NOTICE
The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS
La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCU

Canada
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

HISTORY OF BOEOTIA, 405-395 B.C.

BY

GARTH DUNCAN CLARKE

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1986
Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

ABSTRACT

The study of Boeotian history is hampered by a lack of suitable evidence. For the period 405 to 395 B.C. the best extant source is Xenophon. All other literary sources must be rated below that of Xenophon. Even the Oxyrhynchus Historian (or P) is often over-rated as a source for this period. P is of unknown reliability; his political commentary seems to be incompetent.

The internal situation in Boeotia is obscure -- even with the evidence that P provides. Not enough detail is known about either the constitution of its government or the nature of the political troubles within Boeotia for the period 405 to 395 B.C. Some form of stasis may have been present in the Boeotian Confederacy before the outbreak of the Corinthian War.

Boeotia was forced to reconsider its foreign commitments in light of the defeat of Athens. Boeotian foreign policy, conditioned by its geography and its federal form of government, was based on the maintenance of a strategic defence, and the pursuit of autonomy of action in foreign affairs. The increased Spartan power forced the Boeotians to manoeuvre to keep Sparta from dominating the internal affairs of Boeotia. Boeotian desire for autonomy, combined with Spartan hostility, led to the start of the Corinthian War.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. THE SOURCES.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Source Material</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Oxyrhynchus Historian</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diodorus</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orators</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Non-Extant Source (Theopompus?)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sources Compared</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. INTERNAL AFFAIRS</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P as a Source for the Boeotian Constitution</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government in Boeotia</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Federal Government in Boeotia</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations of the Federal and Local Governments</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of Stasis in Boeotia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stasis as a Cause of the Corinthian War</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles of Boeotian Foreign Policy</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeotia and Sparta, 405 to 395 B.C.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Outbreak of the Corinthian War</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE
THE SOURCES

Introduction

Every study of Boeotian history is hampered by the lack of substantial evidence concerning the internal political situation within the Confederacy and its relations with other states; this lack is especially apparent in any study of the period just before the rise of Boeotia as a great power in international politics — the ten years between the battles of Aegospotami and Haliartus. During that time Boeotia went from being an apparently loyal ally of Sparta to becoming one of its powerful adversaries. A good understanding of the forces at work in the Boeotian Confederacy from 405 to 395 B.C. is helpful in explaining the later rise of Boeotia as a first-class power in Greece after 371 B.C. But any interpretation of the events within Boeotia from 405 to 395 rests upon the view taken of the extant evidence. It is, however, difficult to analyze and to use the evidence because of the diversity of our sources and their overwhelming Athenocentricity.

Before examining, then, the domestic and foreign affairs of the Boeotian Confederacy, it is necessary to assess the sources: to define their biases, strengths, weaknesses, and credibility; and to estimate the usefulness of each source in any analysis of the events. This is of special importance, since some modern students of this
period in Greek history have not given sufficient thought to the probable relationship of the sources and their varied qualities as evidence. There has developed an uncritical and rather eclectic use of the existing sources which is not condigable; and it has, in turn, led to misinterpretations of the events that are known to have occurred and to unfounded theories about their causes. It is strange, however, that few commentators, other than Beloch, feel that there is any need to mention the problems that beset the interpretation of those sources.

Types of Source Material

There is a paucity of material to work with, as is the case in the study of much of ancient history. The evidence that is available can be divided into two types: primary evidence — information and testimony left by the actors in historical events in the form of documents, contemporary witnesses, and evidence drawn from archaeological remains; and secondary evidence — interpretations of those same events by later writers who usually have based their works upon some form of primary evidence. There is little primary documentation available that relates to Boeotian affairs during the period of this study: no inscriptions from Boeotian cities are datable to the ten years from 405 to 395; and the numismatic evidence is too vague to be helpful. Most of the evidence we possess comes to us as secondary evidence preserved in the works of ancient
historians, orators, antiquarians, and biographers. The literary sources, however, must be approached by the modern critic with some caution, because there is not adequate primary source material to use as a check on the accuracy of the versions of events in the secondary evidence that exists in the literary sources.

The literary sources are of varied usefulness in an analysis of the events that occurred in Boeotia. Different authors did not treat Boeotian affairs with the same interest or view; one reason for the varied quality among the sources is the different genres in which the authors wrote. Each ancient literary genre has its own methods for collecting and presenting historical material; in other words, the purpose behind a particular work of literature influences the manner in which the author attempts to deal with historical evidence. Of all the ancient literary genres that of history is the most apt to be truthful, because it implies concern for some concept of historical truth. It follows, then, that the works of the ancient historians who wrote about the events in the ten year period from 405 to 395 will probably be more serviceable for an historical study than other literary sources in genres such as oratory or comedy: the ancient historian was constrained by his proposed methodical pursuit of the true sequence of events and their underlying causes to attempt to give a more honest and less elaborated account.
Yet a distinction should be made among the works of historians: between works written by authors who were contemporary with the events they describe, and works whose writers based their narratives on earlier historical literature. The Greek historians after Thucydides relied on autopsy and oral testimony more than on the many forms of documentary evidence potentially available to them when they wrote their various works. Later Greek historians, whenever they dealt with matters not of their own experience, tried to find works of historians who were contemporary with the events instead of doing their own independent research on whatever extant documentary evidence might still be available. A work written by an historian who was contemporary with the events under examination was felt to be more accurate than later interpretations, even using primary documents, could be. The genres of antiquaries like Pausanias, or biographers like Plutarch allowed the freedom to be more eclectic and far-ranging in methods of research and presentation of events than the methods of ancient historians. They described their subjects using whatever came to hand, in order to increase the appeal of their work to the public, or to make some didactic point. It should be a rule of thumb, then, when dealing with ancient historical works as sources, to give more credence to an author who was contemporary with the events he describes than to other authors who have derived
their evidence from some earlier historical source -- unless it can be shown plainly that a later author has taken his information from a source that was contemporary with the events that it described, and that was respected in antiquity for its accuracy. If the earlier source is not extant its content can only be surmised; and to assume the accuracy of a later source that is known to have used that non-extant source is not following a good critical technique. Without an ability to compare the earlier with the later source in order to detect both similarities and differences between them, it is possible only to guess at the quality of a non-extant source which was used for a later extant historical work. The first step has to be an analysis of the extant sources to discover their probable accuracy.

The works of the four historians -- Xenophon, Diodorus, the Oxyrhynchus Historian and the epitome of Pompeius Trogus by Justin -- are the best of the extant sources for a history of Boeotia from 404 to 395 B.C. The other literary works that mention anything about this period are often of little reliability in use, other than for the verification of one of the several traditions of an event handed down by the extant ancient historians, or for hints concerning the views and methods of Greek historians such as Ephorus or Theopompus, whose works survive only in fragments. In any examination of the sources, then, the surviving works of the
historians should be considered first, in order to build up a probable sequence of events and causes. The other available evidence, both documentary and literary sources, are best used only to supplement the historians' assertions and to fill in any gaps in evidence that still may exist.

Xenophon

There are reasons for treating Xenophon as the most accurate and best of the ancient historians still extant who wrote on the period under study. Xenophon wrote his *Hellenica* in the mid 350s; and, unlike any of the other sources that are extant, his alone is known to have been written by a contemporary of the events described, one who was often an eyewitness to many of those same events. He does not write in the detail that one would wish him to have done; nor does he seem to emphasize what some modern historians would consider the more important events of the period of his study. He fails to discuss certain events that are made known to us by other later authors, but there is no reason for rejecting his account of events he does discuss.

Since the nineteenth century there has been much adverse criticism of Xenophon's historical methodology. Reference has been made to his "strange incompleteness ... curious inequalities of treatment ... [and] numerous omissions of both events and of persons..." that drive
those who admire Thucydidean historiography to despair of ever finding a method underlying, for them, the apparent incoherence of the *Hellenica*. Xenophon seems to write history as though it were but memoirs. Some would deny that Xenophon's *Hellenica* was even intended to be history, others would go as far as accusing Xenophon of being a liar and braggart. Xenophon has indeed ignored the methodology of Thucydides in the construction of his own work. When Xenophon is compared with Thucydides, he does fall short of the mark that Thucydides set. The problem is not so much with Xenophon, but rather seems to arise from the desire of some modern historians to have for a fourth century source another ancient Greek historian of the same genius as Thucydides. As Underhill points out, "it is greatly to [Xenophon's] credit that his detractors should wish to apply [the standard of Thucydides' work] to him at all." 

The *Hellenica*, however, follows accepted traditions of Greek historiography. It is influenced as much by Herodotus as by Thucydides. In one way Xenophon's method of historiography is better than that of Thucydides: he admits that he has selected the facts that he presents according to his perception of their relevance: ... καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς μὲν ἀξιομετροεῖτος γράψας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀξίως λόγου παρῆσαν. Such a principle leaves Xenophon open to criticism for hiding the truth. Yet Xenophon does not seem to falsify his presentation of facts; and he is
capable of understanding the underlying relationship between events, and of attributing the proper causes to those events -- even making a distinction between immediate and distant causes.

And Xenophon has been accused of being partial to Sparta and of having a heavy bias against Thebes -- even by some who are otherwise supporters of the quality of his work. The only serious problem with any use of Xenophon by the modern historian is the common perception of him as being pro-Spartan so that his work, accordingly, treats events to the advantage of the Spartans. This bias is not a grave problem: "Every Greek was a philo-Laconian." Xenophon's only serious bias -- one which all Greek historians have -- is his fondness for moderate oligarchy. It is a minority opinion, but one might hold that Xenophon is usually impartial: his biases show only when he is relating some event that he himself has taken part in, which deeply affected his life. Even with his known biases, he must be considered the best historical source for the fourth-century, for two reasons: first, his biases are known and can be allowed for by the modern historian who uses him as a source; and secondly, he was a contemporary of many of the events that he describes -- unlike any other of the historians who are sources for the period from 405 to 395 B.C.
The Oxyrhynchus Historian

The second best historical source for a history of Boeotia from 405 to 395 is the papyrus fragments of the so-called Oxyrhychus Historian21 (or P as he is commonly termed). The London fragment is the only portion strictly relevant to the present study: it presents the events of the autumn 396 to the autumn of 395 and discusses the state of affairs within Attica and Boeotia, the second campaign-year of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, and the activities of Conon and the Persian fleet at Caunus and Rhodes. The fragment is more detailed than the account of Xenophon; and it gives us more information on the internal politics and constitution of Boeotia and the naval operations of Conon. There is a wealth of information that P alone has preserved. But, even with all the information that he gives, P is probably less accurate and of a more debatable quality than is Xenophon.

P's work was likely written between 362 or 355 and 330 B.C.22 by a member of the Isocratic circle at Athens — possibly, as we shall argue later, Ephorus himself.23 Its author was not likely a contemporary with the series of events that he records in the London fragment, the latest surviving piece of the history — dealing with 396 and 395 B.C. Therefore, on the principle that a non-contemporary author cannot easily write about events of which he was not an eyewitness and for which he would possibly not have
enough eyewitness evidence to examine, but must rely, instead, on primary documents and researches of others, it is reasonable to assume that P is probably no more correct than Xenophon about the events that both describe; and it is likely that P is only as correct as his unknown sources in matters that he alone records.

Most commentators hold that P is far more accurate and knowledgeable about events in Greece and Asia than is Xenophon, and concur with the opinion of Grenfell and Hunt:

... P's excellencies as a narrator of facts, his wealth of information, his impartiality, his acuteness of judgment, and his seriousness, entitle him to [a] very high place among Greek historians.

But such an opinion is more a reaction against the perceived deficiencies of Xenophon than an impartial examination of P's qualities as a historian. The novelty of P's work and the fact that it was found on papyrus fragments have caused many competent historians to treat P in a manner that would not otherwise be allowed by them in the examination of any other ancient Greek historian.

There are problems in understanding the nature of P and his work, his use of evidence, his historical commentary on events, and his chronology.

The Oxyrhynchus Historian should not be considered a first-rate historian without examination or criticism of his work's weaknesses. His historiography is not as sound as was that of Thucydides. The History or Hellenica of P has more the shape of a hurried large scale or universal history
than a finely crafted and intricately constructed work of
doubtedly such as Thucydides or Herodotus provide us with.
Even though the London fragment of about 900 lines deals
with a brief time period of less than one year, it is
written in a most inartistic manner.

P's style is one reason for the diversity of opinion
about the historiographic quality of his work. His bland
and tiring style has a mirror-like quality that allows
varied interpretations to be given as to his abilities as a
source. His language and rhetorical simplicity are without
great art, but they homogenize and make his own the varied
sources that he must have used. Such a style unifies P's
work and makes it appear far more authoritative than it may
actually be.

Contrary to the views of many scholars, P is not very
competent in his description of political events: his
attempt to define the causes of discontent among the states
of Argos, Athens, Corinth and Boeotia explains nothing: "he
shows less grasp of the political situation than
Xenophon." Instead of the political analysis that
Thucydides provides, P relies on the political jargon of his
day and on the revelation of the obvious in order to dress
up his otherwise boring narrative. The best example of P's
small ability in political analysis is, of course, his
famous description of the internal political situation in
Boeotia. He does not understand, since his source did not
describe it, how the stasis came to exist within either the city of Thebes or the rest of Boeotia; instead, knowing from a source that there was political unrest in the Boeotian Confederacy in 395 and that the two Theban political movements were later in conflict in 382, 30 he explains the 395 situation on the basis of the later political situation -- making an inference about the earlier situation based on what was said about the later one.

One is left with the suspicion that P is out of his element when he is narrating events and explaining their causes. P cannot grasp the difference between trivial and fundamental causes of historical events; and he does not seem aware of the fact that pretexts cited by those involved in an event can be used to divine the underlying perceptions of an event in the minds of the participants. He is able to distinguish between immediate causes and pretexts, as his description of the bribery of the anti-Spartan factions suggests, 31 but seems unaware of any of the motivations, other than individual emotions in political leaders, that lead to an event such as the outbreak of war. This in itself is no great problem, as causation was not well understood by the Greeks.

The Greek historians were vague on the best way to treat causation. 32 Even Thucydides can be criticized for not having understood causation well enough for our tastes. 33 It is unfortunate that many historians today
criticize Xenophon and not P for a malady that the latter exhibits as much as the former: i.e., a lack of understanding about the relationship of cause and effect, and of actual cause and pretext. Xenophon, unlike P, understood that it is often necessary to list the pretext given by participants as the reasons for their actions as part of a proper study of the causes of political events, in order to illuminate the underlying causes of those same events. The Oxyrhynchus Historian does not make such a use of pretext; for him pretexts are to be criticized if they appear not to be among the immediate causes of an event, as is shown by his brief discussion of the other version of the cause of the Corinthian War that was current in his own day. Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages -- as long as the modern scholar understands that every Greek historian may have slightly different views on causation that will accordingly colour his historical methods.

The exact biases of P have not been carefully analysed. He appears to be a moderate oligarch, to judge by the political terminology he uses and by his attack on the extreme democrats at Athens. His philo-Laconian attributes may, like those of Xenophon, reflect the general Greek respect for the Spartan Legend. What is unknown is the extent of P's bias towards Athens: the fragments we have suggest only that the history was likely written in
Athens and that there is no anti-Athenian trend, although there appears to be some dislike for radical democracy.

It is more sound to treat P as a source of unsubstantiated veracity and quality whose work must be suspect, especially when his version of an event conflicts with that of Xenophon. P gives more detail than any other source we have for each event that he describes; but length of description is not a reasonable criterion for judging the veracity of a work, especially if the author writes, as it appears is true of P, well after the events took place. P must have relied on other authors and any obtainable surviving eyewitnesses in order to compose his work. It is quite likely that P would use the most detailed source available to him, but not necessarily the one most accurate.

