Immigrant agency in labour market integration in Sweden and Canada

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Why do immigrants seemingly have an easier time entering the labour market in Canada, a selective liberal welfare state, than they do in Sweden, a social democratic welfare state? Welfare state theory, as formulated in the now classic work by Gosta Esping-Andersen would give reason to expect the order to be other way around; that unemployment rates would be lower and labour force participation would be higher in Sweden. The purpose of this thesis is to explore an often overlooked variable that may have great relevance for explaining this discrepancy: the presence of immigrant agency in the opportunity structure of the field.

Immigrant agency consists of the potential for immigrant communities to mobilize and take action to address social issues that affect them negatively. The extent to which governing bodies at municipal, regional or national levels obstruct or facilitate such mobilization and such action will, this thesis argues, have significance for how smoothly integration in the labour market will occur.

The thesis uses two primary theories. Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice is powerful for identifying agency as interplay between the structures of social space on the one hand and resources of social, cultural and economic capital on the other. Christopher Hood’s application of Grid/Group Cultural Theory is potent for categorizing public management models. The two theories are employed together to examine the space for immigrant agency in the labour market policy community of Canada and Sweden. They reveal much about how immigrant community actors are positioned in the policy community in relation to public agencies, and how the choice of organizational model impacts their potential for agency. Thirty six strategically placed respondents from immigrant community agencies, the public administration and other service delivery actors were interviewed for this thesis during 2009 and 2010. They were drawn from
Toronto and Vancouver in Canada and Stockholm and Malmö in Sweden. All interviewees have been involved in the field of finding pathways to bridge immigrants into the labour market in different ways, either as frontline service delivery agents or public funders.

The thesis shows how public management practices in Canada and Sweden from the end of World War Two continue to be relevant for present day practices and argues that the top-down style policy models employed in Sweden have disempowered immigrant community actors there. In the centralized policy community, municipal and state actors have historically been the dominant service deliverers, constraining the opportunities for immigrant community actors to secure funding. This order is reflected in the organizational culture of the public agencies. Civil servants view themselves as guardians of the common good, while community activists are seen as incompetent dilettantes who risk the common good by pursuing self-interest.

Canada has some similarities with Sweden. Both countries adopted similar disempowering top-down policy methods during the 1990s, particularly the regime of onerous accountability methods that came with New Public Management. Even so, the bottom-up management models introduced in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s opened up opportunities for immigrant community actors to take social action. Consequently, their organizations have been able to secure funding, entering the field and remaining there even after the reforms. Moreover, this legacy is reflected in the organizational culture of the Canadian public agencies, as civil servants view immigrant activists as experts on their communities. Their initiatives have been thus harnessed and the organizations have played a constructive role in settlement on the Canadian field.
PREFACE

This thesis is an original work by Mikael Hellstrom. The research project, of which this thesis is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board, Project Name “IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION AROUND LABOUR MARKET POLICY IN CANADA AND SWEDEN”, No. #2148 (TJ-0709-027), July 22, 2010.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Mrs. Ana Maria Hellstrom Narti, who started me on this journey more than a decade ago when she created the Forum for Knowledge Foundation in Stockholm, Sweden, a platform for highly skilled, long term unemployed immigrants to support each other on the path into the labour market. That initiative changed the lives of many people who were previously locked into poverty, even as the organization struggled through adversity. The experiences of that work has inspired and guided this thesis. This is for you, mother, and for all community activists who to action to make the world a better place, regardless of the barriers. Thank you.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Yasmeen Abu-Laban. Not only did she encourage me to apply to the program and start on this great journey that literally has involved crossing an ocean and starting a new life in Canada, but she has also been a wonderful mentor throughout this long and sometimes challenging process. Without her guidance, wisdom and support, this thesis would never have been completed.

I also want to express my gratitude to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research (FGSR), Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, all of which have been source of inspiration and support for me in various ways. Special appreciation goes to Dr. Steve Patten, Dr. Isabella Altamirano, Dr. Frank Trovato, Professor James Lightbody and Dr. Kristin Good, who graciously have taken the time to provide me with very valuable guidance and wisdom through the writing process. Likewise, I want to thank Dr. Patrick von Maravic for valuable collaboration and insights on the subject matter of this thesis. I am also indebted to the Prairie Metropolis Centre for Excellence for financial support, through the Fariborz Birjandian Graduate Student Research Award.

None of this would have been possible without the unwavering support from my family. I am beholden to my parents in more ways than I can count, for wisdom, guidance and assistance. My wife, Eleonora, has been the rock I could lean on when needed, whose untiring love has carried me through at all times. I also thank my children, Siri and Erik, who have been inconvenienced during this work; thank you for your patience with dad’s homework.
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<td>ALMP</td>
<td>Active Labour Market Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU Group</td>
<td>Arbetsmarknadsutbildning Gruppen (Vocational Training Group, approximate translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAT</td>
<td>Colleges of Applied Arts and Design</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>EI</td>
<td>Employment Insurance</td>
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<td>ES</td>
<td>Swedish Public Employment Service</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
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<td>HTA</td>
<td>Hometown Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
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<td>NES</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction – revisiting and reframing integration in the labour market

In 2008, the association Islamiska Kulturföreningen was expelled by the police from its offices in the municipal district of Rosengård, Malmö, Sweden. This triggered a series of riots on a scale that seriously challenged the image of the generous Swedish welfare state. Persistent long term unemployment, discrimination and a segregated labour market were identified by commentators as some of the underlying causes fuelling the frustration of the involved youth by both local and established public actors (Malmö rämnar.2008; Billner, 2008; Hellberg, 2008). Meanwhile, the leaders of the organization emphatically argued that the public authorities’ refusal to acknowledge it as a partner for discussions directly contributed to the escalation of the situation (Mahmoud, 2008).

Riots occurred in again in the municipal district of Husby, Stockholm, in 2013. A report about the events reaches several conclusions. There was a democratic deficit in the area, where local citizens experience a sense of not being listened to by politicians, who rarely, they say, care about the area in everyday life, and that mainstream society is becoming increasingly exclusionary (De Los Reyes et al., 2014).

The examples raise questions about immigrant agency, or potential lack of the same. The focus of this dissertation concerns immigrants’ attempts to express agency in response to labour market issues in Canada and Sweden, including how their capacity for doing so is conditioned by the institutional context they work in. In spite of political efforts to the contrary, immigrants and their descendants in both Sweden and Canada continuously experience socioeconomic challenges. These include discrepancies in wage levels (Andersson, 2007; Graham & Phillips,
2007), the problem of not having foreign credentials recognized (Li, 2001; Rapport integration 2001, 2002; Rapport integration 2003 2004), and the low labour market value of foreign work experience (Reitz, 2001; Bengtsson Sandberg & Chaib, 2002). This shows the importance of immigrants having access to labour markets on equal terms with the native population for socioeconomic integration.

Sweden and Canada are relevant for comparison for several reasons. Both are entrenched democracies and among the wealthiest countries in the world with a high proportion of immigrants in the population. Both are also multicultural states and have –at least in rhetoric – acknowledged a demographic reality of ethnic heterogeneity (Banting & Kymlicka, 2003; Castles & Miller, 2003). However, they also differ in some important respects. Historically, Canada is seen as a multinational federal state while Sweden has been constructed as a homogenous unitary nation-state. This has implications for the study of labour market issues in the two countries. In Canada, provincial governments have extensive powers to shape their own policies. For example, Quebec has challenged the federal government for jurisdiction over this political issue as part of its province building (see Chapter Three). Meanwhile, the national government of Sweden retained unchallenged centralized control over labour market issues for a long time.

Moreover, Canada and Sweden are two wealthy, multicultural countries, with increasingly ethnically diverse populations. They represent two different welfare state models; the liberal, selective Anglo-Saxon type and the universal Scandinavian welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). It has been argued that social democratic regimes are the most successful at minimizing inequalities and reducing poverty, as well as promoting social integration (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin, Headey, Muffels, & Dirven, 1999). This dichotomous
positioning is repeated in other typologies of modes of governance. Thus, the Canadian state is pluralist whereas the Swedish is corporatist (Atkinson & Coleman, 1996; Coleman & Skogstad, 1990). Indeed, the Swedish labour market policy, which rests on a long tradition of active labour market policies, has on more than one occasion been seen as a positive model by Canadian governments. Sweden provides immigrants with comparatively extensive welfare services (Olsen, 2002), therefore, the integration of immigrants should be rather unproblematic, an anticipation further strengthened by it receiving the highest rank in the Migration Integration Policy Index, MIPEX, which collects integration policies among 31 comparable countries (Migrant Integration Policy Index). The liberal regime type, in contrast, is said to be more likely to exclude the poor (Jensen, 2008) and generate distrust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2003). Some would therefore expect a socio-economic gap between the native born population and immigrants in Canada, and research has confirmed its existence (Pendakur & Pendakur, 2002; Frenette & Morissette, 2005).

However, inequality between immigrants and the native born population exists in Sweden, too (Rapport integration 2001, 2002; Rapport integration 2003, 2004; Andersson, 2007). Indeed, the labour market gap is even bigger in Sweden than in Canada. Moreover, that exclusion of immigrants is not a new phenomenon. It has been discussed by Swedish governments at least since the late 1970s, when observers commented on statistics showing how immigrants were confined to unskilled jobs and sectors that ethnic Swedes preferred to avoid. In 1978, the unemployment level for foreign citizens was 4.5 per cent, which was about three times higher than the 1.8 per cent rating for Swedish citizens(Olderin & Karlsson, 1978). The strong economic growth during the 1980s did little to mitigate this as the employment participation rates continued to decline and the unemployment rate continued to increase (Invandrare till
This trajectory stands in sharp contrast to what would be expected from the findings of welfare state theory. The average difference between native-born and foreign resident employment rates in Sweden for 2003 was about 14 percentage points, while the equivalent Canadian number was closer to 3 percentage points, numbers that are consistent over time (Statistics Canada, 2003; Labour force survey 2009, 2009; Ekberg, 2007; Gilmore, 2008).

A common argument for the reason that immigrants have greater difficulties entering the labour market in Sweden than they do in Canada places causality with immigration policy. Sweden has, historically, had a higher share of refugees who are often described as having low “human capital”, i.e. low educational levels and other skills, who therefore confront substantial barriers when entering the labour market. Canadian immigration, on the other hand, has tended to be dominated by highly skilled migrants entering through the labour force immigration stream. While this might provide a partial explanation, it cannot explain the situation fully. Indeed, one study indicates that if Swedish immigrants would have full return on their human capital, their earnings would actually be higher than those of the native born (le Grand & Szulkin, 2002).

Further, observed differences between Canada and Sweden persist across educational levels – a highly skilled immigrant runs a greater risk being unemployed in Sweden than in Canada (OECD). Likewise, the apparent inconsistency between the predictions made by welfare state theory and the lacking capacity for integration found in Sweden can be attributed to the school’s focus on the state as the primary agent or provider of public good. It rests on the argument that the more encompassing the public sector is – i.e. the agency of the state – the greater the well-being of the citizens will be. This implicitly assumes that the state is the most competent deliverer of social services in society, which certainly can be questioned. Moreover, this
argument, based on macro-economics, dismisses or ignores the potential that immigrant agency might have. Thus, the idea that immigrants might respond, or try to respond to socio-economic challenges with actions of their own is not accounted for in any of the above explanations. In the following, the scholarship is explored for other potential explanations and how they relate to the issue of immigrant agency.

**Literature review and analytical framework**

Research has explored many issues that are relevant to the socio-economic discrepancy between the native born population and immigrants discussed above. In what follows, that literature is explored to inquire how it has probed the issue of immigrant agency or potential lack of such. This literature includes a discussion first of typologies of modes of governance in which to frame the institutional context of the state as a provider of welfare state services in the labour market field. That is followed by an overview of studies on the role of civil society actors and their opportunities to articulate interests and participate on the political arena, after which the scholarship on ethnic discrimination is addressed as it concerns the impact of the social construction of the ethnic ‘other’ on societal relations. As will be shown, much of this material was developed in separate fields of research and little of it directly addresses social agency, which limits its capacity for creating an understanding of how agency can be expressed by immigrants. The section therefore finishes with a discussion the central topic of the dissertation, specifically how to operationalize agency.

Immigrants as a group and their integration have been extensively documented by researchers. Such work comes in many forms. The first form concerns the demographic situation of immigrants and was referred above. One study presents a long list of variables that factor into the immigration process, dealing with factors like labour force participation, poverty rates,
residential segregation, outreach services for immigrants, language proficiency, and citizenship regulation (Biles, Burstein, & Frideres, 2008). These variables are quite commonly occurring in the literature examining the integration process. A great deal of attention has been paid to labour force participation, the differences in employment rates, under-employment, and income levels, over time between immigrants and the native born population (Anisef, Sweet, & Frempong, 2003; Ray, 2004; Reitz, 2001; Reitz, 2005). Likewise, studies have investigated labour market integration in detail, for instance the experiences of Chinese women seeking employment in Canada (Xu, 2006). The significance of citizenship has also been acknowledged (Joppke, 1999). Other disciplines have also discussed this from their vantage points, including cultural geographers (Andersson, 2007), interdisciplinary urban researchers (Grant & Sweetman, 2004), sociologists (Fong & Wilkes, 2003) and economists (Hum & Simpson, 2004). However, while much of this does provide important insight into the state of economic integration and variables that are significant for this process, it does not engage with immigrants as subjects, capable of taking their own action to address the social issues that confront them.

Processes of discrimination are also of relevance in the context, given their potential negative impact on agency for those who are exposed to such social forces. Identity based scholarship addresses this phenomenon extensively. It employs terms like ethnicity, race, or gender to study how their politicization based on socially constructed stereotypes embodied in a societal hierarchy of power with material implications. Such essentialism manifests in everyday social life through structural, otherwise known as systemic, discrimination, underscoring issues of belonging and inclusion. In Canada, it is noteworthy that one survey analysis found that Quebeckers along with Aboriginal people, rather than immigrants, feel the least amount of belonging to the ‘Canadian nation’ (Soroka, Johnston, & Banting, 2007). This demonstrates the
complexity of ethnic relations and multi-nationalism in the country (McRoberts, 2001). Still, discrimination is an issue that Canadian immigrants potentially are confronted with, as indicated by past field tests (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007), and the question is continuously given attention by the scholarship (Galabuzi, 2006). Indeed, Eliadis states that the phenomenon of systemic discrimination is recognized by Canadian law (Eliadis, 2007), which speaks to the kind of acknowledgment it has attained in public space.

In contrast, Sweden has no legal instruments to address systemic discrimination, which to some extent hints to its different reception in that public debate. However, the phenomenon has received attention from researchers who show that there is a need to acknowledge and address structural discrimination in the country (Hertzberg, 2003; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2005; Integrationens svarta bok, 2006). This is discussed in relation to the recognition of foreign credentials in one interesting Metropolis-funded study which specifically compares Canada and Sweden and concludes that similar discourses in the two countries contribute to an exclusionary treatment of immigrants in the labour market (Guo & Andersson, 2005-2006).

Generally speaking, the heavy methodological emphasis on discourse analysis in the study of structural discrimination lends a static ontological quality to discussions of the phenomenon in this scholarship. Thus, while the theoretical framework is often potent for revealing how discourses objectify and exclude the ethnic ‘other’, be it on the basis of race (M. S. Smith, 2003) or immigration (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2005), it offers little in the way of suggestions for how to address the issue and therefore provides limited insight into questions of agency on the part of those confronted by discrimination.

Notably, a substantial body of literature has been focused on how dimensions of ethnicity become salient in relations between native-born populations and immigrants. Such a perspective
has informed many studies (see more in Chapters Two and Three). This includes, for example, case studies of ethnic groups in a limited number of cities in one or more countries (Chekki, 2006; Freedman, 1960; Sassen-Koob, 1979; Bloemraad, 2005; Caponio, 2005; Maeyama, 1979; Schmitter, 1980; Vermeulen, 2005). However, this perspective emphasizes ethnicity to a degree that neglects the experiences that immigrants have in common. It may even be that the scholarship has focused too overly much on ethnicity, to the exclusion of other axes of mobilization. De-emphasizing ethnicity could thus in some cases facilitate the study of interactions and relationships between immigrants, by virtue of their immigrant-hood specifically, and the native population and their representatives, including, significantly, governments.

Some such framings do exist within the scholarship. The scholarship on multiculturalism constitutes one example, where the literature has discussed how such policies relate to the welfare state (Banting & Kymlicka, 2003) as well as to belonging in different national contexts (Abbas, 2005; Bekker & Leidé, 2004). Immigrants as a group have also been discussed in the context of immigration policy (Abu-Laban, 2005; Bissett, 2002; Cole, 2003; Hentges, 2002; Huysmans, 2000) and inclusive citizenship (Balibar, 2004), which gain increasing importance in the age of globalization and changing demography. Among these scholars, qualitative methods and political theory is more relied upon than quantitative, and together with the above, the work is valuable for identifying the issues immigrants face in contemporary entrenched democracies.

Categorizing modes of governance can be a useful heuristic device to identify inherent differences in the institutional context that follows from a particular form of polity, as touched upon in the introduction. The literature provides several different useful typologies for this purpose. Welfare state theory has explored the state as a social agent extensively. It argues that
similar pre-industrial structures have induced similar welfare regimes (Kuhnle & Alestalo, 2000) and frames the state as the primary societal agent of social policy, treating the citizenry as passive recipients. Esping-Andersen is a pioneer in the study of comparative welfare states and placed welfare states into three categories: the liberal selective Anglo-Saxon; the German Christian-democrat; and the Scandinavian universal social-democratic (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Esping-Andersen’s typology has a tendency to treat the state as a homogenous entity, which may create difficulties with accounting for the extent to which policy solutions can vary across different policy fields. Still, it remains significant in this context because of the extent to which labour-market policy is used as a basis for his classification and it has been relied upon for analysis by many observers of the Swedish social democratic and the liberal welfare states. This stream of literature has given immigrants attention mostly insofar as they are entitled to welfare services. Its conclusion is that Sweden’s extensive inclusion of immigrants in this respect indicates that the Swedish social state is advanced in comparison with other countries (Olsen, 2002).

An interesting recent contribution to this field comes from Sainsbury who adds the tension between restrictive and inclusive incorporation regimes and how they relate to an application of Esping-Andersen’s typology on the level of social rights and settlement services extended to newcomers. In this matrix, she argues that the United Kingdom’s reliance on market solutions is consistent with the liberal welfare state type, but also that the historical barriers to citizenship for non-British subjects constitutes a restrictive incorporation regime type. The United States, by contrast, is a liberal, inclusive regime. While it has the liberal approach to social service delivery in common with the United Kingdom, its *jus soli* and ‘melting pot’ policies are inclusive and it has also employed strong anti-discrimination legislation. Denmark is similarly contrasted to
Sweden. While both are social-democratic countries, Denmark has been restrictive in comparison to Sweden, which is inclusive and extends a range of social rights to newcomers. For example, becoming naturalized is very easy in Sweden by international comparison (Sainsbury, 2012). However, like the MIPEX index (Migrant Integration Policy Index), this study focused on formal rights and remuneration regimes. As such, it does not address informal relations between immigrant communities and governing bodies. Nor does it discuss relationships between users and service delivery actors. Thus, the study does not comment on immigrant agency as such.

Organizational theory, on the other hand, is a theoretical school highly suitable for discussions of agency, given its focus on how organizations act on a policy field. However, few organizational theorists have given much attention to immigrants and the labour market integration policy field in Canada and Sweden. Still, it seems reasonable to expect that the organizational solutions in this field roughly match the categorizations made by welfare state theorists. Thus, the Canadian state has been called comparatively passive as far as immigrant labour market integration is concerned (Reitz, 2005) with non-profit, so called Immigrant Serving Agencies, ISAs, actively engaged in delivering labour market services to immigrants (Creese, 1998). Meanwhile, the Swedish integration policy has been found to rely heavily on its traditional state centred solutions where such Non-Government Organizations, NGOs, play a relatively small role (Ray, 2004).

This categorization could possibly be challenged by the recent wave of reforms associated with New Public Management, NPM, including the wide scale introduction of Public-Private Partnerships (Greve, 2008; Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999; Kettl, 2005) in public policy. In the literature, it has often been framed as a uniform global transformation of the role of the state, implying that the two countries have grown more similar. However, Pollitt and Bouckhaert argue
that this description is overly simplistic and find reason to differentiate between two main trajectories of reform. The changes associated specifically with NPM are confined to the core Anglo-Saxon countries, including Canada. In contrast, the continental European countries – to which Sweden could be said to belong in this case – chose to maintain Weberian administrative values, reaffirming the state as an important actor, albeit revising its focus from internal procedure to improved external service delivery. This, they argue, would be better described as a Neo-Weberian State, NWS (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). The reform wave notwithstanding, it seems that labour market integration policy in Canada and Sweden can still be cast as different types of welfare regimes insofar as they have been consistent with what could be expected from a liberal and a social-democratic state, respectively.

Access to decision-making arenas, also significant in this context, has been extensively discussed by policy network theorists and social movement theorists. Scholars studying policy networks have conceived a typology of interest articulation, where pluralist states and corporatist states can essentially be seen as dichotomous opposites. The ways the two countries can be categorized in this regard seem to line up well with the observations made concerning the chosen modes of governance discussed above. Thus, Canada’s liberal regime corresponds well to the pluralist type of networks. In Sweden, interest is articulated through paternalist corporatism, where social services and community development have seen little NGO involvement (Rothstein, 2002). This type of organization is also relatively closed in comparison to the pluralist, which potentially makes it more difficult for new actors to gain access to decision-making arenas, though the role of immigrant organizations in the labour market field remains largely unexplored in Scandinavia (Saksela, 2004). The search for immigrant presence in these arenas could be greatly facilitated by mapping such policy networks (Milward & Proven, 1998), if the concept is
properly operationalized and not confused with other, potentially more coercive, relations with the state (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998).

The policy network concept closely resembles what organizational theorists refer to as the organizational field. It represents the ‘life space’ of organizations and forms on the basis of an issue – in the case of this study the labour market integration of immigrants (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 2008). Together, the two concepts could prove useful heuristic devices to discern which actors are involved and how power relations impact the degree of agency they might have (Scott, 2008).

A different perspective on access to political decision-making is presented by social movement theorists. Unlike policy network theorists, they frame this phenomenon in terms of political opportunity structures (McAdam, McCarty, & Zald, 1996). However, they predominantly focus on political mobilization driven by movements based on coherent identities and life styles of groups, like gays and lesbians (M. Smith, 2005), feminists (Phillips, 2004), or environmental activists (Adkin, 1998). An important functionality of these social movements is how their self-identified collective identity functions as a source of socio-political mobilization (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). This has significance with regards to how the movement can be said to rightly represent the interests of these parties. It is, in other words, important to ask to what extent immigrant interests can be adequately represented and defended by actors that were not mobilized based on immigrant identity. Immigrants are typically diverse and therefore more unlikely to form a coherent movement in that sense and therefore rarely attract the attention of these scholars (Hooghe, 2005), even though they do form organizations for common political purposes (Pal, 1993). The immigrant Non Government Organizations, NGOs, of concern here more closely resemble the actors studied by civil society theorists, who focus on local
community mobilization (Benthall, 2000). However, these scholars have given more attention to the generation of local trust than framing NGO activity in terms of agency (de Hart & Dekker, 2003).

Such agency on the part of immigrants is also affected by the organizational capacity of their NGOs, both for delivering social services to their constituents and affecting policy change, which is also relevant for the issue of agency. This has been touched upon by sociologists, past and present. To estimate the success of host nations to accommodate newcomers, Castles and Miller differentiate between ‘ethnic communities’ and ‘ethnic minorities’. The former is characterized by a high level of institutional completeness (Breton, 1964), where community organizations make the social networks needed for economic, social and cultural establishment accessible for newcomers. The latter, by contrast, is characterized by social exclusion and economic marginalization (Castles & Miller, 2003).

Turning again to the Canadian case, research indicates that the organizational capacity amongst ethno-specific organizations does need attention. Sadiq underscored four noteworthy potential limits among ethno-specific Immigrant Serving Agencies, ISAs. They include lack of recourses, the external pressure to assimilate the cultural norms of larger organizations, unequal power relations and the risk of cooptation (Sadiq, 2004). This corresponds to some extent to Hall’s findings regarding the limits of NGO organizational capacity in the context of downloading social service delivery to Public-Private Partnerships (Hall & Reed, 1998). Little research has been done on the organizational capacity of immigrant organizations in the case of Sweden (see more on this in Chapter Three).

Public administration theorists present an alternative way of observing the state and power trajectories when implementing policy. They conceptualize government in a disaggregated form
as a set of bureaucracies and observe how the way they are organized impacts their organizational behaviour both internally and vis-à-vis outside actors. This implies that the delivery of labour market policy will be affected by its organization. A particularly useful framework for this specific context is Grid/Group Cultural Theory. It organizes organizational solutions along two axes, one consisting of its rule-boundedness and the other on its group cohesiveness. Christopher Hood uses this to create a typology for categorizing the inherent strengths and weaknesses of four primary organizational solutions, labelled the Hierarchical Way, the Fatalist Way, the Individualist Way and the Egalitarian Way. Notably, the theory also underlines how each of these organizational models also affect the socialization of the organizational members, how they perceive their own organization as well as the environment they operate in, which in turn conditions the type of solutions they are likely to design in response to problems (Hood, 2000). The typology can be helpful in revealing how the inherent character of the organizational model impacts the institutional environment and has implications for the agency of the actors involved in a particular policy community. Its utility is further elaborated in Chapter Four.

In summary, much has been said about the role and ability of the state, about civil society’s capacity for socio-political agency, and about the constraints of discrimination. Yet, it seems that comprehensive analysis regarding the capacity of immigrants to address these matters is somewhat lacking. This raises questions about how the agency of socially constructed groups of ‘others’, the central topic of this dissertation, is handled by the scholarship.

However, societal agency has been addressed more cohesively outside of the research on immigration. The theory of practice, the analytical framework of the post-structuralist Pierre Bourdieu, employs the interacting concepts of Habitus, capital and field to study precisely that.
Interestingly enough, he observes the same processes as the scholars referred to above, but their narrow focus on a single aspect means that they lack his wider perspective, which gives his framework central significance in this study. The first concept is Habitus. It consists of “dispositions, schemas, forms of know-how and competence” (Crossley, 2001, p. 83) and can be thought of as ‘adopted and internalized social reflexes’ that generates and shapes social perceptions and actions. It manifests on a collective level when individuals adopt similar attitudes through common experiences (Crossley, 2001). This conceptualization is reminiscent of the mobilizing functionality of identity in social movements mentioned above (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). The second concept is Capital which determines the structure of the social space (Bourdieu, 1984). For Bourdieu, capital is not reduced to economy, but captures “the capacity to exercise control over one’s own future and that of others” (Calhoun, 1993, p 4). To economic such he adds symbolic (status), social (connections and networks) and cultural (educational qualifications) capital (Calhoun, 1993; Crossley, 2001). Bourdieu’s final concept is the Field (Bourdieu, 1984). This is the social arena, “the context of action” (Crossley, 2001, p. 86), where agents congregate and habitus and capital together shape action.

While developed separately from each other, Grid/Group Cultural Theory and Bourdieu’s theory of practice are highly compatible and complementary. Indeed, in many ways they speak to the same phenomena and social processes. Thus, an organizational model as conceptualized by Grid/Group Cultural Theory can be seen as a Bourdieuan Habitus, and the way it structures social space has implications for the distribution of economic, social and cultural capital. Likewise, a policy community can be easily be reframed as a field in a Bourdieuan sense. As Pross shows it is delineated in terms of how it addresses an issue, and the actors on the field have addressing that issue in common (Pross, 1986). Significantly, as a policy community to a large
extent is defined by the leading government agencies, using it as a point of departure for this study emphasizes the significance of governments for how the social space becomes structured. To successfully gain entry into the sub-government part of the policy community to set agendas, define the content of the issues, and take actions, an actor needs to leverage capital. Those who cannot are less likely to be able to move from the attentive public sphere to the sub-government sphere. For example, social capital has been studied by civil society theorists (Skidmore, 2001). A community generates this as a function of the number of NGOs that serve it, which increases its capacity for socio-political mobilization (Putnam, 1996). While the other forms of capital have received less attention, they all have significance for the agency of the actors on the field, in the sense that an actor needs to accumulate and leverage capital to position itself within the field. Actors on that field, like immigrant community actors, other NGOs, interest groups or for profit actors may or may not collaborate or be in conflict with each other and the distribution of resources among them will affect power relations between them (see Figure 1, below).

![Figure 1: The constitution of the policy community, reinterpreting Pross using Bourdieu's theory](image)

On the theoretical level, this work concerns the study of how social positioning affects agency. Together, these two theoretical frameworks can thus provide powerful insights into a
range of social processes and provide an opportunity to bridge the fields of research discussed above. The fields of public policy, organizational theory and civil society and network study have largely developed without much dialogue and bringing them together to an analytical whole can offer a powerful tool for the study of social positioning on the societal level. Potential benefits include an improved understanding of the forces that structure social space. Likewise, the two can help illuminating which opportunities exist for actors within that social space to leverage the resources available within it for taking social action. The access to those resources will be dependent on the organizational model, facilitating access for some actors while raising barriers for others. Thus, social, cultural and economic capital cannot be assumed to be evenly accessible. Rather, access is conditioned by the organizational model implemented on the arena. A cross-fertilization of Hood’s Grid/Group Cultural Theory and Bourdieu’s model can thus provide a potent theoretical framework for exploring the issues at hand.

As such, the combination and application of these analytical frameworks for the study of immigrant agency has implications on many different levels, beyond the operationalization presented in this dissertation. It focuses on agency and the relationship between primarily the public administration and immigrant actors. That positions the study firmly in the context of how entrenched democracies deal with the consequences of globalization and increased migratory flows. In this regard, it is significant for the study of politics on the practical level in the sense that it has direct policy implications. Thus, the material provided in the study could be used by decision-makers in both public administration and immigrant organizations to create practical policy with effects on the opportunity structures and organizational capacity of immigrant organizations. This work could thus potentially have direct implications for the degree to which immigrant agency is facilitated.
Likewise, the research has some implications for the study of how ethnic relations and streams of migration affect the globalized political landscape. As immigrants become an increasingly salient group in post-modern society, it could very well attract increased attention from political scientists. Seen in that perspective, the study constitutes a contribution to the efforts of better understanding social agency, organizing and immigrants.

**Hypothesis**

My hypothesis is that one possible causal variable for variation in immigrant labour market integration could be sought in the space for socio-political agency that the polity affords immigrant community organizations in the arena of labour market policy. Such actors can provide newcomers and other immigrants in need relatively quick access to the social networks required for economic establishment. I further hypothesize that in this comparison, two factors stand out as particularly important for explaining differences between the Canada and Sweden. First, Canada’s public management model traditionally gives NGOs an important role in social service delivery (Ley, 2007). In contrast, Sweden’s has historically relied primarily on public agencies to deliver these services. This means that the political opportunity structure in Canada seems to accept NGOs as social agents, while Sweden’s political opportunity structure acts in a constraining factor, making it more difficult for bottom-up impulses to exhort influence. Second, the corporatist network type acts as a structural impediment for new actors to access decision-making arenas networks than pluralist such. These two factors seem to act as obstructions for Swedish immigrants building institutions that could allow them a potential for agency. How structural discrimination acts in relation to these factors remains to be established. My hypotheses, if correct, could help increase the theoretical understanding of how forms of polity are related to the development of ethnic communities versus the development of ethnic
minorities, and more concretely provide an answer for the otherwise unexplained Swedish situation.

This dissertation revolves around the operationalization of the term ‘agency’, informed by Pierre Bourdieu’s theory (see Chapter Two). Specifically, it asks: to what extent do different public management models impact immigrant agency in the labour market integration policy community? The question spans a range of issues that have to be clarified to provide a comprehensive answer.

Immigrant agency has to be comprehensively defined. This involves establishing a theoretical framework facilitating the understanding of what separates agency from non-agency and the social processes involved in agency. Also, the capacities and resources immigrant community actors can leverage to influence policy or deliver labour market integration services to their constituencies have to be identified. This relates to the capacity of immigrant actors, in the form of representative non-government organizations (NGOs), to generate and draw upon the needed resources, manifested as material and symbolic capital, for action. That includes establishing how immigrant communities develop institutions like organizations, centres and other infrastructure needed for social action, i.e. how the degree of institutional completeness (Breton, 1964), manifests through immigrant organizations actively delivering labour market services to their constituencies. The organizational capacity of immigrant community NGOs to do so is significantly conditioned by the potential to access funding. For many, public funding has been a very important source of revenue, and so the conditions under which public funding is available reveal much about the opportunity structure of the polity. Finally, the institutional context of the labour market integration policy community also has to be charted. Doing so includes exploring how the public administration is organized in the field and whether immigrant
actors have access to the sub-government where policy is shaped. Each chapter in this
dissertation (see Overview of chapters, below) will explore this by answering a question probing
a dimension of the research question and by examining the formal and informal forces that shape
the potential agency of immigrants and the power relations between the actors involved.

**Methodology**

The dissertation rests on the methodological tradition of qualitative research insofar as it relies
primarily on in-depth, semi-structured interviews. ‘Qualitative’ should here be understood in the
interpretative hermeneutic meaning (Martin, 2000), in the sense that the analysis includes
interpretations in at least two stages. On the one hand, the respondents interpret their own roles,
actions and social contexts in particular ways. On the other hand, I, as a researcher, use theory
(see Chapters Two and Three) as a guide to interpret their responses to discern meanings and
establish causality for how actions are motivated by the actors. I put forward that hermeneutics
tends to be overlooked as a method in comparative politics and that it offers opportunities to
draw new conclusions about old generalizations (Stake, 2008), in this case concerning social
policy implementation in different welfare state regime types.

As such, the study looks to penetrate the cases of the labour market integration policy
communities of Sweden and Canada in depth to gain a deeper understanding of the political and
institutional context in which the actors in the respective countries operate. These can be
characterized as ‘critical cases’ (Flyvbjerg, 2011) in the sense that they are strategically
important in relation to a general problem, namely immigrant integration into the labour market.
As mentioned above, Sweden has been characterized as a successful welfare-state, which would
make many researchers expect it to manage social issues like this well, particularly given the
leading findings of scholars in welfare state theory. Canada, on the other hand, pioneered
multiculturalism, which would also make many researchers expect the country to manage these issues well. For that reason, employing a combination of Grid/Group Cultural Theory and Bourdieu’s theory of practice in an in-depth study of these two cases offers opportunities to gain new insight into these social policy processes. The findings can constitute a significant supplement to previously used methods and be used as a point of departure for future, more generalizing, efforts (Flyvbjerg, 2011).

The country cases are based on two cities in each country, the largest and the third largest. In both countries, they together represent almost 25% of the nationwide population. In Canada, these cities were Toronto and Vancouver. Toronto has more than five million residents, 46% of them immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2007). Of Vancouver’s two million residents, about 40% are immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2007). In Sweden, Stockholm and Malmö were the cities of choice. The metropolitan area of the first city has about two million residents. In the municipality proper, about 20% are immigrants (Sveriges befolkning 31 december 2007: Kommunala jämförelsetal. 2008). As the national capital, it is an economic as well as a political centre. The metropolitan area of the second has about 600,000 residents. About 27% of its municipal population consists of immigrants (Malmö Stad, 2008).

The thesis is grounded in my past employment in the field of labour market integration in Stockholm. The research proceeded in an order common to this type of work (Johnson, 2002). It began with the identification of an experience. In my case, it involved work in relation to immigration in several capacities. One significant experience was as a project manager for an NGO. That role involved both project planning, implementation and reporting. I also participated on a panel evaluating funding proposals from NGOs, another important function for the context, advising a public agency on which proposals to approve and which to disapprove. In these
positions, I have experienced application processes from both the position of applicant and the public funder. Informed by that experience, the available theoretical frameworks have facilitated the identification of the institutional processes that are shaping roles and relationships in the field. Finally, those processes have been investigated to “describe analytically how they operate as the grounds of the experience project” (DeVault & McCoy, 2002, p. 755).

Also, I have lived extensively in both countries. My background as both an ethnic Swede and a Canadian citizen facilitates my understanding of technical terms and the culture in the two professional fields. With English as a second language, I have had to absorb the full meaning of professional jargon in the Canadian field, which has sometimes been a barrier to properly conceptualizing or communicating my research to Canadian interviewees. On the other hand, living as a resident in Canada for years and being fully socialized into Swedish culture and fluent in Swedish has given me access to that field in a way not easily achievable for researchers who lack this background. Conversely, being immersed in the Canadian culture for years, I believe I have achieved an understanding of the Canadian field in a way not easily achieved for Swedish researchers (Ryen, 2002). This has had some significance, since the terminology varies somewhat between the two fields, reflecting on the culturally specific construction of knowledge. For example, in Sweden, the studied organizations are typically referred to as ‘immigrant organizations’, while in Canada, they are normally labelled ‘immigrant serving agencies’, (ISAs). These terms are not, strictly speaking, synonymous, and that has challenged me to develop a vocabulary that is transferable between the two cases. This is thus a study using social phenomena which I have access to and knowledge of as a point of departure (Johnson & Rowlands, 2012).
The experiences have proved helpful for conducting the research in many respects: familiarity with the field has allowed me to locate strategically positioned interviewees and prepared me for some potential pitfalls. The experiences also gave me valuable insight into the social processes and dynamics in the relationship between immigrant community NGOs and public agencies. As such, I have acquired significant cultural and social capital needed for navigating these social spaces successfully (see Chapter Two and Four discussing Bourdieu’s theory practice) and decoding the professional and specialized jargon used there. These competencies have been significant for informing how to structure the research design and adapt it to successfully navigate the social spaces being investigated. For example, they allowed me to decode statements easier with a more in-depth understanding of their meanings, which allowed me to conduct the interviews in a way that produced richer material (Dunbar Jr, Rodriguez, & Parker, 2002) and in ways that may be seen to enhance validity.

For this reason, respondents were selected based on their position and experience in the field. Interviewees can be described as key respondents, who shared the lowest common denominator that they all have had relevant experiences as representatives for the strategic position on the field of their respective sector (Stake, 2008) and were able to speak to the processes of frontline work (DeVault & McCoy, 2012). The respondents were drawn from three primary groups to gain insight into multiple perspectives into the issue at hand and thus a more nuanced understanding of it (Beitin, 2012). Three interview guides were consequently developed for the semi-structured interviews, adapted to probe the particular experiences of each social position. Converging responses contributed greatly to creating a coherent narrative of the state of the field. When responses have conflicted, however, the context of the respondent has been used to interpret the veracity of the statement.
The first category of interviewees was frontline civil servants who acted as important gatekeepers and typically expressed agency through their discretionary power over public policy implantation (Carroll & Siegel, 1999). This could include positions as funders of public services as well as managers involved with such implementation. They represented national, regional and local administrations, including municipal districts in the case of Sweden. These interviews covered the process of becoming a public partner, whether through procurement or projects, the role of immigrant users and community actors on the field, how services and competencies are framed and evaluated, as well as how outreach to immigrant communities and users is done.

The second category of interviewees was workers from immigrant community organizations. These workers acted as managers for service delivery in a range of capacities and generally had experience of applying, delivering and reporting publicly funded social service programs to their constituents. As such, they were strategically placed with experiences of interacting with public funders and other actors on the arena. For the purpose of this study, this included the organizations directly involved with service delivery to users. Likewise, umbrella organizations representing these actors also existed in some cases and have in this dissertation been treated as part of this sector. The interviews probed the history of the organization, how it had proceeded to gain public funding, as well as questions about competencies and relationships of the actors on the arena, including outreach to immigrant communities and users.

The third category of interviewees consisted of workers from other service delivery actors in the arena. Like the interviewees from immigrant community organizations, they have had experience of publicly funded service delivery on the field. They have also interacted with public funders and had gone through the same type of processes for proposal writing, implementation and reporting as the former did. However, since most of these respondents were placed in
prestigious and entrenched organizations, like community colleges (in the case of Canada) or private education companies (in Sweden), they were also differently positioned in relation to the public funders. The testimonials they share could thus be compared and contrasted to those of immigrant community actors and civil servants to improve the validity of the material. This last category is referred to as ‘non-community actors’. As in the case of immigrant community actors, this category includes both the organizations directly involved with service delivery to users and any umbrella organizations formed by these on the arena. The interviews explored why the organization got involved in the relevant service delivery, what it had to do to gain public funding, how it conducted outreach to immigrant communities and users, as well as competencies and relationships between actors on the arena.

In total, 36 respondents were interviewed for this study. Given the size of the respective professional field, this sample is strongly representative. While the Toronto field was certainly larger than the Malmö one, the field is still limited in terms of the number of people involved. As such, the responses have been codified in such a way as to maintain the confidentiality of the respondents. For example, the names of the respective organization they worked for are not included. Likewise, when respondents have included references that may be used to identify the informant, these have been replaced with more generalized labels. The interviews took on average about an hour to complete, with the shortest lasting about 15 minutes and the longest closer to 90 minutes. Interviewees were invited to speak freely around the themes of the study, deviating from the interview guide when necessary to explore the themes grounded in their particular experiences. The distribution of their social position and location is as indicated in Table 1, below:
Table 1: Respondents sorted by social position and location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Public agency</th>
<th>Immigrant community actor</th>
<th>Non-community actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmö</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All interviews were conducted by the author, and completed either in person, or through telephone depending on accessibility between 2009 and 2010. The interviews with the respondents in Canada were conducted in English, while the interviews completed in Sweden were conducted in Swedish. There were two reasons for this. While many Swedes speak English with fluency, expressing nuanced and complicated professional relations is still easier in the first language. Moreover, some immigrants to Sweden come from countries where English language training is less accessible, and using English could potentially create barriers for respondents with such backgrounds. Interviews conducted in Swedish were translated by the author into English. In that sense, this constitutes an example of how my linguistic comprehension has been a great asset for the ability to navigate two cases with two different professional languages, although it is recognized that translation is sometimes complicated and there are choices involved.

The study constitutes an effort at forming an institutional ethnography (DeVault & McCoy, 2002; DeVault & McCoy, 2012). As such, the interviews aimed to probe a set of relationships and processes of governance as each informant understood those, grounded in their professional experiences from working in that policy community. The study investigates “local settings of everyday life, organizations and translocal processes of administration and governance”
The purpose of these interviews was to, as DeVault and McCoy put it “…build up an understanding of the coordination of activity in multiple sites” (DeVault & McCoy, 2002, p. 757) and constituted opportunities to “…learn about a particular piece of the extended relational chain, to check the developing picture of the coordinative process, and to become aware of additional questions that need to be answered” (DeVault & McCoy, 2002, p. 757). As such, the interviews were semi-structured, based on interview guides available in the appendices A through C.

The interview material uncovered patterns, experiences and relationships that might not be accessible through other methods, like document study or quantitative surveying. They highlighted informal as well as formal manifestations of organizational behaviour in the public administration. The study corroborated experience showing “that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification” (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 311) in the sense that several assumptions I had based on previous experiences proved incorrect. The clear extent to which both regimes emphasized accountability measures was one example of that.

Definitions

For the purposes of the study, immigrants are defined as the “foreign-born” population regardless of their citizenship status. This corresponds closely to how it has been used by the governments of both Sweden and Canada. Thus, the Canadian definition of the term ‘immigrant population’ is:

…people who are, or have been, landed immigrants in Canada. A landed immigrant is a person who has been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by immigration
authorities. Some immigrants have resided in Canada for a number of years, while others have arrived recently. Most immigrants are born outside Canada, but a small number were born in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2007).

The Swedish government has not committed to any conclusive definition of the term, even after in-depth analysis of its use (Kulturdepartementet, 2000). The Swedish Migration Board explains that anyone born abroad and registered as a resident in the country is considered an immigrant for statistical purposes, although the population is also differentiated on the basis of birth place – ‘foreign-born’ – or citizenship (Migrationsverket). The category known popularly and in the media as the ‘second generation’ of immigrants is excluded in this definition. This is done for the sake of conceptual clarity which facilitates keeping the scope of the investigation focused. As ‘second generation’ persons may confront similar issues of discrimination and exclusion that the ‘first generation’ does, the study could be said to be relevant also for their concerns. Immigrant actors of relevance in this investigation include non-governmental organizations (NGOs) representing immigrant groups and/or communities, such as ethno-specific Immigrant Serving Association, ISAs, or immigrant mutual aid societies (Moya, 2005) which specifically address labour market integration issues. In this study, they are labelled as immigrant community actors, to capture their connection to the community in a wider and more precise sense than other labels can. For example, the term ISA can be applied to actors that do not have a community connection. Likewise, immigrant community actors might not always be ethno-specific, but can rather deliver services to a range of ethnic communities sharing the immigration experience in some sense (this is discussed in Chapter Two).

The study is centred on labour market integration and focuses on the government policies directed to address this. This primarily includes labour market policy, in this case efforts taken by governments to mitigate or minimize unemployment or under-employment in general, as well
as actions specifically aimed at improving the integration of immigrants. This work also touches upon matters that are otherwise regarded as part of social services or multicultural policies. Therefore, several different government bodies are relevant as state actors for the project, including administrations, agencies and decision-making bodies involved in labour market policy implementation. In Canada this principally includes Human Resources and Development Canada and its equivalents on the provincial level. In Sweden, labour market issues are firmly centralized at the national level and are the domains of the Swedish Employment Service. That agency went through a re-organization in 2010, when its name was changed from the Swedish Public Employment Service to the Swedish Employment Service. The implications of this organizational transformation are still unfolding and not fully covered in this dissertation.

Insofar as social services are of concern here, Swedish municipal governments, under whose purview such issues fall in Sweden, are also relevant in this study. Since labour market integration problems in both countries seem to persist long after immigrants can be considered newcomers, immigration policy will not be a primary focus, though it will be discussed in terms of its significance as a potential background factor on labour market integration outcomes.

Immigrant integration is here conceptualized as a process of participation and negotiation based on respect between the parties involved (Li, August 2003), which recognizes the need for both immigrants and state and societal actors to exercise agency and to change or adapt for the process to take place. Immigrant integration is only discussed in socio-economic terms in this dissertation, i.e. the potential for immigrants to achieve a socio-economic position on par with that of the native born population. Other dimensions of integration – cultural, social, or political – are not addressed, primarily because public debates discussing integration in such terms at times make implicitly assimilatory assumptions. That is to say, immigrant integration is said to
have been achieved when socio-cultural sameness with the native born population has been established to some extent. This often denies one party agency, which is contradictory to the inherent meaning of integration as discussed above.

**Overview of chapters**

This introduction is followed by eleven chapters. Their contents are as follows. Chapter Two engages mainly with the question: *How can immigrant agency and capacity building to influence policy or deliver labour market services to their constituencies be conceptualized?* It does so by presenting an analytical framework for immigrant agency using Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, particularly his separation of capital into three different kinds; social, cultural and economic. It allows also scholars to recognize representative agency. Further, the chapter facilitates an understanding for how immigrant community actors are particularly well positioned and equipped for delivering services to their constituencies, and that this depends on how they can leverage cultural capital valid in these communities as part of their capacities. That is accomplished by investigating the extant research on immigrant community actors to identify how they have been leveraged for social agency. That allows an assessment about what the available literature can reveal with regards to immigrant actors social positioning, mobilization and capacity building in general. It concludes that Bourdieu’s theory is revealing for the social forces that shape the relations between immigrant communities and non-community actors, particularly governments.

Chapter Three continues the work begun in Chapter Two on how to operationalize the theoretical framework presented there, but this chapter probes studies of immigrant community actors in Canada and Sweden specifically. It answers the question: *How has immigrant agency and capacity building to influence policy or deliver labour market services to their*
constituencies been articulated in Canada and Sweden? As in Chapter Two, the available research on these actors is analyzed through the perspective of Bourdieu’s three types of capital (social, cultural and economic) to identify how they have been leveraged for agency. The chapter concludes that the findings in the scholarship reveal different trajectories regarding the relationship between immigrant communities and government gatekeepers. For the case of Sweden, the material shows that there is a distance between the social space of immigrant communities and the government. Research has also shown that immigrant community actors have encountered barriers to taking social action and entering the policy community. In Canada, by contrast, the immigrant community actors have received government funding for service delivery for a long time, and in some cases, such community actors have grown to have metropolitan level scope in service delivery. As a result, considerable amounts of bridging networks have been developed between immigrant communities and the government here. The findings bring out differences in how immigrant community organizations in Sweden and Canada have been able to access and leverage social, cultural and economic capital.

Chapter Four asks the question: What is the significance of the institutional context of the opportunity structure for immigrant community actors in the policy community? The chapter introduces Bourdieu’s concept of Habitus and how it can be applied to study social space as a force for homogenization, effectively creating a field of action that is equivalent to the arena that a policy community acts on. It allows also scholars to avoid essentialization while recognizing the shared experiences of immigrant populations, as well as capturing the dynamics of community mobilization. This theoretical concept is then synthesized through Grid/Group Cultural Theory, a theoretical framework for categorizing different types of public management models presented here.
Chapter Five continues examination of the significance of public management solutions. It asks the question: How has historical public management solutions in Sweden and Canada facilitated or constrained immigrant agency in the labour market integration policy community? The chapter presents an overview of the national institutional backgrounds under scrutiny with an account of the history of the labour market policy field in the two countries. It starts with the Keynesian consensus of the post-war era, through the reforms related to the introduction of New Public Management during the 1990s, up to the present time. Grid/Group Cultural Theory is operationalized to provide an analysis of the changing dynamics of the policy communities, in terms of the effects on actors involved in decision-making and service delivery, with special attention paid to the opportunity structures for immigrant community actors.

The chapter concludes that the barriers that immigrant community actors in Sweden have experienced can largely be explained by examining the predominant public management models in that policy field. It finds that the top-down management styles of the Hierarchist Way and the Fatalist Way have been important forces here, creating mistrust and distance between government actors and immigrant community actors. Canada also has seen governments implementing methods from the Hierarchist and Fatalist Ways, and, like Sweden, saw the introduction of methods from Individualist Way during the 1990s. A significant difference between the two countries, however, is that Canadian governments also used methods from the Egalitarian Way, which became a key in opening up opportunity structures for these actors. This concludes the theoretical part of the dissertation.

After that follows the empirical part of the thesis. These chapters present the testimonials of the interviewees. They explore manifestations and aspects of cultural, social and economic capital as they are shaped by the chosen public management models on the policy communities.
in the two respective countries, respectively. The material shows how important values associated with the Egalitarian Way have been for shaping the perspectives and organizational culture of the Canadian public agencies, while values from the Hierarchist Way and the Fatalist Way have similarly informed perspectives prevalent among Swedish civil servants.

Chapter Six asks the question: *What cultural capital in the form of skills and competency can immigrant actors leverage to influence policy or deliver labour market integration services to their constituencies?* The chapter focuses on how cultural capital manifests through the skill set of immigrant community actors and describes which skills are important for successful service delivery and which skills the immigrant community actors actually have. The chapter concludes that in Sweden, they lack managerial skills, and find proposal writing challenging. However, they have strong ties to the community. The Canadian actors have stronger formal managerial skills than the Swedish ones, but many hold that they would still like to improve. They can also access consultants that can write proposals for them. Like the Swedish actors they have strong ties to the community. These findings are consistent with material from previous scholarship, reaffirming that immigrant community actors are well equipped for delivering services to their constituencies due to their connection, through internalization of the social space, the Habitus, of these communities in their formation.

Chapter Seven asks: *What cultural capital, in the form of skills or competency, has public agencies in Sweden and Canada accumulated?* Shifting focus to public agency skills, it provides a mirror to Chapter Six in the sense that it explores how cultural capital manifested within the public administration and how these competencies affects the structure of the policy community. Public agencies in the two countries play different roles in their respective policy communities. Unlike their counterparts in Canada, public agencies in Sweden engage extensively in service
delivery and case management while also contracting some services which compels special scrutiny of how they manage relations with user and immigrant communities, including, for example, needs assessment and the capacity to do outreach. Here, respondents commented on how the sector is ethnically homogenous where it matters (i.e. higher levels). Also, civil servants lack the capacity to understand user needs and provide users with comfort, even as those users have little influence on the delivered services. Nor are their managerial skill as good as is often assumed. The values expressed are consistent with the top-down management models of the Hierarchist and Fatalist Ways. In Canada, civil servants have a less interventionist role, and generally better insight into the complexity of ethnic communities, corroborating the significance of the Egalitarian Way here. Even so, methods from the Hierarchist Way are present here, too, as programs are designed to serve public agency needs over user needs, and there are still times when the partnership with immigrant community actors is overruled for political reasons. The findings are consistent with the material in Chapters Three and Four, illustrating the significance of the public management model for the values developed within the government social space, or Habitus, with the implications this have for relations in the field.

Chapter Eight continues probing the effects of cultural capital in the policy community. It asks: *How are immigrant community actors recognized by public agencies and how do they gain recognition within the public agency social sphere?* It explores how cultural capital, manifested as symbolic capital, matters in terms of how immigrant community actors gain status within the public agency social sphere. The interview material shows that Swedish civil servants, conditioned by the chosen public management models, particularly the Hierarchist and Fatalist Ways, often view immigrant community actors as mostly suspect, incompetent, and dangerous opportunists who seek to undermine the policy process from the common good because of their
own narrow self-interest; this they view as potentially negative for immigrant integration. Meanwhile, the civil servants frame themselves as guardians of the common good and fairness, consistent with the values of the Hierarchist Way. In Canada, in marked contrast, immigrant community actors are seen as the experts, the actors who know their own communities the best, and having these services delivered by the public agencies is seen as impossible. These attitudes are consistent with the adoption of values from the Egalitarian Way into the public agency organizational culture.

Chapter Nine asks: How are social networks structured in the policy community? It turns the attention to the distribution of the social capital of the field, including the structure of the networks formed between organizations on the arena. Governments condition the structure of these by the organizational models they employ for public management, and at the same time, such networks are important for immigrant community actors to leverage for agency. It finds that, in Sweden, the most important networks are the public agencies. Anyone who wants to be in the arena needs to be an insider of those networks. Immigrant community actors, however, tend to be outsiders, and tend to be isolated from each other. These findings are again an indication of the historical importance of the Hierarchical Way in this country. In Canada, the major immigrant community actors often have strong networks with each other, and good relations to the public agencies. That means that they even get asked to accept funding for program delivery. It also means that newcomers might potentially have a hard time getting in. These findings are indicative of the strong influence of the Egalitarian Way on the organizational structure of the policy community in Canada. Finally, the Chapter also notes the special significance of the United Way, an umbrella organization for charities and NGOs that provides key capacity building, networking and funding to member organizations (United Way Centraide
Canada). This organization, respondents emphasize, has been a key resource for immigrant community actors.

After exploring cultural and social forms of capital, the dissertation shifts attention to economic capital. Chapter Ten asks: *What is required for an immigrant community actor to successfully apply for government funding in Canada and Sweden?* It charts the opportunity structure for immigrant community actors seeking funding for the delivery of social services for their constituents and the barriers such an actor needs to navigate to successfully apply. Economic capital is highly significant for immigrant agency, and access to government funding is highly conditioned by the management models adopted by governments, as shown in the theoretical Chapter Five. Chapter Ten concludes that the funding levels are much lower in Sweden, and that it is much more difficult to get approval, again corroborating the influence of top-down management methods, like those of the Hierarchist Way. Responses also indicate the presence of onerous accountability regimes, an indicator of the Fatalist Way. Interestingly, that is also present in the material from the Canadian respondents, who spoke at length about the very high demands of documentation when submitting an application. The material thus shows that the Fatalist Way has been significant in Canada, too, in this specific context.

Chapter Eleven, finally, concludes the exploration of the empirical material by asking: *What conditions do immigrant community actors who strive to remain relevant for policy making and service delivery in the policy community operate under?* It closes the probe of economic capital available to immigrant community actors by investigating the conditions they face if they do manage to get a funding proposal accepted. The empirical material shows that the performance measurements and procurement systems, methods informed by the Individualist Way introduced during the 1990s, do not take the competence of immigrant community actors into account in
Sweden. In Canada, which also introduced such Individualist tools at roughly the same time, these actors did have some influence in this regard. That indicates that the historical presence of immigrant community actors on the Canadian field has shaped the implementation of the Individualist methods there. The finding constitutes a significant difference between Canada and Sweden.

The dissertation then ends with the concluding Chapter Twelve. This chapter brings together the main themes that emerged from the empirical material and provides a summarizing analysis operationalizing the theoretical framework presented in this work, as well as areas for future research.
Chapter 2: What is immigrant agency? Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of practice

Introduction

That immigrant organizations matter, or more precisely that the community’s organizational infrastructure matter for social integration in some way has been known in the scholarship since Park discussed the significance of community mobilization in 1920 (Park, 1967). Time and time again, scholars have presented studies of the mobilization of community based organizations in immigrant communities, a key part of the infrastructure of the institutional completeness in an ethnic community (Breton, 1964). Research includes case studies of the mobilization of minorities in general or specific ethnic communities in a city (Good, 2005; Chekki, 2006; Freedman, 1960; Sassen-Koob, 1979), studies of such actors in a limited number of cities in one or more countries (Bloemraad, 2005; Caponio, 2005; Maeyama, 1979; Schmitter, 1980; Vermeulen, 2005) or studies of the effects of immigrant involvement in associations (Agrawal & Qadeer, 2008). Finally, there have also been attempts to develop typologies for the classification of immigrant organizations (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005; Jenkins, 1981; Moya, 2005).

Evidence supports the efficacy of these actors. As early as the 1980s, Jenkins found that they “have a very impressive performance record. In numerous cases examined, they represent the only access link for the delivery of entitlements to immigrant groups” (Jenkins, 1988, pp. 280-281). She attributed this link precisely to the connection to the ethnic community and the bridge-building capacity, which are both important for integration in society. More recently, Guo and Xu (Guo, 2005; Guo, 2006; Xu, 2006) found that organizations in Vancouver have had a significant role in a similar sense. Fennema reaches analogous conclusions about their
significance for the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream politics in Amsterdam (Fennema & Tillie, 1999), as does Landolt’s study of organizations in Toronto (Landolt, Goldring, & Bernhard, 2009). Likewise, Couton refers to studies showing that ethnic groups benefit from better educational and economic outcomes and that communal organizational “can overcome isolation, provide material support, and defend the interests and culture of the community” (Couton, 2011, p. 3).

However, as Chekki notes, the field has suffered from “a dearth of theoretical models related to the literature on immigrant ethnic organizations” (Chekki, 2006, p. 3), particularly concerning the nature of these organizations in comparison to actors that do not represent such communities. For instance, while many scholars note that their attachment to the community and the community’s capacity to interact with the rest of society is significant for integration on a structural level, there are few that have ventured to explain why that is. What is needed is a comprehensive theory that can provide such explanations.

This chapter draws on the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to begin to provide a comprehensive theory for why immigrant community actors fulfill these functions and in so doing, engage with the question: How can immigrant agency and capacity building to influence policy or deliver labour market services to their constituencies be conceptualized? His theory of practice captures how social and cultural interactions produce structures in society and also agency. The main components of this framework are the concepts of Habitus (see Chapter Four) and Capital, which facilitates the understanding of agency. This present chapter demonstrates the utility of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of Capital for studies of immigrant community organizations by examining how the findings in a number of case studies on immigrant community organizing can be revisited and understood using it as an analytical tool. Specifically,
I argue that applying Bourdieu’s theory can illuminate how a) immigrant community organizations are tied, through Capital, to said communities and act as its primary agents; and b) which factors facilitate or obstruct the mobilization of these organizations, with particular attention paid to the role of government bodies for this.

The chapter is theoretical and starts with an examination of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of Capital. This is followed by an examination of how observations from the scholarship can be re-visited using Bourdieu’s conceptualization of Capital to further the understanding of the relevant social processes. The chapter concludes with an observation on the significance of the role of government and how social services are organized for immigrant agency.

**Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice**

The French post-structuralist Pierre Bourdieu was frustrated by the debate between structure and agency. Structural theory managed to capture structures that confined actors caught within them, but gave little space for agency, creating a theory with an embedded sense of pre-determination for individuals which could not account for change. Theories addressing agency did the exact opposite and focused completely on change processes without the capacity for capturing social barriers to action. Bourdieu’s objective was to formulate a theory that could describe how social space could be structured, ordered and patterned (Maton, 2008) but flexible enough to allow for social change. His framing of Capital is informed by this objective and goes beyond a materialist analysis inherent in traditional Marxism to capture how social context and agency influence each other. The following examines this framing.

**Capital - creating leverage for agency**

For Bourdieu, Capital determines the structure of social space (Bourdieu, 1984) and enables actors to act within a given social field. The capacity to generate or accumulate capital is
therefore necessary for agency to be possible. For Bourdieu, capital is not limited to the
economy, but also includes social (connections and networks) (Calhoun, 1993) and cultural
(status, educational qualifications, symbolic) forms (Calhoun, 1993); which capture “the capacity
to exercise control over one’s own future and that of others” (Postone et al., 1993, p. 4) in a more
multi-faceted way. The following describes the significance of capital and the absence of it and
presents a systematic account of the three forms of capital and how these have been viewed as
significant for community based organizations in the scholarship.

The importance of capital should not be underestimated. The formation of community
based agencies and their capacity to implement social action depends on their capacity to
generate social, cultural, and economic capital. Such resources also facilitate individual and
collective capacity to orient and act within a particular field, as well as for gaining legitimacy in
the eyes of other actors in the same field.

In contrast, actors without capital lack agency and are unable to influence the
surroundings, which Greener captures well:

We have a trapped actor, willing to engage with their surroundings, but unable to because
of structural constraints…. [Such actors] lack the right type of capital – or, indeed, any
capital at all – to make any impact upon the field. The field is working against the
individual to constrain them…. As such, actors may be trapped not because of their
education or skills, but simply because they do not have access to the resources they
require (Greener, 2002).

Such actors might even be unaware of the extent to which their agency can be constrained
by their lack of capital if the situation have become so entrenched that is has become normalized.
It is then reflexively accepted and taken for granted by the trapped individual (Greener, 2002).
Lukes divided power into three different forms of manifestation, or faces. The first was decision-
making power, the second was agenda setting power, and the third was ideological power, or the power to shape someone else’s interests and thoughts (Lukes, 2005). Greener underlined how the trapped actor’s lack of awareness is connected to that third face of power, where the individual has internalized the interests of another group with the effect of disabling the individual’s capacity to act or develop the awareness of the constraints on opportunities necessary to try to change the situation (Greener, 2002).

**Social Capital**

Social capital consists of networks between individuals and is very significant for Bourdieu’s framework. Putnam showed how this type of capital is essential for a vibrant civil society and the generation of trust between individuals in a community (Putnam, 1993). Putnam also differentiates between bonding social capital, which contributes to a community’s cohesiveness and sense of inner solidarity but might actually increase segregation in society in general, and bridging social capital, which decreases segregation and increases the integration of different communities (Putnam, 2007).

**Cultural Capital**

Cultural capital can be defined as symbolic objects like educational qualifications, but also other markers of status, like figures of speech or body language. In other words, it tends to manifest as expressions of the social space in which it is produced. More precisely, it can manifest in an embodied form as “principles of consciousness in predispositions and propensities and in physical features such as body language, stances, intonation and lifestyle choices” (Moore, 2008, p. 105). Such dispositions can be unconscious in nature, akin to adopted social reflexes or perspectives. Cultural capital can also manifest as particular forms of professional expertise, in-depth understanding of the ‘rules of the game’, and the capacity to discriminate between
canonical and non-canonical information (Moore, 2008). These types of expressions are
corporeal in the sense that they cannot be separated from the individual, who becomes a vector
for their manifestation.

The accumulation of cultural capital is deeply intertwined with the processes of socialization
the individual has gone through as a function of being a member of a particular social stratum.
Thus, being immersed in a particular social space for an extended period of time also means
internalizing it and manifesting key elements of it through attributes like specialized jargon or
expertise, poise, or even choice of clothing. This reflects that the process of accumulation can
only occur over time (Moore, 2008). As an embodiment of social space, this type of capital can
be unconscious in nature, akin to adopted social reflexes.

Like economic capital, cultural capital can be acquired through heritage. Parents can transfer
capital to children by choosing more prestigious schools, enrolling children in extra-curricular
activities like arts or sports, and so on. The capacity to do this is related to the economic
resources of the parents, demonstrating how the two forms of capital can be reciprocally
influencing (Calhoun, 1993). Some examples of such exchanges include having gone through
“the traditional English public school..., the priesthood or the military or...craft apprenticeship
or...the apprenticeship of the artist or, elsewhere, in the cultivation of elite sporting skills or the
vocations of the liberal professions” (Moore, 2008, p. 111). Economic capital provides access to
prestigious schools, and the alumni of those schools will possess more cultural capital than those
who are not. That cultural capital can take more than one shape. The diplomas constitute an
objectified form of capital, while the manner of speaking that alumni have acquired through
socialization constitutes an embodied form of it, for instance manifested as Oxford English.
Finally, attendance becomes a marker of membership in a certain social elite, inaccessible to
those who did not attend notwithstanding their potential access to material wealth. They are simply not ‘Oxford-grads’, as it were. This membership also changes how they perceive the world around them, a perspective which they share only with other alumni. As this example illustrates, this cultural capital can be used for boundary work, defining who is a member of a group and who is an outsider (Lamont, 1992; Lamont & Thévenot, 2000).

The transposability of cultural capital between different social spaces is sometimes limited. In other words, an attribute that is considered a mark of high status in one context may, in another, be considered a mark of low status. An example could be the display of certain types of jewellery. In some social settings, jewellery known as bling would be considered a symbol of power and recognition, but the same piece of jewellery would in other settings be considered vulgar and gauche. In that sense, cultural capital is highly significant for legitimacy in a particular social space. Manifesting the acceptable type of cultural capital facilitates recognition. Indeed, it could be argued that cultural capital, as a status symbol, acts as a form of legitimacy in its own right.

It can also be argued that the forms cultural capital takes are intertwined with power. That is, the holders of prestigious symbolic capital produce and reproduce manifestations of such capital within a given field. Consequently, symbolic capital can be unequally distributed within the population of any given community. Such inequalities can reflect different capacities to acquire capital between individuals (Moore, 2008). The generation of cultural capital at an individual level is also intrinsically linked with its generation on a collective level, and, in turn, to the production and reproduction of such capital in a community.
Summary

To summarize, Bourdieu frames capital as consisting of three dimensions, economic, social and cultural, to capture social agency. Actors can change the social structures in which they are immersed. The scope of that action will depend greatly on the type resources that are accessible to them.

The theory of practice and immigrant agency

The following shows how Bourdieu’s insights can provide new avenues into understanding by revisiting findings in the scholarship and reinterpreting them using his framing of Capital.

Agency and immigrant community formation

Immigrants, in the strictest sense of the word, typically have in common that they were not born in the host society in which they reside. This means that the native born population to some extent share different experiences, and thus dispositions and perspectives, than immigrants by virtue of having been born and raised in a different social context. For example, growing up in a particular national setting means having been exposed to a specific array of cultural narratives, like fairy tales, children shows and books, formative events in sports, politics, institutions, like school, as well as language and other common cultural reference points, much or most of which an immigrant arriving at adult age would not have had the same childhood experience of. It could therefore be argued that the native born population have grown up in a social environment that the immigrant, at the point of entry, cannot be assumed to have been exposed to. This experiential difference will be more pronounced the older the migrant was at the moment of immigration.

Likewise, immigrants cannot be assumed to be blank slates, ready to be ‘born again’ upon arrival, but will rather carry with them at least a memory of language, culture, values and life-
styles from the country of origin (Jenkins, 1988). These experiences will, in turn, affect the dispositions and attitudes that the immigrant has internalized before the process of migration started. It could also be argued that the process of migration itself constitutes an experience unique to those who have gone through it, which again separates the immigrant both from the native born population of the new host society, but also, increasingly, from the population of the country of origin. In that sense, the migratory process constitutes a common experiential denominator for immigrants.

As they settle, immigrants typically form communities informed by this shared history and experience. The commonalities within these communities consist of several different components. On the one hand, there is the social positioning in relation to the rest of the host society, socio-economically, culturally and otherwise. On the other, there is the retention of cultural heritage the community has transposed from the country of origin to the host country, which can manifest as embodied forms of cultural capital, like jargon, ways of dressing and so on. Third, there is the schema and practices that the community uniquely develops in response to local conditions.

The differences in experience and socialization manifest as a series of markers that differentiate the immigrating population from the native born. Common manifestations include significant ethnic attributes, like language, kinship patterns, culture, collective memories and consciousness (Jenkins, 1988; A. Smith, 1999). Note that it is important to avoid the assumption that ethnic groups are internally homogenous and clearly externally bounded, which is often taken for granted (Brubaker, 2004). The community is separate from the host society, though the degree to which it will be distinct will vary from community to community. As such, it will develop its own forms of cultural capital.
Likewise, the social sphere of government can also be said to be distinct from the rest of society. The Weberian definition of the state as the administrative unit with the monopoly of force within a given territory offers useful guidance for this conceptualization. It implies that the government consists of a formalized organization. However, it can also be disaggregated and treated as several distinct organizations, where each individual agency or department represents a subunit. Likewise, government can be divided into national and sub-national units that are formally distinct from each other. Even taking that level of nuance into account, however, there is a set of commonalities that unites the sphere as separate and distinct from other parts of society. All of these units are vested with public authority, and the people who work within them share the identity of being civil servants. Thus, a distinct organizational culture develops, and with that, cultural capital in the form of modes of behaviour, standard operating procedures, shared meanings and values and distinctive dress codes and jargon. The relationship between government and immigrant communities is illustrated in Figure 2 (see below).

Figure 2: How the government and Immigrant communities relate to each other.
Over time, the immigrant communities also tend to build an awareness of common social needs in the new environment (Chekki, 2006; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005; Jenkins, 1988; Mikkelsen, 2003; Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005). Such awareness is needed to properly identify barriers to integration, for instance lack of access to mainstream social services (Bergin, 1988; Henry, Tator, & Rees, 2005; Leung, 2000; Reitz, 1995). Even when an immigrant community has access to social services, there can still be a sense within the community that the service is not provided in a way that is adequately consistent with and sensitive to the cultural needs of the group (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005) or that non-community actors fail to respond appropriately to the needs of the community (Henry et al., 2005). Members of the community can also feel the need to be able to provide for their own, as related by interviewees in studies by Bloemraad and Soysal which express a preference for the community to deal with its own problems in countries of Europe and North America (Bloemraad, 2005). Moreover, external pressures from the host society can compel immigrant communities to mobilize, sometimes in order to defend their rights. For instance, Martiniello notes how the increasing securitization of Muslim identity since September 11, 2001, has also led Muslim immigrants to increasingly mobilize on religious grounds (Martiniello, 2005).

The response to these internal and external pressures compels communities to mobilize “‘their own’ organisations” (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, p. 894). Such actors can voice the identified community needs in public space (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005), effectively providing community leaders with a base for claims-making (Hein, 1997). Indeed, the organizations have, as Moya puts it, “…mushroomed in situations where neither traditional institutions, such as kinship groups and the parish church, nor newer ones, such as the welfare state, insurance companies and corporations, could satisfy social needs like health-care, leisure and
companionship” (Moya, 2005, p. 840). They are, essentially, a collective response to local needs (Rex, 1987), created to address “service gaps in their communities” (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, p. 908) and fill those gaps by delivering those services for the local constituents (Soysal, 1994). The self-understanding of community organizations thus “reflects strong reliance on ‘community care’ without public involvement…” (Soysal, 1994, p. 103). Figure 3 illustrates how these push and pull factors from inside and outside forces interact to produce the immigrant community organizations (see Figure 3, below).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3:** Outside and inside pressures compelling the creation of immigrant community actors

Such organizations are thus an intrinsic part of the community formation in the sense that they constitute a response by the members to the social constraints of the host society. As such, they constitute an expression of community agency. They retain certain particular traits, unique to these social entities. For example, the expressed needs are deeply intertwined with the conditions, experiences, dispositions and schemas of the community. Since these are immigrant
communities, ethnicity often becomes a salient marker of identity, explicitly invoked for the purpose of collective mobilization (Iglehart & Becarra, 1996).

Indeed, identifying such organizations as ethno-cultural has become a common practice. Both Jenkins and Iglehart use ethnicity as a fundamental criterion for their typologies of organizations (Iglehart & Becarra, 1996; Jenkins, 1981; Jenkins, 1988). Jenkins distinguishes between an ‘ethnic association’, an organization with a wide general purpose, including “social, recreational, political, cultural, professional, business, service or a combination of some or all of the above” (Jenkins, 1981, p. 10) and an ‘ethnic agency’. The latter actor is explicitly focused on social service delivery to its constituency (Jenkins, 1981). It has professional staff, operates under a board of directors, often with both public and voluntary funding. The ethno-cultural perspective forms a part of the needs assessment of the social issues to be addressed, capturing how negotiation and mediation forms a part of the community organization that has to navigate social space on the collective level, within the immigrant community and between it and government.

While ethnicity without doubt is highly significant, it is arguably not sufficient for capturing a Bourdieuan conceptualization of immigrant community mobilization, for several reasons. First, it gives rise to the perception that only the ‘ethnic organization’ has an ethnic identity, whereas other organizations do not, mistakenly suggesting that “mainstream” society and social organizations is somehow non-ethnic and does not reflect the culture of the dominant group(s). The practice highlights the reflexive tendency to consider the dominant ethnicity normative for society or taken for granted in public space. This is misleading, since this part of society is also infused with the cultural values of the dominant ethnic group(s).

Second, a country can have ethnic minorities that have little or no recent migratory experience as part of their collective memory, which separates them from immigrant communities, even
though they may share common attributes in other respects. For example, while immigrants and ethnic minorities might both experience barriers related to discrimination, the latter are not likely to experience barriers that are specifically related to the settlement process. Moya captures this when he uses the term immigrant organizations instead in an attempt to nuance the terminology (Moya, 2005).

Third, ethnicity implies that the organization’s constituency is both separated from mainstream society and united as a group primarily by virtue of ethnicity. While this might be at least partially true, there are conditions that could be common for immigrants beyond ethnicity, like socio-economic conditions, or processes of discrimination that actively exclude immigrant minorities from host society immigrants. Immigrants could thus mobilize on the basis of grounds other than ethnicity for mutual assistance, for instance professional or religious identities. Moreover, limiting a typology to ethno-cultural expressions of mobilization renders these manifestations of agency invisible.

Even so, mobilization does not necessarily have to occur along strictly ethnic lines. Markers transcending ethnicity, like religion or race, could also be salient, depending on political context (Caponio, 2005; Martiniello, 2005). Another conceivable marker of identity is profession, given its significance for social issues like unemployment. For instance, the mission statement of Society for Internationally Trained Engineers of British Columbia states that the organization exists to promote the interests of these engineers so that they can contribute to the Canadian economy (Society of Internationally Trained Engineers of British Columbia). Thus, the membership will likely consist mostly of immigrants who have that profession in common. However, the studied scholarship has not discussed mobilization in such terms and it is unclear how significant this type of organization is to integration. It is impossible to say whether this is
because the identity is rarely invoked for the purposes of mobilization, thus making it less conspicuous in public space, or because this type of actor has attracted less attention from scholars.

The scholarship often describes the organization that forms as a result of this community mobilization as one that carries an affective tie to the community, based on the nature of the common interest which makes the organization a “special type of self-help group” (Jenkins, 1988). In Bourdieuan terms, it could be argued this tie consists of an accumulation of community cultural capital. The scholarship has defined a range of criteria for identifying community based organizations that corroborate this reading of the social process. First, that such organizations have mutual benefit for members of the group as a goal seems generally accepted as significant (Mikkelsen, 2003). Moreover, explicitly invoking community identity is also important. For mobilization based on ethnicity, this can involve “a consciousness of ethnic identity and a policy on mixing or matching by ethnic group in all areas of operations” (Jenkins, 1988, p. 10). The organization’s mission and the characteristics of the client base (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005) are also important markers. The mandate focuses the agency on serving clients from the same community group. Jenkins’ study of organizations in New York, NY, provided an example of this, showing that three quarters of the included agencies “served over 95 per cent ethnic clients” (Jenkins, 1981, p. 45).

Second, the commitment is reflected in the demographic composition of the actor’s clients and staff. Jenkins found that in 57 per cent of the 54 agencies visited in New York, NY, the director was from the primary ethnic group served. Likewise, the study found that in a full two-thirds of the agencies, 95 per cent of the staff shared the same ethnicity as the primary group served and in a third of them, all employees were of the primary ethnic group (Jenkins, 1981).
This type of pattern was replicated in later work, which observed this demographic quality in the board of directors of organizations (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005), through the senior executive ranks (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005), down to full-time and part-time administrative and operational staff (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005; Iglehart & Becarra, 1996; Mikkelsen, 2003). It is thus not surprising that Cordero-Guzmán observes how community based organizations often have a significant proportion of staff who can speak several languages (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005), a competence which also facilitates an understanding of community issues. Finally, the offices of these actors tend to be in neighbourhoods where large numbers of community members have settled (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005).

Third, the commitment also translates into specific competencies. For instance, its linguistic mastery provides it with the capacity for outreach into the community (Jenkins, 1988). It can act as an important information broker, providing access to services that community members would otherwise find difficult to access, which is critical for reaching persons who are in need of assistance (Jenkins, 1988) but lack the social capital needed to overcome barriers related to a segregation of social space.

Likewise, the community based organizations have also been observed to be ethno-culturally sensitive in their service-delivery (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). That helps the client experience “a sense of ‘we-ness’ or ‘one-ness’ that fosters trust and rapport” (Iglehart & Becarra, 1996, p. 3), which contributes to the clients’ psychological well-being. This capacity can also create something of a safe haven for community members when they encounter discrimination in society, and particularly so if prejudice is entrenched in mainstream social service delivery (Jenkins, 1981). Moreover, it will facilitate an understanding of community perspectives and what can become issues. The observations speak directly to a Bourdieuan framing of the social
process at work. When the organization adopts and manifests the embodied forms cultural capital considered valid community members, it achieves the capacity to create social spaces with such feelings of ‘we-ness’, trust and rapport between the organization and its users.

