lack of communication between project parties during construction, and ignorance of or failure to use prevailing knowledge have all been encountered.


Performance in geotechnical practice cannot be assured without invoking appropriate risk management practice to minimize the detrimental effects of human uncertainty.



























































## He concluded with the observations:

....."Engineering judgment dominates design in soil engineering, but it is tremendously difficult to transfer a sense of judgment from the experienced to the inexperienced".

He went on to say:

....."In the soil engineering world it is all to easy to spend time on calculating what can be calculated rather than on what should be calculated, to giving an over precise answer to the wrong question...".