Diodorus

The third ancient source of any value for Boeotian affairs is Diodorus Siculus. He was a Greek orator of the first century B.C. who wrote a universal history in forty books describing events in Greece, Italy, and Asia down to Caesar's campaigns in Gaul. In books 13 and 14 he deals with the events in Greece, Asia Minor, Sicily, and Rome for the period of this study. Although much of his complete work is either wholly lost or epitomized, these two books seem to be as Diodorus wrote them. Diodorus covers many of the same events as Xenophon in his description of the events in Greece from 405 to 395 B.C., but his work also
mentions the activities of Conon during the Persian struggle with Sparta over the control of the Aegean.

Diodorus used the works of earlier historians as the source material for his Bibliotheca. His own qualities as a historian are generally considered to be negligible, and little if anything that he wrote seems to be based on any of his own independent research.

Diodorus has been perceived as being a mere copyist; he is held to have excerpted from one main source at a time, in such a manner as to leave that earlier writer's material almost unchanged or only slightly adapted to fit his own rhetorical style. Such a view of Diodorus has been used by many scholars as their rationale for treating all of the Bibliotheca as a cut-and-paste abbreviation of Diodorus' sources -- an epitome of non-extant authors. It is risky to treat Diodorus' work in such a manner -- as Holm pointed out many years ago.

Recently, however, there has been a change in opinion about the manner in which Diodorus uses his sources. A modern view is that Diodorus took his source material and then moulded it, somewhat, to fit his own style and purpose. He tried to "create a work of independent merit". He commenced by finding the most detailed ancient historians -- the ones still popular in the first-century B.C. Then he fitted the narratives of these historians into a chronological scheme based on Athenian archon-lists, Roman
consuls, and Olympiads using someone's previously published chronological list 49 -- often getting his sources' chronological arrangements confused in the process. For every book Diodorus seems to have used one major source, supplementing that authority with extracts from other authors whenever he felt it necessary. 50 Diodorus did not, however, copy his source word for word; instead, with his own purpose in mind, he abbreviated his major source's description wherever he wished, in an attempt to tailor the information of the author he was using to fit the balance of his own narrative and to conform to his own narrative framework. There are often many verbal echoes of the sources of Diodorus; 51 but he has his own style. It is therefore risky to attempt to equate directly a passage in his work with a non-extant portion of whatever source he was using for that portion of his work.

It is difficult, then, to ascertain with any certainty the degree to which a passage in Diodorus owes its form and detail to an earlier non-extant source, or even to be certain where Diodorus deviates from his major source and uses the work of another historian. This is not to say that there are not indications within the Bibliotheca that Diodorus has used a particular source, but rather that Diodorus alone cannot be used as substantive proof that his major source for a passage wrote as Diodorus himself writes: there may be differences in detail, chronology, attribution
of cause, or in arrangement. Diodorus' use of a source, when verifiable, can only be used as an indication of trends that were present in the earlier source's version of events.

Diodorus has such a close affinity to the fragments of the Oxyrhynchus Historian as to suggest that he used P directly or indirectly \(^{52}\) for his version of the events of 396 and 395 B.C. Most scholars support the view of Volquardsen that Diodorus' major source for his books 11 to 15 was the fourth-century historian Ephorus. \(^{53}\) There were no other works of that age suitable for Diodorus' analysis of the history of Greece and Sicily that mentioned the events of both regions in an non-complex manner. It is also likely that Diodorus used Theopompus in at least one place in book 14 of his Bibliotheca. \(^{54}\) Diodorus has drastically abbreviated Ephorus, turning four books into two of his own; therefore it is probable that Diodorus' version touches only on the basic events that Ephorus and P mentioned in greater detail.

This dependence by Diodorus on Ephorus cannot be used to prove either that P or that Ephorus (if the two are not one and the same) \(^{55}\) is a better source than is Xenophon for a reconstruction of the history of Greece from the end of Thucydides' history till the battle of Cnidus. Such a view as that is beyond the nature of our evidence. Nor is it possible to use Diodorus' use of P -- directly or indirectly
-- as proof of the superiority of Diodorus' version of
--- and his chronology over those of Xenophon.

Justin

The least useful of the available ancient historians
who deals with the period of this study is the epitome of
Pompeius Trogus by Justin. A work in Latin from the reign
of Augustus, it has some affinities with P. The degree to
which Pompeius used P or Ephorus is impossible to discover,
but the work is proof that at least the tradition
represented by P, if not the work of P himself, was well
known at the beginning of the Christian era. There appears
to have been no examination of primary evidence by Trogus;
and for the period of Greek history under examination it is
of no real independent value.

Orators

The orators mention little that is of use for a
reconstruction of a history of Boeotia; they should be used
only to substantiate what the historians Xenophon, Diodorus
or P stated about an event. Their works cannot be trusted
to contain objective historical analysis and a truthful
sequence of events. Orators were compelled by the nature
of forensics and debate to twist the truth sometimes or to
be extremely selective in their presentation of historical
events and facts. With that in mind, it is possible to
state that the orators contemporary with the events they
describe -- for this study they are Lysias, Andocides, and Isocrates -- can contribute not necessarily any historical facts or causes, but rather the contemporary perception of the events as they unfolded. The great difficulty with the use of orators for a study of Boeotian history is the intense Athenocentricity of their speeches and pamphlets. The later orators are almost worthless for what little they state about Boeotian affairs before 382. Demosthenes totally confuses the events of 395 with those of 379 and later. 60 And Aeschines uses another orator of dubious veracity, Andocides, for part of his historical analysis of past Athenian history. 61

Other Sources

Of the other literary sources Xenophon's biography Agesilaus is not of much use: there are some differences between it and the Hellenica, but these can be explained as caused by the different methods of the two works occasioned by the difference in genre between history and encomium.

Plutarch is of some help. His Lysander, Artaxerxes, Agesilaus and Moralia contain snippets that mention Boeotian events which Plutarch has culled from various sources. Unfortunately the eclectic nature of Plutarch's method of biography and his dependence on earlier historians' works limit his use for historical research. It is difficult to trust what Plutarch reports, when it is often impossible to know what is his ultimate source. If the source for a
statement is unknown, it is difficult to give credence to a statement of Plutarch without worrying about its truth. As a biographer or essayist, Plutarch seems to have read quite a few historians but to have been unable to judge their relative worth in comparison to one another whenever there was a conflict over the details of an event. It is difficult to know for certain when Plutarch is using a particular historian, since he seems to be capable of combining sources in an attempt to bridge over conflicts between them. It is interesting, and perhaps significant, that Plutarch used Theopompus' historical works but not those of P. Both his works and that of Pausanias seem to have preserved a third tradition about the sequence of events in the outbreak of the Corinthian war which is different from either that of Xenophon or that of the Oxyrhynchus Historian.

Pausanias' *The Description of Greece* is of some use for this study. He, too, seems to be rather catholic in his tastes when describing the history of Boeotia and of Sparta. There are some similarities in his descriptions to those of Xenophon and those of P. It would appear that his major historical source for the period 405 to 395 was Theopompus — if his description of the bribery by Timocrates is based on that of Theopompus. It is not possible, however, to isolate Pausanias' sources easily, and thereby be more certain of his descriptions of historical events. His
evidence, therefore, must be treated with caution — even when it is enticing to accept a version of Pausanias over that of Xenophon.

The other literary sources remaining to be discussed are Nepos' Conon, Polyaeus, and Frontinus. Polyaeus' Stratagems is an anthology of small items dealing with military matters. None of these exempla appear to be taken verbatim from the original sources; instead Polyaeus has excerpted from various authors or earlier anthologies. It seems that Polyaeus used P, Plutarch, Xenophon, and Theopompus — or compilations from those authors. Nepos' biography of Conon is useful for the fact that it contradicts P in several places. Frontinus' Stratagemata is of no value for a study of the period of Boeotian history under examination here. These three minor works cannot be used alone as historical sources; they do, however, supplement the three major historians available: Xenophon, the Oxyrhynchus Historian and Diodorus.

Athenian tragedy and comedy offer no help for research into the state of affairs within Boeotia or for Athenian relations with Boeotia for the period roughly 405 to 395.

Thus it is apparent that of the existing literary sources for a political history — there not being enough material for a social or economic one — the surviving works of the historians, especially Xenophon and P, are to be valued above all the others; in other words the other
sources can only complement the description of historical events in Boeotia to be found in the histories available.

A Non-Extant Source (Theopompus?)

There is, however, evidence that a third historical tradition did exist which was known to the ancient Greeks and Romans. The evidence is as follows: first, in Plutarch and Pausanias, Tithraustes, under royal instructions, is seen as the sponsor of Timocrates' visit with gold to Greece\(^1\) -- contrary to P but supporting Xenophon's version. Secondly, Athenian statesmen are implicated in accepting the Persian money\(^2\) -- supporting P against Xenophon. Thirdly, Pausanias knows of the names of two Argive bribe-takers,\(^3\) whereas Xenophon only records one name and P none.

Fourthly, Pausanias holds that the West Locrians and not the East Locrians were involved in the outbreak of war with Phocis,\(^4\) thereby supporting P's version against that of Xenophon. And finally, Pausanias then lays the blame on the Locrians for starting the war with Phocis,\(^5\) supporting Xenophon against the view of P. It is unlikely that either Pausanias or Plutarch would mingle their sources so fully, as would appear to have been done, if one does not hypothesize that a third literary tradition was available to them which has since disappeared. That Pausanias knows of a further named Argive bribe-taker suggests that he had read a source which named all the Argive leaders who accepted
monies from the envoy -- a source which is not Xenophon or P.

The simplest hypothesis is that neither P nor Xenophon was used, instead, another historian had been read who knew the work of Xenophon and perhaps also knew of the alternative tradition, as recorded by P, of the outbreak of the Corinthian War. The most likely candidate for this historian would be Theopompus: he used Xenophon as a source when he wrote his own *Hellenica*; 76 and Plutarch claims Theopompus as a source for his *Agesilus*. 77 Furthermore, Plutarch does not appear to have used P. 78 Theopompus' work could then be seen as an attempt to apply Athenian source material to the account of Xenophon, in order to correct its apparent errors and to add more detail to it. The work of P would not have been used by Theopompus as a source, since he too would have access to the same sources that P used a few years before.

This third tradition seems to have taken shape at approximately the same period when P wrote. It is only evident today in the contrasts between what are apparently fragments of it, as preserved in Plutarch and Pausanias, and the two other known traditions presented by Xenophon and P with regard to the visit of Timocrates, the bribes, and the description of start of the Corinthian War. Nothing can be firmly established, because of the possibility that Pausanias and Plutarch have contaminated their source with
material from either P or Xenophon; but, nevertheless, it seems to be a reasonable hypothesis that there was a third tradition concerning these events, one probably due to Theopompus, and based upon the *Hellenica* of Xenophon as "corrected" by the later remembrances at Athens of those events.

The Sources Compared

A comparison among the best of the ancient traditions — those of Xenophon, P, and Theopompus — reveals some conflicts over chronology and details of events that must be resolved. The differences are great enough to suggest that one, if not all, has confused and erred in the narration of those events. There is a conflict over the sponsor of the embassy of Timocrates. The difference, moreover, affects the chronology of the event and its relative importance as a major cause of the hostilities that led to the Corinthian War. Xenophon, supported by Pausanias and Plutarch, writes that Tithraustes sent Timocrates after the death of Tissaphernes; P, on the other hand, supported by Polyaeus, holds that the Persian sponsor of Timocrates was Pharnabazus and seems to imply that the embassy of Timocrates took place before the battle of Sardis.

Secondly, there is disagreement between Xenophon and P over the acceptance of bribes by Athenian politicians: Xenophon states that no Athenian took any of the money offered; whereas P, supported by Pausanias, lists
Epicrates and Cephalus as the two Athenian statesmen who accepted money. Thirdly, there are great differences between their accounts of the battle of Sardis, which make the two accounts appear as if they are descriptions of different battles. 83 Fourthly, there is disagreement over which of the two states of Locris was invaded by the Phocians: Xenophon states that East Locris was involved; 84 whereas P, supported by Pausanias, states that it was West Locris that was invaded by Phocis. 85 Fifthly, there are different causes given for the start of the Corinthian War.

Some scholars hold that P's version of events is to be preferred over that of Xenophon simply because they believe that P writes a more accurate history. 86 For other scholars a middle way between P and Xenophon seems the easiest: they pick and choose between the two historians in order to avoid dealing with any of the controversies and to allow them free rein in their reconstructions of the history of the period. One of the most blatant of this school is C.D. Hamilton. 87 His work is useful only for his footnote references -- the book is based often more on his own views of Sparta and Greece than on the evidence. It is more logical to prefer Xenophon, even if he was not an eyewitness to many of the events in Greece from 401 to 394 B.C.: he is the only historian whom we know to have lived during the period he writes about, and he had an extremely good, if biased, group
of eyewitnesses and documentary sources among his friends the Spartans.

When an analysis to ascertain all the conflicts between Xenophon and P has been done, as will be seen below two conclusions emerge. First, Xenophon appears to be more accurate than P, although his work is more concise. This is especially true in the case of Xenophon's narration of the events of the battle of Sardis, but is also quite likely in his description of the mission of Timocrates and his narration of the Phocian-Locran troubles that led to the Boeotian invasion of Phocis. Secondly, there appear to have been three historical traditions preserved concerning the events of 395 B.C.: that of Xenophon, a contemporary of and participant in the events he describes; that of P, who is used by the later writers Diodorus, Polyaeus, and Pompeius Trogus, and who may be the Greek historian Ephorus; and that of another historian, who based his account on Athenian sources, later used by Plutarch, Pausanias and Népos.

Conclusions

Xenophon's Hellenica should be considered the most accurate of all the extant sources -- both for Greece and Asia Minor. Xenophon is not the perfect Thucydidean-styled source that many scholars wish to have for the period 410 to 362; but he is, all in all, the best that is available. The Oxyrhynchus Historian is useful in supplementing the narrative of Xenophon, but his work is probably of later
date than that of Xenophon; and P cannot be proved to be as accurate as Xenophon in his description and interpretation of events, even though more detailed. P's material may be used to supplement Xenophon but not to correct him\(^{89}\) -- even though such a method will often leave the modern scholar with vague conclusions about the period from 405 to 395 B.C. Diodorus is to be treated as less accurate than P because of his abbreviation of the other's work and the chronological problems that he introduces into P's account. All the other literary sources can be used only as inaccurate supplements to Xenophon; and any epigraphical or numismatic evidence currently available, because of its scarcity and fragmentary condition, is best interpreted in light of Xenophon. Such a view as this must be introduced into any modern re-examination of the history of Boeotia from 405 to 395 B.C. in order to limit the current exuberant but frequently unsound use of P and the uncritical selection of data from various sources without regard for their likely trustworthiness.
CHAPTER TWO
INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Introduction

The internal situation of Boeotia from 405 to 395 B.C. is obscure, even with the information that P provides in his description of its institutions and domestic politics. Today there is still little true understanding of the intricate processes that were at work in the domestic affairs of the Boeotians during a period that led to the rise of a mutual antagonism between Boeotia and Sparta, its onetime hegemon. It is unlikely that modern scholars will ever be certain about the structure of the Boeotian system of government or about the nature of the political machinations in Boeotia that P describes as having occurred in 395 B.C.

P as a Source for the Boeotian Constitution

Little was known about the actual constitution of the Boeotian Confederacy until the discovery of P. P's analysis of the political structure of Boeotia has been accepted as accurate by most students of the history of the fourth century B.C. His statements, however, should be examined to ascertain as far as is possible the nature and quality of his evidence, the veracity of his account, and the accuracy of his comments. There is space here to do nothing more than point out some of the potential difficulties caused by reliance on P.

It is difficult to place a great deal of faith in his
interpretation of Boeotian politics and policies because of the possibility that P himself knew little about this period in Boeotian history and had instead used sources of unknown quality. The entire digression on the politics and constitution of Boeotia has the manner and style of a passage taken from a guidebook. P's work was written well after the events of 395 B.C., and it may contain errors concerning the condition of Boeotian and Theban politics.