Fourth, the programming reflects the commitment and the competence. Many of the actors deliver a number of significant services (Gold, 1992; Jenkins, 1988). Jenkins mentions the inclusion of ethno-cultural awareness through food, art, music, holidays, and history (Jenkins, 1981). Such activities can be particularly visible if the agency has a strong focus on a comparatively homogenous group of clients. Jenkins also observes the prevalence of bilingual programs, a significant marker of culture, which 65 per cent of the studied agencies had (Jenkins, 1981).

Moreover, many immigrant community organizations engage in activities related to settlement and integration in the host society at all stages of the process (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). These include legal advice and interpretation and translation of documentation to the language of the host country (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005).

Employment and training services, like job readiness programs, interview training, career orientation, and vocational training for specific occupations, can also be provided to prepare clients for introduction to the labour market (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). These services are often structured to accommodate the needs of the clients in ways that non-community actors do not, for instance with “more flexible hours, with evening and weekend services; drop-in services; locations in accessible, informal settings, such as community centres; home visits; community outreach; advertising of services in the multicultural media; and group counselling” (Henry et al., 2005, p. 181).
Fifth, just as for many other interest-groups, the community based organization can articulate the needs of the community and mobilize for collective action (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). As a part of such activities, it transfers skills significant for such activities to members of the community (Bloemraad, 2005) and leverages resources (see discussion below on capital) within the community that individual members, particularly newcomers, might not have access to. In this capacity, it can represent the community in policy-making, management and implementation. Being able to influence the decision-making process so that funding conditions for social service delivery is harmonized with those community needs is often facilitated by access to such arenas (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005).

All of these factors (summarized in Table 2) are significant and speak directly to the many channels through which the organization connects to the community into organizational practices and ideology. These connections shape the organizational culture, which in turn affects how the staff is socialized into it and internalize the perspectives, values and attitudes of the organization in such a way as to come to view themselves as advocates of the community and its members. Thus, even if some of the employees do not, initially, share these with the organization, they will, over time, internalize it as a result of being exposed to the same conditions and social position.

| Table 2: Manifestations of community attachment in a community based organization. |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Demography                      | Competence                      |
| • Staff                         | • Language skills               |
| • Board of directors            | • Cultural skills               |
| • Members                       | Location                        |
| • Users                         | • Community offices             |
| Programming                     | • Heritage                      |
|                                 | • Language                      |
|                                 | • Settlement/Integration        |
More significantly, this internalization means that the actor has integrated a familiarity with the dispositions and experiences of that social space, which gives it the capacity to navigate its own social sphere and also to understand and act in accordance with those perspectives on an organizational level. Indeed, Iglehart and Becarra observed that “. . . agencies generally embody the community’s response to a service need or service gap” (Iglehart & Becarra, 1996, p. 3), which directly echoes the thoughts of Bourdieu, and illustrates how the organization manages to use its familiarity with the users’ social space to facilitate social service delivery. That competence thus can become a vehicle for agency. When that happens, the organizations can potentially become claims-making actors in public space.

This process can also facilitate the understanding of why these actors need to be concerned with maintaining support from the community. On the one hand, the deep connection with the community fosters a self-identification within the organization as a community representative. The role of acting as a liaison between the community and public government bodies follows as a logical next step. On the other hand, it reveals how the organization experiences itself as having a responsibility to the community, and in some sense considers itself accountable to the community. The organization thus significantly depends on the community for legitimacy.

However, community based organizations should not be viewed as static entities which, once organized, will remain isolated from the impulses of the social context it operates in. It cannot be assumed that the community is a priori synonymous with the organization. Indeed, it can be argued that the process of mobilization of an organization effectively creates a new social space within the organization, with its members adopting distinct practices, ideology, culture, perspectives and dispositions. To some extent, this space is separate from that of the community and even if spaces of the two initially might overlap considerably, they can become increasingly
detached from the community over the lifetime of the organization. Thus, “determining exactly what the relationship is and should be between the organisations and the grassroots community” (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, p. 906-907) is very complex.

There are many ways the actor’s relationship to its users, its community or outside actors can change over time and a range of factors that can influence these relationships. First, even if the agency has an explicit mandate to serve a particular community, the client base is not likely to be homogenous. Some clients spontaneously seeking its services are likely to come from other groups, which can sometimes include persons from groups that are seen as culturally similar. The organization needs to be able to manage that in some capacity. Second, the nature of the community itself can change over time. For example, a community in the diaspora can become entrenched in the new host society and become considered an ethnic minority rather than an immigrant community, in which case the agencies and organizations associated with it might drift in terms of mandate, client base, or services provided, including possibly transferring their services from the original ethnic group, now a minority, to new waves of immigrants of different ethnic heritage (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005).

One example of such a dynamic are the Korean organizations in Boston, MA, studied by Chung, which began as largely ethnic organizations, managed by earlier migratory generations, but became both key service providers for the general Korean population and political brokers between that community and the mainstream society (Chung, 2005). These kinds of dynamics can affect the agency’s relation to the community. Jenkins’s New York study noted how such drift resulted in lower community support for agencies in Asian communities, “which represented an earlier migration” (Jenkins, 1981, pp. 45-46).
Likewise, there can be an attitudinal difference between the general community and the power groups within the community in terms of supports for the organization. Indeed, some studies find that the leadership of community organizations was recruited from well-educated professionals found among the local “ethnic elites” (Björklund, 1986, pp. 298-299). In some cases, they might not adequately represent local grass-roots. For instance, in Italian cities, Caponio observed that “many new associations were formed by unrepresentative leaders” (Caponio, 2005, p. 943). In other words, the organizations could come to constitute an elite within the community which might become more or less segregated from its unorganized grassroots. This might be a cause for confusion for outsiders who try to identify representative actors for the community, and an “atmosphere of intraethnic competition” (Jenkins, 1988, pp. 280-281) can be particularly troublesome in this regard. A challenge for the scholar is therefore how to identify which actors can be said to be ‘legitimate’ representatives of the community.

A third way in which the relationship between the organization and community can be impacted relates to organizational growth. This can lead an organization to expand its activities beyond the immediate community. Cordero-Guzmán developed a typology of community organizations that can be used to discuss this process in terms of a type of growth cycle of organizations. He divides them into three types of entities. The first are Hometown Associations, HTAs, which are immigrant groups, associations and clubs:

…concerned with promoting social and economic ties, connections and activities between immigrants from particular countries or regions…[with]… close economic, social and political contact to their areas of origin, are mostly organized around community events, and have a relatively small social-service base (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, pp. 893-894).
These bodies tend to be small, with tight leadership structures. Such organizations primarily draw upon volunteer activism to provide members with cultural, maybe mostly bonding, functions and operate under highly constrained budgets that limit the capacity to deliver social services. These organizations evolve to become the nucleus of the organizational infrastructure from where other, more formalized, organizations can spring.

The second are the immigrant organizations, which are formally constituted as non-profit organizations:

They have a service portfolio, a direct social-service base with clients, paid professional staff, offices open to the public with regular service hours, and some sources of funding. These organisations are usually involved in a broad range of social services to immigrants from a particular country (or region) and are central to the social-service delivery system for particular ethnic groups and in many ethnic or immigrant neighbourhoods (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, pp. 893-894).

This roughly corresponds to Jenkins’s definition of an ‘ethnic agency’. He further describes this as “an organisation formed by individuals who are members of a particular ethnic or national-origin group, for the purpose of providing social services primarily to immigrants from the same ethnic or national group” (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, p. 894) The third type is the service provider that has a metropolitan level outreach. The scope of service delivery has expanded well beyond the immediate neighbourhood or even wider ethnic community to embrace a wide range of ethnic groups, including non-immigrant users, though frequently from ethnic or racial minority groups, across the whole city. These organizations are “older, larger, often with multicultural staff, and many have offices in several neighbourhoods” (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, pp. 893-894) and are “…more-established” (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, p. 901).
The typology implies that this is what ethnic agencies become when they grow beyond their original founding community. The potential growth cycle of immigrant community actors could thus be summarized as starting as a small HTA and ending with an organization with a metropolitan scope, developments that have also been observed by Jenkins (Jenkins, 1988). The commonality between the different actors is that they remain focused on addressing the typical needs of newcomers.

However, this also suggests that the nature of the relationship between the organization and the community will transform as more groups become stakeholders in the organization. This need not be negative for the organization or its users, but does mean that the new stakeholders’ forms of cultural and social Capital needs to be linked into the actor’s organizational culture and network. Doing so would require it to shift from a single, more narrowly defined, community to a broader, inter-ethnic, membership base that might still be differentiated from the native born population by virtue of common migratory experiences. If this transformation is not successfully negotiated, the bond with the community might “become so vague that the binding power flags and initiatives water down” (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005, p. 831), without having established sufficiently strong ties with the new, larger community. The previously institutionalized community connections within the organization can then become compromised by commitments and loyalties to actors and social spaces outside the community. The relationships with both the state and other non-community actors can result in different forms of dependency and cooptation. Dependency on the state can lead organizations to “…become so ‘grant-driven’ that they will veer toward a bureaucratic stance rather than retain their ‘linkage’ position” (Jenkins, 1988, pp. 278-279).
As well, the leaders could end up in a state of dependency to the state in the sense that their positions within the state administration are established and maintained by “…loudly proclaiming the backwardness and helplessness of their co-ethnics” (Björklund, 1986, p. 302), which in turn results in “the establishment of some specialized arm of the state to deal with the ‘problems’ of some ‘resource-poor’ group” (Björklund, 1986, p. 302), that could lead an increasingly professional cadre that are accepted by host state officials and crowd out community actors. These factors can explain why many organizations can be sceptical about receiving public funding for fear of cooptation (Cheetham, 1988).

In addition, governments can “enforce mergers between organisations by giving or withholding subsidies” (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005, p. 829), develop funding requirements that effectively turn officers of the organization into agents of the state (Ng, 1996) or incorporate “ethnic associations into existing systems of state-sponsored organizations” (Björklund, 1986, p. 302). All these situations could lead to a shift in how the organization is perceived within the community, where the close relationship with the state effectively blurs the roles of the community organization and the state, to the point where users consider them almost synonymous (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005).

Another common policy that can become disruptive to how the organization relates to the community is by being given state funding on the condition that the organization does not discriminate on the basis of national origin (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). Even if this is informed by the good intention of eliminating ethnic discrimination in publicly funded services, it might still conflict with its community mandate. Moreover, it might be an overly cautious principle. A community organization will often draw upon its community socialization as a competence, leveraging cultural and social capital for service delivery vis-à-vis a particular clientele. Even
though the organization itself might readily implement anti-discriminatory policies as a commitment to human rights, members from other groups might not be very interested in seeking the services of the organization because of its lacking competence in serving users from outside the community. Government intervention into organizational practices could do more harm than good if in the name of addressing an existing problem – ethnic discrimination – it unintentionally disrupts the agency’s relationship with a community.

Dependency on non-community actors can result in a “strongly asymmetrical relationship that does not help immigrants’ associations to become autonomous, but rather tends to lock them in a paternalistic outlook” (Caponio, 2005, pp. 936-937). Some power holding non-community organizations even engage actively in forms of collaboration that effectively constitute “a strategy of cooptation and control of immigrants’ associations” (Caponio, 2005, p 948).

All these cases results in distancing the organization from its community, and as a consequence, its cultural capital in the form of legitimacy decreases. The framing facilitates the understanding of why non-community actors imposing organizations on the community without local legitimacy will likely have limited results. Caponio’s study shows how Pakistani and Mahgrebi groups in Italy ultimately rejected a series of associations precisely because they had been coerced by non-community actors into forming them “…rather than the expression of genuine ethnic identities” (Caponio, 2005, p. 943). This push-pull effect on organizations acting between the immigrant community and the government is illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4: The forces that immigrant community organizations have to navigate to maintain the connection to the community.

Non-community organizations are more likely to have a limited capacity to navigate the social space of immigrant communities successfully. This is particularly likely in societies characterized by a great deal of social segregation, because of the increased social distance involved, and the frequent lack of understanding between different communities in such societies. In such social contexts, non-community actors will be more likely to be deeply infused with the cultural and social capital of the dominant ethnicity.

The non-community organization thus often lacks the capacity to address ethnic, linguistic or cultural barriers to service delivery. It is therefore more likely to lack the competence for how to do outreach within the community, which results in their services being “inaccessible to multicultural and multiracial communities” (Henry et al., 2005, p. 192). Even if community members can access the services, the non-community organization will likely find it more
difficult to attract users by building trust and confidence with them. Thus, clients might attend for public services, but attendance might not be related to a sense of comfort or confidence in the service provider’s capacity for giving the support needed to solve the social issues that confront them. These issues are particularly problematic in public agencies. They are vested with the powers of the state, ranging from the use of spending power to, ultimately, the monopoly of force to compel others to act according to the dictates of the government. Government agencies can use this power to set agendas, implement public policy, and otherwise intervene into immigrant communities.

Moreover, since public agencies operate under democratic accountability, they have to be primarily responsive to holders of public office, like ministers or municipal officials. Thus, they are often organized in a top-down manner. As shown in organizational theory, such organizational models tend to block the capacity for absorbing grass root impulses, which in this case entails building the capacity to identify local needs and links with the community (Hood, 2000). This is particularly true if there is a:

…lack of recognition on the part of planners and practitioners of the diversity of ethnic patterns and cultures of the client population… [Or]… persistence of stereotypes which have hampered the understanding of the ethnic communities, their problems and their special needs; and the threat to the survival of the group as a cultural entity, exacerbated by many aspects of the service system (Jenkins, 1981, p. 11).

All these factors, linked to an actor’s capacity to navigate the cognitive framework of a social space, affect its ability to deliver social service effectively. The immigrant community organization exists within the community but also between the community and its host society. Korazim describes their position well:
…such organizations can be described as special structures between formal public bureaucracies and primary social networks, which help to absorb each group of immigrants according to its special socio-cultural characteristics. An immigrant organization, with its strong ethnic dimensions, is thus simultaneously bureaucratized and non-bureaucratized, using different combinations of hired personnel and volunteers primarily of its own ethnic origin (Korazim, 1988, p. 155).

One way to address such deficiencies could be to employ some workers from immigrant communities. However, the extent to which a minority of employees will be able to influence the organizational culture and be able to use their community-related competencies is open to question.

The Bourdieuan perspective highlights the fact that mobilization for an immigrant or minority community is done in relation to the mainstream community. This has implications for how such services can be delivered effectively. Ultimately, the capacity to do so is directly correlated to the community organization’s capacity to generate and leverage the types of social, cultural and economic capital specifically needed for service delivery, which the following explores in more detail.

**Social capital and immigrant community actors**

Research on immigrant communities has identified a range of different factors which contribute to increasing social capital within them. The size of the community seems to be a factor for the growth of community organizations. Small communities have little formalized organizational activity, but these activities increase when the community grows (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005). In her study of US and Canadian cities, Bloemraad reasons that this is related to having “…more individuals to establish them and more resources to support them” (Bloemraad, 2005, pp. 876-877).
Moreover, once formed, organizations forge connections between individuals within the community, and between the community and mainstream society. In Spain, the government has been actively collaborating with community organizations precisely to tap into the resulting networks (Hunton, 2001). Describing this process as a consequence of a series of community conversations leading to collective action, Hyman identifies five activities that make up this action. These are: resident engagement, agenda building, community organizing, community action, and, finally, the ongoing communication between the organization and the grass root community members (Hyman, 2002). The activity generates more social capital (Couton, 2011), effectively creating a positive feedback loop.

A community’s cohesiveness, i.e. its level of bonding social capital, can also be significant for facilitating mobilization (Jenkins, 1988). This type of social capital has been criticized for being a potentially detrimental social force, but Putnam points out that it can be “…a prelude to bridging social capital, rather than precluding it” (Putnam, 2007, p. 164). He argues that “ethnically defined social groups (such the Sons of Norway or the Knights of Columbus or Jewish immigrant aid societies in the U.S.) were important initial steps toward immigrant civic engagement a century ago” (Putnam, 2007, pp. 163-164), echoing the findings of Fennema and Meindert (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). Settlement and social service agencies are, thus, an important institutional arena of political socialization and a bridge to broader host-society political engagement (Savidge Sterne, 2001). Moreover, the act of organizing can mark the line between members and non-members more distinctly (Mikkelsen, 2003). Such boundary work further strengthens a community’s bonding capital. To some extent this might fuel the conceptualization of ethnic groups as being internally homogenous and externally clearly bounded, which as noted should be seen as constructed, rather than inherent.
Another factor that encourages mobilization is the level of ostracism and social exclusion the community experiences. If “…the host society has negative attitudes toward the group, and if the political climate appears to be controlled by a dominant group” (Jenkins, 1988, p. 18), the need to defend community rights is increased. In a study of the Turkish and Afro-Surinamese communities in Amsterdam, Vermeulen found that such ostracism constituted part of the reason that the former developed a stronger organizational infrastructure than the latter (2005). The implication is also that a community that is received in an inclusive manner has less reason to mobilize to defend its own rights. In this context, the cooptation of community leaders into state administrations is one expression of external control by a dominant group which can provide the grassroots of the community with a clear object to focus its resistance on (Björklund, 1986). An ostracized community might also counter-mobilize along the very identity lines that have been politicized for such ostracism, and thus leverage an already politicized identity as part of a conflict-based relationship with majority society.

Even so, some research indicates that too much bonding capital and too little bridging can become problematic for members of the community. For instance, both Borjas and Kazemipur find that the social networks of immigrants are generally less ethnically diverse and have a lower socioeconomic value, implying that the limited diversity of connections also limit the work opportunities for those living in socially segregated environments facing high unemployment levels (Borjas, 2006; Kazemipur, 2006). Governments can facilitate the formation of social capital by opening up local opportunity structures and act as a connector by creating space for continuous interactions between community and non-community actors (Suzuki, 2005). More concretely, Cordero-Guzmán observed how significant the connection to the social service delivery system is for organizations (2005), since it allows access to the funding structures
within this system, which is needed to develop organizational stability. Social capital in the form of connections to a particular network, thus translates into increased opportunities to accumulate economic capital.

If governments approach immigrants and immigrant communities in an inclusive manner and implement initiatives that promote the use of immigrant skills, they facilitate the development of such networks (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005). This is most optimally done by sharing power with the community in an inclusive manner (Daubon & Saunders, 2002; Hyman, 2002; Potapchuk, Crocker Jr., & Schechter, 1999; Warner, 2001), specifically, by “shifting their emphasis from that of controller, regulator and provider to a new role as catalyst, convener and facilitator…” and by viewing “immigrants as participants, rather than clients…[developing] a facilitative, participatory structure” (Chekki, 2006, pp. 4-5). For instance, Vermeulen observes how the inclusive stance of authorities towards Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam had a direct impact on the organizational formation in the group (2005). Similar effects are identified in Caponio’s study of primarily Maghrebi immigrants in Italy, where “the opening-up of the institutional opportunity structure favoured a sudden increase in the number of formal immigrants’ associations” (Caponio, 2005, p. 943).

Conversely, being segregated from the formal social service system is detrimental for the agency (Jenkins, 1988), impeding the development of bridging social capital. Such exclusion can occur if non-community service deliverers crowd out immigrant actors from the service delivery arena by using their entrenched networks with government funders (Jenkins, 1988). Caponio describes how the Catholic organizations and trade unions in Italy were able to leverage their organizational capacity for such purposes to greater effect (2005). They thus became favoured by government funders and “contracts for service delivery remained a prerogative of the main,
highly specialised, lay co-operatives” (Caponio, 2005, p. 944), compared to the small grants of “around 2,500-3,000 Euro each” (Caponio, 2005, p. 943) accessible to immigrant community organizations, which were hardly sufficient for sustainable social service delivery. Finding themselves continuously excluded, immigrant organizations thus had to work through Italian organizations acting as mediators between government funders and immigrant communities on an informal basis (Caponio, 2005).

Policy network structures can thus be significant in this context. Soysal found that in the Netherlands, the corporatist structures, which impede access to decision-making arenas for non-traditional actors, compelled the immigrant actors to create large-scale, centralized ethno-cultural associations for the purpose of claims-making. They were devoted primarily to folkloric activities that could preserve the ethnic identity of the community, with advocacy as a second most important objective, while only 10% of the associations were engaged with social service delivery. In contrast, these large-scale federations tended to be absent in liberal, pluralist, countries like the United Kingdom, which instead tended to produce local social service delivery organizations. Almost 70% of organizations there offer such services, while only 10% were engaged in advocacy (Soysal, 1994). Likewise, hierarchically structured programs are less likely to build community social capital than are decentralized programs which build on community assets through horizontal partnerships with community members (Kretzman & McKnight, 1993; Potapchuk et al., 1999; Potapchuk et al., 1999).

**Cultural capital and immigrant community actors**

For immigrant community organizations, there are two major manifestations of cultural capital; competence and legitimacy. To some extent, they overlap. That is to say, some competence effectively constitutes legitimacy vis-à-vis some other social actors for an organization, and,
conversely, legitimacy can be leveraged as competence in some social contexts. The immigrant community organization needs to be able to navigate both the community and the host society, particularly the sub-government space of the policy community.

Immigrant community organizations vary greatly in terms of organizational capacity (Jenkins, 1988) and scholars have identified several relevant competencies they need for successful operation, including securing funding for their services. Most of these are related to organizational and human resource capacity in a wide sense. To navigate the social space of the immigrant community successfully, the organization needs language competence, and an understanding of kinship patterns, collective memories and consciousness (Jenkins, 1988). Such skills facilitate efforts to identify community needs, reach vulnerable clients and establish a strong rapport with them. They also create legitimacy within the community, because they foster the perception that the agency can advocate for the community and act as a defender for it. This should not be taken for granted, but rather depends on the organization’s accumulation of the cultural and social capital valid in the community.

Even so, the skills are more likely to be developed within community actors than within non-community actors that also operate in the intersection between immigrant community and the surrounding society. If they lack these skills, which are regarded as prestigious cultural capital within immigrant communities, they might have limited success with social service delivery there, as has been observed in Canada (Beyene, Butcher, Joe, & Richmond, 1992). Barriers to communication include lacking language skills within the staff, lacking cultural skills which prevents the organization from fully understanding the clients’ perspective on the delivered services as well as limited capacity to orient and do outreach in the community. Such deficiencies could have numerous consequences. First, they make it more difficult to identify
actors that are legitimate representatives of the community. Instead of approaching the actors that are considered legitimate by the community, the gatekeepers might erroneously approach the actors that fulfill stereotypical expectations of what the leaders should look like. Caponio describes how it was “difficult for Italian institutions to identify legitimate leaders” (Caponio, 2005, p. 935), which might be an example of this. Second, they could impede the ability to identify root causes of social issues, particularly if the subsequent analysis of the problem is made on the basis of assumptions informed by such false stereotypes. Third, they could fuel mistrust within the receiving community. The result could be that the community members who are most in need of services would have the greatest difficulty or be most reluctant in accessing them from such providers.

In terms of managerial skills, starting and managing a formal organization is highly technical and requires skills specialized for the professional administrative context of the new host country. In New York, NY, Cordero-Guzmán observes that “someone from the community has to have the capacity to understand the grants and contracts application process and all of the intricacies of program development, design, management, reporting and evaluation” (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005 p. 895). He goes on to conclude that when immigrant communities have members with such experience, from the country of origin or from the host society, they are more likely to form sustainable organizations (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). Likewise, skills in professional social service delivery are required to support clients with overcoming barriers, though how such skills should be defined needs careful assessment. For instance, many groups might be able to satisfy at least some needs on an informal level. Such skills might even be more significant for the mobilization and formation of organizations than the size of the community because they allow the organization to successfully navigate the social space of public agencies.
Caponio’s study showed how they could be acquired through several different ways. First, collaboration with non-community organizations can result in transferring much needed experience of organizational management and social service delivery to the community actors. Second, “students and political dissidents provided organisational skills and a basic knowledge of the institutions of the host country” (Caponio, 2005, p. 933), which were instrumental for the development of the associations. Third, some Muslim organizations had access to Italian converts to Islam who were more knowledgeable about Italian society and institutions and could thus “act as leaders” (Caponio, 2005, p. 935). It should be noted that the Italian converts might not only have been able to address a gap in social networks and organizational skills, but perhaps proved valuable in a context of negative stereotyping of Muslim immigrants, though the study does not explore this intriguing possibility.

Skills like the above can also be provided directly by government (Suzuki, 2005). Bloemraad’s study showed that civil servants in the United States informed community leaders about the administrative procedures necessary to incorporate as charitable organizations, how to create organizational by-laws, and gave direction to further support needed to develop organizational capacity. Soysal likewise found that the Dutch policy during the 1990s emphasised “…training, with the idea that it is crucial for migrant organizations to be ‘competently staffed and in position to train future administrative staff’” (Soysal, 1994, p. 98). All such expertise can be important for newcomer groups with limited insight into such procedures in the new host society (Bloemraad, 2005). Moreover, the acquisition of the skills creates a cadre of professionals with expertise in their areas of resource acquisition and who have experience in communicating and establishing relations with the bureaucracy (Soysal, 1994).
They can use their skills to the benefit of the community, transferring them to other members within it.

Conversely, lacking skills can have an impact on the quality of the services delivered (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). This was one of the weaknesses of some immigrant agencies observed by Caponio in the Italian cities, where only the mainstream organizations had the “organisational skills needed for managing most of the social services” (Caponio, 2005, p. 947), while the immigrant community organizations did not. This imbalance contributed to immigrant initiatives being crowded out (Caponio, 2005). Indeed, possessing both community skills and managerial skills is what often makes the professional leadership of the ethnic communities such effective brokers (Björklund, 1986) between community and government. To be able to enter the social service arena, the community organization also needs cultural capital that is considered prestigious and meriting within the government field. This is required to be regarded as legitimate by the established actors.

Another way of increasing that legitimacy is identified by Cordero-Guzmán. He points out the significance of having staff within the organizations educated in some of the leading policy and management schools in the city and with experience from working both in their communities and in mainstream institutions and organisations (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). The credentials of those prestigious schools are entrenched as symbols of authority to non-community actors. Credentials are also relevant because some governments have been shown to actively undermine the legitimacy of organizational staff. For instance, a government could signal that it considers the organized activities of immigrants “…undesirable or even threatening” (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005, pp. 828-829). Likewise, when governments treat immigrants as foreigners who do not really belong to the country-wide community and singularly restricts its activities to
the legal procedures of immigration, it abdicates an integration role in society. In such cases, support for immigrant community organizations will be weak (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005). Josephides observed such a stance among local authorities in Britain who seemed to consider ethnic associations delivering services to their own communities “an attack on the welfare state” (Josephides, 1987, p. 52), a sentiment which apparently only manifested when such actors expressed a need for funding of those services.

The Italian case also illustrates these mechanisms well. The Catholic Church and the trade unions, had “gained the trust of public institutions” (Caponio, 2005, p. 936) through a long history of service delivery to the poor which entrenched their legitimacy, that is their cultural capital. The immigrant actors were also consistently excluded from key decision-making arenas, and thus effectively silenced, or rendered invisible in public space (Caponio, 2005). In the Jenkins’ study in New York, NY, one respondent said that immigrant agencies were “the best-kept secret in social work” (Jenkins, 1988, p. 277). The comment suggests a history of lack of recognition from the majority society which creates further barriers that the immigrant agency needs to overcome. Making immigrant actors invisible in public space can arguably have similar effects with regards to legitimacy, effectively trapping the actor in a vicious cycle of lacking legitimacy fuelled by exclusion from the arenas that create recognition.

However, governments can also do much to legitimize the process and the actors involved (Suzuki, 2005), especially by including immigrant agencies in public space. This is achievable through public manifesting, by funding or otherwise, to emphasize the importance of immigrant community organizations for society and acknowledging the role they play in facilitating the integration of newcomers. Bloemraad explains that “the normative support accorded to refugees in the United States acts in a way similar to multiculturalism in Canada, altering the perception
of mainstream actors such as the Boston Archdiocese toward accommodation of newcomers” (Bloemraad, 2005, p. 881). Even symbolic support can strengthen immigrant actors’ legitimacy vis-à-vis non-community actors significantly. Bloemraad argues Canada’s policy of multiculturalism has been important for the development of agencies in that sense. Not “only is the overall number of organisations in Toronto larger than in Boston, but the diversity of those organisations- ranging from voluntary advocacy associations and formalised social-service agencies to for-profit media - is richer, enhancing the community’s organisational capacity” (Bloemraad, 2005, p. 880). Not only does such support affect legitimacy, but the support also seems to encourage immigrants to mobilize more directly (Bloemraad, 2005).

**Economic Capital and immigrant community actors**

Funding is ultimately a necessity for the delivery of social services and immigrant community organizations can vary greatly in terms of available economic resources. A socially disadvantaged community suffering from high poverty levels has greater difficulties in leveraging economic capital from within the community than a rich community does (Jenkins, 1988). While a quite intuitive observation, it underscores a particular problematic issue, since those communities arguably are the ones that are in the greatest need of effective social services and community empowerment, but also the ones that face the greatest barriers to address social issues without outside support.

In one New York study, organizations had an average budget of $ 7.5 million but there was also a great range between large and small actors. The smallest organizations, 10 per cent of the sample, had budgets of less than $ 80 000, while the top 25 per cent of the agencies had budgets higher than $ 4 million, with the top five having budgets “…of $25, $28, $35, $72 and $120 million” (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005, pp. 898-899). Two studies from 1988 also had interesting
numbers. One investigated organizations in Israel, where the annual budgets ranged from US $ 627 000 to US $ 1500 (Korazim, 1988). In Casey’s study of ethnic associations in New South Wales, the largest organization had a budget of AUD $ 200 000, with eight employees, while average annual budgets were AUD $ 20 000 - $ 30 000. These organizations were generally “low on resources, understaffed,” and “function from inadequate premises” (Casey, 1988, p 262), which seems more common for the smaller actors. These figures would have to be adjusted for inflation and year for more precise comparison, but still provide some sense of the wide scope and range of funding. Together, the studies give an idea of the range of organizational capacity that can exist within the sector. Governments can be a significant source of this funding in many cases (Suzuki, 2005). This can take the form of direct subsidies, grants or the purchase of social service delivery from specific organizations (Hein, 1997).

In the Netherlands, “seventy percent of the total number of migrant associations (over 2,000) receive some sort of support from local government” (Soysal, 1994, p. 98). In Britain, governments have provided funding for “…specific educational and social service functions of migrant associations” (Soysal, 1994, p. 102). The majority of the agencies in Cordero-Guzmán’s study of New York, NY, had support, through either contracts or grants, from one or several levels of government, 56 per cent of them through either contracts or sub-contracts (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005), and it was a common source of revenue for organizations in Israel, too (Korazim, 1988). Josephides found that the Cypriot community centres all receive some public funding for the welfare services they provide (Josephides, 1987). In Bloemraad’s study of Boston, governments provided “between two-thirds and three-quarters of…” (Bloemraad, 2005, p. 875) the studied agencies’ budget. She also found that the US federal government provided states with funding for settlement under condition that a portion be devoted to immigrant
community organizations “…rather than to traditional resettlement agencies” (Bloemraad, 2005, p. 872). Indeed, since the 1960s, American governments have increasingly purchased services from non-profit organizations in general, and immigrant community actors have benefited from this (Hein, 1997).

Combined, this evidence from multiple national and urban contexts reveals how significant governments can be for providing direct access to funding for operations. It may have had “…a positive effect on the organisational infrastructure of the immigrant community” (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005, pp. 829-830), which is arguably why community organizations “have become more and more involved in direct bargaining with the welfare state” (Björklund, 1986, p. 299).

The size of this funding can vary greatly. While some governments are comparatively generous, some grants can be very small, ranging in the hundreds or thousands of dollars (Soysal, 1994). However, even when funding is limited, it can still be important for the organization if it can be used effectively. In Cheetham’s study, public funding tended to be limited to about £ 30 000 annually, but it was used to pay rent and hire staff, which is strategically important (Cheetham, 1988). Soysal also found that organizations would use funding for such purposes (1994).

Government funding can also help inexperienced community actors develop organizational capacity (Hein, 1997). In Bloemraad’s study of the U.S., the government “actively encouraged the creation of Vietnamese mutual assistance associations to provide culturally and linguistically sensitive services and to help create an ethnic advocacy structure” (Bloemraad, 2005, p. 871). Thus, a community that had not mobilized for social service delivery became enabled to provide such through government support. Moreover, this funding created spill-over effects. One of the established organizations helped create other organizations, showing that the skills transferred into the Vietnamese community had, in turn, contributed to more organizational
mobilization (Bloemraad, 2005), effectively creating a positive feedback loop. Even if funding is not directly or easily accessible from governments, state actors can still facilitate the accumulation of economic resources in many ways. This includes making non-profit organizations eligible for tax exempt status (Hein, 1997), or networking with external parties which can prove crucial to establishing the steady cash flow needed for sustainable social service delivery. Sub-contracting with metropolitan-level service providers can provide one such source of revenue for immigrant community associations (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005).

However, as significant and positive as government funding can be, the funding models can impact the structure of the receiving actors, due to the attached conditions. Soysal found that British and Swiss governments only reluctantly funded activities that “directly promote collective identities or ethnic organizing” (Soysal, 1994, pp. 102.-103). British government funding was mostly provided for the delivery of social services, and the Swiss government had no subsidies for immigrant community organizations (Soysal, 1994). Likewise, the German federal government had no funding dedicated to immigrant community organizations. Local governments tended to distribute funding on a project basis (Soysal, 1994). France, likewise, had many restrictions on how immigrant communities could mobilize, which impacted the capacity of their organizations negatively:

In France, legal restrictions on migrant organizing in effect until 1981, coupled with the lack of policy instruments and incentives to promote the collective organizations of immigrants have resulted in relatively limited and dispersed organizational activity among migrants. The same conditions also led to the formation of a high number…of ‘solidarity associations’ established by French nationals (Soysal, 1994, p. 104).

Moreover, some conditions can force a community organization to compromise its mission and vision, which can undermine its legitimacy if these conditions do not fit community needs
(Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). Some governments even stipulate that receiving agencies must refrain from activism or political activities (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005; Jenkins, 1988). This has been observed in Korean organizations in the US (Chung, 2005), and agencies in Vancouver, Canada (Creese, 1998). Other funding models can drive rivalry within the community for state recognition, even as it internalizes and accepts the funding arrangement (Soysal, 1994).

Likewise, when public funders emphasize distinctiveness based on “very particularistic (folkloric and reified) cultural markers of identity” (Landolt et al., 2009, p. 2) ethnicity may be underscored as a particularly significant social cleavage. This might skew or obscure interest articulation in public space when communities share similar barriers and opportunities but fail to coordinate because of funding regimes effectively isolating diverse communities from each other. In other words, the formation of “ethnic-ness” is, to some extent, intertwined with “the top-down bureaucratic manoeuvres of who should receive settlement services, for how long, via what institutional channels, with what sectorial priorities in mind, and so forth” (Landolt et al., 2009, p. 2). These ultimately determine the opportunity structures that the community has to operate within, and that the community has to internalize to some extent, in order to become a successful claims-making agent.

When governments introduce funding conditions, especially ones stressing ethnicity, they signal who are considered legitimate actors and what is considered legitimate activity. In that sense, the condition can be said to constitute cultural capital manifested in the form of competence and organizational structure that the funder recognizes as authoritative. Thus, the conditions themselves can affect both the relationship between the funder and the receiver but also shape the identity, culture and infrastructure of the latter. Moreover, Hein found that the scope of the welfare state itself can be a detriment to community actors. In the United States, its
rise hurt social service providing immigrant community organizations by crowding them out
(Hein, 1997).

When government funding is inaccessible, organizational mobilization is also impeded. In
Italy, Caponio uncovered that “legislation seems to have completely abandoned the purpose of
empowering immigrants’ associations. Neither the centre-left government law of March 1998,
nor its reform by the current centre-right majority in July 2002, assigned any special functions or
resources to existing regional and local committees” (Caponio, 2005, p. 937). The result is to
strongly constrain the formation of immigrant agencies. Caponio describes how the inability to
gain a government contract had “the effect of keeping immigrants’ associations even more
inexperienced and structurally weak” (Caponio, 2005, p. 948), creating a vicious cycle that the
immigrant agency might find difficult to break. The organizations “are still poorly developed and
weakly structured. This is confirmed by the fact that most associations lack proper offices. Their
official addresses usually coincide with the home of the president or person in charge…and thus
change frequently” (Caponio, 2005, pp 936-937). She summarizes:

In this context, immigrants’ associations did not have any opportunities to develop. The
communities which were among the most well established in the 1980s are now far less
organised and significant. On the one hand, especially in the case of the Egyptians, the
settlement process favoured individual integration into the host society, thus breaking ties
with the community. On the other hand, the elimination of previous institutional
opportunities, in particular the Foreigners’ Centre, has made it extremely difficult to
organise regular activities, since most associations lack the resources to run permanent
offices. As a consequence, the majority of immigrants’ associations present today in
Milan can be depicted as ‘community leisure associations’. They meet at the week-ends,
like the Filipina women in Catholic parish churches…, or occasionally get together for
national celebrations, like the Albanian-Italian Cultural Association... (Caponio, 2005, p.
941).
Summary

As demonstrated above, Bourdieu’s framework can effectively provide theoretical coherence to the disparate findings of the scholarship on immigrant community organizations. It explains why and how immigrant community organizations are linked to the community, and how staff and board demographics, the location of offices, and the mission and vision of organizations matter and act as indicators for this. It shows how social, economic and cultural capital manifest in the intersection between community and non-community actors and how these forms of capital are significant for the mobilization of community organizations.

Governments can be particularly significant in that context as they can impact access to all three dimensions of capital in a profound way. They can act as external catalysts, connectors, legitimizers, skills incubators and provider of funding (Suzuki, 2005), which raises the social, cultural and economic capital available to the community actors. They can also obstruct the same by excluding them from key social arenas. The factors affecting community mobilization are summarized in Figure 5, below:
Bourdieu’s theory applied to immigrant organizations can be useful for understanding matters of ethnic relations beyond the study immigrant communities examined here. It can provide a new reading of relations between majority and minority communities. These are often intertwined with the social construction of the ‘other’, which is also conceived as the manifestation of collective dispositions towards people thought to belong to politicized vernacular categories. Berger and Luckmann expressed this when they showed how “….the meanings produced in social interaction ‘come to confront [the actor] as a facticity outside of himself’” (Scott, 2008, p. 125). The dynamic process behind the phenomenon underscores the complexity of studying it. The debate on multiculturalism, for instance, tends “…to construct the members of minority collectivities as basically homogenous” (Yuval-Davis, 1993, pp. 627-628) and similar tendencies towards essentialism have been found elsewhere in the scholarship when...
social scientists assume that ethnic groups are characterized by internal homogeneity (Brubaker, 2004). However, while shared experiences might be potential grounds for defining vernacular collectives, they do not necessarily translate into a homogenous culture (Alkadry, 2007).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored how immigrant agency can be understood using Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, specifically his framing of Capital. Situating a number of studies of immigrant community agencies within it has shown how the theory clarifies the mechanics of the social processes involved in the relationship between immigrant communities and non-community actors, where governments have a particularly important role.

Another important property of the framework is the capacity to recognize the significance of the social dynamics of change. It allows the scholar to work with three different dimensions of resources, including monetary, social networks and cultural, all of which are important to acting politically. Recognizing all these dimensions provides a fuller account and a wider understanding for what is required for immigrant communities to develop what Breton called institutional completeness and take social action. This provides a researcher with a more complete set of tools to work with to analyze processes of mobilization and social action, and most significantly, what factors will likely facilitate or obstruct mobilization and action.

The role of government in this complex is of particular importance. As Bloemraad states, its support “…including funding, technical assistance and normative encouragement, plays an important role in building immigrant communities’ organisational capacity” (Bloemraad, 2005, p. 867). Chapter Three will operationalize this insight by considering the cases of Sweden and Canada.
Chapter 3: The extant literature on immigrant agency in Sweden and Canada

Introduction

The previous chapter showed how Bourdieu’s conceptualization of Capital can be used to enhance the understanding of the social processes involved in the relations between public agencies and immigrant community actors. It then proceeded to demonstrate its utility by applying it to previous research on immigrant community actors, their mobilization and social action. To further demonstrate the utility of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, it will now be applied to the cases of Canada and Sweden. While both have historically adopted multicultural policies (Castles & Miller, 2003), there are some interesting differences between them. The former is a federal country that could be said to belong to Esping-Andersen’s liberal welfare state type (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The latter is a unitary, social-democratic country. The chapter surveys the extant literature to answer the question: How has immigrant agency and capacity building to influence policy or deliver labour market services to their constituencies been articulated in Canada and Sweden?

The chapter finds that, in Sweden, immigrant organizations confront many barriers to activity. This is partially linked to issues of cultural capital manifested as legitimacy. Social service delivery is seen as an arena for the state, establishing a political culture excluding voluntary organizations from the field. Moreover, ethnicity is not popularly constructed as a salient political cleavage, which constitutes a further barrier relating to dispositions within key gate-keeping social actors. Ultimately, the cultural capital necessary for legitimacy in the government sphere is inaccessible to immigrant community actors, but the reverse is also true as
governments are perceived as very distant by community members. Consequently, bridging social capital is absent and the two social spheres remain separate, distinct and segregated.

In Canada, governments have historically funded immigrant community organizations to deliver settlement and labour market services to their constituents. Consequently, while success for immigrant community actors should be far from taken for granted, some of these actors have managed to gain legitimacy within the public sphere and governments have gained legitimacy within the communities. Immigrant community actors and public agencies have also developed more bridging capital, bringing the two closer to each other. Even so, there is cause for concern with regards to changing funding levels and regimes.

The text starts with an overview of immigrant community organizations in Sweden first and then addresses the situation in Canada. The reviewed research is older, particularly in the case of Sweden, which partially reflects a dearth of attention to immigrant community actors there on the part of researchers. The review provides a context for the investigation into the organization of the labour market integration policy community in Chapter Four, thus bridging that with Chapter Three.

**Immigrant agency in Sweden**

At first glance, it might seem that the Swedish regime might be quite conducive to immigrant agency. For example, a crown commission has, in the past, encouraged collaboration between the majority population and immigrant communities (Aytar, 2007). Likewise, Swedish governments have framed the integration process as reciprocal such that it is built on a foundation of active participation from both immigrants and the native born population of the country. A national public agency was even created to promote this in the early 2000s (Dahlstedt, 2003).
However, these declarations notwithstanding, the potential for immigrant agency and the mobilization of immigrant community organizations in Sweden is affected by the fact that ethnicity is not a socially salient cleavage in Swedish political culture. Immigrants are thus not regarded as representatives of a publicly acknowledged social class. Indeed, Odmalm found that using an association as a vehicle for advocacy on the basis of immigrant identity is even “…regarded as unfitting behaviour in Swedish society” (Odmalm, 2004b, p. 113). This is a significant obstruction to presenting demands based on ethnicity, as “the space available for these types of claims remains minimal; and hence the main vehicle for mobilisation — migrant associations — becomes less useful and mobilisation forces are directed elsewhere or diminish” (Odmalm, 2004a, p. 482). The sentiment manifested most recently in a recent Crown Commission on xenophobia, which asserts that the state should not encourage ethnic organizations, because doing so is to promote segregation between Swedes and other ethnic groups: “It is natural for persons with foreign background to channel their interests through traditional interest groups, just as persons with a Swedish background, …” (Westerberg, 2012, p. 318, author’s translation). The conceptualization uses the expression ‘natural’ with little reflection and reveals the scepticism towards ethnicity as a social cleavage referred above. In Bourdieuan terms, ethnicity is not easily converted into cultural capital in this social context, which creates a substantial barrier to immigrant agency that is not easily overcome for immigrant communities.

Indeed, the label ‘immigrant’ itself has effectively superseded and replaced ethno-cultural identity, partly because of a self-image in Swedish public space of a historically ethnically homogenous population (Odmalm, 2004a). This image is inaccurate, for instance, ethnic Finns existed for centuries in Sweden (Aytar, 2007), as have the Roma, and not least the aboriginal
Sami population. As a result, members of the Swedish ethnicity, which dominate public administration and decision-making arenas, have the privilege of defining ethnic labels. Odmalm quotes the manager for the Department of Ethnic Relations in Malmö to illustrate the process:

“People are informed that they are immigrants as soon as they get here—that’s an identity that they have never had before—and when they come here they are branded as ‘immigrants’ and their ‘Turkish’ or ‘Iranian’ identity is taken away from them and that’s a very strange identity because there’s nothing that unites ‘immigrants’ with each other … their children haven’t migrated but they are still immigrants and that identity is becoming more confirmed, you get people who say ‘I’m an immigrant’ … they have stopped saying ‘I’m Chilean’ (Odmalm, 2004a, p. 477).

However, there seems to be a lack of reflection with regards to the use of the label by these Swedish gatekeepers. Dahlstedt could not find any sophisticated definition of ‘immigrant organization’ in either the scholarly literature or Swedish government databases. The definition he did manage to find (Dahlstedt, 2003) at the Immigrant Institute (Immigranternas Riksförbund) was based on simple demographics, where an immigrant association was defined as an association that has a membership consisting of over 50 per cent immigrants. This definition does not reflect the insights from scholarship discussed in Chapter Two, particularly with regards to mission, cultural connections to the community and agency (Dahlstedt, 2003). It thus seems that the term ‘immigrant’ has become infused with a form of negative cultural capital that effectively renders the competencies and characteristics of individuals so labelled invisible under a sweeping generalization. This generalization both misrepresents and socially constructs immigrants as a homogenous collective.

Interpreted using the theory of practice, it seems that the power-holding government sphere has produced and keeps re-producing cultural capital that a priori de-legitimizes immigrant agency. This comes across in several ways. First, it happens in terms of how
articulating demands based on ethnicity is considered inappropriate in the political culture. Second, it happens in how the power-holding gatekeepers retain the privilege of effectively removing ethnicity as a label in public space and replacing it with the relatively generalized and homogenizing label ‘immigrant’. These practices together create high barriers to gain cultural capital that is recognized in non-community public space.

Even so, Soysal found that immigrant community organizations are more numerous in Sweden than in many other European countries even though numbers are often difficult to verify (Soysal, 1994). They take primarily two forms, local and national. The former tend to be smaller community organizations and have primarily “been preoccupied with sports and traditional cultural preservation activities” (Odmalm, 2004a, p. 485) and been more like social clubs than interest groups or platforms for community advocacy (Freyne-Lindhagen & Petterson, 2000). Many of them also deliver services for their communities, including settlement services aiming to facilitate the social inclusion of immigrants (Osman, 2005; Mikkelsen, 2003; Dahlstedt, 2003). In interviews with 20 local associations in Malmö, Dahlstedt found that sixteen of them organized courses and study circles (see more below), either on their own or in cooperation with one of the major non-community educational associations, and twelve assisted their members with labour market integration in some form (Dahlstedt, 2003).

National organizations are larger ethno-cultural federations of associations based on a single ethnic identity, formed specifically for filling the advocacy function in relation to the national government. The national government has compelled ethnic communities to form these federations to create speaking partners that fit into the Swedish corporatist model (Odmalm, 2004a). These bodies engage in almost no social service delivery at all. Swedish immigrant communities thus act like immigrant communities in other countries and mobilize to address
common need, but the activities they engage in depend on which level of government they establish relationships and communicate with.

Officially, Swedish government policy has for a long time been to encourage collaboration between the majority population and immigrant communities, and involve them in decision-making in policy areas that affect them (Aytar, 2007). This principle was adopted as early as 1974. Even so, studies indicate a discrepancy between this stated objective and policy practices and outcomes. First, evidence indicates that governments and other gatekeeping actors act consistently with scepticism towards claims making based on ethnicity discussed above, and are reluctant to engage in deliberations with immigrant organizations. Evidence from Velásquez’s case study of the governance of a local integration policy project in Stockholm revealed how the project was primarily formulated to fulfill the objectives of central authorities, rather than local community needs (Velásquez, 2005). The social reflex of the local public agency consisted of legitimizing these objectives in the communities rather than acting as their advocates. When civil servants wanted to create an advisory body of local representatives, the representatives were selected by the civil servants and local residents became under-represented. Moreover, the civil servants also expected the members to be sympathetic to their cause, rather than the opposite way around. Indeed, the “role of the residents as experts in their neighbourhood, as exposed and squeezed between different power holders and robbed of their voices was never really discussed” (Velásquez, 2005, p 95, author's translation). In effect, reciprocal dialogue with the communities was undermined (Velásquez, 2005).

The pattern is repeated in other studies. The national Immigrant Council, a body of immigrant community representatives, is supposedly a consultative body where the national government can get advice from the national ethno-cultural associations. However, in practice, it
lacks significance for policy making and is rather used for rubber stamping policy that has already been decided upon in other bodies, implicitly assuming approval from the body without any significant input from the members of this council (Aytar, 2007). This disposition is pervasive enough to be found outside government among significant NGO actors, who also avoid collaborating with community actors (Dahlstedt, 2003). Swedish folk high schools – adult education institutions, common in Nordic countries, which tend to be disconnected from academic educational streams – and major educational associations are particularly significant as funders for study circles, a kind of non-formal way of providing educational opportunities that has become so deeply entrenched in Swedish society that it is strongly associated with the state (Odmalm, 2004b). However, even though immigrant community organizations constitute an important target group for such programs, immigrant community organizations were largely absent from the funders’ decision-making bodies (Osman, 2005).

The rationale offered by the non-immigrant community organizations is that immigrants have not yet acquired the skills necessary to be able to fully participate fully or effectively in such bodies in the Swedish democracy. Moreover, the educational associations also use this argument to assume the mandate to provide immigrants with said skills (Osman, 2005). However, Osman points out that many of the interviewed members of community organizations had been pro-democracy champions in their countries of origin, an activism that might even have been the reason some of them became refugees. Yet, this background of political activism was never considered by the Swedish educational associations (Osman, 2005). The cultural capital they had brought was thus made invisible, rather than validated as relevant. Moreover, the leaders of the immigrant community organizations tend to be persons who have been residents
for a longer period of time and achieved fluency in Swedish and thus act on behalf of the organizations (Eriksson & Osman, 2003).

Other case studies found similar patterns of behaviour. Erikson’s and Osman’s study of mainstream non-immigrant associations focused on combating discrimination found that leaders within this realm displayed little interest in entering into a dialogue with immigrant community actors. The analysis of the social situation, including necessary solutions, had already been completed and key decision-makers of associations had no interest in discussing this with immigrant actors, or “listening to the perspectives of others” (Eriksson & Osman, 2003, p. 118). In labour unions, which have a central role in the Swedish welfare state, immigrants are generally confined to the lower levels in their hierarchies (Aytar, 2007; Knocke, 1999). The lack of recognition that could be expected based on the observations of political culture and cultural capital made above is thus confirmed in these studies. Immigrant community organizations and their representatives are systematically constructed as lacking competence in different ways. They therefore generally lack the legitimacy needed to be considered competent actors that can contribute in any meaningful way to the decision-making process in these non-immigrant organizations. It could be said that their organizational culture impedes their ability recognize the competence that does exist within the immigrant community actor (see more in Chapter Six).

Turning to the state, it can be note that instead of collaboration, the government elites have tried to absorb ethnic immigrant actors into the public administration: “Prominent community activists may be offered positions within the welfare bureaucracy, giving them the opportunity to represent the interests of their community, although this must be done within the rules and structures set from above” (Odmalm, 2004a, p. 484). However, as helpful as insiders in the public administration can be for accumulating the cultural capital that is valid in immigrant
communities, those same rules and structures can arguably become greatly constraining to the articulation of immigrant advocacy. The upper echelons of the public administration hierarchy only have to ignore, silence or over-rule decisions or suggestions from these actors for any initiatives to be blocked.

The comparatively low funding levels provided to community organizations are consistent with these dispositions. The actors commonly have to rely on government grants, mostly from municipal governments, but the amounts are not very substantial. In Soysal’s study of Sweden and European countries, the level of funding from local governments was estimated to be above $ 2 million, which, she asserted, constituted about half the total budget of the associations (Soysal, 1994). In Örebro, a town of about 100 000 inhabitants, 17 associations shared about $ 75 000 of municipal grants, averaging $ 4400 per association (Freyne-Lindhagen & Petterson, 2000). This implies that most of the organizations in Sweden would qualify among the smallest organizations noted in the studies of New York, New South Wales and Israel (Casey, 1988; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005; Korazim, 1988). For instance, if we compare the organizations in Cordero-Guzmán’s study to those in Soysal’s work, one single organization of average size in New York, NY, had more funding than the total amount of funding available for community actors in all municipalities in all of Sweden (Soysal, 1994; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). Most of these grants are directly correlated to how well they reach the integration goal, or to membership numbers, which tend to be limited by the size of the local community (Odmalm, 2004b). While the difference between the two studies is striking, Soysal’s data is older and more recent material is needed to update this overview. It is possible that Swedish governments have changed priority and funding structures since her study was published, but data is inaccessible. The issue has not gained much attention from Swedish scholars, and the Swedish state records do
not allow for easy tracking. For example, funding could come through contracts with the Employment Service, or through municipal agencies or the ESF-Council which is the national agency responsible for distributing grants for EU-projects (see more on this in Chapter Nine). Each of these public bodies would have to be contacted separately, and the accuracy of responses would depend greatly on the extent to which the funder has data on whether recipients are immigrant community actors or not, which is far from certain. Completing that task requires a research project in itself, and falls outside the scope of this dissertation.

What can be said is that the funding that is available is also subjected to highly constraining top-down control related to the activities of the organization so as to prevent any form of profit or even professionalization (Odmalm, 2004b). For instance, some funders will only provide grants for projects targeting children and youth (Odmalm, 2004b). Moreover, they are only available through a limited number of departments. In Odmalm’s study of Malmö, the grants were provided by the recreational board (2004a). The department likely has this jurisdiction because of how ethnicity has been compartmentalized as related to spare-time activities aiming to preserve culture, like folk music, dancing or cooking. Immigrant community organizations are thus politically expected to be engaging in such voluntary driven activities, but not much else (Dahlstedt, 2003; Odmalm, 2004b). Most of the local social service delivery is thus unfunded by governments. This is not particular to immigrant community organizations. Swedish political culture has a strong focus on voluntariness in regards to associational life and NGOs in general tend to be absent from that arena because social welfare services have traditionally been the exclusive jurisdiction of the Swedish state (Soysal, 1994).

It is therefore not surprising that a lack of resources is a common theme among local associations in both Malmö and Örebro (Odmalm, 2004a). Many of the associations lack staff
(Freyne-Lindhagen & Petterson, 2000) and some draw upon unemployed persons with internships or subsidized salary to cope with this (Odmalm, 2004b). Establishing a permanent office is also problematic and members tend to commute between several different temporary spaces. In the Dahlstedt study, several of the interviewed associations had been forced to relocate because the office spaces they had were located in an industrial area where the authorities had decided to ban non-profits. Finding new offices without municipal support proved challenging (Dahlstedt, 2003). The situation has created a dependency on municipal grants. A local politician describes it:

…through these structures and mechanisms, the associations are tamed and all they care about is getting their activities financed. They are completely controlled by the local authorities and don’t even dare of thinking about questioning the system, because they know that they will be punished and that all the money disappear (Representative for the Green Party, quoted in Odmalm, 2004b, p. 113).

The choice of the word ‘tamed’ is quite revealing with regards to the prevailing attitude towards immigrant community actors within Swedish government. They are to be controlled, silenced and well-behaved to gain any funding. There is thus a relatively low threshold for communities to mobilize organizations which explains the high number of such bodies in the country. However, because of the onerous control on funding, these organizations often remain confined to an existence based on volunteerism (Odmalm, 2004a).

The larger organizations also get government grants; national and municipal government made up about 40% of the total revenue of the associations (Dahlstedt, 2003), including the national umbrella organization for ethno-cultural association (Dahlstedt, 2003). During the late 1980s, they shared a total of about $ 2-3 million between about 20 organizations, where the largest received about $ 2-300 000 and the smallest about $ 15-20 000 (Soysal, 1994). These
levels place the Swedish organizations in the lower end of funding in comparison to the New York, Israel and New South Wales, at about the same funding levels as the latter ones, and nowhere near the levels available to the former, which had an annual budget of varying between $120 million and more than $600 000. At the Swedish funding levels, only the largest ones can function with some level of professionalism. Some of the larger ones might have some full time employees, mostly attending to administrative duties.

Funding from the national government has historically come in three forms. First, there have been special projects focusing on local issues in residential areas characterized by social exclusion: “In 1987, fifty-seven projects conducted by migrant or Swedish organizations and concerning various aspects of the incorporation of migrants received around $324 000” (Soysal, 1994, p. 92). Second, there has also been a start-up grant for associations that do not fulfill all requirements. The objective of these grants was to facilitate the settlement of newcomers, protect equal rights, to counter discrimination and xenophobia, as well as to increase the knowledge about integration processes (Dahlstedt, 2003).

The third stream has been directed to the large national federations of associations. They need to have at least a thousand paying members, be national in scope, have a ‘democratic structure’, including “an elected board, an annual meeting open to general membership and formal by-laws” (Soysal, 1994, p. 91), been organizing activities that promote integration for the previous two years and have a plan for how to do so for the future (Dahlstedt, 2003; Soysal, 1994). They also need to be, at least officially, non-political, entirely founded on an ethnic basis the way the Swedish state recognizes it (Schierup, 1991). They also have to provide information about “democratic values…” and “equal rights” (Odmalm, 2004a, p. 476), terms that are largely undefined.
Like in the case of local organizations, the level of funding is correlated to membership numbers. Thus membership recruitment becomes “…a goal in itself” (Soysal, 1994, p. 91) regardless of and disconnected from other activities. Funding provided to these federations can filter down to local community members associations, creating a strong incentive for agencies and associations to form. Even so, that funding is primarily directed to the distribution of informational material from the central level (Odmalm, 2004a). These subsidies have not been keeping up with the rate of inflation. In 2002, the national board of integration argued that increases were necessary because most of the national federations could not finance their own administrative staff, a serious impediment for activity (Dahlstedt, 2003).

The federations have historically been heavily dependent on this state funding. Soysal found that nearly three quarters of their total budget came from state sources (Soysal, 1994). Indeed, the subsidy system has become a way to control and constrain the ethno-cultural federations, effectively stifling the potential for immigrant communities to develop their own consciousness in a bottom-up manner that could “break the norms and frameworks of the established political consensus” (Schierup, 1991, p. 120).

In this environment, social capital is important and can take the form of informal connections with a traditional actor, either a political party, a major non-community NGO or a public agency for ensuring the economic viability of the community organization. One organization in Odmalm’s study of Malmö had a more professional capacity and stronger resource base due to its closer and more continuous connection to political parties (2004b). Indeed, in Osman’s study, organization members expressly stated that funders would systematically exclude immigrant community organizations, and favour actors who already have good informal connections with municipal administrations (2005). Since those networks tend to
be based on corporatist structures, the barriers for entry into the delivery field can be steep. Without such ties, an organization becomes effectively marginalized. Actors who lack social capital find themselves having to compete against each other for the scarce resources that are available (Osman, 2005), instead of collaborating and forming empowering coalitions.

In the early 1990s, Schierup asked if the national ethno-cultural organizations would be able to overcome what he calls "the fragmentation of political culture of ‘silence’ to which a paternalist administration has exposed them" (Schierup, 1991, p. 134). This seems not to have been the case. Immigrant community organizations remain relatively marginalized and neither local nor national governments pay attention to or recognize the work done by immigrant community organizations (Osman, 2005). The evidence suggests a separation between government and community. Government agencies can easily communicate with each other, since they share the same social space, dispositions and perspectives. As Alici expresses it, they can “speak each other’s language and often find constructive solutions for their problems” (Alici, 2007, p. 81). In Bourdieuan terms, they share embodied forms of cultural capital, the specific forms of which are needed for legitimacy within that social space. Communication with the community is more difficult and its perspectives remain inaccessible. Alici’s section on this has the headline “Authorities on the moon” (Alici, 2007, p. 81), which reflects how distant community members experienced public agencies to be. In other words, the public agencies lack cultural capital that is valid within immigrant communities, just as the immigrant actors lack cultural capital for the government sphere. Thus, government and immigrant communities remain distinct and separate from each other.
**Immigrant agency in Canada**

Organizing on the basis of ethnicity seems common in Canada (Landolt et al., 2009; Chekki, 2006; Leung, 2000; Ma, 2008; Weiner, 2008). Hiebert refers to organizations like DIVERCity, ISS-BC (Immigrant Services Society of BC), MOSAIC and S.U.C.C.E.S.S. in Vancouver, all of which provide a range of social services to communities (Hiebert, 2009). Guo’s in-depth study of S.U.C.C.E.S.S., which focuses on the Chinese-Canadian community, emphasizes how it was founded as a response to identified community needs, in this case cultural and linguistic barriers and a sense that government agencies had failed to “to provide accessible social services for newly arrived Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong” (Guo, 2006, p. 9). S.U.C.C.E.S.S. aims to both promote integration and advocate on behalf of the community (Guo, 2005; Guo, 2006), echoing the findings above.

The organizations range in scope, from small associations relying entirely on volunteers, to large service delivery agencies with hundreds of professional staff (Holder, 1998; Suzuki, 2005). For instance, in Winnipeg, their budgets range from “less than $10,000” for ethno-cultural organizations to from “CAD $60 000 to a maximum of $500,000 +” for ethno-religious organizations (Chekki, 2006, p. 10). The majority of the former “are run by volunteer members and leaders. The paid staff, if any, is part time” (Chekki, 2006, p. 9).

In larger cities, there are also small actors, often focusing on a single demographic. However, individual community organizations can potentially become substantially larger. For instance, Hiebert reported that the Vancouver organizations DIVERCity, ISS-BC (Immigrant Services Society of BC), MOSAIC and S.U.C.C.E.S.S. all had professional case officers and large networks of volunteers, multiple office locals and membership in an umbrella organization, the Affiliation of Multicultural Societies and Service Agencies (AMSSA), for immigrant
community actors (Hiebert, 2009). The author describes the city as having “a rich field of ISAs…dedicated to assisting immigrants in a variety of ways” (Hiebert, 2009, p. 14). Guo’s study of S.U.C.C.E.S.S. in the same city showed how it grew from a budget of less than $ 100,000 annually to $ 8 million 25 years later. The development allowed it to go from a single 300 square foot office to an organization with several branches all over the greater metropolitan area, headquartered in “a 26,000-square foot Social Service Building of its own” (Guo, 2005, p. 14).

Community actors provide culturally sensitive (Chekki, 2006) social services, including employment, language and settlement. Holder argues that this effectively makes the organizations necessary for meeting the needs of immigrants, particularly when taking the inability of non-community actors to meet the needs of this client group (Holder, 1998). In other words, they provide bridging capital for their communities (Hiebert, 2009; Guo, 2005). Guo also described how this bridging effort affects mainstream society, in that mutual understanding has improved, effectively enhancing the two way process of integration (Guo, 2005). He also emphasizes how the studied settlement agency could provide support to clients in a holistic way, implying that governments compartmentalize social issues in a way that can be highly problematic for clients (Guo, 2006). As a whole, Canada’s network of refugee- and immigrant-serving organizations provides significant supports, offering resources for education, liaison, expertise, information, and assistance with access to key mainstream bodies, like government agencies, businesses, and community organizations (Suzuki, 2005).

Non-community actors also deliver services and have made some efforts to diversify services and incorporate multicultural competence within organizations. However, the efforts have often been more “cosmetic” than substantive, because “the needs and interest of minorities are dealt with on an ad hoc basis rather than being integrated into the structure, policies,
programs, and practices of the organization” (Henry et al., 2005, p. 192). In some cases, minority representatives have been recruited to address some of the issues of representation. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that such employees:

…are frequently isolated and marginalized in mainstream agencies. They are concentrated at the entry levels or in front-line positions. Their primary role is to serve clients who share the same racial or cultural background, but they tend to have limited power and status in the organization. This practice can result in a kind of ghettoization, especially of staff who are people of colour, where all ‘problems with Blacks’ are referred to the Black worker (Henry et al., 2005, p. 182).

On the other hand, governments have a long tradition of collaborating with community organizations. This can occur through deliberation on the settlement agenda where organizations can advocate for their communities and through the funding of social services from both local level and federal government (Wayland, 2006). The federal Immigrant Settlement and Adaption (ISAP) program, which “funds service-provision organizations to deliver direct, essential services to newcomers” (Suzuki, 2005, p. 7) is an example of this.

Scholars have identified many factors that have contributed to such collaboration. In Toronto, “personal trust and commitment on the part of mid-level bureaucrats, neither too high nor too low to be constrained in taking the initiative in meeting new needs” (Simich, 2000, p. 35) contributed. So did the capacity of the networks to mobilize organizations beyond the immediately involved public agencies and community organizations, like interfaith communities, which could add resources to collective actions (Simich, 2000). In Vancouver, Creese found that building anti-poverty coalitions could pressure governments effectively (Creese, 1998), and Guo showed how S.U.C.C.E.S.S. could leverage thousands of members and volunteers that could not “be ignored by politicians and policymakers” (Guo, 2006, p. 18).
In Bourdieuan terminology, immigrant community actors have been considered legitimate partners, i.e. have had cultural capital valid within government, which facilitated the development of a trusting relationship with key civil servants. In essence, cultural capital could thus be converted into social capital in the form of networks within public agencies. Moreover, in cases where trust might not have been available, or key, the development of social capital within the community allowed the organizations to mobilize it in a way that could be effectively leveraged to pressure government actors. This exemplifies at least two different ways immigrant community organizations can build legitimacy vis-à-vis government bodies.

Another component of gaining such legitimacy is membership in The United Way. The United Way is a prestigious umbrella organization for NGOs, with local chapters in municipalities across Canada. Each such local chapter engages in fund raising and the distribution of funds to NGOs (United Way Centraide Canada). In the case of S.U.C.C.E.S.S. in Vancouver, it was the first ethnic Chinese NGO to be accepted in the organization. That membership in the United Way proved to be an important step in building legitimacy in the arena (Guo, 2005).

The evidence is not entirely clear with regards to the risk for cooptation of community organizations. Pal’s study from the early 1990s, while not focused only on immigrant community organizations, found little evidence indicating this among of advocacy organizations and concluded that “the most prominent and well-funded organizations are often the government's most strident and articulate critics” (Pal, 1993, p. 264). Later, Holder argued immigrant community organizations have had at least intermediary influence on the field and benefitted from at least some policy decisions (Holder, 1998).
Government funding has not been in direct conflict with the advocacy role of S.U.C.C.E.S.S., Guo argues. Rather, the organization could leverage its strong community ties and “frontline experiences” to become “more effective than voices from pure advocacy groups” (Guo, 2006, p. 19). Indeed, he concludes that its collaboration with the government has been beneficial for both parties. For the community organization, it provided important funding that was needed to fill service gaps in the community. The funding also gave the organization standing as a competent actor and legitimate representative of the community, effectively providing it with cultural capital valid in the government sphere. For the government, it provided access to a community it previously had little contact with, and increased legitimization of government policy, as well as cost savings (Guo, 2006), in other words, social capital and cultural capital valid within the community.

Moreover, the structure of governmental capacity and institutions has played a role in the relationship between government and community actors. First, administrative routines and decision-making have often been ad hoc and not very precisely defined which impedes government capacity for dominating other actors (Pal, 1993). Second, service provision to immigrants has “been characterized more by coordination than by centralization” (Suzuki, 2005, p. 7). Third, Canadian governments have lacked the capacity to deliver some services effectively. For instance, in a study of Chinese immigrant integration, Salaff noted that the Canadian governing institutions have been unable to create bridges that could convert foreign working experience and credentials to their Canadian equivalents. NGOs have thus had to step in and address the necessary support to underemployed immigrants instead (Salaff & Chan, 2007). All of these factors have provided opportunities for non-government actors and ensured some measure of independence.
However, Ng found that funding requirements did change the role of the service delivery agency in relation to the user, making it in at least some respects a representative of the state (Ng, 1996). Moreover, in 2009, the federal government removed the contracted funding for language and employment training to the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) in apparent response to the critique the organization’s president had directed against Jason Kenney, the minister of citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism, for the Minister’s support of Israel’s war on Gaza (Abu-Laban, 2013; Stasiulis, Hughes, & Amery, 2011). The federal government’s retribution and withdrawing of funding to this organization sends signals about the predictability and dependability of the federal government in relation to contractual relationships to other service providers within the system. The move suggests a more aggressive stance of the current Harper government towards funded organizations, where funding through the federal government would be considerably less predictable. As the events of this matter are still unfolding it is too early to draw conclusions about the full impact on relations between funded agencies and the federal government. Even so, evidence shows government funding in Canada has impacted service delivery agencies in ways that suggests at least some level of cooptation.

Even without taking the above developments into consideration, community organizations have still faced several challenges. For instance, when becoming involved with government funding systems, the ability to process grant applications and manage finances can become more important than the ability to represent the community (Holder, 1998). In other words, the ability to present a professional looking application for funding is vested with more cultural capital than the latter ability is.

Moreover, in Winnipeg, racialized minority groups have had:
…either no or limited opportunities to strengthen their alliances and maximize their collective impact on national immigration policies. Moreover, most of these ethnic organizations indicated that policy development on issues critical to their community takes place without their participation and therefore without the representation of visible minority perspectives (Chekki, 2006, p. 16).

These community organizations may lack significant social capital that others have been able to access. The example is an important reminder that social and cultural capital should not be assumed to be distributed equally between different immigrant communities.

Another issue concerns the pressures of the funding model on the articulation of ethnic identity. While communities might spontaneously organize on the basis of ethnicity, funding models sometimes privilege certain identity formations over others. For instance, the study by Landolt et al. found that “pan-ethnic-multi-service and lobby/umbrella organizations” were favoured by government funders, effectively removing opportunities from “ethno-national or country-of-origin-based organizations” (Landolt et al., 2009, p. 20). In these funding regimes, identity itself actually becomes a form of cultural capital, where a mobilizing base of multiple ethnicities becomes constructed as a priori more valuable than a single ethnicity. If the growth cycle of organizations as has been described, is correct, then these particular criteria will structurally privilege the larger ones over the smaller ones.

Indeed, in a Toronto study, Sadiq found the development of a two tiered dependency system, based on size. In the first tier, larger multi-service agencies with city-wide operations, which may or may not be community based, enter direct contractual partnerships with the state to secure their operating capital. Since they are unable to raise the required funds in other ways, they are effectively dependent on the government funds for continued operations, which also makes them particularly sensitive to government fiat with regards to what services to provide, how to deliver them, as well as what not to do. The second tier consists of smaller, more
narrowly based ethno-cultural organizations. Because of their lack of capacity to develop funding proposals, they are unable to compete directly with the larger organizations for service delivery contracts, but can sub-contract service delivery with those larger organizations, rendering the smaller ones dependent on the larger ones (Sadiq, 2004).

Nonetheless, changes in the funding model over the past twenty years have had serious implications for service delivering community organizations. First, funding levels declined during the 1990s, with settlement services disproportionately affected (Wayland, 2006). In Ontario, this led to increased competition between community organizations for the increasingly scarce resources, but has also undermined the capacity to build long-term partnerships between them and government funders (Richmond & Shields, 2005). Chekki’s Winnipeg study likewise showed that a majority of community organization lacked “adequate financial resources to either meet their operating costs, embark upon new building projects, or expand their services to meet the needs of their growing community” (Chekki, 2006, p. 11). In Vancouver, Creese found some concern (Creese, 1998) that an ‘advocacy chill’, defined as a “reluctance [of funding dependent organizations] to be outspoken on behalf of their client group” (Wayland, 2006, p. 8) might spread among community organizations. Canadian community organizations in general seem persistently underfunded in comparison to needs (Holder, 1998).

Second, the forms of funding also changed, from direct funding to funding on a project basis (Wayland, 2006), or, from core to program funding (Richmond & Shields, 2004). This had made community organizations “less stable and more dependent on government agendas” (Wayland, 2006, pp. 2-3), and de-legitimized community development (Richmond & Shields, 2004). Some consequences have included onerous accountability routines, loss of organizational infrastructure and competence and capacity for advocacy (Wayland, 2006; Richmond & Shields,
Further, the funding process may have narrowed agencies into service provision or even specific kinds of services (Holder, 1998). What governments have considered acceptable activities has thus changed significantly over time.

Moreover, some ethnic groups have been unable to access funding for services, resulting in service gaps for their constituents. A study of Toronto found that most agencies offering services in Tamil had offices located in the inner city, but most Tamil speakers did not reside there, indicating a spatial disconnect between needs and services (Lo, Wang, Wang, & Yuan, 2007). Such gaps, it has been argued, could be better filled through improved collaboration between the service delivering community agencies (Leung, 2000), which have often been found to act in isolation from each other to the extent that researchers speak of the “two solitudes” (Henry et al., 2005, p. 181), and between federal immigration policy and local needs (Simich, 2000).

Also, the case of the withdrawn funding for the Canadian Arab Federation, as mentioned earlier, should not be ignored. The action constitutes a powerful symbol. It would not be surprising to find other agencies becoming more hesitant to criticize funding governments as a result.

To summarize, the Canadian immigrant community organizations have had a long tradition of relations with different government levels, sometimes contesting and confronting and sometimes collaborating as partners, and sometimes maybe both at the same time. The long-standing nature of this relationship has several implications. First of all, it is clear that at least some community organizations have sufficient cultural capital to be considered legitimate as both service deliverers and community representatives. Indeed, Suzuki mentions that the strength of the community delivery network lies in “its combined experience and its strong links with
communities” (Suzuki, 2005, p. 7), which arguably has been recognized as a strength by the public funders.

Secondly, it has effects for the social capital of both government bodies and community actors, effectively strengthening the bridging capital available for both. For governments, the community organizations have been an important channel for reaching out to communities it previously had difficulties communicating with, such as in the case of S.U.C.C.E.S.S. in Vancouver. For community bodies, being a social actor on the field has provided it important channels for advocacy. Even in times when funding conditions have constrained the capacity for direct advocacy, the membership in the arena has likely provided the community bodies with a significant network of contacts with other organizations which could be leveraged as social capital in the conversation with governments.

Conclusions

The two cases of Canada and Sweden illustrate the dynamics of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of Capital well. They are consistent with the general observations from the scholarship on immigrant community organizations in European and North American countries and agency in terms of how relations between community actors and government bodies are highly significant for the mobilization of capital within the communities. They also reveal quite different trajectories regarding the relationship between immigrant communities and non-community gatekeepers.

In Sweden, immigrant community organizations seem to experience barriers to entering decision-making arenas and accessing funding that could be used to address community needs. Government and other significant non-community gatekeepers have remained reluctant to funding immigrant actors and involving them in decision-making contexts. This is partially
related to the difficulty of gaining cultural capital that is recognized by the gate-keeping bodies. Moreover, the cultural capital necessary for acquiring significant economic capital through public funding is produced and re-produced by non-community actors in a way that seems to systematically exclude the immigrant organization from meaningful participation, further reinforcing the social divide between the two social spaces. As a result, evidence indicates a social distance between immigrant communities and public agencies, which in effect makes it difficult for the two parties to understand each other.

In Canada, by contrast, community actors have long been funded for service delivery, and in at least some cases, most notably that of S.U.C.C.E.S.S. in Vancouver, this relationship have proved mutually beneficial. Once an organization has acquired such funding, it has gained important levels of the type of cultural capital recognized within the government. Governments can also benefit from collaboration, and gain important cultural and social capital within a community it previously had difficulty accessing. Even so, changes in funding regimes over the last decades have negatively impacted the capacity for social action and community development among organizations. Thus, understanding how public management models can impact immigrant community mobilization is another piece of the puzzle which may facilitate the understanding of constraints and opportunities for social action.
Chapter 4: The Field and the Habitus – how public management shape social space

Chapter Three showed how immigrant community actors have acted in different opportunity structures in Canada and Sweden, where governments have engaged more with these actors in the former country than they did in the latter. This chapter expands this line of inquiry, and engages in more detail the issue agency in a policy community by asking the question: *What is the significance of the institutional context for the opportunity structure for immigrant community actors in the policy community?*

The theory of Pierre Bourdieu is, again, of use. Specifically, his concept Habitus is a powerful tool. It captures the structure of social space and how social position manifests in dispositions, perspectives, body language and otherwise. When actors take action, they are heavily informed by their social positions, and tend to re-produce the structures into which they have been socialized. The public management model constitutes a very significant social structure for the actors within the policy community. Bourdieu’s theory implies that it has effects beyond simple organizational infrastructure. It is thus important to be able to identify different types of organization to ascertain effects on agency and to determine effects on different types of actors in general and the space for agency for the participation of immigrant community actors on the field in particular.

Group/Grid Cultural Theory provides a tool for doing so. The theoretical framework studies how social organization affects perception and culture within an organizational entity. Its typology allows analysts to study how the structure of a policy community affects the cognitive biases and, consequently, the responses of actors in the field. As such, it can also facilitate an understanding for how different forms of capital, including economic but also, highly
significantly, cultural and social capital, is structured by the formal organization logic that exists in the policy community. Indeed, when choosing an organizational model, the social space becomes defined by a set of particular common conditions and experiences that are shared by the participants of that space. Reading these organizational models from a Bourdieuan perspective, they become a key vehicle for structuring the Habitus of the policy community.

The chapter is divided into two primary sections. The first section provides an overview of Bourdieu’s concept of Habitus and how it applies to community formation. The second section explains Grid/Group Cultural Theory, the typology of organization model it presents, and then draws some conclusions about the implications of different policy models on immigrant agency.

**Habitus: the creation of social spaces**

Together with the concept of Capital (see Chapters Two and Three), the concept of Habitus forms the final key component in Bourdieu’s theory and is a way to capture social position. He argues that social space is constituted by common experiences (Crossley, 2001) and conditions of existence which “produce the structures of the *habitus*” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 54). Those conditions are the lowest common denominator of the members of a particular space, motivating the group being labelled as a social class in the sociological sense.

