ERA

Download the full-sized PDF of Belief Revision as Propositional UpdateDownload the full-sized PDF

Analytics

Share

Permanent link (DOI): https://doi.org/10.7939/R3F18SF0M

Download

Export to: EndNote  |  Zotero  |  Mendeley

Communities

This file is in the following communities:

Computing Science, Department of

Collections

This file is in the following collections:

Technical Reports (Computing Science)

Belief Revision as Propositional Update Open Access

Descriptions

Author or creator
Elio, Renee
Pelletier, Francis Jeffry
Additional contributors
Subject/Keyword
human belief revision
Type of item
Computing Science Technical Report
Computing science technical report ID
TR96-01
Language
English
Place
Time
Description
Technical report TR96-01. Five experiments investigated human belief revision, defining belief revision as a required change to an initial set of beliefs, modeled as a set of propositional sentences, when new information presents a logical inconsistency with the initial set. Certain prescriptive notions of belief revision, such as epistemic entrenchment and minimal change, depend on the representational assumptions adopted for modeling the belief state, in particular whether a syntactic or model-theoretic perspective is taken. These perspectives were examined by manipulating the syntactic form of sentences comprising the initial belief state. Subjects selected among several alternative sets of sentences as their preferred new set of beliefs. These alternatives differed according to which of the initial beliefs were abandoned in order to define a new consistent belief set. Subjects did not follow a minimal change strategy, as defined by four different algorithms on these problems; further, subjects preferred to eliminate logical inconsistency by abandoning conditional statements rather than non-conditional ones, even though either option would lead to a consistent new belief state. Revision choices were also affected by whether the initial belief state included a modus ponens or modus tollens inference, and whether the problems involved abstract symbols or natural-language cover stories. We discuss the role of deductive reasoning in relation to certain aspects of belief revision, and the empirical evidence of these studies for notions like minimal change and epistemic entrenchment as prescriptive and descriptive principles of belief revision.
Date created
1996
DOI
doi:10.7939/R3F18SF0M
License information
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported
Rights

Citation for previous publication

Source
Link to related item

File Details

Date Uploaded
Date Modified
2014-05-02T17:36:58.258+00:00
Audit Status
Audits have not yet been run on this file.
Characterization
File format: pdf (Portable Document Format)
Mime type: application/pdf
File size: 341504
Last modified: 2015:10:12 13:11:05-06:00
Filename: TR96-01.pdf
Original checksum: 09bf8935d31bd7cae28cabd5e78f34a4
Well formed: true
Valid: true
Page count: 77
Activity of users you follow
User Activity Date