P's description of the Boeotian constitution seems strangely incomplete: He speaks about the probouleutic functions of local councils, yet he does not speak about these same functions when he discusses the Federal Council. He discusses the division of all Boeotia into eleven districts each of which sent a Boeotarch and 60 councillors to the Federal Council, but he does not mention how such representatives were selected — an omission of some importance, since P was attempting to explain his statement that a shift of power had taken place. The function of the federal dicasts is not mentioned — another omission of some consequence considering, as will be discussed below, that the federal court may have been a major factor in the control of Boeotia. He fails to explain the manner by which the Thebans controlled the two Plataean districts. P does not explain how the four local councils of a city voted on a resolution, nor how a city allocated its enfranchised citizens among its four local councils. And,
most important of all, P fails to explain the underlying rationale for the division of one federal district among three separate cities.

General trends can, perhaps, be discovered in P's description of the nature of the Boeotian government. There may, however, be problems of interpretation caused by our total dependence upon P's account of events in Boeotia in 395 B.C. and his digression on the structure of the Boeotian federal government. 12 Whatever the ultimate reliability of P in these matters, his evidence is the only evidence available 13 and should be used, although caution must be exercised. Enough information can be gleaned from P to build an approximate picture of the structure of federal and local government in Boeotia in 395.

Local Government in Boeotia

The Boeotians lived in an area of Greece that was fertile and open to frequent invasion. 14 The land was heavily populated and highly exploited agriculturally. 15 At some point in the late sixth century B.C. the Boeotians formed a defensive confederacy by which the various smaller cities gained a maximum of security from large-scale foreign invasion -- by either the Athenians, the Phocians, or the Thessalians -- with a minimum of interference in their internal affairs by the more powerful Boeotian cities such as Thebes. 16
Each Boeotian citizen, enfranchised or not, could be a citizen only of his native city and not a citizen of every city within the Confederacy. He would be able to claim a common national identity and isopolity in any other part of Boeotia; but he would not be able to gain full citizenship in another city of the Confederacy or admittance to the local councils of another city, except by the means of marriage or resettlement.

There was a two-level system of government in the Boeotian Confederacy. Of the two levels of government, the more powerful, in theory, would seem to have been not the federal but the various local governments. Each Boeotian city when it joined the Confederacy had delegated only a small amount of its authority to the Federal Council and held all the residual powers for its local government.

There may have been a single model for the structure of local government in Boeotia. Every city in Boeotia possessed a local government made up of four councils, but it would not have been impossible for local variations on that oligarchic model to exist.

An unknown portion of the total free citizenry of Boeotia was eligible for positions on any of the four local councils in each city. There was a minimum property qualification to be met by any potential councillor, and there were probably other qualifications such as an age limit or even restriction of entry only to the heads of
families. The four local councils probably resulted from an equal division into quarters of the total eligible citizenry in each city. It seems probable that the partition may have had its origin not in probouleutic divisions of the year, but in the representation of four differentiated oligarchic classes with varied entrance qualifications, or of four separate regions—although there is no evidence to prove this to be so.

The local councils held much of the legislative authority in Boeotia. Each council undertook the probouleutic duties for the other three in some unknown sequential rotation. What those probouleutic duties were is not known, although it is possible that the probouleutic council summoned the other three councils in order to transact business. It is unlikely that each council voted on issues with a single no-vote acting as a veto of the legislation: the manner of voting was probably by plain majority, and was probably not just a ratification of the probouleutic council's previous decision.

There were, no doubt, variations in law and custom from city to city in all areas outside the jurisdiction of the federal government; this may have been why the federal court at Thebes was necessary: it was in a position to arbitrate conflicts of law and custom that must have occasionally occurred between Boeotian cities. The federal government was distinct enough structurally from the local
governments that variations in the form of oligarchical government at the local level would not have impeded the federal government's function, so long as the local governments continued to meet their obligations to it.

The Federal Government in Boeotia

P gives only the briefest description of the federal government and its functions within the Boeotian state -- in part because he himself was probably uncertain about the function of government in Boeotia.29 His description is adequate to give only a general idea of the institutions in Boeotia and cannot be used to show the actual manner in which the institutions were used or abused by the Boeotians.

The federal government in Boeotia, as it existed in 395 B.C., was constitutionally based on at least one series of reciprocal treaties between the constituent Boeotian cities from 446 B.C. at the latest.30 Within the constitution the federal government was given supreme authority over prescribed functions of government: it was supreme in international affairs, the defence of the Confederacy, the maintenance of public order within Boeotia, the maintenance of public shrines,31 and the power of judicial review.

Given the desire of the cities for as much control of their own affairs as was possible, the amount of authority originally vested in the federal government would have been limited designedly by the direct participation of local or regional representatives in the Federal Council. Those
Boeotians who desired some form of co-operative federal government were forced by pressure of the individual cities and their oligarchs to create a constitution for Boeotia that would, in theory at least, enable each local government to have some degree of direct control or influence over the actions of the federal government while at the same time preserving much of the autonomy of each local government. 32

It is impossible, given the silence of P, to know the manner by which federal councillors were selected from each federal district or whether a single method of selection was set in place throughout all of Boeotia. The potential influence of the individual cities in the affairs of the federal government would be determined by the form of selection. Possible and not unreasonable methods for selecting federal councillors would include the nomination of suitable candidates by each city or their selection by lot from district military lists.

All Boeotia was divided into eleven districts or μέρη, 33 each of which appears to have originally been a region encompassing the same number of active full citizens. 34 Each district sent a Boeotarch and 60 councillors annually to Thebes, which was the federal capital. 35 It is likely that there were annual meetings of the Federal Council in other parts of Boeotia: at the shrine of Itonian Athena 36 and, perhaps, at other federal shrines such as that of Ptoion. Thebes was probably chosen
as the capital of the Confederacy because of its central position, its wealth, derived from trade and commerce with foreign nations, its size, and its prestige.37

The ratio of full citizens to each federal representative was probably less than 50 to 1.38 The small ratio probably reflected an earlier division of the citizenry into lochoi or military-groupings of approximately 300 men throughout the cities of Boeotia. The concept of representation by districts may well have been taken over from methods of levying troops in the sixth century B.C.: the concept seems to be chiefly associated with the equitable distribution of the burden of raising a hoplite army. The boundaries of the eleven districts did not have to reflect the boundaries of each city,39 since the objective seems to have been to allow every enfranchised citizen an equal right of representation in all deliberations of the Federal Council.

Each large city in the Confederacy appears to have had at least one federal district within its own boundaries,40 though the smaller cities could be grouped together. The federal districts may have been designed to reflect diverse political and regional interests at the Federal Council. The large cities, the small towns, and the rural villages all would have had some voice in federal affairs. The districts after 427 B.C. were as follows:41 two in Thebes, two in the area of Plataea and the surrounding countryside,
two in Orchomenus and Hyettus, two in Thespiae (along with Eutresis and Thisbe), one in Tanagra, one including Haliartus, Lebadea, and Coronea, and another including likewise Acraephium, Copae, and Chaeronea. The boundaries of these federal districts could be changed to reflect major changes in the total numbers of hoplites of military age in Boeotia. However, the number of Boeotarchs and the total number of districts stayed the same, if one can take P's phrase, ... ἀπλῶς δὲ δὴ δῆλωσι κατὰ τὸν ἄρχωντα, as meaning that the Boeotians did not vary the number of Boeotarchs -- at least after the incorporation of the Plataean territory into the Confederacy -- whenever the military districts had to be readjusted.

The Boeotarchs were responsible for all military strategy, the policing and defence of the Confederacy, the negotiation of treaties -- arising from their control of the heralds -- and the administration of the day-to-day affairs of the Federal Council -- which met as a committee of the whole to ratify the actions of the Boeotarchs and to deal with issues of war and peace probably less than eight times a year. The 660 federal councillors exercised an office which probably originated as a check upon potential abuse of power by any of the Boeotarchs.

As P also uses the plural "Councils" when speaking about the federal government at Thebes, it is likely, as many have pointed out, that the Federal Council was
composed of four distinct councils that acted in the same manner as the local councils in each city. It is not known how the Federal Council functioned, other than that it possessed the power to vote down a proposal coming from the Boeotarchs themselves.47 It is best to interpret the federal councillors as representatives delegated in some manner or other by each district48 to advise the Boeotarchs and to make all laws dealing with foreign affairs. The Council's actions, if legitimate, would thereby be binding upon all the districts and, by extension, on all the cities of the Boeotian Confederacy.

The Federal Council had limited powers in comparison with many modern-day federal governments and only imposed its policies on the cities of Boeotia during times of war or civil rebellion. During such periods the Federal Council and the Boeotarchs could summon troops from every district — up to the maximum limits of 1000 hoplites and 100 cavalry49 —, levy taxes, and authorize requisitions for the troops. Given either the desire of a majority of its Council or an immediate threat of enemy invasion, the federal government would have had at hand the means with which it could have usurped many of the constitutional powers of the local governments: the threat of military retaliation.
Relations of the Federal and Local Governments

There was some rivalry among the cities of Boeotia, but the constitution of the Confederacy must have been designed to limit such antagonism in normal circumstances. The local governments could fall under strong federal control only if a majority of the Federal Council -- formed from representatives from diverse regions with varied interests -- were willing to take action against a particular city or federal district. This action, because it meant a possible military expedition and garrisoning of the offending city by drafted troops at a substantial cost of maintenance, would probably not be used very often. Every city was jealous of its own autonomy and wary of any federal attempt at reducing the freedom of any city within the Confederacy. The instrument which was available to the federal government for enforcing its wishes against any city or district was probably the federal court. Any majority found on the Federal Council would also be found among the dicasts or jurymen sent to serve on the federal court -- especially if the councillors themselves fulfilled the role of federal dicasts. By engineering favourable judicial decisions the majority controlling the federal government could probably exile any Boeotian citizens who were nuisances. And a city that ignored the judgment of the court would hazard the threat of a military expedition sent by an increasingly hostile Federal Council.
It is probable that the Thebans usually controlled the Federal Council, but it is impossible to determine from the degree of Theban domination. The federal districts and the federal court would be controlled by the Thebans only if they could consistently win over the majority in the Federal Council in order to pass laws that would be advantageous to Thebes and detrimental to the other cities of Boeotia. P states that there was no consensus among the Thebans in 395. Without some form of consensus among the Thebans themselves it is difficult to believe that Theban domination of the Federal Council could last unaided by foreign coercion.

Some individual cities, if not whole districts, appear to have been unhappy with the actions of the federal government from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. The hardships caused by high battle losses at Delium, assorted foreign expeditions and garrisons must have been difficult for the landed oligarchs in Boeotia to bear. Their wealth and income were damaged by the strain of keeping a nation under arms for such a long period; and in a heavily populated land which was near the maximum of exploitation the mere threat of an invasion during harvest would have dangerously depleted the surpluses that could be taken off the land. The only thing that seemed to push together diverse interest groups among both the full citizens was, as P points out, the nearby presence of a large
Spartan-led garrison at Decelea and the constant threat of Athenian incursions and covert Athenian support for exiled Boeotian democrats. At the end of the Peloponnesian War the threat of either Spartan retribution or Athenian invasion considerably lessened, but, from the events of 395, it appears that the federal government had not returned to its peacetime inactivity.

Causes of Stasis in Boeotia

Only the sketchiest outline of events within Boeotia can be gained from a study of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. There was some form of stasis within both Thebes and the rest of the Boeotian Confederacy, but what it was caused by is unknown; nor is there any real certainty about the length of time that such turmoil had been going on. The political situation in Thebes and Boeotia in 395 and for some time before that, was one of turmoil. 54 P speaks of stasis at Thebes, but is impossible to know whether P took his information from a reliable source or from the trial of Ismenias in 382 B.C. 55 According to P there was political strife in 395 which was caused by two "movements" 56 made up of an unknown number of oligarchic clubs or groups. 57 Both movements had three leaders: the one Ismenias, Antitheus, and Androcleidas; the other Leontiades, Asias, and Coeratadas. 58 The latter is called pro-Spartan by P, perhaps because of its later support for the Spartans; 59 the former movement is said to have feigned a pro-Athenian
stance in 404/3 B.C. P has thus defined the two opposing political movements in terms of differing foreign policy goals. He adds further support for his view by stating that the movement led by Ismenias and Androcleidas held two platforms: the destruction of Spartan power, and the prevention of Spartan aid to its rival movement. It seems likely that P's view is an over simplification of what was actually a far more complicated political situation. If the cause of stasis in both Thebes and the other Boeotian cities was not as P states, then it is necessary to speculate on what the reasons could have been for stasis in Boeotia and Thebes.

In his digression on Boeotia and its internal situation P attempts to explain the domestic factionalism that he believes existed in 395 in terms of an on-going struggle between two oligarchic movements divided over the proper foreign policy for their country. This is naive. Domestic political squabbles are usually caused more by local problems than by debates over the direction of foreign policy. This is especially true in a federal state where there is constant friction between the central and regional governments over the demarcation of their respective powers -- something that P, writing primarily for the citizens of a unitary state, seems to have had difficulties in explaining and probably in understanding. It is usually impossible to explain the domestic political situation of
any state simply by reference to its foreign policies. P interprets the domestic factionalism at Thebes to be the reflection of a debate over the relationship of Boeotia with Sparta. It is unlikely, however, that he had enough information at hand concerning the complicated machinations that occurred at Thebes from 405 to 395 B.C.; if he had possessed more evidence, he would probably not have made the error of explaining the political turmoil in terms of foreign policy views. He knew, however, that the later political stasis at Thebes in 382 B.C., which led to the seizure of the Cadmea by the Spartans, had arisen from the dispute of two broad-based oligarchic groupings that had long existed and were bitterly opposed to each other. He also knew that the Spartan-supported movement of Leontidas stated, as its pretext for overthrowing the Theban government, that the movement of Ismenias had long been anti-Spartan. P may have interpreted his sources about the trial of Ismenias to mean that the political instability had existed in Boeotia since at least 395 B.C., and that this instability had been caused initially by an intense dispute over the alliance of Boeotia with Sparta. Given a dearth of evidence, P's analysis of the situation was the best that he could do. P's evidence about domestic politics in Boeotia may have been more rudimentary than is often believed.64 There must have been other reasons for the tension that
existed between the two movements of Leontiades and Ismenias at Thebes — if indeed any such tension existed in 395 B.C.

Leontiades’ group had been in a position of prestige and control in the local councils of Thebes since the refounding of the Boeotian Confederacy in 447/6 B.C. The political status quo may have been destroyed by the influx of many of the rural inhabitants of Boeotia into Thebes or by the fortunes made or lost during the latter part of the Decelean War. At some point during the Peloponnesian War the traditional power structure at Thebes may have began to disintegrate. By 395, another movement led by Ismenias had gained the upper hand at Thebes and in the Federal Council.

The political differences, then, between the two movements may well have been not primarily over foreign policy, but rather over extension of the political franchise and the degree of authority to be vested in the federal government. Leontiades and his supporters would likely have sought a stricter and more aristocratic oligarchy and a more powerful Federal Council dominated by their Theban-based movement; while Ismenias and his supporters were probably seeking a more moderate oligarchy and a greater degree of local autonomy. Such a struggle over franchise qualifications and the division of powers between the local councils and the Federal Council could easily have extended throughout all the cities of the Boeotian Confederacy and
have become the cause of much political factionalism — given the similarity of governmental models and the common political heritage of the Boeotians at that time.

The stasis of 395 B.C. was not a conflict between the fully enfranchised citizens and the less fortunate disenfranchised citizens, but was primarily an ideological battle over two or more versions of oligarchy. Nor was the stasis chiefly about the nature of the foreign policy of the day — although this was probably used as a political pretext by both sides in the struggle.