Being immersed in these conditions subjects the members to a process of socialization. The social space is thus “the basis of the perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 54) for the members, who also internalize the history of the social space into a reflexive, but potentially subconscious, form that retains an active presence in the individual (Bourdieu, 1990). For Bourdieu, social space is thus a “system of cognitive …structures...” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53).
In that sense, Habitus centres on patterns of behaving, feeling and thinking (Maton, 2008), and describes how social position becomes embodied in the individual as “...dispositions, schemas, forms of know-how and competence” (Crossley, 2001, p. 83). The dispositions are durable, both in the sense that they form a part of the social construction of the self and in the sense that they remain transposable between different social fields. Habitus is thus not just a way to describe position, but also to describe how the individual expresses this position as adopted and internalized social reflexes.

Having adopted similar attitudes, members also generate socially accepted forms of behaviour and “...procedures to follow…”(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53) that are “common to all products of the same conditionings” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 59). These procedures are strongly normative “…motivating structures...” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53) and guarantee “constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 54). They effectively lend the Habitus a homogenizing force. This is why members of the same social space tend to adopt similar attitudes and mannerisms.

The social structure can both constrain and empower social action, depending on context. For instance, socially informed schemes of perceptions are likely to emphasize some aspects of a situation, some”…paths to take” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53), over others. People from different social spaces would therefore make different interpretations of the same situation, and thus react differently to it. In that sense, responses can be said to be constrained by the structures of the social position.

Even so, Bourdieu does not reduce individuals to captives of their Habitus. He also describes it as enabling for three reasons. First, it can act as a buffer against the outside world and allow individuals to practice “their relative autonomy with respect to external determinations of the
immediate present” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 56). Second, internalizing a Habitus can be said to constitute a competence in itself. As Sewell puts it, agents “…are empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to mobilize resources and by the access to resources that enables them to enact schemas” (Sewell, 1992, p. 27). Finally, each individual retains the capacity to create new and unique expressions in any given social situation, while still being informed by the Habitus. Social space, it could be argued, is always evolving in response to production and reproduction of these complex social relationships as a result of interactions between the agents immersed in them. Agency is thus retained. In this framing, social change can be seen as a renegotiation of old schemas into new forms that are informed by the old ones. This captures how negotiation and mediation is a constant part of social interactions conducted by individuals navigating social space on the collective level, within and between Habiti.

The dynamic nature of the Habitus, and its strong ties to cultural schemas and resources, means that it can be described as “the dynamic intersection of structure and action, society and the individual...It is meant to capture the practical mastery that people have of their social situation, while grounding that mastery itself socially”(Postone, LiPuma, & Calhoun, 1993, p. 4). Its flexibility allows it to operate on several different levels of social analysis, and could help provide additional nuance and precision to several debates related to ethnic relations. Because a Habitus makes no assumption of any single identity as the ultimate determinant of the individual’s social position (Bourdieu, 1984), it avoids the problems of essentialism while retaining the ability to recognize the conditioning nature of (ethnic) identity for individual dispositions. Brubaker similarly proposes that vernacular labels instead should be treated as politicized categories to which individuals might assign themselves, allowing scholars to study them as events of mobilization in political space (Brubaker, 2004). This conceptualization should
make it possible to study both how essentialism affects immigrant actors from without but also how it influences the mobilization from within, and conversely how it impacts the perception of immigrant actors among civil servants, all of which are significant for conditioning the relationship between the government and immigrant organizations.

It also allows the scholar to differentiate between immigrants and persons that migrated while very young who share the social position of the mainstream society to a greater extent, due to having gone through the same process of socialization as most of the native born population. Likewise, the European discussion about so-called ‘second generation of immigrants’ in public space often lacks precision because of assumptions of an essential homogeneity within an immigrant community across generations. Such generalizations fail to account for the differences in experiences between the first and subsequent generations, particularly if the parental generation immigrated as adults and their children were born in the new host society. The second and subsequent generations, growing up within the “host country”, are informed by the experiences and perspectives of their parents, but adapt these dispositions to the new environment. Indeed, the second and subsequent generations can potentially generate a new Habitus that might become distinct from both mainstream society and that of the older generation, depending on variables like the degree of isolation from mainstream society, the institutional completeness of the immigrant community, and the cultural cohesiveness of the community. In some areas, particularly those strongly segregated from the host society, one can also speak about counter-cultures which constitute a third space between the old country and the new country, where both the parental generation and the people of the mainstream will be outsiders to some extent.
Finally, the concept of Habitus can help nuance the study of diasporas. It could be easy to assume that communities sharing ethnicity would be homogenous regardless of host society, for example, that a Chinese community in New York would be homogenous and identical to a Chinese community in Paris. However, the Habitus produced by each diaspora may be unique to each location, because each is immersed in a set of unique social circumstances, which will give each community a very particular set of shared experiences. This differentiates the community from diasporas living elsewhere. The Parisian community can therefore not be assumed to have experiences or dispositions that are identical to its compatriots in New York even though there are commonalities by virtue of the preservation of some cultural ties to the country of origin.

These examples reveal a range of advantages to using the Bourdieuan-inspired framework. It allows the scholar to avoid pitfalls like essentialization or groupist thinking, while still recognizing the experiential and dispositional difference between immigrant populations and the native born such. It facilitates an understanding for how communities form. Moreover, it manages to capture how community formation is fundamentally a relational process, one that is informed by relationships within the community as well as between the community and the surrounding society.

Habitus provides an understanding for how identity matters for mobilization in public space. Thus, while ethnicity can be significant, other identities, like religion, can also become salient and the understanding of these identities can differ between host societies and the immigrant communities themselves, which affects the relationship between them. The theory allows a discussion about the representation of certain experiences and perspectives that many people share and which, in this case, are linked by the migratory experience. How significant that
experience becomes in the society varies by factors like age at migration, or processes of racialization which might politicize immigrant-hood into something stereotyped.

One conclusion to draw from this is that maybe the present scholarship has been too focused on ethnicity. It seems most of the scholarship has focused on investigating ethnic organizations, such as the Korean, Turkish or Surinamese actors in the studies considered in Chapter Three. This may be because the scholars use the ethnic community as a point of departure for the study. While the formation certainly is significant, it is hardly the only possible avenue of mobilization for social action. For instance, none of these examined studies have discussed the role of the professional identity among immigrants for organizational mobilization. This is somewhat surprising, given the recognized significance of labour market integration for the socioeconomic standing of immigrants. Such mobilization could also be done on an inter-ethnic basis, where the immigrant status is the lowest common denominator.

The social space where immigrant communities and government bodies meet, and where social service delivery occurs, could be argued to the intersection of two different Habiti. Thus, the discussion in Chapter Two on how these interact could be framed as the relations between two Habiti. However, to facilitate the clarity of analysis here, the concept of Habitus will be reserved to discuss the dynamics of the policy community in this dissertation, and how meanings, dispositions, know-how and competence become framed within it, which ultimately implies that the structure of the Habitus can become a matter of contest between different actors, as they leverage their social, cultural and economic capital for to influence policy making and implementation. Having the power to set the parameter for the Habitus can be decisive for succeeding with that objective.
In summary, Bourdieu’s theory of practice has the capacity to recognize both structure and agency with great flexibility. The concept of Habitus is an effective and nuanced tool for understanding the processes of community building. It is also helpful for understanding how social space is structured, and how, consequently, the distribution of power within it can become contested. This understanding of how social space operates brings out the significance of models of governance for the structuring of the Habitus in greater clarity. For that reason, the text now turns to Grid/Group Cultural Theory and its applicability for this analytical context.

**How the Habitus of governance models affects relations between government and immigrant community actors**

The structure of a policy community depends greatly on how government has chosen to organize the implementation of policy, which ultimately is a question of public administration or management. Grid/Group Cultural Theory was originally conceived to learn more about institutional risk assessment and how certain phenomena become identified as threats at all (Douglas, 1982; Douglas, 1992; Thompson & Wildavsky, 1986; Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil, 2006; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). It can facilitate an understanding of how an institution’s organizational form creates a cognitive bias for its members through shared values and beliefs based on a common ‘way of life’ within the organization (Thompson et al., 1990). These affect the culture of the organization and, consequently, the way the members of the organization interpret the surrounding world and give meaning to it and their own role in relation to that environment (Geva-May, 2002; Thompson & Wildavsky, 1986). Notably, these framings correspond closely to how Bourdieu conceptualizes Habitus. It could thus be said that the organizational model shapes the Habitus of the policy community. The resulting behaviour affects government relations with other actors in terms of determining legitimacy and access to
decision-making arenas, policy networks or granting service delivery partnerships, as well as how such partnerships are structured.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grid (Rule-boundedness)</th>
<th>Group (Social cohesion)</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>The Fatalist Way</td>
<td>Low-co-operation, rule-bound approaches to organization. Example: Atomized societies sunk in rigid routines.</td>
<td>The Hierarchist Way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>The Individualist Way</td>
<td>Atomized approaches to organization stressing negotiation and bargaining. Example: Chicago-school doctrines of ‘government by the market’ and their antecedents.</td>
<td>The Egalitarian Way</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The typology is useful for analysing public management and organized along two axes (see Table 1). The first is Group, which indicates the degree to which the system is contained within coherent collective or bounded units (Thompson et al., 1990). In the case of public administration, it shows the extent to which the administration is “institutionally differentiated from other spheres of society” (Hood, 2000, p. 9).

The second is Grid. It indicates the degree to which the system is confined within rule-boundedness which “are visible rules about space and time related to social roles” (Douglas, 1982, p. 192) and constrain the activities of individuals in the system. In terms of public management, the axis can be seen as an indication of the “extent to which [it] is conducted according to well-understood general rules” (Hood, 2000, p. 9). The emerging types can be discussed both as cultural values and contexts where values have cultural consequences for
action within a particular social space. As will be demonstrated below, and through the rest of
the thesis, the organizational model has consequences for the formation of values and
perspectives in the policy community and, because of how those values and assumptions inform
decision-making and social action, for opportunity structures as well. An in-depth presentation of
the different Ways follows, starting with the Hierarchist Way and ending with the Fatalist Way.

The Hierarchist Way

The Hierarchist Way model is characterized by a combination of strongly bounded groups as
well as a great degree of binding prescriptions that constrain individual action (Thompson et al.,
1990). This type of organization is good at control and the exercise of authority (Hood, 2000). It
has been represented by a pyramidal organizational form (Swedlow, 2002) or a calculating
machine, “held together by special operating procedure” (Coyle, 1997, p. 63) that relies greatly
on the credibility of experts. Power is centralized in a fairly small caste of leadership, which can
impose its values on others (Hoppe, 2002). This corresponds to the traditional image of a
modernist Weberian bureaucracy (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). Hierarchist public administration
will thus privilege government actors (or members of the Hierarchy) as problem owners. As
Warner expressed it, a highly “professionalized service assume that the professional has the
solution and the client has the problem” (Warner, 2001, p. 189). The Hierarchist, in a sense, has
a fundamentally optimistic attitude towards public management: administrative problems can be
solved as long as the proper system is developed for that purpose.

Policy networks within this model will tend to be state centred and corporatist, where
governments invite a limited number of trusted social actors, typically labour unions and
employers, as collaborators in policy-making as has been the case in Sweden, Germany and
Japan, with its keiretsu, though Hood argues that French dirigisme, where the economy is led by
a technocratic elite, can fit this management style too (Hood, 2000). This closed structure is more compatible with paternalist style governance than other network models. This potentially makes it more difficult for new actors to gain access to decision-making arenas (Montpetit, 2009). The model is likely to fail in situations when “authority or expertise is insufficiently questioned, such that a large edifice comes to be built on shaky foundations, leading to dramatic collapse” (Hood, 2000, p. 28). The strong top-down structure ultimately obstructs efficient absorption of grass roots impulses that in some cases are necessary for the success of policy implementation.

The heavy groupist emphasis on cohesion within the public administration should lead to a Habitus with a comparatively clearly boundary between those who belong and are insiders, members of the sub-government, and those who are outsiders, a line that separates civil servants from the rest of society. This has consequences for how cultural and social capital is structured. For example, social networks will more likely be centred on the civil servant group. Consequentially, the same group will be more likely to be the agents who determine which forms of cultural capital manifestations are to be considered legitimate for the policy community, particularly in its sub-government arena.

Examples of this type of organization abound, because it has been quite popular historically, for instance the Confucian-style organization of Imperial Chinese public administration, or the traditional, rule-bound British civil service (Hood, 2000). An extreme form of this would be an army. Its organizational structure is akin to a pyramid, with power formally centralized to the top. Note, for example, how commonly historical narratives of battles tend to centre on the actions of the commanding officer of the army, revealing the assumption that this person is the primary agent and decision-maker of the organization. The members of the organization are taught to obey their superiors, and as they gain recognition and experience, they
rise through the organization by achieving higher ranks, which are even represented with insignia on their clothing, and each rank has clearly formulated rights and responsibilities.

Figure 6: The structure of the Hierarchist policy community

The Hierarchist solution employs paternalistic policy-making processes that obstructs bottom-up impulses. Figure 6 illustrates the effects on the policy community. It will likely consist of the leading government agencies, which will both fund services and offer their own. Further, some trusted non-government actors, like unions or employer organizations, will have membership in the sub-government field. However, there will be notable difficulties for other actors to enter that sphere, and thus the line separating the sub-government from the attentive public has here been illustrated with a thick line. Immigrant actors will be more likely to be outside the sub-government than inside it. They can either be cast as irrelevant for the policy process or even be categorized as a ‘special interest’ that is an impediment to finding solutions.
for the common good. They will more likely to be considered ‘outsiders’ and thus less likely to have access to the networks that are important for social capital, and likewise less likely to be able to generate the types of cultural capital that the ‘insider’ civil servants will recognize as legitimate within the social space of the policy community. The participation of immigrant actors will therefore most likely be constrained.

The Egalitarian Way

This part of the group-grid scale is characterized by strong group boundaries and cohesion, but few restraining rules (Thompson et al., 1990). The Egalitarian Way relies on group solidarity for policy implementation. As such, the Egalitarian Way is especially good at promoting “social cohesion” (Hood, 2000, p. 60), and can often deliver good social compromise outcomes.

The model is based on radical decentralization to avoid hierarchical top-down structures with their lack of participatory opportunities. Instead, it relies extensively on self-administering face-to-face interactions (Hood, 2000) and peer-group accountability. Advocates value the lay knowledge of users over that of experts, and focuses blame on hostile outsiders to the organization when something goes awry. Terms like ‘Empowerment’ have been popular in Egalitarian discourse, and can be found in the European Social Fund programs targeting groups at risk for social exclusion in the labour market during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Hellstrom, 2001).

The model aims at dissolving the difference between the producer and the client, and favours delivery through the representatives of the target group, though how the legitimacy of such representation should be determined might not always be clear (Hoppe, 2002). Every day public management should therefore be conducted “through low-level organizations, voluntary
organizations, self-help associations rather than central state bureaucracies” (Hood, 2000, p. 122). Of the four Ways, this is the one that relies most heavily on NGOs for service delivery.

The networks that emanate from the Egalitarian Way provide ample space for interest groups to engage in problem solving and deep relations with state actors. Indeed, since the interest groups own the issue as well as the delivery, networks would have a clientelist flavour in the sense that NGOs would be more able to constrain state actors in comparison to the other models. That said, clientelist networks are commonly described as having only one group in the field, which would be an exaggeration (Montpetit, 2009). The primary weakness of the Egalitarian Way manifests when solidarity is absent or lacking, participation is weak, or entrenched local power structures co-opt the participatory agenda, which results in lacking ability to reach consensus, mobilize small scale organizations or free-riding issues, as well as risks the paralysis or collapse of the organizational service delivery framework (Hood, 2000).

The groupist dimension of this policy model is likely to create a strong sense of community among the participants in the policy community, which like in the case of the Hierarchist Way, can create strong boundaries between those inside the sub-government and those on the outside, in the attentive public. However, in this model, the inside group is more likely to the actors representing grass roots, with networks based on their interactions with each other. Likewise, these actors will be highly influential with regards to what types of cultural capital is considered legitimate as status in the Habitus.

One example of the Egalitarian management model was the ‘Community Free School’ of Boston and the communal organization in Twin Oaks. It was an attempt to remove the power of professional educators in school and empower parents by directly involving the latter in school management as the decision-making body. A more common way of implementing this model is
the ‘Neighbourhood Watch’ system, which directly engages residents to take an active part in crime prevention operations (Hood, 2000).

Figure 7: The structure of the Egalitarian policy community

The Egalitarian model could be conducive to immigrant agency since it relies on a bottom-up approach for management solutions. As seen in the configuration in Figure 7, government agencies will be more likely to take a residual role, funding services rather than delivering them in-house. Non-government organizations will instead be trusted as the service delivery agencies, and these could well be immigrant community agencies. Its success will, however, depend greatly on the structure of social networks within the immigrant communities and depends primarily on whether they have strong internal solidarity, if the actors in the field are genuinely representative of the people they serve, and if they can achieve consensus on how to address social issues.
This has been by represented the relationship arrows between actors in Figure 7. Thus, the individual users who are members of NGOs in the sub-government will have access to a platform that can influence government policy with some potency. However, immigrant community organizations that are not part of the sub-government sphere will not have access to such influence channels. In such situations, the relations between insider and outsider immigrant community organizations will be important. If these two are in conflict, the members of the outsider organizations will likely be ignored or lack recognition by government funders.

**The Individualist Way**

The Individualist Way can be found in the low group, low grid corner of the matrix. Actors here are bound by neither prescriptions nor group boundaries, and all potential collective action is “done provisionally and on the basis of negotiation” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 7). If there is any social cohesion to speak of, it will very much resemble “the ideal of the free market” (Douglas, 1982, p. 194).

Like the Egalitarian Way, this is a bottom-up approach. Individualists also prefer the knowledge of the practitioners over experts and base problem analysis on meetings with network members. Problem ownership is assigned to the actor that has the highest stakes in solving the problem (Hoppe, 2002).

Unlike Egalitarians, Individualists lack faith in the inherent good of people, assuming instead that human beings will always be opportunistic and self-serving. They therefore rely on positive incentive structures and trust markets to produce good results, which is why competitive procurement is a common solution for service delivery (Hood, 2000). Such market mechanisms are thought to lead to greater quality of service and less waste of resources through a customer-salesperson type of accountability.
Since networking is the social interaction of choice in this model (Hoppe, 2002), pluralist networks with many actors competing for the attention of policy-makers tend to develop. Due to the competitive environment and fragmented community, interest groups tend to confine themselves to advocacy rather than more in-depth co-operation with government bodies (Montpetit, 2009). The model will experience failure when “private self-interest is put before public or collective interest” (Hood, 2000, p. 27), as well as when self-interest prevents effective co-operation.

This management model is likely to produce a more porous and fragmented field, and as such, the Habitus will be less clearly externally bounded. Instead, there will more mobility, and the ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ dynamic will likely be less salient for relationships within the policy community. Indeed, the border for where the sub-government begins and ends will be more difficult to locate. Likewise, the competitive nature of the field is likely to produce less stable social networks between service providers and funders. This dimension could, in some ways, even undermine the generation of trust in the Habitus. At the same time, the generation of cultural capital will likely be more ‘up for grabs’, where the actor with the best service delivery outcomes for the moment becomes framed as authority figures and thus define what type of manifestation that will be seen as legitimate.

The most salient contemporary example of Individualist-style public management is the doctrine of the New Public Management, inspired by the Chicago School ‘government by the market’ solutions. As the Keynesian consensus was challenged during the late 70s, it largely displaced Hierarchism as a dominating paradigm, particularly in countries like the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada and the United States (Hood, 2000). New Public Management has two main components. The first is that co-operation between the public sector and service
deliverers from either the private or non-profit sector or goods take the form of Public-Private Partnerships (Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999; Greve, 2008; Kettl, 2005). The partnerships are based on contractual relationships that aim to increase cost-efficiency, improve service quality, and make policy implementation more responsive to local needs (Kettl, 2000). The second is an emphasis on increased accountability. This is allegedly achieved by moving from top-down, rule-based systems to bottom-up, as well as result-driven performance indicators. However, the NPM discourse itself is vague as to how achieve these ambitions. For example, New Zealand is often cited as the country pioneering the New Public Management model, but even there public servants “tended to over-concentrate on outputs (e.g., cases completed) at the expense of the final outcomes (e.g., satisfied clients)…” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p. 88). Governments have been left to ‘fill in’ how to devise such indicators, and they have made use of traditional quantitative measurements, often implemented in an ad hoc fashion.

Figure 8: The structure of the Individualist policy community
The Individualist Way could be conducive to immigrant agency in the policy community, given its focus on bottom-up impulses for decision-making. As shown in Figure 8, above, this is the management model that is most likely to have the most porous line between sub-government and the attentive public. The government will take the residual role as a funder, but use market-like competition to contract for services. That means that no single actor can be sure of permanent funding and a service delivery agency that has won a contract at one time might lose it at a later date, as users change service delivery agency when they are dissatisfied (see the arrows between the actors in Figure 8). That makes it easier for smaller actors to enter, including immigrant community actors. Again, the success of the model will depend greatly on the structure of social networks within the immigrant communities that are to be served. The Individualist Way would be best suited for a community that is strongly divided between competing groups which lack mutual solidarity, since it relies more on market-based solutions where social networking is only done on an ad hoc basis.

The Fatalist Way

The Fatalist Way assumes that solidarity is at best an unachievable utopia and that every system invites fraud and opportunism. Therefore, the state must not only protect itself but also identify and neutralize perpetrators of such behaviour. The guiding philosophy of this model is mistrust and it introduces random control mechanisms for the purpose of minimizing free-riding, like traffic stops with breath-testing for drivers (Hood, 2000). While hierarchies might not be as clear, and organization is less focused as in the Hierarchist Way, those subjected to fatalist organization are still controlled from above (Thompson et al., 1990) and in that sense the Fatalist Way shares disempowering traits with the Hierarchist Way (Hoppe, 2002).
The unpredictability (Swedlow, 2002) and lack of trust leads actors to shy away from collaboration. They fear that such efforts will be co-opted by others or yield small returns for substantial efforts. Co-operation is therefore seen as inherently problematic (Hood, 2000), and its absence in the arena is another characteristic of the Fatalist Way. Cynicism is, in this sense, a central characteristic of this Way. A Fatalist will likely be convinced that any prospect of solving problems in anything but a short term capacity is futile.

An example of a society entrenched in the Fatalist Way could be the poor village of Montegrano in southern Italy, where the central feature of communal behaviour was the lack of co-operation for the purpose of creating public goods. Citizens of the community were deeply mistrustful and cynical of civil servants and generally saw them to be corrupt, and the social environment encouraged civil servants to reciprocate the mistrust (Hood, 2000). Workfare programs could also be an example of Fatalist style practices. They often emphasize control and mistrust of social welfare users, framing them as potential opportunists and free riders and subjecting them to drug testing, literacy testing, coercing them to completing certain workloads, as assigned by case officers, before receiving their welfare remuneration (Herd, Mitchell, & Lightman, 2005; Lightman et al., 2006; Lightman et al., 2006).

This model would likely produce dirigist networks, in the tradition of France where NGOs were too weak to challenge or influence policy agendas and at best are informed when decisions and policies have already been finalized. In such a context, they are strongly constrained by the fact that government “do not value the contribution of...interest groups” (Montpetit, 2009, p. 279). This results in a fragmented community that has no incentive to organize or mobilize. Instead, activist individuals will be more likely to be able influence policy-making by joining the government actor as employees (Montpetit, 2009). Governance failures
likely “consist of inaction or inability to change course even in extreme and pressing circumstances calling for a decisive response outside normal routine” (Hood, 2000, p. 28). This is due to “lack of enthusiasm, lack of disposition to take responsibility or to plan for apparently predictable events” (Hood, 2000, p. 44).

Out of the four management models, this is the one that will most likely result in the most fragmented Habitus. The emphasis on mistrust will make cohesion very difficult, and actively undermine the generation of social capital. The top-down structure will also mean that the upper levels of the organization will retain all but exclusive power over how cultural capital manifests, with grass root actors likely to lack the capacity to influence this to any significant extent.

**Figure 9: The structure of the Fatalist policy community**

As shown in Figure 9, this would be the management model with the highest barrier between attentive public and sub-government. The ideological basis of the Fatalist solution,
mistrust, in itself would prompt policy-makers to assume that immigrant actors and clients are opportunists trying to co-opt the policy-process. This would lead to a great reluctance to allow such actors into the field, and if they are allowed in, they would only be so under onerous accountability regimes which directly impact the efficiency of service delivery. Civil servants will also frequently be rotated to prevent the formation of clientelist networks, perceived as undue nepotism, giving the actors undue access to public funds. This could potentially obstruct the participation of immigrant actors and lead to a generally weak development of social capital in the policy community.

**Conclusions**

The Hierarchist and the Fatalist Ways are less conducive to immigrant group agency and the Individualist and Egalitarian Ways are more conducive to it. The former are top-down systems that are more conducive to paternalism in that they privilege the higher echelons with agenda-setting and decision-making power. In Bourdieuan terminology, this also translates into the privilege of defining which artefacts and forms of cultural capital that should be considered valid within the Habitus of the field. Their reliance on rule-boundedness also gives little flexibility with regards to impulses from frontline actors, regardless if these are civil servants or users.

In contrast, the latter two models share the commonality of being bottom-up approaches to management precisely because they are less bound by rules, and provide the flexibility that is needed to create space for bottom-up impulses. In these cases, the grass root actors will be more likely to access social capital and participate in the definition of what constitutes legitimate cultural capital and what does not in the Habitus. Whether they will fail or succeed will depend greatly on the internal structure of the community. If it is internally coherent, relatively homogenous, and has a well-established consensus, then the Egalitarian Way will be more
conducive to success. If it is internally conflicted, with strife and competing interests that cannot compromise or see eye-to-eye, then the Individualist Way will be better suited for the community. The degree to which the two management models have been entrenched in the policy community Habitus will thus determine which dynamic will have primacy. In the next chapter, this theoretical framework is applied to an overview of the history of labour market integration policy in Canada and Sweden, to investigate what models of governance have shaped the communities in question.
Chapter 5: The impact of labour market administration on immigrant agency in Canada and Sweden

Building on the theory introduced in Chapter Four, this chapter continues the engagement with public management models by asking the question: How have historical public management solutions in Sweden and Canada facilitated or constrained immigrant agency in the labour market integration policy community? It answers this by reviewing the historical development of the labour market administration and the policy community of active labour market policies in Sweden and Canada, a key policy field for labour market integration. These organizational solutions chosen through history are analyzed using Grid/Group Cultural Theory and Bourdieu’s theory of practice. The review is somewhat limited by the scarcity of studies that discuss the organization of labour market administration generally and the state’s relation to immigrant community organizations specifically, but it can still provide valuable insight into the general outline of governance in the two countries.

Sweden has enjoyed an international reputation for its Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP), which has been described as the flagship of its Social Democratic welfare state and was the source of inspiration for that welfare type in Esping-Andersen’s famous three model typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Historically, the Swedish system of governance has been characterized by strongly Hierarchist centralization, where the labour market policy has been solidly within the jurisdiction of the national government and a closed corporatist network structure effectively has excluded immigrant groups from the policy community sub-government.

Canada, on the other hand, is an Anglo-Saxon country with liberal traditions, and a strongly decentralized federation at that. It thus differs from Sweden in some respects. First,
while Hierarchist ideals have also been embraced at some points in history, the commitment to them was shorter, and Egalitarian ideals rose to prominence for a significant period of time. Second, both provincial and federal governments have claimed labour market policy as part of their jurisdiction, leading to conflict between the two. Both of these factors have contributed to a more pluralist network structure with openings for immigrant groups that have not existed in Sweden. That said the policy communities in the two countries also had some similarities, particularly in terms of how they have been influenced by New Public Management over the past couple of decades. These differences and similarities will be explored here, starting with Sweden and ending with Canada.

Sweden is a unitary country where labour market policy has traditionally been under the jurisdiction of the national government, while Canada is a strongly decentralized federation where both federal and provincial governments have historically been actively involved in the sub-government of the policy community, which makes it comparatively more difficult to make statements that are valid for all of Canada than for Sweden. For this reason, the text showcases the role of the federal government and its relations to the provinces of British Columbia and Ontario. Their two major cities, Vancouver and Toronto, are major receivers of new arrivals to Canada, making them highly relevant.

The chapter concludes by drawing some conclusions with regards to what type of effects, in terms of immigrant agency, that might be expected in the two countries. I argue that the organization of Canadian policy has allowed immigrant groups to organize and deliver labour market services to their own constituencies, whereas Swedish policy has obstructed such mobilization. This finding can provide at least a partial explanation for the greater labour market success of immigrants in Canada as compared to Sweden.
The case of Sweden

As a unitary country, Sweden has traditionally had a strong and centralized national government, which has been able to monopolize the implementation of labour market policy and remained the only, uncontested actor within the policy community for decades after World War II. This changed only after the economic crisis of the early 1990s, when reforms inspired by New Public Management were introduced, including procurement of service delivery and an increased role for municipalities in the field, both of which have changed how labour market policy is implemented in the country. The following details this history, from the start of the centralized national government agency during the rise of Keynesianism, through the post-war period to the end of the 1970s, to the transitional decade of the 1980s. It ends with an account of the developments during the two decades of New Public Management reform post 1990.

The rise of Keynesianism: 1940s-1970s

This section deals with history of the Swedish labour market policy. Organizationally, it could be said that the present day labour market administration saw its initial establishment in 1940, when the National Labour Market Commission was incorporated as a new government agency with responsibility to administer labour market policy on the national level. Municipal offices were nationalized under its auspices and the commission evolved into a central government agency, the National Labour Market Board, in 1948 (Jangenäs, 1985). Over time, administrative bodies in the field were merged with the Board, effectively creating the agency known as the Labour Market Administration.

The Labour Market Board was the highest level of this agency and dealt with issues of national strategy. 24 County Labour Boards were incorporated below it, responsible for the regional coordination of labour market policy. The local level, finally, consisted of the
Employment Service offices which implemented the labour market policies under the direction of District Labour Boards (Jangenäs, 1985). The agency enjoyed a virtual monopoly on service delivery throughout the period (Riksrevisionen, 2006), based on legislation that banned for-profit agencies from operating in the field (Dahlberg, 1988; Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009).

Originally, these offices were geared towards servicing the labour market participation of men, particularly labourers, and retained this focus as it developed (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009), which likely has had an impact on its organizational culture. Moreover, front line civil servants had the right to assign clients to vocational training programs, giving them important roles as gatekeepers (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). The literature does not discuss to what extent clients were able to influence these decisions.

This was also a time of considerable expansion. The number of offices grew from 156 in 1939 to 253 in 1945. The number of employees also increased, from 464 in 1940, when most offices were staffed by only one person, to 2272 in 1945 (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). This continued during the early post-war era, which saw an expansion of vocational training programs for the unemployed (Jangenäs, 1985). Public expenditure levels on ALMPs rose too, and by the mid-to-late ‘60s they were about five times higher than those of unemployment insurance, underlining Sweden’s unusually strong commitment to ALMPs compared to other countries (Olsen, 1988).

The top-down centralization of the policy during this period effectively eliminated all actors besides the national agency, privileging the top levels of this body to implement policy as mandated by the national government. Moreover, it effectively assumed that problem-solving capacity and competence could be delivered by the enlightened technocrats of this level in the organization. Both of these correspond closely to top-down management principles. The
narrative indicates that the Habitus was a closely bounded one, defined by the formal borders of
the public administration with jurisdiction over the policy area, with the implications this had for
the generation of social and cultural capital.

Immigration was regarded as an issue of labour force skills and thus integrated under the
auspices of the National Labour Market Board, which thus had the responsibility to provide
introduction services to newcomers. While immigration was fairly low during the early years, it
increased significantly during the growth years of the 1960s, when migrants from the Nordic
countries and southern Europe arrived. Olofsson argues that the changing demographics of the
client base presented new challenges for the employment offices (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009),
likely because the agency lacked the skills required to provide newcomers from Southern Europe
with adequate service.

Immigration policy changed radically during the economic crisis of the early 1970s when
labour unions successfully pushed for an end to labour immigration. Treaties kept borders open
for Nordic migrants and, later, migrants from the EU countries. For others, however, the refugee
and family class streams remained the dominant modes of entry to the country (Frank, 2005;
Johansson, 2008). Even so, the demographic change was lasting and is reflected in a report from
1978, which acknowledges a range of inadequacies that the agency needed to address, including
better language competence, more information published in several languages, as well as
increasing the organizational knowledge levels concerning foreign educational credentials.
Likewise, program content was considered insufficiently adapted for the clients’ individual
needs. The recruitment function of the agency also needed attention, since language competence
was not considered a merit, and very few case officers had immigrant heritage. Likewise, new
recruits got very little training before acting as case officers for immigrant clients (Olderin & Karlsson, 1978).

A couple of suggested solutions stand out as particularly interesting in the 1978 report. Olderin and Karlsson argued that the agency needed to start collaborating with immigrant organizations, so that immigrants could participate more in decisions affecting their situation and facilitate outreach to immigrant communities. Similarly, they proposed that language training initiated by immigrants should be added to the agency registry (Olderin & Karlsson, 1978). There is no evidence that any of these proposals were ever implemented.

The report also contains language that is quite paternalist in nature. The title itself, “Our responsibility for the immigrants”, is very revealing with regards to who is considered the active subject and who is not. The concern for understanding this new demographic of clients is expressed thusly:

We must familiarize ourselves in the thought processes of immigrants so that we understand why they don’t understand as well as Swedes and learn how to express ourselves to become understood. What is self-evident for a Swede is often unintelligible for an immigrant (Olderin & Karlsson, 1978, p. 33, author’s translation).

Notice how the passage captures a series of skills that the authors considered important, and which become artefacts of cultural capital. In this case, they both capture deficiencies within the public administration, but also skills that the immigrants will have to internalize and master to gain recognition in the field. This passage clearly thus separates the agency ‘we’ from the immigrant ‘them’, displaying clear difficulties in understanding this ethnic ‘other’, that, as implied by the title, the agency has under the powers of its care. An organizational culture of entrenched paternalism towards this client group is strongly suggested.
Between the two top-down management models, it seems developments during this era correspond closer to Hierarchist ideals than Fatalist ones. The first indicator of this is the attention to centralization into a single national organization. This is more characteristic for the Hierarchist beliefs in rational, top-down planning for policy implementation. The second indicator is the absence of onerous accountability regimes and controls on users. This is where the focus of Fatalist thinking lies, and if such concerns are absent, Fatalist principles are, too.

Finally, the perspective on immigrants seem to correspond more to Hierarchist beliefs than Fatalist beliefs in the sense that they are constructed as a group of users who need the assistance the benevolent agency civil servants, rather than threatening potential free-riders. Moreover, framing them as a difficult to understand ‘other’ is also quite compatible with Hierarchist management. It, again, reflects top-down management philosophy in the sense that it discusses immigrant users in terms of a target group that ‘we’, the enlightened civil servants, need to assist, which assumes that immigrants need that assistance. Indeed, the self-image integral to an organizational culture that sharply differentiates between the members of the agency who are framed as experts and the users who need the help of those experts constitutes a world view of divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to begin with, and that can very well fuel a process of otherization. This framing also vested the position of the civil servant itself with cultural capital. As such, the sub-government area of the policy community comes across as closed, where the power over social and cultural capital formation is firmly situated within the public administration.

**The decline of Keynesianism: the 1980s**

By the mid-1980s, the Labour Market Administration was firmly established. The decision-making level was characterized by corporatist decision-making, with representatives from the
central labour unions and the employer confederation having a majority of seats in the central Board Directorate (Jangenä, 1985; Rollén, 1988; Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). Rights-seeking equity groups, like women’s or ethnic minority organizations, had no representation, and thus little access to significant social capital and limited influence over the manifestation of cultural capital.

During the mid-1980s, the agency experienced its first major reform, as the training and rehabilitation function was separated into a government agency of its own, called the AMU Group (acronym for Arbetsmarknadsutbildning, which roughly translates to Vocational Training). It copied the parent agency’s organizational and decision-making structure (Rollén, 1988) and its purpose was to deliver courses, generally at an upper-secondary school level (Rollén, 1988), to clients needing long term skill training programs to prepare for entry into the labour market. Immigrants were categorized as a ‘disadvantaged group’ (like people with disabilities) and made up an important target group for these courses (Jonzon, 1988; Rollén, 1988). Clients were assigned to these centres by the Employment Service offices (Leijon, 1988), which retained case-management duties (Dahlberg, 1988).

Meanwhile, the immigration process changed, with more emphasis being put on social integration and less on labour market integration. As a part of this shift, municipalities were given responsibility for settlement services. The ‘Whole Sweden Strategy’ (author’s translation) was the result, a policy which involved sending newcomers to any municipalities with available housing. However, these vacancies were generally a consequence of local populations moving away to seek employment. The result was a considerable delay with regards to entering the labour market for immigrants who were effectively sent to live in unemployment (Ekberg, 2004).
The policy might have satisfied the needs of municipalities with housing vacancies, but arguably
did not meet the needs of the immigrants.

The economic growth and labour shortages of the late 1980s did little to remove barriers
preventing immigrants from entering the labour market (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). The
Labour Market Administration agency concluded that main problem consisted of immigrants
having the wrong competence profiles to accept the available jobs (Invandrare till arbete: Ett
handlingsprogram för arbetsmarknadsverket.1994). This placed the blame for the failure on the
immigrants themselves, suggesting that the agency could provide them with a competence they
lacked through training programs, an attitude that corresponds well with the Hierarchist belief in
the enlightened expert which assists and improves the unenlightened client. The entrenchment of
cultural capital in the role of the civil servant thus continued.

The municipalities asserting themselves in refugee housing policy and the breaking up of
the Labour Market Administration into two agencies can be said to have challenged the
monopoly that this national agency had enjoyed in previous periods. These constituted a break
away from the previous situation in the sense that the monopoly of social and cultural capital
within the Labour Market Administration now became challenged both by the second national
agency but also by municipal administrations. Even so, it is doubtful if these developments can
be said to represent a shift in management models in the policy community. Its top-down
structure remained, with immigrant users having little to no say. Again, the accountability
regimes of mistrust were absent, indicating that this period can be seen as a continuation of
Hierarchist management, albeit one where several public agencies, all of them hierarchies on
different governmental levels, started competing with each other.
The rise of NPM: the 1990s and onwards

The early 1990s saw a serious economic recession in Sweden, and immigrants were adversely affected. The Labour Market Board reacted with a report discussing a range of suggestions for how to address their persistent exclusion in the labour market. The language of the report is reminiscent of the text from 1978. It notes that “weak groups, including immigrants with low levels of education, poor Swedish language skills and deviant cultural and social backgrounds, have great challenges in finding a place in working life” (Invandrare till arbete: Ett handlingsprogram för arbetsmarknadsverket. 1994, p. 10, author’s translation). Like in the text from the 1970s, the text signals that immigrants are different from mainstream Swedish culture, in this case by using the word ‘deviant’. This difference is then used as an explanation for immigrant exclusion from the labour market, and becomes a manifestation of the type of cultural capital that is not acceptable within the Habitus and has to be transformed into something that is considered legitimate instead. Thus, the ‘othering’ of immigrants was still accepted within the organizational culture.

While the report noted that the agency had developed some special bridging programs for the benefit of highly skilled immigrants within several professional areas, including social work, psychology, educators and dentistry, it also repeated many of the suggestions from the 1978 document. This included the need to properly assess educational credentials, and greater flexibility and adaptability in the face of a more culturally and socially diverse client group. Likewise, it repeated the suggestion of increasing the competence about foreign cultures among agency case officers (Invandrare till arbete: Ett handlingsprogram för arbetsmarknadsverket, 1994). That the agency continued to wrestle with these issues almost twenty years later could very well be a reflection of the inherent top-down structure of the Hierarchist management,
possibly an effect of the isolation of the policy community sub-government Habitus from the social space of the uses, and the ensuring lacking capacity to absorb bottom-up impulses and respond to the needs of a diverse group of users.

The report also advocated more cooperation between the agency, the private sector, public employers, vocational trainers and municipalities, but not immigrant actors, to build programs targeting immigrants facilitate their social and cultural adaptation to life in Sweden. Again, the implication is that deficits among the immigrants were the root cause for exclusion, marking particular cultural capital in the form of know-how as necessary for recognition. Finally, it noted that better tracking systems should be developed to avoid having clients get stuck in a cycle of referrals to different training programs without actually getting closer to the labour market (Invandrare till arbete: Ett handlingsprogram för arbetsmarknadsverket, 1994).

The initial response to the increased unemployment of the recession was to simply expand the job search activities. The size of the agency also swelled to about 9900 employees by 1993 (Trehörning, 1993), including some programs targeted immigrants specifically. For instance, the National Labour Market Board cooperated with the Swedish Immigration Board and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities as well as major employer organizations and trade unions to produce an introduction to working life for this target group, where municipalities in cooperation with the local Employment Service office were tasked with devising so-called individual introduction plans for new immigrants (Trehörning, 1993). The goal of these plans was to facilitate settlement for newcomers by introducing them to Swedish society. As the case shows, the corporatist approach where government agencies and traditional social partners were the only actors involved remained deeply entrenched as a model for
‘problem solving’, revealing the resilience of Hierarchist beliefs within the organizational culture of the field.

Another development during the decade was Sweden’s accession to the European Union in 1995, adding another level of governance to the labour market policy community. This manifested through the funding available through the European Social Fund, the ESF, which provided EU grants for experimental projects in the labour market service field. A key theme of the ESF was empowerment, which was reflected in how project funding was accessible to any organization, including non-traditional NGOs (Hellstrom, 2000). While these funds involved comparatively small sums, they could be quite significant locally (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). For instance, even though most of the funding was channelled through the traditional actors in the policy community, some of these funds were actually accessed by immigrant actors during the years 1996-1999 (Hellstrom, 2000). The programmatic emphasis on empowerment ideals in this funding stream reflected a commitment to Egalitarian ideals on the EU-level; however, the marginalization of non-traditional actors as project owners implies reluctance among Swedish public agencies to embrace those ideals.

More significantly, the 1990s can rightly be spoken of as representing a major shift in Swedish labour market policy, further underlined by the changes introduced by the centre-right government (1991-1994), many of which were inspired by New Public Management. One such development was the reform of the Board of Directors of the National Labour Market Board. The new government framed the old corporatist speaking partners of labour unions and employers as ‘special interests’ and argued that they should not be a part of the decision-making bodies in government agencies. They were dismissed from the Board in June of 1992, against protests from both the agency itself as well as the major labour unions. Still, a residual corporatist
construction remained, as the parties were present in a new advisory council appointed by the Board. Corporatist decision-making also continued to exist in the executive on the regional level (Trehörning, 1993).

Additionally, performance measurement systems were introduced early in the decade as a response to the critique that the agency was too bureaucratic, rule-bound, inflexible, and wasted resources. In the early 2000s, the chosen indicators included the number of clients getting a job 90 days after completing a labour market training program, the number of long term unemployed persons registered at the employment office per month and the number of clients with an individual action plan (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). In short, they were predominantly quantitative in nature. Critics have pointed out that these types of performance indicators can lead to “creaming”, where those most in need of service risk exclusion because of the need to satisfy the indicators over the short term.

1993 also saw the abolishment of the monopoly on service delivery, a major structural reform which allowed for-profit actors to operate in the sector (Riksrevisionen, 2006; Trehörning, 1993; Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). It also opened up the field for public procurement of services, like vocational training programs, from non-public actors. The system operates on a performance principle, where higher success rates are rewarded with greater remuneration (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009).

The same year, the AMU Group was turned into a Crown Corporation and started operating as a for-profit training centre, supplying the Employment Service offices with training programs purchased through procurement. It was not the only actor involved in such a contractual relationship; municipal adult education authorities, upper secondary schools, institutes of higher education, folk high schools (Nordic adult education institutions that do not
confer academic degrees), adult education associations and some private companies (Trehörning, 1993) as well as some labour union bodies also supplied services. Even so, the Crown Corporation, called Lernia since 2000, remains the principal supplier (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). Notably, most of these actors are public agencies or mainstream NGOs.

Clearly, the Individualist principles of New Public Management had a more pervasive impact on the policy community than any other set of reforms since World War II. The influence could be seen in the organization of the Labour Market Administration, the introduction of performance indicators, the privatization of a principal actor and the opening up of the arena to others. Even so, these reforms mostly affected formal arrangements. Thus, even though the relations between actors were now regulated through contractual agreement, in practice government actors of different kinds, as well as folk high schools, continued to dominate the field (Osman, 2005). There has been more than one example of this. For instance, the case in Örebro where the Employment service implemented programs for labour market integration without consulting or collaborating with immigrant community actors (Freyne-Lindhagen & Petterson, 2000). Likewise, in a study from the mid-2000s, Odmalm pointed out how the corporatist network structure of the policy community continued to obstruct immigrant community actors from entering the sub-government to a significant degree (Odmalm, 2004b). The persistence of the pattern reveals the resilience of Hierarchist structures, and the inertia of Habitus.

Another development was the increasing presence of municipal governments on the labour market field (Lundin, 2007); both because of municipal initiative and policy downloading from the national level (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). Historically not involved, municipalities traditionally had the responsibility for providing social welfare assistance to those who did not
qualify for unemployment insurance. As the ranks of unemployed swelled, so did the number of
people who never qualified for, or lost, this insurance. The burden on municipal budgets rapidly
increased and many local governments therefore took their own initiative to move clients out of
their system. Over time, major municipalities developed employment service centres, which
offered services very similar to those of the national labour market administration (Touche,
2005). In 2002, two thirds of the municipalities had some form of policy aiming towards the
labour market activation of social welfare recipients (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009).

However, the municipal governments have been insufficiently equipped to handle the
new task. For instance, their databases were created to manage welfare assistance at a household
level, rather than at an individual level, and thus many agencies lacked information about clients.
As a result, the effectiveness of the interventions was unclear (Salonen & Ulmestig, 2004).
Moreover, the objective for the municipal agencies has been to get clients off the municipal
welfare rolls (Salonen & Ulmestig, 2004), which can be achieved by moving the clients into the
national employment insurance system. While this satisfies municipal interests, the result for the
(immigrant) client might be a simple change of funder for welfare remuneration, rather than a
step closer to entering the labour market.

Moreover, municipalities and the national labour market agency have had a conflictive
relationship regarding the treatment of welfare receiving clients. Several municipalities
expressed frustration over how employment offices treated welfare recipients, arguing that case
officers there remained too focused on clients qualifying for employment insurance to give
welfare recipients adequate service. The national agency retorted that the municipalities were
trying to off-load costs on the national government (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). In effect,
neither of these actors wanted responsibility to service these clients. That members would act to
defend the self-interest of their organization is hardly surprising. However, the behaviour does
expose the sharp division between client and civil servant in traditional Hierarchist management,
where the interest of the two does not coincide and the management model creates a social
distance between them.

In 1998, the legislation surrounding social welfare changed, empowering municipalities
to sanction welfare recipients who refuse to participate in activity programs by reducing or
removing benefits (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). They have acted accordingly (Salonen &
Ulmestig, 2004). For instance, clients must be physically on the premises of the agency resource
centre three hours per day, five days a week to ensure that the person is not involved in black
market activities and moreover absences can result in revoked remuneration (Touche, 2005). In
some cases, mistrust in the clients’ position on the labour market has been used as a rationale to
question their capacity as parents (Salonen & Ulmestig, 2004). The national labour market
agency case officer similarly has powers to sanction clients who refuse to cooperate in the
creation of an individual action to find employment by cancelling employment insurance
(Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009).

These reforms have not facilitated immigrant integration on the labour market. Instead,
their exclusion became further entrenched throughout the period. The labour market
administration has even increasingly constructed immigrants as a ‘problem group’ (like women,
the under-educated, persons with disabilities and youth) and therefore an impediment to
economic growth (Peralta Prieto, 2006). Indeed, evidence indicates that frontline civil servants
during this time have allowed their practices to be informed by discriminatory stereotypes in
their communication with immigrant youth (Hertzberg, 2003). Consequently, the unemployed,
and particularly those from the mentioned ‘problem groups’ are exposed to greater mistrust and
increased scrutiny by the government agencies that are supposed to facilitate their re-entry into the labour market. Both are characteristic of the type of paternalism of Fatalist management models and the mistrust that arguably is detrimental to the user’s capacity to development social and cultural capital.

The reforms since the 1990s have been critiqued, as the introduction of market-inspired mechanisms is seen by some as a threat to transparency and democratic control. While they have meant a step away from the national labour market agency completely dominating the field, policy-making is still centralized to the national agency and it remains strong (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009).

In 2008, the Centre-Right wing Reinfeldt government coalition that ascended to power in 2006 launched a thorough reform of the Labour Market Administration. The agency changed names to the Swedish Public Employment Service, and County Labour Boards were eliminated from the hierarchy (Olofsson & Wadensjö, 2009). This could rightly be called the most radical organizational reform of the national agency since at least the 1980s. It also entailed shifting the responsibility for settlement programming from municipalities to the Employment Service, a way for the national government to emphasize the importance of labour market entry for immigrant integration and its commitment to solve this matter. Simultaneously, the emphasis on the use of external contracted actors in labour market service delivery was further underlined with the introduction of ‘settlement pilots’ [author’s translation], tasked with providing newcomers with facilitating and guidance during the settlement process.

At first glance, these reforms seem to signal a significant shift towards the Individualist Way. However, there is little research material detailing to what extent the practice of the reform reflected its rhetoric. The available material consists mostly of grey literature, like some reports
from think tanks, and thesis work on the bachelor and master’s levels. This material does provide some insight into the dynamics of the reform and pointed out several areas of concern.

One such related to the actions of municipalities. Several observers comment on how they reorganized, often by dissolving the integration unit, along with any pre-employment programs, within the municipality. There was some concern within the municipalities that vital expertise built up through decades of settlement work would thus be lost (Chin, 2011; Rosenqvist, 2011; Myrberg, 2014). However, evidence here is mixed, as Myberg also state that the municipalities seemed “quite happy to be rid of the direct responsibility” (Myrberg, 2014, p. 23). Their attention instead turned to the problem of coordinating with the Migration Board to find housing for the newcomers. Likewise, Chin argued that some municipalities had managed to navigate the reform by reorganizing to support their previous practices (Chin, 2011).

Also, since most newcomers have never held a job in Sweden before, they cannot be expected to qualify for employment insurance but have to rely on social aid remuneration, which remains with municipalities. Thus, even though settlement service delivery is moved away from municipalities, the first contact will still be that with municipal civil servants to obtain that financial support. This is emphasized as one of the most troublesome aspects of the reform. Moreover, national government had subsidized municipal programming. This funding was now cut by more than 50 per cent, from SEK 189 000 over two years per newcomer refugee to SEK 80 000. At the same time, regulations prevented the Employment Service from contracting municipalities to continue delivering the services (Rosenqvist, 2011).

Municipalities continued to be responsible for delivering second language training. The reform did not concern that service delivery in any way, but there was and remains a potential that language training would be negatively affected anyway when it becomes split away from the
pre-employment training programs that will be delivered under Employment Service jurisdiction after the reform. The complexity is further enhanced as vocational language training is ostensibly going to be delivered by settlement pilots, contracted by the Employment Service. Thus, three actors might potentially be involved in this aspect of programming (Rosenqvist, 2011).

As part of the reform, an institutionalized three party dialogue, consisting of representatives from municipality and Employment Service on the one hand and the newcomer on the other, was introduced. The intention was to coordinate efforts better (Warnsjö, 2012). Even so, problems in the coordination between municipalities and Employment Service were also reported. In some cases, jurisdictional responsibilities and division of labour remained unclear, which decreased quality of service and efficiency (Chin, 2011; Warnsjö, 2012).

Likewise, commentators were concerned that the regional municipalities with responsibility for health care have not been involved in this reform, which can create barriers for newcomers when the Employment Service neglect to account for their health concerns when designing introduction programs (Warnsjö, 2012). Also, commentators describe this reform as a shift in balance between the municipal and national governments where the latter asserts itself as dominant in the field of settlement services for the purpose of standardizing the process (Myrberg, 2014).

The efforts of the Employment Service have also been criticized. The umbrella organization for municipalities claims its programs have not been sufficiently adapted for serving refugees in particular, who often have a long path to labour market entry. The programs of the Employment Service were better suited for persons who were considered job ready by civil servants. Fewer newcomer refugees were able to access internships in conjunction with language training after the reform than before. Likewise, three months after the launch of the
reform, the Employment Service had not launched their own programs to replace those that were cancelled by municipalities (Rosenqvist, 2011). Finally, problems had also been reported with the payment of settlement remuneration for newcomers, with gaps between different forms of subsidies to the users (Warnsjö, 2012).

The settlement ‘pilots’ have been described as an important third party in this reform. These have primarily consisted of large, private educational companies that already had a long history of delivering services to the Employment Service through contracting. Several of these had staff with language competence that facilitated communication with the newcomers. Moreover, in several instances, the Employment Service did not have access to such language skills in-house, but had to rely on interpreter services, which suggests that the ‘pilots’ have been better equipped to deliver settlement services to the users (Rosenqvist, 2011). ‘Pilots’ have also provided users with social capital by developing their networks and strengthening their cultural capital with training in Swedish civics as well as cultural codes (Rosenqvist, 2011).

However, testimonials from some of these companies argue that the playing field is not even. Newcomers can choose any ‘pilot’ they want, and these respondents argue that popularity or language skills play a disproportionally great role in that choice compared to positive labour market entry outcomes. This is because such information is not readily available for the users, and then hearsay, which can be misinformed, fills the void (Chin, 2011; Lundin, 2011). Likewise, concerns were raised that not enough ‘pilot’ companies were available (Rosenqvist, 2011), though these were voiced at an early stage and the situation might have changed since then.
Even with the service scope assigned to the ‘pilots’, the Employment Service retained significant decision-making powers. The newcomer is obliged to fulfill the settlement plan that has been designed by the Employment Service. Ostensibly, this is done in a dialogue with the newcomer, but the extent to which the user has any powers to veto suggestions from the case officer is open to suggestion. Thus, only the Employment Service has the right to change this plan. Thus, the ‘pilot’ can suggest interventions for the user, but the national agency alone has the power to refer users to such programs. Likewise, the ‘pilot’ cannot refuse to accept a user and is under an obligation to meet with the user at a frequency set by the Employment Service. There is also a cap on how many users can be assigned to a single ‘pilot’ (Rosenqvist, 2011).

Further, the remuneration to the ‘pilot’ is based on performance, where a bonus is awarded based on how fast the user gains entry into the labour market and remains there. However, the contracted agencies have voiced concerns that the remuneration is too low, because the estimated time needed to enter the labour market has been underestimated (Rosenqvist, 2011). Moreover, this performance basis for remuneration produced gaps in remuneration for the users (Myrberg, 2014).

The results of the reform for the users are mixed. A quantitative evaluation of the Employment Service database showed that users who participate in some programs with external providers do get more support and are more satisfied than those who do not. These results vary somewhat depending on demography, where women, short term unemployed and those born outside Nordic countries have reported the most positive results, while those who are long term unemployed have experienced the least positive effect from programs delivered by external providers. Even so, the effect was, on average, low, with only 2 per cent higher success rate (Liljeberg, Martinson, & Thelander, 2012).
municipalities have also experienced at the reform as a positive development that facilitates labour market integration (Warnsjö, 2012).

However, the picture changes substantially in a qualitative report based on interviews of Red Cross volunteers. They offer a critique of several aspects of the system: the information provided to users is often in too complex, bureaucratic, and the Swedish language creates particular barrier for those who are just learning the language and certainly for those who do not understand it at all. The information is not available in other languages. Several respondents have also argued that attitudes towards immigrants have become less accommodating than before, and that demands on them have increased regardless of their background, competence or health condition. As one respondent put it: “The people who come here are exhausted like they have run a marathon, but instead of resting up, they are forced to run one more right away” (respondent quoted in Röda Korset, 2013, p. 12). There is thus reason to suggest that the reforms have not resulted in an organization that has the competence needed to accommodate users based on their individual needs (Röda Korset, 2013; Chin, 2011).

In summary, and although more research is necessary to draw any more substantive conclusions about the reform, the present data does suggest somewhat complex and not entirely positive results. While outsourcing of service delivery has been even more emphasized than previously, invoking methods from the Individualist Way, the centralization of settlement service delivery to the Employment Service’s jurisdiction constitutes a significant reassertion of the national government’s authority on the field, which would further entrench the dominance of this these actors within the Habitus. Moreover, there is no sign that this reform has opened up the opportunity structure for immigrant community actors. Rather, the demographics of the field seem to be quite consistent, with the traditional public actors being dominant, further underlining
the inertia of the structures of this social space. Likewise, the points of critique are consistent with those raised throughout history as well. In 2013, a key problem seems to be that the dominant public agency is incapable of accommodating the individual needs of the users, just as it was during the 1970s.

**Summary**

![Diagram of Swedish policy community](image)

**Figure 10: The Swedish policy community**

To summarize, Swedish labour market policy has been dominated by the Hierarchist Way since World War II. This has been reflected in the dominance of large public agencies, organized in a top-down fashion, with an organizational culture that places authority with agency experts to provide solutions for social issues. As illustrated in Figure 10, these actors hold the significant social and cultural capital required for legitimacy in the field. The unitary political system has facilitated their continuous dominance. Moreover, the main problem with immigrant integration in the labour market is framed as one of deficiencies within the clients that should be solved by
the agency. In other words, they are thus socially constructed as individuals who need to be invested with cultural capital as defined by the civil servants.

Some Fatalism has entered the field since the 1990s. These elements of mistrust towards the users are likely to have exacerbated the division between the agencies and the users it ostensibly serves, framing the latter not only as lacking vital competence, but also as potential free riders. If paternalism was strong in the policy community previously, this development has likely strengthened it even further. The effect would be widening the social distance between the government and the users, reinforcing the barrier between sub-government and attentive public as shown in Figure 10.

Interestingly enough, these beliefs co-exist with organizational solutions from the Individualist Way, in the form of New Public Management-style procurement and performance indicators. However, given the continued dominance of the traditional actors, it is questionable to what extent the beliefs inherent to this Way have actually reshaped or displaced previous organizational culture. The core dynamics, in terms of how the social space is structured and the generation and distribution of social and cultural capital, seems to be largely consistent with the Hierarchist past, even though the relationship is not formalized through contracts.

Methods and ideas from the Egalitarian Way are glaringly absent in the Swedish sub-government policy community. None of the reforms or organizational solutions initiated by Swedish governments, national or municipal, has invoked ideas from this model. Moreover, the only funding stream informed by such ideals came from the European Union, and had very limited impact on Swedish practices. Thus, immigrant community actors seem absent from the sub-government policy community, excluded from key social networks and without influence on
which artefacts of cultural capital that are considered legitimate by key gatekeepers. The Hierarchist Way, it seems, has been and remains strong in Sweden.

The case of Canada

Unlike Sweden, the history of Canadian labour market policy is a good deal more eclectic. This has several reasons. First, Canada is a decentralized federation. The Canadian constitution does not explicitly mention labour market policy, which thus theoretically would belong to the residual powers of the federal government. However, education and most social welfare policy specifically fall under provincial jurisdiction (Bakvis & Aucoin, March 2000; Banting, 2005). Active labour market policy, with its frequent reliance on vocational training, therefore straddles these fields which has led both federal and provincial governments to become actively involved. This has sometimes led to policy clashes and entanglements (Peck & Rutherford, 1997) and sometimes to periods of compromise between the two levels of government. The lack of jurisdictional clarity has provided openings for immigrant groups to become social actors and from the 1970s onwards they were directly entrusted to deliver services by the federal government. As well, the federal government has engaged in the re-organization of labour market policy agencies several times. Finally, New Public Management ideas have also influenced the policy community and all levels of government. Like the section of Sweden, this discussion starts with the rise of Keynesian ideas during the 1940s, investigates the shifts in policy-making occurring between the 1960s and the 1990s, and ends with an account of the influence of the reforms of the last two decades.

The rise of Keynesianism: 1940s-1960s

During the post war era, Canada’s attitude towards immigration was based on the settlement nation self-image. Immigrants were thus seen as necessary for the nation-building project of
governments (Boyd & Alboim, 2012; Li, 2012; Siemiatycki, 2012; Stafford, 1992). However, this was nation-building in a very particular sense, specifically building a white, British, Christian nation (Siemiatycki, 2012). Immigrants were thus seen as necessary for population growth, but only as long as the immigrants conformed as closely as possible to that image of the nation.

Two key moments at this time marked the launch of large scale federal involvement in the labour market policy during the World War Two era. The first was the adoption of the Unemployment Insurance Act in 1940, a constitutional amendment which allowed the federal government to shoulder the responsibility for the first Unemployment Insurance program and saw the reorganization of the Employment Service of Canada into the National Employment Service, NES. Local offices were centralized under the auspices of the new agency and there was a considerable expansion of the organization which provided both income support and Active Labour Market Policies. Consequently, provincial offices, the earliest of which had opened in Ontario and Quebec 1908-1912, closed down. The second was the Vocational Training Coordination Act of 1942, which set up a framework for coordinating the federal vocational training efforts, through both training projects of its own as well as through conditional funding to provincial service providers (Hunter, 1994).

This largely set up the framework for the operations during the 1950s and early 1960s – the NES offices provided job placement services as well as some vocational training to the unemployed, or referred them to provincial training. However, even with the unprecedented policy involvement of the federal government, inter-governmental bargaining continued, with the federal government tending to respect the provincial jurisdiction over the field of education (McFadyen, 1997). This jurisdictional contest arguably undermined the federal capacity to
centralize and monopolize service delivery in the policy community decisively. Indeed, even though relations between them were not always without problems, voluntary organizations, unions and other actors remained present in the field (Hunter, 1994), which was a significant difference from developments in Sweden.

Moreover, the NES was allegedly plagued by a lack of sufficient staff and facilities (Dupré, 1973). Likewise, some operating procedures were not conducive to solving individual client issues. For instance, the simplistic performance indicators counted success by the number of placements, and anecdotal evidence suggests strong pressure on local case workers to achieve objectives by any means necessary (Hunter, 1994). Finally, the staff complained about the lack of special competence required to assist disadvantaged workers. As a result of case overload, responsibility for the placement of immigrant clients shifted from NES to the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration during the early 1950s (Hunter, 1994).

The centralization attempts, but more significantly the administrative system reveals a strong measure of top-down thinking during this era, similar in at least some respects to developments in Sweden. In both cases, the agencies seem to have lacked the cultural capital in the form of competence necessary to serve a diverse base of users. The Hierarchist Way thus seems to have been the management model orthodoxy of the day, producing a distance between the government and the users.

**Transformations: 1960s-1980s**

The 1960s was a transformational decade. For one thing, Canada’s immigration policies shifted. The idea for how immigrants would contribute to the building of Canada transformed from a focus on building a white, British, Christian Canada to a multicultural Canada based on the immigration of people with high human capital (Siemiatycki, 2012). For example, the points
system for high skilled immigration that would become so characteristic for the Canadian system was introduced during this time (Boyd & Alboim, 2012; Li, 2012; Siemiatycki, 2012; Stafford, 1992). Thus the perspective on immigrants changed, from a strongly and explicitly racialized idea about who should be allowed to enter the country to contribute to nation-building, to an idea of allowing anyone to enter who could have sufficient skills as defined by the government awarding points.

In labour market policy, the first significant change came with the Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act of 1960, which extended the scope of federal funding for training considerably (Bakvis & Aucoin, March 2000). This was a response to federal concerns with how provinces delivered vocational training, for instance by delivering the cheapest possible secondary school level courses, rather than courses that could overcome occupational barriers (Hunter, 1994). Such instances, where courses were designed to serve the needs of provincial governments rather than the users, reflect how Hierarchist practices had been adopted by these governments as well, which then used the leverage of the management model retain significant leverage over the definition of relevant manifestations of cultural capital.

In 1966, the federal NES was re-integrated with the immigration service, under the umbrella of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration (Hunter, 1994), with the local offices reorganized into Canada Manpower Centres (Bakvis & Aucoin, March 2000). This also saw a less than successful recruitment drive to attract graduates with social science degrees. The employer made career-related promises, but the new staff became disillusioned when they failed to materialize as they encountered “a pyramidal hierarchy of positions that ensured promotion could not be rapid for more than a few” (Dupré, 1973, p. 136). This can be considered another
indicator of how the NES was organized along Hierarchist principles in such a way that concentrated the distribution of cultural capital to the higher echelons of the organization.

The federal government also took steps to end cost-sharing arrangements with provinces, where both levels of government contribute funding towards the same policy area. The objective was to have increased control over how federal money was spent by purchasing training directly from a variety of providers, including actors from the private sector (Bakvis & Aucoin, March 2000; Klassen, 2000). This flexibility did not materialize as envisioned, as provinces remained strong and sometimes reluctant to federal involvement. For instance, in Ontario, the federal government eventually conceded its rights to purchase courses directly from suppliers to the provincial agencies, which gained exclusive brokerage (Dupré, 1973). Thus, provincial governments could retain control over program approvals (McFadyen, 1997).

Provinces with the financial capacity to do so developed their own Active Labour Market policies for target groups they considered strategic (Wood & Klassen, 2008) and some also responded with large scale innovations of their own. Thus, Ontario developed the Colleges of Applied Arts and Design, CAAT, that were “to be all things to all people not adequately served by elementary, secondary, or university institutions”(Dupré, 1973, p. 79). Likewise, community colleges became important providers of training programs for unemployed clients in both BC and Ontario (Haddow, 2000).

On both government levels, trainees found themselves assigned to seats “purchased in these institutions not so much for their benefit but to fulfil provincial notions of what a balanced institutional program should be” (Dupré, 1973, p. 227). The style of counselling in community colleges was also characterized as benign paternalism (Dupré, 1973). These examples suggest a
continuity of Hierachist management within the two levels of government. User-driven actors still lacked the cultural and social capital needed to influence these services, it seems.

Towards the end of the 1960s, Canada also made efforts to adopt a Swedish model of labour market policy organization (Hunter, 1994). Consequentially, Canada “had a manpower policy second only to Sweden’s in terms of its scope and impact on the labour market” (Hunter, 1994, p. 196) by the early 1970s. However, this did not include implementing the Swedish corporatist style of decision-making, and business and labour had a much more limited role to play in policy formation (McFadyen, 1997), partly because labour rarely managed to present a centralized organization that the federal state had to deal with (Panitch, 1977). The attempt to incorporate that component of Hierarchist organization failed, suggesting the limited capacity of the Canadian governments to act in the policy community.

On the other hand, many community organizations came to enjoy an important role as service providers (McFadyen, 1997). For instance, in the Outreach program, started in 1972, employment offices began to operate “by community organizations...normally funded in full by the federal government although some partnerships with other levels of government were arranged...The major users of Outreach were natives, people in isolated areas, the disabled, women, ex-offenders, immigrants and youth” (Hunter, 1994, p. 217). This kind of partnership opened up the arena for bottom-up actions and initiatives in a way that contrasted with the top-down thinking of earlier decades, adding a significant stream of Egalitarian practices to the field. At this stage, user-driven groups could use the new opportunity structure to develop and leverage social capital and create the cultural capital needed to take action.

During the 1980s, services continued to expand. There were 435 Canada Employment Centres providing services across the country in 1980 (Hunter, 1994), and by the mid-decade
there were 500 (Wood & Klassen, 2008). Once more, there were attempts to adopt corporatist management principles by increasing the involvement of business and labour in the policy community “as a counter-balance to federal–provincial bargaining” (Wood & Klassen, 2008, pp. 336-338), even though neither party had shown much interest for these issues (Tully, 1988). These attempts would become more comprehensive and encompassing during the 1990s.

In parallel with these efforts to develop the traditional Hierarchical components in the policy community, the outsourcing of service delivery to not-for-profit organizations also continued (Hunter, 1994). The 1985 Canadian Jobs Strategy was an example of this, which “reinforced the earlier policy by attempting to direct more funding to third parties (e.g. community-based groups and private trainers) rather than to the provincial institutions” (Klassen, 2000, p. 166). Indeed, research on immigrant community organizations shows that they have had an important role to play as service providers (Chekki, 2006; Guo, 2005; Guo, 2006; Suzuki, 2005). These funding streams further institutionalized the Egalitarian model into the Canadian institutional framework. Thus, immigrant community actors at this time were able to continue to develop and leverage social and cultural capital, strengthening their capacity for agency. Likewise, this speaks to how the borders between government and immigrant community actors become increasingly porous.

**The rise of NPM: 1990s and onwards**

The 1990s were characterised by the introduction of New Public Management. First, the federal employment administration was thoroughly reformed into the new mega Department of Human Resources Development Canada, HRDC, in 1993 (Bakvis & Aucoin, March 2000). When this was done, the responsibility for immigrant labour market settlement was once more broken away
from the department dealing with labour market issues and transferred to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (Klassen, 2000), where it has remained.

While the new HRDC continued to collaborate with the now entrenched community organizations and non-profit agencies through contractual agreements on service delivery (Klassen, 2000), there have been challenges to the integrity of the Egalitarian practices on the arena. First, many settlement organizations experienced difficulties in the wake of the funding cutbacks initiated in the early 1990s (Landolt et al., 2009). Second, the new accountability regimes resulted in experiences of an increased emphasis on mistrust, and less predictable funding (Creese, 1998). While these observations pertain primarily to settlement services, they do reflect how Public-Private Partnership governance based on onerous Fatalist style accountability systems have impacted immigrant community organizations during the decade. Their capacity to generate social and cultural capital was arguably negatively impacted as their access to economic capital became less dependable.

The second major reform was constituted by the attempt to introduce Swedish-style corporatist governance models on the otherwise pluralist Canadian scene in the form of Labour Force Development Boards (Haddow & Sharpe, 1997; Klassen, 2000). Aside from labour and employers parties, representatives like women’s organizations, ethnic minorities and other equity groups were also included in this framework. This inclusion was driven by “the wishes of governing politicians, not the wishes of business and labour, who have insisted on remaining the primary actors on the boards” (Haddow & Sharpe, 1997, p. 301), though other observers saw their presence as necessary (Haddow & Sharpe, 1997). The Canadian pluralist culture thus proved resilient in the design of these bodies and gave them an inclusive make-up. This is consistent with how social capital had bridged immigrant community actors and government
during the 1980s, influencing the culture of the policy community Habitus to a point where governments considered these community actors insiders within the sub-government.

The attempt ultimately failed for a variety of reasons, (Wolfe, 1997; McIntosh, 2000; Haddow & Sharpe, 1997), but it did expose how the structure of policy communities differs between provinces. Thus, Ontario conformed well to a classic fragmented pluralist model, while British Columbia’s more centralized community has more of a corporatist streak to it (Haddow & Klassen, 2004). In the terms of Hood, this would suggest that the former province would fit closer to an Individualist management model while the latter would be closer to Hierarchism.

Following this failure, the rest of the decade was characterized by federal retrenchment, which was exacerbated by spending cutbacks (Wood & Klassen, 2008). As a result, provincial service providers had more space to act, which increased duplication. Provinces, with Quebec forming the vanguard, began to argue that the situation should be ended for the sake of increased efficiency, implying that these services should be operated by the provincial system only. In the wake of the sovereignty referendum in Quebec in 1995, where the province came close to voting for secession from the federation, the federal government was not partial towards further confrontation. Under the combined push-pull pressure, it retreated (Wood & Klassen, 2008).

The solution became the Labour Market Development Agreements, LMDAs, which downloaded a considerable amount of power to the provinces. They were framed as a way for the federal government to respect provincial jurisdiction for the field of education while increasing efficiency though harmonized program delivery. All together this shift constituted a “fundamental re-ordering of federal–provincial responsibilities in this policy domain” (Wood & Klassen, 2008, pp. 336-338). The local Human Resource Canada Centres were no longer the most important delivery point for federal ALMPs (Klassen, 2000). Settlement services funded
through Citizenship and Immigration Canada were similarly devolved to the provinces
(Canadian Council for Refugees, 2000).

LMDAs also included quantitative performance measurements with the potential to encourage creaming. Such indicators encourage a focus on assisting clients close to the labour market that require a limited amount of assistance to be placed in work (Lazar, 2002; Lightman, Herd, & Mitchell, 2006). As Klassen put it, “[t]he issue is not so much that creaming will occur, but rather that it is now imposed and deemed acceptable by the LMDAs” (Klassen, 2000, p. 185). While the indicators were most likely inspired by New Public Management ideas, and thus come across as Individualist in nature, they might actually have reinforced top-down management practices since they conveniently fulfills the policy objectives, but might only have constituted a short-term solution for the clients, particularly if they did not include long-term career developments indicators.

The shift to LMDAs simplified the policy community to the extent that stakeholders could focus the dialogue with operational staff on provincial actors, rather than having to spend efforts on both provincial and federal levels. However, while establishing relations with federal government agencies could be more challenging for actors that lack national representation (Klassen, 2000), local social actors, like community organizations, expressed concern both over being excluded from the decision-making process between federal-provincial governments and about how to get involved in program design (Lazar, 2002).

Finally, the role of provinces in the policy community has also grown as a result of changes to their social welfare policies, which have increasingly adopted labour market entry as a goal for the clients (Russell, 2000). This client group, including many immigrants, increased in numbers as more restrictive EI eligibility meant that many no longer qualify for such programs
Simultaneously, municipalities, particularly major metropolitan ones entered the policy community as funders for service delivery. Social assistance administrations have thus taken up some of the same tasks of the mainstream labour market administration, like contracting service providers for courses, communicating with potential employers and so on (Klassen, 2000).

Throughout this time, the non-profit settlement agents continued to deliver services funding by all levels of government. For example, “a total of 238 immigrant settlement agencies operated in the Toronto area alone” in 2005 (Siemiatycki, 2012, p. 232). During this era, practitioners identified a series of problems to integration. These included how the points system did not reflect labour market needs in an optimal fashion, a need to improve language and skill screening before immigration and facilitate the possibilities for foreign students to become permanent residents. Foreign credential recognition and the need for bridging programs have been particularly emphasized (Poisson, 2012).

That stronger role for provinces was paralleled in immigration policy, where provinces also became increasingly involved through the provincial nominee program. That gave the provincial governments a say in immigration, in order to solve regional labour shortages. That gave provinces a way to complement federally regulated immigration to satisfy their labour market needs (Li, 2012).

Stronger control mechanisms towards both EI and welfare clients were also introduced at this time, through so called workfare regimes. In these, clients confronted demands for documentation high enough to disqualify them on the grounds that they were unable to provide all the requested information (Herd, Mitchell, & Lightman, 2005), as well as constraining rules (Lightman et al., 2006), and literacy and drug testing (Lightman et al., 2006). In one study,
respondents bore witness to how the system was “dominated by suspicion and a mentality of policing” (Herd et al., 2005, p. 13) and senior managers complained that the system had been turned into an “eligibility machine” (Lightman et al., 2006, p. 137). These solutions re-introduced the paternalism of the 1960s to the policy community, albeit now with characteristic mistrust of the Fatalist management model, which, again, proved detrimental to the generation of social and cultural capital among users.

Meanwhile, federal attitudes towards immigrants shifted towards a framing aiming to create a more flexible workforce in a paradigm of increased securitization. The change has been two-fold. On the one hand, federal focus, particularly during the Harper administration, has moved from high skilled immigrants who receive permanent residence when landing, towards lower skilled immigrants with temporary work permits (Siemiatycki, 2012). On the other hand, it has meant a re-introduction of processes of racialization, particularly of immigrants of Arab and Muslim heritage, as part of the ‘Fortress North America’ policy introduced in the wake of 9/11 (Abu-Laban, 2005; Abu-Laban, 2013).

During the last few years, there have been two noteworthy federal policy initiatives. Local Immigration Partnerships, LIPs, is a policy initiative from the federal Citizenship and Immigration Canada agency in Ontario originating in 2008. They were aimed at establishing strategic partnerships that could facilitate coordination to strengthen service delivery, with the federal agency acting as funder, with an overall goal “to improve labour market integration outcomes for skilled immigrants, enhance economic competitiveness for businesses and vitality for the community” (Stasiulis, Hughes, & Amery, 2011, p. 114). Applicants for creating LIPs came from both municipal and regional governments, as well as community agencies. This was
thus a form of funding where immigrant agencies could act as hosts for the partnerships. Burr provides the LIP from London, Ontario, as an example. It includes:

settlement agencies, community organizations, health centres, police services, seniors services, government representatives, child and family services, French and English language training providers, employers, housing services, immigrants, legal services, schools, women’s services, libraries, and refugee services (Burr, 2011, p. 4).

Other LIPs seem to have similar representation (Stasiulis, Hughes, & Amery, 2011). LIPs also seem to have “a strong client focus, broad-based leadership and membership, cultural competence, transparency, empowerment, positive communication strategies, and social learning/information sharing” (Burr, 2011, p. 4). The activities of these bodies include “research, information provision, workshops, mentoring and bridging programs for newcomers, cultivating access to labour pools, awareness raising, and training for employers” (Stasiulis, Hughes, & Amery, 2011, p. 114). Reservation has been made with regards to representation. For example, the group involved in these networks seem relatively closed, and in at least one region, no ethno-specific organization was represented in the partnership (Stasiulis, Hughes, & Amery, 2011). Good notes that “insiders determine who is in and who is out” (Good, 2005, p. 263). At least some immigrant community actors had acquired sufficient cultural and social capital to be considered ‘insiders’ and thus part of a shared Habitus, even though others, in this case ethno-specific agencies, had not managed to enter this social space. Even so, the language framing the policy is consistent with the Egalitarian Way and its introduction thus suggested a renaissance of these ideals within the federal government at the time.

However, another policy turn has complicated matters. The LMDAs were set to expire in March of 2014, prompting a round of negotiations between federal and provincial governments
to renew them. Unexpectedly, in 2013, the federal government decided to unilaterally cut CAD $ 300 million annually from the LMDAs in order to fund a new federal employment program, the Canada Job Grant. Moreover, this program would require the provinces to match the federal funding with moneys of their own, meaning that they would have to raise an extra $ 300 million annually, in addition to the lost federal revenue, to fund the new federal program. The provinces had not been consulted about this new policy direction, which represented “an aggressive federal foray into an area which had been recognized over the last quarter century as within provincial jurisdiction” (Mendelson & Zon, 2013, p. 10). Unsurprisingly, provincial governments expressed little interest in cooperating (Mendelson & Zon, 2013).