The centre of the turmoil was at Thebes between two movements within the ruling oligarchy: that of Leontiades, and that of Ismenias. The stasis is unlikely to have reached the degree that it did if it was only caused by a fight over the future direction of Boeotia in international affairs; there surely had to have been a domestic element. Boeotia's government, therefore, was unstable because of disputes over the form of oligarchy to be followed by the Confederacy.

The stasis that states existed in Boeotia in 395 B.C. probably continued at Thebes until the seizure of the Cadmea in 382 B.C. The later adoption of democracy at Thebes may well have been an attempt by the victorious revolutionaries of 379 to increase the number of moderate voters in Thebes, giving more individuals a stake in their government, in
order to isolate the aristocrats from any future control of the city.

**Stasis as a Cause of the Corinthian War**

P combines descriptions of domestic turmoil and foreign political tensions that had been present in Boeotia to reach the further thesis that the domestic turmoil at Boeotia, caused by debate over the support of the Spartans, was the major cause of the Corinthian War. He sees a link between the outbreak of the war and the desires of those in power in Athens, Boeotia and Argos. P seems to be influenced by a desire to demonstrate that domestic politics led to the start of the Corinthian War. He postulates, then, a cause for the factionalism within the Boeotian Confederacy which he also regards as the initial cause for the start of the Corinthian War. By 395 B.C., if P is correct, the combination of factionalism among the enfranchised citizenry and the intriguing of the Spartans had led to plotting by Leontiades' movement to seize control of Thebes with the aid of Spartan-supplied troops. The stasis may well have resulted, directly or indirectly, in the loss of Orchomenus in 395 to the army of Lysander. The defection of Orchomenus can be explained as the result of local dissatisfaction with a Federal Council that had decided to go to war with Phocis without weighing the severe hardship that its own army would impose on the Orchomenians at harvest time. What is known, based on P's description, is
that in 395 B.C. stasis in Boeotia was a cause of the Corinthian War.

Yet it seems improbable that a difference over foreign policy alone would have caused enough turmoil at Thebes and in the rest of Boeotia to have led to a degree of political violence that led in turn to the outbreak of war. Sharp differences can and do occur within the ruling class of a state over its foreign policy, but such disagreements are catalysts only for pre-existent domestic dissension, and cannot drive otherwise stable regimes into chaos and destruction. Some element is missing from P's interpretation of the political turmoil at Thebes: It is too simplistic. Some modern scholars agree with P's analysis of the domestic situation in Thebes and Boeotia, in part because of the well-known obsession of the Ancient Greeks with stasis. That political weakness of a state was readily exploited by other Greek states for their own ends. The major powers in the region, usually Athens and Sparta, frequently interfered in the internal affairs of a state wracked by stasis: supporting one movement against its local opponents. But it is not demonstrated by P or anyone else that shifts in a state's foreign policy necessarily demonstrate that there were also shifts in the internal political situation, even if shifts in internal political power can be shown to have occurred. Moreover, a state that shows a sudden shift in foreign policy often
does so more because of direct external manipulation of both its foreign and internal affairs by a powerful state desirous that the change take place than because of any shift in government.

The political turmoil which would have developed in Boeotia would fit within the Greek definition of stasis. And such turmoil would have made it easy for Sparta to exploit the situation to its own advantage. And Sparta, for its own purposes, tried to exploit the Boeotian turmoil: first, by actively supporting one group of oligarchs against the other, then, by invading Boeotia.
CHAPTER THREE
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Introduction

After the battle of Aegospotami in 405 B.C. the Boeotians changed from being loyal allies of the Spartans to becoming their ardent enemies.¹ Some scholars see this change as the result of a great shift in Boeotian foreign policy, caused by stasis at Thebes and the rapid rise of the political movement of Ismenias in the Federal Council.² Such a view is over-simplistic. A multitude of causes within and without Boeotia led to a confrontation with Sparta, one that by 395 B.C. had turned into the beginnings of another major war in Greece and the Aegean.

Principles of Boeotian Foreign Policy

Boeotia followed a course of action in its foreign affairs that was conditioned by its geographical position. It was faced with the continual threat of attack by powerful enemies from either the north or the south. It had experienced previous attempts by both the Athenians and the Spartans to change or influence its form of government and its alliances.

The form of government in Boeotia, federalism, also made Boeotia extremely vulnerable to outside interference: disputes between the central government and individual cities could be turned into serious rebellions by astute foreign powers willing to give aid to a political movement within a disgruntled local government. The secession of but a single city from the Boeotian Confederacy would have
threatened the integrity of the state as a whole.

The landed oligarchs had much to lose if their Confederacy were weakened to the point of disintegration. The defences of Boeotia had to be sufficient to protect it against incursion or interference in its internal affairs by powerful neighbours. The Boeotians' resources -- from a land rich, but taxed almost to the limits of its production -- would be greatly strained in attempts to expand Boeotian domination beyond its borders. The Boeotian Federal Council pursued a line of foreign policy that reflected the capacity and needs of Boeotia. Although well-populated, Boeotia, isolated by alliances of neighbouring states with either Athens or Sparta, would be subject to invasion by armies larger than any it alone could muster. The Boeotians, therefore, were constrained by their geography, oligarchy, and population in their exercise of foreign policy. What that policy was during the crucial period between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the beginning of the Corinthian War can only be discovered by a detailed analysis of the events of that period.

Because of the potential threat of Athenian invasion and conquest, the Boeotians had become allies of Sparta or members of the Peloponnesian League, and had subordinated themselves to the leadership of Sparta from at least 446 B.C. in return for the promise of military aid. The defeat of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405/4 meant that
Boeotia had to respond to the sudden and complete attainment of hegemony by the Spartans over all of Greece. Reconsideration of foreign policy and alliances occurred throughout Greece in the wake of the Spartan victory, and Boeotia was no exception in its re-evaluation of foreign policy priorities.

In 404 B.C. there was no opponent for the Spartans. Athens was weakened by the war and the civil discord that resulted from its defeat. Persia, still the nominal ally of the Spartans, was too preoccupied with dynastic succession and the revolt of Egypt from its control to contest the control of Ionia and the Aegean with Sparta. The other major Greek states were either weakened by the war or controlled by pro-Spartan leaders, who were often backed up by Spartan garrisons. No state could stand alone against a hegemon constantly prepared for war. Yet the Boeotians began almost immediately to pursue a policy of independent action in foreign affairs, one that frequently conflicted with the interests of Sparta and led ultimately to war.

Boeotia and Sparta, 405 to 396 B.C.

After their victory against the Athenians, the Spartans had decided to deal first with the question of Athens and its former empire. The establishment of the Thirty and the decarchies flowed out of this policy. Once they had settled the Aegean and eliminated the threat of any immediate rise of a second Delian League or the seizure of
control of the Aegean by the Persians, the Spartans next turned to affairs within the Peloponnese. Sparta used an old pretext of a slight to a Spartan king to invade and weaken Elis. By dominating Elis, the Spartans sought to reassert their influence upon their Peloponnesian allies and to warn them of the consequences of not obeying Spartan dictates. Only after these actions, by 400 or 399 B.C., was Sparta able or willing to devote itself to pressuring an independent-minded Boeotia into returning to its subordinate position within the Peloponnesian League.

Boeotian actions with respect to the other major and minor powers in Greece from 405 to 395 B.C. reflect a consistency of foreign policy. Dissatisfied with its hegemon, Boeotia reacted to Spartan initiatives by defending its independence of action.

The Boeotians were not whole-hearted supporters of Sparta -- that state, in the pursuit of its own goals, had indirectly caused the Athenian domination of all Boeotia for ten years. It was reasonable; after the elimination of the major reason for its alliance to Sparta, for Boeotia to examine its obligations to Sparta and her League. The Boeotians often acted in ways antagonistic towards Spartan interests. But the Spartans were not prepared to deal with Boeotia until they had set in order their newly acquired empire.
Boeotian opposition to Spartan orders -- even when they may have been supported by the majority of the members of the Peloponnesian League -- did not evoke immediate retaliation from the Spartans. Boeotia was not treated as a state revolting from the Peloponnesian League and the Spartan hegemony; however, enough bad will was slowly built up against the Boeotians that the Spartans by 399 B.C. may have begun to work to destabilize and thereby weaken the Boeotian Confederacy by supporting the political movement of Leontiades against the movement of Ismenias.  

The first known action that the Boeotians took against the Spartans, after the victory of Aegospotami in 405 B.C., was the Boeotian motion at the Council of the Allies to have Athens destroyed. The Boeotians and other Greeks must have realized that Sparta would not destroy Athens because of its strategic importance for Spartan dominance of Greece and the Aegean.

The next apparent act of protest against the Spartans was the Boeotian request to the Spartans at Decelea for a share of the spoils of the god Apollo. The tithe that the Boeotians claimed was probably the portion reserved for King Agis to dedicate to Apollo at Delphi as leader of the Peloponnesians, and not merely one-tenth of the profits of the booty taken by the army at Decelea itself. Such an action was a diplomatic insult second only to the denial of sacrifice to a Spartan king or the striking of his person,
and perhaps is to be explained as Boeotian reaction to the excessive *hybris* that King Agis is said to have had in his dealings with the Boeotian federal officials. The incident was considered serious enough by the Spartans for them to make use of it as a pretext for war against the Boeotians nine years later.

Although the Athenians had suffered defeat, they were still a powerful nation and as such still a potential threat for the Boeotians. If a pro-Spartan regime were installed at Athens (as happened later with the Thirty Tyrants), an army of perhaps 8,000 hoplites could be mobilized against the Boeotians at short notice. Athens would then have become a Spartan satellite ready to turn the flanks of the Boeotians by sending an attacking force westward in concert with a Peloponnesian army marching north through the Megarid or south through Phocis. The Athenians also could threaten the Boeotian control over Plataea: the democratic Plataean exiles were back at Athens, and there may have been some question about the legitimacy of the Boeotian claim to the land because of its capture by a Spartan-led army. In any case, the loss of the Plataean territory to its former inhabitants would have jeopardized the integrity of the Boeotian Confederacy. Plataea would have become a safe haven within Boeotia for any Boeotian malcontents and an advanced base for Athenian or Spartan expeditions against the Boeotian Confederacy. The Boeotians also had cause to
worry about the future status of Oropus, independent in 404 B.C. 24 and considered by the Boeotians as part of Boeotia, 25 once the Athenians had gained enough confidence and Spartan support to reassert their control over that city. 26

Boeotian concerns about the potential threat of Athens under Spartan domination caused aid to be given to the Athenian democratic exiles at Thebes. The civil disorder that the Thirty created in Attica was a godsend to the Boeotians. They exploited the situation in order to weaken Athenian power to the point that the Athenians would not risk invading Boeotia or annexing Oropus. Ismenias 27 gave Thrasybulus enough aid to stir up some trouble along the border with Attica — though the Boeotians probably never dreamed that the enterprise would succeed so quickly. The aid given was not from the public treasury, perhaps because of a desire of the Boeotian Federal Council that there be no open provocation of the government of the Thirty. 28

The ultimate result of the actions of the Boeotians was the invasion of Attica by King Pausanias 29 to reassert Spartan control and quash the Athenian democratic exiles. The Boeotians refused to comply with the summons of all the allies of Sparta to take part in Pausanias' expedition. 30 They may have disputed the right of Sparta to summon forth its allies for an expedition against a state that technically was not an enemy and was a member of the Peloponnesian League. There was no Spartan retribution at
that time against Boeotia because of the mess that Pausanias made of things -- something for which the Spartans never forgave him.\textsuperscript{31} It is likely that, during Pausanias' expedition into Attica, the Boeotians had mobilized their federal army to guard against a sudden incursion into Boeotia by the Spartans.

Between 402 and 399 B.C.\textsuperscript{32} the Spartans attacked Elis, their nominal ally.\textsuperscript{33} All the other allies of Sparta, except the Boeotians and the Corinthians,\textsuperscript{34} sent contingents to aid the Spartans.

The Boeotian refusal to join either Pausanias' expedition or the later Spartan expeditions against Elis seems to have been an expression of dissatisfaction either with the actions of the Spartans against their nominal allies, Athens and Elis, or with the nature of the obligations that Boeotia was under in its treaty of alliance with Sparta.\textsuperscript{35} Yet Boeotia, as far is known, did not suffer for its stand against the Spartan exercise of hegemony. It stayed as an ally of Sparta or as a member of the Peloponnesian League, and the Spartans did not take any revenge.\textsuperscript{36}

During the same period as the Spartan expeditions against Elis,\textsuperscript{37} the Boeotians were troubled by problems nearer home. In 402/1 B.C. the city of Oropus was in violent political turmoil. When asked for aid by the oligarchic faction, the Boeotians seized the city.\textsuperscript{38} The
possession of the city and its harbour had in the past allowed the Athenians use of Oropus as a base of attack against Tanagra and its surrounding area. The Boeotians needed to hold Oropus to protect their south-eastern strategic flank from attack by either the Athenians or the Spartans. The city was refounded away from its harbour in a stronger position commanding the road to Delium. The new foundation may have allowed the Boeotians to claim the territory as theirs by right of colonization. The Athenians were unable or unwilling to go to war with Boeotia over Oropus -- probably because the democracy at that time was engaged in recapturing Eleusis from the extreme oligarchs and in healing the wounds of civil war.

Two years after the annexation of Oropus, Boeotian relations with the Spartans had further deteriorated. The Spartans were desirous of controlling Northern and Central Greece. They had been interested in that region since at least their foundation of Heraclea in Trachis, but only after their war in Elis did they again show renewed interest in expanding their influence into Thessaly and the Thraceward region. This renewed concern arose, in part, from the Spartan desire to control Thessaly, to reduce a renewed Persian influence in the region, and, most important of all, to seal off a potentially hostile Boeotia by re-establishing Spartan control at Heraclea, thereby eliminating the possibility of any aid to Boeotia from any
area north of Thermopylae, or any aid from Boeotia to Thessaly.

Heraclea, situated north of Thermopylae, was a key position for those who held it. An army moving south via the pass at Thermopylae would run the risk of an attack on its rear if an enemy controlled Heraclea; and an army attempting to block the passage of an enemy moving north or south through the pass at Thermopylae would be greatly aided by the possession of the walled city of Heraclea: it could be used as a supply base or a place of refuge, and it commanded the alternative route south that by-passes Thermopylae and reaches Elatea in Phocis. Whoever held Heraclea could easily pour troops into Boeotia. In 399 B.C. the Spartans decided to re-establish control of Heraclea, then stricken by stasis. They sent Herippidas with a force of Spartan troops to restore order. The expeditionary force probably marched across the Isthmus and through Boeotia on its way to Heracleia, as opposed to taking ship across the Gulf of Corinth. If so, the Boeotians were probably constrained by the nature of their treaty with Sparta to allow Herippidas' force to traverse Boeotia and to supply his troops while he was in their country. It is unlikely that the Boeotians attempted either to stop or supply Herippidas. The expedition would have been a warning directed at the Boeotians to step into line with Spartan policy or face the consequences. The Spartans
by 399 B.C. had decided to tighten their control of Phocis
and Thessaly.\textsuperscript{50}

Between 399 and 396 B.C. the Spartans managed to
develop an administrative organization that allowed them to
operate simultaneously in Greece, Asia Minor, and Sicily
without much economic or military strain on their own
resources. By 401 B.C. the Spartans were confident enough
of their position in Greece to aid Cyrus the Younger;\textsuperscript{51} and
on the failure of their attempt to manipulate the Persian
dynastic struggle for their own advantage, the Spartans had
the means to attempt to regain control of Ionia; they sent
an expedition under Thibron to Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{52} The Persians
satraps were unable to defeat the Spartan military
operations under Thibron or his successor Dercylidas, in
part because of the distraction of King Artaxerxes by
problems in reasserting control over his empire.