Finally, municipal governments also deserve a note. Within the Canadian governance structure, municipalities are somewhat constrained in what they can do. Provincial and federal governments are much more powerful and thus tend to dominate the field. Swedish municipalities are, by comparison, more powerful. One example of that is how the latter retain the right of levying income tax from residents, something Canadian municipalities cannot do. Even so, Toronto in Ontario and Vancouver in British Columbia are two of the major cities in Canada, and as such the municipalities here do have significant capacity to engage in service delivery.

While the provinces of Ontario and BC have not given local municipalities a mandate to act on issues of multiculturalism and integration, the cities of Toronto and Vancouver have taken action, been responsive and built policy coalitions to address policy concerns. This attitude can be contrasted to the municipalities of Mississauga and Brampton, Ontario, which have been unresponsive and not included ethnic or migrant community actors in municipal governance (Good, 2009).
The institutional completeness of immigrant communities has played a role in how different municipalities have acted. Where immigrant community agencies are strong and established on the service delivery arena, municipalities have been more likely to be responsive. In Toronto, mobilization on the municipal level has facilitated pooling resources between immigrant communities, greatly increasing cooperation, but also allowed access resources at provincial and federal levels of government. Community agencies there even supported a decentralization of settlement responsibility to the municipal level because this made policy-making more accessible. In Vancouver, municipal efforts in the area of multiculturalism are closely linked to the city’s role in the Pacific Rim context, where the Chinese community has key significance (Good, 2009).

**Summary**

The Canadian labour market policy has gone through many vicissitudes, making it hard to fit neatly into any one of Hood’s categories. At first glance, it would be expected to correspond closely to Individualist style as an Anglo-Saxon style welfare state. Indeed, it has some traits characteristic of that management model, including procurement style delivery of services where non-government actors of different kinds are significant actors. However, most of these Individualist practices seem to have been adopted during the 1990s, as part of the New Public Management-driven wave of reforms that swept the world at the time. Interestingly enough, this same era also has seen the adoption of practices that best fit Fatalist ideas of how governance should be done, with increased mistrust towards service users and deteriorating social and cultural capital as a result.

At the same time, Hierarchist management ideas have also been strong, and, indeed, have a much longer history in the Canadian labour market administration than Individualist
organizational solutions do. Finally, the Egalitarian Way of doing governance has also been significant, and specifically encouraged the inclusion of immigrant community actors in the delivery of social services, making them a legitimate and entrenched participant in the arena, vested with the social and cultural capital needed for legitimacy. Likewise, the networks created in the policy community have bridged government and immigrant community actors to such an extent that at least some immigrant community actors are considered sub-government ‘insiders’. These relations are captured in Figure 11. The government agencies in Canada do not engage in service delivery directly, contracting NGOs or other actors instead. The negative effects on social and cultural capital are represented by the dashed lines between the parties in the sub-government, but the thick dashed line between sub-government and attentive public that is characteristic of the Egalitarian Way (see Chapter Four) is retained here, and immigrant community actors are represented in the sub-government area.
Figure 11: The structure of the Canadian policy community
Conclusions

Comparing and contrasting labour market policy in Canada and Sweden shows that while there have been differences between them, as could be expected, and there have also been some interesting similarities. Figure 12 illustrates how policy in the two countries changes over time across Hood’s typology of public management.

Both Sweden and Canada start firmly in the field of the Hierarchical Way. The former clearly fulfills the classical type of this model. It has historically had a stable, centralized system with a pyramidal national administration, strongly vested with cultural and social capital. Because of the unitary organization of the Swedish polity, that agency had a long period of service monopoly and governed through state corporatism with frontline civil servants holding power over their clients.

The Canadian federal and provincial governments were also animated by the Hierarchical ideals and tried building Hierarchical administrative structures during the early post World War
Two decades. However, because of the unclear jurisdictional order and the contested nature of federal-provincial relations that ensued, the field was more fragmented. Moreover, where the Swedish agency experienced stability for decades, the Canadian equivalent went through a range of political vicissitudes beginning in the late 1960s. This has meant that neither level of government could establish a monopoly on service delivery nor become as dominant as the Swedish national agency became, effectively creating a field of constrained Hierarchism. Consequently, voluntary agencies and private companies have continuously had some opportunity to enter and exit the field, and a role to play as service providers. Such space was not available in the Swedish field.

From the 1970s, the two cases diverge considerably in terms of governing philosophy. While Sweden remains firmly committed to the Hierarchist Way, the Canadian federal government adopted significant Egalitarian practices and gave non-profit and community agencies a larger role in service delivery, allowing immigrant groups an expanded role in the arena during the following decades. This turn opened up possibilities for immigrant community actors to develop social and cultural capital, which allowed them to increase their organizational capacity for agency. This Egalitarian dimension in Canadian social policy has been largely absent in Sweden.

The two polities converged to at least some extent with the introduction of New Public Management-ideas, as governments in both countries adopted some such reforms. First, they introduced contractual forms to regulate relationships between funder and service deliverers, a distinctly Individualist dimension of this approach. In Sweden, this meant an end to the service monopoly of the Labour Market Administration and a move away from traditional Hierarchism. However, while such procedures were introduced, the field has remained dominated by
government bodies, specifically the national labour market agency, the Crown Corporation and municipal service centres of different forms, which suggests how resilient Hierarchism has been in the field. Like in Sweden, there is no evidence of any immediate or radical change in the composition of actors on the arena in the Canadian field. The community actors that were already present in the field could access the contracts and could remain active as service deliverers. The impact of this Individualist reform was thus limited here, too.

The second commonality concerns the introduction of Fatalist style control of clients as a part of the same reform wave, an element that corresponds poorly with the bottom-up ideals advocated by Individualists. This is interesting given the alleged sources of inspiration for New Public Management. In both cases, it represented an addition of a paternalist element in management practices. In Canada, it constituted a trend back towards the governance style of the 1960s, albeit now in a Fatalist guise instead of the then-dominant Hierarchist one. In Sweden, the combination of such methods in a culture of already entrenched Hierarchism arguably reinforced the paternalist top-down structures which likely have constrained bottom-up impulses considerably. Either way, it represents a direct contradiction to Individualist values and would not be conducive to immigrant agency, as it undermines the capacity to develop of social and cultural capital among immigrant community actors.

In theory, this evidence suggests a substantial disempowerment of immigrant communities in the Swedish policy community. Immigrant user knowledge would not be valued as highly as that of authoritative experts within the administration itself, nor would the corporatist structure yield many opportunities to enter the policy community sub-government, and consequently, immigrant actors seem to remain confined to the attentive public even after the introduction of NPM-style contracting. These characteristics correspond to the current state
of immigrant communities in Sweden, which have been described as challenged by social exclusion (Andersson, 2007). The dominant role of government agencies and the lack of mention of these actors in government documents suggest a limited, potentially even marginal, role for them. They seem to be “outsiders” and lack the cultural capital needed to be considered an ‘insider’ having legitimacy in that social space.

In Canada, the more prominent role of immigrant community organizations as publicly recognized service deliverers, which thus do have cultural capital valid in the policy community Habitus, can be understood as a result of the stronger bottom-up style of governance of the policy community, including both Individualist and Egalitarian practices. This could have contributed significantly to their organizational growth when the federal government reached out to them post-1970. An equivalent space never existed in centralized Sweden. However, a negative trend for the income developments of immigrants has been observed in Canada over the past couple of decades (Frenette & Morissette, 2005). Several possible causal variables could be driving this trend, including shifts in the economy, changing immigration policies as well as shifts in refugee intake. As it could be argued that the structure of the policy community also could be significant for such outcomes, the introduction of Fatalist governance in Canadian politics should be taken into account when reflecting over these developments.

The differences between the Canadian and Swedish experiences as explored here does suggest that the significance of different models of public administration should not be underestimated when studying integration processes. In the following chapters, the empirical material from the interviews is used to further explore these dimensions as they manifested to the respondents in the policy community. Those chapters, particularly chapters Nine and Ten, show
how immigrant community actors have tried to mobilize within the policy community and the conditions that facilitate this.
Chapter 6: Immigrant community actors and cultural capital as skills

Chapter Three showed the contrasting attitudes of Swedish and Canadian governments toward funding immigrant community organizations. Swedish governments have typically monopolized settlement and labour market integration services, resulting in sharp segregation between public agencies and immigrant community actors, where the former dominate the policy community Habitus and forms cultural capital takes within it. In contrast, Canadian governments have relied more on immigrant community actors as service deliverers. As a consequence, the social spaces that public agencies and immigrant community actors occupy are more closely integrated, and both types of actors have been able to influence the forms cultural capital take in the policy community Habitus.

As Chapter Five showed, this has been the result of the organizational models used for the policy fields in the two countries. Administrations in both countries embraced classic Weberian, Hierarchist management model, but institutional differences produced different results in the two cases. In unitary Sweden, Hierarchism became deeply entrenched, the Fatalist reforms of the 1990s further underscoring the top-down organization of the field. Even though Individualist reforms were introduced as a result of New Public Management-thinking, these did little to shift power away from dominant public agencies, providing immigrant community actors little to no space to enter the field. In federal Canada, however, governments were too fragmented to become that dominant. As a result, Hierarchism was more constrained. While Canada also introduced Fatalist practices, Egalitarianism and Individualism opened up greater opportunities for immigrant community actors to become social actors and service deliverers.
In Chapter Two, Bourdieu’s theory of practice was used to explain the role of cultural capital and its significance for agency. Like economic and social capital, it can be mobilized to take social action. It was also shown how this type of capital can be manifested in several different ways, like symbolic actions or places, or fashion choices. Importantly, specialized jargon, professional expertise, in-depth understanding of the ‘rules of the game’, and the capacity to discriminate between canonical and non-canonical information (Moore, 2008) are also forms of cultural capital that are instrumental for the actor’s human resource infrastructure. These competencies are needed to orient in the actor’s own community, as explained in Chapter Three, including, for example the capacity to manage relations with individual members.

Moreover, cultural capital is also intertwined with the perception of competence within a Habitus. To some extent, these two forms overlap and might be either interchangeable or difficult to distinguish from each other. For example, when dealing with the public sector through procurement, it is typically imperative for applicants submitting a proposal to demonstrate that they have the accounting skills necessary to manage an organizational economy in an effective and legal way. Such skills are related to the organizational infrastructure discussed above, but also affect the perceptions of competence. However, sometimes, the competence that is actually needed to deliver services and create the perception of competence do not overlap, and when that happens, problems can ensue, as this chapter will demonstrate.

This chapter asks the question: What cultural capital in the form of competence can immigrant actors leverage to influence policy or deliver labour market integration services to their constituencies? Specifically, it discusses how immigrant community actors in Sweden and Canada can leverage cultural capital for agency, manifested as skill sets, as respondents interpreted them. These specialized skills are divided into three primary formal sets: a)
organizational competence, complete with a board of directors, bylaws, a mission and vision and objectives for its service delivery; b) the capacity to orient within the chosen model of governance, expressed, for instance, through the ability to put together strong funding proposals, and, finally; c) the capacity to orient in the immigrant community, which is key to do successful outreach to immigrant service users.

Grid/Group Cultural Theory and the Bourdieuan theory of practice presented in Chapters Two to Four are used to draw conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of immigrant community actors in Sweden and Canada. As discussed in Chapter One, respondents came from three categories. The first two were civil servants and, immigrant community actors. The third were non-community actors, coming from organizations that engaged in publicly funded social service delivery, but were not organized from immigrant communities.

The findings reveal how perspectives on all three dimensions can be affected by the organizational models used in the policy community. For example, Swedish respondents often argued that operating in their environment (a Hierarchist Habitus) impeded their ability to create a rapport with the users. Consistent with the research discussed in Chapters Two and Three, immigrant community actors leveraged community attachment as a skill in both countries, but the interviews also showed that they needed to acquire the capacity to express that skill in the specialized jargon used by the funding public agencies. Likewise, formal organizational management skills were also stressed. A significant difference between immigrant community actors in the two countries was that some Canadian respondents engaged in how such actors were able to use their economic resources to acquire proposal writing skills from outside, when this was deemed necessary to produce a competitive application, as these require a quite specific type of jargon. Their Swedish counterparts, consistent with their position of greater
marginalization and thus lacking the economic capital to exploit such possibilities, did not
discuss such possibilities (see Chapter Three). The responses also show that immigrant
community actors should not be assumed to always have the ability to accumulate or leverage
the cultural capital needed to retain community attachment.

**Formal organizational competence**

The section presents an account for the form of cultural capital that manifests as the skills related
to formal organizational and managerial competence. Organizations in Canada have been
involved in social service delivery to at least some extent historically. As Chapter Five described,
they particularly took this on during the 1980s, and those that managed to establish themselves
then often weathered the paradigmatic move towards New Public Management, sometimes even
growing to achieve the third stage of Cordero-Guzmán’s development typology, with a
metropolitan scale of service delivery. As such, the indications of more frequent opportunities to
develop skills significant for social service delivery in the interview material were not surprising.
Respondents in general seem to be in agreement that growing to such size can be conducive to
developing an organizational infrastructure for effective service delivery. This respondent
described how growth went hand in hand with professionalization:

…and even the employment services organizations have undergone and are still
undergoing a big transformation over the last 5 or 10 years of really professionalizing
their services, professionalizing the way that they deal with employers and approach
employers....I actually don't think that it's effective to have small settlement organizations
providing employment services. And I think there's a lot to be said for the economies of
scale of larger organizations in terms of the quality of what they can deliver... (Non-
community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The respondent even asserts that an organization has to reach a certain size to be able to deliver
quality services. However, even if this can be validated, growth can still be problematic.
Organizations that manage to get public funding and achieve some level of growth beyond Cordero-Guzmán’s first stage can still experience issues in terms of how to manage their resources for skill development. One area of expertise that several respondents emphasized as important for successful integration concerned the immigrant community actors’ capacity to build links between their own community and that of the surrounding society, or, as Putnam would have put it, bridging capital (Putnam, 2007). Such bridging capital would facilitate the navigation of the social space outside the immigrant community. Respondents from two social positions capture the same issue in different words:

…so they may not be familiar with Canadian employment piece, but they may be familiar with the background of the individual because of their linkages to maybe that background or ethnic group. So it's hard to broker that with the Canadian knowledge and use that to the benefit of the newcomer (Federal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

…a college is often the first time [students] experience a mainstream multicultural Canadian institution…Sometimes the ethnic serving agencies are…not necessarily giving the immigrants the full experience of being in a Canadian institution and…the immigrants will bump up against the way Canadian society works…(Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Note the word ‘sometimes’; it should not be assumed, based on this, that these actors promote isolation. Indeed, a respondent from an immigrant community actor displays an awareness of the need to bridge users: “…for us…to be a player in this sector, we have to first of all… know a lot about…what the labour market…needs” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Rather, the statements point to the struggle that the immigrant community actor will have with acquiring the specialized knowledge needed to orient skillfully in the surrounding society. Such skills will likely be more challenging to develop than the ability to orient in the community it mobilized within.
The need to develop the variety of skill sets can create stresses on the organization. It needs to deliver services competently while at the same time develop the human resources of the organization. This respondent illustrates the dilemma by describing some very specific skills the organization was lacking:

…the referrals to where a client can go to get a particular type of training, or to a proper assessment of the clients' background, so those are the things that…we have to improve on in order to do a better job in providing employment information. It's just that…the work load that we have, sometimes it's not as easy for us to just say, “take a week off” or “do research” or “take a course” or whatever (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

In short, service delivery can be time intensive, and an organization with limited economic resources will also have limited staff resources, and, by extension, limited time. As a consequence, finding the time necessary for professional development can become challenging, which leads to them having to deal with assignments they are not adequately prepared for.

Unsurprisingly, lacking skills on a professional level will make it more difficult for immigrant community actors to establish a professional relationship of some kind with public funders, as the skills shortage will be identifiable. This respondent puts it thusly: “What I've seen is that smaller organizations don't have the capacity to take advantage of many of the opportunities that are out there” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Respondents describe the types of competence gaps that would impede accessing funding in some detail. Interestingly, those gaps include some fundamental aspects of organizational infrastructure that are fairly basic to anyone familiar with formal organization in mainstream society:
…it's good for you to have a structure, a board who actually follows the law, for we have…organizations that are breaking the law on a daily basis, and there is absolutely no excuse for that. You can debate the law, sure, but...there's a number of examples of stupidity (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The problems, the respondent related, consist of having a staff that may have advocacy and representation skills from previous political experience, but may lack managerial skills for the Canadian or even provincial context:

It's very specialized. It requires specialized knowledge just to gain entry, and entry is not easy… so most new emerging organizations don't necessarily have that breadth of capacity. They don't actually have the resources so they can do this kind of work. They have people who are extremely skilled…but they don't have this….I think it's a…sort of a natural consequence of not having the one thing that they need, that they are actually not able…get the work funded (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The statement underlines the importance of the skill for being a consistent actor in the policy community. Notably, the public funder does use these criteria as a threshold for funding. As the following civil servant puts it: “…you need to have a street presence… you need to have some sort of public awareness, a marketing strategy, a board of governors. All of these…constitutional bylaws and whatnot and some of those smaller initiatives might not have that yet….” (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

These are fairly basic functions in an organization and lacking them would be considered an elementary mistake for those established as professionals, and even impede the future growth of the organization. It also seems fairly easy for the gatekeepers to the public funding structures to identify such deficiencies. Thus, they become an indicator for the competence of the organization. Hence, to move beyond Cordero-Guzmán’s first stage of development, the Home Town Association (see Chapter Three) and achieve sustainability and longevity, the organization
fundamentally needs to be able to draw upon members who have these orienting skills. An organization needs to develop the cultural capital that manifests as organizational infrastructure to a certain level of sophistication before it achieves the capacity needed to engage with the existing funding opportunities. In the words of Korazim, the immigrant community actor is compelled, by the funding system and law, to become more professionalized and then also become “simultaneously bureaucratized and non-bureaucratized” (Korazim, 1988, p.155).

Even if organizations do not succeed in getting public funding for their activities, they might still try to deliver services. However, this well placed respondent remarked that the organizations doing so end up in a precarious position, causing others to ask questions like “‘who are you accountable to given that no one is paying for it?’, ‘what's your reporting mechanism?’, ‘how do you keep track of what you're doing?’ , ‘how do you report out?’” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Further, they might try to achieve objectives they might not have the social or cultural capital to achieve without funding: “…they are either doing it through volunteer time, through stealing time from other projects, or on a completely ad hoc basis. And they…do not have the capacity to structure in any meaningful way. Not all, but most of them certainly” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Such a situation would be hard to sustain over a longer period of time.

For immigrant community actors in Sweden, this has particular implications. As research has shown, they tend to be relatively marginalized on the Swedish social service field (see Chapter Three). According to Cordero-Guzmán’s typology, they should thus be expected to have smaller organizations with weaker infrastructure and capacity (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005), as, indeed, Odmalm’s study of Malmö found (Odmalm, 2004a).
His study also discussed how there were exceptions to this rule. For instance, the Iranian-Swedish Association could be clearly distinguished from other immigrant community actors in Malmö based on its higher level of professionalism and more distinct structure. Interestingly, Odmalm described it as “more reminiscent of the ethnically Swedish associations” (Odmalm, 2004b, p. 113, author’s translation). Similar similes were presented by respondents in this study, who tended to use municipal organizations as the reference point for describing the degree of stability in an organization’s infrastructure, when describing immigrant community actors as relatively weak in terms of managerial competence. Here, a respondent invokes it when trying to place the organization on a ‘stability scale’:

…we're still pretty stable compared to many other associations … we're pretty in between being voluntary and independent and at the same time being a bit municipal, if you take my meaning, even if we aren't municipal ourselves, we have this kind of stability…it's a combination of champion and a very, very strong structure…. (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Note how this respondent emphasizes that the actor does have the very competence that the respondents in Odmalm’s study assumed immigrant community actors generally do not have. It thus constitutes an exception paralleling that of the Iranian-Swedish association of that study. However, even this respondent invokes an assumption that the norm for a structured organization is the municipality. The way the labels ‘ethnic Swedish association’ and ‘municipal organization’ are similarly invoked in the context of the Swedish policy community is interesting on many levels. It implies that the norm for immigrant community organizations, in terms of organizational capacity, is weakness. Further, it takes for granted that ‘Swedish organizations’, whether municipal or NGOs, are more competent. Together, these two assumptions form a dichotomy where within immigrant community actors take the position of ‘less competent
immigrant activists’ on the scale the respondent above invokes, in contrast to the ‘more competent Swedish professionals’. In the case of the quote above, where public bodies are used as the normative point of reference, immigrant organizations by default become framed as ‘unstructured’.

Conversely, the comparative exercise can contribute to sustaining the hegemony of the public agency as the paradigmatic nexus of the field. In the following case, a civil servant is correlating the organizational strength of immigrant community actors to how strongly they have internalized the dominant Swedish culture or Swedish Habitus: “…it varies between the immigrant associations and user organizations to what degree one is, how far into the Swedish society they are” (Civil servant, National agency, author’s interview, author’s translation). Like above, the statement assumes that immigrant community actors cannot be strong in their own right. Thus, the primacy the public sector carries over into the social construction of the standards against which organizations are held. These standards, however, might not necessarily be appropriate standards of measurement for non-profit community organizations.

The framing itself can become a barrier for immigrant community actors seeking legitimacy as service deliverers within the Swedish policy community Habitus; they will be a priori assumed to be incompetent by virtue of their status as immigrant community actors and confined to activities for non-professionals, as shown in Odmalm’s study. It found that immigrant community actors in Malmö were mostly confined to activities like the preservation of cultural heritage and sports and barred from other streams of funding, precisely because they were not seen as legitimate actors in social service delivery (Odmalm, 2004b). Since their ability to develop the organizational infrastructure depends greatly on opportunities for funding, the assumption that they cannot be competent can create a vicious cycle, where the immigrant
community actor is barred from significant funding opportunities because of this perception of its lacking potential. The social construction then becomes self-fulfilling; the lack of opportunities to develop that infrastructure is taken as an indicator of its poor potential for development.

In summary, respondents in all social positions from both countries agree that cultural capital in the form of managerial skills, and the infrastructure they build, are keys for successful service delivery. Canadian respondents, consistent with findings in previous research, also suggest that immigrant community actors have this type of cultural capital, particularly the bigger organizations. However, in both countries, there is also a concern that smaller actors might have serious gaps in this regard, which could constitute one of the barriers such organizations face as they strive to develop comprehensive services. This is thus a type of cultural capital that some actors do possess, but others might find more challenging to develop. That gap is more problematic in Sweden, where the persistent exclusion has become so entrenched that immigrant community actors now are a priori assumed to be incompetent and amateurish, whereas public agencies are socially constructed as professional.

**Navigating the model of governance**

To be able to become a stable presence on the social service arena, an immigrant community actor needs to be able navigate the policy community Habitus and the model of governance that structures that social space. The most common way this was articulated by respondents was through discussions about the importance of proposal writing as a skill in itself, a potent manifestation of in-depth understanding of the ‘rules of the game’. Those who seek public funding need to be able to formulate a proposal that communicates the competence of the organization as well as how it is going to fulfill policy objectives in a way that is understandable
to the public funders. As this respondent puts it: “You need to get resources and you also need to be knowledgeable about what they're asking for” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Notably, the applicant’s funding needs in order to continue operating and the funder’s policy objectives might not always match perfectly, and even if they do match, they might not be expected to because the two parties come from different social positions and thus might understand and interpret the social issues and how to address them differently. As such, they might also employ different languages to speak about the same thing. The significance of this potential gap in understanding, as it applies to this exercise of communication, comes across in this statement:

And sometimes one can think that since we're always expanding our activities, so we work with labour market issues and we work with mentorship programs…so we work in many different ways. Sometimes, some funders can think that, “but you've done this, and now you're doing that, and how do those things stick together?” And that's something we need to explain; how we think, and show that it's the same movement, after all...(Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Here, the respondent engages in the problem of how to communicate how different social problems are interlinked with each other to civil servants working within a public administration. Those civil servants work in an organization based on a traditional Weberian top-down order, where social issues become compartmentalized and put under the jurisdiction of different departments that are assumed to be separate and distinct from each other for the purpose of avoiding duplication and inefficiencies. However, social reality is more complex and interconnected. Immigrant community actors, organized in a bottom-up fashion, will have a different point of departure for how they think about the social issues they address, informed by
that same holistic understanding and perspective as the users who experience them in everyday life.

As such, not only do these practitioners in the field have to communicate how issues overlap to civil servants who might interpret the matter differently. They might also find themselves in a position where more than one source of funding is relevant and related to their activity in some way, as they understand it. It is thus reasonable to expect NGOs to apply for funding across a broad spectrum of programs. When that happens, they need to be able to communicate to the civil servants responsible for all of the funding adjudication and explain why each stream is applicable and appropriate, sometimes at the same time.

Notably, the framing also suggests that writing proposals is a skill set different from identifying and addressing the needs in the community. These organizations have been specifically developed for the purpose of delivering services to their constituents. The associated skills would thus be more likely to form the core of the in-house organizational infrastructure. The need to turn to the outside implies that proposal writing skills are separate and distinct from those other core skills, know-how that the organization needs outside help to obtain. These findings echo those by Ng, whose work revealed that settlement agency employees did not take administrative duties very seriously, but rather as something that they wanted to get done so they could get back to the “real work” of supporting the users (Ng, 1996, p. 87). That, in itself, reveals a disconnect in the procurement process between being able to service clients well and being able to satisfy funder demands.

To some extent, this civil servant touches on this issue:

Over our history, we've reviewed…every single application, we read everything, take an enormous amount of time and energy. We…do try and be very open, I have to say......
know, that sometimes, when you see something that's kind of out there, when you get a hodgepodge and it's not as clear and “oh, my god”, and then…you're not sure that this is good. So you want to make sure, right, to be fair. So, presentation is everything…(Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

While the civil servant starts of being very assertive about the quality of the process, the statement finishes by acknowledging that ‘presentation is everything’, which very much strengthens the impression produced by actors outside the public agency that this disconnect exists for those who have not acquired the needed proposal writing skills.

Significantly, immigrant community actors should not be assumed to have these skills, even in the cases when funding has been successfully acquired in the past, as this respondent noted: “…we might not be the best at describing exactly how we proceed” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). This can be problematic for the actor. A failure in communication could mean that civil servants are tempted to decide that they know the mission of the NGO better than the NGO does, based on their own, potentially flawed, understanding of the social problem which leads them to believe that the actor is irrelevant. If so, they might deny the applicant funding based on a misunderstanding.

This civil servant connects the skill to the size of the organization:

The ability to…present a package that actually is competitive once it's been reviewed. You know, to have the resources to make a submission for one, and to be able to articulate and clarify your program in such a way that you are actually clear what the service you're providing. Sometimes immigrant agencies…are not sophisticated enough, they don't have the resources to develop in the system, they haven't understood the system. That doesn't mean they don't have good service...they don't ...get graded as well (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

Like in the case of formal organizational competence, then, the capacity to navigate the model of governance successfully is linked to organizational size by this respondent. That is consistent
with findings linking increased size to increased professionalization and bureaucratization
(Korazim, 1988; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005) and follows the same logic; an organization that has
become big enough to develop the solid infrastructure discussed above is also more likely to
have access to proposal writing skills.

The Canadian respondents differ in one important respect in how they discussed accessing
this skill; several of them mentioned examples of immigrant community actors leveraging their
economic capital to procure outside help to craft competitive applications:

….I think, some other immigrant organizations, they will invest money into, maybe… I
wouldn't really call it consultants, or whatever, people who specialize in, obviously, re—
with research background, I think proposals background, but they… see initiative… see
where… there is opportunity for a project… and they can look for funding and… they can
be valuable in writing successful proposals. Some agencies, they've been doing that, they've
been successful, because they have money that they put into this exercise (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

…we have organizations like the [mainstream organization], [immigrant community
actor], and, you know… these are large organizations with millions of dollars and then you
get the small fledgling organizations whose intentions are good and try to meet the needs
of their community, and quite often it's ethno-specific, much more difficult for them,
because they don't have the money or the infrastructure. Or the expertise of proposal
writing, too (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

These quotes emphasize how significant this skill is for some organizations, in the sense that
they are prepared to invest funding to acquire outside competence to supplement the in-house
skills for this purpose. Significantly, this type of comment was conspicuously absent from the
dialogue with Swedish actors. Given the evidence discussed in Chapters Three and Four about
the marginalization of these immigrant community actors, this is to be expected. That evidence
does suggest that few actors in that context would have the economic resources needed to access
consultants, so the lack of commentary on that matter turns out to be consistent with the
marginalization found in previous research (Odmalm, 2004a; Dahlstedt, 2003; Eriksson & Osman, 2003; Osman, 2005; Velásquez, 2005; Aytar, 2007).

Notably, this practice has a potential drawback. A consultant might lack a proper understanding for the true capacity of the organization, as this respondent notes: “There aren't that many people who can write proposals on behalf of organizations. They may be able to write, but they do not have a sense of our culture, or our mission or our vision...” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). If the outside consultant lacks a proper understanding of the organizational culture, then it will be more difficult to describe the organization’s objectives and methods accurately.

In summary, it should not be assumed that immigrant community actors have the skills necessary to produce competitive proposals to access funding, a key form of cultural capital. The skills facilitate building a mutual understanding of social problems. If an organization does not manage to communicate either its intentions or its methodology clearly, its funding can potentially be in peril. Being able to draw upon members with these skills is thus essential. This form of cultural capital seems more challenging to acquire than formal organizational competence, possibly because the specialized jargon of these ‘rules of the game’ is less accessible. Unlike their Swedish counterparts, some of the Canadian immigrant community actors had achieved sufficient organizational capacity to be able to acquire these skills from outside in times of need. Thus, again, evidence seems to corroborate Cordero-Guzman’s findings with regards to the organization’s developmental cycle (2005); the larger organizations seem more likely to develop these skills than the smaller ones.
Orienting in the immigrant community

The third skill that is explored here concerns the capacity to orient within the immigrant community. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, these involve cultural sensitivity, possibly specialized language skill and in-depth understanding of the social dynamics of the community, a ‘game’ that may be separate from the proposal writing exercise but also involves observance to ‘rules’, albeit unwritten, for acceptable behaviour. Respondents in this study corroborated the findings in the research covered in the chapters mentioned above, and provided additional nuance in terms of how these skills manifested in the field.

For example, respondents from immigrant community actors, perhaps unsurprisingly, often spoke of these communities as ‘their’ communities or neighbourhoods, establishing an element of ownership over it and a clear sense of belonging – a ‘we’ – where the organization was seen as an extension of the community, or a manifestation of community will, just as Cordero-Guzmán observed in his work (2005). One respondent described this as a function of how the community actors share life space with the members: “…It's something more that you share life with each other in a different way” (Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). Moreover, as shown in Chapter Three, research has shown how immigrant community actors often act on behalf of the community. The respondents in this study invoked similar language, as in this case, when an interviewee from such an actor engages in how they act to protect the community members from the actions of the public agencies: “They also know that we can help them get help against the public authorities. That's why I have the law book here” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). This sentiment is consistent with the findings in research from Italy, where Muslim immigrants increasingly mobilized precisely to defend community members in response of increased
hostility to Muslims in the wake of the September 11 attacks (Martiniello, 2005). In such cases, the immigrant community actors constitute a platform of resources for the users.

Respondents from immigrant community actors similarly commonly described the development of their organizations as a way to address community needs:

So, there had seemed to be a need…around language and communication. That was apparently missing at that time, or there was a huge gap in terms of it being targeted to a specific, ethno-specific group. And this is how [organization name] is founded, because we've always kept that kind of feel within the organization, around very specific, not only to ethnicity, but also professional groups….so they applied for small funding at the time and they were granted to teach a group of [ethnic demographic] English (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

We first started in [year]…and at first it was just a group of…retired professionals, getting together and they found that at that time, there wasn't a lot of services for immigrants, especially for immigrants from [country] or from [country]…so they just got together and used their spare time to help out...(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This corresponds well to how previous research has conceptualized the mobilization of these types of actors (Chekki, 2006; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005; Jenkins, 1988; Mikkelsen, 2003; Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005), and also implies that this constitutes an important part of the internalized self-image of these organizations.

Importantly, however, this strategically positioned respondent with good insight into the overall field questioned the extent to which the metropolitan level immigrant community actors could actually maintain their connectedness with the community. Instead, the respondent argued that only the smaller organizations, of Hometown Association scope, were genuinely able to retain such ties. “But they've tended to be stay quite small, and less professionalized to some degree, and I think they’re closer to their actual immigrant association roots” (Non-community
actor, Toronto, author’s interview). According to the respondent, the larger ones have a greater difficulty maintaining ties to the community.

This does echo the concerns addressed in Chapters Two and Four with regards to how growing organizations can manage that growth while successfully remaining attached to their communities, while calling the veracity of Cordero-Guzman’s typology into question. However, another respondent challenges the notion that the smaller organizations have better insight into community needs:

So, I would have to say, in some ways, I think the larger organizations have more capacity to solicit input, feedback, guidance from their constituents, than the smaller organizations do. Because one of the challenges for the smaller and more quote unquote “grass-roots” organizations, is that they're often incredibly under-resourced, under-capacity and just grappling, and time, of course...something that they never have enough of (Non-community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

This interesting argument challenges the notion that the small organizations should always, a priori, be seen as the ‘genuine’ community actors, representing the grassroots by re-framing that connectedness into a skill set and an activity that needs coordination and planning. Staying in touch requires practical actions – a concrete set of practices – and is not something that just metaphysically appears from nothing. Taking organizational action requires organizational capacity of some sort, and bigger organizations have more resources to leverage, even though there is no a priori guarantee that they will have the competence to do so. In fact, there are plenty of cases when they might not. Again, social position and organizational culture matters.

Respondents did engage with the issue of how to manage community attachment, often by invoking the methods discussed Chapters Two and Three, like matters of staff demography in relation to user demography, cultural and linguistic competence, and how to leverage these to
identify user needs. In doing so, they provided some answers in terms of what actions immigrant community actors can and do take to retain attachment with immigrant communities.

**Staff demographics**

As discussed in Chapter Two, previous research has shown that staff demography is one important aspect of community attachment for the immigrant community actors (Jenkins, 1981; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005; Iglehart & Becarra, 1996; Mikkelsen, 2003). This was a common theme among respondents from that type of organization. They emphasized how staff demographics reflected community ties and the users being served:

> And, of course, you still have to be very familiar with the clientele that we're serving, because the majority of our clients are still [ethnicity] immigrants, so that's one of the things that we're strong at. Because, we have that background….Pretty much all our staff or our board members are immigrants. They might have been here for a longer time, like they might have been here for 20, 30 years, but they are all immigrants (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

> It is that the staffing here at [organization name] reflects the population we serve. And so, there's that whole issue of diversity. The cultural background, the ethnicity, all that kind of stuff, it's reflected from the ground up within the organization because we also look at the board of directors, to ensure that the reflection is there as well….one of the spots on the board of directors is always reserved for a graduate of one of our programs. So, they can get or give input from the client base perspective, and for us, that's really important (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

These are examples of institutionalized efforts to reflect the diversity of the clients served.

Including a former graduate on the board of directors is not insignificant and ensures that the client perspective is represented even at the highest level of the organization. Such actions provide the organization with a skill set that is very close to that of the users, and also allows the organization to access their perspective and norms, all of which constitutes a quite specialized form of cultural capital. One respondent emphasizes: “That is what distinguishes us, too…”
(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview), underlining how this quality separates the community actor from others in the arena.

Even so, one respondent expressed concern with regards to too much homogeneity within an organization:

Actually, I've experienced the opposite, which is with ethno-specific organizations you may actually find a group, depending on where they come from, the country, where you've got over-representation of a particular; let's say a clan…within a board, and in some ways less diversity. Again, that's just anecdotal (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

The framing of identity in this statement gives rise to an interesting thought. The nation-state concept has been very strong in the west. So, when we hear that people are from a particular country, we expect to find an organization representing all citizens of that country. What if this particular imagined community – the nation – was never strong there? Then why should the clan not be the ground for mobilization? And why should persons from outside the community challenge that? Just because a group from a different cultural sphere does not conform to the Western standards of mobilization does not mean that they are ‘doing it wrong’.

Creating comfort for users

Staff demographics are arguably interlinked with the capacity to leverage cultural capital that is conducive to creating “trust and rapport” (Iglehart & Becarra, 1996, p. 3), with the users. Specifically, skills like language competence could contribute to the comfort level immigrant community actors can provide their users, another example of how cultural capital can be put into action. One civil servant framed it thusly “…so their strengths are cultural sensitivities” (Federal agency, Toronto, author’s interview). Notice how the statement explicitly invoked the
same terminology researchers have used in past studies (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). Other civil servants did not use exactly the same language, but invoked the same theme:

The strength is that… [The users] get a reception that is…they get over the language barrier, for instance. That's so very apparent…that they can communicate…it's, maybe, a little more comfortable reception…to meet someone who has the same nationality…who can speak the same language, who understands the culture you're coming from…That's a great strength..(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

It's client comfort level, too. Like, if I was a woman I would maybe want to go to a women's organization that offers these types of services, or if I'm part of a particular culture, maybe I want to go to an organization that, while they serve everybody, seems to have a lot of people that look like me and speak my language there, so I think it gives a bit more options to clients (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

In the statements, the respondents argue that this competence is a particular strength of immigrant community actors, setting them apart from other actors. Note how the respondent sees the strength as a function of staff demographics, echoing the research findings emphasizing this variable discussed in Chapter Two (Jenkins, 1981; Iglehart & Becarra, 1996; Mikkelsen, 2003; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). Users will experience familiarity in manners of speech and cultural sensitivity, and feel a sensation of ‘coming home’. Only organizations with an in-depth knowledge of the norms for hospitality could provide such a welcoming environment, which makes this form of cultural capital quite significant for successful service delivery.

Moreover, the respondents also emphasized the importance of how immigrant community actors, unlike public agencies, do not exercise public authority. This interviewee explained how significant this characteristic was for their relationship with the user:

I mean, a great advantage is that you don't mix roles. If you are a civil servant who might simultaneously have responsibility for grants, and on the other hand you have to reach out
with information, plus some [users] might perhaps come from some countries where the state has a totalitarian function, it's a pretty tricky situation [for the public agency]. (Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The absence of public authority thus becomes another way to build trust and rapport with the user.

**Identifying user needs**

Further, the capacity to identify user needs (Chekki, 2006; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005; Jenkins, 1988; Mikkelsen, 2003; Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005) was also involved. Respondents described how the sense of connectedness could be leveraged for this purpose, and the ability was widely recognized as a particular area of expertise for the immigrant community actors, including by some respondents from public agencies:

So, the user organizations are, of course, good at linking to the target group…as a part of the target group…they can formulate the needs of the target group…That's almost a precondition to get the bottom-up perspective…it's that bottom-up perspective that is the big strength there. The target group itself (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

These skills and the perspectives that come with this social positioning and organizational model, have an effect for the understanding of the relationship between service deliverers and users within immigrant community actors. They consider the users to be the experts of their own situation, as expressed here: “And then I think it's very important to go in and say: ‘Let's do this together. I'll look for a mentor for you, but I'm blind, you're my guide. You're the expert on your field, not me’” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Note how this statement invokes the predicted strength of the Egalitarian Way of management in Grid/Group Cultural Theory. It also frames immigrant community actor
competences in a way that directly reflects the Bourdieuan theory of practice conceptualization of how community ties can be leveraged as capital. Social capital in the form of networks and also cultural capital provides the actor with the capacity to engage with users on a basis of intimate familiarity, and an understanding for practices and behaviours within the user community. That cultural capital is implemented as organizational expertise in the form of cultural sensitivity, language skills and in-depth understanding of social codes.

Interestingly, Swedish respondents described how this is a competence that seems to be encountering resistances from the surrounding systems. This respondent put it thusly: “I generally believe in this thing with taking your own initiatives and try to proceed, and it can be really hard…when there are so many obstructive systems around” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). Another expressed similar concerns:

…they have learned “truths” that aren't really truths, too, about the Swedish society…But when they come…you break that and say, “No, it's like this. Your case officer is not the one you should wait for”…such a simple decision, really…So, they, like: “she didn't approve of my going through education”…I, like: “but have you considered other paths? There is this way, instead”… you try to give the person the strength to understand that “some decisions, only you can make” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Notably, Canadian immigrant community actors did not describe similar situations. In that sense, the statements should be understood as reflections of the particular Swedish governance environment, where public agencies are more active in service delivery than their counterparts in Canada. These examples thus concern clients who became pacified while under the direct supervision of municipal and national case officers in the Hierachist and Fatalist governance milieu. Once these users arrive in the context of the NGO, based on Egalitarian values and practices, the NGO workers have to undo the pacification of the users resulting from the
immersion in the previous administrative environment. That has to be done in addition to providing the support the user needs to overcome barriers to integration in the labour market. That adds further burdens to the already challenged immigrant community actor. Thus, the Hierarchist practices have raised another barrier for service deliverers, and more so, it would seem, in the Swedish case than in the Canadian one.

**Changing user demographics**

Another challenge identified previously concerns shifting user demographics, and some respondents engaged in how such developments can have some concrete consequences for service delivery. This respondent first describes the original user demographics the organization served:

...before, if we're talking about 10, 15 years ago, 10 years ago, 8 years ago, a lot of the new immigrants when they come in, they just ask us for very straightforward...questions about settlement. So, they just wanted to know where they can get their social insurance number, where can they get their health card, what kind of benefits they can get if they have kids, for example the child tax benefit...those kind of information (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Then the respondent goes on to describe how user needs have shifted, based on their changing competence profile:

But, about 6-7 years ago...a lot of the immigrants that we see today, they have a lot of higher education...so a lot of them...can handle themselves...but it's employment that they are still finding problems with, because they might not have Canadian experience, they might not be that fluent in English...occupational language, the oral, the communications part that they have difficulties with. So they come to us...It's under that circumstance that we started providing employment support, about 5 or 6 years ago (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).
The organization thus shifts its typical service delivery in order to respond to shifting demographics and the changes in user needs this brings. This is an example of how an organization has to leverage its professional expertise to be able to adapt and respond to a changing client demographic and the change in needs and demands that follow.

**Gathering user feedback**

To continuously ascertain user needs, however, organizations need to gather feedback from them, which might not always be a straightforward matter, but rather involve specialized competence. A respondent provided one interesting hurdle they can confront when trying to gather feedback on services from users:

> The problem is that sometimes our clients...When we ask them, "how do you feel about the programs or the services?" they will write, "oh, good, good, good", "how good is it, from number 1 to number 5", "oh, 5,5,5", you know, they all answer that. And they will think that this is the relationship...They are afraid that we will not serve them again, anymore [if they critique our services]...and I really want to talk to them in the heart, what do they think about us? That would help us to model and shape our program (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

While this was the only respondent expressing a frustration over the potential lack of candor expressed by users, it is still important. It constitutes a reminder that trust between users and NGOs should not be taken for granted. In some contexts, users might very well, for different reasons (some more valid than others) remain defensive also in the relationship to organizations that are established as community actors. This is why such organizations continuously need to retain the cultural capital they have within the immigrant community to re-affirm this connection to the community and users.

> The same respondent expressed these wishes for how to address this:
Right now… the information we got is mainly from the satisfaction survey, from the dialogue our staff are having with the clients before and after the workshops…I want to do more focus groups with clients, they can sit down and tell us more about what they need. This…may help us to…do our programs. But…focus groups most of the time are only limited to a certain group of clients…the representative is not big enough sometimes…but I think in terms of manpower we can't…go to all the communities to ask about…the needs. We have to depend on…you, universities, scholars (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The elaboration highlights that community attachment and knowing the client needs are not just ‘out there’. It comes from somewhere, and even when the staff is recruited from the community and the organization has its origins there, it needs to work to get its feedback from the clients, in part because perhaps newcomers do not want to be critical when in need of services. Having noted this, a community NGO that has established strong comfort and trust levels will likely find it easier to engage users in focus groups, and find these users more cooperative with constructive and honest feedback during that participation.

In summary, respondents seem to agree that the strengths of the immigrant community actors consist of their attachment to the community and their ability to identify the needs of the users. This involves a series of specialized forms of competence, including language skills, cultural sensitivity and a thorough understanding of the social codes that constitute the unwritten ‘rules’ of the community. As such, this form of cultural capital is the forte of these actors. The respondents also engaged in five different dimensions of the specialized expertise needed for navigating the community, including recruiting locals to the staff, creating a trust-based rapport with the users, gathering user feedback and adapting to changing demographics in the community. All these contribute to strengthening their cultural capital within that social space. Significantly, for immigrant community actors, that relationship can be established without disruption from the exercise of public authority, unlike the case for public agencies.
However, they also encounter challenges that should not be ignored. These include the conceptualization of what constitutes the ‘community’ and who gets to define that – the constituency, the community actor or outside actors – as well as the difficulties of getting honest and forthright feedback from hesitant users who do not provide sufficient information for improving service delivery. Finally, Swedish testimonials suggest obstructive systems in the environment, referring to the public agencies which have a pacifying effect on the users coming to these actors. That creates barriers for positive service delivery outcomes and thus increases the workload for these actors.

**Summary**

The above suggests that the strengths of immigrant community actors correspond closely to what is expected from the Bourdieuan theory of practice and Grid/Group Cultural Theory. Specifically, they involve the attachment to the community and the capacity to establish a trust-based relationship to the user, attainable through specialized knowledge of the social codes of that social space. Leveraging this relationship as cultural capital recognized in the community is what allows the community actor to engage in effective service delivery there. Primarily, these relate the trust-based rapport with the users that follows from the community attachment and, as reflected in staff demographics and the capacity for doing outreach in the community. These are all significant components of the cultural capital these actors can leverage.

However, they also face several challenges. These relate to building organizational infrastructure, which seems a particular concern for the smaller organizations. There is also the matter of developing the capacity to navigate outside the community, and in particular acquiring proposal writing skills. The significance of this is underlined by the practice of hiring outside
help, though even this has its complications. These are forms of specialized expertise that seem more difficult to develop within these actors.

However, there are a series of potential risks for these actors. First of all, there is the question of the development of formal organizational competence. The narratives here are conflicting. One respondent asserts that the key to the organization’s success lies in its stable infrastructure. Others assert that immigrant community organizations might have weaknesses in this regard. Cordero-Guzmán’s typology linking organizational size to competence (see Chapter Three) gives reason to expect that such a weakness could be correlated to the organizations experience on the arena (2005). An actor that has received funding successfully over a longer period of time has had the possibility to develop standard operating procedures that can increase organizational efficiency. Actors that have been unable to access funding, however, most likely face greater struggles in developing such proficiencies.

That likelihood is, in turn, related to the organizations capacity to orient in the policy community Habitus, and in particular, the proposal writing skills of organization members. These should not be assumed to exist within the organization, nor should they be underestimated. The immigrant community actor and the public agency come from two different social positions, with associated differences in perspectives on social problems, and different ideas about the role of the service deliverer as well. Gatekeeping public agencies expect or require the applicants to invoke specialized jargon for an application to receive funding. Applicants who lack the capacity to do so will encounter formidable barriers to accessing these important economic resources.

Finally, the practices of the surrounding public management paradigm will also be significant. Notably, the comments of the Swedish respondents indicate that Hierarchist methods
pacify users and, by extension, increase the workload for the organizations. They will have to activate these users again for them to be able to assume a role as experts on their own situation.

Conclusion

This overview of the interview responses engaging with immigrant community actor skills has discussed how these particular forms of cultural capital has manifested in the Swedish and the Canadian cases. It discussed these in three different general areas: a) formal organizational competence, primarily relating to management and service delivery infrastructure; b) navigating the model of public management, and; c) orienting in the immigrant community.

The main difference between the two cases lies in how the immigrant community actors in Sweden discuss the conditions that arise from existing in a Hierarchist public agency Habitus, which, they argue, impedes their ability to create a rapport with the users and thus negatively affects the potential to leverage that type of cultural capital. Particularly, they emphasize how they need to ‘reactivate’ users who have been pacified by a paternalist and disempowering system of governance.

Another interesting difference is found in how Canadian immigrant community actors have been observed to use their economic resources to acquire proposal writing skills from outside, when this was deemed necessary to produce a competitive proposal, as it requires a quite specific type of jargon. Swedish respondents never mentioned that as an option. Given what has already been found in previous research with regards to the economic wherewithal of these actors in Sweden, it seems reasonable to ask to what extent this omission might relate to Swedish immigrant community actors simply lacking the economic capital necessary to hire consultants to provide such services.
There are many similarities between the two cases. Indeed, the similarities are so many, and correspond so distinctly to what has already been found in the scholarship, that these findings can be seen as confirming the already established pattern of cultural capital developed by this type of actor. In both cases, the respondents emphasize how the strength of immigrant community actors lies in their attachment to the community and their capacity to leverage their in-depth understanding of the conditions of that social space to establish a trust-based relationship with users for successful and effective service delivery. That ability becomes a needed skill, which can be channelled properly as cultural capital in a funding proposal.

To do so, the organizations need to able to express the ideas in the appropriate specialized jargon, as defined by the funding public agencies. In other words, they need to have internalized the sub-government Habitus to such an extent that they can convey meanings and show that they understand the same distinctions that civil servants make. In both cases, this is emphasized as something vital for the organization to do, but it is also far from certain that it will master this.

Another skill set identified as required for organizational success relates to the formal organizational skills, like the creation of bylaws and infrastructure needed for service delivery. A common denominator here seems to be that organizational size matters – the larger organizations seem more capable of having developed these professional abilities comprehensively such than the smaller ones. This seems intuitive; a larger organization is more likely to have the economic resources needed to create this infrastructure.

In conclusion, the interview findings strongly suggest that immigrant community actors are well suited for service delivery in their respective constituencies. They are organizations focused on serving these particular users; it is the heart of their operations, their raison d’etre. To function in that capacity, they develop certain specialized competencies that are adapted for this
purpose. Ultimately, they are created to be accountable to their users, a sentiment that is strongly internalized into their organizational culture. Thus, their needs cannot really be sidelined in the same fashion. This is not to imply that there might not be a lack of capacity for change in those organizations, for other reasons (such as insufficient funding), only that they will not consider those needs a marginal issue that can safely be neglected or put aside in some project to satisfy orders from higher echelons. Indeed, in some cases the users are represented in those higher echelons and that has at least some impact on accountability to the constituency.

The above findings are consistent with the hypothesis presented previously based on Grid/Group Cultural Theory and a Bourdieuan framing of the social processes. The cultural capital that is needed to create and retain attachment to the community is illustrated in the captured narratives, but they also emphasize that this attachment is not to be taken for granted. For policy makers, harnessing these competencies will depend greatly on the choice of public management model for the policy field and how this model harnesses bottom-up processes in the policy community. The next chapter explores how the respondents probed the competencies of the public agencies and the value systems reflected in these replies.
Chapter 7: Cultural capital as skills in the public agencies

Cultural capital is important for public agencies, just as it is for immigrant community actors. Like them, public agencies mobilize it for social action, manifesting it in several ways within their own organizations. For example, the major public agencies can draw upon their considerable economic resources and convert that to cultural capital of the embodied kind, like buildings. However, even though public agencies are vested with regulatory power, they should not be assumed to have the capacity to orient within any social space. That capacity will depend greatly on the public agency’s understanding of the social space in question. This, in turn, is related to issues like the demography of its staff, just as in the case of immigrant community actors, as discussed in Chapter Two. The ability to do outreach and internalize learnings from such bottom-up exercises also has to be taken into account. All of these skills will be influenced by the model of governance chosen for the field, as this affects how public agencies perceive their environments, analyze problems, and identify the solutions they will consider appropriate to solve those.

The public management histories of the two countries, as presented in Chapters Three and Five, suggests that these skills could vary considerably between public agencies in the two countries. This chapter engages with the question: What cultural capital, in the form of competence, have public agencies in Sweden and Canada accumulated? It does so by providing an overview of how public agencies in Sweden and Canada have drawn upon cultural capital manifested as the set of skills that inform service delivery to immigrant communities. This comes across in many aspects of the organization of the two fields, including interview material provided by the respondents, who came from public agencies, immigrant communities and non-
community actors, i.e. those actors who were contracted by public agencies for service delivery but were not mobilized from an immigrant community.

Specifically, this cultural capital involves: a) the public agency capacity for implementing the policy agenda, both in terms of how that agenda is anchored and prioritized within the public agency, and in terms of administrative competence, which is often assumed to be a strength within these actors; b) the capacity orient in the immigrant communities, and; c) how user needs are identified and the degree to which users have influence on public agency actions.

The Canadian case has historically been more eclectic than the Swedish one, partly because of the tensions between provincial and federal government levels. This relates to the lack of clarity with regards to who has constitutional jurisdictions over these issues. This type of contest between the two government levels ensured that none of them could dominate the policy community entirely. Consequently, the field saw many policy changes during the post-war era. Methods from the Hierarchist, Fatalist and Individualist Ways were all used, as well as tools from the Egalitarian Way. Interestingly, the values of the Egalitarian Way were most commonly invoked by the respondents, reflecting the significance of these methods there. As a result, the Canadian agencies have gained more cultural capital in the immigrant communities than their Swedish counterparts.

Some dimensions of what was discussed with respondents in Sweden were not immediately transferable to the case of Canada. For example, in Canada, community actors tend to deliver services to users. The role of front line case officer rests with the service deliver agencies, rather than the public administration. As such, the civil servants will engage directly with users on a significantly less frequent basis. The role of staff demographics within public agencies then changes.
In Sweden, the Hierarchist, Fatalist and Individualist Ways have been important for the field. As the findings of Chapter Five suggested, the former two have been stronger than the last. The public agencies will have the most significant power to define what artefacts and forms that will be considered valid cultural capital within the policy community.

Interestingly, the Swedish public agencies retained service delivery in-house, unlike their Canadian counterparts. As a result, Swedish public agencies competed to some extent with contracted service delivery agencies. Likewise, the interview material showed that Swedish public agencies framed themselves as administratively strong organizations, but responses also revealed reasons to question that. Also, the Swedish legacy of Hierarchism impacted on the organizational culture of policy community Habitus profoundly, and impeded the capacity of the public administration to orient in immigrant communities. For example, respondents spoke about a lack of demographic diversity in the work force and reveal institutionalized blind spots that undermine the ability of public agencies to identify user needs.

At the same time, there are some noteworthy similarities between the two countries. For example, the values in the Swedish policy community seem to have become increasingly influenced by the Egalitarian values brought in by the funders of EU-projects, while Canadian respondents also invoked perspectives based on the Hierarchical Weberian model of administration. While both countries have adopted New Public Management, the impact of this has, importantly, been limited on values expressed by respondents.

To reflect these variations between the two countries, the chapter starts with a discussion of the interview material addressing the skill sets that both Swedish and Canadian public agencies have in common, specifically, how they frame managerial skills and how they orient in immigrant communities as public authorities. After that, the chapter turns to discuss issues that
only the Swedish public agencies had to engage with by virtue of being service deliverers in their own right. The chapter ends with some conclusions about how cultural capital was manifested by public agencies in the two countries.

**Skills as public authorities**

**Managerial skills**

Swedish respondents engaged more with the issue of managerial skills in the public administration than their Canadian counterparts. The public agencies in that country have long been the primary vehicles for social service delivery. As such, their administrative competence tends to be taken for granted by those in the field, like in the case of this respondent: “So, I've seen… the strength with the public [sector] is really that they have competence, knowledge and the tools too, so, they can navigate in the society in a different way [than other actor]…” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). ‘Competence’, as the term is understood by this respondent, comes across as a form of cultural capital defined and shaped by public agencies, rather than in a dialogue between the actors in the field.

However, this statement from a respondent within the public administration challenges this assumption. The respondent had been involved with project work in the public sector, including EU funded projects, and found problems among the public sector project managers:

…how do you work with implementation, work with strategic impact and those things? You need to make that clear to yourself before you put the shovel to the ground... I've talked to the project managers we've had network meetings with... If it was 20 project managers, it was three who had project manager training. So, what they were asking for, from us, was, more or less, project manager training. And our organization is not really built for that... it's the wrong person in the wrong position (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).
It seems that even the big actors lack fundamental skills for the delivery and implementation of these projects. Many of these projects seem to be starting from scratch, led by managers without experience of project management. When immigrant community actors exhibit these types of deficiencies, they tend to be barred from entry into the field, revealing a problematic double standard favouring the public agencies.

Moreover, respondents observing a major public agency were concerned that it could not fulfill its mandate to provide users with meaningful bridging services into the labour market due to insufficient staff resources. Respondents noted how this is true in two senses. On the one hand there is the number of case officers employed by the public agencies. They are, as this interviewee put it “…few officers…with too many clients…But if you have too many, then there's no chance of being able to help these” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). Moreover, they also lack the tools needed to complete their objectives, because they “…don't have any contacts… How are you supposed to know where the jobs are? It's impossible, if you don't have that network” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). It seems that this is an indicator that in practice case officers are moving towards the role more thoroughly developed in Canada, as an administrator and supporter of the work others do to place unemployed into work, but without the capacity needed to complete that functionality. At the same time, the Swedish public agency retains substantial social service delivery for itself, which means that it probably cannot act with neutrality towards the actors around it that might be better at doing the matching. These two factors coincide to impede the successful completion of this task. This is another instance of when a public agency, with substantial funding, fails to deliver the outcomes that immigrant community actors often are considered incapable of carrying out.
Further, the specialized competence needed to deliver social services through the complex institutional framework that is the public sector could also be questioned. However, coordinating efforts between public agencies that share overlapping jurisdiction can be challenging. The next respondent described such a venture and the level of conceptual confusion that emerged when they tried to communicate:

We don't know [municipality’s] assignment, what definitions do we have? We use different definitions; there is confusion of terms, already at something simple, ‘health conversation’, “what's that?” “But isn't that called ‘health check’?” “No, that's something else”, and so on. And what's a ‘newcomer’? What's a ‘refugee’? So, from that you see all this that creates disturbances in the actual system (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

These actors have all been active in the field for a long time, yet had to make considerable effort just to reach agreement on how to define fairly basic concepts to enable cooperation. Arguably, a common professional jargon had not developed across organizations in a complete way, at least.

This lack of communication impedes everyday operations. Thus, even when civil servants are sympathetic to users, there are still organizational problems. This respondent starts by describing how users do not remain in one location: “They move quite a lot within the municipality, and between municipalities and city districts, and then it's a new settlement all the time…and you have to begin all over from the beginning” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). This causes problems for the organization of service delivery, because of the number of civil servants from different agencies who become involved in case management:

It's the officer from the [national agency 1], and then it's the officer from the municipality, and then it's the [national agency 2] officer, and then it's possibly an officer within a
project you get shuffled into, and the coordination might leave a lot to wish for. You get completely tired of speaking to officers, the same story, over and over again. So, and then you notice that nothing happens, so then you stop saying things… (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This describes the consequences of the overlap between the different public agencies as an overload for the users. Ultimately, the respondent asserted, the user is pacified by a process that is too demanding. The remedy, the respondent continued, would be improved coordination, which has its own complexities, particularly with regards to establishing operational continuity beyond the scope of a single project. Within that project, “...coordination might work… It might be one, two persons who coordinate very well, and then it ends, and then the coordination is gone, because there's someone else, they are not sitting there anymore” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The description also reveals how the user has almost no say in the process, which seems more like a long cycle of bureaucratic manoeuvres designed to meet the needs of public agencies rather than achieve effective results for the user’s settlement process. The above respondent was frustrated by the situation, but frontline civil servants are too far down in the hierarchy to make an impact on the internal logic of the organization, which resists attempts of reform through the inertia of established momentum.

In Canada, respondents had a more specific concern with regards to the administrative capacity of the public agencies, and that was focused on the contact that service delivery agencies had with the case officers of the public administration when implementing the contracted services. In particular, this respondent expressed frustration over the lack of continuity in the contacts with the public funder:
At the beginning of this year, we had four different [federal agency] settlement officers handling our file… The one that we used to have was with us for many, many years, and then he got… assigned to another position, and then we had another one, and a month later we had another one, and then another later… (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This lack of permanence could have many different causes. Recurring re-organization within the public agency or a high degree of staff turnover could both have this possibly unintentional effect. However, it could also be a conscious policy choice. If NGOs have had a long history of building a relationship with a single case officer, and establish a strong rapport with that individual, a clientelist network could develop. In such cases, the NGOs could gain a great degree of power within the arena, and can sometimes even influence policy. Some would consider such power deeply suspect and would frame the situation as ‘skewing the policy process’ dangerously, where the NGO is framed as a potential free-rider or opportunist. Rotating case officers would then be an apt method for preventing that, consistent with Fatalist values.

In summary, in Sweden, respondents often took for granted that public agencies had managerial skills, a specific form of cultural capital. However, some respondents reported that such agencies should not be assumed to possess these skills a priori. In some cases, higher echelons of the organizations might have assigned duties to frontline workers without properly equipping them for these assignments. Moreover, a comprehensive professional jargon needed to carry out operations in a coordinated fashion does not seem to have developed. Meanwhile, the different role that government agencies take on the Canadian scene is reflected in how respondents think about their competencies as managerial entities. The narratives focuses more specifically on a single dimension of administration, revealing a concern over how frequently case officers were reassigned, which impacted performance negatively. The effect of this policy is actually to decrease the managerial skill set within the public agency, as each new case worker
will have to learn the local details from scratch on arriving. The result would thus be a negative impact on this type of cultural capital.

**Orienting in the community as public authorities**

As discussed in Chapter Two, immigrant community actors develop the capacity to orient in the community by employing staff from the community and do outreach to identify user needs, by framing the user as the expert and developing a trust-based rapport. Another important dimension is that they do not exercise public authority. Public agencies will have to exercise some measure of such authority, as this function is integrated into their core functionality as bodies that can define and enforce the ‘rules of the game’. Theoretically, this could become an impediment to service delivery, particularly in Sweden where public agencies still engage in such in-house, but as the respondents show, it is not the only barrier to developing the capacity to orient in the immigrant community. Conversely, the long Canadian history of cooperation with immigrant community actors should have had some impact on the public agency capacity to orient in these communities, or the civil servants’ understanding of what is needed to do so. The scope of this influence, however, has to be weighed against the impact of the other management models on the organizational culture of the Canadian public agencies. As will be seen, respondents reflected on the significance of influences of Hierarchist values on practices in the field. These were relatively few, but those that were discussed by respondents still deserve some attention.

In both countries, the respondents engaged with the public agency capacity to identify user needs and the issue of when public agencies structure activities and organizational solutions to satisfy the needs of the administration rather than the users. Notably, there were a range of issues that only respondents in Sweden engaged with, namely staff demographics, user influence,
the existence of an institutional blind spot and the importance of a champion within the organization. The differing service delivery roles of the public agencies in the two countries might go some way to explain this discrepancy.

**Identifying user needs**

The distance created between public agencies and users can potentially disrupt the relations between them. The Hierachist practice of having civil servants determine user needs can further exacerbate that. In organizational terms, this Swedish civil servant provided an example of which actor is assigned the responsibility of determining user needs: “Since most projects are run by the municipalities, it's the introduction divisions [that ascertain client need]...” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). Another described the process in more detail, beginning with how civil servants from a national agency and a municipal program determined whether a user had achieved certain learning benchmarks. If the civil servants determined that user had not, they would take steps to address this:

> In that case, then we must check, where…exists the possibility that this person will learn this learning result…that it's required to increase the possibilities to find work. And then we can send this person to a complementary actor, external deliverer, internal deliverer, or, if there is one, computer course at [municipal program] (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The organizational solution here is thus to have a panel decide what the users need to succeed in the labour market. It does so by subjecting them to a battery of tests to determine if those are met. A key functionality in this system is the reliance on the judgement of the civil servants, and the competence they develop through contacts and interactions with users. One civil servant reflects over the process of developing experience within the policy community:
I have worked within the refugee area…in different groups, for four or five years, from municipality district level, to [municipality], to some different, internship coordinator, refugee officer, a little bit like that, so I believe myself to know, just about, what people need (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Over time, then, this competence is ostensibly built up through interacting with users, until the civil servant reaches a critical mass of experience and uses that to predict user needs, and thus self-identifies as the user’s voice. This self-image is thus grounded in personal experience.

Another example of needs assessment was presented by this civil servant, where the case officers strive to assess of the user’s past learnings through quality assurance:

…it's not called education because it's not...courses in that sense...these modules have a learning result, there are evaluation criteria and there is proof for this learning, which a person can bring along from the country of origin, can learn through friends or can be acquired through many interventions that can be found at the [national agency] or the [municipal program]. The only that we had...is to quality-assure this learning which this applicant, or this person, has (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The statement is interesting in several respects. For one, the term ‘quality assurance’ is quite vague and the respondent did not elaborate further on what that meant more substantively.

Further, this perspective seems to rest on the assumption that the reason immigrants do not enter the labour market is because they did not learn the right things, and that success will come when they have been elevated to a new level of certified learning. To some extent, entering a new country is, indeed, a learning process, but it is not clear why these public agencies are going to such great lengths to get this learning ‘certified’. It seems highly symbolically significant, but it is not clear that it would reflect actual deficiencies within the newcomer as such. Either the user already is skilled and has some form of professional credentials which should either be sufficient or at least translatable in some way, or the user is low skilled in which case the educational
system should presumably be an avenue for addressing the learning needs. In either case, the functionality of the ‘certification’ is unclear. One possibility is that it functions as some form of foreign credentials recognition to mitigate the effects of employers discriminating against foreign training, though the language seems to suggest something more encompassing that such a process.

Many of the tools discussed above, like building professionalism or having credential benchmarks are seemingly similar to the type of assessments NGOs would engage with. However, the NGO, in some sense, has its mandate from the users, either because the users make up the membership and staff of the NGO, or because the users have a greater possibility to opt out from the NGO if the service is not satisfactory. The government agency does not have these types of mandates. Moreover, the situation is complicated by working within a hierarchical organizational culture, which may or may not encourage civil servants to become user advocates. Also, the top-down infrastructure can conflict with and impede such a role directly. Thus, even if the civil servant does develop the competence necessary to exercise proper discretion, it is not clear that the working environment will be conducive to allow that.

Significantly since civil servants make assessments of the users’ competence outside of the type of accountability regime that an NGO is subject to, there is a potential for the type of arbitrariness that can exist within the Hierarchist organization. An example of that is when the organizational culture is informed by negative stereotypes about immigrants. That such instances can occur is related by this respondent from a Swedish immigrant community actor:

…we didn't listen to their [Employment service] case officer, we didn't listen to their social secretaries, when they said that they are not suited to become doctors, they are not suited to become this and they aren't suited to become policemen and they aren't suited to
become fire fighters, but they fit better within caring and janitorial. That's what we heard (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The account corresponds well to previous findings from the field. In one ESF-project, project participants were continuously discouraged from making certain career choices by their case officers. This included some quite under-handed methods, like contacting the supplier of an internship position to dissuade that supplier from accepting the participant, or revoking another client’s permission to participate in the project. In one case, the motivation was that Sweden needs nurses, not administrators. In another instance, the case officer decided that the internship was at a too low level of competence without consulting the participant (Hellstrom & Narti, 2003). Hertzberg likewise found that civil servants act informed by stereotypes in their dealings with immigrant youth to a significant extent (Hertzberg, 2003). It seems that a paternalist organizational culture within public authorities is conducive for allowing such attitudes to influence service delivery. There is thus a potential that services in an organization based on a top-down model can be designed according to the bureaucracies’ paternalistic perception of what the user needs, which can be something quite different from the real needs.

This is not to suggest that Swedish public agencies lack organized mechanisms for getting user feedback. For example, this respondent recommends using focus groups as an important tool for that: “Another thing that we see is to have focus groups: ‘What is it you lack that the municipality can assist with?’” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). This is the same tool as one could find also employed by immigrant community actors (see Chapter Six).

However, the same tool, used by owners positioned differently in relation to the user can have different outcomes. Also, the feedback and user reactions can be received differently,
depending on organizational culture (see more on this in Chapter Eight). The following respondent expresses frustration about a number of experiences that were considered problems for civil servants trying to get feedback on immigrant needs. The respondent identified two problematic areas. The first relates to how users, in this case newcomers, and civil servants had differing perspectives on practices and relationships. Some users had trepidations about mixed-gender groups, because they felt “…that there might be some dating service” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). In other cases, some male refugee children could not “…take orders from women” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation), which created problems in an administration with predominantly women employees. The respondent argued that the users “haven't quite entered the Swedish thinking with flat organizations and participation” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation) and that their reactions “…magnifies an already, by us, considered bad pattern of segregating men and women” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

These reflections are interesting on many levels. First, they express a paternalist perspective in the sense that the expectation is continuously placed on the user to adapt to the organizational culture and values of the public agency, whereas there seems to be no effort on the part of the public agency to engage the users in any dialogue or approach them as equals. Indeed, the respondent seems to be taking for granted that civil servants have a right to, and ought to have the right to, change the value systems of the refugees.

At the same time, the civil servant also expressed concern of the lack of users influence on service delivery and that there is a fundamental problem in the role of the civil servant itself - as a person vested with public authority, vested with power: “So, there is a problem that the
newcomers do not have a voice, that's my point of view, that …there's too much public authority-think vis-à-vis individual-think” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). This is something that gets in the way of the communication with the client inseparable from the nature of the organization the civil servant belongs to.

That becomes a particularly clear complicating factor in the relationship between the public agency and the users who come from countries with authoritarian regimes: “…that somewhere, there is also a cultural problem here, when many people come from dictatorships, or something, and that public agencies are something you should be careful with. Try to break down that barrier” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). Refugees from such countries, who have often fled because of fear of persecution by authoritarian public agencies, are understandably less likely to feel trust in such institutions. Encounters with such users are probably to be expected in this context, and providing users with a comfort zone that reduces stress and lays a foundation for a trust based relationship can be a key to success. Thus, public agencies might be less suited for completing them than other organizations.

Even so, the Swedish solution to this, as described here, is not to outsource these services to the immigrant community actors, where there could potentially be at least some distance to this power dynamics, but instead to use focus groups. That usually does not solve the problem, though, because the power dynamics remain the same and thus the obstructions remain the same. The fundamental reflex is, thus, to try and work within the existing Hierarchist system, rather than do any fundamental reform that would actually empower immigrant agencies and, by extension, immigrants.
Indeed, this civil servant was asked about how Swedish public agencies ascertained client needs if the target group is not represented at the table. The respondent circumvented the question to some extent:

…another very interesting question is to what extent... these, because of the asymmetrical relationships that exist between user organizations and public authorities; to what extent are these captured in the stronger party's networks, the structures of the exercise of public authority. They are so dependent of these over here that it's not entirely straight-forward relationships. All the way down to individual level, so to speak (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The reaction to avoid engaging with the question in this manner is interesting. The reaction suggests that there is no good institutional method for identifying user needs within the Swedish model of governance. It seems unequipped to address the issue in a way that centres on the user perspective, or maybe public agency actors have been socialized into a perception of the environment that constraints their capacity to identify this as an issue that needs to be addressed.

As a result of the challenges that public agencies have with identifying user needs, it seems some public authorities continuously lack a clear idea about what newcomers require to enter the labour market quickly. The respondent here represents a group of public agencies that have had jurisdiction over the settlement process for a long time, yet still have gaps in understanding that there are significant impediments to the efficiency of their service delivery. As such, a project was launched to address those gaps. The central question of that project was: “What learning does a person need to increase the possibilities to get work as soon as possible?” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). That the gaps in understanding remain so substantial in organizations that have had jurisdiction over the issues for an extended period of time that they need to launch a new project to address them is noteworthy.
Interestingly, the Hierarchic practice of assigning a gatekeeping role to the civil servant case officer remains in place when a user receives services from a contracted actor, even though that system is supposedly based on the Individualist Way, an organizational model that was designed to be centred from the bottom-up (see Chapter Four). The following respondent from a contracted service delivery agency addressed how to manage client expectations when the conversation engaged with this organizational phenomenon:

…there are times we get [users] who come and say, “I was going to get training, where is it?”…and then I realize that…the case officer most often presented information that wasn't correct. And this is a concern, because in their own system, for example, in the service, there are hundreds of training providers and it's not easy for a case officer to keep track of, “oh, what did [Private educational company 1] do? Ah, they did that…” So, that's why clear and succinct information is really important to the case officers (Non-community actor, Stockholm, author's interview, author’s translation).

Note how the respondent emphasizes the importance of correct information to these gatekeepers, and is concerned about the consequences of misunderstandings and the dissemination of incorrect information about services within the system. The respondent then explained how the organization tries to prevent such situations from occurring:

…it's really important for me that I supply the officer with adequate information…that's a really important part. So, for our part it's very much about, from the proposal we write and submit, I also work with information material which I both can send to the officers at the [national agency] but I can also inform, so sometimes I have the fortune to come and meet the officer and speak about this…this is how we work, and it's important that this reaches the participant and then we have set the level right away…(Non-community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Note how the case officers act as information brokers between service deliverers and users in this system. This also implies that the users were not trusted to find this information themselves, and
raises the question of to what extent the users have direct access to information about the service deliverers or can request this information.

The methods used by public agencies to ascertain user needs above, then, included relying on the expertise accumulated by frontline civil servants who later move up the ranks in the organization and focus groups. However, the users in these Swedish cases remained at the bottom of the organizational structure, and if asked for feedback, that material might still have limited impact if the organizational culture impedes the agency’s capacity to internalize the experiences of the users. In the testimonials provided by the respondents here, for example, it was often the users that were expected to adapt to the procedures of the public agency, not the other way around. Moreover, there is also the potential that the wishes of the higher echelons of the organization over-ride the feedback provided by the users.

The contrast to a system where bottom-up styles of organization have had some impact is noteworthy. As shown in Chapters Three and Five, Canadian public agencies and immigrant communities may not share the same social position but some bridging has been done between the two as a result of the historical influences of the Egalitarian Way. This legacy is traceable in the language used when respondents from the Canadian policy community discuss tools for identifying user needs.

One example of this is demonstrated by this respondent from a public agency, who speaks about need for public administrations to continually revisit which communities are being served at any given time: “…we don't do community capacity building either…but then we have to strike that with the balance of services to potentially new groups that existing services don't exist for…” (Federal agency, Toronto, author’s interview). Note how the civil servant presents the absence of community capacity building actions as a problem when identifying user needs. The
civil servant acknowledges that there may be communities the administration has little insight into where services might not yet be provided comprehensively. Moreover, using community capacity building as a reference point implies that the outreach can be best provided by the local community actors. That is consistent with the history of the Egalitarian Way in the Canadian field.

Interestingly, the statement is also an example of the interplay between rule-boundedness and a bottom-up-focused organizational culture. The civil servant exists in an organizational culture that, it seems, does not obstruct recognizing the value in capacity building as such, yet the regulatory framework for agency actions does prohibit the administration from acting on that understanding. Thus, there seems to be a contradiction here, where government actors do acknowledge the competence of community actors in principle, which has opened up the opportunity structure to some extent. However, simultaneously, at least some agencies refrain from engaging in the capacity building that sometimes is needed to enable immigrant community actors to fulfill their role as service delivery agencies to their full potential.

The Egalitarian perspective carries over into other areas as well. Several civil servants engaged in descriptions of immigrant communities that explicitly recognized the diversity within such communities. This included acknowledging that newcomers of the same ethnicity could come from different sending localities and that this impacts user behaviour: “So, for example, [ethnic group]…can come from many different places of the world…so the incoming countries are actually in fact the driving force, who seeks the service” (Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview). Likewise, the respondent displayed the capacity to identify the heterogeneity within a linguistic group:
You may be linguistically or ethnically...even from one similar region, even that is becoming less and less important in a sense, and...the rise of unique...heterogeneity of the original identity is actually much stronger than people seem to think. So, from Latin-American...although you can speak Spanish to a Chilean, to a...Nicaraguan or a Mexican, no, they actually perceive each other quite differently, in terms of who they are, whether they belong to, should belong to the same...(Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview).

Note how this statement captures that often perceptions about homogeneity from outside a community belie that reality is more complex than how the scholarship has discussed ethnic belonging. In other words, in this statement, the assumption is that a set of different communities – Chilean, Nicaraguan and Mexican – are often assumed by the dominant group(s) to belong together by virtue of sharing a language, in this case Spanish. That expectation may then be materialized within governments (in the sense that actors within public agencies assume or take for granted that these actors will mobilize together in a single organization based on this commonality). ‘Same-ness’, as it is perceived by the mainstream society, seems mostly based on geographical and cultural difference, and, likely, on ‘othering’ processes that racialize these minorities, as the case of Muslims described in Chapter Three.

The respondent then goes on to describe some experiences of such interactions:

…in fact, in our funding of the program, Spanish speaking senior groups for example, and it ends up all the seniors from who go to that group, 98 per cent of them are from one Latin American country, and they cannot attract…seniors from other sources... and they outnumber all the rest...my goodness, they're, they're quite disparate groups, like at one point there were 50 seniors' groups, or a hundred, the number just boggles the mind....(Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview).

A certain frustration seems to shine through. This is not particularly surprising. From the public agency point of view, it would be easier to provide social services if client groups conformed easily to neat social categories. In reality, though, there is a great deal of complexity that defies
such simple categorization. That said there seems little reason why the government should try to force individuals into rigid categories.

Moreover, the civil servant is actively trying to avoid treating ethnic groups as internally homogenous and recognize the diversity within communities. As such, the statement reveals a consciousness of research findings concerning how community actors need to manage the changing user demographics as migration patterns change over time (Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005; Jenkins, 1981; 1988; Chung, 2005), as discussed in Chapters Two and Three. There is a contrast, here, to the statements made by Swedish civil servants. The statements made by Canadian civil servants focus on community capacity and how a diverse demographic among users has effects for service delivery. Immersed in an organization with a strong Hierarchist legacy as shown above, the Swedish civil servants perceived the service delivery field quite differently. They located needs assessment to the civil servants, tended to consider immigrant user perspectives a problem for service delivery rather than a solution, and community capacity building was absent as a problem solving tool.

That said the extent to which the Egalitarian Way has impacted actual service programming in Canada can still be debated. This interviewee from an immigrant community actor comments on changes in programming, emphasizing how public agencies are trying to develop tailor made approaches based on user competence profiling:

This is a new, new thing....since I've been here, I find that there are more and more programs which are targeted towards speciality professionals and, I mean, even five years back there weren't so many programs, so there is an increasing awareness on the part of the policy makers that you cannot have a cookie cutter approach and say, “ok, all immigrants, they register in these programs and they will be able to get jobs”…they're customizing the needs of the clients that they are serving (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).
Note how the respondent connects the changes to a shift in the funder’s understanding of user needs, moving away from a standardized response to a more nuanced one, better suited for individual needs. Also notable is that this is seemingly a recent trend, according to the interviewee. That defies what would be expected from the policy history of this field, where the material from Chapter Five indicates a stronger presence for the Egalitarian Way. A key characteristic of this management model is its bottom-up dynamic, and given the significance the model seems to have had on the Canadian policy community, it would seem likely that civil servants would have abandoned a ‘cookie cutter approach’ quite some time ago. That suggests that the way the perspectives associated with the different management models manifest and becomes internalized by those immersed in the field is highly complex.

In summary, then, there is some evidence revealing practices that contradicts expectations of a policy community where the Egalitarian Way informs the organizational culture and perspectives of the actors. Even so, the Egalitarian influence in the field cannot be dismissed and perhaps give Canadian public agencies the potential to better understand the social dynamics of immigrant community actors than their Swedish counterparts. That has enhanced the competencies with the agencies in this regard. They could therefore be said to have some measure of cultural capital valid in the immigrant community, even though it might not be as strong as it would be within an immigrant community actor.

**Satisfying the needs of the public administration over the needs of the user**

The top-down structure of the Hierarchical Way means that the organization is primarily designed to satisfy the needs of the upper echelons rather than those of the user. This focus on meeting the objectives of the public administration rather than the user is a recurring theme in the responses. For example, some EU-funded projects in Sweden have been designed for that
purpose, as in the following exchange, where the respondent discussed why it has been so challenging to invite immigrant community actors to the regional body of governance for the project partnership. The respondent explained that many of the NGOs were locally based, with comparatively small organizational structures, which, the respondent argued, created problems for the public agencies, because all new methodologies coming out of the project “… should be upscale-able to the regional level…” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). The respondent continued:

… It needs to be something that gains from and needs to be scaled up... Transferable…we do nothing…if the municipalities can do it themselves, there's no reason for us whatsoever to do anything at all. That's what I meant, there must be an expressed need…and then it must be something on a certain level,…we see, well, if we start with this locally, here in [municipality]…and then, this can, kind of be transferred, and maybe be done in ten municipalities…and then all. That's how we work (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The rationale for not inviting the representatives of the users to the table is thus that they are too small or too local. Instead, it is the organizational needs of the municipalities, as expressed through jurisdictional rationales, that dictate what should be done and who is to be invited. That sets the agenda from the start, excluding the target group from the overall strategic planning. This becomes particularly problematic when the target group lacks regional organizational structures that could act as a speaking partner to the public agencies on that level. This suggests that needs formulation is articulated through an institutionalized order that will act as a barrier to the bottom-up impulses.

The following national agency respondent summarizes the prevailing mentality on the political decision-making level like this:
...it's a question of...what the politicians have as an objective for the integration...how much is integration and how much is assimilation? That's always a sliding scale...partially integration, and partially assimilation in all these models...Even if you're not allowed to speak about assimilation...there are always dimensions of that, after all...But...if you see it from the immigrants' perspective, I think [the Canadian] model is interesting...and I can believe that even from an effectiveness point-of-view...(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The phrasing here suggests that the normative point of the departure is not ‘seeing it from the immigrants’ perspective’, but rather that the public agency-perspective is the prevailing norm.

There were few comments from Canadian respondents regarding satisfying the needs of the public administration over that of users. Even so, the public administration remains the primary funder of these services. This funder conditions the structure of the funding stream in terms of which services can be offered and which users will have access to them. Exercising that power can become problematic from the users’ perspective. This civil servant reflected on how organizational solutions sometimes acted in contradiction to the motivation of many newcomers:

An individual that came to Canada...is keen to kind of have an identity with Canada and make it feel like home. And one of the first aspirations they have is to have the Canadian passport...They may not have transitioned...in their actual integration, but that's not the first thing they want to do. After they get their job and their housing...the first thing is...their citizenship...it's just an identity thing...Status (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

Here, the respondent explains how a powerful incentive for newcomers motivates their action early in the settlement process. Becoming a naturalized citizen brings a certain cultural capital in the form of status, and there is a fairly entrenched perception that achieving citizenship equalizes the relationship between newcomer and the host society to some extent. Indeed, that assumption seems to be one of the primary drivers for studies on inclusive or exclusive citizenship (Sainsbury, 2012) and rankings of the legal framework for naturalization (Migrant Integration
Policy Index). It should thus not be surprising that this could be a motivating force for newcomers.

The respondent then went on to describe the problematic consequences of achieving this goal, as the newcomer then loses access to services:

Once they get that, now, all of a sudden, not from an employment point of view, as much I would say, but for other settlement and social support programs that are needed to serve immigrants in a holistic manner, it reduces their access to programs...and that affects their employment because when they lose a job, then we're behind the 8 ball. So, for instance, if they were in a settlement program initially and got connected, they may not have taken [language program] or whatever, and eventually they…do a survival job...(Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

In other words, policy makers have not taken these newcomer motivations fully into account. The criterion might also be based on the assumption that naturalized citizens should no longer be seen as ‘immigrants’, or at least newcomers, and thus no longer have need for the services. However, even if that is the underlying assumption, the situation reveals a top-down categorization, given the disconnect that appears in practice illustrated here. When the users act contrary to policy makers expectations and lose the access to services that were intended to support them in the settlement process, they end up in a highly problematic situation.

These conditions of access are controlled by and decided by the public officials who lead the organization. This is to be expected, to some extent, given the demands on democratic accountability on a government administrative system. Even so, it creates some problems of accessibility, when clients are suddenly barred from accessing a program because of a change in circumstance that has little relevance for their needs. Giving users more power over needs articulation would challenge this type of top-down categorization.
In both Sweden and Canada, then, there are instances of organizational solutions driven by a need to satisfy the interest of the administration, which might not reflect the interest of the users very well. The latter is likely to not care much about administrative jurisdictions and which public agency funds or measures support structures as long as support structures are there. This should not be surprising, but corresponds very well to the problem solving and organizational culture of a public service that has been organized in ways consistent with the Hierarchist principles of the Weberian model. The model, however, negatively affects the administration’s capacity to act on information about user needs, and, in turn, the associated cultural capital.

**Summary**

The general assumption among Swedish respondents describing the public agencies is that they are administratively strong, which is not surprising given their long historical dominance of the sector. However, when the matter is probed, it seems that this cannot be taken for granted. Shifting responsibilities may have left at least some frontline case workers either overloaded or with tasks they are ill prepared for, at least according to some of those immigrant community actors who interact with them and find their capacity to complete certain tasks lacking.

The testimonials reflect the eclectic history of the Canadian field. Insofar as the managerial competence of Canadian public agencies has been negatively affected, tools from the Fatalist way seem like the most likely cause. On the other hand, the most commonly referenced perspectives and methods seemed informed values from the Egalitarian Way, which have been positive for the accumulation of community navigational skills, and the associated cultural capital. Even so, those skills might be constrained by effects from Hierarchical management styles, which were also referenced. These two do not necessarily sit comfortably together. One is top down and rule-bound. The other is bottom-up.
In both cases, respondents discuss how the skill of orienting immigrant communities was further undermined by the structure of the organizations, designed more for satisfying administrative needs than user such. In the Swedish case, that was mostly related to Hierarchist organization. In Canada, it was associated with the application of methods from the Fatalist Way.

Most interesting is the absence of the Individualist Way in these responses. Even though it has been framed as the new paradigm for public administration in Canada, it does not seem to reflect that strongly in framings of competence. For example, private educational companies might have successes in submitting proposals (though that is not a topic for this thesis), but civil servants do not frame competence in terms competitiveness or marketability. Rather, they talk about the complexities of relationships between and inside ethnic communities, community capacity building as well as the need to locate and create connections with communities that they do not yet have such with. The legacy of the Egalitarian Way has thus not been completely displaced by New Public Management, which might not be entirely surprising. Both of these ways are based on a bottom-up perspective, and thus they are not inherently at odds with each other.

**Skills as service delivery agencies: Orienting in the community**

In Sweden, where public administrations acted as service delivery agencies as well, skills emphasis became particularly salient. The dynamic contributed to weaknesses with regards to the public agency to orient within the immigrant community. Moreover, Swedish respondents also commented on the effects of lacking diversity within staff demographics and how the organizational culture contributed to an institutionalization of a blind spot where the agencies’ lack important capacity to understand the complexities of interfacing with immigrant
communities. Finally, they commented on efforts taken to address some of these organizational barriers and gain some feedback from users.

**Staff demographics**

There seemed to be varying opinions on the degree to which public agencies had a diversified workforce. Respondents from outside the public agencies seemed largely in agreement that the public agencies were not sufficiently diverse. This respondent from the voluntary sector describes how the public agencies remain highly ethnically homogenous, which is most apparent at conferences and other such professional meeting spaces. A respondent commented that the ethnic make-up of the professionals in the field during an integration project was “…most often completely Swedish, so ethnically Swedish events, because…the higher up you get, there is no one, no one with ties to another country” (Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). That is consistent with some research results which concluded that the public administration on at least the municipal level has been problematic in the past. The study found that civil servants with an immigrant background were under-represented in staff demographics (Velásquez, 2005).

This respondent from an immigrant community actor engaged with the issue while reflecting on how diversity management, a management trend aiming to increase the diversity of the work force, became implemented in Swedish public agencies in a tokenistic manner:

They hired people like [name]. People who speak like they do...and then they never employ another [person from a racialized minority]. So, I know, for instance, [national public agency] had that. And they employed my aunt. And today, she is still sitting there alone in the department (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).
This constitutes an example of tokenism, where employers hire a single person from a racialized minority (the respondent was a person of colour) in order to satisfy demands for representation with minimum effort, and in a symbolic fashion to show that the employer is tolerant and the work force is diversified. However, that is rarely sufficient, since the impact on operations or the organizational solutions is often negligible, particularly when the person in question has neither a substantive mandate nor critical mass to change the organizational infrastructure or impact procedures in a more inclusive direction. Moreover, the person may face a lack of opportunities of advancement, and the opportunity to internalize new skills, as the person is isolated from the operations or proper service delivery.

The responses correspond well to the findings of two reports from EU-projects exploring the diversity of public agencies in Stockholm. They found that only half of the answering public agencies reported that they had immigrants employed, and among those that did have such employees, the proportion of immigrants became smaller the higher one moved up the organizational hierarchy. Moreover, they found a general lack of coherent methodology, coordination and evaluation with regards to ethnic relations in human resources and recruitment practices in the public administration. Instead, the organizations present ad hoc interventions and sporadic activity seemingly lacking in coordination and continuity, with a focus on practices that could be easily implemented over the short term and had little cost associated with them, both in terms of time and monetary resources (Hellstrom & Linner, 2001; Hellstrom & Narti, 2003). These reports need to be supplemented with further research. Even so, they do suggest that the experiences of the respondents in the present study are not isolated, but rather patterned.

However, the perspective seems to shift when a civil servant describes the situation. This respondent from a municipality describes the ethnic composition of local district office:
Now, we have very a mixed staff group here at [district]. The most mixed in [municipality]. I have myself--- [the] municipality has done inquiries into this, like, followed statistics, how many have immigrant background, and so on (Municipal district agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Note, however, that these municipal districts constitute the lowest level of the hierarchy in the municipal public administration, so this statement and the testimonials above are not mutually exclusive.

Further, obtaining clarity concerning staff demographics in Sweden is not straightforward. As discussed in Chapter One, there are issues with the available statistics, particularly with regards to how ethnicity and immigration is captured in official databases. The term ‘immigrant’ lacks a conclusive definition by Swedish government bodies (Kulturdepartementet, 2000). Generally birth place or citizenship is used to differentiate between native born and foreign born (Migrationsverket). These definitions do not capture ethnicity well. The comments by this municipal civil servant become particularly interesting in the context of those findings:

I'm a little sceptical about that, myself, because…I previously had a colleague here who was called [First name], [Full name], very Swedish…and my name and appearance is very immigrant… But if we would look at who is Swedish and who is an immigrant…actually, she was a German citizen. I’m a Swedish citizen since 24 years. So, so, it doesn't say very much, and it also doesn't say very much about me having better treatment than she has, or the other way around. So, it's a little pointless…(Municipal district agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The civil servant seemed uncertain about how to measure the diversity within a work force. Interestingly, the respondent seems to assume that staff demographics should be charted by assigning identity based on narrowly defined criteria, like citizenship, place of birth, or nationality (the criteria used in official Swedish statistics) or even names. Such a practice might
come across as intuitively ‘objective’ for some. In reality, however, these criteria are flawed. Curiously, the respondent did not engage with self-identification as a measuring tool. While that, too, is problematic, it would be less so in comparison to those mentioned, and it is the commonly established practice in North America, where issues of diversity in the workplace have been discussed for a longer time. Taking that into consideration, the absence of reflection on such methods here is notable, and raises questions about to what extent this topic has been engaged in a substantive fashion the Swedish context.

Indeed, the respondent went on to state explicitly that ethnicity should not be regarded as a competence:

So, ethnicity is not really a competence. It's something that you're…born in, and moreover, it's very different, too…Myself, I'm originally from [country], but if one would say that I am culturally competent in [country’s] culture, nothing could be more incorrect. I left the country...it simply depends, so, what city I come from, the social background I come from, the educational background I come from, what political ideology I belong to, so all this counts (Municipal district agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This builds on a misconception of ethnicity as something given by birth, rather than something a person is socialized into. More significantly in this case, the framing serves to undermine the claims to competence an immigrant community actor can make based on ethnic/cultural competence. Thus, that type of cultural capital is delegitimized, discounted and made invisible.

In summary, while at least one respondent described diversity within a public agency, it was an observation made on the lowest level of that administrative hierarchy. Other testimonials imply that the diversity decreases when ascending the hierarchy, and in some events, a room filled with people who are ostensibly there for the purpose of addressing social issues affecting immigrants can be almost entirely ethnically homogenous, without much representation from
immigrants at all. Likewise, one respondent talks about a relation between who was recruited for tokenistic purposes and then isolated from the rest of the organization. These narratives correspond to what would be expected in situation of strongly segregated social spaces.

**An institutionalized blind spot**

Further consistent with the hypothesis of strongly segregated social spaces, this respondent reflects on the conditioning of the public agency social space and how the administrative model has created a social distance between decision-maker and user:

...one of the obstacles is to understand, or to be able...to relate to other realities...and to realize that just because something is written on a paper, doesn't mean that it will be done in that fashion...And it is actually true that even if we have a great many immigrants...the people who sit and make decisions, often have very little knowledge about the people it's about, very little contact, so...to get...these carriers to meet, that is...an ongoing...obstacle that must be handled, with the resistance that it entails...(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This reflection is quite consistent to what Group/Grid Cultural Theory hypothesizes about the Hierarchist model. As civil servants internalize the organizational culture of the public agency, these social reflexes form and contributes to this ‘inertia’, among those who are immersed in those organizations. The reflection on this type of ‘institutional blind spot’ continues:

And I don't understand why...it's so extremely hard to make Sweden understand that we, Swedes, need to have information sessions when we are on a charter trip, or we won't find our way to the coffee shop...and they have to be in Swedish, and it has to be with others who are like us, and so on. How can you then think and believe that people who come here from completely different contexts and with everything people bring and in our complex society...very difficult to absorb, everything is in Swedish....(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
This could be framed as an organizational, or institutionalized, lack of empathy; a lack of capacity to relate to the needs of others. It is an expression of how the top-down structures struggle to internalize the perspective of the users.

The effect of this lack of capacity to relate to the migrant experience is captured by this respondent from an immigrant community actor, who expresses frustration over the civil servant reactions to immigrant users:

And then they go, “oh, are you still here? Five years later. Are you still here 10 years later?” It doesn't feel like they have realized that almost…twenty years later…and still see on the same level; “oh, right, what happened in your country, why did you come?” That was twenty years ago (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Such reflexive attitudes in the public administration are indicative of a ‘from the outside’-perspective.

From the conversations with immigrant community actors, it seemed like the civil servants they had interacted with did not fully comprehend the basis of the competence of these NGOs. One respondent described an encounter when the public agency wanted to buy a service delivery model from the immigrant community actor to deliver it in-house: “They, these people, yes…the [national agency] wanted to buy this” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm). While it is welcome that the agency wanted to give the actor remuneration for the idea, the proposal itself is indicative of a lack of understanding for why the organizational form of the community actor in itself has significance. An important key to successful service delivery is community attachment, leveraged as cultural capital in a way public agencies find difficult to do. An actor who fully recognized that would try to harness this potential by entering a partnership with the community actor and remunerating it for services provided to the community rather than trying
to buy it as if it was a franchise that could easily be duplicated by anyone, regardless of organizational form. The lack of reflection on these processes revealed by the attitude here ultimately trivializes the competence profile of these actors. That could become a barrier for immigrant community actors wanting to enter contractual relationships.

In summary, the respondents provided a range of examples of how the perspectives that develop from this organizational culture include certain institutionalized blind spots. The perspective does not include the experiences of the users and a lacking capacity to relate to the needs or perspectives of the users, as well as to recognize competencies that are built on other foundations than those of the organization.

However, respondents also spoke about methods and tools to overcome these organizational barriers. Specifically, employing immigrant community representatives into the public agencies to gather feedback from the community, the difference a strategically placed champion within the administration can make, and the incentives for change towards more Egalitarian values promoted by the funders of EU-projects.

**Gathering user feedback**

In one case, a civil servant talked about overcoming the problems discussed above, by employing a group of ‘civic and health communicators’ from the targeted community. The respondent described this as a method unique for the local policy community and explained that the objective was to increase target group representation within the public agency:

I had a very careful selection process where I really ascertained that these people understand the complexity, understand what we are trying to create, can relate to that and take responsibility for it, and…can represent the target group. It's not perfect but it's better than nothing….but moreover, when they meet the target group, and they do so continuously, every day, they bring those questions or problems…. for example this
[ethnic group] project…it's built from below, it's [ethnic group] themselves …(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The recruitment of this group of frontline civil servants was intended as an attempt to create a bottom-up channel to gain feedback from the community. The respondent explains that this group of communicators were needed specifically for that purpose:

…they are not only there for the target group, they are for us, so that we can adapt and learn, so that we can adapt the methods after what is actually needed. So, they are really important. There is a…conversation, a process; they are a link between the target group and the system (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Without these communicators, the quote suggests, the organization would lack the ability to identify real needs in the target group. The communicators take on a role as agents of the target group, as target group representatives that are able to provide insight for the organization. It is interesting to note that the capacity is placed within this group of communicators, rather than civil servants in the line organization who have an immigrant background themselves, by collaborating and communicating with immigrant community actors.

However, Chapter Two asked to what extent employing target group representatives into public administration would be sufficient for ensuring the articulation of immigrant agency within that organization. Both the civil servant and a representative from an NGO partner present some reservations as to its efficiency and how much it really added community orientation skills to the public administration:

…we are in the world of the public administration, everybody needs to be involved and understand, but if it is to be built from below from their conditions…so, it means a lot of adjustments and compromise...(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
…they say they've employed persons who have precisely the task to inform civic info-forward civic information, but it's a lot of, like, one way channels…plus it's also mostly in Swedish, so one has to ask how much actually reaches… [it takes a lot to get feedback saying]: “This was really good, something we never would have been able to forward in that way” (Non-community NGO, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

From this outside perspective, the attempt seems less successful. Instead of becoming the representatives of the community within the public administration they were intended to be, they function like town criers and representatives of the public administration within the community. This corresponds well to observations made in a study of municipal operations in the Alby district of the Stockholm municipality. It found that the implemented policy was characterized by an outsider perspective, informed by the needs of administrators in the hierarchical centre, which impeded local actors from setting the agenda or developing policies based on a more diverse set of local voices. Moreover, the organizational structure conditioned local civil servants to become the mouth pieces of the central administrative levels. Their function became to legitimize decisions made centrally and win local support for them. The local community representatives were even expected to be sympathetic to and having understanding for, the civil servants, who were framed as experts, squeezed between central hierarchy and local activists. The community representatives were, for their part, never framed as experts in their own neighbourhood. Thus, a reciprocal dialogue with residents was never developed (Velásquez, 2005).

Like in the Alby case, the trajectory in the present example is top-down, rather than bottom-up. This is understandable, since it reflects one of the incapacities of the Hierarchist way – the organizational model itself becomes a barrier for the bottom-up feedback and co-opts the channels that are designed to provide the feedback, turning them into the opposite of what they
were intended to be. Thus, the problem remains: without bottom up feedback, the competence for outreach will likely be highly circumscribed.

The respondents corroborated these findings and emphasized that including a bottom-up focus was actually something rare in the Swedish public agency field. The following respondent stressed that the national agency the respondent belonged to was “…actually fairly uniquely advocating…working with, that perspective” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation), meaning working with inclusion: “So, we are very proud over this activity, and it has also directly inspired [others]…so it's possible to work like this” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). Note the phrasing ‘it’s possible to work like this’. It seems that the mere thought was unconceivable before, or at least very unorthodox, again illustrating how the Hierarchist management style affects the perception and problem solving capacity of those socialized into that organizational culture. The socialization impedes the capacity to consider bottom up models as a possible solutions in the first place.

The importance of a champion

Interestingly, several respondents emphasized that immigrant integration issues would not be prioritized within the public sector without a well-positioned champion to keep them on the agenda. The following respondent stated that “…the knowledge, the need, the will, everything, is there on the civil servant level…” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation), meaning that the lower ranks within the public administration often might be engaged with the issue, but that the senior management level often was considerably less invested in the issue, to the point where “…there's often such a great distance that there's been a lack of ability to implement” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). That pattern, though, was broken when
our executive...who is very interested in issues of integration, he formed...a group of executives...for strategic collaboration...so you shouldn't underestimate the value of important persons in these contexts...a person who, with that dignity, can say that this is completely decisive for our future. So, that's been really good.” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The statement implies that the issue of immigrant integration was more marginalized within the organization when the civil servants working with it lacked strategic support from their superiors, and particularly from the very highest echelons. Moreover, it suggests that such support should not be taken for granted within the sector. These organizations might be reluctant to prioritize substantial efforts to facilitate integration in society if there is no one in a position of power within the organization who pays special attention to the matter. This reflects one of the problems of the Hierarchical model’s lack of flexibility. Lower ranking members are disempowered and cannot make decisions or take actions according to local needs.

Indeed, the respondent had become involved in the policy field based on personal interest and experiences, and in that sense could have been described as a champion of this cause, too:

...all people have personal experiences, and...it clearly affects the perspective. And I had a grandfather that was in a concentration camp for four years, I've myself been in war, I lived in [country 1] when it was invaded, I lived in [country 2] for ten years, I've had to flee earthquakes and migrated five or six times, I have children who grew up in [country 2] and came here as 9-10 year olds...So, I have my own experience of these contexts and issues, which, of course, affect what I...think is important (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

It is likely that many ethnic Swedish civil servants have lacked exposure to such experiences. In other words, this is a case of a person with personal familiarity of migration, and even the traumatic experiences that immigrants can carry with them in the social position to become a champion for other immigrants. Ironically, the person can be a champion by virtue of
socialization into a public agency dominated by ethnic Swedes and the organizational culture of
the public administration, and accepted as one of the other civil servants. Initiatives from outside,
for example taken by the organizations from immigrant communities of either of the two
referenced countries, would likely have had much less chance of success (see further in Chapter
Eight).

In summary, these testimonials give reason to believe that the organization needs a
champion on the right level of the Hierarchy to increase the likelihood that the issue of ethnic
diversity and immigrant integration gains traction. This should not be entirely surprising on one
level. As an organization of significant size, the public agency tasked with social service delivery
will most likely have a fairly wide reaching agenda, and many user groups as potential
stakeholders. Likewise, as part of a Hierarchy, it will be primarily accountable to its executive
level, rather than the users directly. As such, it will have to weigh different and potentially even
conflicting policy priorities against each other (Brunsson, 2003). Without someone guarding the
interest of the immigrants within the organization, it is possible that other user groups, with
stronger organizational leverage, will be able to dominate agenda setting.

Demands on increased user influence
There are some indications that at least public agencies owning and managing EU-funded
projects have become increasingly responsive to client needs. This strategically placed
respondent from a national agency with insight into these projects argues that such is the case,
even though project owners might not necessarily appoint user representatives to project steering
committees. First, the respondent discussed how such projects ideally should be organized in
terms of user influence. The project should appoint a user-representative to the steering
committee, much like how a Canadian immigrant community actor structured the board of
executives in Chapter Six. This representative should also have some substantive influence on the project development:

…you have some form of user perspective before you have…written the application. That can vary, and sometimes you have to be content that user organizations have been involved in the co-operation in the field …like immigrant associations, youth, and etcetera. There you can easily introduce them to the project development, and we see examples of this. So, the municipalities will work with…youth with welfare assistance because they have had sit-downs with them to hear what they think and believe that they need (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Then the respondent goes on to discuss how municipal actors generally have responded in a positive fashion to these recommendations:

…they are fairly open to discuss new ideas. It's not that they think they have the solutions for the issues and just go, the way one might sometimes have thought in the past, historically, but…rather they are forced to sit down with the users to be…individualized, in some fashion…So, there are no standard templates, one can't lump immigrant together to one group (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

These reflections seem to speak to how a there is a growing realization that the Hierachist organizational model has failed and when this failure becomes too glaring, other solutions are finally considered. The respondent elaborates on why this shift could have an effect on practices:

…when the projects are set-up…from the very start, that one has the target group along, that one has a dialogue with the target group…and listen…to what they're saying and, so that one doesn't have too many pre-conditions about what is needed for them, but, sort of, learns from the target group, sort of identify their own, both their problems and needs for the labour market. That's probably a requirement...(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
In other words, the national agency is compelling public agencies seeking EU funding to create a project management model that includes the user groups. Interestingly, the civil servant speculates that these types of practices are now gaining increasing traction beyond EU-funded projects:

…we have a development here in Sweden…there is a transformation into an empowerment-user perspective. There is a lot of talk about the user-perspective within caring services in Sweden today. It starts with the needs of the individual much more and not so much from the needs of the organization's wishes….in some ways, one has adopted the empowerment perspective, and then you don't know if it's distorted, or if it's the whole empowerment package…one can adopt when one speaks about the user perspective (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Note, however, that rhetoric is one thing and organizational action another, and the question is to what extent the term ‘empowerment’ is a buzz-word, or if the value will translate to change in organizational behaviour and forms. If it is reduced to the former, a clear shift in rhetoric should be expected, but with quite limited impact on operational practices.

The following respondent from a national agency does express a wish to harness and identify what the users want for themselves:

…so start your own career, “what do you want to do here in Sweden?”; “could you consider taking this internship position?”…“You decide.”…Instead people think that: “You are a civil servant, then you decide what I should do”…but these focus groups that people have started using more and more…we are sitting here and trying to guess what the target group wants, more or less qualified guesses…No, we need to ask those who are going to participate in this project (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Interestingly, even when the respondent is expressing the need to gain insight into the user’s perspective, the civil servant still placed the responsibility with the user and argued that the user
was not being forthcoming enough when asked to identify an obstacle to identifying user needs. Even so, the statement specifically points out the office of the civil servant as a basis for the expectations for a solution. In other words, the way the user is described inherently contains a framing of the civil servant being expected to find solutions for the user by virtue of being able to wield public authority.

Another respondent discussing the interactions between civil servants and users mentions a similar range of questions used to plan interventions:

Now, we don't have many courses of our own, except some vocational training within [name] municipality, and then we work, so, there are [high demand] occupations, we call them, it can be crafts persons of different kinds, and there we have procured some courses from different parts of the city, so...“what do you want to do?”; “I want to work with crafts”...and then you can say; “could this be something for you?”...(Municipal district agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This indicates that asking such questions might not be as unique as the first respondent believes. The extent to which case offices habitually engage in these types of questions thus remains unclear.

Overall, all the factors listed above contribute to weaknesses with regards to the public agency to orient within the immigrant community. It is thus possible to question the extent to which public agencies in Sweden have acquired cultural capital that is recognized in immigrant communities and that allows them to navigate that space successfully. If the demographics of the staff are as homogenous at upper levels as respondents suggest here, the organization would have less access to the perspectives and specialized skills that are needed to navigate that area, for example language but also the unwritten social codes concerning what is considered appropriate behaviour.
It must be recognized that some respondents from public agencies do provide examples of how there is increasing acknowledgement within the sector that user voices play a role in service delivery. Examples include the demands made from a funding authority like the national agency, but also in everyday situations when case officers do engage users in a conversation about objectives and past work experiences. Even so, this shift might be more prominent in rhetoric than in practice, since few other tools for increased user influence, such as user representation in key bodies of governance seems to have been implemented. With such a low degree of user influence, it would seem that the task of building a trust-based rapport with users and establishing comfort levels for them during operations will be more difficult to complete successfully.

**Summary**

The respondents’ comments also give reason to believe that Swedish public agencies might be particularly ill-equipped for orienting in immigrant communities, precisely because of the strong Hierarchist traditions that still, seemingly, prevail. This came across in many areas of competence. These include staff demographics, which seems to be strongly ethnically Swedish, at least in the higher echelons where the more significant agenda setting takes place. Respondents also spoke of an institutionalized blind spot related to the organizational culture that lends members of the organization incapable of empathizing with and absorbing the perspectives of the users. This incapacity was also associated with its capacity to identify user needs. Likewise, user influence on operations was found to be limited, although it seems that some ideas about bottom-up management have at least been discussed.
Conclusion

This exploration has shown how the respondents engaged with public agency competence in the Swedish and Canadian cases. It discussed general managerial skills and the capacity to orient in the immigrant community. The two countries have different histories and traditions with regards to public administrative practices, and that is reflected in these testimonials. While Swedish public agencies have service delivery in-house, and thus compete to some extent with the contracted service delivery agencies, Canadian public agencies tend to rely more on contracted agencies. That has significance for how the two relate to immigrant communities. In Sweden, they have to orient directly in these social spheres. In Canada, the public administrations can leverage immigrant community actors as intermediaries. As such, there will be both differences and similarities in the articulation of cultural capital. The following summarizes the findings and compares and contrasts the two cases, starting with differences and ending with similarities between Sweden and Canada. Overall public agencies have fairly strong cultural capital as far as its own organizations go, which stands to reason. However, they do not seem to have the capacity to accumulate the cultural capital that is considered valid in immigrant community social spaces.

Given their historical prominence in the field, it is also not surprising that the Swedish public agencies often were assumed to be administratively strong organizations, and thus strongly invested with this form of cultural capital. However, the responses give reason to question this assumption. It seems that in some cases, particularly frontline civil servants have been given tasks they might not be sufficiently prepared for as a result of the administrative reforms.
Also, the Swedish legacy of Hierarchism seems to have left a deep impact on the organizational culture. The discussed practices were often problematic with regards to the capacity to orient in immigrant communities for several reasons, and particularly so when the staff of the public agency is insufficiently ethnically diverse, as respondents assert. These skill deficiencies manifested in several ways, including institutional blind spots. Taken in combination, the public agencies’ ability to identify user needs was undermined. All of these practices can be related back to the values and perspectives of the Hierarchist Way. It seems to impede the development of this particular skill-set, and the associated cultural capital.

The Canadian administrative history is more eclectic, and this comes across in the responses. Values consistent with the Egalitarian Way were most commonly invoked. Examples include how the respondents speak of the need to establish contacts and communication with community actors to facilitate the assessment of user needs and the importance of community capacity building. In this sphere, the Canadian agencies have thus accumulated stronger cultural capital valid in the immigrant communities than their Swedish counterparts have.

The similarities between the two countries are, in this case, fewer than the differences, yet a couple of points remain noteworthy. First, Hierarchism and Egalitarianism, respectively, were not the only value systems or framings invoked. Both had notable practices and perspectives from other value systems. In Sweden, this was the increased attention to inclusion and user influence, brought in for example through EU-project funding. In Canada, it was related to the effects on perspectives caused by the Hierarchical Weberian model of administration.

Most interestingly, however, was the limited impact of the Individualist Way on the framing of skills within the public agencies. In both countries, New Public Management has been adopted, and the introduction of this administrative model has been described as a paradigmatic
shift. However, the impact on these practices and value-systems seems limited to the formal re-organization of relationships within the sectors. Procurement has been introduced in both countries, but has not displaced the key gatekeeper functions of civil servants in Sweden, or the role of immigrant community actors as intermediates in Canada. The values associated with the Individualist Way were also mostly absent in respondent replies. It thus seems to have had a limited effect on the manifestation of cultural capital on the two arenas. The next chapter continues to probe the impact of value systems and management models on the cultural capital of the field, changing focus to explore their effect on how immigrant community actors are recognized and perceived by civil servants in public agencies.
Chapter 8: Recognition in the field? Accumulating cultural capital as status

The skill sets of immigrant community actors and public agencies were discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. Immigrant community actors were generally found to be proficient in terms of their capacity to do outreach in their constituencies and build a trust-based rapport with the users that turn to them for service delivery. Their community based cultural capital was thus strong. Their management skills and particularly their ability to produce competitive proposals should, however, not be taken for granted, and it seems more likely that the larger organizations would have had the opportunity to develop that infrastructure than the smaller ones. In other words, their ability to internalize the cultural capital regarded as valued by public agencies in the policy community Habitus was weaker and more challenging to develop.

The public agencies, for their part, were seen to be lacking somewhat in their capacity to do outreach into immigrant communities. In both Canada and Sweden, satisfying the needs of the organizational order impeded their ability to satisfy user needs. Developing the cultural capital considered valid within the immigrant communities was not without challenges. In that sense, the policy community contains several actors competing for the power to define which cultural capital should prevail within the policy community Habitus.

There were also some palpable differences between Sweden and Canada. The former tends to seek in-house solutions to ascertain user needs, whereas the latter turned to immigrant community actors for assistance. In the Canadian case, the legacy of Egalitarian values compelled civil servants to consider communication with the immigrant community actors. In the Swedish case, the strong Hierarchical values meant that in-house solutions were more commonly considered typical procedure. Between the two, the Canadian public agencies were
thus more successful in developing and accumulating cultural capital considered valued within immigrant communities.

This chapter continues the exploration of the question: *How are immigrant community actors recognized by public agencies and how do they gain recognition within the public agency social sphere?* The question is probed by investigating how the style of governance has shaped the patterns of recognition within each policy community. Specifically, it asks to what extent immigrant community actors have accumulated the types of cultural capital that are significant for achieving legitimacy within the policy community Habitus, how values are guiding or shaping this type of cultural capital as well as how immigrant community actors are socially constructed by the interviewees.

Respondents came from three categories. One was civil servants from public agencies, another was interviewees from non-community actors, i.e. actors that were engaged in publicly funded service delivery, but were not organized from immigrant communities. The third were respondents from immigrant community actors (see Chapter One for elaboration).

In the Swedish case, the Hierarchist value system seems much more entrenched. Swedish public servants viewed themselves as experts, guardians of fairness and the public good. They possess cultural capital by virtue of their position in the system, rather than through past performance. The immigrant community actors are consistently depicted as incompetent and a threat to policy-making and community interest, and are framed as a dichotomous opposite of the public good. When these Hierarchist and Fatalist values act together, they create a quite powerfully excluding effect. The greater social separation between the immigrant communities and public agency means that it will be more challenging to develop legitimacy across the two social spaces as well, since legitimacy is at least partially a function of being considered a
member, or an insider, of the policy community Habitus in question. For immigrant community actors, that means that the process of building the type of cultural capital that translates into prestige with the public agencies will be a more arduous one. All of these create substantial barriers for immigrant community actors trying to build recognition.

Canadian civil servants frame immigrant community actors in a way that is quite different from how their Swedish equivalents do. The Egalitarian values come across as civil servants describe immigrant community actors as experts. Likewise, the immigrant community actors have managed to create their own symbolic capital recognized by public agencies. Some of that cultural capital contains a dimension of Individualist meritocracy values, manifested in the recognition of historically demonstrated performance. This is a more inclusionary perspective and should make cultural capital more accessible to immigrant community actors. Even so, some immigrant community actors have reservations about how public agencies have acted in the past, and the testimonials discussing such events reveal behaviour that seems more consistent with Hierarchist values than other organizational models. The Canadian situation is thus one with values that potentially conflict with each other.

The chapter starts by discussing these significant value frames that capture perceptions of prestige in this arena. Specifically, it examines the implications of the Egalitarian values on the arena, followed by an account of the impact of paternalist attitudes. The chapter finally engages in a description of the actions immigrant community actors have taken to navigate that environment and build their cultural capital within that social space.

**Significant frames**

The administrative model and the values associated with it affect perspectives of the environment for the people socialized into the public administration, which includes the self-
image of members, the civil servants, and the perception of outside actors. Reflecting the
different histories of public management, respondents invoked different frames to some extent in
Sweden and Canada. In the former case, civil servants emphasized a self-image as guardians of
fairness and justice strongly. They also expressed distrust vis-à-vis immigrant community actors,
who were socially constructed as potential free riders. The Canadian respondents were
considerably less likely to describe immigrant community actors in such terms. Instead,
Canadian civil servants emphasized how such actors were experts about their communities.

**Civil servants as guardians of fairness and justice**

Swedish respondents most commonly defined the civil servant role as that of an expert, judge,
guardian of fairness or referee. This came across in numerous replies where respondents
reflected on the principles of the Swedish state and role of the state in Swedish society, and is
consistent with the history of Hierarchism and Fatalism in the Swedish case (see Chapter Five).

This respondent describes the thought underlying the Swedish system: “There is an advantage if
you say that the municipality is the party that takes care of everything that deals with your
everyday life, which involves services...everything...with less inequality...” (Municipal agency,
Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). Another respondent had similar thoughts:

…that you make sure that there is…a little more equality, that there is a guarantee that
everybody gets equal treatment, which can be a bit difficult when you have...many
organizations which after all have their own...values...But it's very present in Sweden.
That faith in the good, neutral state...but civil servants are also people and can be very
different in how they behave (Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
Fairness in this context means, ‘less difference’, and is defined as everyone getting the same service or service provider. This, then, is a prestigious attribute in the Swedish context, and seemingly a significant cultural capital artefact.

In the following reflection, the municipal civil servant reflects more explicitly on the civil servant role, and provides an example of the self-image of the civil servant:

We as public authority persons, we have...professionalism...we are held accountable, we follow legislation, so there is a predictability in this, partially. Transparency in the operations from all kinds of directions. So a journalist can come now this morning and say to me, “What do you have for me today? What are you doing today?”...that is…our advantage in this. Transparency; professionalism (Municipal district agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The civil servant is thus constructed as the guardian and foot soldier of democracy, continually held accountable through democratic steering and bound by law in how to conduct work. This framing came across frequently in responses, as in the following statement by a civil servant: “I also imagine that you, if you look at the [national agency], too, and count that in…that you have...a broad knowledge base with them. They can be professional from knowing what the labour market looks like, what demands are being made…” (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). The framing includes the assumption that the administration is the natural body for service delivery, and that the organization has expertise to conduct such activities. This has been noted in previous studies of the Swedish administration, discussed in Chapter Three, which showed how this pattern occurs over time and space in the country, where welfare services have traditionally been monopolized by public agencies (Soysal, 1994). It is easy to see how centralizing the jurisdiction over a social issue to one body becomes a taken-for-granted organizational solution from that point of departure. Note how
‘professionalism’ gets a very particular interpretation here, acknowledging some forms of competence that may or may not be present within the public agencies. For example, Chapter Seven showed that administrative skills should not be taken for granted with the administration and that particularly Swedish public agencies have deficiencies with regards to developing the specialized expertise necessary to navigate the immigrant communities. However, the specialized knowledge required to navigate a community, possessed to a greater extent by immigrant community actors, is rendered invisible in this framing.

Further, the framing neglects the problems of the particular form of accountability and top-down steering that are at work. This could, again, be linked to the socialization associated with the organizational form, where the members lose the capacity to consider other forms of accountability, such as assigning such powers to users, or recognizing some forms of competence, like user competence, as valid. Ignoring them does facilitate coping with the demands of Hierarchism. Ultimately, the frontline civil servants, if they really are to be bound by these laws, have a fairly limited amount of power over the programs they are set to implement since many important decisions about policy are made at much higher levels in the organization.

Also, the self-image can potentially become self-fulfilling in a circular fashion. A decision becomes viewed as fair and neutral because it was made by a civil servant, according to the rules, regulations and the proper procedures for that decision, notwithstanding the outcome for the user. Consequently, other actors are barred from entry, leaving the civil servants to dominate the policy community. In this sense, when the framing is internalized by the civil servants, it informs their decisions and their actions, and will reflexively compel them to bar ‘outsiders’ from entry, since such actors, by virtue of not being public agencies, lack these valued properties.
Understanding the process this way also provides an explanation for why this self-image could create a reluctance to view NGOs as legitimate actors. Such actors are easily framed as outsiders since they do not share the same organizational culture, they do not answer to the democratically elected legislations, only to their members (who can then conveniently be labelled as 'special interests') and they also are not bound by the same types of regulations, which gives them a freedom that might even come across as downright suspect for some civil servants. Thus, the organizational culture and the self-image that has resulted from this encourages and reinforces the invisibility-making of the community actors, preventing civil servants from considering them experts or framing them as competent, because doing so would undermine their own legitimacy as social actors.

Moreover, the ‘expert’ framing legitimizes retaining the agenda setting and problem formulation, a pattern of behaviour observed before, for instance, when the local administrations in Stockholm retained problem solving and agenda setting powers (Velásquez, 2005). This respondent provides a policy shift as a good example of the phenomenon. A decision had been made that integration into the labour market should be viewed more as an intersectional problem than previously, with the effect that immigrant community actors no longer could access program funds:

...so they are also involved as a target group, integrated into others. So, it's not just being an immigrant...that's not the only problem, there are also other...problems with getting into the labour market. I can't think of any, I don't think I have any pure immigrant project myself (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The respondent went on to elaborate on the rationalization for this shift:
But, I mean, in some way, every immigrant's...life history and situation, is...unique, too...so one can really ask why there should be special immigrant projects...No, really, what is the difference...? ...and then, there are clearly groups of immigrants who have particular problems with post-traumatic stress disorder and other...and there are projects directed towards them, that type of group....(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The program designers, representatives of mainstream society, thus decided that ‘immigrant’ is a label among others, and that it should be considered a ‘subset’ or a ‘subordinate category’ to other labour barriers. Note that the civil servant is technically correct, ‘immigrant-hood’ is certainly not the only status that matters for someone who is unemployed, and a measure of intersectionality in terms of how different collective identity factors in to the situation is probably valid in most cases. Even so, it seems reasonable to ask what immigrant communities would think of this shift, and how they think about these social problems. However, their voices seem absent in this reflection, and that absence is consistent with the framing of the civil servant as the ‘expert’. It facilitates ignoring outsider voices that could potentially challenge the policy shift by making it easy to dismiss them as ‘non-experts’, and the framing can then be used to legitimate the absence of immigrant community actors in the arena.

This framing also disqualifies immigrant community actors from delivering social services. In effect, they are denied it because someone else enjoys the privilege of ‘hierarchizing’ the barriers for labour market entry. Thus, immigrants are deprived of the possibility to act on the issues that they themselves perceive as important in their own social contexts because someone else is setting the agenda, producing and re-producing an order where the civil servants are positioned as enlightened experts, endowed with the gatekeeping role of deciding who is allowed access to the arena, and who is a legitimate stakeholder.
The Hierarchist perspective has other consequences as well. The following respondent taps into how this organizational culture compels civil servants to construct immigrants as victims, objects for the good intentions of civil servant, rather than competent subjects with agency and a voice of their own.

And then it's difficult to say how big the demand is. It's there, but I think that Sweden generally speaking is very cautious with, and very slow with seeing...those immigrants who in spite of all have moved from their old countries, travelled all the way here, gotten integrated, learned a language, as an asset. For some reason, they are still just victims (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This statement corresponds well to findings in previous research attesting to a culture of paternalism, in which immigrants are persistently reduced to a state of passivity, whose needs are best addressed by those well-meaning Swedish public authorities (Velásquez, 2005). Like the ‘expert’ framing of the civil servant, the ‘victim’ framing of the immigrant has potentially negative consequences for immigrant community actors trying to accumulate prestigious cultural capital, as it denies them the potential for agency. The following quote illustrates this attitude towards immigrants well:

...yeah, I think actually the language part needs to be better...“Swedish for Immigrants”...has not been quite....good... just take the name; “Swedish for immigrants”. There is only...one Swedish language. There can be different levels, you can't have mathematics for immigrants, or biology for immigrants (Municipal district agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Contrasted against the equivalent Canadian terminology where such programming is called ‘English as a Second Language’, the reflection summarizes how civil servants have systematically framed immigrant as a ‘special class of people’ that cannot act on its own accord.
Indeed, the paternalistic attitude is so entrenched that not behaving in a patronizing way is actually considered demanding by some civil servants, as this respondent argued:

That is enormously demanding for the officers...you need to have keen sensitivity. You have to be very responsive...Respect...is something that is the key here...and not regard people as children who you...in some way have to as a parent tell, “but sweetie...”...you don't get offended by hearing that you need to complement...what you are offended by is if you are treated like a child...but that...is very demanding for the officers, and that is something that we have to work with continuously (Municipal district agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

That civil servants do not react as if it was obvious that everyone coming through the door is an adult is an interesting reflex in itself. The statement suggests that users have often traditionally been treated like children by civil servants, to the extent that interpreting their role as the parent knowing what is best has become entrenched among civil servants as the behavioural norm. Indeed perhaps it is difficult to avoid doing given Hierarchist values. In any case, the framing implies that immigrants cannot act for themselves, but need a party capable of responsibility to guide them along the path to success.

Like the respondent from an immigrant community organization in Chapter Six, this respondent explicitly states that the Swedish organizational model pacifies the users: “So, to get them active, because Swedish... integration policy...is sometimes, I'm not saying always, and I'm not an expert on it, but sometimes very pacifying” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). Likewise, this respondent from a non-community actor reflected on how the integration discourse is conducted in a very reductionist fashion: “So, this is a discussion which goes on right now...so first there was talk about Kurds for a period, we have talked about Iraqis for a period and now, it's...Somalis” (Non-community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). Note the formulation; ‘we have talked about’, followed
by a label for an ethnic group. This strongly suggests that the ethnic group in question is not involved in the discussion or the debate, at least not at equal level. If it had been, the phrasing would more likely have been along the lines of ‘there has been a dialogue with the [ethnic label] community’. Again, the parallel to Velásquez’s study is powerful. In that case, too, the organizational model undermined the potential to create a reciprocal dialogue between public agencies and local residents, nullifying the latter as agents (Velásquez, 2005). In Sweden, then, integration seems to be a problem discussed among Swedish actors exclusively.

Another respondent from a non-community NGO reflects on how this paternalist attitude has become pervasive within the policy community to the point of being adopted also by actors within mainstream civil society, who, like public agencies, often disregard their outsider position and adopt the attitude that “‘we know what you need, without bothering to find out what you really think about it’” (Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). This implies that the paternalistic attitude towards immigrants exists beyond the public sector, and seems quite pervasive in Swedish society, corroborating the findings in research done on folk high schools – adult education institutions that do not confer academic degrees – and mainstream NGOs discussed in Chapter Three (Odmalm, 2004b; Eriksson & Osman, 2003). The formulation: ‘we know what you need, without bothering to find out what you really think about it’ is a particularly powerful way of expressing the cultural attitude coming from the Hierarchical way. It also corroborates the findings in Osman’s study, also addressed in Chapter Three, which found that educational associations persistently ignored the competence that already existed among the immigrants whose skills they sought to raise, rendering that form of cultural capital invisible (Osman, 2005). The example is an indicator of how significant public agencies can be
for influencing how cultural capital is shaped within the policy community in the Hierarchist organizational model.

Some measure of paternalism was also found among civil servants in the material provided by Canadian respondents, though it was expressed in a different fashion. A well placed respondent with insight into the state of affairs in the policy community provided the following narrative. Describing how major non-community NGOs entered the service delivery field, it reveals that even though some immigrant community actors have been approached and included in policy relations, it should not be assumed that all public funders always will consider such actors competent by default:

…this was an idea that was cooked up by [federal agency]...they want people who are more able to integrate faster into the labour market…So these people should be able to function on their own. All they need is information and referral and then we just kick them out the door. So, the department… sent out a call for tenders…they figured [mainstream actor] was a safer…financial risk...Doesn't matter that [mainstream actor] has never done this, they don't have a clue. So that's how [service centre] was born (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Judging by the wording in this statement, this comes across as a case of where public funders made a decision with a profound indifference towards user needs. In this case, the civil servants did not seem to interpret their roles as parents acting in relation to children, but simply considered users disposable. The narrative likens them, in a fashion, to raw material in an industrialized conveyor belt model of social service delivery, managed by the civil servants, reminiscent of the role of users in the provincial programs of the 1960s, when institutions assigned users to seats to fulfill administrative ideas of user needs (Dupré, 1973), or the workfarist “eligibility machine” Lightman et al identified (Lightman et al., 2006, p. 137), as discussed in Chapter Five.
Moreover, the decision also seems to have been informed by stereotyping different types of actors, where smaller community organizations were assumed to be untrustworthy or less skilled, while the larger organization was assumed to be ‘safe’ or competent simply by virtue of its size. However, an inventory of the actual competence of the service deliverer was apparently not completed, because the receiving organization had no prior experience with the particular issues at hand, and, it would seem, perhaps no genuine competence in that service delivery area. Thus, it seems like adjudication was based on reputation built through other means, where this type of cultural capital was a function of organizational size, and, potentially, name-recognition. Notably, the process as it was described was completely top-down, informed by particular wishes from the government, that might not reflect actual needs on the ground very well.

The narrative gives reason to ask questions about the tension between the ostensibly neutral and objective procurement evaluation process to eliminate undue biases favouring or disfavouring any actor and the funder’s capacity to fully recognize the relevant competencies of the service deliverers. The above implies that the reason some mainstream NGOs, which might not have community ties, are entering the field is at least partially because governments want them to, based on predispositions linked to the accumulation of cultural capital. If this is true, it could seriously undermine the credibility of the neutrality in the procurement process. Neutrality can be achieved by simply constructing the evaluation criteria and the application process in such a way as to disfavour community actors, for instance by not capturing their particular skill sets through the quantification process. The above contrasts to the statements that assert that the service delivery agents have an influence on the framework, and suggests that such efficacy of the dialogue between the public and community actors should not be taken for granted, but may rather be highly contextual.
In summary, the dominant theme in the Swedish responses is that the civil servant is the expert and guardian of fairness of the system. There is also a degree of paternalism toward the users, and some civil servants seem comfortable talking about different user groups, without engaging in dialogue with those groups. The above corresponds well to findings in past research. In a study of the municipal urban renewal projects in the Stockholm suburb of Alby, civil servants were framed prominently as experts, and much work was done to clarify this role for the local ‘champions’ to establish a dialogue as the civil servants defined the term (Velásquez, 2005). Thus, the local champions were expected to have sympathy for the hard working expert civil servants, rather than the other way around. Because of these expectations from the public agencies, there was never any chance of establishing a reciprocal dialogue where both parties, community representatives on the one hand and civil servants on the other, were considered equals. Nor did the program infrastructure incentivize the civil servants to actively seek out the perspectives of the local residents in any substantial way. The civil servants were cast as ‘program experts’; however the local community representatives were not cast as equivalent ‘neighbourhood experts’, but rather as ‘dilettante champions’, people who were animated by the issue, but ultimately amateurs (Velásquez, 2005).

These practices and perspectives reflect on the Hierarchist Way, which assigns the top echelons within the organization the position of the expert, suggesting that the lower one descends through the ranks, the less expertise is to be found. By extension, the user is then the party considered least knowledgeable, and it is the task of the benevolent civil servant to take care of these users and do what is best for them, regardless of how these users might feel about these actions ostensibly taken for their benefit. This framing also invests the higher echelons with prestige a priori, while simultaneously marginalizing the grass root actors. The cultural
capital becomes associated with the position in the system, rather than the competence or expertise of the actors on the arena.

In the Canadian responses, these framings were less common. Even so, they were not completely absent. One respondent in a key position described a contracting procedure that ignored the competence of immigrant community actors and framed users as largely interchangeable raw material for conveyor-belt style service delivery.

Note, moreover, how Fatalist and Individualist values seem absent in the above responses. While there is a sense of guardianship in these narratives that would not be conflicting with the Fatalist Way, there is not a sense that civil servants distrust each other or the process they are involved with. Nor do the respondents emphasize a role as judges or that acting as enforcers of regulation in a hostile environment is a primary concern. Likewise, the role of neutral referees between competing actors that the Individualist Way would be more likely to promote is also absent. These ideas about the self within the public agency arguably have some relevance for how actors within the public agencies perceive others.

**Mistrusting immigrant community actors in Sweden**

The preceding gives reason to believe that Hierarchist values played an important role in the socialization of primarily Swedish civil servants, conditioning how they perceive immigrant community actors in the arena, but also have had some effect on their Canadian counterparts. The difference between the two became even more pronounced when the Swedish ‘guardian of fairness’-frame was synthesized with values from Fatalist Way in the policy community. The ‘fairness’ frame itself invites the construction of a dichotomy. Since the civil servant is positioned as the steward of both justice and expertise, the immigrant community actor by definition has to be socially constructed as less competent, legitimizing and reinforcing the civil
servant image. One civil servant illustrated the process of creating such a dichotomy when arguing that immigrant community actors should not be allowed to conduct social service delivery or take such initiatives for their own communities, an attitude that is consistent with an administrative order where the public agencies have traditionally monopolized service delivery (Soysal, 1994). To quote:

…So there could be lock-in effects in ethnicity, the [ethnic] group has a tendency to move to the [area], and there they could start a pilot company, and then the integration might get worse, because many have not studied Swedish, you could work in a company run by a compatriot…. (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Note how the respondent interprets the achievement of a securing a job through the services of these organizations as questionable, even though the user is no longer on welfare, because the user might work for a compatriot and not be properly ‘integrated’. Thus, the respondent defined the concept of ‘integration’ in a way that is consistent with the interpretation of the civil servant role of being the expert who retains the right to define the term ‘integration’ without consulting immigrant community actors, simultaneously removing agency from them. This process reflects the same pattern of thinking that informed the writing of the 1978 report “Our responsibility for the immigrants” discussed in Chapter Five, where civil servants were framed as active subjects and problem solvers, and clients assumed to be passive objects (Olderin & Karlsson, 1978).

Simultaneously, the respondent invoked a ‘fairness’ framing, repeating the pattern. While the civil servants interpret their own role as being the guardians of ‘fairness’ and thus see themselves as ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’, the immigrant community actors are interpreted as potentially disruptive to this fairness. As this respondent put it: “…the absolute demand is that you can relate to something other than your own, because otherwise, it's not possible to have that
discussion. Otherwise, you can only see your own. You must be able to see…greater contexts”
(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). This statement implicitly
constructs immigrant community actors as less competent, assuming that they lack the capacity
to see the overall public good, a competence that, implicitly, only the civil servant has.

In the framing, this incapacity to see the overall public good also means that immigrant
community actors by definition should be viewed as suspicious ‘special interests’, as implied in
the following statement:

…a particular organization that is driving its own…agenda…and if you are backed up
from below, and paid from above, you can…make your thing to everybody's thing, if
you're very strong, which is more difficult in Sweden, because of public authority control
(National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The sense here is that the immigrant community actors will pursue private self-interest. This is
not unreasonable to assume to the extent that any actor is motivated. However, it does becomes
questionable when private self-interest is assumed to be a dichotomous opposite to the public
good, and civil servants are framed as the stewards and guardians of that public good, a framing
implied here, where the respondent expressed scepticism about the utility of focus groups as a
feedback mechanism, precisely due to the risk of cooptation. To exemplify:

….and they try to ease that up with focus groups, but as I said, then people might not turn
up, and so on, and then maybe there are the same people coming to several, so someone is
made into a spokesperson for an entire ethnic group within a particular area, or something
(National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Another civil servant expresses similar scepticism towards initiatives from immigrant
community actors:
…Who articulates, what is the premise of the project application? So, the fundamental principle: Is the point of the departure the needs of society or is it the needs of the target group, that's a really interesting...(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The wants and needs of the target group are here framed as potentially at odds with the greater good of society, and just the expression of another ‘special interest’, as it were. That is radically different from how an Egalitarian perspective would interpret these actors, where the needs of the target group are, for all practical purposes, also the needs of society. Consequently, the statement, like in the case above, implicitly rests on an assumption that frames immigrant community actors as lacking the competence to have the ‘bird’s eye view’ that the public agencies can, which then should retain ownership of the agenda and the problem-solving, for ‘the public good’. Moreover, the framing also implies that immigrant community actors do not know what is good for them. Such a paternalist perspective is consistent with a Hierarchist organizational culture.

Significantly, the framing fails to acknowledge many different problematic assumptions involved. Firstly, the power relation between the public agency and the immigrant communities their actors is disregarded, which in itself is problematic. Secondly, that public agencies often have their own vested interests that they will pursue often linked to satisfying their executives’ wishes. Public agencies might therefore not at all be the guardians of the ‘public good’ that the respondent seems to assume. Thirdly, it ignores how the organizational culture of the public agency can be affected by stereotypes of minorities that will skew the perspective of key decision-makers and gatekeepers within these public agencies and thus undermine their capacity
to act for the ‘public good’. This is problematic even without entering into a discussion about the possibility of defining the ‘public good’ in a comprehensive manner.

Overall, the framing raises several questions about how professionalization is conceived and by whom that framing is done. For example, when does professionalism become an expression of assimilation? In other words, it is necessary to disentangle processes where the label ‘professionalization’ becomes a vehicle for the de-legitimization of immigrant community actors, from those where a substantive assessment of the skills necessary to reach a social service objective is made. This is not to suggest that this respondent is engaging in such an assimilationist framing, but rather than the framing here is a reminder of the necessity to keep those two processes apart.

Significantly, when immigrant community actors are considered self-interested amateurs with no or limited capacity to identify the common good, their social service delivery can even be framed as explicitly bad for integration. This respondent describes some collaboration with immigrant community actors and the reflection was also cautious, separating good actors from bad ones:

So, such places can be good places to mobilize and connect with people. But they can also be places where you propagate for disintegration…where you promote exclusion, so it's important …to use discretion, because you cannot automatically collaborate with all associations, just because they are immigrant associations. You also cannot exclude them, because then you exclude…important routes of connection…(Municipal agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The respondent then went on to describe a past example of how the municipality had ceased collaborating with an actor that was viewed as negative for integration: “….during last Spring, there was a lot of unrest here in [municipal district]...and that was such an association, where
they propagated for exclusion…So, that type of collaboration you don't want and the unrest started when we wanted the office space back and that space is today a civic office…”

(Municipal agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). This respondent was quite cautious, and even defensive to some extent. The respondent’s scepticism towards some immigrant organizations was notable. Similar thoughts were expressed in the Crown Commission report on xenophobia discussed in Chapter Three, which advised immigrants to turn to traditional Swedish associations precisely because interest articulation based on immigrant community mobilization is seen as a process that increases segregation (Westerberg, 2012). The assumption in the report was that immigrant community actors represented special interests that are most likely to create bonding capital at the expense of bridging capital, as if these two are dichotomous opposites. If such attitudes inform civil servant perspectives on immigrant community actors in the policy community, establishing some degree of institutionalized collaboration would be challenging.

Another civil servant expresses frustration when reflecting over past experiences of trying to engage immigrant community actors:

….we've invited to....inform from the immigrant associations. I'd say that we don't fully use the resources within the [municipal program’s] sphere. It looks a little bit different, if you come to [municipal district], where we have, among others, [ethnic group] associations, and so on, we try to see how we can work together. Now it's, unfortunately, gotten to be a little bit the opposite, so it's become a little counteracting, some from the immigrant groups have maybe, then, raised some protests, I'd say (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

When asked to elaborate on why the representatives from immigrant community actors had reservations, the respondent continued describing how awkward it had been for the agency when users raised a series of concerns over operations. These included how users wanted to bring
children in to the programming even though the municipality offered child care services, but also other matters:

…they see don't see…that you should have to have attendance demanded…as a social welfare recipient you don't have any vacation…And they've reacted strongly to that…

…Some from…primarily then, Muslim backgrounds, have had organizations with demands being made when it comes to wearing a veil, not wearing a veil, long, short…“can I drive a truck for the [liquor sales monopoly]?” …“do I have to work in a hotel, because there are mini-bars?”…(Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The conversation reflects a difficult relationship between the agency and the immigrant community. The respondent used the phrasing “We've tried to”, which is interesting here. It suggests that community engagement has not been validated or recognized as valuable in this field. If it had been, there would not be a need to try, the channels for communication would already exist, and this would not be as great a challenge. Instead, the public agency was dissuaded from continuing the dialogue attempts, as soon as this initiative encountered barriers, in this case when the community representatives were ‘making demands’. This reaction suggests either that the public agency was unprepared for a potential confrontational situation, or that the organisations would have reasons to be frustrated with the status quo, or both. Moreover, the fact that voicing concerns became dissuading for public agencies indicate that advocacy or critique from client groups is considered burdensome. The overall impression is a reflexive reluctance to dialogue on equal terms with immigrant groups precisely because the substantial demands would require significant efforts to accommodate. Here, two worlds meet; the grass roots and the hierarchical civil service, and the latter is accustomed to being the primary owners of the agenda and problem formulation.
Respondents from community actors bear witness to encountering such arm’s length attitudes as they try to seek out public partners or work within the policy community Habitús:

…when we are going to contact our countrymen, when we are going to deliver service, we have some elderly immigrants, seniors, we can much better communicate with them. Simultaneously… I know that in Canada, it's, for instance, left this task to immigrant association. I know that in Sweden, there's also been some thought about this, but the problem is that these are municipal services, they don't want to, because they don't want the competition, we will take their jobs. That's how they feel about it, and that's wrong (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This respondent expresses a great deal of frustration over how the public agency actors keep treating the organization as unwanted competition. The statement also identifies an inherent institutional self-interest that further incentivizes public agencies to prevent new actors from entering the arena. They would be considered an intrusion on to a field that is considered an inherent part of a social sphere that belongs in some sense to the public agencies.

Other examples were also provided:

First and foremost, they don't think that an immigrant association can succeed with certain issues….when I was at the ESF-Council [the national agency distributing EU-project funding], I was there for 2 years in a reference group…So, most of the projects that were usually granted approval, were projects that common Swedish associations, or the municipality applied. Maybe 0.1 % went to immigrant associations. So, there's a lack of belief in immigrant associations…they maybe think that they can't pull it off (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

An advantage with the Canadian model is that…the society overall has seen different actors as a resource. Both that the society welcomes immigrants and integration, and sees them as a potential partner in the whole. In Sweden, this is not the case. Everything is taken care of by public agencies (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).
The above quotes succinctly point out how the public discourse affects policy making and who is considered a legitimate actor and who is not considered a legitimate actor, and illustrates how the organizational form of the public sector affects how problems are perceived and how solutions are formulated.

To some extent, the relationship between actors depends on the personality of the individual case officer within the public agency, and this may or may not be problematic for the association:

> It's still very much depends on the person you meet..... Is the individual civil servant amicable or not amicable? It plays a great role, still. Particularly when it comes to immigrant associations. Do they believe in you or do they not believe in you as someone who has competence and can have competence?...We ended up in a conflict…with the [municipal agency]…and then we said that there must be some unit to evaluate this, “no we don't have any unit to evaluate this, the [municipal agency] has to do that”...(Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

> We encounter the most rigid people…”the decision I make means that this person doesn't have food and can't have a place to live. But I have…followed the rules. So, there!” But then there are those un-bureaucratic…follow the rules but even so find solutions. And we noticed also it depended entirely on the [attitude of] management…(Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

In other words, if the gatekeeper is sympathetic, cooperation is greatly facilitated. However, as the latter respondent describes the situation, it is difficult to anticipate the likelihood of finding a sympathetic ally in the public administration, and organizational culture arguably matters in that context. That respondent even kept a book to keep track of interactions with public agencies as a defensive measure in case they had to interact with unsympathetic civil servants. The quotes illustrate the arbitrariness and lack of transparency that occurs when a public agency is given both the power to arbitrate and evaluate performance and contracts between the two parties,
when, at the same time, the same public agency is also a service deliverer and a competitor to the 
other actor. Arbitrariness will work to the advantage of the public agency, and the immigrant 
orGANization will find it difficult to win a dispute, given the power relations between these two 
actors. 

This respondent reflects on the skewed power-relations between the actors:

I know many, many associations…But it's really tough; all associations feel the 
demands…The last four months, the administration denied us all the grants because of a 
problem we had with them and with a board member in the association. Everybody 
thought we'd fold, but we didn't. We know what we're doing…I think that the larger 
society still does not understand… It's not possible when a Swedish organization comes 
and says “ok, I'm going to help the immigrant associations”…It's on their terms. It's all 
wrong (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The statement reflects the social reflex on the part of the Swedish actors to not engage in a 
dialogue with immigrant organizations, but rather to operate along the paternalistic assumption 
that they know what is best for the immigrant community. Once more, the attitude seems to be 
that immigrant community actors are incompetent, that they are expected to recognize this 
weakness on their part, and therefore should graciously and gratefully accept the caring efforts of 
the well intentioned Swedish civil servants. In effect, it seems that immigrant community actors 
are expected to know their place and not dissent.

The lack of empathy of this attitude manifests in this testimonial, describing the 
interaction with a civil servant who was denying the immigrant community actor funding for 
operations. The civil servant followed up with a statement that took the respondent aback:

“…and then they say, twittering happily, ‘yes, but money for closing down, you can always get 
that’” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). This 
type of comment is very revealing of the low value given to immigrant community actors. The
attitude is translated into relations between mainstream Swedish organizations and immigrant community actors. The following respondent discussed manifestations of these attitudes at length, starting by summarizing the general situation:

…it's not just my opinion, many say so; when it comes to integration issues…our Swedish friends…have earned a lot from it. But it has not resulted in integration…The target group is immigrants, but even so, those who work on it are Swedes. It's…childish. It [should be] mutual, on everybody's terms…(Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The respondent then explained some experiences further and how the representatives from this immigrant community actor respond to queries from the public agencies:

I have actually been in contact with public agencies and many other big associations. When they come to me, they say…“we are a public agency that have started a project that concerns immigrant groups”, I say “ok. If we are going to co-operate with you, what do we get out of it?”; “Nothing…” I said, “Ok, when we start writing the project, come to us then. Because we should be there. When you get money…We should be there from the start. Otherwise you show that you are going to use us…” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Note how the immigrant community actor is trying to protect the organization from being exploited by the public agencies, while the representatives from the latter seemingly expect the immigrant community actor to collaborate without any form of reciprocal compensation. Finally, this respondent describes a case where these concerns were validated by a public agency that acted unilaterally, even after an initial meeting where the organization had made the conditions necessary for collaboration clear:

…the [municipal public agency] came to train people, young boys and girls…I had a meeting with them…so I said, “ok, when you are writing this idea and apply for money, we should participate from the start.”…but they sent the application without letting us
know….I don't know if they don't believe in immigrant associations, immigrant persons, or they think, “no we can take that without sharing…the entire amount…” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

These are powerful words. The respondent expresses a deep level of frustration over never being taken seriously by the professional actors in the sector, who instead persistently use these immigrant community actors to legitimate funding applications and appropriate funds for their own operations, without ever wanting to engage in any genuine partnership. The systematic nature of the marginalization in this narrative is striking and corroborates findings by Osman, who concluded that the government agencies traditionally established within settlement services would regard immigrant community organizations trying to do the same as illegitimate competitors (Osman, 2005), much like in the case of how British local authorities reacted in the 1980s (Josephides, 1987).

The dichotomous constructs of public agencies as competent experts and stewards of fairness and the public good, as opposed to the immigrant community actors that are amateurs, seeking to co-opt the policy process to promote their self-interest, becomes particularly damaging when existing side-by-side with the Fatalist values of mistrust discussed in Chapter Five. Such endorsement of immigrant actors manifested in some replies. The following was a response to the question: “What can immigrant associations be good at?”

....so, it's several different parts. That they have a democratic structure, I'd like to say, is the most important, really. That they don't exclude…people. There is seriousness behind this, so it's not a couple of people who collect names and so on, and who represent in all contexts and so on. Honesty...they don't say one thing and do another thing…when no one else is around (Municipal district, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
The next reply highlights however how the municipal district is guarding against being defrauded, rather than an assessment about competencies or expertise, which is very telling for how state actors perceive immigrant organizations. The underlying assumption seems to be that immigrant community actors should be assumed to be potential system abusers, until they have proven themselves to be otherwise:

…when we, as a municipality, or as a municipal district, collaborate with an association…we give legitimacy, and thereby power, which they can exercise, and if that power is not exercised correctly, they can oppress. For instance…if we have as a mission that everybody should have the same opportunities…children…women…men of all ages, and so on, what if there is an association that doesn't think it's good that women should get work…..? (Municipal district agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This type of caution was pervasive, and suggests that the normative point of departure was to assume that these kinds of attitudes are those that must be expected be among immigrant associations.

The mistrust can have consequences for how public agencies interact with immigrant community actors. One immigrant community actor described experiences of how mistrust from the public agencies manifested during interacting:

…they think that maybe…the accounting…was not complete. But for another it's ok to do so. Or…the association might not be so professional, so, different from the Swedish associations…At the same time, when it comes to big money, immigrant organizations are much, much poorer…what they thought, too…“we only have [SEK] 50 000, is that enough?” “No…”…an association that has [SEK] 5 million in the cashbox, then it's a good association…they won't complain….well-known, too (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

What comes across here is that the mistrust is linked to arbitrary indicators, like the size of the account holdings and general renown, rather than proven capacity to deliver services or
substantive competence. Moreover, the quote suggests a double standard, where established mainstream organizations face lower demands on economic accountability than immigrant community actors do.

The institutional mistrust could also be conducive to creating a siege mentality within immigrant community actors. This quite defensive response, during a discussion about the actors on the arena could be an indication of such an attitude: “Well, organization as organization. Established or not established. We're all established in one way or the other. So, I see no difference. We are needed just as well as [mainstream organization]” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). The reaction suggests that people in this social position are used to having to defend their existence and are under continuous pressure to prove themselves in relation to the mainstream actors, particularly public agencies.

The values expressed by the Swedish respondents seem consistent with both Fatalist and Hierarchist values. They seem to inform the notion of immigrant community actors as dangerous opportunists who seek to undermine the fairness of policy making and thus must be held at bay. It is interesting to note that the Fatalist elements were only expressed when respondents were engaging in discussions about actors outside of the sub-government. For immigrant community actors wanting to accumulate cultural capital valid in that social space, these framings will act as significant barriers. The actors need to convince the civil servants that they do have valid competence, even though their specialization remains largely unrecognized. Also, they need to show that they are experts on their field, and do not constitute a threat to policy making, contrary to the entrenched social construction that now is in place.
The community actors as experts and the case of Canada

In contrast to Swedish civil servants, who saw immigrant community actors as potentially dangerous or incompetent ‘special interests’, Canadian civil servants often expressed themselves like this about community actors: “We rely on the community structure to meet the needs because we see them as being the experts. So, if you're gonna go to provide a service to someone, go to the experts, go to the people that can do it, versus, you know, with us” (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview). Collaboration with community NGOs is institutionalized in this organizational model, and that seems to reflect on the organizational culture within this public agency. After decades of relations with community actors, civil servants have internalized an image of them as experts. The same civil servant elaborated:

They understand the plight of the immigrant. They understand the challenges, quite often because they have an ethno-specific background themselves, and their employees will have some background in that area quite often…or they’re just up to date on the real issues…and have the ability to build their infrastructures and programs to them, in some cases it's language specific or career specific also (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

This respondent explicitly emphasized how the organizational infrastructure is actually developed to serve community needs, the bottom-up structures that the organization needs to be able to deliver on its mission. It makes a significant difference for how these organizations are perceived in comparison to the public sector, which is organized in a top-down fashion to serve the needs of the state. This framing recognized the specialized expertise that these actors possess as valuable, and thus acknowledges its value as cultural capital.

Indeed, this civil servant cannot even imagine the public administration taking over the service delivery:
See, we're so used to everything being contracted out to a third party, that the thought of getting rid of that system and creating, you know, [provincial training centre] is...it almost seems unfathomable. Because you'd have to just erase all of these organizations that have developed, you know (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

The statement speaks not only to how difficult it is, organizationally, to do major reform of a political field, but also how ‘unfathomable’ to the standard operation procedures and structures of a management model entrenched as the paradigmatic common sense within the organization. While organizational inertia itself is a barrier to any systemic change, the status quo is also so taken for granted so that this civil servant cannot imagine that it could operate in any other way, consistent with a policy community where community actors have been service delivery agents in some capacity since the 1970s (Hunter, 1994), as discussed in Chapter Five.

The outlook was also reflected by at least some respondents from community actors. This one seems convinced that the public funders have a positive outlook on immigrant organizations:

What, I can only imagine in a favourable light, I mean if the growth of the organization, or the growth of our revenue is any indication…with respect to employment services, we're undergoing all kinds of changes with [provincial program name] and I expect that they will continue business as usual, so I would imagine, I would think that we have some public support, or that we're looked upon favourably…having said that, I think that…how much of that is political, too? Nobody is gonna remove our funding (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

In this case, the respondent’s organization represented a racialized minority group, which contributed to the sense of security expressed here; it would, the statement implies, simply be politically too sensitive to remove the funding from a minority group that is already exposed to several barriers and can counter-mobilize with relative ease.
Moreover, the conversations revealed that there are moments when what immigrant community actors say and do in public mattered a great deal to the public funders. In this case an organization had published a commentary on a series of negotiations, which created quite the reaction from the involved public agency:

And it was a fairly innocuous document, it's a narrative of what actually happened, and very little about speculation. And, so we got a formal response from [federal agency] saying, “well, ok, we noticed you captured most of the stuff, we're happy but we disagree on these points”...I think we were quite amused by the discussion, because…we realized that...what [organization name] says and does, what our members say is really under scrutiny (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

What is significant here is not so much how much the organization managed to influence the policy process, but that the public agency felt compelled to engage with the organization in a public conversation. This means that, while decision-makers might dismiss suggestions at any given time, the organization is a recognized public actor. It is an actor with sufficient cultural capital valid in the policy community Habitus to be a recognizable presence in the public discourse.

**Building legitimacy in the policy community Habitus**

The previous section showed how the responses provided by interviewees corresponded closely to the types of values promoted by different management models, providing insight into how these organizational forms can influence how civil servants perceive immigrant community actors. The findings imply that some internalized perceptions can create barriers for how these actors can become recognized as competent and legitimate actors in the policy community. The following explores how immigrant community actors strategized to navigate the policy community environment to build such legitimacy.
Interestingly, the one commonality between immigrant community actors in Sweden and Canada was the reliance on producing and displaying performance results. In this case, the Swedish respondent emphasizes the importance of that and of being diligent with deadlines:

So, we're pretty meticulous on accounting for results…I've worked with other associations as well, and I can tell you that we're all very good at keeping deadlines. So, I mean, situational reports come in a week after the period is over that they're reporting. So, it's very, very smooth…that means that you have a good reputation, and that they know there'll be results (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The reports themselves become transformed into symbolic capital and prestige within the policy community habitus. The immigrant community actor is thus leveraging a meritocratic framing of its activities to strengthen its legitimacy. Moreover, actors in Canada had taken this framing further and created an actual award based on meritocracy, complete with a symbolic event to further invest with cultural capital and thus develop recognition of both users and community agencies:

There's a community award, there's a [award name]…you know, and so what we look for is for people who have contributed. Landed, contributed, you know, they deserve to be recognized for that, and so we hold a gala every year...and…it's huge, we have about 5-600 people attend the event (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

These kinds of events are arguably important to raise the awareness of immigrant success stories, give immigrants role-models and to show, on a symbolic level, that immigrant success is welcomed and celebrated. The meritocratic dimension and its bottom-up dynamic correspond closely to Individualist values, as it is related to performance outcomes in social service delivery. Notably, creating such an award not only recognizes the contributions of the recipient, but also
enhances the standing of awarding institution. An organization capable of recognizing excellence is presumably also competent, increasing its cultural capital in the view of other actors.

However, respondents identified challenges associated with tools based on the Individualist Way, too, as this respondent from an immigrant community actor attests to:

…if I were the government, of course I would go for the agencies with a better track record of providing employment service…even though we've been providing employment support for the past 5-6 years, it's not the main activity that we do, so, in the view of the government…they might not feel that it is enough for them as proof that we are able to deliver those kinds of services. So, that is one of the things that we are encountering right now. So, it's very difficult to get new types of funding (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The organizations that have produced good outcomes in service delivery gain prestige for this. That means that the more successful and experienced an organization is, the more recognition it will have accumulated, as the cultural capital is a function of past performance. Conversely, organizations that are new to the policy community and unproven in the public eye will face greater challenges to achieving recognition.