By 398/7 B.C. the situation had begun to change.
Artaxerxes, angered by the Spartan raids on his coastal
possessions in Asia Minor, ordered the construction of a
fleet ostensibly for an attempt to push into the Aegean Sea
and wrest its control from the Spartans.\textsuperscript{53} News of this
caused a reaction in Sparta because of the threat of a
combined military and naval incursion by the Persians into
Ionia. King Agesilaus organized a larger Spartan expedition
to Asia Minor and requested aid from Sparta's allies,
including Boeotia.\textsuperscript{54}
The Boeotians refused to join Agesilaus' expedition. The Spartans sent Aristomelidas, who had been one of the Spartan judges at the capture of Plataea, as envoy to Thessaly with Agesilaus' request. This action may have been a thinly veiled threat. The Spartan envoy probably reminded the Federal Council that the Spartans had a claim to the territory of Plataea and were prepared to resettle the exiled Plataeans there by force of arms, unless the Boeotians supported the upcoming expedition and let the pro-Spartan movement rule the country. The sacrifice at Aulis by Agesilaus may have had a similar motive: to tell the Boeotians that the Spartans were the hegemons of Greece. The Boeotian refusal to allow the sacrifice was tantamount to the start of an unheralded war, but it was forced upon them: to have allowed the sacrifice to take place contrary to the local customs would have been an admission of Spartan hegemony over Boeotia. The insult to Agesilaus brought Sparta and Boeotia closer to war. The Spartans may have intensified their campaign of disruption against the Boeotian Confederacy.

The Outbreak of the Corinthian War

By 396 B.C., then, the Boeotians were prepared to risk war. To judge by the events at Aulis, the Boeotians wanted freedom of action in foreign affairs and non-interference by the Spartans in their internal politics — in other words, some degree of autonomy.
The success, however, of Agesilaus in Ionia and Caria in 395, combined with the inability of Conon to challenge the full Spartan fleet, had left only the Boeotians willing to risk war against their former hegemon. The Athenians, although not without the resources for maintaining an army in the field, were more interested in regaining their naval supremacy in the Aegean; the Corinthians seemed unwilling to cross the Spartans; and the Argives were waiting for some coalition to form against Sparta, but were unwilling, given past performance, to commence hostilities without sufficient allies. Boeotia was isolated: of the states that bordered it, Athens was indifferent, Locris, although an ally, was too small to render much assistance, and Phocis, firmly in the Spartan camp, was hostile.

The Boeotians had but one dependable ally: their neighbour, East Locris. Both countries had one thing in common: enmity for the Phocians. Boeotia had supported East Locris in its on-going dispute with Phocis. The East Locrians had been fighting the Phocians over the ownership of a strip of land containing the sea port of Daphnis. The city of Daphnus was the terminus of the pass that led from the Phocian Hyampolis to the sea, and as such was a valuable prize for either the Phocians or the Locrians. If the Phocians gained possession of Daphnus, East Locris would be cut into two parts and would probably fall under Phocian control. The Boeotians may have been interested in
the disputed area after the Spartans regained control of Heracleia: whoever controlled Daphnus could also control the major route between Phocis and Heracleia.\textsuperscript{63} The Phocians were willing to expand into the area of Daphnus with the implicit support of the Spartans.\textsuperscript{64} The Boeotians had to back up the East Locrians in order not to lose an ally and to not be further surrounded by potential enemies.

In this light, the Boeotian support for the Locrians, mentioned by both Xenophon and P, becomes understandable.\textsuperscript{65} The Boeotians could have done nothing and let an old ally, a common enemy of Phocis, fall under the control of the Phocians and their masters the Spartans; or they could fight. The Boeotians chose to fight the Phocians and risk war with the Spartans at a time when Boeotia had no strong ally. It was this willingness to risk self-destruction for no apparent goal that caused the ancient Greek historians to search for an underlying motive for the action that led directly to the start of the Corinthian War.

The Boeotians, knowing that direct military support for Locris was needed and probably constrained by their alliance, invaded Phocis. They seemed determined not to bend to Spartan pressures. Their expedition into Phocis\textsuperscript{66} was never the outcome of a policy of expansionism,\textsuperscript{67} but was instead an attempt to draw the Phocians out of East Locris or to bottle them up there. The expedition was punitive with no attempt to establish permanent garrisons; and it
probably reached East Locris, by way of Hyampolis, before returning to Orchomenus and then disbanding. It was at about this time that Timocrates the Rhodian went to Greece with gold worth 50 talents in order to bribe the leaders of Thebes, Argos, Corinth and, perhaps, Athens to agitate for war against Sparta. He had been sent by Tithraustes. Before the victory of Agesilaus at Sardis, Artaxerxes dispatched Tithraustes to Ionia in order to organize the resistance against the Spartans. After attempts to reach a peace settlement with the Spartans failed, Tithraustes attempted to sow dissension in Greece by promising future Persian aid to those states that revolted against Sparta.

The Spartans seized upon the Boeotian invasion of Phocis as providing the excuse to implement a plan for the break up of the Boeotian Confederacy. Sparta sent Lysander to raise troops in Central Greece and attack Boeotia. The Boeotians were forced to search for more allies: the collective military might of the Peloponnesian League and many other pro-Spartan states in Central Greece was about to descend upon them. Only the Athenians responded to Boeotian entreaties, because of their fear that Pausanius might attack Athens either while on his way into Boeotia by the Road of the Towers or after he had dealt with the Boeotians. The Spartan invasion of Boeotia failed because of the untimely death of Lysander at Haliartus. The
Spartan goals for their invasion of Boeotia had been simple: the destruction of the Boeotian League, if not in pitched battle, then by the capture of various Boeotian cities and federal shrines. It is likely that if the Spartan attack had succeeded there would not have been a coalition of major Greek states against the Spartans for several more years. But the Spartans had achieved some of their goals before Pausanias retreated out of Boeotia: the revolt of Orchomenus from the Boeotian Confederacy; and the visible Athenian breach of its alliance with Sparta.

An unexpected victory over the Spartans, combined with the loss of Orchomenus, may have forced the Boeotians to continue on in the war. With the death of Lysander it would have been possible for both sides to have come to an agreement for peace. The Boeotians had accomplished what they had set out to do: they stopped Phocian aggression against East Locris and fended off an attack by the Spartans. They were safe from further invasion for at least the winter of 395/4 B.C. But it is likely that there would not have been a permanent peace until Sparta was forced by pitched battle to relinquish its aims in Central Greece. With the issue of Orchomenus unresolved, the Boeotians, together with the Persians were the driving force behind the Alliance of Corinth later in the winter of 395 B.C.
The Causes of the Corinthian War

The ancient historians had some difficulty in explaining the causes of the Corinthian War. The bribery of the Greek leaders of Thebes, Argos, Corinth and, perhaps, Athens by the Persians seemed a reasonable cause to some Greeks for the sudden coalition of states of diverse interests after the battle of Haliaertus. Xenophon saw, as did P to a lesser extent, that the entire Greek world was poised for war. It is probable that some form of embassy from Tithraustes did arrive in Greece, but not until after the Boeotians had either decided to go to the aid of the Locrians or had invaded Phocis. Each of the states wanted money to finance large capital-intensive defence projects, such as the rebuilding of the Long Walls at Athens. The Persian offer of monetary support did not cause the various cities to become hostile towards Sparta, but it increased the enthusiasm for war, so that the fortunate victory of the Boeotians further increased the resolve of those other cities to form a coalition in late 395 B.C. against the Spartans.

The Spartans had undoubtedly felt hostile towards Boeotia since at least the incident at Aulis in 396. The Phocians had entered into war with Locris expecting tacit approval of their action by the Spartans and, therefore, inaction by both the Boeotians and the Spartans should Locris complain. When the Boeotians invaded Phocis, the
Spartans had the excuse that they needed to war upon the Boeotians and to destroy their Confederacy. Sparta had become over-confident because of the successes of Agesilaus in Asia Minor. With no other large-scale military commitments abroad the Spartans had their picked troops ready and the forces of their Peloponnesian allies to use in an attack on Boeotia.\(^86\) They were not concerned about the Persian fleet.\(^87\) The Spartans were more concerned with forcing Boeotia back into line. The Spartans wanted war with Boeotia in the summer of 395.\(^88\)

**Failure of Boeotian Foreign Policy after 395 B.C.**

The Boeotians were responsible for starting the Corinthian War only to extent that they aided their ally East Locris in its troubles with Spartan-backed Phocis; and they continued the hostilities with Sparta to find a better peace.\(^89\) By 392, however, the Boeotian oligarchs could not support the burden of a lengthy war and were seeking peace with Sparta.\(^90\) The policy of continuing the state of war was disastrous for the Boeotians: it led to the enforced breakup of the Boeotian Confederacy as a part of the King's Peace of 386 B.C. -- something that the Boeotians may have been fighting against in 395.

**Conclusion**

The foreign policy of 405 to 395 B.C. was not much different from that which Boeotia had followed since at
least 421 B.C. Until 405/4 B.C., Boeotia had been a strong but independent-minded ally of the Spartans. The period 405 to 395 B.C. was one of constant manoeuvring by the Boeotians to keep a powerful Sparta from controlling internal Boeotian affairs, or hampering freedom of Boeotian diplomatic initiatives, or causing the destruction of the Boeotian Confederacy itself. Boeotia refused to fulfill all its obligations to Sparta: although in theory still an ally of Sparta, Boeotia ignored Spartan demands for military aid. In doing so the Boeotians may have realized the potential danger: sooner or later there might have been a confrontation between the two states.

The cornerstone of Boeotian policy was the defence of the integrity of the Confederacy and its independence of action. The Boeotians were compelled by the factors of geography, population and resources to act on the strategic defensive. The Boeotians could not afford to be aggressive and expansionistic. The characteristics of their defensive foreign policy were: first, the maintenance of a hoplite army strong enough to threaten the success of any foreign invasion; secondly, the cultivation of alliances against the more threatening of the two largest Greek powers -- an attempt at balancing Athens and Sparta off against each other and thereby insuring some degree of autonomy for Boeotia; thirdly, attempts to secure as much of its border areas as possible, such as the more defensible marches of
Plataea and Oropus, in order to block any easy access for foreign invasions; and fourthly, maintenance of autonomy of action in its alliances. These characteristics of foreign policy are common to all the smaller Greek states in that period.

It is unnecessary to link the shifts in Boeotian foreign policy to changes within the internal power structure; and it is likely, whatever movement was in power in Boeotia, that the policies of the government, as long as it was oligarchic, would be similar.
NOTES: CHAPTER ONE

1 Examples are: Margaret Cook, Boeotia in the Corinthian War: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics (Diss. Univ. of Washington, 1981); C.D. Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War (Ithaca, 1979); P. Salmon, Etude sur-la Confederation bootienne (447/6-386) (Brussels, 1976); and H.D. Westlake, "The Sources for the Spartan Debacle at Haliartus," Phoenix 39 (1985) 119-133.

2 K.J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2 ed. (Berlin, 1912-1927) -- see II,2 pp.23f on Xenophon.

3 See G. Dittenberger, Inscriptiones Graecae VII: Inscriptiones Megaridis et Boeotia (Berlin, 1892) and Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (1923 to date) for Boeotian inscriptions. There are several non-Boeotian inscriptions that will be used in this study; they are Athenian and West Locrian: see M.N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions II (Oxford, 1948), numbers 101, 102 and 103; and also R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1969), no. 29.

4 See B.V. Head, Coins of Central Greece (London, 1884) p. xl. The coinage for Boeotia cannot be dated adequately without reference to the literary evidence. Given that age of many Boeotian coins is determined solely by their quality and workmanship, and not upon proved
dates, the numismatic evidence is untrustworthy and cannot be considered useful for establishing by independent means the dates of important events in Boeotia.


6 Ibid.


11 C. Grayson, "Did Xenophon intend to Write History?", The Ancient Historian and his Materials (Westmead, 1975) p. 31.

12 A good example of this is E.M. Soulis's poor treatment Xenophon and Thucydides (Athens, 1972) -- a work which owes more to the political climate of Modern Greece
under the rule of the military dictators than to a reasoned historiographical analysis of Xenophon.

13 Underhill, op. cit. (note 9) p. xxxiv.

14 Hell. 4.8.1.

15 Underhill, op. cit. (note 9) p. xxx.

16 W.P. Henry, Greek Historical Writing (Chicago, 1967) p. 3.

17 Underhill, op. cit. (note 9) p. xxviii.

18 Ibid.


21 There are at present three separate groups of papyrus fragments identified as being part of this author's work: P. Oxy. 842 first published by B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt, "842. Theopompus (or Cratippus), Hellenica in the Oxyrhynchus Papyri: Part V (London, 1908) pp. 114-242; PSI 13.1304 or the Florence fragment conveniently published in V. Bärtoletti, Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (Leipzig, 1959) together with the London fragment; and P. Cairo temp. inv. 26/6/27/1-35 s. 1 p. conveniently published in H.J. Mette, "Die 'Kleinen' griechischen Historiker heute", Lustrum 21

22 The former date, 362 B.C., is conjecture based on the fact that several "Hellenica" and "Histories" were produced in rapid succession both at Athens and in other areas of Greece immediately after that date. The death of Epaminondas and the destruction of Theban power caused many Greeks to re-examine the course of events throughout Greece and Asia Minor from the fall of Athens until the decline of Sparta -- something not done since Thucydides broke off his account of the Peloponnesian War. The latter dates of 355 and 330 are based on internal chronological analysis of the London fragment -- see Appendix One.

23 See Appendix One for the arguments concerning the attribution of the Oxyrhynchus history to Ephorus.

24 See note 5.


27 See Appendix One.


29 Hell. Oxy. 17.1-2; 18.1-2 (Bartoletti's numbering however illogical it may seem to number two series of fragments consecutively, it seems that Bartoletti's system has taken over, if only for simplicity's sake. To use the numbering that Grenfell and Hunt gave the London fragment, subtract 5 from Bartoletti's paragraph numbers).

30 Cf. Xen. Hell. 7.2.25.

31 Hell. Oxy. 7.2-3.


34 Contrary to Grayson, op. cit. (note 11) p. 37.

35 Hell. Oxy. 7.2.

36 Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit (note 21) p. 122.

37 See note 19.

38 See Appendix One.

40 Ibid.

41 Griffith, op. cit. (note 8) p. 173.

42 Barber, op. cit., (note 22) p. 54.

43 Underhill, op. cit. (note 9) p. xxxiv.

44 A good example of such a technique is G.L. Barber's The Historian Ephorus, where many characteristics of Ephorus and his work are deduced solely from Diodorus' use of that earlier historian's work for a portion of his history.

45 Holm, op. cit. (note 20) p. 17.


47 Ibid.


49 Underhill, op. cit. (note 9) p. xxxvi.


52 Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 21) pp. 124, 137. See Appendix One for further discussion.

53 C.A. Volquardsen, Untersuchungen über die Quellen der griechischen und sizilischen Geschichten bei Diodor, Buch XI bis XVI (Kiel, 1868) as pointed out by Grenfell and Hunt op. cit. (note 21) pp. 135f. I have not consulted this work. This theory is the basis for much of the modern discussion on Diodorus, P., Ephorus and Theopompus -- though many modern researchers neglect any reference to it in their studies of the history of the early fourth-century B.C.

54 It is impossible to point to any particular passage that is known to have been taken from Theopompus; it is likely, however, that Diod. 14.80.2 -- the burning of Tissaphernes' pleasure gardens -- is taken from Theopompus.

55 Cf. note 52 and Appendix One.

56 Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 21) p. 125; Bruce, op. cit. (note 21) p. 21.


58 Underhill, op. cit. (note 9) p. xxxiv.
59 Fornar loc. cit. (note 57)

60 Demosthenes 18.96, where he in error states that there were Spartan harmosts in Boeotia and Tanagra when describing the Athenian army that aided the Boeotians at Haliartus — thereby erring in fact by about twenty years.

61 Aeschines 2.176 is based upon Andocides De Pace 3 sqq.


63 Ibid. pp. 58f.

64 P.A. Stadter, Plutarch's Historical Methods (Cambridge, Mass., 1965) p. 139.

65 Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 21) p. 133.