Notably, this Individualist tool was the only substantial strategy discussed by both respondents in Canada and Sweden. On one level, it fits the history of the two policy communities well. Procurement has been adopted in both countries, as discussed in Chapter Five. However, the values based on the Individualist Way have otherwise been quite absent from the narratives and framings presented by respondents, and particularly civil servants, in the topics discussed previously. It seems like immigrant community actors in this respect have been quicker to adopt the values of the Individualist Way than civil servants have, and they use them as leverage to create cultural capital and gain recognition.
In other respects, the respondents reported quite different strategies for building legitimacy in Sweden and Canada. In the former country, where the policy community has been strongly characterized by values from the Hierarchist and Fatalist Ways, immigrant community actors confront specific barriers. However, even in this challenging milieu, building symbolic capital within the policy community Habitus should not be assumed to be impossible. A few of Swedish immigrant community organizations contacted for this study had managed to build some level of legitimacy. This respondent shared how the organization went about building symbolic capital by entering a partnership with other service delivering actors:

But when we started with the [organization name], then, and two other associations, then, we also became known... Then, we could get into other tracks, and at the same time, we thought...showed ourselves. We showed others what we can do. And, as we usually say, the authorities and the municipality must use us as resources (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This is a way to build the organizational resume, or set up credentials, based on past work, which can then be used to demonstrate the competence of the organization to others. Building such collaboration with public agencies in particular was mentioned as highly important. This was significant for a range of matters. For example, it could contribute to increasing the chances of finding someone receptive to the organization’s initiative: “I think a lot of the administrators, they're kind and interested in the ideas, even if they aren't formulated exactly the way they want them to be” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). Also, politicians could find it useful to work with organizations that “…have the liberty to address issues in a way that they might feel that they don't have…” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). The following respondents described how collaborations provided strategic opportunities for the organizations:
What we usually do...did many times, sent applications, but always was turned down. But we thought, ok, we need to maybe use another strategy...we learned that Swedish associations were much, much more successful...So, we thought that first we need to make contact with the public agency that we seek funding from...We first talked with them, and then we sent them a primer, and then the primer came back to us and then it became a completed application...already at the start, we had this agreement (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

...that succeeded thanks to...two things...we formed a steering group consisting of all...the collaboration partners, but also with...two persons from the parliament's integration group. So...if something happened, we noted signs of racism, because it exists in abundance, we could address it to the responsible Minister directly. And then in the steering group, there were...persons who could make decisions sitting at the table. That's also very important...the chief of police...the chief of the fire department sat there...(Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

These come across as powerful examples of how to succeed when having to navigate a Hierarchist social context. The key is to become part of the network, an ‘insider’ and develop the connections. That builds recognition, essentially by leveraging social capital and transforming it into cultural capital.

Another respondent from an immigrant community actor describes an alternative method used by the organization to achieve a relatively unique position:

I don't know if it's entirely unique for [municipality], but the fact that it's not an ethnic association, it's not concentrated to [a demographic] from a particular country, it's really [demographic] from several countries, including Sweden. It makes it a bit...unique, you could say, compared to many others...(Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Plus, we have gotten a part of the [national agency’s] program for [demographic] resource centres, there's such an effort in Sweden, they work a lot with labour market issues, not necessarily with integration, but rather [collective identity cleavage], labour market, and we work the labour market as a tool in, sort of, two different issues, it's both [collective...
The organization was explicitly not mobilized on the basis of a single ethnic identity, but rather on different demographics. This trait comes across as a particular asset in relation to other mainstream society actors, like public agencies and school. Thus, the strategy of mobilizing on a non-ethnic basis seems to have been a successful strategy in gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the public administrations in an environment where ethnically based mobilization is considered ‘unfitting’ (Odmalm, 2004b), as discussed in Chapter Three. Doing so allowed the organization to tap into more funding streams. Thus, funding for other identities has been leveraged by this organization to solve issues that confront immigrant communities.

This dynamic also comes across as being based on Hierarchist policies. The logic is to define the organization according to the identity that is currently being subsidized through public funding. The crux of the matter is that it is the government that, in top-down fashion, defines both the content of these identities, and how much funding they shall receive. In effect, it is a top-down way of establishing needs, based on the authority of experts in the higher echelons, within the respective identity groups. It also implies that certain demographics enjoy greater cultural capital within the public administration than others do, by virtue of the funding they receive. Thus, by working through intersectionalism and making claims based on the more prestigious identity, the immigrant community actor can leverage some of that capital for its own needs.

Given its Egalitarian legacy, it would seem that there would be fewer barriers to building legitimacy and accumulating the cultural capital relevant in the Canadian public agency arena than in the Swedish one. The interview material shows that this is true, but only in some respects.
For example, the size of the community seems to be one important dimension in the process, as this respondent reflects. At first, the representatives from the agency were not noted by the public agencies:

First, when we started...how to make the government aware of us, because, at that time...there were a lot of immigrants that were [ethnicity], but they were not significant enough to influence the government...to serve the [ethnic group]...we did a lot of lobbying...of the needs of the newcomers and...at that time, we were a small agency, I think the government...they didn’t even bother to talk to us...(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This changed over time:

But I think that when we were getting more of the [ethnic groups], and living in the downtown, you know, influencing a lot of social issues, like transportation, like...recreation, they caught things up and they started to look into, you know, us. And at that time, since we were...serving...whole-heartedly...focusing on the needs of the clients, we tried our best to help them, and they saw our efforts, and then they started talk to us about a funding (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This is an interesting note, because it stipulates that government recognition is, strictly speaking, more a function of community size than of community needs. Certainly, if a community grows, the needs of the same group become more wide-spread, but that begs the question of how to articulate and meet the needs in small communities.

A similar dynamic seems to occur to immigrant community actors as they grow. It seems like they cease to be considered community agencies and start to become framed as ‘immigrant serving agencies’ instead, as reflected by this respondent:

Some immigrant serving organizations grew out of immigrant organizations, an organization like [name], for instance, which is one of the largest immigrant serving
organizations in [municipality], was originally an [ethnic] community organization, you know self-help settlement type service, but it now provides broad services as it is one of the largest Immigrant Serving Agencies and provide services…to all immigrants…(Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Note how the respondent here emphasizes that it started as an ethno-specific organization, and then uses the word ‘but’, indicating that the actor no longer qualifies for that label. The implicit understanding here is that an Immigrant Serving Agency no longer is an immigrant organization either.

One respondent asserts that this terminology originated from a bureaucratic label:

I think that whole language about immigrant serving…again I cannot attribute it all to [federal agency], but I think that over the years that the model of funding has been that you serve all immigrants. So maybe that's been now, sort of embedded in the language, with an Immigrant which is one that focuses on the need of newcomers, despite maybe originally serving [ethnic group], when it's first created (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

Even if that is not the case, it suggests how powerful government language can be. Significantly, this type of labelling could impact the recognition of an organization in several ways. Having this label assigned to the more economically successful, and larger, organizations sets a precedent. It effectively becomes an articulation of cultural capital in its own right and signals that it is more prestigious to be an immigrant serving organization than an ethno-specific one, regardless of skills sets and notwithstanding the fact that the funder’s conditions compels these actors to transform this way.

Interestingly, the label is based solely on which users are being served. As such, it does not acknowledge the connection to the community. This lack of attention to that very significant quality could become more of an impediment than a help in some cases, with regards to
identifying the most competent actor. The might framing effectively obstruct the visibility of certain actors and competencies. That is not without consequence, because apparently some use the label to describe actors without such community ties, as this testimonial suggests: “…because you go to a so-called Immigrant Serving Organization and the only immigrants you are seeing is clients and frontline people, right?” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

It would thus be more precise to devise a terminology that can capture both the variable sizes and the community ties these organizations have.

Also, these larger organizations are not the only active agents on the arena. This response implies that there are more organizations active on the field that would be visible from a simple overview of who gets funding:

So, when we look at employment services as a whole, looking at who gets funded is not a reflection of who's doing the work. So, a lot of ethno-specific organizations actually do the work, but we don't know if they will tell you that (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Like the social worker quoted by Jenkins who spoke of these entities as the best kept secret of the sector (Jenkins, 1988), this statement suggests that lot of work is being done outside of the public light, and potentially unreported. This is work, then, that public agencies do not acknowledge and accord cultural capital.

Notably, it should not be assumed that organizations active in the neighbourhood can simply step forwards to get acknowledged for the work they actually do carry out. This respondent implies that some actors might, in fact, experience trouble if they would do so: “It's very iffy; because there are consequences to saying we provide a service when you don't have a structure in place or any of that” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).
Exactly what the repercussions would be was never revealed, but the statement does imply that there might be a subsection of actors that provide services somewhere between the informal and loose network and the more professionalized, formalized, NGO, and that these actors are discouraged from coming forth because of fear of repercussions. The question is to what extent there is competence in the field that remains invisible to the public funders. One civil servant notes that smaller organizations may be overlooked in terms of their contributions:

“If you really look at the service and what they do, sometimes in comparing, they’d probably be very good - not always, but I'm just saying, you know, in fairness, there might be some that are really good but are missed because they just don't get through the system process (Municipal agency, Toronto, author's interview).

It would seem, then, that there is a tendency to create a dichotomy which constructs the larger organizations as more competent, and the smaller ones are constructed as less so. This type of label is assigned in a top-down fashion and comes across as based on a Hierarchist way of thinking in the sense that it attempts to categorize entities in the social field, based on expert authority.

In summary, it seems that there are three primary ways for immigrant community actors in Sweden to build legitimacy. The first is to partner with other, already established, organizations to deliver services, and use the legitimacy of those partners to increase the standing of the immigrant community actor. The second is to mobilize the organization based on more than one identity, so as to be able to leverage several identity-based funding streams. The third, which is possible to leverage only after funding is secured, is to submit the results the funding agency is asking for promptly according to specified deadlines.
In Canada, an immigrant community actor can build cultural capital by establishing a history of strong performance in service delivery, which is difficult for a newcomer to do. It can also draw upon the size of the community as leverage in relations to the public agencies. Gaining the label Immigrant Serving Agency also seems to help, as do symbolic events like award ceremonies. This reflects the complex interaction of community level actions, like the award ceremony, and recognition that is the result of public agency actions, capturing the compound dynamics of how Hierarchist, Individualist and Egalitarian values interact in the Canadian arena.

Conclusion

Continuing the probe of how organizational management models affect perceptions, this chapter has explored the manifestations with regards to how public agencies recognize immigrant community actors. In the Swedish case, the testimonials speak to the strength of the public agencies in the Swedish field. Importantly, they also reveal how the organizational model impacts the perspectives and social reflexes of the actors immersed in it. The strong Hierarchist and Fatalist values of the Swedish field have had a number of consequences for how civil servants perceive their social environment.

Overall, immigrant community actors have to engage in work to either overcome or circumvent the social constructions that make up the foundation for prestigious cultural capital valid in the policy community Habitus. The Hierarchist framing situates the public agencies as the a priori problem solver and expert, while the immigrant community actor is considered either incompetent, lacking the capacity to ‘see the common good’, or an outright danger to policy making. The Fatalist framing casts immigrant community actors as untrustworthy and potential free-riders who seek to undermine the fairness of policy making and thus must be held at bay. It is interesting to note that the Fatalist elements were only expressed when respondents were
engaging in discussions about actors outside of the sub-government. When these act together, the status mechanism that results in the arena is one that builds very strongly on a top-down, and strongly disempowering, dynamic. For immigrant community actors wanting to accumulate cultural capital valid in that social space, these framings will act as barriers that should not be underestimated.

The actors need to convince the civil servants that they do have valid competence, even though their specialization remains largely unrecognized. Also, they need to show that they are experts in their field, and do not constitute a threat to policy making, contrary to the entrenched social construction that now is in place. The material thus corroborates previous research discussed in Chapters Three and Five which found immigrant community actors to be generally marginalized, made invisible and, at best, used as rubber-stamps for decisions that have already been made elsewhere to keep up the appearance of consultation (Eriksson & Osman, 2003; Odmalm, 2004b; Odmalm, 2004a; Velásquez, 2005; Aytar, 2007).

One possible way to overcome these barriers as identified by respondents would be to leverage values consistent with the Individualist Way. The actor that manages to enter the field can establish itself within it if it can produce a track record of positive outcomes, and as such, this can become leveraged as an avenue to social action. However, given the considerable barrier for immigrant community actors created by the Hierarchist and Fatalist value systems, that might be a tall order.

While the Canadian policy community also contains Hierarchist and Individualist values, many framings are based on the Egalitarian Way. For at least some civil servants, immigrant actors are considered the natural service delivery agencies. Moreover, community actors have managed to create recognition through symbolic events like award ceremonies. The values and
framing of this manifestation of cultural capital strongly reflect the values of the Egalitarian Way. Finally, there is a meritocratic dimension, expressed through the recognition of performance outcomes. It is also expressed through symbolic events like community award ceremonies. These form the basis of how Individualist values influence the field.

Together, the management styles form an interesting mix. They are often contradictory. The Hierarchist model is top-down, but the Egalitarian and Individualist Ways are bottom-up. Likewise, in one model, the civil servant is the natural expert, while in the others, the community actors are. This creates a type of push-and-pull dynamic within the field, where both public agencies and those immigrant community actors that are established service delivery agencies have some capacity to influence the formation of cultural capital. At the same time, there is a distinction between them, as they are accountable to different parties. The significance here is that that the two bottom-up value systems could very well create a dynamic that competes with, or even offsets, the top-down pressure of the Hierarchist perspectives.

Interestingly, there are very few similarities in how the cultural capital of prestige is framed in the two countries. While there are Hierarchist values in both cases, they are manifested in different ways. In the Canadian case, they are articulated when civil servants apparently awarded a contract to a major NGO lacking a clear community connection, bypassing regular procurement processes in favour of some other form of cultural capital. Likewise, the top-down development of definitions to be used in the field with regards to organizational types could also be seen as a manifestation of these values. In the Swedish case, the Hierachist value system seems much more entrenched. The immigrant community actors are consistently described as incompetent, particularly in comparison to the civil servants, who are framed as experts. They possess cultural capital by virtue of their position in the system, rather than through past
performance. Further, the immigrant community actors are also constructed as a threat to policy-making and national interest are framed as a dichotomous opposite of the public good.

The difference between the two cases becomes even more pronounced when exploring the other value systems. The way the Swedish civil servants invoke Fatalist values when describing immigrant community actors as unreliable opportunists combine with the Hierarchist values described above, to create a powerfully excluding effect. All of these create substantial barriers for immigrant community actors trying to build recognition.

The contrast to the Canadian the civil servants who invoke Egalitarian values by describing immigrant community actors as experts are quite sharp. Immigrant community actors have also managed to create their own symbolic capital that seems to further improve their standing on the arena. This is a more inclusionary perspective and should make cultural capital more accessible to immigrant community actors. In the next chapter, the networks structures in the respective fields are explored and compared to assess this.
Chapter 9: Leveraging social capital – the structure of policy community networks

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight investigated cultural capital in different manifestations, the specialized competence of immigrant community actors and public agencies, as well as how the management model affects the accumulation of recognition within the policy community Habitus. Consistent with previous research, immigrant community actors were in Chapter Six found to be competent in terms of navigating the community Habitus, but faced challenges in terms of developing the specialized jargon competence needed to produce competitive funding proposals. The public agencies, on the other hand, faced challenges in developing the expertise required to navigate the immigrant community social space.

Chapter Seven revealed substantial differences in the processes of recognition in the two countries. In Sweden, civil servants were described as guardians of fairness and vested with expert authority, while immigrant community actors were labelled as threats to the policy process and labelled as dilettantes, obscuring their specialized knowledge of how to navigate their own Habitus. Both of these framings create barriers for those who seek to establish themselves as actors on the arena. In Canada, civil servants tended to describe immigrant community actors as experts, acknowledging their capacity to navigate their social space as significant specialized knowledge. Even so, institutionalized dynamics sometimes impede the administration’s capacity to fully absorb their competence.

While networks in general are positive for the development of social capital, and bridging capital is good for integration, the types of networks that connect to the public agencies have particular significance. The policy community is the site of access to economic resources, but to
access those resources, actors need valid cultural capital. Being included in the sub-government is thus highly important for those actors who want to deliver services.

Chapter Four argued that the different management models will affect network structures and relations in the policy community. The Hierarchical Way is conducive to corporatist networks, a structure that is characterized by creating entry barriers for new actors to decision-making arenas. Fatalism is more likely to lead to dirigist networks, where NGOs remain weak, excluded from policy-making and unable to challenge governments. Individualism is most likely going to be produce pluralist networks. In those, interest groups tend to confine themselves to advocacy rather than more in-depth co-operation with government bodies. Egalitarianism could lead to the emergence of clientelist networks in the sense that NGOs would be more able to constrain state actors in comparison to the other models (Montpetit, 2009). These are very different in structure and the shape of the network will thus be revealing for how the different management models have been entrenched and the effect they have had on the formation of social capital.

This chapter explores the question: How are social networks structured in the policy community? It does so by discussing the formation of networks in the policy community, to assess to what degree immigrant community actors can be said to have access to social capital. The chapter examines several different dimensions of social connections on the scene. First, it explores network structures between different public agencies. It then goes on to analyze the network structures between public agencies and immigrant community actors, followed by networks between immigrant community actors themselves. Finally, it addresses the significance of organizational incubators for the development of the organizational capacity of immigrant community actors.
Respondents, from the three categories of civil servants, immigrant community actors and actors engaged in publicly funded service delivery, engaged with these issues in different ways in the two countries. The Swedish interviewees emphasized the effects of the Hierarchist and Fatalist management styles, manifested as the dominant position of state actors with relatively closed network structure within the policy community Habitus. They also revealed the excluded position of immigrant community actors in relation to the closed corporatist network.

Respondents in Canada presented evidence of all four management practices, but instances of Hierarchist practice are articulated in different way than in Sweden, reflecting how the Egalitarian Way has been significant in Canada. There are entrenched relations between public agencies and immigrant community actors, with support for community capacity building and institutionalized incubators, and some cases of entrenched informal networks that circumvent procurement to some extent. Although these informal agreements might have had negative effects on relations with smaller actors, the evidence does suggest a significant amount of bridging social capital among immigrant community actors. In both countries, respondents engage with the negative effects of jurisdictional compartmentalization for the development of social capital. Compartmentalization is used to establish clear boundaries of jurisdiction between different levels of government and public agencies which can reduce overlap and is intended to rationalize the division of labour (Hood, 2000; Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999). This occurs regardless of the differences between the federal and unitary systems. Also, Fatalist and Individualist practices carry negative implications for social capital.

**Relations between public agencies**

Respondents in both Canada and Sweden expressed concern over how public agencies communicated with each other for the purpose of maximizing positive policy outcomes in all
instances. Their answers seem to suggest that there are cases where these entities lack formalized means of interacting to at least some extent. This could be argued to be an effect of compartmentalization, where agencies operate within their own jurisdictions, parallel to and independently of each other. An example of this type of organizational solution was when the Swedish government separated the training and rehabilitation function from the Labour Market Administration into the AMU Group, as discussed in Chapter Five. Such organization risks but will not always, creating inefficiencies like duplication of services or interventions that lack a sufficiently holistic perspective on the issue to be addressed.

A particular problem identified by contracted immigrant community actors in Canada concerned how government agencies fund programs in similar or overlapping policy areas, with “their own logic, their own purpose and how they streamline services internally…”(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview) which might not be communicating with each other or coordinating their efforts. That impact clients and service delivery agencies. For the latter, it means navigating public management conditions, often in an ad hoc manner, to make ends meet:

The problem, though, is that the types of employment programs [federal agency 1] funds are labour market focused more specific and probably more effective. [Federal agency 2] funds peripheral activates that may support that, and the thing is not everyone qualifies for that, so what's supposed to be a seamless transition is not…these are two federal departments that don't necessarily talk to each other, which makes it difficult for the organizations that are doing the work…(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

…So, now I'm hearing that there have been some conversations that [federal agency 1] would maybe are looking at job development support within their funding stream as well. Now, I can understand their hesitance in the sense, that…”whoa, whoa, wait a minute here. Employment? That's not my thing. That’s [under the jurisdiction of federal agency
2] over there”. And I understand that to an extent. But on the ground level it makes it difficult (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Both of these examples end with an observation of how the lack of coordination between public agencies in the arena has negative consequences for the operational conditions of service delivery agencies. Further, the task of coordinating the efforts between actors on the field falls on the frontline actors. They need to develop strong networks among the public agencies to be able to complete the task of social service delivery effectively.

Swedish respondents repeatedly discussed how they had to build bridges between agencies to overcome issues of departmental territoriality:

A human is everything at once...and health affects language learning capacity, if you have bad housing, you'll probably have bad health...and then you don't learn the language, and then you don't get a job...And if not everyone who has tasks in these issues can see that, the complexity, and be able to relate to everything at once, then we see consequences in that the interventions being planned, they do not fit, they do not get the wanted effect. And this is....a holistic way of thinking that is...very demanding but it is possible...(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The next respondent discussed the matter in similar terms:

So...short courses, maybe, that are directly linked to occupations with shortages...and then...a bit more differentiated courses from educational background...Then, we need to get better at seeing the connections between different operations. Now, I’m thinking about, for instance, schooling, labour market, those parts, and training, for parents, for children, how can we merge that? (Municipal agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The result interestingly seems to be a fragmented policy community that to some extent is reminiscent of the findings with regards to how the federal nature of the Canadian context has impacted the efficiency of public agency service delivery. This is interesting, since Sweden is not
a federal country, yet each public actor seems to operate largely according to its own conceptual framework. It also suggests that these public agencies have less social capital on a formalized organizational level than what would be optimal for effective and efficient service delivery operations.

One respondent from a non-community actor even considered this lack of cross-departmental communication an opportunity for the organization. The respondent described how there was “…a gap, and that is communication municipality-Employment service” (Non-community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). The respondent considered that lack of communication an opportunity for the organization to act as a liaison between the different public agencies. The statement seems to be a strong indication of how entrenched the lack of communication is.

Overall, then, quite a few actors have also expressed frustration over compartmentalization and barriers to successful cooperation between agencies. It seems like the compartmentalization of public policy has had a negative effect on the development of networks between public agencies. Thus, the public agencies have social capital, though it seems that in some cases, they have not been able to leverage it for optimal service delivery. Interestingly, this aspect of the effects of the chosen management models has not gained much attention by the scholarship investigating integration in the labour market previously, as is evident from the lack of engagement in the topic in the literature discussed in Chapters Three and Five. This could be an area for future research.

**Relations between public agencies and immigrant community actors**

The relations between public agencies and immigrant community actors vary between Sweden and Canada. In this area, the differences in public management history come across strongly in
respondent replies. In Sweden, replies centred on the strength and centrality of the public agencies and the absence of immigrant community actors on key decision-making arenas, while Canadian respondents were engaged in a discussion about the nature of partnerships between the two parties, both in terms of mutual opportunities and problematic aspects that impeded effective working relations.

**The dominance of government actors in Sweden**

A continuous theme among Swedish respondents was the dominance of government actors. Given the historical strength of such actors in this policy community, this is not surprising. Chapter Five showed how the Labour Market Board monopolized labour market service delivery for some time. Its strong legacy was captured by respondents when most of them explicitly pointed to the significance of its successor organization, the Employment Service: “The Employment Service is central, a central actor, now, it's clearly so” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This response is informed by its function as a contracting funder as well as its significance for other funding streams, like EU-projects. At same time, it also delivers some services on in-house (see Chapters Nine and Ten). These factors act together to create a significant gatekeeping function, as this respondent touches on: “…I think one strength is probably, the inclusion…for the public authorities. They exist within the structures…and can work within them” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). Here, the respondent is effectively arguing that the greatest strength of the public agencies is that they exist within the government sphere, i.e. their own structures. While the statement may seem circular, it underscores the dominance of these actors, the importance of being an insider to that social space.
Another respondent reflected over how the same people tend to cycle through different employers within this field and keep running into each other: “People just change employer” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). The statement suggesting a fairly finite and externally bounded social space and is a powerful illustration of the informal dimension of the organizational structure of government dominance discussed in Chapter Three. Such a social dynamic is likely to have some effects on the building of social capital within the field, and, arguably, make it more closely knit.

The following respondent discusses how entrenched these networks between public actors are:

Clearly, public authorities have worked up routes to other authorities...they have a number of dependencies between each other. Often municipality, [national agencies]...they tend to act together in so many different constellations so they have established co-operation channels, and then there's also dependencies and personal connections. There's all these different factors (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

An example of partnerships is provided by this respondent:

We even have a collaboration agreement with the Employment Service, so...we collaborate very closely...the responsibility for the municipality is really to raise the level of competence, so that you can become match-able on the labour market....And then the Employment Service is going to...manag the contacts with employers and match and go in with the supportive interventions...give employers subsidies...Then we also have contacts with employers, we also place people in internships...(Municipal agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This is one example of how agencies can cooperate over jurisdictional borders involving one national agency and one municipal agency. The respondent discussed the division of work between the two parties and emphasizes the close nature of the collaboration. This was not the only example of such. Respondents from Stockholm could produce similar examples, adding
complexity to the narrative of how public agencies relate to each other and showing that the effects of compartmentalization can be overcome and public agencies should not be a priori assumed to be isolated from each other.

The narratives provided here imply that public sector itself constitutes the core of the field, or the normalized portion of it. That suggests the creating of powerful bonding capital between the public agencies within the policy community Habitus. Bonding capital is not necessarily a dichotomous opposite of bridging capital. However, it is conceivable that it can act as a barrier to bridging, if it reinforces exclusionary forms of cultural capital. Other actors, like NGOs or community organizations, are newcomers and have an uphill battle in terms of both legitimacy and networking. If so, outsiders will find entry into the sub-government more difficult because they lack the social capital that would help them develop the valid kinds of cultural capital. As outsiders, they are effectively excluded. Previous research, discussed in Chapter Three, has examined the complexities of how bridging and bonding social capital can facilitate or impede immigrant integration. That research, notably, was focused on social capital development within immigrant communities, and did not engage in a discussion on the equivalent processes within public agencies. The findings here indicate that this field might require further exploration in the future for a more complete understanding of the complexities of how social capital acts in relation to these social processes.

*The exclusionary partnerships of public agencies*

There are consequences for having public agencies constitute the normative centre of the field as in the Swedish case. The inside actors will face fewer barriers to access resources, because they are already integrated into the funding structure and is thus more likely to get funded. Outside actors, however, will face barriers to entry, which makes accessing the network structure of this
social space more difficult, and for outside actors, the field would thus be seen as relatively closed, a pattern observed in Chapters Three and Five. Manifestations of these systemic properties were found in both Malmö and Stockholm. One collaboration project in Malmö had 29 local municipalities, the national umbrella organization for municipalities, one regional municipality, three national agencies, two post-secondary institutions, one research institute and one umbrella organization representing civil society (Länsstyrelsen Skåne). No immigrant community actor was listed in this collaboration.

One interesting example of how this type of partnership organizes programs for immigrant communities without their involvement comes from a community information and business centre (Somali Information & Business Centre, 2013) in Sweden. It provided counselling services for entrepreneurs from this ethnic group, and while eight of the nine employees seem to be of that ethnic origin, the centre is operated by the Herbert Felix Institute, an immigration research institute, together with a range of four municipalities, one regional municipality, and two national agencies. None of the organizations in this partnership represents the ethnic community.

That pattern reoccurs in the testimonials when respondents spoke about institutionalized collaboration. In this example, a range of private companies had also been included, but mostly, the partners were local or national public agencies, and community actors were not even mentioned.

This [program] has been approved for a panel which…consists of, I'm not sure if it's 26 or 29 representatives from major companies, like [major company name], and…employer representative from the private sector or the entrepreneurs, from organizations, state agencies like the Employment Service and…the regional municipalities, the [municipality]...(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
Notably, the actors consist of many of the same ones as in the previous example, although actors with jurisdictional responsibilities for immigrant settlement and integration in different capacities.

A third example is an EU-funded project co-owned by a municipal and a national agency.

However, there's the EU financed project we run… in partnership with, above all, the [national agency], but there's also the [non-community NGO] involved…we own the project, but we have two project managers, one from us and one from the [national agency], so we are that tight….we have that close cooperation (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Again, no immigrant community actor is involved. The only NGO is a large organization with international scope.

The pattern is so entrenched that when a civil servant starts listing ‘all actors’, in other words, the significant ones in the field, the list consists only of public agencies. “…then you gather, which I did, gather all actors in one geographic municipality, so all, [national agency], municipality and so on, and start to, sort of, penetrate this issue” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). This response was reflexive, reflecting the social conditioning within the Habitus.

The common denominator in all these examples is that it is the public agencies that are the leaders of the arena, not the community actors, which continues the pattern found in previous studies. Examples include the lack of reciprocal dialogue with residents in the local partnership for economic growth in Alby, Stockholm (Velásquez, 2005), and with the national Immigrant Council on the national level which played a token role in decision-making (Aytar, 2007). The relationship between user organizations and public agencies is, as one respondent put it, “asymmetric” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
The relation has consequences for the flow of information in the field, as one respondent observed: “There is a double arbitrariness, so firstly; to get at all any information; secondly, who gets it?” (Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). In other words, actors that are not considered insiders risk missing out on significant information. If such information gaps include funding opportunities, outside actors can find themselves continuously sidelined by the entrenched actors. Thus, the exclusion of immigrant community actors from these networks has consequences for their potential to access economic resources, an effect that has been observed previously in the scholarship (Jenkins, 1988), as well as developing cultural capital considered valid within the policy community Habitus.

Even so, the respondent reactions are consistent with the findings in Chapter Three and Five. The Swedish policy community is dominated by government bodies and the few trusted actors these have invited to the table. The above suggests that those would predominantly consist of employers, and one NGO actor was also mentioned. Labour unions, however, were a notable absence. Most significantly, immigrant community actors were also absent.

**Partnerships between immigrant community actors and public agencies in Canada**

In contrast to the Swedish themes of public agency dominance and the exclusion of immigrant community actors, Canadian respondents often discussed the entrenched networks between immigrant community actors and public agencies, consistent with the Egalitarian history of this policy community explored in Chapter Five. While many interviewees described instances of cordial relations between the involved parties, there were also complications and barriers to reciprocity between the actors on the policy community that deserve attention. The following quote is one good example of the former, when respondents stressed the amiable nature of relations with the public funders:
We maintain a friendly relationship. We are not only …“fund us!”; badgering for money, but we are also their friend…I'm not involved in that communication with the government....According to my observation, ok...In [country], you want to maintain a relationship with government, you have to treat them well, you understand?...You have the relationship, you have everything, you don't, you lose everything... (Immigrant community agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

The first part of the statement underlines that the relationship is constructive. Apparently, that relationship can be maintained to some extent even under a public procurement situation. Note, however, how the respondent clarifies the relation by adding that maintaining it is a strategic necessity. Without it, ‘everything’ can be lost, implying that poor relations with the public funder will have economic consequences for the organization. The observation corroborates Cordero-Guzmán’s findings concerning how significant the connection to the social service delivery system is for immigrant community organizations (2005). There is thus a strong incentive for the funded organizations to maintain a friendly disposition.

The relations have been sufficiently cordial for a range of formal and informal partnerships involving immigrant community actors to develop across the field. These were related to service delivery, sometimes outside the funding relations with the government agencies. This respondent described partnerships with immigrant serving agencies, many of which are community actors: “We're just doing a big study right now in [municipality], for example, looking at the immigrant employment experience, and so, a number of the immigrant organizations are partners in the research …” (Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). The following statement from an actor in the field of bridging programs described these relations in more detail, including how responsibilities have been divided between the different actors:
When it comes to bridging programs we tend to partner with immigrant serving agencies...so that they can do the...marketing, screening, maybe sometimes the assessment stage, we'll do the training stage, they might do the follow-up stage. I would say, relative to where we were 5 years ago, the networking among immigrant serving agencies and colleges have significantly increased (Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The respondent goes on to describe that one of the reasons for developing these partnerships was the demands made by the funder:

Partly, it was a funding requirement in the bridging programs that the provincial government put out...so that's one of the things that got us out of our comfortable relationships and into...exploring new partnerships...that was a good element that they required of us and I think it has stimulated more relationships, that partnership activity between colleges and immigrant serving agencies and social service agencies (Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The significance of such demands for opening up the opportunity structure for immigrant community actors should be recognized. The non-community service delivery agencies are, in short, compelled to seek out community actors to partner with. A civil servant describes the relations in similar terms:

We have a phenomenal amount of partnerships and relationships with community organizations that we refer to, and the information share, and that we support the clients they are working with, but we have nothing to do with the funding. These are good organizations; we know they provide good services so we'll support them and our clients and working together (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

This suggests that the public organization is actually supporting and networking with organizations they do not fund, i.e. organizations they do not have an immediate stake in. Moreover, these organizations also want to work with this public body. That says something
about relations between these actors. In simple terms, these relations come across as classic business partnerships. They are also another indication of a strong level of social capital on the part of the immigrant community actors involved in them. As such, the narratives provide powerful examples of the type of structural actions government can take to support immigrant community actors. They are comparable to how the US federal government compelled states to devote some federal funding to immigrant community actors described by Bloemraad (Bloemraad, 2005). Entrenched relations like this can give rise to further funding opportunities, as many respondents attest:

…so they were told they were getting the money before they wrote the proposal. And it was largely based on political connections…if you look at how money is allocated. If you did a sort of political economy of where the funds go, on any of the diversity and equity issues, you would see that there's lots of organizations getting lots of money, for reasons that probably don't have to do with their efficiency, effectiveness. It has to do with lots of other things (Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

…It used to be…other agencies have to apply for [funding]…But for us, sometimes …they even had that officer…approaching us, and ask us whether we are interested to apply for that funding or not. So I think we maintain a very good relationship, and I think that relationship implies that…they know about us and they know what we can do… And some of the funding, we will approach them, we talk to them and they would just ask us "how much do you need?" (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

As such, this is a potent example of how immigrant community actors can benefit greatly from developing bridging social capital specifically with public agencies, which can then be leveraged to access economic resources. However, that also means that the actors are beholden to the system:

I think, to maintain a good relationship, you have to be a good boy, as an agency....That means, when they are asking, you have to do what they are asking to do. That's not a bad
thing, though. Sometimes they ask for, like “study this”, we have to give them on time, that's the first thing. So, the funding agency, when they give out the money, they like to see the results (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

While the respondent does not seem to consider this an issue for concern, it might become one for some agencies, if their capacity for advocacy becomes too constrained by the need to ‘be a good boy’ which could impede bottom up impulses. That was a problematic issue identified among immigrant community actors in Toronto and New York (Sadiq, 2004; Jenkins, 1988) and precisely the reason why such actors refused to rely on government funding in the United Kingdom (Cheetham, 1988). On the other hand, it also seems to work to hold the agency accountable and deliver professional services.

A prime example of formalized networks like these was the creation of Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) in the Toronto region, discussed in Chapter Five. They were frequently mentioned by Canadian respondents:

The city's sponsored [LIP] and...we support it and are a partner and a player in that...Essentially they are…funded by the federal government…to however do a successful submission and create a network and a stakeholder table that starts to…think about local planning from a settlement and employment perspective. To come up with what makes sense at a local level and…a work plan and infrastructure…that kind of zeroes in on those needs…(Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

This respondent from a provincial agency described the concept in some detail, beginning with the strategic objectives:

…it's not community capacity building per se, but it's basically funding to bring together groups within a community so that we include…immigrant serving, ethno-specific groups to come together and…identify and…map out strategies…to provide services to newcomers. Now, obviously employment and language play a high…priority in those
because those tend to be…the top two gaps for concern for newcomers (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

Then the respondent went on to describe what these LIPs would mean in terms of the opportunity structure for immigrant community actors:

…you could sort of see LIPs as an opportunity for immigrant serving agencies, or ethno-specific agencies to be engaged at a different level in the discussions around employment and newcomers…within communities…I mean within Toronto I think there's 13 LIPs or something like that…so within those neighbourhoods you have folks at the table that maybe aren't even funded by any of the major service settlement funding pockets, but they're at the table, so they do provide an opportunity to be part of that... (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

Notably, the focus here is on getting the local community actors to come together. Responding civil servants are clearly framing those as primary target groups and agents to be involved in the process and at the table. Moreover, the respondents are talking about getting both smaller and larger types of organizations involved. All of these partnering efforts seemed to be aimed at harnessing the competence of community actors. In that sense, they correspond closely to Suzuki’s observation of how governments can support the development of social capital among immigrant community by opening up opportunity structures and acting as a connector for interactions between community and non-community actors (Suzuki, 2005). They also contribute to legitimize these actors as relevant for the social service delivery. As such, the LIPs seem strongly informed by Egalitarian values.

In summary, the respondents presented a series of examples of partnerships between public agencies and immigrant community actors. These reflect strong bridging capital between the two social spaces. Developing this is important for the immigrant community actors as they can leverage that to access vital economic resources within the policy community. However,
doing so also creates vulnerabilities and can constrain their freedom of action if they want to maintain the funding stream.

**Barriers for reciprocity in partnerships**

The above might suggest that networks give immigrant community actors substantial agency in the policy community, given the emphasis on trust and cordiality that many respondents refer to and how these actors seem to be able to influence the arena. That said, partnerships like those describe above have not been achieved without conflict according to this respondent:

> Let's be clear on this: the sector was never inclusive. We had to fight tooth and nail for every victory we've had so far. And we're still fighting for it. And I think the minute we give up things will revert back to what it was (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This really reflects the importance of agency – that social equity does not come about on its own accord – it is the result of a struggle, much like how the anti-poverty coalitions and S.U.C.C.E.S.S. in Vancouver mobilized to gain attention and acknowledgment from policymakers as described in Chapter Three (Creese, 1998; Guo, 2006). If the voices of the subaltern groups cannot be heard, if they have no platform to mobilize around and from which to pursue this struggle, then their interests will not be taken into account by holders of power, which is why paternalist systems tend to not produce such equity.

Further, the influence that has been achieved is constrained in many ways, not just through the dependency on public funding as already mentioned. In addition to the funding levers, this respondent, strategically placed in the policy community, discussed how the public agencies also retain the privilege of how to interpret contractual clauses.
our relationship is one of funder and recipient of funds. We are not partners. Because partnership implies a different kind of a relationship which does not exist…one party sign a contract that they are not really allowed to amend…the type of contractual agreement that exists is mutually imposed unilaterally on community organizations that receive the funding...(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The respondent continued to elaborate on the challenges associated with this order. Since the civil servants interpret the contractual clauses, the predictability of the relationship decreases when individuals within the public agencies leave positions and new recruits enter in their stead:

…as departments hire new staff, community organizations are literally at their mercy because these are new people who interpret guidelines…the sector has had incredible difficulty just trying to negotiate that relationship. And it's always up in the air. At times, it's been fairly smooth, you can actually interpret clauses in a way that really makes sense, and at times it hasn't (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This dynamic is highly significant. If a program is to be genuinely bottom-up, then control over the parameters of the program would be shared, rather than monopolized by one party. In other contractual relations, either party would be able to go to a third party, for example the court system, to adjudicate disputes on an equal playing field. That does not seem to be the case here, and if the government retains the ability to change its interpretation of central causes at will, for example to reflect a sudden reversal in policy, then the community actors who entered into a contractual relation under a particular understanding will be dependent on the government’s good will. There seems to be little recourse if the government decides to not retain the original agreement throughout the contracted period. This does not correspond well to how the Individualist Way of governance has described the functionality of contracting. Further, it would affect trust, and thus social capital, between the parties negatively.

Moreover, several statements assert a limited degree of reciprocity in the relationship:
When I look at our previous experience…what I think is that it's not a factor at all. Because we had asked for the sector to have a voice when the agreement was first signed in 2005, and we didn't. Not formally, anyway, and even informally…although we were part of the consultations and discussions, it was one of those exercises where government listens and then go ahead and does their own thing (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Such lack of influence seems to be particularly associated with changes in policy, which can “shift real quickly...” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). This, in itself, can create uncertainty among the funding recipients and undermine long term planning for consistent service delivery. One such occasion that caused concern among service deliverers is described by some respondents:

...they kind of want like a few big one stop shops, which is great to have those big organizations, but, like when you have organizations that are set up to serve everybody, the most marginalized always experience additional barriers to accessing their services, so...that won't really completely work, there's gonna be some smaller organizations, but, how to get money? (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

Because the model will be more like a one stop model, where under one roof all kinds of services will be provided, and very few agencies will be able to do that, so assuming that those agencies will get the funding, that means that they will get rid of maybe some smaller agency service providers, maybe more partnerships will be required to be built...(Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

…the organizations able to deliver full services are the bigger ones, and the small, ethno-specific ones will actually get shut down permanently. Because they can't, they don't have the capacity to deliver that full suite at that level of services and politically that becomes really difficult to shut down all the little organizations in your riding for a politician. That may be one of the reasons that that process has stalled (Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).
This was preceded by a series of ‘consulting’ efforts, through teleconferences, seemingly taking in input. However, it appears that the model had already been decided upon because this one-stop-shop concept appears across the two investigated provinces, notwithstanding the reservations from the service deliverers and their concerns about the impacts on service quality. In this case, government funders have actively promoted a new model regardless of the wishes of the service deliverers, where the decision was made without community engagement.

The model seems more like the management model fad of the moment, than an actual engagement with the service deliverers for the purpose of meeting user needs. For a relation that, in some respects, has shown signs of dialogue and reciprocity, such actions come across as downright unilateral and disempowering, driven by top-down fiat. However, it also seems like the reforms stalled because of the character of the field itself; actors seemingly have mobilized to resist the reforms. That, in turn, implies that government has at least some constraints to act as social agents on the field due to the strength of other actors which is an important institutional dynamic.

The above processes have a top-down dynamic in common but the exclusion does not seem to be based on mistrust directed towards community actors. Rather, the unilateral dimension seems to be an effect of expert authority within the higher echelons of the public agencies having a preference for a particular organizational model and then adopting it, regardless of community opinion. In that respect, these processes seem to capture a Hierachist methodology. The power dynamics between community actors and government remains one skewed in the latter’s favour. The Hierachist dimension of the organizational model cannot be ignored. It affects trust and reciprocity to some extent constrains how far the social capital can potentially be developed between these actors.
The Fatalist practice of rotating civil servants to minimize freeriding and stop rent-seeking actors from co-opting the service delivery process described in Chapter Seven is also relevant here. Those practices have disrupted relations that were previously steady between community agencies and civil servants. The following is an example of that. The respondent first described how the work process used to be when there was a single, continuous case officer communicating with the service delivery agency:

Yes, within the government...over the last year and a half. The original officer was with us for many years, at least six, seven years, so he knew a lot about our agency, he was very familiar with our operation, so when he came in to do activity, monitor, we didn't really have to explain a lot of the detail...he would know already, so he could focus on tackling emerging issues, what kind of barriers that we are seeing, what kind of difficulties we are having so we can focus on those kind of problems (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

However, that changed, which had implications for the operational effectiveness of the agency:

…but for these new officers, like every time they came, we have to start all over again from the history of our board, to our other services, so that's a difficulty that we're facing and it's not just us, some of the other agencies...they're facing similar issues as well...they have to deal with those different government officers handling their files. So, that's why…I use the word chaotic…a lot of time put into everything works fine, rather than focusing on how to improve the service itself...(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

However, even though cooptation could be a valid concern in these types of relationships, changing case officers too often will, conversely, lead to inefficiencies when the agency has to repeat information over and over again, which arguably may create redundancies and a lack of consistency needed for delivering services. Once more, Fatalism seems to create more impediments to a smooth operation than it saves monies. Further, it has a negative effect on the
generation of bridging social capital between immigrant community actors and public agencies. The mistrust inherent to the management model acts as a constraint on the development of trust, and the repeated rotation creates barriers for the development of institutionalized networks. The social capital of the field thus declines.

In summary, Swedish public agencies work primarily with other public agencies, on either municipal or national level, though the degree to which they do varies depending on context. Immigrant community actors, however, are, by and large, marginalized and excluded from collaboration. In Canada, by contrast, public agencies do engage in collaboration with immigrant communities on a regular basis. Even so, there are barriers for reciprocity, particularly in relation to Fatalist and Individualist management methods.

**Relations between immigrant community actors**

One significant similarity stands out between Sweden and Canada. In both countries, respondents describe how public policy has had negative effects in terms of how networks between immigrant community actors have been fragmented. However, the case of Canada differs substantially from Sweden in that there is simultaneously a great deal of communication between these actors, at least among those who do manage to get public funding, and they even have umbrella organizations acting as advocates for the sector at large, all of which seems absent in Sweden.

**Fragmentation among immigrant community actors**

In Sweden, being systematically excluded from the established collaborations within the public agencies has implications for the social capital of the immigrant community actors. Even so, they do have some forms of social capital. Specifically, they tend to have a strong network with the community they are immersed in: “We have a great network” (Immigrant community actor,
Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). These, the actors would argue, were stronger than those of the public agencies: “They don't have the same network as we have” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation), just as has been reported from immigrant community actors in Spain (Huntoon, 2001). It constitutes an example of how cultural capital in the form of the specialized knowledge that is required to navigate that social space can be translated into social capital and an entrenched network in that Habitus. However, having strong networks within their local communities does not mean that networks in relation to other actors are also strong. The question is to what extent these networks are bridging between different immigrant communities and between the local community and actors from mainstream society, particularly the public agencies.

However, those specific connections seem to be substantially weaker. Those immigrant community actors who managed to entrench themselves in the social service delivery arena reported that they had few connections to other immigrant community actors:

Very few [connections]. Everybody is working in their little niche, and so on. We also didn't continue, here on [organization name], to be able to reach a collaboration in that way. So, everybody is working on their thing. So, there, I have difficulties…informing you about what is going on in terms of collaboration. But it would be interesting to see how you could collaborate (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

…we have pretty good connections to schools….we have pretty good connections, for instance with companies, precisely for our mentorship programs...anything that touches upon [demographic’s] entrepreneurship at all, we have frequent contacts, and then with others, like immigrant associations, some co-operation, but I haven't taken part in any venture where we've had...we have enough muscle to make our own agenda (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
When discussing this lack of outreach to immigrant community actors, respondents, both from within and without the community fields, often remarked on how difficult it was to maintain stable networks and contacts with such actors. Even the representatives from immigrant community actors found it hard and the consensus seemed to be that these actors lacked sufficient organizational infrastructure and, simply, permanence for any institutionalized cooperation to be established. As this respondent put it: They may “…not have that set structure at all, which I can imagine with many more transient organizations. They work with something, but it might be dependent on a single person's will” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). Another respondent reflected on similar experiences:

I only know that sometimes when you have a list like that with…oh, this can be a good association to contact, it's not always the case that you can reach them, it's not always they still even exist. Sometimes, unfortunately, it seems that they never existed at all; that happens, too (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

These comments are consistent with the findings of Dahlstedt, who tried to conduct field research in this sector in Malmö, as mentioned in Chapter Three. The attempt failed, because address information in phone books, umbrella organization and municipal databases proved to be inaccurate, and the study was never completed (Dahlstedt, 2003). The lack of resources available to the actors found in this study could well have contributed to the difficulties encountered by Dahlstedt.

Some of the Canadian respondents from immigrant community actors observed that they tended to be scattered and lack coordination when asked about weaknesses among community actors: “We are too scattered. I mean, they, in general the other agencies are surviving by their own, they don't have much connection with other agencies” (Immigrant community actor,
Toronto). However, other respondents claimed the opposite; that coordination and collaboration was well established (see further below). These two narratives could coexist if some agencies cooperate less than others. For example, it is conceivable that the level of collaboration between actors is somewhat dependent on size and historical presence in the policy community sub-government, where, to use Cordero-Guzmán’s typology, the small Hometown Associations might experience less collaboration because of a limited capacity, whereas the large actors with metropolitan level outreach engage in more. On the other hand, some major ones might be self-sufficient and not see a need for cooperation.

It is also possible that this captures an effect of the procurement management model. This respondent asserts that conditions in the contract sometimes impede the development of some collaboration:

...and we always have to be...very conscious of our needs to meet our targets in our contract, and nothing that we do in collaboration with someone else, which in some cases might make more sense to the client, can really damage our ability to deliver on our contract, because then it affects our ability to get new contracts (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

A contract process that is an obstruction to effective service delivery to users would be problematic. If that is the case, then the bottom-up flexibility that is at the heart of the Individualist Way has not been achieved. Instead, the contracts should be designed with sufficient flexibility that service delivery agencies are encouraged to develop those collaborations that are necessary to meet client needs. Another example of how competition drives fragmentation is seen when multiple service providers approach the same employers in an uncoordinated fashion: “They [employers] are approached often by multiple service providers and quite frankly they often don't have the time, they don't know who to work with, they don't
know how to work with everyone, so there are some inherent challenges that occur in the system” (Non-community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview). If competition in the field actually makes it harder for employers to identify partners, then that is arguably also a problem.

**Canadian immigrant community actor networks**

Notwithstanding the observations of fragmentation above, the organizational infrastructure of the Canadian immigrant community actors stand out as comparatively strong. There are province based umbrella organizations in both Toronto and Vancouver. In the former metropolitan area, this is the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants, OCASI, and the Affiliation of Multicultural Societies and Services Agencies of BC, AMSSA, which serve this function (Affiliation of Multicultural Societies and Services Agencies of BC; Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants, 2012). The presence of these umbrella organizations constitutes an important sign of the institutional strength of these actors compared to their Swedish counterparts, which had no equivalent regional or national umbrella organization. Further, some testimonials indicate that the level of cordial relations between immigrant community actors has sometimes been transformed into entrenched policy networks. The larger organizations can establish informal agreements with each other for the purpose of facilitating cooperation that is economically advantageous for the parties involved:

Big organizations have formed...these consortiums, and they apply for funding...as a group...And they kind of corner the market in a way, because they know how much money is on offer...and they just divide up the funding exactly between them, and because, they can offer so many services, they get the money over and over and over...but actually they don't really offer adequate services or this place wouldn't exist (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

We try to maintain a good relationship with other agencies...we will not do the direct competition with other agencies... whenever there is an agency that settles into an office
in an area …this is not a rule, but they will agree to not set up their office close to that location…there's some kind of agreement…We are following that. When there's an agency in [region], we are not going to setup an office or service around it (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This seems very much like the agencies are trying to circumvent the pressures of Individualist style procurement and still maintain the integrity of each respective niche and the respect of their colleague agencies to at least some extent, an informal counter-force. To some extent, this corroborates evidence from previous research in the Toronto region which found that service delivery agencies in this sector has a long history of developing networks between each other (Good, 2005; Stasiulis, Hughes, & Amery, 2011; Siemiatycki, Rees, Ng, & Rahi, 2003).

In some cases, they seem to be succeeding, too:

Then there is the other part where [federal agency] actually play politics instead in certain communities and funded the organizations that they were comfortable with. I shouldn't say it's the department, I would say it's the bureaucrat, and they actually pushed out smaller organizations that could have done the work. I think if they would have put more effort into it, they could have encouraged a partnership, which would have happened, because the larger organizations have mostly been willing to do that (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

In other words, sometimes establishing an entrenched clientelist network relationship with the public administration has consequences. Civil servants will tend to go with the ‘trusted buddies’ over a newcomer, and that makes entry into the arena more difficult. Individualist style procurement is directly designed to minimize or dismantle such relations, if there is intra-community conflict where a weaker party becomes excluded from the key arenas. Some respondents had experienced difficulties in entering the field as a consequence:
….we do encounter obstacles in a lot of our funding applications, especially towards getting money from employment service…even though we've been providing employment support for the past 5, 6 years, we're still not getting any type of major funding…there are a lot of employment oriented agencies in the Toronto area, and mainly the government would like to continue funding them because they've been doing quite a good job…So, it's not as easy for, let's say an outside agency…to get into the loop (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This civil servants comments on how it in at least some cases have led previously established community actors to establish offices in communities they had no previous attachment to, because the local actor did not have information about funding opportunities. These bigger actors thus supplanted the smaller ones, complicating relations and community attachments considerably:

…the agencies…who'd have been there for whatever number of years and responding to those unmet needs…Never even got wind of the opportunity to be even considered for a funding…And the ones that were here were given…expansion money to go setup shop…over there, because they're already in the system…all they had to do was extend the contract. And now they're all over the place… they have no clue about what's happening in those communities, because they weren't from that community...(Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

This has led to some friction between community actors, where there is a risk that the smaller organizations develop a level of resentment towards the bigger ones. However, respondents from major actors argue that these larger organizations are not as predatory or exploiting as the above seems to assert. Instead, they propose the issue is more related to the skill gaps and sub-optimal organizational infrastructure within the smaller organizations. This respondent explains how part of what drives “the jealousy of the ethno-specific ones” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview) is related to the considerable difference in organizational capacity:
...because of...our length of service, that we...are often the first group approached to do
a new service, because we're not gonna...break the law...an ethno-specific group is still
learning the ropes...and it's not to say some of the bigger ones haven't been caught with
their hands in the cookie jar either...it's just the fear on the funders' part...“20 years, solid
service, highly diversified income stream...6 months, just got your charitable number, you
have one other program...4 staff.” ...it's not a fair competition (Immigrant community
actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Another adds:

Well, this is an interesting debate. I think a lot of smaller organizations are going to shoot
me for saying this, I used to think that [bigger organizations colonize the areas of small
organizations] ...but...the longer I did this job, the more I went out and talked to people,
the more I actually saw what was happening on the ground. Obviously...I've changed, my
thinking has shifted (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The above testimonials illustrate trust issues between different actors depending on size and
‘stage of development’. There also seems to be an element of animosity arising from how the
funder will be more suspicious of the smaller ones because of a perceived greater chance that
they might be opportunists who are trying to exploit the system for short term monetary gains for
itself and the members of a particular family if the organization is family-run. To what extent
this is stereotyping, which it may well be to some extent, and based on experiences that validates
these sentiments from the part of the public actors, is impossible to answer in this study. Using
Cordero-Guzmán’s typology, this would be an example of tension between HTAs and a
metropolitan level organization (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005), consistent with the tensions observed
in Toronto (Sadiq, 2004).

In summary, Swedish immigrant community actors might have strong networks
internally, but at the same time weak bridging networks. Further, judging by the responses, these
actors seem fragmented as they lack connections to each other. That further undermines their
social capital. Also, Canadian respondents talked about how both Individualist and Fatalist management practices had a negative impact on the social capital of the field, but in different ways. In the case of Individualist procurement, the fragmentation is a result of the lack of coordination in an increasingly competitive context. Fatalist practices on the other hand undermine trust and constraint the opportunities for stable networks to develop. The effects are felt both between immigrant community actors and between them and public agencies.

However, Canadian testimonials also show that particularly the larger immigrant community actors had been able to develop entrenched informal cooperation, notwithstanding the pressures from the introduction of competitive Individualist style procurement. These have enabled the larger actors to leverage their social capital to secure funding. The sector has even developed umbrella organizations. The Swedish counterparts seem to have lacked the capacity to develop an organizational infrastructure on this level of sophistication. However, the strength of the large, metropolitan level organizations also seems to have played a role in the development of friction between larger actors and smaller ones. The material, however, does not allow any clear conclusions as to whether these informal networks do obstruct opportunities for smaller actors, or if they are rather distracting focal point for actors that lack significant organizational infrastructure to be able to secure funding appropriately.

**The importance of incubators in Canada**

A final theme invoked by Canadian respondents concerned the importance of building community capacity. Such infrastructure is significant for creating sustainable immigrant community actors, capable of delivering social services, and its absence from the Swedish policy community is therefore as revealing as the absence of umbrella organizations. Some Canadian public funders offered some support to develop this type of institution:
...absolutely, that's really...one of the key underpinnings of the programs, too, is to build capacity of the community. Not so much government, but the community itself to do the certain work that, that's of interest or importance, so...obviously grants can help facilitate that, and, although the grants that each organization receives from the city may be small, compared to other governments, but they are actually very useful in the sense that is does help to legitimize the service and also to help organizations to bring other resources to them (Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview).

The civil servant goes into some detail with regards to the effects of this funding:

...we fund an umbrella group that supports a number of organizations...And also they can support...other non-profit groups to look at how to better set up a board or...volunteer function...Really with the same intent...that they...build the capacity of groups that otherwise would not get that capacity. It could be even...building up the internet, the computer...literacy, or...something quite specialized, that the group is capable of delivering to their membership...(Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview).

An institutionalized and formalized type of organizational incubator could be a key such support structure. It would provide nascent actors with advice and guidance. This can facilitate the development of the competence needed to reach the point where it would have developed the infrastructure needed for operations. Respondents assert that some of the large community actors have acted in such a way, mentoring smaller actors. The United Way was also mentioned as highly significant in this context. This prestigious umbrella organization for NGOs has chapters in municipalities across Canada and engages in fund raising, and the distribution of funds to NGOs (United Way Centraide Canada). Membership in The United Way proved very important for S.U.C.C.E.S.S. gaining legitimacy in the Vancouver policy community sub-government as discussed in Chapter Three (Guo, 2005). This respondent explains how the umbrella organization provides incubator services for its membership: “...it's amazing in the sense that it [United way] has an entire department dedicated to what they call capacity building for organizations that are
members” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Other respondents talked about the umbrella organization in similar terms:

And, if you talk to, if you go back and talk to [organization name 1], [organization name 1] has actually managed to incubate a couple of organizations and they brought them along. It hasn't always worked, and this is the part of the work that [organization name 2] does is to connect organizations that way, and it works sometimes and in many cases it doesn't work for many reasons (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The United Way does other things besides the funding. The funds are important but they also have HR resources, where they can actually provide mentorship support to organizations, so they have other things, but again, they have to scrape out amongst a lot of organizations that need it. They are kind of limited in what they do, but what they do, or what they are able to do is critical (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

These incubators will arguably have some consequence for the development of social capital in the sector. As social nexi, they could act as a meeting place for emergent actors to engage with those that are already established. The latter can then transfer experience to the former. As such, the incubators present a potent example of how the development of social capital connects directly to, and intersects with, the development of cultural capital. Cultural capital could here take the form of both skills and prestige, where the latter is a function of attendance, much like in the case of diplomas from educational institutions. Having accessed the services of the incubators allows the new actors to reference this social platform, which raises their own legitimacy in relation to other actors in the field, as the incubator can then effectively vouch for their veracity.
However, even with such an infrastructure like incubators, there can still be challenges to an organization’s longevity. This respondent was involved with one community group that had some initial successes:

There are other groups like the two that I have worked with that,... formed by a group of immigrant doctors who got some funding…from the Maytree Foundation to get started …the doctor shortage was very high on the government agenda …we had…two dozen…staff…a database of 2500, 2000 immigrant physicians and a lot of data on who they were and where they were in the licensing process…And…we had a fairly high profile over a fairly short period of time (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

However, the group was unable to leverage that initial success into organizational longevity, largely because the government funder took over some of the services the organization had been delivering, and was thus less inclined to fund it:

…once government…took on some of those roles that this advocacy group had taken on in terms of building a database, getting people oriented in the licensure process and providing some basic…services to them. There was less interest from government in funding the group. And of course there was also…the challenge of taking government funding and also doing some intensive advocacy around the government's regulatory policy…and so that group is now back to the entirely volunteer run group, and struggling (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The outcome in this case was less-than-satisfactory. The narrative suggests that the need for incubator services might very well outstrip the existing resources of such institutions. Even so, it seems clear that the group would have had a much more challenging start without that initial support.

Further, it should not be assumed that all Canadian public agencies offer this type of support. Some do not engage in capacity building:
…we don't do community capacity building…but then we have to strike that with the balance of services to potentially new groups that existing services don't exist for…so their strengths are cultural sensitivities so they may not be familiar with Canadian employment…but they may be familiar with the background of the individual because of their linkages to maybe that background or ethnic group…I think from that point of view, the system doesn't enable... there's one thing about contracts and that gives ability to organizations in the long haul, there should be mechanisms to enable development that way” (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

We don't do capacity building…through our information sessions you can sort of learn about what we fund and what we expect, but…we don't go out into the field and pull people together, encourage those little organizations to work with [organization name] or whatever, we don't do that, and that's part of retaining our integrity of our competitor process, we have to present a compelling business case for our funding…(Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

What is interesting in this quote is that the government representative claims that the funding process would risk becoming compromised if the public administration engages actively in outreach and even acts as a facilitator for community actors to network amongst each other. This understanding of the role of the state seems informed by Fatalist thinking, which would frame these community actors as rent-seeking agents aiming to coopt the funding process.

Indeed, this civil servant even goes so far as to claim that the system, as whole, is not particularly conducive to community capacity building, implying that such programs, while key to the incubation of new actors, are still too scarce: “So, I think from that point of view, the system doesn't enable… there's one thing about contracts and that gives ability to organizations in the long haul, there should be mechanisms to enable development that way” (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview). It would seem like at least this public funder is frustrated with the lack of capacity to support potential partners in this way.

In one case, the initiative for at least some facilitation towards capacity building came from a non-government actor, precisely because some other actors were less than interested:
“That's one of the reasons we decided to do this, was to…to find ways that they can increase their capacity by working together, by sharing experiences, by sharing infrastructure, that's of interest to many and to some that was less of interest” (Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). The respondent never elaborated on who those reluctant actors were, or why they were reluctant. However, research indicates that there have been many different networking initiatives to bring together stakeholders on the field. Weiner provides five examples, like Capacity Canada, the newcomer Labor Market Partnership, the Ontario Regulators for Access, and the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council, TRIEC. All these bring together government bodies, community actors and sometimes employers on either a national or regional level for the purpose of coordinating efforts. Most likely, the community actors accessing these would be the larger ones (Weiner, 2008).

In summary, public agencies engaging in the practice of community capacity building and the existence of organizational incubators are an important structural institutional features in the Canadian field. It is a testament to how entrenched the Egalitarian Way has become in Canada. Further, it also speaks to the sophistication of the networks developed between immigrant community actors, and, in turn, to the amount of bridging social capital these have accumulated over time, and how that can be translated into both economic and cultural resources. There are parallels here to how American public agencies actively encouraged the Vietnamese community to develop its organizational infrastructure (Bloemraad, 2005). Even so, the most dependable resource for capacity building seems to be a solution developed within Canadian civil society, provided through the umbrella organization The United Way, rather than through public agencies. Notably, no such equivalent was mentioned by Swedish respondents. In that
policy community, immigrant community actors have to operate without such civil society support, providing a stark contrast between the two countries.

**Conclusions**

This chapter has analyzed the structure of the networks in the policy communities, and the effects of management systems on the accumulation, distribution and forming of social capital. The similarities between the two countries primarily consisted of the negative effects jurisdictional compartmentalization and on the establishment of networks and social capital between the public agencies of different government levels. In the Canadian field, this might not be entirely surprising since the federal system can be expected to have such effects to at least some extent. Interestingly, Sweden is a unitary country, but the effects manifest all the same.

There is a substantial range of differences between the two fields. In the Swedish case, the impact of Hierarchism is palpable. The dominance of the public agencies is strongly emphasized by several respondents. The effects of Hierarchism on the Canadian field seem more residual, emerging in observations of the dynamics of procurement, where the funder has some latitude to re-interpret contract clauses. Thus, even though Hierarchist practices exist in both fields, they are articulated differently and they seem much more prominent in Sweden than Canada.
Together with the Fatalist practices, the civil servants of Sweden have been able to build a relatively closed network structure, illustrated in Figure 13. Here, the public agencies together dominate the policy community Habitus. It mostly includes public agencies of different levels, and maybe some private employers. The policy community sub-government can thus be framed as a social nexus for primarily public agencies, who share the space through strong bonding social capital between civil servants. In that sense, the Habitus includes a mechanism that creates a boundary which separates ‘those who belong’ to the sub-government area from ‘those who do not’, who are confined to the attentive public. One of the respondents invoked this process well: “You're in a paradigm, a thought paradigm. Now, it is public authority-Sweden we're talking about, now…” (National agency, Malmö). The reflection powerfully captures the significance of organizational forms for shaping the perceptions of those immersed in that field. Community actors are marginalized. They lack the capacity to engage in institutionalized collaboration, even
with other community actors, there are no umbrella organizations active in the policy community, and no support through institutionalized incubators. This is problematic, since all these functions are important for entering and becoming entrenched in the policy community. There is thus little evidence of bridging capital here and immigrant community actors have a particularly low amount of social capital. Not even networks between these actors seem very well developed.

**Figure 14: Policy community networks in Canada**

In the Canadian policy community, by contrast, the Egalitarian Way has had significant effects in several ways, captured in Figure 14, above. First, there are entrenched relations between public agencies and immigrant community actors. This includes partnerships, but also important support for community capacity building, institutionalized incubators, and umbrella organizations for the service delivery agencies even though the needs might outstrip the existing resources for this. Moreover, larger immigrant community actors have managed to develop some
cases of entrenched and mutually supporting informal networks that facilitate, and even circumvent, procurement to some extent. Even though these informal agreements might have had negative effects on relations with smaller actors, the evidence does suggest a significant amount of bridging social capital between immigrant communities and between immigrant community actors and public agencies.

That said, there is also evidence of some negative effects on social capital. Two drivers in this context include the Fatalist style rotation of civil servants and Individualist style competition. The first undermines cooperation between immigrant community actors and public agencies, and the second does the same to the relations between immigrant communities. The existence of the United Way as a resource is noteworthy here. That umbrella organization, formed by the civil society, comes across as an important way to circumvent problematic public management practices that impede bottom-up organization. The next chapter goes on to probe the conditions for new actors wanting to access public funding and enter the service delivery field.
Chapter 10: Entering the field – seeking economic capital

Chapters Six and Seven analysed the skill sets of immigrant community actors and public agencies. The respondents showed how immigrant communities tend to be capable of the navigation of the community social space, a skill that the public agencies find more difficult to acquire. On the other hand, the public agencies have the power to define which skills and what jargon matters for acquiring public funding and immigrant community actors have to develop these. Chapter Eight then went on to explore the dynamics of recognition, and how immigrant community actors can acquire this within the policy community Habitus. Here, there were considerable differences between Sweden and Canada, where actors in the former case found greater barriers than their equivalents on the latter field did, reflecting the different organizational legacies of the two countries. The Egalitarian history of the Canadian policy community differentiated it from Sweden’s greater emphasis on Hierarchism. Chapter Nine, in turn, addressed network structures, where Sweden’s were found to be more closed than the Canadian ones. As a consequence, immigrant community actors in Sweden seem to have accumulated a lower amount of social capital than their Canadian counterparts.

Chapter Four discussed how public agencies have an advantage in the policy community by virtue of their regulatory capacity. As creators of ‘the rules of the game’, the cultural capital public agencies develop can influence practises for the entire policy community. Applicants will have to adopt and master the specialized jargon, professional expertise and become deeply familiar with the perspective on society that develops within public agencies to secure funding.

This chapter continues the exploration of the institutional context by asking the question: *What is required for an immigrant community actor to successfully apply for government funding in Canada and Sweden?* It does so by investigating the relationship between immigrant
community actors and government funders. Funding practices and the conditions that the funder imposes on those who want to receive public funding will be deeply intertwined with manifestations of social and cultural capital. As gatekeepers to funding, the public agencies have great power to affect what becomes transformed into cultural capital, for instance the indicators and conditions funders demand to approve funding, but also the language and jargon the funders use.

The chapter explores how immigrant community actors navigate the funding model to acquire government support for their respective organizations. Civil servants and interviewees from non-community actors, i.e. actors that were engaged in publicly funded service delivery, but were not organized from immigrant communities as well as from immigrant community actors (see Chapter One for elaboration) shared their experiences of the funding application process. This provides insights into both the size of funding streams, but equally important into the procedures necessary to apply for them and the conditions required for securing funding over time. Particular attention is given to the barriers an immigrant community actor will likely confront and have to overcome to become an established service deliverer. The material clearly indicates that the opportunity for immigrant community agencies is much more constrained in the Swedish field than in the Canadian one.

The chapter starts by exploring experiences that respondents from immigrant community actors in Sweden had shared about project funding from municipalities and the EU. The study circles discussed in Chapter Three was mentioned by only one actor. For this single organization it clearly stood out as a significant centre-piece of the revenue stream, and since there are so few immigrant community actors in the Swedish field, it is a conceivable pathway to at least some
funding. Even so, the funding levels accessible through project funding stand out as more substantial and those avenues have thus been focused on here.

It then turns to procurement funding, a tool from the Individualist Way management model, which exist in both countries. Respondents in both countries spoke about how the point allocation was insufficient for capturing how skills like cultural competence can be leveraged for service delivery. That reveals how the market is artificially created, with the funding public agency determining conditions and incentives. In doing so, it retains controls over both supply and demand in a way that contradicts the objectives of the Individualist Way. Thus, the reorientation of power dynamics, from top-down to bottom-up, is not fully realized. For immigrant community actors in Sweden, procurement was very inaccessible, and so few respondents could share much about that funding stream. In Canada, by contrast, procurement was the predominant form of funding. The chapter therefore considers the greater wealth of experiences respondents from Canadian immigrant community actor had had of the funding stream, including barriers for success and existing support structures.

**Project-funding in Sweden**

Most immigrant community actors turned to project grants from the either municipal or EU level for funding. Municipal funding is the more accessible avenue, but the economic volume per project is marginal, often equivalent to CAD $ 10 000. EU-funding is much less accessible, but the size of funding for an individual immigrant community actor can be considerable. Further, the fund was originally informed by Egalitarian ideals, focusing on the empowerment of individuals from multi-barri ered target groups, including immigrants. It has thus had particular relevance for immigrant communities, historically (Hellstrom, 2001). The segment starts with the municipal projects and then goes on the EU-funded such.
Municipal projects

Municipal project funding plays some role for immigrant community actors. Odmalm’s case study of Malmö showed how they have been able to apply for such projects successfully on a relatively regular basis. However, one observer noted that the sums available were mostly ‘symbolic’ and “cover nothing” (Green Party candidate qtd in Odmalm, 2004a, p. 478). Respondents in this study corroborated these findings. One respondent mentioned the sum of SEK 100 000, roughly equivalent to about CAD $ 15 000 (Immigrant actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation), which is equivalent to the levels Soysal found in her study of city of Stockholm in 1987 (Soysal, 1994). This is insufficient to finance all the dimensions of a service delivery budget, including office space and employee salaries over any significant period of time.

Any actor relying on this type of funding could try to compensate for this by applying for several different projects. This practice, however, would require devoting substantial effort to applying for new projects, which could become a constant pre-occupation: “There are always new ones. Now we have a new project with [national agency], for example” (Immigrant actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). The limited scope of the funding model thus becomes an issue in itself. One way of coping is to streamline the production of the project applications the organization needs to submit.

We…have worked a great deal with the standardization of how we develop applications and everything else, precisely to not get this, “oh, so what will we do this time?” but rather persistently have a system to follow. And then we have our own application form that we work with that we try to use to the max…Sometimes, there are questions we didn't think about that must be formulated specifically...(Immigrant Community Actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
The method offloads the administrative burden of the many application streams. That allows the organization to devote staff resources to core activities. Herein lies an irony; the organization needs funds to be able to pay for operations, but to able to acquire these, the organization is forced to divert resources away from those same activities to produce applications that will satisfy the public funder.

Moreover, under constant pressure to find new revenue streams, organizations will have an incentive to widen their search to include streams that may not be an immediate fit to the core mission. Doing so requires the organization to provide a clear rationale as to why the applicant is appropriate for the funding, which may not be immediately recognizable. Even so, if the program objectives are too far removed from the organizational goals, seeking the funding could become problematic for other reasons: “That is if you have an idea for an activity that is not in line with the type of project they want. Then you can often find an angle that works, but it's also necessary that it feels sufficiently sustainable for doing an application” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö). A careful rationale for how the organization is a relevant actor could convince the funder that it is eligible. That way, the funding can be used to continue providing services, notwithstanding the funder’s original intent. To some extent, this may even become a way to co-opt the cause of the funder by investing the funder's language with a shifted meaning, thus enabling operations to continue in the face of a funder's reluctance to fund such ventures. However, it is also possible that desperate staff decide to re-interpret the organization’s mission so as to be eligible for available funding, which could either compromise its community mandate or lead to a dead end as the organization either fails at delivering a service it has no competence for or the project activities start drifting in that direction in the process. Eventually, the organizational community mandate could even become compromised.
Municipal projects are thus quite small in terms of funding size. A single one is far from sufficient for social service delivery on any kind of consistent basis. An alternative is to apply for several different ones. However, that can become quite taxing on the organizational infrastructure of the applying actor. It might also lead underfunded organizations to apply for funding that may not fit their mission or vision very well.

**EU-projects**

EU-funding is an alternative that provides funding of more comprehensive scope for service delivery. A respondent uses the example of a project with a turnaround in excess of CAD $ 3 million (National Agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation), which is hardly insignificant. Some such actors have, historically, operated this type of projects successfully (Hellstrom, 2000; Hellstrom, 2001). Even so, a study of the implementation of ESF-projects in Sweden during the late 1990s revealed that the high demands for economic and administrative capacity on project collaborators became a barrier for the participation and project ownership for immigrant community actors (Hellstrom, 2001). This issue re-emerged during the discussions with the respondents involved in this process.

There are several barriers for immigrant community actors to access EU-funds. All of these relate to Hierarchist management practices. These include formal barriers as well as informal methods of control. Each will be described in turn.

**Formal barriers**

Several formal barriers were identified by the respondents. They included prerequisites like the levels of liquidity required to qualify for application in the first place, as well as whether the funding authority only provided partial funding. Also significantly, that public agencies assigned users to the projects was also considered a barrier. Each will be discussed in turn.
First, applicants were required to have a certain level of liquidity. As one respondent noted, “…it's difficult to know your costs, since you get money after the fact. So, that makes budgeting difficult...” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). To overcome these demands, a respondent recommends that immigrant community actors struggling with liquidity partner with some bigger organization, which can act as the project owner: “And then they use each other…so, [non-community NGO], for example…could be used by an immigrant association, for example, as a project owner” (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). While this could, indeed be an ad hoc solution for a fledgling organization, it would mean relinquishing ownership of the project. If the initiative came from the community, that would be a significant loss of potential for empowerment.

Second, the ESF-Council only provides part of the total funds needed for a project, requiring applicants to find substantial co-funding, from at least one more public agency:

…And I can say that on many occasions, the region and the municipality are co-funders for, for instance, EU grants or grants through the [national agency], and for them, it's kind of a precondition that there are other funders to cover, generally speaking, half the costs and then they can consider going in with 25-50 % (Immigrant Community Actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Third, EU-project owners have to rely on public agencies to supply users to the project, primarily the Employment Service, and the supplying agency has to be a project partner: This respondent emphasized how the Employment service had to the partner in their project: “… [The] Employment Service has the participants for the projects.” (Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). The next respondent described the consequences of this recruitment bottleneck:
…We contact the [national agency] but there we can't go directly and find participants, and we'll have to speak with individual case officers and [national agency] offices to distribute information, we can't reach out, we can't go and meet a group of job seekers, it doesn't work like that on the [national agency]…it's a question of integrity (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

In this narrative, the national agency refers to the integrity of the clients to legitimize the retention of control. Certainly, integrity issues should not be taking lightly. However, the effect of this administrative order is to give the public agency another lever of control over the field. This control extends beyond referrals to the actual recruitment process itself, which remains outside the project owner’s jurisdiction. If the public agency denies the applicant, the project will not be approved by the ESF-Council. It could also impact the relationship between the project owner and the users, since the parties have not actively sought out the other. Instead they have to establish a rapport as best as they can after the responsible agency has decided that they should work together.

Moreover, respondents report cases of how the sending public agency would refuse to partner with organizers who include particular practices as part of the methodology, which means that applicants have to be careful with the wording in the application:

January 15, we got a decision from the ESF [national agency distributing EU funds], but it was not until...March 15…we got a decision from the Employment Service where they approve the entire system….All I'm saying is, the Employment Service owns “matching”. And if it would be shown that we are matching, it would be terrible, right? So we had to remove “matching”, we're not allowed to use the word…Maybe we “co-operate with associations”…(Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Notice the emphasis on ‘owns that’ in this quote. The phrasing suggests that the Employment Service apparently will not accept an outside project owner entering onto a domain it considers
its jurisdiction. Together, these conditions give the partnering public agency an effective veto to any project, even though the ESF-Council might have approved its methodology.

Moreover, public agencies, particularly the large ones, tend to be organizations with extensive budgets and a substantial capacity to absorb the operating costs in the initial phases of any project. They also have direct access to users:

…often it’s officers in the integration divisions [who are project managers]... The introduction division finds a problem, and then there'll be an application, and then they pick an officer from the integration division that becomes a project manager…and they sit out among the introduction divisions and have client contact (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

As such, these public agencies are better positioned to submit application without encountering the same barriers. The playing field is thus tilted against immigrant community actors from the start. This might not be coincidence.

**Informal barriers**

Respondents also identified several informal barriers. These were primarily constituted by patterns of behaviour on the part of the public agencies. The EU-projects are publicly funded, and as such constitute part of the public jurisdiction over the settlement process, which has historically been a domain for public agencies. This respondent suggests these actors might not want to surrender control over that policy implementation:

So the question is to what extent the politicians are ready to relinquish the control of the entire settlement process, right? So, what incentives does have to do so? Because it's quite a bit of monies that are given. It's control. It comes with a lot of tax money if you change things and lose direct control (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
A respondent from a community actor makes a similar reading:

…Swedish, professional, project writers, they do not want to share. That's my experience. The network has to be in the way they want. Not we want, all of us. And when we say that, “ok, we also have ideas”, they don't want to collaborate with us. And it has turned out, I think, unfortunately... that they benefit from it, they are employed with high salaries, the target group is us, and nothing happens...and that happens again and again, and I…have been in the voluntary sector for more than 20 years, I'm very fed up with it (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This framing can explain a number of interesting experiences described by the respondents. For example, the following respondent reflects on how a national public agency stole a project idea from an immigrant community actor. The interviewee started by describing the details of that process and how the organization applied for EU-funding for the purpose of building a senior care home in collaboration with others:

And there, the [national agency] …asked, “I don't think you can find 15 persons who can get subsidized employment”. And we found 30 though our radio. And the day after we said that we had found 30 people; “No, we have questions about quality”. Then they took our idea and did it themselves. And it turned out that instead of 15, it was 150…I said: “No, we want to do our project the way we want to do it. We can't train people…you have done our project now. What are we going to do afterwards?” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The respondent then reflected on the experience, finding it curious that the funder approved the application from the public agency when the project idea had originated from an immigrant community actor that had proven itself capable of conducting its service delivery in a competent fashion:

…first they approved it, but [national agency 2], in the last moment said no… it took 6 months for us, we were given a preparatory project from the ESF council [national agency
distributing EU-funds], and we hired two people…the report itself is on our website…And…it was…very professional, and we thought that we will add that this training project, but [national agency] took it for themselves (Immigrant community actor, Malmö author’s interview, author’s translation).