66 Ibid. p. 125.

67 See below.

68 Bruce, op. cit. (note 21) p. 21; Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 21) p. 125.

69 Stadter, op. cit. (note 64) p. 27.

70 Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 21) p. 125.

71 Paus. 3.9.8 and Plut. Artax. 20.3.
Paus. 3.9.8 and Plut. Ages. 15.6. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.5.2 and Hell. Oxy. 7.2.

Paus. 3.9.8. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.5.2 and Hell. Oxy. 7.2-3; 17.1.

Paus. 3.9.9. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.5.3 and Hell. Oxy. 18.2-3.

Paus. 3.9.9-10. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.5.3 and Hell. Oxy. 18.2-3.


Ages. 36.

Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 21) pp. 125 and 133.

Xen. Hell. 3.5.1; Paus. 3.9.8; Plut. Artax. 20.

Hell. Oxy. 7.5; Polyaeus 1.48.

Xen. Hell. 3.5.2.

Hell. Oxy. 7.1; Paus. 3.9.8.

Xen. Hell. 3.5.3-5; Cf. Hell. Oxy. 18.13, which seems to be closely followed by Diodorus 14.80.1-6.

Xen. Hell. 3.5.3.
85 Hell. Oxy. 18.2-3; Paus. 3.9.9. See Chapter Three for a possible resolution of this conflict.


87 C.D. Hamilton, op. cit. (note 1) passim.

88 See Chapter Three.

89 This is especially true if the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is indeed a portion of Ephorus' History -- see Appendix One.
NOTES: CHAPTER TWO

1 See Appendix Two for a chronology.


5 See Appendix One, where it is shown that P may have written between approximately 355 and 330 B.C.

6 See Chapter Three.

7 *Hell. Oxy.* 16.2.


12 Ibid. 16.2-4.

13 P's description of the federal government is rather ragged, something that only Cloche, op. cit. (note 4) p. 317, seems to lament: in his discussion of the political situation at Thebes in 395 B.C. he states that P's explanation is unsatisfactory.


16 For one view of the earlier development of the Boeotian Confederacy see Buck, op. cit. (note 14) pp. 107-138.


18 Hell. Oxy. 16.44.

19 P mentions only one form of government; however, he was writing well after the dissolution of the oligarchic Boeotian Confederacy in 395 B.C. There may have been more than one form of oligarchic government. P implies that all of Boeotia was oligarchic (17.1) and Thucydides (3.62.3) suggests that Boeotia was a moderate oligarchy. It is
impossible to go any further without exhausting the available evidence.

20 *Hell. Oxy.* 16.2. It is unknown whether several of the larger villages had their own councils, but it is unlikely for the simple fact that the villages were probably too small to fulfill all the administrative requirements placed upon every local government by the federal Council.


21 *Hell. Oxy.* 16.2.


23 See Bruce, *op. cit.* (note 4) p. 158.

24 *Hell. Oxy.* 16.2.

25 Salmon, *op. cit.* (note 20) p. 66.

26 Bruce, *op. cit.* (note 4) pp. 103, 158.

27 J. A. O Larsen, *op. cit.* (note-17) p. 34; Salmon, *op. cit.* (note 20) p. 66.


29 P seems confused about the undoubtedly complicated division of powers in a two-level government of a federal state: even if he were—as argues S. Hornblower, *The Greek
World 479-323 BC (London, 1983) p. 85 -- a Boeotian, this might be understandable, and even more so if he were not. See Chapter One.

30 Buck, op. cit. (note 14) p. 150.


32 Cf. Dull, op. cit. (note 31) p. 98.

33 Hell. Oxy. 16.3.

Although P suggests (16.3) that the division was by πάντες οἱ τῆς χώρας οἰκονόμοι, it is likely that only those who met the hoplite census were to be considered.

35 Hell. Oxy. 16.3.

36 Pausanias 9.34.

37 Larsen, op. cit. (note 17) p. 35.

38 This figure is based on P's statement, 16.3, that the military force that could be levied from each district contained 1000 hoplites and 100 cavalrymen. Such a figure must be, if P's figure is correct, not an average contribution by a district, but the maximum number that the federal government could request from any district. If that is so, then an approximate figure can still be worked out.
for the number of full citizens within the Boeotian Confederacy. The number of actual enfranchised citizens in any district may have been no more than two to three times the figure given by P; this will give a figure of between 2,200 and 3,300 citizens of the hoplite class in each of the eleven federal districts. When this approximate figure is divided by the 60 federal councillors that every district sent to Thebes a ratio of between 36:1 and 55:1 is reached.

39 See below.

40 This fact does not invalidate the interpretation of changing boundaries above because the larger cities and their Χωραί would have a higher population density than the smaller ones.

41 Hell. Oxy. 16.3.

42 Using Wilamowitz's emendation. P's use of Hysiae instead of Hyettus is possibly an indication of his imperfectly remembered reliance on another's work on Boeotia and its political institutions. Dull's view that Hysiae, a village near the border with Attica, is actually meant (op. cit. note 31 pp. 105ff.) cannot be correct: Dull's line of argument is too extended, and he appears to make the suggestion as a weak argument for Theban domination of the districts.
Chaeronea seems to have been shifted from the military district of Orchomenus (Thuc. 4.76.3) to that in which P (16.3) records it. It is likely that the number of hoplites in Orchomenus had declined after the abortive democratic revolt in 424 (Thuc. 4.76) and that its population was swelled by the migration of some of the franchised citizens from Chaeronea.

Heli. Oxy. 16.3.

For an example of the military origin of such watchdog groups, although it is late, see Xenophon Heli. 3.4.2. when 30 Spartiates are sent as companions of Agesilaus on his expedition to Asia Minor.

See Bruce, op. cit. (note 4) pp. 108 and 159-160, for a recent synopsis of the interpretations of P's statement.

Thuc. 5.38.3.

Buck, op. cit. (note 14) p. 156.

Heli. Oxy. 16.3. The figures that P reports were no doubt constitutional limits on the troop-levying power of the federal government instead of an average of the maximum manpower, in hoplites and cavalrymen, which could be fielded by all the districts.
Examples of federal actions against cities in the period before 395 are: the garrisoning of Chaeronea and Siphae against democratic conspirators (Thuc. 4.90); and the destruction of the walls of Thespiae (Thuc. 4.133). In both cases the actions, whatever the actual motivations of the Thebans, were undertaken by the federal government in order to preserve the oligarchic control of those cities. See Dull, op. cit. (note 31) p. 62.

Buck, op. cit. (note 14) p. 155; and Dull, op. cit. (note 31) p. 82.


Hill, Oxy. 17.1.

Ibid. 16.1; 17.2.

Xen. Hell. 5.2.33-36.

Hill, Oxy. 17.1. I have used the word "movement" to translate the Greek μέρος instead of "faction" or "party" because "movement" gets across the idea present in P's description of the unification of various smaller groupings or factions under a broad-based coalition.

Cf. C.M. Calhoun, Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (Austin, 1913) passim for the workings of oligarchic clubs.
58 Hell. Oxy. 17.1.

59 Xen. Hell. 5.2.37.

60 Hell. Oxy. 18.1.

61 Ibid. 17.1; 18.1.

62 See Appendix One.


65 The family of Leontiades was probably aristocratic, and so too most of his supporters. See A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1945-81) vol. 2 pp. 3f.

66 Hell. Oxy. 17.3.

67 Interpreting P's statements at Hell. Oxy. 16.1 and 17.1-2.

68 Hell. Oxy. 17.2.

70 *Hell. Oxy.* 7.2...

71 Bruce, *op. cit.* (note 4) pp. 116f, to his credit as attempted to grapple with this problem.

72 *Hell. Oxy.* 18.1.

73 Xenophon *Hell.* 3.5.6.

74 Salmon, *op. cit.* (note 20) p. 66.

75 Examples are: Cloche, *op. cit.* (note 4) *passim,* (where he builds up an elaborate structure of conjectures on the state of political affairs in Thebes based upon the evidence of P and an analysis of the foreign policies and actions of Boeotia leading up to the domination of a war party in the Federal Council -- no doubt under the influence of the events of the First World War); Cook, *op. cit.* (note 4) *passim,* (who takes Cloche a step further by making the political *stasis* at Thebes a contest between a vehement nationalist party under Ismenias bent on foreign domination and an internationalist party under Leontiades); and Kagan, *op. cit.* (note 64) *passim,* (who applies this idea of domestic policy changes directly affecting a state's foreign policy to all the major Greek states).

77 See Chapter Three.
NOTES: CHAPTER THREE

1 See Appendix Two.


4 L. Moretti, Ricerche sulle leghe greche (Rome, 1962) p. 149.

5 The Boeotians may have been members of the Peloponnesians League at this time. See G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London, 1972) pp. 335-38, 342-45.


Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20-3.10; Diod. 14.3.4-6.

Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21-31. The use of the pretext of an insult to the dignity of a Spartan king was a favourite one among the Spartans when they decided on a course of war with another Greek state: compare the actions of Agesilaus at Aulis (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4 and 3.5.5.), and the refusal of sacrifice by the Athenians to King Cleomnes (Herod. 5.72) which was used as a pretext for declaring war on the Athenians (Herod. 5.74).

Thucydides 1.107-108.

*Hell. Oxy.* 7.2.


Adcock and Mosley, *op. cit.* (note 6) pp. 66, 137.

Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5.

Cf. H.W. Parke, "The Tithe of Apollo and the Harmost at Decelea, 413 to 404 B.C.*," *JHS* 52 (1932) 42-46.

The Spartan leader of allied troops may have always been granted the lion's share of any booty after a battle or, by extension, a war: Cf. Diod. 13.34.4.
19 Hell. Oxy. 17.2 seems to suggest that there was interference by Agis in the internal affairs of Thebes and the Federal Council there.

20 Xen. Hell. 2.3.1-3 and Dio Ch. 14.3.3-4.5.

21 Cast out of Scione by Lysander in 405/4 B.C. Cf. Xen. Hell. 2.1.2.

22 See below.

23 The strategic importance of Plataea to the Boeotian Confederacy can be seen in the attempt by the Boeotians to take Plataea before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.2.1).


25 Thuc. 4.99.

26 Cf. Xen. Hell. 2.3.14.


28 Justin 5.9.8. It was a diplomatic ruse. The Thirty still had the support of Sparta -- Athens was an ally of Sparta --, and any involvement by the Boeotian government in the supply of the Athenian democratic exiles would have been
tantamount to a declaration of war on Athens and would have drawn a Spartan response — perhaps an invasion to seize all the exiles which Boeotia was harbouring. Even harbouring the Athenian exiles was against the normal rule of international law (Cf. Diod. 14.87.1). The general practice in Greece, upon being asked to hand over exiles to their own states (Xen. Hell. 7.4.11), was either to hand them over, or to expel them, or to claim that they were resident by sanctuary.

29 Xen. Hell. 2.4.29-39.
30 Ibid. 3.5.5.
31 Ibid. 3.5.25.
32 See note 11 above.
33 See Appendix Two.
34 Xen. Hell. 3.2.25.
36 It is impossible to know what actions the Spartans may have taken against the Boeotians after their refusal to send troops on the two expeditions against Athens and Elis. There is no extant source that mentions enough to allow more than idle speculation.
See Appendix Two for a brief description of the chronological problem in dating the war against Elis.

Diod. 14.17.2-3; Theopomppus 115 F 13.

Thuc. 3.91; 4.91; 7.29.

The restored Athenian democracy's seizure of Eleusis and not the restoration of the democracy at Athens is, the probable chronological starting-point for P's eighth year (9.1).

Thuc. 3.92.

H.D. Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. (London, 1935) p. 51. Thessaly was a source of grain and large numbers of cavalry, and it would have been a dangerous enemy if ever unified.

Cyrus the Younger had been attempting to re-establish links with some of the old pro-Persian noble families in Thessaly in order to regain lost influence in Thessaly and Macedonia. He lent money and mercenaries to Aristippus in order to aid his faction in Thessaly (Xen. Ana. 1.1.10); and Clearchus was sent to "aid" the Greek settlers in the Hellespontine Chersonese against the Thracians (Xen. Ana. 1.1.9). Cyrus was killed before he could do anything further in Thessaly or other areas of north Greece. The re-established contacts could have been
put to use by Artaxerxes in order to weaken the Spartan attacks on Asia Minor through threats of Persian expansion in Macedonia and Thessaly.

44 Diod. 14.38.4-5; Polyaeus 2.21.

45 Thuc. 3.92-93.

46 Cf. the Celtic invasion of Greece: Paus. 10.20.9-22.8.

47 Which is probably the reason that the Boeotians garrisoned Heracleia with 1000 troops in 420 B.C. (Diod. 12.77.1).

48 See note 43.

49 The saying attributed to Lysander (Plut. Lys. 22.4 and Mor. 229c) concerning whether he should march with spears raised or lowered through Boeotia, which H.D. Westlake, "The Sources for the Spartan Debacle at Haliartus," Phoenix 39 (1985) 126, attributes to the invasion of Boeotia in 395 B.C., fits better the comparatively peaceful transit of the expedition of Herippidas in 399 B.C. The saying may be the vestige of a tradition that Lysander accompanied Herippidas to Heracleia.

50 As may be deduced from the actions of Dercylidas in Thrace and the presence of a Spartan garrison at Pharsalus in 394 B.C. (Diod. 14.82.6).
51 Xen. Hell. 3.1.1 and Diod. 14.19.4-5.

52 Xen. Hell. 3.1.3-5 and Diod. 14.35.6-36.1.

53 Diod. 14.39.1; Xen. Hell. 3.4.1. It is unlikely that the fleet would have been a threat to Spartan naval dominance of the Aegean Sea until the latter part of 394 or 393, given the length of time it usually took for a Persian fleet to be built and manned (Cf. Diod. 14.98.3, where Artaxerxes ordered a fleet to be prepared against Evagoras of Cyprus. The action took three to four years to complete, Diod. 14.110.5). In 397 B.C. the Persian fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean was weak because of a loss of 50 ships to Egypt in 400 (Diod. 14.35.3-5 and 19.5).

54 Xen. Hell. 3.4.3.

55 Ibid. 3.5.5.

56 Pausanias 3.9.3.

57 Thuc. 3.68.3: The Spartan judges are said to have confiscated the land and let it out for ten years to the Thebans. Because they settled the Plataeans in 386 B.C. at Plataea, it is possible that the Spartans probably claimed de jure control over the lands of Plataea even in 396 B.C.

58 Aulis: Xen. Hell. 3.4.3-4; Plut. Aegis. 6.4-6; and Diod. 14.79.1.
59 Xen. Hell. 3.4.2; Hell. Oxy. 6.1-8.2

60 The East or Opuntian Locrians and the Phocians had been hostile to each other since at least the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides mentions that in 418/17 B.C. the Locrians had been badly defeated by the Phocian Confederacy and suffered severe losses (Thuc. 5.32.2; Diod. 12.80.4-5). Gomme believes that the Locrians referred to by Thucydides are the Opuntian or Eastern Locrians as opposed to the Western Locrians (Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides vol. 2, p. 11). When Aegina assembled a fleet in 413 B.C. from contributions of the allies Locris and Phocis were to contribute 15 triremes together (Thuc. 8.3). This reference may suggest that Phocis dominated East Locris in 413, or that there was a Spartan imposed armistice (cf. Hell. Oxy. 18.3 where there is an arbitration of the border dispute) which broke down by 396/5 B.C.


It is not possible to believe P's statement (18.2) what the dispute was between the Western Locrians and the Phocians, even though Pausanias supports him (3.9.9). Xenophon refers to the Opuntian Locrians (Xen. Hell. 3.5.3), and I must agree with Lerat (op. cit. II p. 43) that Xenophon's version is more credible. P and Pausanias (who is probably following Theopompus here) may have confused the
later troubles of the Third Sacred War and the Amphissian War with the situation that existed between the Locrians and the Phocians in the period down to 395 B.C. The Phocians probably were not in conflict with Amphissa or the rest of West Locris over any tract of land on the slopes of Mt. Parnassus, because that area of West Locris bordered on the state of Delphi not Phocis (Lerat, *ibid.*). Opuntian Locris had a past history of warfare with Phocis, whereas nothing is known of such antagonism between Phocis and West Locris. Thucydides (3.101.2) refers to the fear of Amphissa of making enemies of Phocis, when the Spartan Eurylochus was marching through West Locris on his way to attack Naupactus. The reference does not fit, nor can it be made to fit, the theory that Amphissa and Phocis had a long standing dispute over a common march region; rather, it is best to interpret Thucydides' *Hera* as referring to the desire of the Amphissians to maintain a form of cautious neutrality with both sides in the Peloponnesian War in order to preserve their territory from the ravages of the war.

The Phocians had little to worry about with regard to the West Locrians. If Amphissa is any example, much of West Locris was rather cool towards Athenian control of Naupactus and to any alliance with Athens. The East Locrians were probably more of a threat to the Phocians. While still nominally allies both the Phocians and the East Locrians had fought a pitched battle. The Opuntians had been interested
in the unification of the two states of Locris since about 475 B.C. They participated in the colonization of Naupactus before it was taken over by the Athenians in approximately 460 (Thuc. 1.103.3) as is seen by the surviving inscription from Galaxidi (Meiggs-Lewis no. 20). At the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans may well have reawakened feelings for unification among the Eastern Locrians by their expulsion of the Messenians from Naupactus and the return of the city to the Locrians (14.34.2). The Opuntian Locrians may have begun aiding their western cousins to build up a strong federation along the lines of their own. The Phocians would have been worried by the potential threat of a strengthened dual-Locris seeking to expand at the expense of the Phocians towns between.

62 J.A.O. Larsen, Greek Federal States (Oxford, 1968) p. 41, mentions that Strabo (9.416, 424f, 426) talks of Daphnus as having once been in the possession of the Phocians, who occupied it, according to Larsen, to defend themselves from incursions by the Thessalians.

63 Ibid. p. 41.

64 To judge by the rapid Spartan response to a request for aid by the Phocians. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.5.4-5.

65 Xen. Hell. 3.5.3; Hell. Oxy. 18.2.

66 Hell. Oxy. 18.5; Xen. Hell. 3.5.4 and Paus. 3.9.10.

Hell. Oxy. 18.5 suggests that the Boeotians returned to Boeotia by way of East Locris.

The date of the campaign is uncertain -- it should be dated to the late spring to early summer of 395.

Xen.Hell. 3.5.1-2. P seems to have placed the mission of Timocrates before the battle of Sardis and under the auspices of Pharnabazus instead of Tithraustes (Hell. Oxy. 7.5). Xenophon is probably correct against P. He had Spartans sources for the trial of Ismenias in 382 B.C., where the bribery was one of several charges brought against him. Pausanias (3.9.8), who is probably following here Theopompus' version, supports Xenophon's version. Plutarch (Arax. 20.3.4) suggests that the bribery mission had the approval of Artaxerxes. Polyaenus (1.48.3) cannot be used to support P's view -- it seems to be derived from P.

The mission of Timocrates fits well with Tithraustes' powers, it does not with those of Pharnabazus. Although Pharnabazus was appointed by the Persian King to build up the fleet and given monies to accomplish that task (Diod. 14.39.1), it is unlikely that he could either spare the 50 talents worth of gold for the bribe or that he would have promised further support from Artaxerxes at a time when Tissaphernes was the only Persian who could negotiate for the King (Xen. Hell. 3.2.13,20). It was only after the
arrival of Tithraustes at Sardis in 395 B.C. that Pharnabazus could have been in a position to act on his own initiative. P's dating and sponsorship of the mission of Timocrates must, therefore, be considered as suspect.

71 He was the chiliarchus (Nepos, Conon 3.2) or the highest official of Artaxxes, and probably a descendant of one of the six Persian nobles who helped Darius the Great (Herod. 3.70 and 84), or a bastard brother or cousin of Artaxerxes or of Darius II.

72 So Xen. Hell. 3.4.25 can be interpreted.

73 Tithraustes seems to have been authorized by Artaxerxes to act in his stead in the negotiations with the Spartans (Xen. Hell. 3.4.25).

74 The connection between Xen. Hell. 3.5.1 ὁ μέντος Τιθραύστης and 3.5.3 κυνῳδοίτες δὲ οἱ...προεστώτες can be interpreted in one of two ways: (1) as the listing by Xenophon, in a direct and sequential chronological order, of the events that lead to the outbreak of the Corinthian War; and (2) a non-chronological listing of the causes of the war running from general to specific. The second interpretation would make the δὲ in 3.5.3 equivalent to a co-ordinating conjunction, much like the Latin item. Xenophon, then, could be interpreted as progressing through a list of causes he feels led to the Corinthian War: first, hatred of
Spartan rule; second, the bribes offered by Timocrates; then the actual *casus belli*, the Phocian-Locrian border war. In other words, Xenophon may not always keep to a strict chronological sequence when dealing with causation.

75 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6.


77 The Spartans could not have failed to see the change in Athenian attitude towards a subservient role under their hegemony. Cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 6 and 7.1.

78 See N.G.L. Hammond, "The Main Road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese through the Northern Megarid," *BSA* 49 (1954) 103-122.

79 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.19; Diod. 14.81.2; Paus. 9.32.5; and Plut. *Lys.* 28.5. See Westlake, *op. cit.* (note 48) pp. 119-33.

80 By holding the temple of Itonian Athena during the approaching festival of Pamboeotia the Spartans would have won a propaganda victory against the Boeotian Confederacy, by showing that its federal government was too weak even to assure the safety of its people in the annual celebration of Boeotia's unity.
81 Xen. Hell. 3.5.22.

82 Andocides 2.20.

83 Xen. Hell. 3.5.1; Hell. Oxy 7.2,7.3, and 17.1; Pausanias 3.5.1.

84 If Tithraustes sent Timocrates to Greece shortly after he arrived in Sardis, the Rhodian probably arrived shortly after the Boeotians invaded Phocias. This causes no great problem with the bribes being seen as a major cause of the Corinthian War, if it is realized that those bribes probably were accepted by the politicians of Argos and Corinth (and perhaps of Athens) before the Spartan invasion of Boeotia and the defeat of Lysander at Haliartus.

85 See note 57.

86 Xen. Hell. 3.5.6.

87 The Spartans had bottled up Conon in Caria and Rhodes; and with the subordination of the navarchy under the direct control of Agesilaus (Xen. Hell. 3.4.27-29) the Spartans may have felt that their prospects were good of crushing the Persian naval presence in the Aegean.

88 Xen. Hell. 3.5.5.


90 Andocides 2.20.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


"The Four Senates of the Boeotians", CP 10 (1915) 381-385.


Bruce, I.A.F. *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'*. Cambridge, 1967.


Calhoun, C.M. *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*. Austin, 1913.


_________. "Les Helleniques de Xenophon et Lacedemone", *REA* 46 (1944) 12-46.

_________. "La politique thebaïne de 404 à 396 av. J.-C.", *REG* 31 (1918) 315-348.


Cook, Margaret L. *Boeotia in the Corinthian War: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*. Diss. Univ. of Washington, 1981.


De Sanctis, G. "L'Attide di Androzione e un papiro di Oxyrhynchos," *Scritti Minori* III. Rome, 1972, pp. 7-.


Drews, R. "Diodorus and his Sources", *AJP* 83 (1962) 383-392.

___ "Ephorus and History Written kata genos", *AJP* 84 (1963) 244-255.


Gartner, H. "Ephorus", KP ii. 299-301.


"History of Sicyon", The Oxyrhynchus Papyri 11 (1915) 107, no. 1365.

"Theopompus (or Cratippus), Hellenica", The Oxyrhynchus Papyri 5 (1908) 110-242, no. 842.


"The Main Road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese through the Northern Megarid", BSA 49 (1954) 103-122.


Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. II. Berlin, 1926.


McKaye, K.L. "The Oxyrhynchus Historian and the Outbreak of the 'Corinthian War'", CR n.s. 3 (1953) 6-7.


Schwartz, E. "Diodorus", *RE V* 633-704.


APPENDIX ONE
THE IDENTITY OF P

Gomme has pointed to the utter futility of attributing the fragments of the *Hellenica* *Oxyrhynchia* to either Theopompus, Ephorus, Cratippus or Daemachus; he suggests, instead, that it is more sound to treat the work of P as that of an unknown author. Such an argument would be most laudable, if it were not vitiated by continued views of the work of P that are not based upon evidence of the work itself. All too often those who claim that P is an unknown author are the same ones who attempt to treat his work as a history second only to that of Thucydides. They tacitly refuse to apply the same critical methods to P as they do to all the other historical sources for the fourth century B.C. Yet the work, as we possess it, is in a such a fragmentary state that all those who place too much trust in its author leave themselves open to the possibility that their trust may be misplaced. P's work is used to attack the reliability and veracity of Xenophon's *Hellenica*. P's interpretation of both the political events and the constitutional framework of Boeotia has been accepted as accurate, though it may be in error. A criterion for dealing with the fragments of P has, after some seventy-five years, yet to be adequately worked out. The attribution of the work to an anonymous author allows those who support its great historiographical worth to continue to leave
unexamined any biases and misconceptions they may possess about the nature of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, its author's critical acumen, and, ultimately, the usefulness of much of Diodorus Siculus' history -- since it is based in some manner on the work of P.¹³

Since Bloch's article on P,⁴ the general opinion on the authorship and the date of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* has remained unchanged. Bloch holds that P is not to be connected with either Ephorus or Theopompus; but it may be Chatippus; and his history was probably written in that of Xenophon.⁵

The nature of the debate, however, has changed once more with the discovery of a third fragment of the history of P.⁶ Once again there has arisen controversy over the identity of P: G.A. Lehmann and his circle in Germany have resurrected the theory that P is Theopompus.⁷ Yet this renewed debate continues heedless of the problems that have plagued any interpretation of the work of P and of his identity: the unacknowledged biases of the commentators and their misinterpretations of the evidence.

The three fragments of the Oxyrhynchus Historian that have been discovered and published are enough to allow a rough definition of the scope and quality of his complete work.

Although the fragments found of P are only from a history of Greece, a *Hellenica*, that does not *ipso facto*
mean that the entire historical work of P was only a
Hellenica or that it could only be a Hellenica taking as its
starting point the end of Thucydides' history. P could have
equally written a universal history, and the portions that
we possess today would then be from two distinct books of a
much larger work that may have dealt with the history of
Magna Graecia and other areas of the then known world. In
other words, the exact nature of P's history is still
unknown.

On internal evidence the work of P could have been
written between 394 and 330 B.C.,⁸ but the best time period
would be towards the latter date.⁹

The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is written in a pure Attic
which is best dated to the last quarter of the fourth
century B.C.¹⁰ The work was probably written for an
Athenian audience because there is some evidence of
Athenocentricity¹¹ — though the author himself need not
have been a native Athenian.¹² There is a noticeable lack
of any complicated rhetorical device, except for a fondness
for avoiding hiatus.¹³ Yet the style of P is dull and
repetitive.¹⁴ There is tendency to digression combined with
a wealth of detail.¹⁵ It seems that P's style was
appreciated enough for Polybius to copy it later.¹⁶

There are several references within the digressions in
the London fragment of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia to
historical events that may be helpful in establishing
termini for dating the portions of the composition that we possess. The mention of the Boeotian constitution by P suggest that he was writing after — if not well after — the dissolution of the Oligarchic Boeotian Confederacy in 386 B.C. 17 There are other references to a period later than that which P is writing about. The most important is the comment by P that the Persian king was still alive at the time of his composition. 18 This gives a terminus ante quem of no later than the arrival in Athens of the first dispatches concerning the death of Darius III sometime in 330. More attention is usually given to P's mention, in the present tense, of the border problems between the Phocians and the Locrians. 19 It has been suggested since Grenfell and Hunt 20 that P could not have written this portion of his work later than 346 B.C. because the Phocians were destroyed in that year. But that is not true: the Phocians were forced to surrender to Philip of Macedon in 346 B.C. and there was hardship for the people; 21 the Phocian votes on the Amphictyonic Council were given to Philip, but Phocia did not disappear as a political entity — even when Demosthenes bewails the sufferings of the Phocians 22 he speaks of that people as still surviving. The Phocians, contrary to the views of Grenfell and Hunt 23 (and many since them), were rearmed and allies of the Athenians and Boeotians shortly before 338 B.C. 24 P's reference to Phocian-Locrian border skirmishes as still occurring in his
own day does not, then, give a precise terminus ante quem, and it cannot be used to date the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. Nor is the argument valid that, because no mention is made by P of the Third Sacred War when he discusses the Phocians, the work had to have been completed by 356 B.C.25

P mentions Thucydides by name in the Florence fragment26 but, since the styles and historiographical methods of the two authors are not similar, all that can be said is that P had read Thucydides, and wrote after Thucydides' work had been published. It cannot be substantiated by internal evidence alone that P intended his own work to be a continuation of Thucydides' history or that he used the point at which Thucydides' narration breaks off as his own starting point27 -- however inviting that hypothesis may be. P refers to certain unnamed individuals, probably historians and antiquarians, when he criticizes their views about the causation of the Corinthian War.28 Though it has been doubted29, P is probably speaking about Xenophon's interpretation of the start of the Corinthian War. If P had indeed read the *Hellenica* of Xenophon there would be a terminus post quem for the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* of about the mid-350s, based on the date of Xenophon's *Hellenica*.30

The Oxyrhynchus Historian does not seem to have much grasp of the intricacies of the internal political situation in Boeotia and Thebes. He appears to extrapolate from the
well known political stasis in Thebes of 382, when he analyzes the state of affairs in Boeotia in 395. In addition, P does not seem to understand that causation in political affairs exists in many other ways than merely in personal motives. He confounds immediate causes and pretexts, not realizing, as does Xenophon, that often the pretexts given for an action are more valuable clues into the ultimate causes of a state's actions than a simple listing of the immediate and often obvious causes. This turn of mind that P exhibits in his political analysis makes it likely that he was writing his work in the second half of the fourth century -- when such superficial historiography was developing.

There is no evidence, then, but it seems that the extant fragments of P's history can be dated within a span of twenty-five years from about 355 to 330 B.C.

It cannot be proved with any degree of certainty, but, on dating alone, it is reasonable to ascribe the work of P to a well known historian who was at Athens in the circle of Isocrates. There are at least two candidates: Theopompus and Ephorus. The possibility of dating the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia to a period as late as 330 B.C. eliminates a great deal of opposition to identifying Ephorus as the Oxyrhynchus Historian. Most scholars favor a date for P which is too early given the internal evidence. As Bloch points out, it is impossible for those who date the work
of P to before 356 B.C. to see P as Ephorus because of the fact that Ephorus wrote his 20th book of his history after the publication date of Callisthenes' Hellenica, c. 343-335 B.C. But if the work of P is dated as suggested above there is no chronological difficulty in postulating that Ephorus wrote the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. As Walker, a supporter for the identification of P with Ephorus, has pointed out, only two major objections stand against the consideration of Ephorus as the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia: his method of composition kata genos, and the scale of his universal history.

As to the scale of Ephorus' work, there is not enough known about the degree of detail of the later books of his history to make an argument for or against the equation of Ephorus and P. The most difficult obstacle facing anyone who wishes to see P as Ephorus is the fact that Ephorus, according to Diodorus, arranged his material kata genos for each book that he wrote. No one quite knows what Diodorus means. It is, however, unlikely that the phrase means that Ephorus wrote his history without regard for chronological connection of events, but rather, that he arranged his material by gene or geographical regions: writing distinct Hellenica, Macedonica, Sicilia, Persica within his universal history. The method of chronology that P uses is synchronistic and follows a scheme that divides the year into "winters" and "summers." Some
believe that P's system of chronology is not reflected in the episodic nature of Ephorus' method of arranging his material; and that it is not possible to equate the two authors for that reason. The entire issue of Ephorus' method of chronology should be re-examined.