The narrative illustrates how smaller actors are exposed to the arbitrary decision-making power exercised by a national agency. On the one hand, the regulations of the program prohibit the smaller actors from launching a project without the approval of a public agency. On the other hand, if the small actor approaches the same actor to pitch its idea, it can take that idea and implement it in-house, at a larger scale, without the involvement of the community actor, thus keeping the funding under agency control. This is an effective method to keep weaker actors from competing in the same field as the dominant ones.

Together, these obstacles mean that immigrant community actors experience great difficulties when trying to access the EU funding stream. When asked about which specific immigrant community actors were operating the projects, this civil servant had to search through memory to find any. The respondent could recall two, one that had managed an EU-project with a budget of “…at least SEK 25 million [$ 3.6 million CAD]” of funding (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation), and another organization that had been managing a major project in a previous incarnation of the EU-program, but no longer was:

[Immigrant Community Actor 1]…is a good example of an organization that's been able to run really big projects. They are one of the big actors in the social economy here…. That is really the immigrant association…but otherwise I can't really see any big immigrant associations…then there was the [Immigrant Community Actor 2], of course, has also, in the old program…so they, of course, have also been involved….but actually I don't think we've had that many pure, if you want to call it that, immigrant projects….(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).
According to this respondent, only two such actors managed to apply successfully for this type of funding. This suggests that immigrant community actors are uncommon among project owners and seems to confirm the narratives of the respondents from immigrant community actors.

The above seems to corroborate the previously established hypothesis regarding a clear segregation between the immigrant communities and the public agencies, where the former exists outside the established power structures of the policy community Habitus. Likewise, the narratives show how the historical Hierarchical administrative organizational model continues to act as a driver for excluding immigrant community actors from this arena. The public actors benefited economically from monopolizing service delivery and have a strong incentive to maintain the status quo.

In summary, for an immigrant community actor, being active in the social service field can be a challenging task, where multiple barriers have to be overcome in order to achieve some form of longevity for service delivery. Judging by the above accounts, this can be done either through several short-term projects, in parallel or consecutive order. EU-projects come with substantial funding. Getting a proposal approved, however, comes with several serious challenges for an immigrant community actor. Those include the formal demands, like the several layers of possible public agency vetoes, not just from the funding authority itself, but also those that are compulsory partners as inherent to the funding design, and the demands on organizational liquidity. There are also informal barriers, like the competition from public agencies that also want to be project owners and might steal the project ideas from aspiring immigrant community actors that are compelled to seek out partnerships but powerless to stop the public agencies from organizing the project in-house without the involvement of the community actor that originally produced the idea.
Procurement

Both Sweden and Canada have introduced procurement as a significant source of funding for service delivery for immigrant community actors. As this constitutes a contractual relationship to deliver line services, it might remedy some of the problems encountered with project based funding discussed above, like the lack of longevity and multiple public agencies with effective vetoes over applications. This municipal civil servant discusses the scope of contracting for line service delivery:

About 80 % of our SFI [Swedish For Immigrants, equivalent to Swedish as a Second Language] is delivered by others…About 20 % is in-house…when it comes to other programs, it is…really employment preparatory programs, so, what we do at [municipal program], can also be done by other actors with motivational conversations, with CV preparation and seen to it that there are application documents in place…those kinds of programs. Then we have what we call communication raising programs, which are…complementary to SFI (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

A substantial number of services are thus contracted out for delivery by this agency, giving some sense of the scope of this funding stream in Sweden. In Canada, procurement contracts provide substantial funding, varying depending on funder, over several years for those who manage to submit a successful proposal. A municipal program has “…a bit over $ 4 million that we disperse out to the community to about 100 plus non-profit organizations…” (Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview). In one case, the rule was that any programs above $ 500 000 had to be funded through open procurement proposals: “…and this is for an agreement that is more than half a million dollar value, so then you go on open proposal, if your contract is below $500,000 you don't go on call for a proposal” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview). Such sums are sufficient to operate some form of social services.
Further, advocates of NPM would also argue that procurement would open up opportunity structures, based on the assumption that only the best, most meritorious and competent actor would be assigned the contract. This respondent observed some such effect on the field:

When the agreement was signed, the [federal-provincial] immigration agreement, it brought a lot of money to this sector. The other change that happened was that the funder opened up the criteria for funding. Not completely, there was still a lot of restrictions that were difficult, but they did open up a bit…. when they got new organizations, they said fine, they accept applications from anyone, this is the criteria you have to meet. (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This observation corresponds with what would be expected from implementing an Individualist model of governance. The introduction of market-like competition mechanisms should create openings for new actors, provided that they can show how their competence is bringing added value to the field. This is confirmed by civil servants, like this respondent: “So, we just went through that process and we came up with 45 new agencies that are gonna deliver for us these next few years. Some are repeats and some are new…” (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview). The opportunities to access funding from a single funder will, of course, be confined to frequency of the calls for proposal. However, for at least this actor, the number of government agencies on the field seems to result in opportunities for funding applications every year: “…we do proposals every year, and sometimes we do a few proposals for a year just for, yeah, one program even” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview). Having such opportunities would be significant for the entry of new actors. If the funding structure is closed off for long periods of time, the opportunities for new actors to enter the arena will become quite constrained: “But you know, the majority of our projects are in the [region] and there's a finite number of organizations who do…what we fund, so we don't tend to see a lot of new players
popping up” (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview). To get approval, immigrant community actors have to navigate the call for proposals procedure, which has a series of barriers. This section shows how respondents engaged with both the opportunities and barriers previously discussed as they have manifested in the field, starting with an account of the mechanics of the procurement processes. After that, the barriers confronting the immigrant community actors are discussed. The section finishes with some concluding remarks on the potential for immigrant community actors to enter the Canadian policy community sub-government as service deliverers.

The Calls for Proposals process

To enter into a contract relationship with a public funder, an immigrant community actor has to first submit an application during a call for proposal. This Canadian respondent detailed what applicants need to do to submit the proposal: “…anyone who is interested…purchases the RFP [Request For Proposal], because it costs $100…completes the information and submits it on a specific date and a specific time” (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview). Then the respondent went on to describe how the proposal is screened and reviewed by the public funder:

…there is initial screening of base criteria as required…you have to have…your business licenses in place….and if you don't, you're screened out and if you do, you're in…where you're screened in for a review. Then…there's groups of people who review the proposals, independently…and they're scored based on…what the program is that they have to offer, their ability to meet the needs of our clients, their experience, their partnerships that they have with the community and so on…it's quite a long, big, very formal process (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

A respondent from an immigrant community actor describes the same process and what the call for proposal asks the applicant organization to submit:
…there is a huge section...about the competence of the organization, obviously they're looking at your structure...accounting practices...personnel practices...risk management policy is a big one, orientation training of your people is a huge one, certification of your staff is becoming more and more important...there is a huge segment...that you have to demonstrate that...you will be successful in conducting the project...you have to give them ...all your previous projects with them, with other departments, with other ministries (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

A Swedish respondent described the process in similar terms:

We follow the law of public procurement...we have a specification guide with a number of requirements. This you have to achieve, you will have this experience, you will have to be able to start on these terms, you need to able to show references that show you have done this with good results in similar cases before and you have to accept taking groups with this and that many or few participants. That is established in the specifications (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This respondent did not enter into a detailed discussion about what these requirements might consist of. None of the civil servants seemed to know much about how the requirements, and the point system that is used with them, have been designed. That was handled by separate departments. This division of labour has likely been put in place in order to keep the process objective and free from bias towards any applicant.

The barriers immigrant community actors have to navigate to get approval are related to tools inherent to the Individualist Way of management. Respondents from such actors in both countries expressed frustration over the quantitative criteria used by public funders to evaluate the proposals. They felt these were too simplistic to capture the full range of competence that immigrant community actors have. “…they treat us like a vendor, like a hot dog vendor…” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview), a Canadian respondent said. Respondents from service delivery agencies in both countries were concerned with regards to
how the procurement process captures competence, a concern directed at how the evaluation recognized past performance:

One of the things that is not really...taken into consideration, or given as much weight as people think it should be, is your track record in actually delivering programs... and you're, you're rootedness in the communities, because, with this competitive bid, you get these wild swings of some organizations that are very deeply rooted in the community, that have delivered the program for decades, losing the contract. And some, you know, private sector, ambitious, aggressive firm, gets it with nothing (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

So, and this is true in all domains in Canada that, that often funds are allocated based on good proposal writing....or...organizations that are established in an area will tend to keep getting money in that area, regardless of what their results are (Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

These are interesting observations when considering that several Canadian respondents had narratives about how contracts had been terminated because of performance failures and raises the question of to what extent the process screens well. The terms of contracting must thus be further researched, since the assessment system used by the public agencies, particularly with regards to how competence is framed, will have great importance on the accessibility of the funding and, in consequence, the power dynamics of the field. This Swedish respondent explained how the recognition of past performance was displaced by the focus on low price “....it's a pity, really, that we live and fall on the procurement, in spite us of having proper results......but we might not be the cheapest actor to pick...” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). As noted in Chapters Two and Six, a primary competence of immigrant community actors is their ability to leverage their familiarity with the community as a competence for service delivery. If this strength is not recognized by
the evaluation of the proposal, then these actors risk being at a competitive disadvantage compared to others.

That was, however, not the only dimension that goes unrecognized by the evaluation process. This respondent went on to elaborate on how other highly relevant criteria also get ignored to the point of undermining the quality of the service:

…[The focus on] price has been very, enormously straining. And you can tell, the participants who have, also, been going around to these cheap actors. And they think, why are you doing so much at [organization name], the others don't care that much about us......it's so uncertain sometimes. We don't know if we will continue existing... (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The users arriving at this agency have, in short, been accustomed to receiving poor quality service at other agencies. This immigrant community actor thus has to underprice the higher quality services to the public funders in order to remain competitive, a strong indicator that the public funder does not acknowledge quality to the point where the users get subpar service. A civil servant emphasizes that price is, indeed, the principal focus of the evaluation process:

“…they go on a strict price ranking order…Period” (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). The statements are interesting, given that Individualist style procurement is supposed to focus both on cost efficiency and good performance. The question is what effects disregarding performance in favour of price will have on the quality of service.

In Canada, the evaluation process seemed focused on applicants emphasizing their uniqueness to be competitive:

Really flesh out why you're unique. Why your services, again I'm talking about settlement service, why are you unique, why your particular piece is innovative for the particular
group that you want to service…don't duplicate, you don't want to create…a two-tier system of employment services…but it's really that bridging piece, it's that enhancement piece, and if you can bring something to the table in that area, that needs to come through in the application (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

This criterion, driven by the wish to avoid service duplication described by the respondent, is a source of frustration to the immigrant community actors:

What's frustrating for us, from our perspective is that there's always a huge part in every proposal about "how is this different from everything else" and "how is this not duplication of services" and then there's an announcement where they funded [organization] for an IT-program and they funded us. So, it's frustrating that way (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The underlying assumption might be that duplication creates inefficiencies in public funding streams. On the one hand, this creates a lot of pressure for the service deliverer, depending on the definition of ‘unique’. Respondents did not discuss the potential effects on applications, but the regulation does create an incentive to frame activities as highly innovative, regardless of the actual practices involved, and might actually lead to a disconnect between the rhetoric of the proposal and the activities on the field. On the other hand, it does create space for new actors to enter the arena as innovators. If the funder was content with all agencies working with the same methods, there would be little reason to consider new actors or competencies, as this civil servant discusses: “…if it's to be the concept of a new group that's created itself because they see a gap in services to that particular community” (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview). New actors can identify needs that may have gone unnoticed by other actors that may lack the tools needed for outreach in those communities.

Moreover, respondents from Canadian immigrant community actors were generally less critical of the process than their Swedish counterparts. When asked if they felt that the demands
from the funding public agencies were relevant to professional service delivery, this respondent answered affirmatively:

…yes, the segment they have there is relevant…And, now this process is more objective…and it came probably last years, only when they started applying a point system…you get points for each and every segment…and they are important things…everything from…how you plan on doing the project, and what are your objectives and your activities… your results, your master chart, how you're gonna measure, how you're gonna change things if it's not working…(Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

The respondent also emphasized how the points system was not only relevant but also constituted an opportunity for new actors in the policy community:

…and if you've done it before and then if you've been successful you're getting extra points for that, but it can be that you never done the project and you are a brand-new player but if you do a great proposal you'll still be able to get the funding, probably, if you get enough points and scores. And you can be a fresh new player (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

While the response does not engage in the details of how points are assigned to different scores, the system is not rejected outright. Instead, the respondent seems to consider it valid in terms of how it captures relevant competence. Swedish respondents did not share any such positive experience.

Importantly, the above examples show how the priorities and perspectives of service delivery are driven and formulated by the public administration in both countries. These form the incentive structure for other service delivery agencies who want to remain competitive. If the contracted actors are discouraged from ‘caring’ for the users, or building a trust-based relationship, they will act accordingly. The top-down dynamic is therefore maintained in this
process. That is contradictory to the bottom-up dynamic that is the goal of the Individualist management style. Hence, procurement in itself does not guarantee that paradigmatic switch or user empowerment.

This also gives reason to ask which actors the process is geared towards. Respondents from Swedish public agencies came across as having an ambivalent attitude towards engaging in service delivery relationships with non-profit organizations in general:

It's a fairly big jungle, really. Which has a lot money in associational grants…that's within our administration here…and…there we touch upon going against the law of public procurement…services that are similar…there is a weakness in that, and then the ideal is that it's run by champions, that it's run by people that want something more than just the economic gain...so it gets a little competition there and…how do we really handle this? (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The perspective is consistent with the findings about civil servant attitudes toward community actors in Chapter Eight. It seems like non-profits do not quite fit into any of the delivery systems well. On the one hand, they commonly apply for grants, which are too small in scope to sustain services. However, if they enter the procurement arena to try to gain a more stable economic basis, the grants become a problem, because they will be seen as skewing the competition. This implies that procurement has not been introduced with non-profit organizations in mind.

This civil servant, in contrast, describes procurement as a good way to solve the difficulties that have been impeding cooperation between municipalities in the region:

So, it concerns SFI [Swedish as a Second Language], that's the part that has worked best, and regionalized during the time I've been working with this…if you specialize the SFI, you get a better results…to get the volumes you need all municipalities in the county to be able to buy this SFI service…Send your client there, and you…pay (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).
Instead of having each municipality trying to organize and deliver its own Swedish language courses for settling newcomers, regardless of their financial capacity, they buy courses from each other. That allows one municipality to deliver profiled services focusing on a single professional group and still achieve the critical mass of students needed to make the service financially viable. The application criteria seem to be designed more to satisfy the needs of these municipalities, rather than to create an open playing field for actors from several different social spheres. Thus, the competence or needs of actors outside the policy community sub-government are not taken into consideration.

This seems also to have become the perception. Hence, respondents speak of immigrant community actors as few and far between on the arena. Indeed, the following respondent is under the impression that there is only one immigrant community organization that has successfully entered the field of procurement:

On the ground, immigrant organizations, I think it's only the [organization], who have gotten all the way from grants and labour market integration and to procurement. We are alone. Unfortunately. That's how it is (Immigrant Community Actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

While this proved to be incorrect – one more respondent had successfully engaged in contracting on at least some occasions – the quote is still revealing, expressing just how uncommon such success is. This was corroborated by civil servants from both municipal and national levels. This respondent summarized the situation succinctly: “…so there's five big actors, and it's the entire range they offer, all three study routes, and everything in that way” (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). A respondent from a national agency elaborated, giving more detail first about which actors the national agency contracted:
With newcomers…[it] is primarily big educational companies. With newcomers and at the [national agency] side are only four complimentary actors, [Company name], it's a major education company, [Company name], major education company, [Company name], major education company, and [Company name], which comes from England, which has also experience from Australia or New Zealand, but started with its operations here in Sweden. We have four complementary actors who we work with concerning newcomers (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The respondent then went on to talk about actors contracted by a municipal funder:

[Municipal program], [Municipal program] also has…external, they're called external providers. They have six or eight external providers. They are also major educational companies. And, moreover, they have internal providers, that means it's operations within the municipality which has municipal governance or it's owned by the [municipality]. But that's it, there are no other applicant categories, for instance [non-community NGO name], [non-community NGO name], but not with newcomers (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

These statements are quite revealing with regards what type of actors dominating the field. New actors would have to compete with one of these dominant ones to enter. They also imply something about the marginal position of immigrant actors in the field, who seem to be too weak to fulfill the requirements for contracting in their own right. This corroborates the findings from Chapter Five that the field has not changed much in terms of which actors are present.

It could also provide a partial explanation for the emphasis on easily quantifiable criteria for assessment, like price. Maybe the designers of the criteria a) lack insight into the technicalities of service delivery, or b) lack tools for quantifying key components of service delivery without being framed as ‘subjective’? Regardless of what the case might be, the testimonials reveal a concern over indicators being insufficient for capturing high quality service delivery. At the same time, they create a barrier for entry for actors who are unfamiliar with the
public agency jargon of the day, which is more likely to be those outside the policy community sub-government.

Procurement might be the most stable form of funding in the Swedish context. However, it is also inaccessible for immigrant community actors, as demonstrated by the very low success rate suggested by the respondents. Barriers include the onerous accountability procedures and the assessment criteria that seem unable to capture the full competency of immigrant community actors and the lack of dialogue with the public agencies that develop these criteria.

These barriers relate to the mechanisms used for procurement, which rests on the dynamics and cost-efficiencies expected from market-like competition, values associated with the Individualist model. What is interesting here, however, is that these particular tools might not accomplish the goals of the Individualist Way. The model aims to create incentive structures that will promote positive service outcomes and assign problem ownership to the actors with the greatest interest of solving the problem. Neither seems to be achieved here. The incentive structure that has been created here serves only to achieve low costs for the public administration and does not seem to capture the proficiencies that are needed for positive service outcomes.

Moreover, a strong argument can be that immigrant community actors are the ones with the strongest incentive to solve the social problems confronting immigrants, given their community mandate. However, the dominant actors are instead major educational companies, with immigrant community actors being largely marginalized. The key component here seems to be the procurement evaluation criteria, which are designed by civil servants, and thus limited by their capacity to recognize competence and problem ownership in the social arena. If these key gatekeepers do not engage with key stakeholders, the evaluation criteria might being designed will be without consideration for what matters for many community actors.
In contrast, the Canadian procurement of labour market integration services is generally geared towards non-profit organizations. This civil servant from a provincial funder, for example, explicitly stated that the procurement procedure was geared towards these actors: “we have to fund not-for-profit organizations” (provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview). A respondent within the sector confirmed that many of the contract winners are civil society actors:

Actually, most of them are non-profit, but of course, there is still...like [for profit company name], I think that's for-profit, but then...they have one contract from the government as well. So, actually, it varies...(Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

We fund a mixture of community based agencies, so [organization names], the big ones we tend to fund. Also a lot of colleges and universities. So we're already funding the broader public sector or publically funded organizations...we're a little bit of a hybrid of some NGOs and a lot of, of post-secondary educations institutions, we also fund (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

The contrast here is sharp. In Sweden, procurement is a tool used for either trading services between public agencies, or soliciting services from major for-profit companies. In Canada, the process is geared specifically to non-profit agencies, providing openings for immigrant community actors there that their Swedish counterparts do not have.

This is not to suggest that new actors on the Canadian field can enter it easily. This municipal civil servant was less than enthusiastic about the prospects for new actors:

Good luck. I'm being very serious. They have to do it. In order to access funding to support that service, it's going to be very difficult for them. It's almost impossible...in our system that's accessible every five years they have an opportunity to access funding by submitting a quality proposal. A proposal, I would not say quality, quality is judgemental, but eventually, have enough quality and depth in it; it could very well be there (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).
The respondent here is clearly cynical about the chances for these actors to enter the field. While procurement might have opened up chances somewhat in comparison to the past opportunity structure, it should not be assumed to have created an equal playing field. Moreover, the potential to enter is only available during the brief window when the call for proposal is available. After that, it closes again.

The procurement procedures in the two countries have a number of similarities. In both cases, they rely on a series of quantified indicators to assess the veracity of the application. While the material does not make it possible to comment on the exact process here, respondents had reservations about some aspects of it; especially to what extent it captured the competence of immigrant community actors in Sweden and the capacity to capture past performance in Canada.

**Canadian experiences**

As procurement was the only significant steady funding stream for service delivery agencies in Canada, at least immigrant community actors had been able to succeed in accessing this funding, the dynamics in the Canadian policy community differed from the Swedish one. The Canadian immigrant community actors can access funding in the scale of millions of dollars through procurement. They do not have to compete with public agencies when applying for funding, and the system itself is geared towards non-profits. They also have access to support services that facilitate access to information about funding opportunities. Even so, the Canadian playing field cannot be called level, as new actors face considerable barriers. Further, the copious amount of documentation required for a proposal, inspired by Fatalist values, is also a considerable barrier for Canadian immigrant community actors. Moreover, even success has brought new challenges, in the form of tensions between large and small immigrant community actors. As such, a series
of themes emerged from these interviews in Canada that had no equivalent among Swedish interviewees. The following explores those.

**Competition between small and large organizations**

While procurement has opened up some opportunities for smaller organizations in Canada, it has also introduced an atmosphere of competition to the sector. When a call for proposal is launched, all the actors in the field go into preparation mode. Several respondents engaged with that, like this one “…so, when you going to call for proposal, and everybody else is bidding on that…everybody's bidding...” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview). Also this respondent from Toronto: “But we do tend to go after the same money. So we're serving the same clients, but in a very different way. So the client has more choice, I guess” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Added another reflecting on the situation: “But, I think you can't get away from the fact that there is tremendous tension in the sector from the organizations that are not funded, between them and the organisations that are funded” (Immigrant community actors, Toronto, author’s interview). These actors are turned into business rivals during the call for proposals, which undermines inter-agency cooperation, at least for that period, as was noted in Chapter Nine. Competition is thus experienced as detrimental to both the individual organization and the sector as a whole.

For the users, this may be problematic because it can create a quite confusing field of service deliverers, making it difficult to choose the best provider:

…we're representing clients and we're seeing it's hard for clients, they're getting confused and they're lost, and, yes, there is a lot of duplication of services, so even for referral purposes, you have to know it all, but can you know it all when there are so many and so much, constant change and all that…(Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).
The comment is interesting. It highlights the resulting confusion for the service users, which must be managed in some fashion. The goal, after all, of Individualist competition is to empower users to ‘vote with their feet’ and choose their service delivery agency. That, however, depends on the user being sufficiently informed to choose competently between these agencies, which, itself, builds on the assumption that the user is empowered to some extent as a point of departure, but that might not always be the case. A newcomer might very well lack the skills necessary to navigate the service delivery field, and thus need some introductory support to be able to make informed choices.

**A Two Tiered Structure**

Further, several respondents asserted that the atmosphere of competition created a potential for rivalry between smaller and greater immigrant community actors. This respondent described how efforts had to be taken to diffuse these tensions by deliberately reaching out to the smaller organizations when networking.

We formed a coalition of…different immigrant professional groups…the kind of criteria we set when the group was forming was that it would only be immigrant professional groups and that the only representation from service agencies was…the umbrella agency. Because otherwise, inevitably it happens that service agencies…that have…paid staff, want to have meetings during the day and that they become the spokespeople, and so we didn't want to…(Non-community NGO, Toronto, author’s interview).

The respondent here perceives the larger service delivery organizations as more privileged and prestigious, and shows steps had to be taken to remain inclusive to a wider field of actors when arranging a meeting.

This differentiation between larger and smaller organizations was a continuous theme in responder comments, generally corroborating Sadiq’s findings from a study of Toronto (Sadiq,
2004) discussed in Chapter Three. He found a two-tiered structure, where the first tier is constituted by larger, multi-service organizations contracting directly with the public funders. Those immigrant community actors that win contracts tend to be in the largest category, with a metropolitan scope of service delivery (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). The second tier is made up of smaller, often ethno-specific, organizations, corresponding more closely to what Cordero-Guzmán labels Hometown Associations, or HTAs. Sadiq argued that they lack the capacity to prepare applications and proposals and thus are unable to compete for procurement contracts. Instead, they can sub-contract with the organizations in the first-tier to access streams of public funding (Sadiq, 2004). The phenomenon when larger organizations crowd out smaller ones has been called ‘empire building’ (Stasiulis, Hughes, & Amery, 2011).

Using this differentiation to categorize the actors of the field was common among Canadian civil servants, who continuously invoked it. They tended to divide the immigrant community actors of the policy community into two these different size-based groups, where the smallest groups were mostly described as, or assumed to be, ethno-specific:

....so you start with an agency that is ethno-specific…and they focus on the needs of a particular group …and they can respond well to that, and often funders will go to them for support, because there is no one else who maybe is culturally sensitive to the needs, or could really be a bridge in terms of Canadians’ understanding what some of the needs of this group might be…but they may not be linked into mainstream or other networks and have social capital actually to bring that group to a different level...(Federal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

Respondents remained consistent with Cordero-Guzmán’s typology when describing the larger organizations as multi-service and multi-ethnic organizations, providing a range of different services to newcomers from many different ethnic communities (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005).
Notably, this civil servant echoed others in expressing a preference for contracting with the larger type of organization, also consistent with Sadiq’s findings:

I don't know...the nature of the organizations that we deal with...they're the key government funded employment deliverers who have the mandate and the capacity to deliver employment services to all newcomers. They're at that third stage of evolution...I don't have any experience in dealing with ethno-specific or ethnic based organizations (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

This choice could reflect the demands for structural sophistication, and a historical relationship, meaning that the requirements are too demanding for small organizations. They might not even be seen as legitimate cooperation partners by virtue of their smaller size and more niched operation. If so, then there might be an assumption that big organization equals more competent organization, which may or may not be true.

To navigate these obstacles, civil servants recommended that newer actors partner with a larger, more experienced, organization to enter the field. This respondent put it thusly: “To become partner, that's one way, to not be the lead, not be the funder recipient, but partner with a bigger organization, deliver a component of a program, but not the whole program, not manage it” (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview). The following two interviewees expressed themselves similarly:

...So, positive experiences, that kind of stuff, collaborating, partnering with people already with the expertise I think is often a better way to go than to try without capacity to be competing...because often it doesn't work (Federal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

Connect with the current service providers, assess the current service providers and determine what it is they're doing right, where're the areas...where the need is...the bottom line is...we have lots of services, and we pretty well can meet most of the needs,
but there may be some new, emerging needs and...some additional types of services and supports that are required, so why not go there and develop and deliver something that is meeting a need that is not currently being met, versus providing the same old, same old (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

However, the following respondent asserts that some of those major service delivery agencies that have managed to secure contracts with the public agency funders are not necessarily well connected with immigrant communities. Indeed, this is rationale for why they engage in sub-contracting; they need to do so in order to gain access to communities and users they find difficult to reach:

...they don't necessarily partner with the longstanding agencies...it's not an equal playing field...sometimes...they feel like they're used. And they may be being used. People with funding, who are supposed to serve immigrants, don't have access to them because they don't know how to reach them, so they go to agencies and...they are trying to pay for a partner...and pay for the service so they can build capacity, and that then balances the two, but sometimes that doesn't happen. A lot of them are volunteer run, so it's difficult (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

The statement speaks to the different social spaces these actors inhabit and to some frictions between big, mainstream actors and small community actors. There seems to be some trust issues here, and probably not without reason. There is a potential that the competence these smaller actors have in doing outreach becomes obscured by the major actors that have the administrative infrastructure for producing strong and competitive bids during the calls for proposal. In that sense, there seems to be a risk that the smaller organizations are being exploited for their connections by the larger ones.

Still, there were immigrant community actors also among the larger actors, and some respondents from these confirmed that their organizations did engage in sub-contracting to some extent, as Sadiq’s findings would predict. Notably, they did not do so without reservations:
...there will be some instances...we'll do a portion of this is very specific and it's a key strength of someone else...it's much less prevalent now than it were, you work in partnership with a local [ethnic] agency...and the funders have really made that much harder to do....I mean, you can do it on a day-to-day basis, but if you actually look at contracts and...people getting money, it's much harder...(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

...sometimes we do...and that is more...on a partnership basis...we have a partner called [organization acronym]...who would do a specific portion of the program, so we would outsource that piece to them, but it is not as if we had been awarded the contract, and then subcontract [afterwards]. We don't do it that way...In our proposal...the government is already aware from the design of the project, that [organization acronym] would be a partner....that's the only way we do the subcontracting (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This respondent expressed skepticism, and seemed very reluctant to engage in the practice, because the “…experience of providing subcontractors is not very positive. So, there are lots of issues, lots of issues” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview). The next respondent rejected the notion outright, and would avoid sub-contracting if the funder did not demand it:

We don't contract out our service to other ISAs. We just do it, whenever we get a funding, we will try to...hire staff. But sometimes the funding depends, the funding might be in a coalition with other agencies, so we will...go together (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

For at least one organization, the reluctance was related to the funder having made it more difficult over time:

It's been gradual, over the last 10-12 years...I think it's probably mainly the result of audits. People have said, “whoa, there's not nearly enough fiscal control here, or you have divided responsibilities, it's not clear at the end of the day whose accountable for the
money”…a larger organization will have procurement policies and human rights policies. A small group, you know, that's not there right at the top of their agenda (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The tendency to give preference to the larger actors creates a problem since these smaller, neighbourhood based community actors might have a great deal of insight into local service needs, but are too small to provide comprehensive services. However, the practices prevent public agencies from providing that support.

The preferential treatment of the larger organizations has consequences for the potential success of new actors trying to enter the field, but there are still successful examples. Several of the larger community actors with metropolitan scope outreach started as Hometown Associations. These respondents provide examples of the original size of the organizations they represented:

How small? You can imagine! Smaller than that room. Not even one quarter of that room. ...At that time we only...had one desk, and...two or three staff...They told me that they had to share the desk at first, and sometimes they had to squeeze to get into their space. They may hit each other when going through, so that small (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

I believe they, the original group, they rented an office space just across the street and I remember my previous ED told me that when they first started they had to bring in their own stationaries, they didn't have anything, they had to rent the office space and bring in...all their equipment, like pencils. So, it was kind of tough…. (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

These narratives indicate that it has been possible for an immigrant community actor to go from the small HTA to the metropolitan level organizational size on this arena, notwithstanding the challenges involved. At least, that has been the case historically. It remains to be seen if the policy changes of the past decade has made that growth potential greater or smaller.
While the two tiered structure remained a strong theme among respondents, at least one interviewee, in a position with a good overview of the sector, interestingly argued that the entrenchment of this structure might have been exaggerated by some:

...so the perception that large organizations are coming to take over....I wouldn't say it's wrong, but I would question where you're coming from...the larger organizations...they have a responsibility...how they negotiate their relationships in those communities that they enter now for the first time. And it happens in some cases, in many cases it doesn't...it's a learning process for everyone. But I think the perception has been around for a long time, in some cases it's fully justified, in some cases it's not, it's ridiculous (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Overall, the implementation of Individualist-style methods has had mixed effects for immigrant community actors. On the one hand, it has created a more open opportunity structure in the field and several respondents, from different perspectives of the arena, seem to agree that this has been beneficial to new actors. On the other hand, the specifics of the procurement process are a source of contention. Some argue that specifications required are relevant for capturing the competencies needed for successful service delivery, while others think that the connection to the community is undervalued.

Further, the competition seems to create tension between immigrant community actors, with rivalry and potential conflict as a consequence, which could be damaging for attempts at cooperation. Finally, while service users are expected to be able to choose service providers, it is possible that newcomers will suffer from information overload if there are too many actors on the arena, at least initially. All of these effects have been identified as potential weaknesses of the Individualist Way, so it should not be too surprising to see these particular phenomena manifest in a policy community built on such an organizational model.
These effects are potentially mitigated somewhat by the collaborative Egalitarian approach taken by public agencies in the collection of feedback on performance indicators. This institutionalized dialogue has, at least, the effect of recognizing the service delivers as competent to some extent. Even so, it is difficult to ascertain just how influential the immigrant community actors are. The material suggests some influence, but further research is needed to determine under what conditions the feedback has substantial sway over government actions, and when it is ignored for some reason.

**Onerous Accountability Procedures**

Another significant barrier Canadian respondents spoke about was related to onerous accountability procedures. They were quite unanimous with regards to the barrier constituted by the administrative burden associated with the call for proposals. Many respondents from immigrant community agencies expressed particular concern about the size of the application. It comes across as one of the most significant issues in the interviews:

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It used to be extremely thick and… they also figured out that that was rather…nonsense…because we were killing ourselves with huge documents…there was no limit on the document, you could've given whatever you wanted…hundreds of pages. But then, the last couple of years they changed, and they're limiting us to, let's say 20 or 25 pages, there's been a time when you were able to have as many attachments as you want, now even that is becoming more limited…(Immigrant Community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).
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This is the proposal we submitted, it's actually done by the main contractor, which is [owner name], and we're a subcontractor. So this is kind of document you're expected to produce...the entire thing. It's very labour intensive…260 pages…(Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).
However, its scope will vary by public agency. This respondent became surprised in a positive way when encountering the requirements for a provincial program, after being used to federal contracts that were about thirty to forty pages long:

…I was just blown away when I saw my first [provincial program], because it's…it's 4 pages long, one of which is your budget…So…that was a shock, and that change in orientation now, again….certainly under [provincial program], as long as I know it's existence, it's been a performance management system, so they're after continuous improvement and results (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Other funding demands focus on what actions an organization is allowed to do within the program:

Funders never wanted us to get a relationship with employers…they were kind of, “ok, your programs are to teach people, train them how to look for jobs, not to find them jobs…and…and if you're not there to solicit jobs, then why would you be developing…relationships? You have to know who is hiring, you have to know how they are hiring, you have to know what are the recruitment practices, yes, but not to have a direct connection or relationship with them, ok?” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

Such demands are hardly surprising on one level; these are social programs, funded for a particular purpose, and funders do need a delineation of which activities could be fundable and which could not. Even so, there is a balance to strike, and in both the case of the size of the proposal and the conditions on activities, too much micro-management will risk becoming a constraint on the flexibility of the operations to the extent that outcomes might very well be undermined.

These accountability tools increase the administrative work load of immigrant community actors. They also disrupt the potential to build long term relation based on trust
between funder and service delivery agency. The signalling of the onerous administrative load is that service deliverers cannot be trusted entirely, and the short lead up time before a call for proposal are disruptive for all agencies, but are more challenging for the smaller immigrant community actors to overcome.

**The Role of Support Structures**

The institutionalized organizational incubators have already been noted in Chapter Nine. They relate to the legacy of Egalitarian style management on the Canadian field. They are also significant for new actors seeking to enter the field, ameliorating some of the barriers produced by other management tools. Respondents reported how these institutionalized practices, both within the NGO sphere and within the public agencies, acted as conduits for channeling information to members and building networks between community agencies:

Multiple [information sessions]…in person, teleconference…e-mail…we had about ten this year, and…a lot of organizations participate, and…some don't, and often those are the ones that apply every year and perhaps aren't successful. But…often we’ll see one applicant apply one year, not be successful but get feedback and really learn from that and then you'll see a much more robust body of research…to support what they want to do. So…they may come back and present a much stronger case…. (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

The difficulty lies in reaching out with this information to the entire field, because, as this respondent says, many actors are so small that they even lack the resources to access information about information providing networks:

…there are organizations…that actually don't have the capacity for professional development…even if you do offer them opportunities they are often surprised when you tell them, “well, yes, this is there for you and it's free”. They don't know about it, and even if they do know about it they may not have the time to access the opportunity…and this is…an ongoing struggle…for us…and for…emerging groups…if you’re going by a
listing of employment services, you're not getting the whole picture (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

An immigrant community actor that wants to access public funding thus needs to be able to access the procurement process and produce an application. Information about these two components is therefore of key importance. Concern about information sharing led a city of Vancouver Mayor’s Task Force on Immigration to recommend improving connections between the local government and immigrants, and responding to this, the city hosted a conference to “encourage local employers to better value the skills and pre-migration work experience of immigrants” (Hiebert, 2009, p. 14). One respondent describes the efforts undertaken to answer this particular need. The respondent starts by describing the preparations taken in relation to a set of new funding rules:

…we…have tried our best to educate…about the opportunities, encourage them to go out and apply…Many did, many did not…And these guys, I think, have no excuse…it took a long time to actually implement the agreement…From the day the agreement was signed, [organization name] has been telling these members agencies what it means…take advantage of opportunities…so I think had at least 2 years notice that…there was more money, you could…do things you always wanted to do (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The respondent then goes on to discuss the experiences within the sector when the new agreement took effect:

…I was swamped with phone calls from member agencies saying, “Oh, they're asking for this, what do we do?” And the questions they were asking were: “do we do a needs-assessment? How?” [My reaction was] “…how are you serving your community if you don't know what the needs are…This is the height of your responsibility”…this was a frustrating experience with the leadership essentially of these organizations calling us [with the attitude]…”…the government has changed the rules and how dare they?” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).
Even so, some organizations were successful, but even that came with challenges:

And then there were other organizations that were better prepared, that were visionary, that actually went out...lost sleep, did the work they had to do to put something together and successfully got the money. A lot of our member organizations were...expanded like that. And of course, they had their own difficulties with sudden expansion, with staff...(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Finally, this respondent summarized why some of the immigrant community actors in this case failed to leverage the newly opened up opportunity structure:

… not the whole story by any means, [but] part of it was because they simply...did not take advantage of the opportunity...We created opportunities where they could talk to their peers in confidence...exchange information...two of the organizations that were very successful in applying for funding said “we will share our application with you, everything...we'll walk you through this”...you cannot say “I didn't know what to do”. The resources are there and you didn't take advantage, there's no excuse for that (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This narrative reveals the difficulties of information sharing. Simply making the information available is not sufficient. It has to be made available in such a way that new actors wanting to enter the field can digest it. The capacity to do so, in turn, depend greatly on the organizational infrastructure and the knowledge that actor can leverage to fully understand the information presented. For actors that lack these, it will be difficult to implement action based on the available information. Thus, to be able to absorb the information, the actors need to develop the relevant cultural capital. Judging by this account, that development can be highly resource intensive and available resources might not be sufficient.
The structures that have been created in correspondence with the Egalitarian style management model thus aim to share and distribute information to prospective procurement applicants on the field. This functionality has significance, since information cannot be assumed to be reaching all relevant parties without such an infrastructure. The existence of these is therefore a boon for those who aspire to enter service delivery. However, it is also possible that the institutions in place lack the resources to meet the needs. In the words of one interviewee:

…we send information to a wide variety of community organizations, and private organizations, anyone who has contacted us between the period of time between the last one and the current one, plus organizations that we think may be interested doing business with us, plus we post it on the [municipality] website for anybody to see (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

The replies show that at least some public agencies have made attempts to do outreach to immigrant community actors, consistent with the findings in Chapter Eight where Canadian civil servants tended to describe these actors as experts on their own communities.

In summary, some of the barriers immigrant community actors have to navigate when trying to enter the Canadian field can be tied to emphasis in the Individualist Way, like the questions surrounding how the proposal specifications capture community competence, or the rivalry between agencies during the calls for proposals. Moreover, the respondents’ replies also indicate a significant component of Fatalist style management, particularly related to the seeming ad hoc fashion in which calls for proposals are introduced, and the considerable administrative burdens associated with producing the proposal. The combined effect of the Individualist and Fatalist components is to undermine cooperation between the players in the field, at least when a call for proposal is posted, but also to fuel mistrust between these actors. The question is to what
extent the Egalitarian style support structures can offset these barriers. To a certain extent they can, but not completely, it would seem.

Entering the Canadian field can thus be challenging, yet it is not impossible to do. As described in Chapter Three, Guo studied of the development of S.U.C.C.E.S.S., in Vancouver. It was founded in 1973, with only four full-time employed social workers operating on a yearly budget of less than $100 000 out of a small office of 300-square foot. 25 years later, it had more than 200 employees and a budget of $8 million with multiple offices all over the metropolitan area, including a central headquarter building of 26 000 square feet. It provides language services, workshops, citizenship classes and pre-employment training (Guo, 2006). The example is representative of the narratives produced in this study.

The primary barriers identified here can be attributed to three different management models – the Individualist, Hierarchist and Fatalist Ways. The first primarily through the difficulties involved with designing valid and reliable performance measures that capture the complexities of the social processes in question, which plagues both the procurement process itself and the tracking mechanism that comes with fulfilling a contract afterwards. Part of the problem here is the challenge involved with quantifying the inherently qualitative. However, Canada’s Egalitarian tradition does come across as an opportunity here for the immigrant community actors to have at least some impact on how these are designed. That should not be underestimated.

Another effect of the Individualist Way is the competition that ensues when calls for proposals are posted. The responses mainly reflect a concern over how it impedes collaboration within the sector. Moreover, there is some concern that the sheer number of actors can become
overbearing for service users, who have to digest a great deal of information in order to be able to orient in the field if they are to be able to make empowered choices.

Fatalism primarily manifests through the onerous accountability measures. These place a heavy administrative burden on the service deliverers, but, ironically enough, also on the public agencies that supervise them. Indeed, it can even be asked to what extent they are able to follow up on all the material they collect during either the call for proposals or following a contract. Likewise, it also has to be asked to what extent these measures prevent freeriding, or even how great the risk of freeriding would be in the first place. As it stands, respondents are quite clear that the efforts devoted to satisfy funder demands on accountability affect operations negatively.

Finally, Hierarchism is also present. Before approval, it is a factor since the funder can make demands on which clients an organization has to serve to be eligible for funding. After approval, it comes across through the compartmentalization of government departments, which determines to what bodies the accountability regime should be submitted. That organizations need the supplemental funding from the United Way is an alarming indicator of the challenges created by the funding regime.

It is thus possible for a small HTA to establish itself as a social service agency, which over time can achieve metropolitan scope, if it can successfully manage the above barriers. The field has several such organizations which have done so successfully, and kept delivering social services for, in some cases, decades. As such, these actors cannot be characterized as marginalized on the arena, even though they certainly have to cope with many challenges that impede service delivery in different ways.
Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has presented a comparison of the economic conditions on the Canadian and Swedish fields. It has done so by probing what challenges an immigrant community actor that wants to enter and remain on the arena will have to confront and manage, as expressed by the interviewees. First, the chapter discussed the available funding streams in Sweden, and the barriers that persist after acquiring public funding. It then presented a similar account for the Canadian field.

Both similarities and differences were identified in Sweden and Canada and these will be revisited here, along with some concluding remarks and some words on questions for future research. The two fields share some Individualist and Hierarchist tools. The Individualist Way is primarily represented in both fields by the adoption of procurement as a funding mechanism for service delivery. This funding mechanism also shares some significant attributes. For example, respondents spoke similarly about how the point allocation might be insufficient for capturing the relevant competencies on the field, particularly how the internationalization of the community Habitus can be leverage as competence for service delivery.

Notably, this market is artificially created to a large extent. It is the funding public agency that sets the terms and creates the incentives that will prevail. It has many levers to do so: the points system where it decides which competencies are to be recognized, and which are to be ignored, the performance indicators that guide the funding streams, which clients are to be served and the time frame of the contract. In short, the government retains controls over both supply and demand. Interestingly, that is, in many ways, contradictory with what the Individualist Way was supposed to achieve – a reorientation of the power dynamics, from top-down to bottom-up, giving users and service producers primacy on the arena. While service producers arguably have
some more say in the design of the service, and some more flexibility in how to meet user needs than if, say, they were consigned to just filling politically mandated quotas, this is but one step away from the previous top-down order. The users remain largely disenfranchised, insofar as their voices still having limited impact on service delivery.

Another interesting similarity that is also related to the funding system concerns the levels of funding involved. In the Swedish case, these tend to be low, related to the marginal resources available through the project funding. In the Canadian case, it is an effect of the Hierarchist micro-management of what activities funded organizations are allowed to engage in. In both cases, the result is that the receiving service delivery actor has to struggle to find complementary funding to keep delivering services.

This is an odd order in a public management environment where procurement is seen as a solution to service delivery. The systems are supposed to mimic market mechanisms, but when someone buys a service on the private market, the user pays for the full costs of production. Apparently, the funders in these cases, however, are not prepared to pay for all the costs needed to produce social services. That is very strange in the sense that governments make more demands in controlling how the producer spends money than consumers could on companies. That has, of course, to do with democratic accountability ideals – which are very difficult to reconcile with market principles. The two clash in this case.

It also reflects a core difference in the dynamics between procurement and the actual market. In the market, the user of the service, the funder for it, is, typically, the same party. In procurement, however, these two roles are strongly differentiated. The funder and the users are clearly distinguished and separated from each other. As a result, the funders are disconnected
from the experiences of quality of service that the users have to go through. This is problematic for increasing the cost-efficiency of these services.

There are, however, also several differences between the two fields. First of all, the scope of funding comes across as strikingly different. While those immigrant community actors that manage to secure a contract through procurement in Sweden will be able to access considerable funding, the actors who have done so are few and far between. Instead, most are confined to operating based on project funding, and mostly the projects funded by the municipalities at that. The economic volume per project are marginal at best, these are applications for as little as CAD $10,000. The Canadian immigrant community actors are instead competing for funding that often run in the millions of dollars. This is a striking difference in opportunity structure and goes a long way to explain why the organizational capacity of the latter is so much stronger.

The predominant picture that emerges from these testimonials is that the immigrant community actors are largely marginalized and struggling in the Swedish sector, captured in Figure 15. The three primary funding streams, municipal projects, EU-projects and procurement, are included, but the immigrant community actors are mostly confined to the first type of funding. EU-projects and procurement funding, on the other hand, are comparatively inaccessible for those actors and mostly provide funding to public agencies, traditional major corporations and some non-community actors.
This respondent from an immigrant community actor expressed frustration about the opportunity structure:

What we usually do, did many times is send applications, but always they were turned down. But we thought, ok, we need to maybe use another strategy. Simultaneously, when we applied, we learned that Swedish associations were much, much more successful than what was true for social immigrant associations. So, we thought that first we need to make contact with the public agency that we seek funding from...We first talked with them, and then we sent them a primer, and then the primer came back to us a few times and then it became a completed application. Then, we sent it, already at the start, we had this agreement...But at the same time I have to say that in comparison with other Swedish, we had huge problems, and I think there are many immigrant associations that have huge problems with this (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

While the respondent provides an example of how to overcome the barrier of mistrust, a structural difference in the opportunity structure between immigrant associations and Swedish
associations is still emphasized. The former, it is asserted, are consistently much more successful than the immigrant associations. This could be because of a structural differential in competence - perhaps the Swedish organizations have stronger capacity to deliver more professionalized applications on a consistent basis, which might, ironically, be linked to a more stable resource base. However, given the findings in Chapter Eight which showed that the responding Swedish civil servants generally framed immigrant community actors as potentially dangerous free riders, discrimination and mistrust should not be ruled out manifested as an unfounded expectation that immigrant associations in some fashion lack the capacity to do good social work.

The respondent continues:

I think today, that, some years ago, 10-12 years ago, when there was an immigrant party founded, [Invandrarpartiet], I think, I was one those who criticized them, “no, it's not good for integration, it's not good because it'll be something just for immigrant groups, and it's not good with further division between us Swedes”…And today, after so many years, I think that we need a party that would defend us on our terms (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This conveys a sense of desperation with regards to the need for mobilizing immigrant community actors in some way in order to defend the rights and articulate the needs of the communities. When the channel of social service delivery is this constrained, the respondent seeks other routes for interest articulation, even though it comes across as an impractical one. The arena comes across as highly constrained, with very limited opportunities for mobilization and sustained social action.

It could be argued that this, to some extent, relates to the economic capacity of the respective municipality. Malmö has 300 000 residents, while Toronto has about 2.6 million. That is more than 8 times the population size of Malmö, and this will surely be reflected in the
economic resources on the municipal level. Even so, an organization needs to be able deliver services to its members, and given the size of the community the Malmö organization needs to serve, a budget of in the scale of $10,000 is arguably far from sufficient. Instead of being able to deliver services based on a professional infrastructure with decently equipped offices, the Swedish organizations are confined to working through voluntary channels.

The situation for Canadian immigrant community actors is captured in Figure 16. They do not have to compete with public agencies when applying for funding, the way the Swedish actors have to when seeking EU-funding. It is certainly possible to argue that the Canadian playing field is not level; new actors, without recorded experience of service delivery, or previous relations with the funding public agency will face greater barriers to winning a contract than those who have these. Even that, however, is a different magnitude of challenge than what the Swedish immigrant community actors are facing.

Figure 16: Funding streams in Canada
Further, they also have access to information networks that supply information about funding opportunities, albeit seemingly underfunded in comparison to needs. In contrast, the Swedish immigrant community actors have to be careful in their communication with public agencies. If they are not careful, there is a risk that the latter take their ideas and implement them as projects in-house. On the other hand, the Canadian respondents do report significant barriers through the copious amount of documentation required for a proposal, inspired by Fatalist values.

The overall result of these differences comes through in the profile of the actors on the procurement field. Notably, the Swedish respondents spoke about the dominance of a handful of major educational corporations on the field. Meanwhile, Canadian public civil servants talked about how the funding mandate is geared specifically towards non-profits.

The key role of the United Way in Canada was again emphasized by respondents from immigrant community actors, just like in Chapter Nine. That strategic funding provided by this umbrella organization allows them to cope with the onerous accountability measures. Thus, while the number of successful immigrant community actors seems comparatively larger in Canada than in Sweden, this is at least partially a result of civil society mobilization that provides the sector with a bulwark against the Fatalist practices of the governments. It seems, then, that for all the Egalitarian style values, perspectives, attitudes and networking that has occurred in the field, some of these agencies can continue to operate in spite of the serious impediments that the Fatalist practices places on service delivery.

Also, when organizations have been successful, other problems have then emerged. The tension between large and small actors is one such example. That tension is detrimental to cooperation in the sector.
It seems clear that the opportunity for immigrant community agencies is much more marginal on the Swedish field than on the Canadian one. When funding is this hard to access, it is not a coincidence that the organizations that manage to develop from the neighbourhood HTA type of organization all the way to the multi-service body with a metropolitan level outreach are exceptional, and far from the norm. The next chapter explores the environment that an immigrant community has to navigate once approval for funding has been granted.
Chapter 11: Challenges to staying in the field after approval has been granted

Chapter Ten discussed the opportunity structure for new actors and the barriers an applying organization needs to navigate to successfully apply for funding. It found that there are obstacles in both Canada and Sweden. In both cases, onerous accountability procedures and the complications arising from the mechanics of funding are problematic for the service deliverers. There were also considerable differences. Funding levels were much greater in Canada than Sweden. In Canada, there were also some support structures in place to disseminate information about funding opportunities. The number of successful immigrant community actors was consequently greater than in Sweden.

However, it is conceivable that initial success in applying cannot be leveraged into long term sustainability because of the mechanisms of the funding regime. For example, obstacles can arise during the implementation of the funding that prove insurmountable with potentially disastrous results for the organization’s economy. For that reason, it should not be assumed that approval on an application is the end point for an organization that wants to achieve long term sustainability for service delivery.

This chapter thus continues the exploration of the institutional context and asks: What conditions do immigrant community actors who strive to remain relevant for policy making and service delivery in the policy community operate under? It does so by continuing the investigation of public administration and the conditions for service delivery after approval has been granted. The chapter examines the funding streams in each respective country and how the different management models have created barriers or facilitated service delivery.
The chapter starts with a short summary of the general effects of funding approval and then goes on to analyze the interview material provided by respondents from three categories, civil servants, immigrant community actors and non-community actors (see Chapter One for elaboration), with regards to management practices in the two countries. It starts with Individualist style tools, centred on the application of performance policy measures. This section includes a discussion on the use of such tools to try to track long term, quality service outcomes by Canadian public agencies. It then discusses the similarities and differences of Hierarchist practices. The significance of onerous Fatalist accountability measures follows. Both of these values came across strongly in Sweden, but exist in Canada, too, for instance through micro-management of service delivery agency budgets. Finally, the chapter explains how Egalitarian practices have been implemented in Canada, but also how the NGO sector itself, through the United Way, provides a solution to some problems for service agencies. These practices, in contrast, are mostly absent in Sweden.

**Effects of funding approval**

Getting a proposal approved can be very significant for the applicant. The funding is of considerable scope. The added economic resources can make a significant difference. It can be leveraged when future funding opportunities present themselves. As one respondent put it; “…one of my colleagues is working part-time with writing new applications and we all do a little bit of that” (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation). In this case, the organization has assigned a substantial amount of time of one the employees towards preparing future proposals, and the ability to do that will give the actor a considerable advantage over applicants who do not have such resources available.
However, even for successful applicants, service delivery that is sustainable over the long term is not a given. Several barriers remain for the organization. First, the time-span for the project might not cover more than a single year. A Swedish respondent expressed why this was a concern: “And the problem there is also that you don’t have any long-term planning. Since you only get a one year budget. It's not possible to have a long term planning. So, many times, it's ad hoc solutions” (Immigrant community Actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). The lack of consistency over the long term is further exacerbated by unexpected changes in policy from the funders:

Yes, our point of view is that the society and the decision-makers' analysis of the operations and how they want to implement integration policy and labour market was constantly shifting, which we saw that it became a threat for [organization name]’s existence…(Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Such shifts can affect which activities will be covered by funding and thus become a constant source of uncertainty.

In Canada, by contrast, the contracts often span over a time of several years and “…some may be one year, two years, maybe three years” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview). This respondent elaborates on the point:

…about five years ago we introduced the concept of multi-year funding…[previously] the range could be… less than a year, but [now] generally speaking you will have at least a year of investment, up to five years. On average, though, we have multiyear agreements for about three years…and we do a risk analysis on the organization to determine how long the multiyear funding [should be for]…(Federal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).
Notably, the practice of only supplying funding on a yearly basis used to be more common in the past, asserts this civil servant: “Because prior to that we would fund on a yearly basis. So you’d have to apply for funding every year. Sometimes with 18 months, but generally speaking it was a year” (Federal agency, Toronto, author’s interview). Moving towards a multi-year funding model has arguably provided service deliverers with some consistency and longevity, since too short a funding cycle can become onerous for the applicants, as demonstrated in the Swedish case. Even so, the contracted agencies must be able to manage a series of barriers to deliver their services effectively and remain in the field. They are related to Individualist, Fatalist and Hierarchist practices, as follows.

**Individualist performance measures**

Canadian interviewees engaged extensively in how Individualist style performance measures have been structured. This was a cause for concern for many respondents from service delivery organizations, and the discussions revealed a high level of complexity surrounding this issue. The topics included how public agencies used the tools, where some used it to maximize short term quantitative indicators, whereas other funders wanted to establish metrics for more long-term sustainable results, and where users found jobs appropriate for their educational and professional experience. Even those indicators, however, were not straightforward to develop.

Some immigrant community actors in B.C. were concerned with how public agencies remained strictly focused on maximizing short term quantitative outcomes by any means:

> We don't have any say in the nature of the statistics…what the federal government wants to know is, "does this person have a job: yes or no?"...what kind of job it is, they don't care...Any job…the kind of jobs that people often find…if you're looking at an entry level, like warehouse…cleaner, or construction, those jobs are often temporary, but then, the government is like, “oh, got a job, close the file”, that's it...that's one tick...but
actually that person could have lost their job...(Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

Another respondent explained that the organization tried to avoid taking the same client twice during the same calendar year because doing so would require re-opening a file that was classified as ‘closed’, and that would have negative consequences for the organization’s relationship with the funder. This creates problems for a user who, over the longer term might encounter barriers to finding employment:

…even if [the users] want to come three months after [the program ends], we will probably not reopen their file, because they were just here recently…we try to not open the same file within the same calendar year… [The funder] basically fought with us; just this morning, I received a report….and it did say that “you haven't closed a file you were supposed to, the intervention is finished, you are not doing a follow up you were supposed to…why is it open?” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

In both of these instances, ‘closing files’ apparently counted towards the quantitative indicators the funder used. In both cases, moreover, this measure seemed quite disconnected from, and even impeding on, the process of supporting the user on the path towards a stable position on the labour market. This corroborates evidence from previous studies showing how highly skilled immigrants, particularly women, have consistently been directed to menial jobs (Man, 2004; Ng, 1996). These government bodies also seemed uninterested in having a dialogue with the frontline workers about what types of performance measurements might actually be valid.

Swedish respondents active in the field likewise often found the quantitative measurements to lack validity for operations. Like in Canada, many indicators were insufficient for capturing the long term progress of users moving towards the labour market:
...is the situation that they've been going in and out of interventions during the entire [period as unemployed]...also after the end of this project, have gone back and become long-term unemployed again? That would have been really interesting...(National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

They [fundees] do not ask about [what kinds of jobs our users get], but I take notes on it. And there were a few last year who actually found perfectly fitting jobs within their own fields. I was surprised, but it's possible. But it takes a great effort, too…(Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The first comment indicates that the administration lacks the tools needed for tracking the long term progress of users. The second indicates a lack of capacity to identify phenomena like under-employment, a highly significant indicator for successful labour market integration (Biles, Burstein, & Frideres, 2008). These gaps give reason to ask how public authorities can be confident that programs have any impact.

The incentives for using such indicators are powerful for public agencies. Quantitative indicators facilitate target fulfillment over the short term and are easy to distill into reports for higher level managers. As such, they essentially act as an incentive for creaming within the public administration (Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999). In a Hierarchist framework, those interests take precedence over user interests. Finding jobs in appropriate skill levels or sustainable employment is more complex, more demanding of resources and less likely to be yield high target fulfillment over the short-term.

NGOs, however, partially exist outside the incentive structure of the public management and that gives them certain tools that might be unavailable to public actors. The following respondent comments on how the organization sometimes maintains relations with the participants beyond the end of a project period on their own initiative:
Sometimes we keep connected, but it's not on a formal basis…with the project I was working with last year, we had connection for quite some time this year and checked also how things turned out, because there were results coming in then…that I added because I thought that was reasonable…Not everybody gets a job…but it happens later. But it's not like we call around and check a couple of years down the line, not as far as I know, anyway…it's very possible that it's been done, too. But it's very time consuming (Immigrant community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The generated trust levels seem high enough for the actor to maintain informal contacts for some time, but the quote also touches on why it is challenging for a small organization to track long term outcomes, notwithstanding the wish to do so. It is labour intensive, and might thus not always be within the capacity of an immigrant community actor.

However, this situation is not uniform. Some public agencies in Canada, varying with level of government and province, take a different view. Respondents showed that Canadian public agencies, unlike their Swedish counterparts, used indicators for under-employment. The “…funder wants to make sure that it's not just any job” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview), as one respondent said. Just finding jobs of any kind for the user was not sufficient for the funder who was also interested in whether the found jobs were related in some ways to the user’s educational or occupational backgrounds: “What is the job they're getting; is it part-time, is it full-time, is it related to their, their career?” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview), as one respondent expressed it. These funders have moved beyond the quick fix demands, expressing a wish for more sustainable long-term solutions. This implies that they have internalized a more complex understanding of the social problems at hand to the extent that it is being practiced in standard operating procedures.

Even so, there are still problems associated with how these should be defined in a practical and yet reliable and valid fashion:
Two, three years ago, they start talking about getting into their career jobs, but they didn't
know how to measure that, and they didn't give us an instruction on directly how to
measure that, and it's part of the reporting system, but it's unfocused...because for that
you have to have extra money to help the person to get into their career...(Immigrant
community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

As always, the devil lies with the details and how these terms are defined. In this case, the users
are able to define their own objectives, which, ironically, can also be problematic:

…25 per cent, 20 per cent should get the job in the career related jobs…But, by then, it's
all based on...what is objective of the client? If, let's say the client is a medical doctor
from overseas, so they know they're not going to get into it overnight. Ok, so they are
saying, “…I'll be a cashier”, and if that's their objective, my staff is saying, “ok, that's
what they wanted”…we'll support them in reaching the position...And if they found a
job...they will say, they got in their...preferred career. It's not their initial career
(Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

In this example, ‘preferred career’ measurement comes across as a neologism for ‘any job’,
where the new job was in the preferred career since the client decided to take the job because of
the difficulties associated with credentials recognition. The structural barriers the clients face
lead them to constrain their choice, before the content of the indicator has been defined. Thus,
the indicator ends up obfuscating these barriers, rather than illuminating them, which could give
rise to misleading outcome data that actually reinforces perceptions that no structural barriers
exist, rather than challenging them, which would be needed to fully support the client and
address the barriers. Thus, the development of the indicator is actually based on circular
reasoning in this case.

Likewise, the quantitative indicators sometimes have limited validity in relation to the
complexities of what happens during the settlement process. In another case, a respondent
described the problems of performance measures in a language program for newcomers. The
priority for these users was “not learning the language for the sake of learning the language...no, ‘we want a job, and we're being told that the only way we can get a job is to speak...in this way...’” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Finding a job would likely improve the user’s socio-economic situation. However, the program parameters for a language program were strictly focused on having “the student go through these different stages of learning language” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview) and did not take their primary motivation into account. That created problems for the service delivery agency:

… [The funder] would fund the organizations on the basis of the number of students in the class...but every person in that class is focused on a different objective. And once they achieve that objective there is no reason for them to stay in that class. Someone gets a job, drops out… Well, the way [language program] reporting was structured, that was a negative outcome for them (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

In this case, the indicators create an incentive for service deliverers to coerce newcomers to stay away from jobs and remain in the course, even though getting a job can very well be conducive to learning the language more quickly. This demonstrates how indicators sometimes can be directly at odds with the actual process of becoming integrated into a new society and a new job market.

In at least one case, a group of municipal civil servants resisted provincial pressures to implement simplistic quantitative indicators and circumvented them to design something more substantial:

…we were told that it was the quickest way to employment. And we kind of changed that...“no, it's not the quickest way to employment, it's...supporting people towards meaningful employment”...Because there's a difference....I can give you a job working at McDonalds, but....you're a guy with three kids and a wife, you're not gonna keep that job...so it's like, taking a step back, doing the homework, making interventions with
people that help them figure out what is logical and appropriate (Municipal agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

These civil servants managed to assert a more qualitative interpretation of the process as the standard for these performance indicators. The interesting question is why they felt compelled to do this. It seems to suggest an organizational culture that allows the civil servants to be more in tune with user interests. Unfortunately, this conversation did not present the keys to answer these questions.

Further, the methods used to collect data on outcomes are not always optimal. This respondent yearned for more qualitative methods:

I'm sure that they would like to know more, they're interested in knowing more, they just don't have the time, they just don't have the resources themselves to know about any of the details of the work. I mean, they can do a lot of...focus groups, they can do a lot of surveys, they can do a lot of studies, but at the end of the day...I would say that they would know more about the service by talking to the frontline workers (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Likewise, the following respondent was dismayed over the additional administration added by the outcome measurements:

… if you're equipped to do it, if you have the training, if you have the time, the resources, to do it...it would be great. But...given the workload that we have, and given the situation that we are in...sometimes, in this line of work, we see a lot of staff turn-over, so it's not easy to train a staff to do that...without spending a considerable amount of time on training...Most of the time...when I talk to some of my colleagues, they have the same feeling...we do it because we have to, not because we find it extremely helpful (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This observation captures a risk involved with how the collection of performance indicator data is organized. By imposing these performance measurements on an organization that is already
struggling with operations, the stress on it is further increased. That might, ironically, end up defeating the purpose by becoming a distraction and so an impediment to operations as the organization needs to satisfy funder demands before it satisfies client demands. It also creates operational distortions.

Moreover, changes in the structure of the public administration can also affect the capacity of frontline service delivery agencies to collect data:

…they've been doing the regionalization, centralization back and forth…Two, three years ago, they started doing the regionalization again…the idea behind that…was to get people that know about the region…to manage or to liaise with agencies…for us…we have three times the workload…we have four offices and it's fallen into three different regions, and before it would be under one big contract. All we had to do was to deal with one government officer, and now we have to deal with three (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The reform that was supposed to make the public agencies more responsive to regional needs ended up being counter-productive for those immigrant community actors with a metropolitan level outreach. These reservations deserve recognition.

At the same time, respondents also made it clear that performance measures are not uniformly negative for the service providers. They have also been beneficial for them. The introduction of these tools has actually changed how some community actors work:

…we're having to shift our focus…more and more towards whether the service is actually helping clients, rather than just measure, “oh, today we have 20 clients coming, but, none of them actually get anything out of using our services…”…It's totally different from what we used to do…10 years ago, we just…compiled the statistics and then sent it…then we'd be done…nowadays, they're asking more questions. “Ok, what do you think you can do better, what kind of service you're doing, how do you think it's helping the client?”(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).
The quote implies that there was, historically, a lack of habit within the organization to investigate the effectiveness of the services. On one level it is understandable; an organization with a shortage of funding will face barriers to locating resources towards measuring efficiency. Such entities continuously exist on a short-term and ad hoc basis, unable to take a step back to solve structural organizational problems. On another level, it also speaks how powerful funder demand can be: if the funder compels the recipient to ask these questions, efficiency might actually increase as a result, because an organization that lacks performance evaluation procedures will be less than effective, as this respondent observes: “Which also raises questions about the quality of service, because if you have no mechanism to monitor, how do you know that your services are good? You simply don't know” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). This is not an insignificant remark. To be able to develop services and ascertain their quality, ‘quality’ has to be defined in such a way that it can be identified and tracked in a consistent manner, whether through quantitative or qualitative measures. The observation also speaks to how performance indicators cannot easily be dispensed with. Without valid and reliable monitoring tools, there is no way to ascertain the efficiency and effectiveness of the services.

In summary, the record of how performance indicators are used is mixed. Both Canadian and Swedish governments use simple short-term quantifiers that involve the classic problems of such measuring tools. However, Canadian governments have also demonstrated a more complex understanding of the social process involved, and tried to devise more precise indicators. The problems encountered in this venture are to be expected when trying to capture qualitative social processes in a reliable, valid and quantifiable manner. Even so, this effort sets the Canadian field apart from the Swedish one.
Hierarchist methods

Respondents in both countries described Hierarchist practices, but they manifested in different ways. In Canada, they were primarily related to the complications that ensue from governmental compartmentalization of policy jurisdictions, consistent with concerns expressed by respondents as discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten. Moreover, how public funders used different funding regimes complicated work at the operational level for funded organizations. In Sweden, respondents instead focused on how public funders used quotas to fill government programs with users. The one commonality consisted in how public agencies attached conditions to funding, but again, Canadian and Swedish funders focused on different aspects in this regard as well. Each of these is discussed in the next section.

The effects of compartmentalization

Social issues often span across several different departmental jurisdictions, as defined and compartmentalized by governments. Such compartmentalization is rational from the point of view of the administration – it establishes clear boundaries of jurisdiction between different levels of government and public agencies (Hood, 2000; Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999). However, for service delivery agencies, it can create issues, since there is often no clear and distinct boundary for where one social problem begins and where it ends. Instead, social issues are often interlocking, over-lapping and even inter-dependent, which becomes particularly problematic in the Canadian federal system. For example, lack of housing can be a serious barrier to finding employment, but housing tends to fall under provincial and municipal jurisdiction, while employment is a policy field that straddles the jurisdiction of provincial and federal government agencies. This comment captures how the compartmentalization can become problematic even within the administration:
So, there are certain things…that won't be considered under the grant program…we are quite explicit that we don't fund anything around economic development. But having said that, ...we organized this big employment summit in 2008, and that…came from another group, under the city, which…believed that employment issues and economic development is…very important for immigrants, and that's why the city then…agreed to fund and support…that summit (Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview).

Even though jurisdictional lines between levels of government are supposed to be clear and distinct, sooner or later, administrations will run into the grey areas of interconnectedness and interdependency, which thus touches on the domains of more than one public agency, where some rationalization is needed to maintain the boundaries. This situation sometimes creates a need to re-label things, so that governments can act on the issue without being perceived as crossing jurisdictional boundaries.

Further, some actors in the field apparently treat the social issues at hand as if they were separate and distinct, thus reflecting the way the different governmental levels have divided the jurisdictional responsibilities between them. The respondent first reflects on how two policy fields were separated between two public agencies:

Previous to that, the challenge was always trying to get [federal agency 1] and [federal agency 2] to see that, “you know what, you guys should really be talking to each other…because they go hand in hand. Settlement, employment”…some people would make the argument that they're discreet entities. And that's been, for a long time, that thought is out there in the community…I think they're interwoven, and I don't see how you can necessarily separate them (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

The respondent then went on to discuss the consequences for program design and recent changes:
…if you going to design a program that's effective, have the funding available…it shouldn't matter where it comes from, whether it's [federal agency 1] or [federal agency 2]…maybe there's some kind of bridging that you can do to design the program that will...take advantage of both funding streams. And I have to say that [federal agency 1] has moved quite a bit in that area, where they had the funding ongoing for our current …program...before that job development was not a core piece of that program delivery (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

These observations capture the heart of the Grid/Group Cultural Theory argument: that the organizational structure affects organizational culture, and thus perception and problem-solving as well.

The narratives, then, suggest that the compartmentalization creates extra barriers for the service delivery agencies. Their administrative burdens increase because of the multiple layers of government departments they have to communicate with to seek funding from and be accountable towards.

**Affecting or regulating organizational mission, vision and activities**

Public agencies in both countries attached conditions to funding that affects the funded organizations. In Canada, this was mostly confined to mission and vision, including which demographic the funded agency can serve, while Swedish funders regulated outreach activities. This Canadian respondent explained: “And in order to be funded, you actually can't be funded anymore in [province], to serve only one ethnic community” (Non-community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Two other civil servants put it thusly:

We don't fund ethno-specific organizations, our funding guidelines state that you have to serve all newcomers who are eligible to work…That said, we do have some organizations who...by virtue of where they're located……tend to serve more from one ethnic group than another, but in theory…it's likely the majority of their clients would be of [different ethnic] background (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).
...the government...doesn't want to support so ethno-specifically...a very big one...is now serving...many other groups...although I think fundamentally, they're still...rooted in the [ethnic] community...the other two major immigrant service groups...have always served multi-ethnic clients...[and] are now serving clients that the government feels they are capable of reaching out to, including people on income subsidies, unemployed...half of the...population are immigrants...why would they be limited to serving half? (Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview).

These replies corroborate that the funding model “privilege pan-ethnic-multi-service and lobby/umbrella organizations” (Landolt et al., 2009, p. 20), as discussed in Chapter Three. Immigrant community actors cope with these demands by reframing the profile of the organization and accepting a wider range of clients, at least in principle. As one respondent put it, “…a lot of that, certainly was from the perspective of the funders, I will fund you but you have to open up” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Another interviewee explained: “…if you want to stay alive...you have other organizations that traditionally provided services in a particular way, serving only a particular client group, but in order to get funding, they [change]...” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). The responses assert that these changes were done as a response to funder demands, not as a reflection of a changed client demographic, and to some extent under the duress that comes from a threat to cut off funding.

These organizations, of course, want to survive and if the current funding streams require them to look beyond its original mandate, they will do so. Government demands have thus been one key variable in changing how the organizations work and which clients the organization accepts, similar to those made by governments in Sweden. The question is really if this is a good thing. The demands intervene in the internal dynamics of the organization from outside in a way
that may be detrimental to how it delivers its services in a qualitative way, by forcing it to serve users its capacity was not developed to serve.

Even so, the effects of these changes in mandate might be quite limited, precisely because of how the organization’s infrastructure was developed to serve a particular demographic:

…right now you see our agency name is [organizational name]. And it wasn't long ago, about two years ago, that we were actually called [ethno-cultural organizational name]...the name change came about because…[The] government…had this feedback about [the need to be] more inclusive, serving a more diverse clientele and at the time we had consultation with some of the community members…and they decided it was time for a change…[So we changed to] the [organizational name] to reflect our goal of serving a more diverse community (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

However, organizational culture and competence carries considerable inertia, and the respondent went on to recognize this: “the staff, the board and also the volunteers, the majority of us are [ethnic community], it's not easy for a non-[ethnic community member] to come in…” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). It stands to reason that even if it accepts the terms in principle, more in-depth change does not occur over night, or without more thorough and long-term reform attempts conducted by the organization itself.

Respondents related the constraints public funders tied to contracting in the Swedish case to the activities the organizations were allowed to engage via outreach. This respondent describes how the regulations prevented the organization from doing outreach directly to users: “The [national agency]. It's like this, I don't do outreach in that fashion. My client is the [national agency], so I get my participants through the [national agency]. So, I don't go out…” (Non-community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). Another respondent, from an immigrant community actor, explained that users cannot seek out the services of the agency directly: “No, but you don't seek us out. So, not in that way. But rather, to get here, you are
assigned by your social secretary; you must be in a program to be able to get social welfare assistance” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). This division of powers arguably have some consequences for accountability, and disempowers both users and community actors. Note how this differs from the Canadian procurement, where virtually all contractors do extensive outreach on their own, with ads, fairs, and so on, which they see as very important to keep in touch with the community (see below). This could very well affect community relationships for the provider.

The position of the users in the Canadian system, and their potential influence on service delivery, was unclear from interviews. Some respondents speak of referrals from public agencies without further defining what that entails, and at the same time, one document from Vancouver explicitly pointed out that the programs listed in it were optional for users, not mandatory (Hiebert, 2009). That suggests a lower degree of Hierarchist coercion on users in Canada than in Sweden. The lacking engagement from respondents at least implies that this is considered less of a barrier to service delivery among agencies in Canada than what the Swedish respondents experienced.

Both Canadian and Swedish governments attach conditions that could affect performance outcomes. However, the public funders in the two countries focus on different aspects. Canadian funders focus more on mission, vision and ensuring that the service delivery agencies will not turn any users away. Swedish funders will micro-manage this much more, by acting as brokers which control who gets sent to the service delivery agencies directly, and prohibiting the agencies from doing outreach directly to users.
Using quotas

Swedish respondents with procurement contracts commented on how quantitative indicators were employed. However, to fully comprehend how they are used in this area, it is first necessary to understand how outcome indicators are being used within the public agencies themselves. Respondents from both national and municipal level explained how quantitative indicators are not used such much as tools for evaluating efficiency along Individualist principles. Instead, they are ends in themselves, effectively constituting quotas for the civil servants to fill, and thus function as Hierarchist drivers for the operations. This civil servant talked about how an internship program was ordered by senior levels in the administration: “They want 20,000, nationwide [clients to]…go through internships. Other [programs disappeared]…since they need a certain volume…” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). The task of the frontline is thus to fulfill these targets regardless of the needs of individual users or the result in any progress towards entering the labour market. This top-down management style even incentivizes frontline civil servants to cooperate with exploitative employers, because doing so allows for quicker administration, fulfills politically set objectives, and lessens the workload of the front line case officer:

[Employers] want interns since they want to lower their costs…And they come to [national agency] and say, “I want an intern to clean up”; “Yes, of course”…we want to avoid all these administrative duties. We approve six months of internship, which is the longest time for a person to clean up. Why six months?…this person…maybe she needs two days, not six months internship…in this way, you make one single decision and this internship will count towards six months…you will fulfill this political [objective]...(National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The paternalism comes across as systematic: the civil servant is compelled by systemic pressures to lower the administrative burden and fulfill the set quotas. The employer gains free labour. The
user’s needs or wishes are ignored, because they are irrelevant for fulfilling the systemic functions. The case illustrates the inherent problems of Hierarchism in the social service field; the reward system and targets fulfillment is, in practice, not geared towards fulfilling the needs of the user, but towards fulfilling arbitrary political objectives that are disconnected from those needs.

These systemic properties, in turn, render the indicators meaningless, since the program’s target fulfillment is disconnected from user achievements. However, that has little effect on how the organization treats the users. If a user should fail to gain employment after a completed program, another program is chosen, which, again, will fulfill another quota, as this respondent puts it: “No, no, no, then ‘you will go again’, maybe ‘you have not learned enough’. No, no, no, ‘it's good that you will go there’. It's also…some are connected, also, to all these, to show results” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). As the quote reveals, the blame for the failure of a program can then be assigned to the user, legitimizing further referrals as dictated by senior levels in the organization. This way, clients become reduced to being resources for the purpose of building statistics, to ‘show results’, as it is expressed here.

A similar example, from the municipal level, is the political guarantee that a client will have a work plan within the first five days of registering with the service office, regardless of the case officers’ insight into the client’s specific circumstances:

We have a briefing meeting, and then we an introductory period, and within this introductory period, which is, depending on target group, two to four weeks long…after five days, they should have a first work plan, that's this kind of guarantee that the politicians have made, that you should get your path, the quickest path to work. And, of course, in five days, we don't know the trainees very well, so that will be updated after
one month, unless the person gets a job before then (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

Setting up this type of goal based on top-down management ends up being self-defeating. The time span for creating the plan is too short for the case officer to become familiar with the full experiences, competencies and opportunities of the client. The introduction plan is not drafted as an organic result of contact between client and counsellor, but rather to satisfy a criterion demanded from higher echelons in the organization.

Moreover, the indicators are based on short-term achievements that could conflict with the long term goals of finding permanent employment on the right level of competence:

I think this is a bit special, this with us having study and career counselors, we try to work with motivating our participants, who we call trainees, to this long-term goal, but you also see the short term goal to become self-sufficient (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The civil servant seems to realize that bridging someone to work within a higher area of qualification can be a long term process, but the short term policy goal seems to at least sometimes override this, perhaps making the resources at their disposal used less effectively than they could be.

In summary, the above indicates that performance measures are used as a control mechanism to a significant extent in Sweden. Service delivery is geared towards fulfilling set quotas primarily. User needs and long term integration is less of a priority. This is in contrast to the two main Hierarchist features on the Canadian field identified by the respondents. One is the complexities associated with compartmentalized jurisdictions between government departments and levels. The other concerns the active intervention into the mandate and mission of the service
delivery agencies through the conditionality of the funding. Both of these would arguably impact the efficiency of operations and the intended bottom-up trajectory of procurement as a management model negatively. The first does so by creating redundant administrative routines that takes resources from core service delivery. The second does so by potentially disrupting the service delivery agency’s capacity to internalize the community culture. Finally, in both countries, public funders attach conditions to the service delivery funding that can affect service delivery outcomes, albeit in different ways. The application of Hierarchist tools seems consistently more rigorous in the Swedish case than in the Canadian one.

**Onerous Fatalist Accountability Procedures**

The onerous Fatalist-style accountability demands were another source of concern for service delivery agencies, both in Canada and Sweden. On the one hand, it should not be surprising to find that public agencies require regular reviews of the service to continue funding an agency, particularly if the agreed funding is substantial and implemented over a considerable time period. Two Canadian respondents commented on how Canadian public agencies maintain such oversight over a funding cycle. The first worked for a funding agency: “…and then it doesn't matter how long we have received these grants, you have to come back every year to be reviewed again, so it's a pretty rigorous process…” (Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview). The second, from a contracted agency, described the process thusly: “…and usually, if it's a three year contract, then at the end of the two year contract, and any time before the two year contract ends, you will have to…resubmit your proposal in order to extend it…” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview). The review is a way for public agencies to verify that services are delivered according to the agreement.
However, after a certain point, the control measures become so extensive that they impede service delivery. The following respondent found the administrative routines to be at least somewhat superfluous, but a suggestion to make them less cumbersome was dismissed:

Just recently I've tried to say "why don't we build a quarterly report…Exporting electronic data every month, so you'll get that anyway, but how about the paper reports, we do them every three months. I can still give you a qualitative report of a page or two summarizing what's going on…but the quantitative with all the details, you have it in the contact form anyway, why do we do it?" But they are kind of, "no, you have to do it every month." …so we continue to do it every month. It takes a lot of time…(Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

In this case, the administrative operations had to be continued, even though the respondent remained unconvinced that the procedure was effective, and considered the exercise a barrier to effective service delivery, as resources were diverted from operations to accounting.

These demands also act as a barrier for smaller organizations: “…a larger organization will have procurement policies and human rights policies. A small group, you know, that's not there right at the top of their agenda” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto). Larger organizations with this type of infrastructure will be more likely to be able to leverage the capacity necessary to meet the demands. The problem is that a smaller organization might have other, important competencies that become overshadowed by its lack of human resource infrastructure. This again underscores how satisfying the funder’s needs for accountability risk conflicting with satisfying the user’s needs for qualitative services that smaller actors might be able to provide. However, as the funding increases, the resources that the service delivery agency has to be taken from operations for the purpose of documentation also increase.
Ironically, the demands can also become an impediment to the oversight function of the public agency itself. The sheer volume of data produced by the service delivery agencies can become a barrier to the absorption of outcome data on the administrative level:

I remember one of the… [federal agency] officers told us he has about 10-15 agencies to manage, and, and we have reports that are due…every month, and if you do the math…the most that he could spend with an agency in a month would be…one day. And he has to do…all the claims, all the financial stuff first and foremost. That doesn't really leave him any time...(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

This is a very interesting point: data that cannot be evaluated and processed properly will not be utilized to its full potential, and when that happens, some of the meaning of collecting it is lost. If that happens, the purpose of having these types of regimes in the first place is defeated. In the case of proposals, when dozens of applying organizations submit hundreds of pages each, the reviewers would end up having to peruse thousands of pages before a decision about who would win the contract could be made, and this would have to be done in a timely manner, as well. This raises questions about how accurate the review would be.

Some Canadian respondents also provided examples of how some funding agencies have historically engaged in quite detailed micro-management of operational budgets. This respondent described such a case:

…if you're successful in your call and…[are] and awarded a [contract for]….three years….But they don't give you the funding [for] more than one fiscal year at a time, and [federal agency] has a funding model which is line by line…you can't mix the lines up. There's a line for photocopying, there's a line for marketing and you can't [use the funding from one line to fund something else]….and if you don't spend the money, it slips and you give it back, and when you give it back, next year you get less (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).
In this case, the level of micro-management extended to controlling the budget for photocopying, which is taking such practices to a highly granular level, one which is arguably very difficult to estimate at the planning stage. It is also questionable to what extent this type of measure would be valid for achieving successful outcomes.

Further, when the accountability regime acts together with the compartmentalized jurisdictions, a particularly cumbersome effect is produced. Service delivering agencies have to interact with several different levels of government with differences in funding regimes, which, in turn, can impede day-to-day operations. The following respondent provides an example of how such practices resulted the same job being remunerated differently within the same organization, depending on which public agency was funding the delivered program. The respondent first described how the two funding systems work differently in terms of funding levels:

One of the jobs in the sector…is a settlement worker. So, this is a person that…helps immigrants and refugees settle. It's usually one-on-one relationship, and it needs to be…there are…two levels of government that pays for this…The feds pay for fulltime jobs, the province pays for organization, maybe 0.4 of a person, very small amounts…So when you compare how much is the province investing to the federal government, it's tiny (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Then the respondent explained the consequences of this situation for the service delivery agency:

...here you have two people doing exactly the same job but their jobs are paid for by two different funders. As an organization you have to have common pay scale for all of your staff, the pay scale is determined by the type of work they do, not by who funds them. As an organization, how do you find the resources to make sure that both people are paid at the same rate, because they're not? (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).
For the funded organization, this lack of coordination materializes as a highly problematic discrepancy in funding practices. Funders directly impact day-to-day operations when they micro-manage the salary levels of service delivery agencies, and do so significantly more when they do not coordinate with each other.

While the above barriers are significant in their own right, the single most significant funding obstacle related to micro-managing funding allocation identified by Canadian immigrant community actors was that “no one gives core funding” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Core funding, here, is thought of as monies for core administrative infrastructure, including support staff that might not be directly involved in service delivery. For that reason, this capacity might not be easily captured in an individual funding application, but the capacity is still vital for delivering services, which would be strongly inhibited without that infrastructure. Apparently, however, governments do not allow organizations the flexibility they need to decide where to channel the economic resources for the greatest service delivery efficiency.

The above indicates that this Fatalist style of heavy emphasis on accountability is seen as frustrating by many service deliverers. The practices seem to successfully create a series of symbols for accountability that are useful at the political level. However, it is unclear to what extent the measures achieve their objectives in terms of discouraging opportunism in relation to how much they disrupt smooth service delivery.

The practices also stand out as contrasting rather sharply to the evidence of an Egalitarian perspective on immigrant community agencies among civil servants in Canada (see Chapter Eight). On the one hand, civil servants describe these community actors as experts, but on the other hand, the public agencies employ practices which suggest that the service delivery agencies
cannot be entirely trusted, but must be suspected as potential abusers of tax money. In that sense, the methods themselves send out the same powerful signals of mistrust that Swedish civil servants articulated in words (see Chapter Eight). It is clearly a contentious issue that affects the relationship between public funders and service delivery agencies in a disrupting fashion even as the high workload associated with service delivery funding administration means that resources that could have been used for improving the services instead have to be diverted to for accounting. There is a potential that the net result is deteriorating service quality and relations, while a limited amount of abuse is actually prevented.

In Sweden, public funding can also carry a heavy administrative burden. Both EU-projects and procurement have implemented accountability regimes to discourage freeriding, along the same principles as Fatalist workfare programs. A strong theme invoked by respondents concerned the level of micro-management required to track the activities of the EU-project participants: “But if people are at the dentist for two hours, then so many hours disappear of the co-funding” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). Whenever the participants are not on the project owner’s premises, funding is lost. A heavy burden of responsibility to monitor the whereabouts of participants rigorously is placed on the funder:

I saw, during the old program period, those classic, for instance immigrant projects, where they almost locked people up...So, I was up speaking with the participants sometimes...they felt coerced to be there. They were there because they had to be. They...pulled in the welfare assistance if they didn't go there (National agency, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The use of the word ‘classic’ here suggests that this was a common method. Users are coerced to take part in the project, because if they do not, they lose their remuneration. That structure is quite typical for workfare style programs discussed in Chapter Five (Lightman, Mitchell, &
Herd, 2005). These quite invasive practices will most likely affect the relationship between the service delivery agencies and users.

Moreover, the micro-management multiplies as the number of participants grows, making the administrative burden onerous even for large public agencies. This respondent describes how a significant part of the administrative staff had to be devoted to the specific task of counting the attendance hours of 1200 participants in an EU-project, because of the accountability system: “it's hardly possible to work in projects of that size. It's really difficult. And the administration eats a lot of the [project] monies...” (National agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). It seems the larger the project and the greater the level of funding, the more economic capital has to be devoted to administration of accountability instead of service delivery.

The Fatalist workfare-style accountability regimes reoccurred in procurement. This respondent at a public agency discusses how a quantitative indicator, specifically the number of employment interviews an unemployed person has managed to attend, is used as a tool to coerce the client to attend as many as possible. This is done regardless of the career wishes of the client in question, which renders it meaningless.

You can go to an indefinite number of employment interviews. If I force you to attend an employment interview, you can go there, and I can promise you that you, through your way of acting can avoid getting the job, without trouble. So, it's about finding what motivates the individual to want to get the job. And all those parts (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

This quote summarizes the limits of the Fatalist policy. Those living under such regimes can always find ways to resist them, and it is questionable to what extent a contest between the
unemployed and those who are ostensibly tasked with the mission of facilitating their entry into the labour market will facilitate that process.

The respondent went on to question to what extent indicators like attendance actually contributed to improving the user's position in the labour market and how these politically motivated measures have little relation to improving service delivery:

…we [civil servants] also [have to live] live with political decisions…when you come to [municipal program]…everyone [have to] have at least 10 hours planned, trackable activity per week…we also have an attendance demand…everybody must have at least one hour per day, they must be in attendance…to look for a job, to speak to the coach, to have a group activity…but there is overconfidence in having an actual attendance demand that in itself, then, compels [users to do] something (Municipal agency, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The reservation expresses scepticism by questioning the efficiency of this regime for the same reason as noted above. Also, the administrative burden raises questions about at what point the mistrust generated by the system will hamper the chances to achieve positive service outcomes. This Swedish respondent engaged with that issue directly, remarking on how the regime even becomes counter-productive to some extent:

Is he going to sit here tomorrow? Twiddle his thumbs?…It's totally useless for him to be here tomorrow, since he's going to the association on Thursday, he's no business being here, he can sit here and shoot the bull, and then it's better to…prepare yourself at home instead. Apply for employment or something…we must have that, of course, have control over everybody and we write down where you are…it's adults we're dealing with, after all, and if there's anything they'd abuse, then they're not in the right project…(Non-community actor, Malmö, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The respondent, from an NGO, contrasts the mistrust model to a trust-based approach. In such a framework, participants are expected to join the project because they believe it would benefit
them, which would, in itself, discourage abuse of project funding. This suggests that the mistrust-based accountability regime is redundant and inefficient as a control mechanism, in the sense that it does little to prevent abuse while most likely undermining attempts at building a trust-based rapport. Such consequences can have serious implications for the efficiency of the services, particularly for an organization that leverages confidence as a primary competence. It is therefore questionable to what extent these Fatalist-style measures are appropriate for this policy field.

The accountability regime becomes particularly problematic when the pressures from both the Hierarchist methods and Fatalist mistrust within the public agencies coincide to create a strong incentive towards creaming. To avoid such effects, the organization this respondent represented decided to retain a non-profit status, even though the public agencies actively encouraged its representatives to become for-profit to facilitate procurement procedures. The rationale was to avoid entering a system where the organization would be compelled to focus on fast results rather than long term needs:

> We wanted to stay as a non-profit association, because…if we could run [organization name] very commercially, then, of course, it turns out that we, too, start sorting individuals and maybe pick those individuals that can get a job in the labour market, so there will be a lot of interest in profits rather than a focus on the individual (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

That this organization actively turned down the chance to find a more secure source of funding because of these fears is noteworthy, and quite revealing with regards to the type of indicators used for remuneration to service providers. Moreover, some types of work, that seem to be conducive to positive service outcomes, are not compensated within the contractual framework:
They only said it can't be done. In that case, if you have trouble matching that job, they say: “call us”. “Yes, we will call you, but are you ready to pay the time we've been sitting to find this job?” “No, we won't” (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

In this case, the result was that when the organization wanted to satisfy a user’s needs, it encountered a barrier to do so because the service was beyond the scope of the funding mandate. The funding agency’s attempt to encourage the NGO to deliver this service for free is an interesting reflexive attitude from the civil servants and it seems to have strained relations between the two parties.

In summary, Fatalist style accountability regimes were in effect in both countries. In EU-projects, the attached funding can mean significant access to economic resources, but is usually fairly short term, confined to a single year and vulnerable to potentially sudden policy shifts. Further, they carry a heavy administrative burden, heavily influenced by Fatalist management models implemented to micro-manage user activities. Likewise, the quantitative performance measurements do not capture the full scope of complexities involved in labour market integration, focusing instead on short term goals that conflict with user needs. In Canada, micro-management of contracted budgets was also in effect and impacted service delivery in a series of ways. Likewise, the lack of funding for core administrative services was a serious problem for service delivery agencies.

**Egalitarian Influence on performance measures**

A significant difference between the Swedish and Canadian fields is the existence of Egalitarian style methods in the latter. It manifested most clearly in how immigrant community actors consistently reported that they had had at least some impact on how performance measurement or program objectives. For instance, this respondent commented on the public agencies had been
conducting a dialogue with the organization the interviewee represented: “And they actually
discussed the criteria with [organization name] so a lot of what we wanted was reflected”
(Immigrant community actor, Toronto). Another respondent explained in more detail:

Yeah, it includes us; we do lots of telephone conferences. Last week we did two
teleconferences. So, we talk…so they want to hear about how we're doing…and thinking
about new delivery models, the model of the future, the model that will be in effect
probably in 2012. So they're planning for that, finding out what’s working, what's not
working, what are the challenges…and trying to make it easier for clients…obviously,
because we were talking about how hard it is with navigation…I (Immigrant community
actor, Vancouver, author’s interview).

This was echoed by the civil servants, who also discussed how they listen to the service delivery
agencies: “Because we try and reduce… the administrative burden and also it's easier to manage
that way in many ways” (Federal agency, Toronto, author’s interview). This statement reflects a
willingness, on at least some level, to engage with the stakeholders in matters of procedure. One
respondent commented on methods used for this purpose:

…this was in response to a blue ribbon panel and some other reports and consultations
that happened with stakeholders, and of course they certainly identified…their sense of
lack of stability…and the constant administrative burden in relation to applications for
funding. To streamline that process for those agencies that…has demonstrated
success…I (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

It seems that funders have institutionalized methods for engaging with service deliverers. The
evidence also suggests that these engagements have had some impact on policy-making and the
requirements and parameters of procurement.

Even so, some Canadian immigrant community respondents argued that the policies used
were not sufficiently effective:
The government, they do have conferences…for example [program] conference, once every one or two years, and pretty much all our staff would attend the workshop, and that's one of the ways for sharing ideas, for talking to funders directly. But, again, it's...still, I would say still not enough…like forums…surveys, and those kind of things. It's not enough, it's just not enough (Immigrant actors, Toronto, author’s interview).

The question then is what type of engagement and feedback mechanism that would be satisfactory. Respondents from immigrant community actors emphasize the importance of engaging with each other to produce substantive results and quality in service delivery. This respondent describes how the public agencies are trying to “…streamline the process, figure things out, not to make things that hard for the clients, because the clients are confused, ‘where do I go?’” (Immigrant community actor, Vancouver, author’s interview). Another put it this way:

Well, you see, that's where we on both sides we wanna make sure that's it's meaningful. …because if it's out of whack in terms of being unattainable... we're not going to be doing any justice to the client if you're just rushing to get the clients through the gates. Churning out people. We're looking for the quality as well, not just the quantity...(Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

Even if these practices are insufficient, they are at least of symbolic significance, and reflect an organizational culture in this public agency where consultation is considered important. That the agency wants qualitative services for its clients is not particularly strange, it would be integrated into the values and mission of the community actor. However, the respondent also speaks about how the funder takes a great deal of interest in how to support service agencies and clients. There is a dialogue between them and an explicit concern regarding how to include frontline experiences in the evaluation of the quality of services, which corresponds well with the values of the Egalitarian Way.
The dialogue is further facilitated by the adoption of a procedure that combines quantitative and qualitative indicators. The funder first tracks how many of the users have been employed in comparison to the set objectives, but also wants the service delivery agency to supplement that with narratives describing the implemented actions:

…within 3 years of the funding agreement, we'll help 200 people get employed as accountants, if it's year 2 and they're at 40 people…either the training isn't meeting the employers' requirements or the regulators requirements for regulated professions, or there's something else…we also have status reports twice a year, so that would be more of a narrative explaining…the effectiveness of the recruitment strategy, effectiveness of the interview preparations…(Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview).

This data is then directly linked to releasing funding for the service delivering agency, which at the end of the project will “…have a final report which sums up the learnings, the best practices…and our funding is tied to that…the status report that we require, when we get that, we go review it and approve, that triggers the payment” (Provincial agency, Toronto, author’s interview). In this dialogue, this narrative implies, there is eventually a compilation of best practices. That is not insignificant, since it is arguably necessary, though not sufficient, for method development.

This civil servant talks about how these outcome indicators are designed in a bottom-up fashion:

…our evaluation model, we actually ask the organizations themselves to develop the, those kind of criteria. We don't impose the criteria on them. They actually let us know, so we then go back and talk with them. They have to self-define, we can't speak for them. They have to tell us, but we have to be satisfied with their explanation…and if not, then we can go back, well, let's go back and talk some more (Municipal agency, Vancouver, author’s interview).
This approach means that the funded organization is not trapped in a set of variables that might have limited validity for the actual programs that are being implemented locally. This is significant and corresponds well with Egalitarian values.

From the perspective of the contracted service delivery agency, this system can look like this:

…we…proposed [to serve] a higher number…of clients. [The funder] came back to us; “Are you sure that's the number that you wanna put in”? …and they explained…“…given the economic downturn, that seems a little bit high to us. Do you want to reconsider?” …that was an excellent point, so we revised it and…they thought that was more realistic…they're not in it for us to fail. They want us to be successful. So, let's make sure that we are doing something that is realistic for both sides (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

In this case, the working relationship comes across as one based on mutual respect, reflecting a cordial culture in the policy arena.

In Sweden, in contrast, respondents described a notable absence of dialogue between the funder and the actors in the field regarding the relevance of these evaluation criteria. This respondent expressed a certain level of frustration over this: “…there we don't have a dialogue, that's also an interesting phenomenon; we don't have a dialogue with the procurement division beyond submission” (Non-community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation). That the procurement division has no dialogue with applicants during the evaluation period is not necessarily surprising. One commonly referred rationale for this is the need to maintain fairness and limiting bias in the evaluation process. Another reflection, however, gives reason to ask to what extent the lack of dialogue extends to areas beyond the immediate evaluation of proposals, one interviewee highlights a systemic problem:
I think that the procurement law has really suppressed the [contracted] actors today, because you only have…the procurement specifications, you should only adapt yourself accordingly. But [does] the actors' points of view…really have any influence? (Immigrant community actor, Stockholm, author’s interview, author’s translation).

The Canadian example shows that it is possible to discuss evaluation criteria with the actors in the field between calls for proposals, and when these statements are compared to those made by Canadian respondents, the contrast becomes telling. These are social services, and when there is no dialogue with the frontline case officers and users, it will be really difficult to design performance indicators that are helpful to all stakeholders alike.

A second significant Egalitarian dimension of the Canadian field consists of functionalities provided by the United Way, an umbrella organization of NGOs and charities. Respondents often underscored how significant the funding available from this umbrella organization was for operations to continue smoothly and the implications if that funding was not there: “For us, it's not that big. I don't know the proportion, but…[the] majority is [program] funding…but if we don't have United Way, I think maybe half of our services may be influenced” (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview). Another put it this way:

And that's where United Way funding comes in. One of two things that United Way funding helps for is that kind of gap. So you can pay a top-off for this person's salary using United Way funds, because no one else would give that, and this is an ongoing practical problem for almost any organization, that gets federal or provincial funding. Not all do, but most do (Immigrant community actor, Toronto, author’s interview).

As is stated here, the significance is not in the size of the funding, but its flexibility. It can be diverted to wherever it is needed the most. In that sense, it becomes a valuable resource to manage the funder’s restrictions on operational budgets. Without this function in the Canadian field, the arena would be much more challenging for non-profits to navigate, revealing that the
policy model actually contains greater barriers for these actors than might be immediately apparent. No equivalent to this existed in the Swedish policy community, which is revealing in its own right.

In summary, the Egalitarian practice of engaging in an institutional dialogue with the service delivery agents constitutes a marked contrast to practise in the Swedish field. Here, the service delivery agents have the opportunity to critique and provide constructive feedback on performance measurements, which is a key operative function of the funding system in many ways. It is central to the dynamics of the relationship between funder and service deliverers, as well as to the incentive structure of the field, guiding for how funding will be distributed. While these testimonials cannot fully capture how influential the feedback ultimately is – it is, for example, impossible to ascertain under what circumstances civil servants would disregard it – the effects of this dimension should not be underestimated. If nothing else, it is important at a symbolic level, contributing to establishing recognition for immigrant community actors as stakeholders in the field. Moreover, the significance of the United Way as an institutionalized presence on the field should not be underestimated. It provides funding that has flexibility unavailable from public funders. That mitigates some of the most impeding effects of the Fatalist accountability regime, and this support structure is absent in Sweden.

**Conclusion**

The Canadian and Swedish fields differ in many respects in terms of the potential for long term service delivery. Generally speaking, Canada seems to offer greater potential for service than Sweden. This becomes apparent by addressing their similarities and differences.

Respondents in both fields expressed concerns over the workload related to Fatalist accountability procedures. In both cases, then, the funding comes with considerable oversight
that impedes the service delivery itself to some extent, according to the respondents. These undermined the efficiency of social service delivery and likely affected outcomes negatively. The methods are consistent with the influence of workfare policies that have been observed in both countries.

There are, however, more differences than similarities between the two fields. In the case of Sweden, there are two major identifiable funding streams, and while this would seem like an increase of opportunities, it is doubtful whether this is the resulting effect. Both EU-projects and procurement involve a range of barriers to consistent service delivery. The former involves a short time span for funding, for example. Procurement, the only stream discussed by Canadian respondents, was used in both countries, but differences in implementation mean that conditions for service delivery agencies vary considerably between the two countries. For example, the Swedish public funders clearly regulate who the organization should have as a user, assigning civil servants a gatekeeping role based on their ‘expert competence’ consistent with the Hierarchist perspective. There is a potential that such assignments do not take realities on the ground into account properly in a way that may, ultimately, prove disempowering for the client. In Canada, the funder demands on service delivery do not come across as quite as intrusive, but rather are limited to demands on user demographics. That can still impede the service delivery agency’s relations with the community, just the same. Another Hierarchist issue in the Canadian field is the jurisdictional compartmentalization.

Likewise, performance measurements, a central feature of New Public Management, exist in both fields as well. Interestingly, these features often contradict the objectives that New Public Management was ostensibly adopted to achieve, like giving users greater choice and influence (Hood, 2000; Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004) as discussed in
Chapter Four. Indeed, in Sweden, they seem more like an extension of the Hierarchist practices, used as a way to fulfill administrative targets rather than a comprehensive way to evaluate best practices. While quantitative indicators have also been identified by Canadian respondents, there were also at least some efforts to develop more qualitative measuring tools, revealing greater interest in collecting and using feedback from the field. This dialogue corresponds to the history of the Egalitarian practices in Canada, a dialogue that is conspicuously absent in Sweden.

Likewise, the implementation of Fatalist accountability procedures varies between the two cases as well. In Sweden, it is manifested through the rigorous tracking of user whereabouts. In Canada, it is expressed through the high frequency of reporting demanded to track the implementation process.

Finally, the presence of the United Way in Canada is highly relevant. The problems arising from government micro-management of funding streams are somewhat mitigated by the contributions from this institution. The Egalitarian practices that have been part of the Canadian field for so long seem offset by the serious impediments that the Fatalist practices places on service delivery. As a result, civil society has needed to counter-mobilize. It is quite noteworthy that the way to cope with these regimes is based on actions taken from outside the government sector, by the civil society itself. Respondents in Sweden make no reference to any equivalent body. In that sense, the United Way stands out as a significant difference in opportunity structure between the two countries.

**Economic situation for immigrant community actors in Canada**

Immigrant community actors in Canada confront a range of barriers. The two most significant are associated with Hierarchist and Fatalist features on the Canadian field, which consist of the consequences of compartmentalized jurisdictions between different government levels, the
conditions that require organizations to change their mandates to become eligible for service delivery and finally the lack of core funding from public agencies. Together, the administrative procedures involved constitute an impediment to service delivery. Moreover, the demands on mission and vision could disrupt the service delivery agency’s capacity to internalize the community culture. The existence of these tools implies that the public funder does not trust the integrity of the service delivery agencies entirely. The accountability regime thus represents a symbol of mistrust that disturbs the relations between those and the funders. They are therefore problematic in terms of the potential impact on the integrity of the bottom-up trajectory that Individualist procurement supposedly embraces.

The Individualist style performance indicators have mixed effects. On the one hand, public funders have used short-term quantitative indicators that are problematic for measuring the validity of qualitative social processes. At the same time, though, they have also exhibited a more sophisticated understanding of these and made efforts to develop more precise measuring tools.

Finally, the Egalitarian practice of involving the service delivery agencies in consistent conversation about best practices is also a characteristic of the attitude that exists between the two parties in Canada. It enables immigrant community actors to voice their concerns and provide insights into operational challenges that can be valuable for improving service delivery. The exact amount of influence that results from these dialogues is impossible to ascertain based on the present data, but it should not be disregarded when assessing the dynamics of this field. Also, the support structures offered by the United Way are also very significant for the service delivery agencies, allowing them to navigate some of the barriers raised by the administrative procedures put in place by public funders.
Economic situation for immigrant community actors in Sweden

For immigrant community actors in Sweden, neither of the two funding streams should be regarded as an uncomplicated path to sustainable and long term social service delivery. While EU-project funding is significant in terms of the economic resources made available, the complications involved with the implementation of funding are considerable, too. The project period is confined to a single year, which is too short for substantial service delivery. Moreover, the consistency of implementing the project can be undermined by policy shifts. The administrative workload, inspired by Fatalist management models, is also considerable and it becomes more intense the larger the project gets. Likewise, the quantitative performance measurements can become an impediment to service delivery as they are focused on short term objectives that can be at odds with user needs.

Similarly, procurement also involves a number of complications for immigrant community actor. Thus, civil servants remain gatekeepers as they broker positions to services, blocking service delivery agencies from recruiting users directly and performance measurements here function as an extension of Hierarchist methods, where the indicators become a vehicle for fulfilling targets set by higher levels within the administration. Likewise, workfare-style methods were also identified. Both of these disempower users and immigrant community actors and reinforce public agency power. The next chapter summarizes the conclusions from the field, reflecting on the collected findings of this dissertation.
Chapter 12: Recasting Immigration - the value of Bourdieu and Grid/Group Cultural Theory

This thesis started with the examples of the expulsion in 2008 of the immigrant association Islamiska Kulturföreningen their offices in the municipal district of Rosengård, Malmö, Sweden, by the police, and the 2013 Husby riots in Stockholm, both of which shook the international image of Swedish as a successful welfare state. Persistent long term unemployment, discrimination and a segregated labour market were identified by commentators as some of the underlying causes fuelling the frustration of the involved youth by both local and established public actors (Malmö rämnar.2008; Billner, 2008; Hellberg, 2008).

In Malmö, organizational leaders issued statements calling for the public authorities to acknowledge the actor as a partner for discussions (Mahmoud, 2008). A report on the Husby events focused on the democratic deficit, where local citizens sensed that politicians did not listen to them or care about the area in everyday life (De Los Reyes et al., 2014). Taken in the context of the findings in this dissertation, both cases stand out as important examples of the barriers to integration that rise from a lack of the reciprocal relations between immigrant communities and state actors and the consequences of a lack of immigrant agency.

Immigrant agency in Canada and Sweden

The central question of this dissertation was: to what extent do different public management models impact immigrant agency in the labour market policy community? This chapter summarizes the findings in this study. It starts with an account for how the different aspects of this question have been explored. It then presents an overview of the findings from each chapter in the dissertation. The chapter ends with concluding suggestions for public policy as well as a
summary of how the evidence also problematizes findings in the existing scholarly literature, together with suggestions for future research based on these observations.

This thesis has explored how immigrant agency can be conceptualized. The study hypothesized that explanations for the potential success for immigrant labour market integration should be sought in the space for socio-political agency that the polity affords immigrants, rather than in the universality of the welfare regime. This suggestion was based on the role Canada’s management model has traditionally given to NGOs as important in social service delivery (Ley, 2007), which contrasts to Sweden’s reliance on public agencies to deliver these services. Bourdieu’s theory of practice was applied to this field, operationalizing the key operative terms of Habitus and Capital.

The role of the institutional context of the labour market policy community was also explored. This was done by engaging with how the public administration of the policy community was organized and whether immigrant actors have access to the arenas where this policy is decided. Exploring this, the dissertation found that the political opportunity structure in Canada has been more accepting of NGOs as social agents, while Sweden’s political opportunity structure have constrained such bottom-up initiatives in the policy community, affecting network structures and the accumulation of social and economic capital.

The evidence provided by the respondents supports this hypothesis. It strongly suggests that the situation for immigrant agency is palpably different in Sweden and Canada. The frequency of indicators from each management model is collected in Table 3, which summarizes the instances of management model tools as they were used in the two countries. The table is based on the chapter summary, below, where these instances are described more fully. The compilation shows that a mix of practices from several different management models can be found in each country.
It demonstrates a difference in balance between the management models in Canada and Sweden.

In the former, there are more instances of bottom-up management practices than top-down such.

In the latter, there is a clear dominance of top-down management practices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management Model</th>
<th>Instances Sweden</th>
<th>Instances Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchist Way</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalist Way</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum Top-down management methods</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist Way</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian Way</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum Bottom-up management methods</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An investigation of the types of capacity immigrant actors could leverage to influence policy or deliver labour market services to their constituencies was also conducted. It showed that an important number of Canadian immigrant community actors have managed to grow in size and scope from what Cordero-Guzmán refers to as a Hometown Association, HTA, to an agency of metropolitan service delivery scope in both Toronto and Vancouver (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005). They have large staffs, sometimes several offices, stable funding streams and are often involved in partnerships and dialogues with public funders. There are also support structures in place ranging from information sharing to skills development and even strategic funding available.

Meanwhile, the Swedish immigrant actors have no such support structures, few networks, only occasional connections with civil servants who often consider them untrustworthy dilettantes, and they are continuously excluded from key networks or partnerships. The most accessible funding streams are so small that they cannot be depended on for consistent service delivery. As a result, immigrant community actors confront serious challenges in terms of infrastructure, which they often seem unable to solve. Thus, they are often momentary, transient and lacking of
permanence. They flare up for some time, the manifestation of the ambitions of a single champion, and when this champion burns out or goes somewhere else, the organization implodes.

**Chapter summary**

Chapter Two presented the theory of immigrant agency and then operationalized it in the cases of Canada and Sweden. It showed how the Bourdieuan theory of practice can facilitate the understanding of the relationship between immigrant communities, the actors that form to represent them and their interactions with the surrounding host society, particularly the public agencies. The chapter operationalized the theory on the research on immigrant community actors in general.

Chapter Three followed up by doing the same on the research on such actors in Sweden and Canada. The findings in this scholarship indicated a low degree of agency afforded to immigrant community actors in the former case, whereas this type of actor has been acknowledged as service deliverers nationally and in several Canadian cities.

Chapter Four introduced Bourdieu’s concept of Habitus and its significance for identifying a social field and the homogenizing effects of that field in terms of how actors develop cultural capital. It then presented Grid/Group Cultural Theory, a typology for categorizing public management models. The chapter showed how these models impact the formations of social and cultural capital in a policy community and the implications thereof on immigrant agency.

Chapter Five investigated the history of the labour market field in the two countries. Using Hood’s typology based on Grid/Group Cultural Theory, it found that the Swedish history has been characterized by strongly centralized Hierarchist policy, from the end of World War Two until the end of the 1980s. With the 1990s, Individualist style New Public Management ideas...
were introduced, but even so, this shift seemed confined to redefining the relationship between different public agencies on national and local levels as well as between them and state owned companies in contractual terms. Governmental actors thus remained dominant even after the shift.

Canadian history was characterized by considerably more fluidity, to a large extent fuelled by federal-provincial tensions over the contested policy community. Both the federal and provincial governments embarked on a Hierarchist project, but as neither could assert their supremacy over the policy community in a decisive manner, it was never entrenched. Meanwhile, immigrant community actors could operate and provide their communities with services. During the 1970s and even more the 1980s, governments increasingly turned to them for service delivery consistent with the values of the Egalitarian Way. When New Public Management was introduced in Canada in the 1990s, these actors retained a position on the field.

Beginning the empirical part of the dissertation, Chapter Six focused on cultural capital in the form of the skill set of immigrant community actors. The chapter showed that immigrant community actors could leverage the internalization of the community Habitus of these communities to deliver services more effectively to their constituencies. However, in Sweden, they lacked managerial skills, and found it challenging writing proposals. The Canadian actors had stronger skills, but found that improvements could be made. Also, some of them had the resources needed to access consultants to write proposals for them. These conclusions were consistent with findings from previous research, for instance Cordero-Guzmán’s typology that categorizes immigrant community actors by size, where the larger can leverage greater resources that the smaller lack, and Korazim’s study of how the larger organizations tend to become more professionalized and bureaucratized (Korazim, 1988; Cordero-Guzmán, 2005).
Chapter Seven investigated how cultural capital manifested within the public agencies as skills, and tracing the impact of these competencies on the structure of the policy community. The more extensive role of the Swedish public agencies as service deliverers, sometimes in competition with other agencies created problems. Their capacity to deliver services to communities was found to be constrained by the comparative ethnic homogeneity of the higher levels of staff, the lacking capacity to provide users with comfort, and understanding their needs. Also, their formal management skills were found to be weaker than often assumed. Respondents consistently expressed values informed by the top-down management models of the Hierarchist and Fatalist Ways. In Canada, civil servants had a less interventionist role, and the legacy of the Egalitarian Way came across through their stronger insight into the complexity of ethnic communities and value of immigrant serving organizations. However, programs were designed to service the needs of the public administration rather than users, providing evidence of the Hierarchist Way. Likewise, evidence of political cooptation was also provided. The findings were consistent with findings regarding the historic marginalization of immigrant community actors in Sweden and the inclusion of these in the policy community in Canada in explored in previous research as discussed in Chapters Three and Five.

Chapter Eight explored how cultural capital mattered for how immigrant community actors could gain status and recognition within the public agency social sphere. In Sweden, where public agencies have dominated social service delivery, they have a particularly important role as gatekeepers. Evidence suggested that the civil servants, conditioned by Hierarchist and Fatalist public management models, often framed immigrant community actors as suspect, incompetent, dangerous opportunists and potentially negative for immigrant integration because they undermine the policy process by their narrow self-interest. Meanwhile, they frame themselves, as
civil servants, as guardians of the common good and fairness. In Canada immigrant community actors were instead seen as experts about their communities. These attitudes are consistent with the adoption of values from the Egalitarian Way into the public agency organizational culture.

Chapter Nine turned to the distribution of the social capital of the field, specifically the structure of the networks formed between organizations in each arena. The administrative models conditioned the structure of these even as these networks are important for immigrant agency. The chapter concluded that networks in Sweden were strong between public agencies, but excluded immigrant community actors, again corroborating the impact of the Hierarchical Way. In Canada, the major immigrant community actors often had developed strong networks as well to the public agencies, sometimes even being asked to accept funding for program delivery. However, these entrenched networks might create barriers for newcomers trying to enter the arena. These findings are indicative of the strong influence of the Egalitarian Way on the organizational structure of the policy community.

Chapter Ten mapped the opportunity structure for immigrant community actors applying for funding for the delivery of social services. The chapter concluded that the funding levels are much lower in Sweden, and that getting approval is difficult, again corroborating the influence of top-down management methods. Evidence also indicated the practice of Fatalist onerous accountability regimes. Such practises were also present in Canada, where respondents spoke at length about the demanding project submission procedures.

Chapter Eleven was devoted to the conditions immigrant community actors faced after getting a proposal accepted for funding. Performance measurements and procurement systems, methods informed by the Individualist Way introduced during the 1990s, did not take the competence of immigrant community actors into account in Sweden. In Canada, which also
introduced such Individualist tools, these actors did have some influence, though the extent could be debated. The historical presence of immigrant community actors in the Canadian field has thus had at least some influence on the implementation of the Individualist methods there. The finding constitutes a significant difference between Canada and Sweden.

**The effect of management styles on agency**

As the above has shown, using Grid/Group Theory together with the theory of practice to understand the dynamics of relationships on this field suggests that certain public management models are more conducive to immigrant agency than others. Specifically, bottom-up models like the Individualist and Egalitarian Ways would be more favourable for opening up the opportunity structure of immigrant community actors. Top-down methods, like the Hierarchist and Fatalist Way, would on the other hand be expected to create more barriers for them. This can be illustrated by discussing the picture that emerges from the narratives in this study in terms of the influence of each management practice on immigrant agency, understood as the effects on social, cultural and economic capital. These provide significant nuance to the existing scholarly literature.

The section starts with a discussion on how the management models have affected the potential for immigrant community actors to accumulate cultural, social and economic capital, thus contrasting the potential for immigrant agency in Canada and Sweden. Next follows an account of each management style, where each segment discusses how the respective management model is manifested, and includes a table summarizing these observations. The enumeration in these tables gives a visual idea of the frequency of each management model in each country. That frequency is itself an indicator of how entrenched the particular management model is in the policy community in question.
At the same time, different methods and perspectives will vary in how influential they are for practices in the field. For example, a value framing of a particular social group can exert strong, albeit subtle, influence on a range of practices, even though it might just count as a single indicator in the below account. The quantification here should therefore be regarded as a heuristic device for tracking the degree to which a particular model has shaped the Habitus of the public administration. It helps visualizing trends, but should be related to the overall context of other practices. In what follows, the evidence of the Hierarchist Way, and then the Fatalist, Individualist and Egalitarian Way, are given respectively. That is followed by conclusions regarding the relations between the immigrant communities and the public agencies in the two countries.

**Effects of the Hierarchist Way**

As noted in the theoretical section, governments in both countries and on all levels adopted methods from the Hierarchist Way to at least some degree at some point in the post-war era, consistent with the popularity of Weberian administration at the time. Because of a variety of factors, Hierarchist practices became more entrenched in Sweden than Canada. Judging from the typical narrative on management trends, classic Weberian administration has been displaced by New Public Management. However, the testimonials give reason to qualify that.

In both cases, the legacy of Hierarchist practices is still felt in everyday service delivery. Respondents speak of the complications of jurisdictional compartmentalization, a phenomenon that occurs in both countries. This is to be expected. Even with the introduction of New Public Management, one thing that remains a constant within public management is that the administration is the extended arm of the executive branch of the government, locally, regionally or nationally. For a government to be able to govern, it has to steer, and for elected officials to be
able to fulfill their roles as executives within the system, the civil servants ultimately have to remain accountable to them. This is even implied in the term ‘civil servant’; the bureaucrat is a servant, whose function is to carry out the decisions made somewhere else in the system. This subservience is foundational for the system to such a degree that it is difficult to conceive of alternatives. It might therefore be more accurate to say that New Public Management has been introduced into the already existing framework of Weberian management and modified it, rather than saying that there has been a clear break away from latter to the former. This is also consistent with how Pollitt and Bouckhaert describe the situation; in many cases, such as Canada, the shift was more radical in rhetoric than in practice, at least in the initial stages (Pollitt & Bouckhaert, 2004).

That type of framing also facilitates the understanding of why the frontline respondents express frustration over how these jurisdictional boundaries impede the service delivery. Those administrative units are designed to serve the needs of that system, particularly the executive, not the needs of the agencies. They will thus have to devise strategies to cope with the existing organizational context to mitigate the negative effects on the accumulation of social capital as best as they can. This commonality is summarized in Table 4 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchist Indicator</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictional compartmentalization</td>
<td>Public administration organized to fit executive’s needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More significantly, however, was the manner in which the Hierarchist Way manifested differently in the two countries. In Sweden, Hierarchism had a strong presence. Respondents continuously emphasized the dominance of the public agencies in the policy community. First, the self-image of civil servants seems infused with the Hierarchist perspective, where they are
vested with ‘expert’ authority, cast as ‘guardians of fairness’, while immigrant community actors
are considered dilettantes by virtue of their lacking capacity to see the ‘bird’s eye-view’ that
comes with the position the civil servants have.

Moreover, they retained some service delivery, meaning that they effectively compete with
other agencies and thus retain a vested interest in the service delivery jurisdiction. The low
project funding levels available to immigrant community actors wanting to engage in social
service delivery is thus understandable. At the same time, they also have considerable
gatekeeping power over who else becomes a service deliverer, either by funding procurement
and formulating the criteria for that, or by having an effective veto over EU-projects, the other
considerable funding stream. The significance of these powers became clearly expressed when
respondents from immigrant community actors related testimonials of how public agencies
wanted to co-opt or simply outright steal project ideas from these actors to implement them in-
house and thus access and retain the substantial funding for those services as well. Such
experiences mean that immigrant community actors will have to approach the public agencies
with care.

When formulating the proposals for procurement or projects, the respondents emphasized the
need for the applicant to express their ideas and competence in the appropriate specialized
jargon, as defined by the public agencies, to convey meanings in the terminology the civil
servants wanted to see. To do so, immigrant actors need to accumulate and then activate cultural
capital manifested as that skill. Respondents emphasized how select this vocabulary was. The
degree of challenge involved was demonstrated by how even some of the civil servants struggled
to grasp this jargon. If they found it inaccessible, the difficulties must be even steeper for actors
who exist in a completely different Habitus.
The descriptions of the network structure also most closely fit the corporatist type: strongly entrenched networks predominantly made up public agencies on national and municipal level as well as some invited trusted actors, mostly from employer organizations, with labour organizations notably absent. Practically no immigrant community actors are included. The evidence thus suggests a lack of bridging capital, and immigrant community actors in particular being excluded from significant arenas of decision-making and consultation. Indeed, immigrant actors did not seem able to develop networks between themselves.

Hierarchist methods were also identified during the implementation stage. This was particularly true for performance measures. While this concept is typically associated with Individualist management styles, in this case civil servants commented on cases where those could be used as quotas for service delivery, rather than as tools to develop best practices. Such practises come across as a way to co-opt the Individualist tool and implement it within Hierarchist continuity.

The insufficient capacity to orient in immigrant community social spaces, including institutional blind spots, is also consistent with socialization into the Hierarchist perspective. What is particularly interesting in this case is the example of employing members from the target group as representatives of the community. They were recruited to both represent the public agency in the community and represent the community perspective within the public agency. The attempt seems to have met with limited success, precisely because of the hierarchical nature of the organization: these persons remained within its lower echelons and thus had limited impact on agenda setting and policy-making. The combined effect of these is to undermine the public agencies’ ability to identify user needs.
Further, the exercise of public authority, which is inherent to the role of the public agency, impedes their capacity to create a trust-based rapport with the users. Instead of entrusting that role to actors in a better position to do so, like NGOs in general and community actors in particular, the Swedish civil servants consistently try to rely on in-house solutions that fail to address many central issues. Notably, respondents from immigrant community actors needed to ‘reactivate’ users pacified after experiencing paternalist service delivery systems. As the data showed, users that had gone through the public agency services had become conditioned to passivity, compelled by the system to cease taking initiative since the gatekeeping civil servants continuously retained the power of decision-making and referrals. When such users entered the program delivered by an immigrant community actor, the service delivering agency had to re-motivate users who were no longer used to have space to take initiative.

Given their historical centrality in the field, the assumption that Swedish public agencies were administratively competent organizations is not very surprising. Yet, for the most part, the cultural capital vested in this form of organization seemed to be vested in it by virtue of its position and its capacity to define what would create and define that cultural capital for itself, rather than by any clear distinction in terms of competence. In other words, these agencies have translated public authority into cultural capital. The indicators of Hierarchism specific for the Swedish context are summarized in Table 5, below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Indicators for the Hierarchist Way in Swedish management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hierarchist indicators in Sweden</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-house service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low amount of project funding available for outside actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto rights over EU-project funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Copying project ideas
Ensures that the ‘competent’ organization retains jurisdictional control over service delivery.

Cooptation of performance measures
Facilitates steering over individual services.

Lacking capacity to orient in the immigrant community Habitus
Exercising public authority is seen as more significant than being able to understand the social space of immigrant users.

Impeded capacity to create a rapport and trust with users
Exercising public authority is seen as more significant than creating a rapport with immigrant users.

Pacifying users
Exercising public authority is seen as more significant than creating a space for user initiative.

Closed network structures
Only authoritative experts are selected to participate.

In the Canadian field, the Hierarchist Way is not as prominent but present all the same. There were several dimensions of the procurement process that seemed influenced by this management model. This included the power to re-interpret the clauses of contracts when there is a policy need for doing so, demands on what user demographics the funded agency can serve and the jurisdictional compartmentalization, which can still impede the service delivery agency’s relations with the community. Another illustration of the remaining influence of this value system was the incident described by respondents involving a major mainstream NGO lacking community connections awarded a contract independently of the procurement system, based mostly on the perception of its competence. It seemed informed mostly by arbitrary policy decisions at higher levels of the public administration, disconnected from realities on the ground.

The most interesting dimension of public agency power, however, and its capacity to shape the understanding and the special jargon of the entire field, is its potential role in defining central operative terms used by all professionals in the field, in this case the terminology surrounding the typology of service delivery agencies, specifically the label Immigrant Serving Organization.

The indicators for Hierarchist values and methods in Canada are summarized in Table 6, below:
### Table 6 Indicators for the Hierarchist Way in Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchist indicator in Canada</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reinterpreting procurement contract clauses</td>
<td>Retaining the capacity to steer policy and shift policy at will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidelining the procurement process by assigning contracts to major NGO based on perception</td>
<td>Retaining the capacity to steer policy and shift policy at will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining the term Immigrant Serving Organization</td>
<td>Retaining the capacity to steer policy and shift policy at will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaining the control over user demographics</td>
<td>Retaining the capacity to steer policy and shift policy at will.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, of the two fields, the values, methods and perspectives of the Hierarchist Way come across as more strongly entrenched in Sweden than in Canada. It is twice as frequent in the former as it is in the latter. Methods of the Fatalist Way were also present in both policy communities, and it was strongly associated with the shift towards New Public Management.

The findings challenge the traditional classification of that administrative order as an Individualist style method only. However, there were also differences in how this management model manifested in the two fields.

**Effects of the Fatalist Way**

The primary similarity that respondents identified with regards to Fatalist management methods concerned the high workload that resulted from onerous accountability procedures. These were attached to all funding streams in many ways. A common issue interviewees invoked was the need to track users and budget expenditures in detail during operations. The amount of time needed to administer these procedures likely meant that service delivery was impacted negatively, thus undermining outcomes. These methods were consistent with the principles guiding the workfare policies that have also been observed in the two countries. The finding is summarized for convenience in Table 7:
Even so, the accountability regimes manifested in different ways in the two fields. In the Swedish case, the EU-project owners had to track the whereabouts of users on an hourly basis, or lose funding. That intrusive practice disrupts the relationship between service delivery agency and user, since it de facto compels the agency staff to act as enforcement agents against the latter.

Likewise, the Fatalist values come across in how civil servants seem to have internalized a social construction of immigrant community actors as unreliable opportunists. The pursuit of immigrant community interest is also seen as a dichotomous opposite of the pursuit of the common good. That creates a substantial barrier for immigrant community actors trying to build cultural capital within the policy community Habitus. The Swedish Fatalist practices are summarized in Table 8:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fatalist Indicator</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tracking user whereabouts</td>
<td>Assuming that users are opportunistic free-riders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing immigrant community actors as untrustworthy</td>
<td>Assuming that immigrant community actors are opportunistic free-riders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Canada, Fatalism takes other forms. Respondents comment on the very encompassing documentation needed for proposals, sometimes consisting of several hundred pages. Also, respondents speak about the encumbrance associated with very frequent report filing during the implementation stage. The rotation of civil servants is also an example. It undermines long-term collaboration and the establishment of rapport between immigrant community actors and public agencies. Fatalism is also expressed through the micro-management of funding for salaries and the refusal to fund core services. This is an odd order in a public management environment that
supposedly mimics market mechanisms. In the private market, customers pay for the entire production cost, as determined by the producer. In these cases, however, the funders are not prepared to pay to do so and even demand to retain control over how the producer spends the acquired money. While this is informed by democratic accountability ideals, they are difficult to reconcile with market principles and clash in this case. The Canadian Fatalist practices are summarized in Table 9, below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fatalist indicator</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Micro-managing salaries</td>
<td>Assuming that service delivery agencies are opportunistic free-riders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal to provide core funding</td>
<td>Assuming that service delivery agencies are opportunistic free-riders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large proposals</td>
<td>Assuming that service delivery agencies are opportunistic free-riders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High frequency of detailed progress reporting</td>
<td>Assuming that service delivery agencies are opportunistic free-riders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotating civil servants</td>
<td>Assuming that service delivery agencies are opportunistic free-riders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Effects of the Individualist Way**

With the introduction of New Public Management, tools and methods from the Individualist Way entered the policy communities of both countries in a substantive fashion. It is primarily represented in both fields by the adoption of procurement as a funding mechanism for service delivery. However, it is not clear that procurement operates entirely along the principles the proponents advocated. Likewise, the outcomes expected might not have been realized.

The procurement mechanism shares some significant attributes in the two countries. For example, respondents seemed to react similarly to how the point allocation for submitted proposals and performance measures might not sufficiently capture significant competencies in the field, specifically the capacity to navigate the social space of immigrant communities. This is
an area where these community actors excel as a result of having internalized that Habitus into the organizational culture and can leverage for this service delivery.

An interesting problem confronting administrations in both Canada and Sweden is the lack of capacity to track the clients’ long-term progress. This is tied to the nature of program based funding, but also to the integrity of the program participants: Users leaving the social service programs are under no obligation to remain in contact with the organization or public authority (or both) and there is not much service operators can do about that, notwithstanding the consequences for information gathering for developing best practices.

Interestingly, procurement in either case cannot be said to operate according to the market mechanisms that inspired the management model. Unlike in the market, the funder and the user are not the same party in this arena. Instead the two are clearly separated and have very different social positions. The funders thus lack the perspective and are disconnected from the user’s experiences, both being outside the labour market and going through the services that are aimed at providing a bridge back into it. This is problematic, because it means that the public funder might make different demands on the services than the users would, and this might impact the development of cost-efficiency in these services when procurement is supposed to enhance it.

Moreover, the public funder sets the conditions and decides which competencies are valid. The point allocation system used during the calls for proposals and the performance indicators create the incentive structure. In that way, the public funder retains controls over both the supply and the demand that guides the behaviour of the actors in the field. The power dynamics are thus not reoriented from top-down to bottom-up, or at least not as substantively as the advocates of procurement professed would happen. Service producers seem to have some influence in the arena that would be unlikely to have in classic Hierarchist or Fatalist management, but not as
much as they would have if the primary supply and demand driver occurred between user and service delivery agency, rather than between funder and service delivery agency as is now the case.

The limited impact of the Individualist Way on how skills within the policy community Habitus in the two fields were framed was, in this context, quite interesting. Given the significance of the shift towards New Public Management (Hood, 2000; Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004), it could be expected that the impact on organizational culture would be quite profound. Instead, it seems to have been limited to the re-organization of relationships within the sectors on a formal level. Cultural capital manifestations do not seem to be strongly informed by Individualist values. The indicators of Individualist Way methods in the two countries are summarized in Table 10:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individualist Indicator</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>Using competitive market mechanisms to increase cost-efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurements</td>
<td>Tracking service outcomes to increase cost-efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Points allocations</td>
<td>Evaluating proposals in a ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ way to ascertain which actor is the most competent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient capacity to capture community actor competence in performance measures &amp; proposal points allocation systems</td>
<td>Systems geared towards easily quantifiable indicators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also some significant differences in how the procurement methods were used in the two countries. In Sweden, the fact that the public agencies retained some service delivery meant that they effectively competed with the contracted agencies to some extent competed. This undermined their role as neutral arbiter of contracts and the evaluation of service delivery
outcomes. Also, the field was dominated by a handful of major educational corporations in the field. These instances are collected in Table 11:

**Table 11: Indicators of the Individualist Way in Sweden**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individualist indicator</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domination by a handful of major educational corporations</td>
<td>Capacity to create a rapport with users and navigate immigrant community Habitus deemed irrelevant in procurement competition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Canadian field, the Individualist Way emerged in three primary manifestations. First, several respondents commented on how the Canadian immigrant community actors used their economic resources to hire consultants familiar with the specialized jargon needed to produce a strong proposal. Second, at least one respondent argues that the opportunity structure has opened up, giving smaller actors a chance to enter service delivery that would not have existed otherwise. Also, there was a degree of meritocracy manifested in the recognition of historically demonstrated performance. Even so, many also commented on the emergence of competition between community actors submitting proposals, and some reported tensions between large and small actors. These indicators are presented in Table 12:

**Table 12: Indicators of the Individualist Way in Canada**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individualist indicator</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognizing past performance as meriting in procurement</td>
<td>The most competent actor should win the contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting consultants to write strong procurement proposals</td>
<td>Proposal writing is a skill distinct from service delivery, but key to remain competitive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opened up opportunity structure</td>
<td>The most competent actor should win the contract, regardless of historical relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition between immigrant community actors during submission time</td>
<td>Competition increases cost-efficiency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Effects of the Egalitarian Way**

The Egalitarian Way was considerably more integrated in the Canadian policy community than was the case in the Swedish one. That came across in many ways, including the number of
immigrant community actors in the Canadian arena, as well as their size. Even so, it was not completely absent from the latter. Most significantly, actors within both policy communities tended to frame the competencies of the immigrant community actors the same way when prompted. Many respondents emphasized that the forte of the immigrant community actors was to be found in their attachment to the community and their ability to leverage that in-depth understanding of the conditions to facilitate the creating of trust-based relations with the users. The community attachment is thus transformed into cultural capital, a skill that is a key for service delivery outcomes. Even in Sweden’s strongly Hierarchist environment, civil servant respondents seemed confident that the inclusion of these actors would become increasingly common over time, suggesting that a shift towards the perspectives of the Egalitarian Way is not outside the scope of possibilities. Even so, this is not sufficient to argue that there are actual Egalitarian style management methods in place in both countries.

The primary difference, however, lay in the extent to which the Egalitarian Way came across as virtually absent in the Swedish field whereas it seemed quite entrenched in the Canadian field. This emerged in many ways. For example, Canadian civil servants tended to construct immigrant community actors as experts in the field. They were even framed as the normative common sense service delivery agency to a large extent, evident in that the procurement process itself was explicitly geared towards non-profit organizations.

Further, there were many testimonials regarding entrenched relations between public agencies and immigrant community actors, like partnerships, support for information sharing, community capacity building and institutionalized incubators, though perhaps not sufficient to meet the actual needs in the field. The community actors also supported each other to at least some extent, circumventing procurement to a degree. While informal relations among larger actors might have
had negative effects on the interaction with smaller actors, the narratives do suggest significant bridging social capital between immigrant communities and between immigrant community actors and public agencies. These relations on the sector also translated in dialogues on performance indicators in an effort to develop more qualitative measuring tools, as public agencies made an effort, however symbolic, to collect feedback.

The presence of the United Way in Canada is also highly noteworthy. When management practices have proven challenging for service delivery agencies, the United Way has filled an important function. This umbrella organization has the ability to provide funding and take capacity building actions that have been mitigating, through both supplementary funding that played a key strategic role, but also through its action as an incubator, transferring key skills, such as the formal organizational skills needed to master the creation of bylaws and infrastructure needed for service delivery. This is, notably, a non-government body. Thus, civil society has mobilized to fill a need when government policies have become detrimental to bottom-up initiatives. This should not be under-estimated.

The Canadian administrative history is more eclectic, and this comes across in the responses. The values consistent with the Egalitarian Way are more commonly invoked than in Sweden. Examples include how the respondents speak of the need to establish contacts and communication with community actors to facilitate the assessment of user needs and the importance of community capacity building. In this sphere, the Canadian agencies have thus accumulated stronger cultural capital valid in the immigrant communities than their Swedish counterparts have. The findings from the Canadian case are summarized in Table 13 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13: Indicators of the Egalitarian Way in Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian Indicator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Overall effects in the field

Notably, the different historical trajectories in management practices persistently reflects in the field and continue to influence new ideas entering the field. The Swedish field was historically dominated primarily by the Hierarchist management model. When Individualist New Public Management and Fatalist Workfare regimes were introduced to the field, the combination was articulated in a way particular for Sweden. The Hierarchist and Fatalist Ways are both top-down and this commonality increases their compatibility in important ways. While the Individualist Way is not, central concepts and tools of that management model have been informed by values, framings and perspectives from the Hierarchist and Fatalist Ways.

For example, the introduction of procurement did not open up networks for immigrant community actors. Moreover, the procurement process commonly includes a point allocation system to evaluate each proposal in a ‘neutral and objective fashion’ for the purpose of identifying the most competent and cost-effective candidate of the field. However, this was introduced into a field where the organizational culture already framed immigrants and immigrant community actors as dilettantes and potentially dangerous free-riders. Thus, the likelihood that the civil servants who had internalized this perspective would recognize the skill profile that constitutes a community actor’s primary strengths as significant, like navigating the
social space or creating a culturally sensitive trust-based rapport with the users, was not great. Instead, the process became designed in such a way that half a dozen major educational companies dominate the field.

This could be contrasted to the Canadian case, where the field had a notable influence of the Egalitarian Way during the 1980s. When procurement and workfare regimes were introduced here, the result was different. The networks between public funders and immigrant communities already existed, and so civil servants had instead internalized an understanding of these actors as experts of their own communities. A procurement process that consequently is geared specifically towards non-profit organizations is quite consistent with this pre-existing framing.

The Bourdieuan theory of practice is particularly apt for elucidating the dynamics of this comparative analysis. The interview material suggests differences in terms of which actors hold power over shaping and creating cultural capital in the two countries. An important indicator of the importance of that power was presented in Chapter Six, which showed that immigrant community actors need to master a particular jargon to submit successful funding proposals. Figure 17 shows the situation in Canada. At least some immigrant community actors were included in the sub-government area in Canada. Civil servants in Chapter Eight described them as ‘community experts’ and they portrayed were as part of the significant networks and successful applicants in Chapters Nine, Ten and Eleven. However, that positioning was not to be taken for granted. Success was dependent much on size, and smaller Hometown Association-type organizations generally have had a more difficult time voicing their concerns than the agencies with metropolitan scope outreach. The latter tended to have a much easier time accessing funding than the former did, and also had at least some influence on how performance indicators were designed. Also, the playing field was not level, with public agencies being able
to reinterpret contracts and having more power over the indicators and accountability regimes than the service delivery agencies did. Thus, the arrow from public agencies is here illustrated as thicker than the one connecting the metropolitan level immigrant community actors to the cultural capital box.

That fact notwithstanding, there is some possibility to leave the attentive public area and enter the sub-government area. That is not to suggest that doing so would be easy. Many respondents indicate that doing so would involve a long and hard struggle, but the existence of the United Way and other incubators does go some way to mitigate some of the barriers involved.

Figure 17: Cultural capital formation in Canada

The Swedish situation is illustrated in Figure 18 is a different one. Chapter Nine showed how immigrant community actors in Sweden were marginalized from networks on the sub-government level of the policy community, and Chapters Ten and Eleven showed that very few
immigrant community actors could access any funding besides the municipal project grants. Likewise, Chapter Eight highlighted that Swedish civil servants constructed immigrant community actors as potentially dangerous free riders that tried to co-opt the policy process, rather than legitimate partners for collaboration or actors with valuable expertise. Thus, Figure 18 has a strong line between the attentive public and the sub-government, showing how difficult it is, particularly given the absence of support structures, for immigrant community actors to enter the latter. Also, the public agencies seem to be quite dominant in setting the standards for what should become cultural capital in policy community Habitus. Not even the respondents from non-community actors seemed to have much dialogue with public agencies in that regard, or capacity to influence performance indicators.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 18: Cultural Capital formation in Sweden**

The organizational culture of the public administrations of the two countries was informed by a certain set of perspectives, understandings and set of behaviours that are seen as appropriate.
As the figures above show, this social space is not static. Moreover, when a major shift in the administrative practice occurs on a global level, the national and local levels will also be impacted. However, as these ideas are introduced, the actors within the Habitus will use their own agency, their cultural capital, to inform their interpretation of these new practices, which will then be shaped by those previous understandings. Thus, procurement can take different shapes in different policy fields. In neither of the cases did it displace the previous practices or perspectives as much as complement them. It might be more appropriate to speak of the Swedish field as a form of Hierarchist procurement, whereas the Canadian one came across more as an Egalitarian procurement in the testimonials provided.
The difference in opportunity structure between the two fields thus remains stark. Canadian immigrant community actors do confront barriers, like high workloads for producing competitive proposals and continuous reporting. These can be difficult for new actors to overcome. Even so, there are some avenues available that can facilitate that process. Swedish immigrant community actors have none, and also have to remain on guard lest the public agencies co-opt or simply take their ideas and use them to access the funding themselves.

These processes are illustrated in Figures 19 and 20. They capture how the social structure of the policy community Habitus have been highly significant for how the introduction of a new public management model has been dependent on the old administrative practices. The socially informed schemes of perception of these models have emphasized and highlighted some aspects of the New Public Management paradigm over others, and thus actors within the Habitus have chosen some “…paths to take” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53), informed by these values and framings. The framing facilitates an understanding for why the same management reform was interpreted and operationalized in different ways in different social spaces. This relates to the capacity of immigrant actors, in the form of representative Non-Government Organizations, NGOs, to
generate and draw upon the needed resources, manifested as material and immaterial capital, for action.

**Policy relevance**

Inequality between immigrants and the native born population exits in both Canada (Pendakur & Pendakur, 2002; Frenette & Morissette, 2005) and Sweden (*Rapport integration 2001*, 2002; *Rapport integration 2003*, 2004; Andersson, 2007) and has occupied concerned scholars in both countries. However, contrary to the expectations based by welfare state theorists (Olsen, 2002; Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin, Headey, Muffels, & Dirven, 1999), the labour market gap is bigger in Sweden than in Canada. The gap in employment rate between native-born and foreign resident in Sweden was about 14 percentage points in 2003, while the equivalent Canadian number was closer to 3 percentage points. These numbers have been persistent over time (Statistics Canada, 2003; *Labour force survey 2009*, 2009; Ekberg, 2007; Gilmore, 2008) and in Sweden, the gap has existed since the late 1970s. As mentioned in the introduction, the unemployment level for foreign citizens was 4.5 per cent in 1978, three times higher than the 1.8 per cent rating for Swedish citizens (Olderin & Karlsson, 1978).

The Swedish emphasis on refugee reception, in contrast to the Canadian focus on labour force immigration, is commonly argued to explain these numbers. This could be a partial explanation for the gap, as it has been shown incomes for Swedish immigrants do not fully reflect their human capital (le Grand & Szulkin, 2002).

This study has several implications for policy-making. While the state can be an agent for public good, it should not be assumed to *a priori* be so. The findings in this study indicate quite the contrary, that the agency of state might not be the most competent deliverer of social services in society, and that it can even become an obstruction to integration. It seems clear that the
management model impacts service outcomes to at least some extent. Moreover, that impact seems to occur on many levels. A particularly interesting effect concerns the impact on organizational culture, effectively shaping the policy community Habitus. As civil servants are immersed in the organization, they internalize the values through socialization. As Bourdieu captured in his theory of practice, this has repercussions on how they perceive themselves and the world and the schema they use to understand and evaluate it for the purpose of problem solving. This is what he refers to as a “system of cognitive …structures...” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). He connects that to actions, ways of experiencing, and expressing emotions and thinking (Maton, 2008), embodied in the individual members as “dispositions, schemas, forms of know-how and competence” (Crossley, 2001, p. 83). As discussed in Chapter Four, Habitus is both a way to describe social position and also a way to describe how the individual within that Habitus express this position as adopted and internalized social reflexes through similar attitudes and behaviours that are considered acceptable in the social space (Bourdieu, 1990).

These matters have to be taken into consideration for policy making and the issue of organizing service delivery. The organizational culture and perspectives produced by the Habitus will have inertia and can impact reform attempts. Likewise, the role of Habitus for the public administration’s capacity to solve social issues has to be acknowledged. This study presents an important example of the latter. Civil servants in Sweden framed immigrants as incompetent dilettantes and potentially dangerous free-riders whose self-interest driven agenda might co-opt the policy process away from the common good, which could only be safe-guarded by public agencies retaining the ownership of problem-solving and service delivery. The immigrant community actors were not engaged in networks or supported in any substantial way. In Canada, by contrast, civil servants talk about immigrant community actors as experts in their
communities and engaged them in dialogue and partnerships of different kinds. In this case, the understanding of the immigrant community actor and the actions taken in relation to them are consistent. Keeping a distance is a logical outcome of the mistrust-frame, just as engaging in partnership is logical if the actor is seen as competent.

This raises questions about matters of organization and the roles of public executives, the administration, the front line service deliverers, the users and the relationship between them. The common denominator for these narratives is that top-down systems are disempowering for immigrant community actors, while bottom-up systems are conducive for immigrant agency. This is related to the degree of rule-boundness of the former types of management, but also to how each perspective frames the users and user representatives. In the Hierarchist Way, the immigrant actors are seen as incompetent, objects for the benevolent attentions of the ‘expert’ civil servants. In the Fatalist Way, immigrant actors are considered dangerous rent-seekers, whose negative influence must be checked.

The data suggests that the solution would lie in the introduction of a higher degree of substantive Egalitarian and/or Individualist practices into the policy community. The degree to which this has been done to date in the two cases comes across as incomplete. The public administration retains the power to define what constitutes competence and what does not in a way that may be problematic. The interviews show that the capacities central to the community actors, the ability to navigate the immigrant community social space and create a trust-based rapport with the users, might go without sufficient recognition if the public administration lacks capacity to understand these. If such a disconnect exists, the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery may be impacted.
The material does not provide any clear recommendation as to whether the Egalitarian or Individualist Way is the best suited for delivering labour market integration services to immigrant communities. Both management models seem to have strengths and weaknesses. The Egalitarian Way seems to ensure the development of strong social capital of both the bridging and bonding types. As such, it seems to be conducive to the establishment of strong partnerships between both immigrant community actors as well as between them and the public agencies. On the other hand, the interview data seem to suggest a risk that too strong clientelist networks also could close off the opportunity structure for new actors, and that should not be disregarded. The Individualist Way seems to be a good solution for that particular weakness. It opens up a policy community sub-government to new actors. On the other hand, respondents in this study did express concern about the competitive nature of that management model, which undermines the potential to build strong partnerships that can achieve long-term service delivery objectives. Thus, the strength of one model is the weakness of the other.

Further, pursuing bottom-up management models more vigorously would shift these functions to those immersed in the immigrant community who have a more immediate stake in successful service delivery. However, doing so raises a new set of questions that should not be underestimated in terms of their significance for the democratic system. Specifically, what powers of policy making and agenda setting should be retained by the government in a democratic system? Having the top levels of the public administration dictate policy direction is the expected mode of operation in top-down systems, and often what is expected in classic Weberian style management. In bottom-up models, this becomes a source of a problematic tension; users and service deliverers are expected to have more influence and possibly even be the primary agents, depending on the interpretation of the model, and it is even possible to take
the logic of these models to a situation in which the public administration is reduced to the role of funder and residual referee.

A voucher system is an example of this, taken from the Individualist Way. In this system, the public administration issues each user with a monetary voucher and the user is free to spend this on any service delivery agency it chooses. The purpose of the system is to mimic the producer-consumer relationship of the private market, and it arguably could succeed in doing so better the procurement systems as described by the respondents. In other words, a voucher system would eliminate the need for a call for proposal process with points allotments which are inherently problematic because of the difficulty of capturing qualitative skills and competence. It would also, at least in theory, change the requirements for a performance measurement system since users would supposedly leave a service delivery agency they would disapprove of in favour of those that the users themselves find are capable of providing them with satisfactory services. In other words, the role of deciding how to direct the funding stream would switch from the public agencies to the users, a change that arguably is a significant step towards strengthening the bottom-up dynamic of the management model.

Even if a voucher system works according to theory, it still highlights some problems of bottom-up governance. With a voucher, the role of government is transformed from one of agenda-setting to one of oversight. While some would argue that this is a proper role for governments, it is doubtful to what extent governments themselves would want to take such a residual role in the delivery of social services. Governments often want to be seen to take political action, if for no other reason than to attract voters come election time, regardless of whether action is prudent or not from a strict performance perspective. If the users are ultimately
the party to decide how funding streams are directed, governments lose an important policy setting tool that they are not likely to want to relinquish.

The composition of management practices in the field provides significant insight into the social processes that have contributed to these differences in how immigrant community actors relate to the public administration in the two countries. As such, the study offers a granular representation of administrative practices in two countries and demonstrates the utility of both Grid/Group Cultural Theory and the Bourdieuan theory of practice for the study of social service delivery and the relationship between state and citizens.

The operationalization of Grid/Group Cultural Theory encourages a re-examination of the assertion that social democratic regimes are the most successful at minimizing inequalities and reducing poverty, as well as promoting social integration made by welfare theorists (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin et al., 1999). As has been demonstrated in this case comparison, the Swedish social democratic relied heavily on Hierarchist public management models, which ultimately disempowered the users. Grid/Group Cultural Theory acts as a reminder that limiting the study of welfare state operations to the size of the state, the scope of its de-commodification or the degree to which it redistributes wealth is insufficient to answer important questions about the power dynamics between the actors involved in service delivery, particularly the relationship between state and service users, as well as which actor is the most suitable, in terms of competence for delivering such services. The findings invite exploration of the functioning of the welfare state using the Grid/Group Cultural Theory in other policy areas to ascertain whether the typology can be useful for the understanding of these dynamics across policy communities.
The gathered responses also raise a series of questions for further study that operationalizes the synthesis of Grid/Group Cultural Theory with Bourdieu’s theory of practice. First, procurement, deeply associated with New Public Management, has become internationally pervasive as a management model. However, it seems that the procurement point allocation systems might need some scrutiny in terms of how well adapted these are for acknowledging the relevant competence needed for social service delivery, and how the process for assessment that is done: This is a matter of quantifying what is inherently qualitative, which enters into the problems of how the conditions and criteria designed by public agencies are transformed into artefacts of cultural capital in their own right. In other words, the management model shapes the manifestation of such capital, and studying these processes more closely can be important for the understanding of administrative dynamics.

Similarly, ascertaining under what circumstances a metropolitan scale service delivery agency will sub-contract services to smaller immigrant community actors would increase the understanding for when a two-tiered structure emerges between these actors. It would also establish to what extent such a structure is maintained and the likelihood for smaller actors to grow and develop beyond the first stage. This could also involve answering what would deter the larger actors from such sub-contracting.

Another issue concerns intersectionality. At least one organization in the sample managed to leverage a non-ethnic demographic identity for public funding when the funding streams for immigrant community actors proved insufficient for service delivery needs. That raises interesting questions about how identities are politicized through the availability of public funding, how that, in turn, affects the accumulation of cultural capital in NGOs, and how they relate to public agencies that are organized in a compartmentalized way that does not necessarily
fully recognize the intersectionality of social issues. These examples demonstrate the utility and flexibility of the theoretical framework employed in this study.

The relevance of these types of study is not likely to wane in the 21st century. Immigration will continue to matter in an age of increasing globalization. With it, questions of integration in its different forms, including economic issues like unemployment and under-employment will keep being salient. When studying such matters, political scientists, for whom the study of power in society is central, can contribute by increasing the understanding for how these social processes and issues affect empowerment, agency and influence in the relationships between ethnic communities and the state, and what roles these should have in decision-making and implementation of policy.
References


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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE for Public funders

Organisation name:

Respondent:

The interview will be conducted in less than 60 minutes

Public partnerships

1. a) Could you describe the process of becoming a public partner in delivering employment services?
   b) What are the greatest obstacles in that process?

2. How do you evaluate the employment services funded by your organization?

3. Is there any advantage with having NGOs in general, or immigrant organizations in particular, delivering labour market services to immigrants, as opposed to having public authorities do this?

Immigrant clients and immigrant community

4. What competencies and educational background do unemployed or under-employed immigrants who make use of employment services have in general?

5. In your opinion, do the clients have any influence on how the services are being delivered? How?
6. How do you evaluate client expectations and client satisfaction?

7. a) What kinds of jobs do immigrants who make use of employment services mostly get?

   b) Do you have any way to track their long term labour market situation?

8. How does your organization get input from immigrants with regards to the organization’s employment services?

9. Are there any immigrants in the management or in the board of directors of the organization?

10. Could you elaborate on how the organization tries to meet the needs of immigrants?

11. Is there any change or improvement you would like to see within your organization to better respond to immigrant needs and/or the concerns expressed by immigrants?

12. How great is the need in the labour market for intercultural/inter-ethnic communication and professional experience from other parts of the world? Do you have any examples of this?

**Immigrant organizations**

13. How would you define the term “immigrant organization”?

14. a) If you did a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis of the immigrant organizations, what would it look like?
b) How would they, in this respect, compare to other actors, like Immigrant Serving Agencies, private companies or public agencies?

15. As far as administrative strength goes, some might argue that there is an advantage to having a large organization, perhaps even the public sector, deliver these services. Would you agree?

16. Some would argue that there is a different level of understanding in the communication or confidence with the clients if there are many immigrants employed in the staff, too. Would you agree with this?

17. If a new immigrant organization would like to start deliver employment services to its constituency, what would you advice it to do?
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE for Non-Community actors [Labelled “INTERVIEW GUIDE for ISAs” in the Ethics application]

Organisation name:

Respondent:

The interview will be conducted in less than 60 minutes

The organization

1. Why did the organization decide to start delivering employment services and how big was it in terms of annual budget and staff size?

2. a) What did the organization have to do to be able to deliver employment services?  
   b) Could you describe the start-up process?

1. What were the greatest obstacles in this process?

2. In your opinion, what is required to become relevant as a public partner in employment service delivery?

3. Would you say that there are any competencies that could be further strengthened within your organization in this context?

4. a) What is the strength of your organization in comparison with a public organizer?  
   b) Why can’t the unemployment office deliver these services?

5. How are the employment services evaluated?
Clients and Immigrant Community

6. How do you reach out to the immigrant community?

7. How do you ensure client satisfaction/manage client expectations?

8. a) What kinds of jobs do your clients mostly get? 
b) Do you keep in touch with former clients and follow up their long term labour market situation?

9. a) Do the clients have any influence on how the services are being delivered? 
b) If so, how?

Immigrant organizations

10. How do you define the term “immigrant organization”?

11. If you did a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis of the immigrant organizations, what would it look like?

12. How would immigrant organizations, in this respect, compare to mainstream ISAs, private companies or public authorities?

13. Some would argue that there is a different level of understanding in the communication with the clients if many in the staff are immigrants too. Would you agree with this?
14. a) How great is the need in the labour market for intercultural/inter-ethnic communication and professional experience from other parts of the world?  
b) Do you have any examples of this?

**Relations with other actors**

15. How do you experience the co-operation with public authorities?

16. How do you think your organization is perceived by your public partners?

17. a) Do public agencies have any interest for the results/achievements of the employment services?  
b) How is this interest expressed?

18. a) Do the employment services include any communication with potential employers of clients?  
b) How does that communication work?

19. Is there any advantage with having NGOs in general, or immigrant organizations in particular, delivering labour market services to immigrants, as opposed to having public authorities do this?
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE for immigrant community actors [Labelled “INTERVIEW GUIDE for Immigrant organizations” in the Ethics application]

Organisation name:

Respondent:

The interview will be conducted in less than 60 minutes

About the organization

1. When was this organization founded and how big was it in the beginning in terms of annual budget and staff size?

2. Why did the organization choose to mobilize on the basis of [ethnicity/profession/other]?

3. Are there any immigrants in the management or in the board of directors of the organization?

4. Why did the organization decide to start delivering employment services and how big was it in terms of annual budget and staff size?

5. a) What did the organization have to do to be able to deliver employment services? b) Could you describe the start-up process?

6. What were the greatest obstacles in this process?

7. What is required to become relevant as a public partner in employment service delivery?
8. How does the organization evaluate the employment services?

9. a) Do the employment services include any communication with potential employers of clients? b) What are your experiences of that relationship?

10. a) What is the strength of your organization in comparison with a public organizer? b) Why can’t the unemployment office do this?

11. Are there any competencies that could be further strengthened within your organization?

Immigrant clients and immigrant community

12. What competencies and educational background do your clients have in general?

13. a) Do the clients have any influence on how the services are being delivered? b) How?

14. How do you manage client expectations and ensure client satisfaction?

15. a) What kinds of jobs do your clients mostly get? b) Do you keep in touch with former clients and follow up their long term labour market situation?

16. How does your organization get input from immigrants with regards to the organization’s employment services and their needs?
17. Is there any change or improvement you would like to see within your organization to better respond to immigrant needs and/or the concerns expressed by immigrants?

18. a) How great is the need in the labour market for intercultural/inter-ethnic communication and professional experience from other parts of the world?

b) Do you have any examples of this?

Relations to other actors

19. How do you experience the co-operation with other stakeholders, like the public authorities, private companies and Immigrant Serving Agencies?

20. How do you think your organization is perceived by other actors, including the public authorities, private companies and Immigrant Serving Agencies?

21. a) Do other actors show any interest for the results/achievements of the employment services? b) How is this interest expressed?

Immigrant organizations

22. a) If you did a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis of the immigrant organizations, what would it look like? b) How would they, in this respect, compare to other actors, like Immigrant Serving Agencies, private companies or public agencies?

23. Some would argue that there is a different level of understanding in the communication with the clients if there are immigrants employed in the staff, too. Would you agree with this?
24. Is there any advantage with having NGOs in general, or immigrant organizations in particular, delivering labour market services to immigrants, as opposed to having public authorities do this?