It is likely that the latest opinion of Ephorus' system of arranging events will prevail: he divided the known world into regions which allowed him to describe fully a sequence of related events in one region without the need to break up the relationship between those events by having to make the shift from one region to another. Within one genos, however, it was possible for Ephorus to use a precise synchronistic chronology along the lines of P or Thucydides. It is then not detrimental to the case for equating Ephorus and P that Ephorus was said to have arranged his facts kata genos. Our fragments from P are all from what can be termed a Hellenica, and the method of chronology used is synchronistic. Ephorus may have used such a system of chronology within each genos; it is, therefore, not possible to use the matter of P's method of chronology to argue against the equation of P with Ephorus.

There are further arguments based on perceived mannerisms of style for and against the Oxyrhynchus Historian being Ephorus. Ephorus can still be seen as a likely candidate for the authorship of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, even in the face of the opinions of Grenfell
and Hunt\textsuperscript{43} and more recently of Bloch.\textsuperscript{44} The arguments used by these scholars are not convincing enough on their own to eliminate the possibility that there is a direct connection between Ephorus and P which cannot be explained as the later use of P's work by Ephorus.\textsuperscript{45}

It is possible, then, that the \textit{Hellenica Oxyrhynchia} is a portion of the \textit{Histories} of Ephorus. In the past Ephorus has not been felt to be a viable candidate for the authorship of the fragments of P. Most scholars have followed Bloch's belief that there is no need even to consider Ephorus as a candidate for P.\textsuperscript{46} If P, however, is Ephorus, much of the present acceptance of the high quality of P as a source must be re-examined.
NOTES: APPENDIX ONE


2 See Chapters One to Three for more details on P's potential errors.

3 B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt, "Theopompus (or Cratippus), Hellenica," The Oxyrhynchus Papyri 5 (1908) 143.


8 Grenfell and Hunt, *op. cit.* (note 3) p. 122.

9 See below.


11 Although it is indirect or obscured by lacunae: P's digression about Ismenias' reason for aiding the Athenian exiles seems to be slanted to draw a response of indignation from an Athenian audience at a time of political tension between Athens and Thebes (*Hell. Oxy.* 17.1). And P's level of knowledge about the political language of Athens—probably of his own day and not the situation in 395—suggests that he wrote at least this portion of his work for an Athenian audience.

12 Many writers at Athens were not born or raised there: men such as Herodotus, Ephorus, and Theopompus.

13 Grenfell and Hunt, *op. cit.* (note 3) p. 124. This avoidance of hiatus was a popular rhetorical device among the school of Isocrates.


16 Grenfell and Hunt, *op. cit.* (note 3) p. 142.
17 Bruce, op. cit. (note 5) p. 103; Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 3) p. 122. The Confederacy ended in 386 B.C., although local oligarchic government at Thebes lasted until 379 B.C.

18 Hell. Oxy. 19.2.

19 Ibid. 18.3-4.

20 Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 3) p. 122; Bruce, op. cit. (note 5) p. 119.

21 Diód. 16.60; Paus. 10.3.8. Cf. Aeschines 2.9; Justin 8.5. A modern parallel is not hard to find: the similarity of Phocis with Germany in 1919 is striking — undergoing disarmament, war reparations, and famine.

22 Demosthenes 9.26; 19.81 and 141.

23 Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 3) p. 122.

24 Paus. 10.3.3.


26 Hell. Oxy. 2.1.

27 A hypothesis which started with Grenfell and Hunt, op. cit. (note 3) pp. 121f.

28 Hell. Oxy. 7.2.
29 Grenfell and Hunt, *op. cit.* (note 3) p. 205.


31 See Chapter Two.


34 Bloch, *op. cit.* (note 4) p. 323.


36 V. Bartoletti, ed. *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Leipzig, 1959) p. xxi, believes that Ephorus would not have had the space in a book of his history for an account of 396/5 as detailed as that of P; while Barber, *op. cit.* (note 15) p. 55, thinks that both P and Ephorus were equally detailed.

37 Diod. 5.1.4 = Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker* 70 Ephorus T 11.
38 Grenfell and Hunt, *op. cit.* (note 3) p. 127.

39 R. Drews, "Ephorus and History Written *kata genos*", *AJP* 84 (1963) 244-255.

40 Grenfell and Hunt, *op. cit.* (note 3) p. 121.


APPENDIX TWO
CHRONOLOGY

There is not enough evidence available to give more than the most cursory of summaries of the period 405 to 395 B.C. With such a paucity of information, questions of chronology do occur. This appendix is an attempt to give the reader the broadest outline of the history of Boeotia during the ten-year period, and it will also be an attempt to point out areas of chronological uncertainty.

After the battle of Aegospotami, which occurred in the fall of 405 B.C., Athenian surrender was predictable. Athens was besieged throughout the winter of 405/4 and soon sued for peace. At the assembly of the Peloponnesian allies to discuss terms for surrender of the Athenians, the Boeotians supported the minority desire that Athens be destroyed. The Spartans, supported by the majority of their allies, made a conditional peace with the Athenians in the spring of 404; the peace led to the rise of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens.

The Boeotians then asked the Spartans for a share of the tithe of the booty to Apollo from the Decelean War. The attitude of the Boeotians towards their hegemon was no longer one of subservience. The Boeotians began to give aid and shelter to the Athenian democrates exiled by the Thirty. This action culminated in Boeotian logistical support for
the seizure of Phyle by Thrasybulus in the winter of 404/3 B.C. 8

The Spartans sent first Lysander, 9 then King Pausanias 10 to put down the civil war that had broken out at Athens. The Boeotians, together with the Corinthians, refused to send military detachments to help the Spartans in their campaign. 11 By late 403 B.C. there was an end to the civil war through the means of a Spartan-engineered amnesty between the various factions at Athens. 12

Not much is known about events in Sparta, Athens or Boeotia in the years 403/2 to 402/1 B.C. Sometime during this period the Athenians took Eleusis from the extreme oligarchs who had moved there as part of the settlement of 403. 13 The Boeotians, for their part, seized Oropus after a period of stasis in that city. 14 Both events may have occurred in the same year. 15 During the same period, the Spartans drove the pro-Athenian Messenian garrisons from Cephalenia and Naupactus and returned the two places to their previous inhabitants. 16

Sometime between 402 and 399 B.C. the Spartans began to wage war on Elis, their nominal ally. 17 The Boeotians and Corinthians once again refused to send military aid to the Spartans when had been requested. 18 At the end of the third campaigning season, King Agis of Sparta died and his brother, Agesilaus, was named his successor. 19
In 401/400 B.C. the Spartans sent aid to the Persian Cyrus the Younger in his attempt to topple his brother King Artaxerxes. The attempt failed; and the Spartans by 400/399 were asked for aid by the Ionian cities that were being forced under Persian control by Tissaphernes, the chief satrap in Asia Minor. In the spring of 399 B.C. the Spartans reacted to the pleas and sent Thibron to Asia Minor to make war on the Persians.

In the same year, in the archonship of Aristocrates, the Spartans sent Herippidas and an army, presumably through Boeotia, to restore order in their colony at Heracleia in Trachis.

After some minor successes, Thibron was replaced by Dercylidas in the spring of 398 B.C. Dercylidas made a pact with Tissaphernes not to attack his lands, and attacked instead the satrapy of Pharnabazus.

In the spring of 397 B.C. Dercylidas' campaigning forced the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus finally to co-operate. Later that year Tissaphernes and Dercylidas made a truce to allow peace discussions. The time was used by Artaxerxes to start to build a fleet in the Mediterranean, which he placed under the admiralship of Pharnabazus.

During the truce, news arrived at Sparta of a Persian naval buildup at Tyre and Sidon. The Spartans believed that the Persian ships were to be used to seize control of
the Aegean; and so a new expedition was formed against the Persians by the Spartans, to be led by King Agesilaus. Sometime in the late summer of 397 Conon, the vice-admiral of the Persians in charge of a small fleet of Cyprian ships, sailed to Caunus in Cilicia. He there commenced operations against the Spartans.

In the winter of 397 the Boeotians refused to join the expedition of Agesilaus and sent home the Spartan envoy who brought the request. The Spartans sent an embassy to Egypt to make an alliance with the pharaoh against the Persians.

Agesilaus, while his forces gathered at Gerastus, visited Aulis in the spring of 396 B.C. and tried to make a sacrifice. The Boeotians, claiming that he was violating local religious custom, drove Agesilaus from the temple.

At about the same time the Athenians began sending private aid to Conon, who was besieged at Caunus by the Spartan navy. The siege was later broken by the arrival of further aid from Pharnabazus.

Once in Asia Minor Agesilaus made a truce with Tissaphernes, which was used by both sides to increase their armaments. Tissaphernes was the first to break the truce, and then Agesilaus pillaged Phrygia. That winter Agesilaus prepared for further operations against the Persians.
In the spring of 395 B.C. Conon received a large reinforcement of ships from Phoenicia. Then Rhodes, which had revolted from the Spartans, took in Conon. Agesilaus, in the same spring, attacked Tissaphernes and defeated his army at Sardis. Shortly after the battle Tithraustes arrived, a high official sent by Artaxerxes, in order to kill Tissaphernes and to set the Persian efforts against the Spartans on a sounder footing. Tithraustes made a truce with Agesilaus; and he then sent Timocrates with 50 talents to bribe the leaders of various Greek cities to agitate for war against Sparta. In Central Greece a border war had developed between East Locris and Phocis. The Boeotians decided to send a force into Phocis to help their allies the Locrians. The Phocians requested aid from Sparta. The Spartans agreed to support the Phocians; and they sent Lysander to Phocis to raise an army to attack Boeotia from the north; and Pausanias summoned contingents for an army to invade Boeotia from the south. The Boeotians sought help from the Athenians; and both states made a defensive alliance.

In August or September Lysander caused the Orchomenians to secede from the Boeotian Confederacy and then marched into Boeotia. At Haliartus, he was killed and his army defeated by the Boeotians. Pausanias, when he arrived at Haliartus, made a truce with the Boeotians and retreated northwards into Phocis.
By at least this time Timocrates had arrived in Greece and his bribes were accepted by the politicians of Boeotia, Athens, Corinth and Argos who pressed for an alliance of their states against Sparta. In the winter of 395 B.C. there was a congress of the Boeotians, Athenians, Argives and the Corinthians at Corinth, where it was decided to join forces against Sparta.
NOTES: APPENDIX TWO

1 Xen. Hell. 2.1.22-29; Diod. 13.106.1-7; Plut. Lys. 11.


4 Xen. Hell. 2.2.19; Plut. Lys. 15.2-3. Cf. Paus. 3.8.6; Andoc. Pace 21; and Justin 5.8.4.

5 Xen. Hell. 2.2.20; Diod. 13.107.4; Plut. Lys. 14.4 to 15.2.

6 Xen. Hell. 2.3.1 ff; Diod. 14.1.2, 14.2.3; Plut. Lys. 15.5. For a modern study on the Thirty see P. Krentz, The Thirty at Athens (Ithaca, 1982).

7 Xen. Hell. 3.5.5; Plut. Lys. 27.2; Justin 5.8.4. This probably occurred sometime in the fall of 404, based on the sequence of events given by Justin.

8 Xen. Hell. 2.4.2; Diod. 14.32.1; Plut. Lys. 21.2, 27.3-4; Justin 5.9.5-6.

9 Xen. Hell. 2.4.29; Diod. 14.33.5; Plut. Lys. 21.2; Lysias 12.60.
10 Xen. **Hell.** 2.4.29; Diod. 14.33.6; Plut. **Lys.** 21.3; Paus. 3.5.1.

11 Xen. **Hell.** 2.4.30.

12 **Ibid.** 2.4.35-38.

13 Xen. **Hell.** 2.4.43. Underhill, *op. cit.* (note 2) p. lxxxiv.

14 Diod. 14.17.1-3 which he dates to 402/1, but would fit better in 401/0 B.C.; and Theopompus FGrH 115 F 12.

15 See Chapter Three.

16 Diod. 14.34.2-3.

17 Xen. **Hell.** 3.2.21-31; Diod. 14.17.6-17; Paus. 3.8.3-5. There are severe problems in dating the year of the first campaign into Elis and in identifying the Spartan king who led the invasions -- Xenophon states that it was Agis, while Diodorus claims that it was Pausanias. See Underhill, *op. cit.* (note 2) pp. xliii-xliv; and Margaret Cook, *Boeotia in the Corinthian War: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Diss. Univ. of Washington, 1981) pp. 540-55.

18 Xen. **Hell.** 3.2.25.

19 Between 399 and 396 B.C. Xen. **Hell.** 3.3.1-4; Plut. **Lys.** 22.3.

Xen. Hell. 3.1.3; Diod. 14.26.4, 27.3, 35.2.

Xen. Hell. 3.1.4-5; Diod. 14.36.1.

Diod. 14.38.4-5.

Xen. Hell. 3.1.8; Diod. 14.38.2.


Xen. Hell. 3.2.13; Diod. 14.39.4-5.

Xen. Hell. 3.2.20; Diod. 14.39.6 who in error makes Pharnabazus, and not Tissaphernes, the chief Persian negotiator.


Xen. Hell. 3.4.1; Plut. Ages. 6.1; Justin 2.1. The Persian naval buildup was probably at Tyre or Sidon since the lord of Sidon was leading the Phoenician contingent of the Persian fleet in 395 (Diod. 14.79.8; Hell. Oxy. 9.2).

Xen. Hell. 3.4.2; Diod. 14.79.1; Plut. Lys. 23, Ages. 6.1; Paus. 3.9.1; Justin 2.4.

Diod. 14.39.4, which seems wrongly placed in Diodorus' chronology.
32 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3; Paus. 3.9.3.

33 Paus. 3.9.3.

34 Diod. 14.79.4.

35 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4; Diod. 14.79.1; Plut. *Lys.* 27.1, *Ages.* 6.5-6; Paus. 3.9.4-5.

36 *Hell.* Oxy. 7.1.


39 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5.

40 *Ibid.* 3.4.6, 12.


43 Diod. 14.79.6.
44 Xen. Hell. 3.4.22-24; Diod. 14.80.1-5; Hell. Oxy. 11.1-5; Plut. Ages. 10.1-4; Polyaeus 2.1.9.

45 Xen. Hell. 3.4.25; Diod. 14.80.6-8; Plut. Ages. 10.4, Artax. 20.3; Paus. 3.9.7; Polyaeus 7.16.1.

46 Xen. Hell. 3.4.26; Diod. 14.80.8; Plut. Ages. 10.4-5.

47 Xen. Hell. 3.5.1-2; Plut. Ages. 15.6, Mor. 211b; Paus. 3.9.8; Polyaeus 1.48.3. See Chapter Three.

48 Xen. Hell. 3.5.3; Paus. 3.9.9; Hell. Oxy. 18.2-3; Diod. 14.81.1.

49 Xen. Hell. 3.5.4; Paus. 3.9.10; Hell. Oxy. 18.3-5; Plut. Lys. 27.2; Diod. 14.81.1.

50 Xen. Hell. 3.5.4; Paus. 3.9.10.

51 Xen. Hell. 3.5.6; Diod. 14.81.1; Plut. Lys. 28.1; Paus. 3.5.3.

52 Xen. Hell. 3.5.6; Diod. 14.81.1 Plut. Lys. 28.2.

53 Xen. Hell. 3.5.7; Diod. 14.81.2.

55 Xen. Hell. 3.5.18; Diod. 14.81.2; Plut. Lys. 28.5;
Paus. 3.5.3, 9.23.5.

56 Xen. Hell. 3.5.23; Diod. 14.81.3; Plut. Lys. 29.2;
Paus. 3.5.5-6.

57 See Chapter Three.

58 Diod. 14.82.1-3.